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5/29/1968 - The Non-Agreement in Action: Sino-Japanese Trade by Anthony R. Dicks

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS IO B Chatham Road Kowloon Hong Kong May ARD The Non Agreement Action Sino Japanese Trade Nr Richard H Nolte Institute Current World Affairs Madison Avenue New York N Y lOO17 Dear Nr Nolte Westerners reason another occasion closely Chinese whether traditional modern first struck apparent legal system which confronts The whole areas social activity legal regulation pronounced looseness drafting statutes applicable other areas absence detailed prescriptions civil crininal procedure evaluation evidence reluctance invoke fgrmal processes where informal means scial regulation suffice these other features Chinese impression vagueness softness contrasted sharp definition which theoret ically desired usually estern wyers It would great mistake though associate these characteristics conceptual imprecision thinking Chinese lawyers thinking Chinese about On contrary Chinese jurisprudence always characterized On occasion exquisite subtlety precision definition interpretation which combined latent ambiguity Chinese language produce remarkable results required Ny recent superficial contact legal world Japan suggests subtlety matched outshone niceties Japanese juris prudence various societal requirements which underlie I constantly reminded differences their modern political social countries heirs overlapping legal tradition The question leave document familiar draftsmen world perhaps Far E understood Together capacity subtle definition calculated imprecision mention patient tortuous negotiation skill effective sides recent Sino Japanese trade negotiations which concluded signing joint memorandum communique Peking March Both first major international transaction which China party since upheavals Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution indeed demonstration highly effective international bargaining mechanism could emerge unscathed thoseupheavals study resolution common interests against mounting conflicts deteriorating relationship between countries these negotiations arrangements which deserve attention In political economic spheres these arrangements great importance because beginning prospects agreeme governmental trade seemed bleak The reasons situation scarcely understood without account history Sino Japanese trade recent years In absence recognition Chinese Government Japan there course governmental relations between countries Indeed Chinese negotiators opportunity reminding Japanese particularly awkward moment February there Chinese still legally state between China Japan Trade therefore carried unofficial governmental basis concurrence covert participation Japanese Chinese Government Until trade largely carried Japanese firms dealing directly Chinese import export corporations first comprehensive agreement being signed between Chinese Japanese industrial commercial circles In terms overall figures period substantial trade might expected between natural trading prtnerso In Narch elaborate agreement signed Chinese China Council Promotion International Trade CCPIT Japanese three greups Japanese Parlisnentary Group Trade China The Japan Council Promotion International Trade JCPIT Japanese Sino Japanese Impst Export Cartel This agreement never effect however accerding succinct velume Chinese official treaty series which significantly included appendix violation Japanese Government Two months after conclusion China commercial relations Japan follewing Nagasaki incident Japanese rightist pulled Peeple Republic Chinese trade From onwards trade between countries gradually eveloped In first years China willing Japanese firms which prepared through motions least pollticl sympathy China those firms which designated Chinese uthorities friendly continued share market It known these companies dummies subsidiaries great Japanese industrial commercial groups founded express purpose trading China Often executives these companies sympathies spend their Peking there normally least fifty resident Japanese businessmen China doubtless happy compromise although serious deterioration relations between Japanese Communist Party Chinese Communist Party three years effect straining relations between iendly firms their hosts The frily firms linked central JCPIT which negotiates certain matters Connected friendly trade CCPIT Peking Whereas CCPIT technically governmental functions respect Chlna foreign trade whole fulfilling chamber commerce capitalist society JCPIT appears functions outside China trade In resembles number other bodies established various European countries Britain which friendly firms Chinese trade lthough firms which trade other countries In November China reached another agreement broadly based segment Japanese economy In absence diplomatic relations between countries agreement conslse number governmental transactions clearly designed perform functions ordinary bilateral agreements which China concludes other countries diplomatic level several respects Liao Takasaki Agreement whole arrangement called followed pattern other Chinese trade agreements The unofficial character agreement deserves qualified several important aspects The basic document agreement outline nemorandun signed Liao Cheng Cantonese educated Japan Chinese Tatsunosuke Takasaki Liberal Democratic Party member Diet Japuese A detailed agreement described Chinese protocol signed month later President CCPIT representatives JCPIT Japan China Trad Promotion Council other On sides despite unofficial appearance signatories negotiation contents agreements subject close govern mental control offices established rdance their terms Peking Tokyo respectively known Liao Cheng Trade Office Peking Tokyo branuh Takasaki Trade Office Tokyo branch Peking substance though govern offices In context Chinese political surprise unofficial bodies subject fairly degree governmental supervision though perhaps ought overestimate supervision always close The extent governmental control foreign trade Japan however possibly known effective The Chinese might agree American business referring minute supervision every detail foreign transactions maintained inistries International Trade Industry Finance negotiate Japauese company dealing Japan Inc As abortive agreement initiative negotiations which Liao Takasaki Nemorandum Protocol signed accordance interview given prominent Japanese parlia mentarian member ruling Liberal Democratic Party named Kenzo atsumura Premier Chou En during Premier three political principles three principles trade which would followed Sino Japanese relations The former Were Japanese Government hostile China follow United States creating Chinas obstruct development Sino Japanese relations direction normalization The principles trade governmental agreement privately negotiated contracts special terms agreed special cases apparently reference credits The Premier emphasized inseparability politics economics trade atsumura acquiescence these principles expressly accept apparently satisfied Chinese being Since occupied special place ruling Liberal Democratic Party special faction Diet members favour normalization Sino Japanese relations Although holds state office effect virtually minister Sino Japanese relations especially trade To extent group within predominantly conservative Liberal Democratic Party really sympathetic China course highly doubtful device special China party lobby handle Sino Japanese relations behalf Japan rulers without involving Government official convenient sides Frem therefore groups Liberal Democrats Peking where patiently listen Chinese attacks leaders their party while hammering details trade agreements arranging visits journalists country other Chinese dealing however obliquely Japanese Government The Liao Takasaki Agreement provided trade accordance terms period years starting Each total L T trade usually called particular connodities agreed between Liao Takasaki offices agreement signed after fashion annual trade protocols concluded China governments which commercial treaty relations Within framework these annual agreements uantities prices detsiled contracts between Chinese stste trading corpor tions Japanese firms other In practice however particular Japsese industry would normally negotiate whole through association splitting orders among member after reaching agreement China slwsys particularly orders involved During years trading accordance L T arrangements sides whole satisfied commercial point The value trade considerable reaching US series years which Japan supplanting Soviet Union China largest foreign trade partner L T trade never played important Sino Japanese trade friendly trade however example friendly firms US worth business example Sino Japanese trade whole still cptured larger share market There serious causes friction L T relationship mostly quasi political character In Chinese Japanese Government particularly under present Prime inister Sato consis tently increasingly disregarded three principles enunciated Premier Chou En For present purposes I mention points Japanese foreign policy which particularly irked China Continued diplo matic intercourse growing economic between Japan Taiwan perhaps glaring symbol Japsn China posture To added consistent Japanese emphasis close political economic relations United States failure denounce American policy Vietnam continued provision naval military facilities American forces including those nuclear armaments failure press vigorously return Bonln Ryukyu Islands latter themselves perhaps subject Chinese territorial nostalgia actual ambition tributaries China Japanese reluctance grant entry visas Chinese dignitaries number occasions vociferous protests Japanese Communist Communist To matters worse China ideological split Soviet Union reflected splits within Japanese Communist Party which broken Chinese Connunist Party since start Cultursl Revolution while Japanese Soviet Governments seriously though still unproductively discussing possibility Japanese cooperation development Siberia which subject Chinese territorial claims In strictly economic sphere there difficulties though without political tinge Japanese success Chinese bitterly denounce colonization South East Asia continuing reminder China still uneven economic progress specifically Japanese policy serious obstacles large scale trade important these Yoshida At strain Japan Taiwan relations Japanese Prime inister written President Ching Kai assuring funds Government financed Export Import Bank Japsn would credits China since credits viewed Taiwan going beyond ordinary course trade The resulting restrictions effectively prevented conclusion zumber important Japanese sales China including items whole plants ships Other restrictions trade Japanese adherence American inspired embargo certain strategic goods China refusal Japanese shipowners doubtless Government instructions their ships under charter China probably their biggest single customer North Vietnam ports Japanese refusal import Chinese grounds animal hygiene These difficulties compounded since beginning Cultural Revol ution general heightened militancy China conduct foreign affairs widespread deterioration relations world Japan under particularly heavy T makemtters worse Was great extent Japanese journalists Peking responsible interprelation misinterpretation Chinese early stages movement outside world probability Chinese authorities attribute their exceptionally world press these journalists several expelled Meanwhile Japanese businessmen arrested several occasions espionage Although effects Cultural Revolution China foreign trade general drastic first observers predicted large reserve stocks export commodities accounted there marked downward trend exports commodities important Sino Japanese trade Japanese industry watched Germans backed credit facilities credit guarantees their ahead become largest exporterm China prospect selling multi million dollar whole plants China receded Worse Japanese supremacy challenged field chemical fertilizers export which supported large sector Japanese chemical industry respect which geographical propinquity always overwhelming advantage group European manufacturers under Nitrex offer China prices undercut Japanese industry after closure Suez canal substantially raised freight rates Meanwhile serious complaints began heard about uncertain delivery Chinese exporters In autumn Jap shipping industry suffered heavy losses during first major China attributed Cultural Revolution At Shanghai where labour unrest produced delay round ships Chinese authorities deliberately discriminated against Japanese ships allocating berths incoming ships taking advantage favourable rates demurrage penalties delay given Japanese owners With Japanese businessmen taking bleak their prospects China In trade least beaus importers necessary cover themselves against possibility breakdown trade China placing substantial orders elsewhere There certainly little encouragement China L T agreement approached expiry Japanese correspondent reporting Peking December deadlock reached though appeared Liao Takasaki offices would chanel communication The particularly miserable Japanese exporters trade China always conducted sterling settlement being London Hong Kong Yet their future trade balance could scarcely afford discontinue deliveries after devaluation pound though China adjustments At Japan larger trade United States appeared likely suffer severely Amsrican monetary troubles expected trade deficit order US trade China particularly unwelcome The first break clouds again remark Chou En visiting member Diet Mr Hisao Ishino indicated Chinese willing Liberal Democrats Nr Ishino himself Socialist asked convey message Liberal Democrat colleague Natsumura described senior member charge L T trade The Chin themselves selected delegation headed Mr Yoshimi Furui indicated invitation would issued unless expressed willingness Peking It clear there would negotiations renew L T agreement discussion political situation surrounding trade point underlined L T offices convey message might expected While exchanges telegrams twelve finally secured Chinese authorization visit order facilitate political contacts concerning L T trade Chinese invitation actually issued emergency meeting sixteen indus trial commercial orgsnizations which comprise Japan China Comprehensive Trade Liaison Council governing L T trade Japan called consider strategy It immediately issued statement calling removal barriers trade China particular abrogation Yoshids letter expansion items subject strategic embargo increase import Chinese removal Japanese It object account negotiations although coverage given Japanese press would possible recon struct detail Rather I shall analyse which negotiations conducted characteristic patterns negotiating policy emerge It tempting dangerous estimate whica country agreement mostlY breakdown trade The voices Japanese industrial commercial interests particularly steel fertilizer industries enough ensure great prominence given Japan desire maintain trade calculated impression eagerness Chinese One certainly justified assuming little whole field Sino Japanese relations without calculation On other there solid grounds anxieties fertilizer taken almost months hammer agreement under L T auspices The principal evidence anxiety Chinese resume trade comes eemet eventually reached Inasmuch China trade principal Communist partners apparently risen against according Jpanese estimate might first sight refusing greement She might regarded sector ofstrade Japan smaller sector unreasonable price presumably agreeable gesture refusing further dealings Sate party However turning obviou trade Japan might seriously weakened bargaining position European xpdrters would certainly suffered increased shipping Europe While theoretically sterling devaluation which China thought profited quite considerably would enabled cheaper purchase Britain dramatic upturn trade Britain still unresolved Hong Kong situation might politically unpalatable compromise Japan Probably decisive factor China suitability Japan market important agricultural exports Just Japan steel chemical lobby sothe Chinese Government under constant pressure outlets country beans greatly reduced foreign exchange balance Hong Kong increased pressure Significantly despite extensive manoeuvri issue Export IptBamkcredits bargaining eventually followed initial political discussions concerned quantities beans Before actual trade discussions started there three weeks somewhat sided debate political issues involved which according Japanese delegation Chinese evinced harsh attitude although talks described atmosphere As would would fetched regard timing other coincidental Japanese somewhat slippery ground Liberal Democrats their Government permitted gainst strongest opposition encountered visit nuclear carrier U S S En erprise Sasebo And insult injury Government referred explicitly Chinese nuclear threat emphasized overcome nuclear allergy Japanese people Not surprising Japanese delegates message Government Instead turned situation advantage could saying support Japanese people whole continuation L T trade senSe passing question Government attitudes Furui Chinese delegation first meeting regretted present strain Sino Japanese relations pointed continued trade formed foundation phased process normalization relations between countries It apparent China positive political interest negotiations Japan The latter attitude trade relations China possible political altogelerby maintaining ingenious specious principle separation economics politics One major objective Chinese short ultimate bringing about major change Jspanese policy towards United States Taiwan demonstration separation false untenable point pressed throughout negotiations Other tangible objectives course removal essentially political barriers Japanese exports credit anith embargo inseparability politics economics probably Chinese Japan politically defensive China position especially strong political terms because uncertainty Japan world politics Cultural Revolution would permit require abandonment catholic foreign trade policy which China pursued years Japanese confidence score should overestimated Accordingly stage purely political negotiation passed Chinese presumably could extracting political concessions political threats pressures course trade discussions It significant point joint communique political aspects negotiations finalized until after conclusion trade agreement An atmosphere uncertainty whole outceme exploited Chinese There Were fermal meetings after Japanese arrived Peking visas visit They submit agenda which somewhat position petitioners When talks evetually started after agenda considered adjourned indefinitely theffirst morning Chinese resumed suddenly In primarily political phase talks Jpanese advautge flexibility which their unofficial status Any major concession which might question political principle speak repudiated advance Japanese Government Thu sixth political discussions cabled three political principles would conceded Jpan there trade agreement The Chinese apparently reversed their initial statement impossible under Sato Cabinet promote economic cultural personal exchanges between countries committee ppointed draft joint ommunique Furui colleagues stood however basic doctrinal question separation politics economics presumably instructed clear would document explicitly critical Japanese Government For several there deadlock finally broken resolved trade should simultaneously drafting political communique At point became clear Lo T trade continue Chinese retained option using political issues point chose persuader commercial negotiations During preliminary period Japanese position obviously commercial aspects whole situation public series official official statements punctuated earnest pleas various industrial commercial associationso Thus anticipation negotiations public debate question using Export Import Bank funds status Yoshida letter This public diplomacy characteristic modern Japan extensiv throughout whole course negotiations The discussion Yoshida letter affords example Before Japanese delegation Peking various members overnment question Export Import Bank credits transcended Yoshida letter decisions grant withhold loans basis This first point though everyone policy Government consistently refuse credits On February talks seemed likely start _JapTimes usually faithful organ Government opinion rvealed Premier Sato Nr Foreign Ninister personally assured Furui before would regard themselves bound Yoshida letter The newspaper itself however pointed Premier nothing position earlier important policy speech opening Diet commented Government words merely giving impression change policy remained firmly opposed granting credits Thus seems though Japanese carefully through motions preparing apparent cencession revealing press purely purpose negotiations As placating their allies United States Taiwan enabled Japanese indicate Chinese possible concession without whatever giing It enabled Furui before state publicly Government position represent forward which light specially friendly Chinese position anxious principals though Harriman Paris having denounced President Johnson position escalation inadequate impending negotiations It would great present purposes document further examples diplomacy Japanese lackingo The technique available Chinese course quite since neither Chinese press speeche Chinese leaders there slightest overt departure position monolithic solidarity Accordingly flexibility would introduced statements negotiators themselves these available sufficient detail purpose The position eventually reached question Export Import Bnk credits gives indication toughness whole negotiations As actual trade talks began Chinese discounted possibility large scale agreement current political situation The following their position clear although Japanese Wanted agreement there could question rrangement longer without issue Export Import Bank loans respect exports China Accordingly agreed almost immediately agreement should should involve China large scale equipment which course credits would particularly applicable Some weeks later after agreement finally concluded Foreign Office Tokyo first officil statement Yoshida letter making quite plain Japanese Government regard establishing binding obligation Japan towards Nationalist Government would continue applications credits major exports basis In Yoshida Prime inister letter President Chiang curious Japanese Foreign Office spokesman stating letter quite unrelated Government persomsl binding Japan After assurance Norwegian Foreign inister Danish Amb ssador Permanent Court International Justice Estern Greenland Case consti legally binding waiver Negian laimo sovereignty Greenland It further stated spirit letter followed because binding because decisions credit basis happened coincide though admitted purely coincidental quality relationship clear after death Yoshida October It ascinatin speculate veneration great matter almos certainly important factor Prime Ninister against China trade lobby within party delaying clarification policy A month later Mr Nakasone Ninister Transport Japanese Government making efforts facilitate export Japanese freighters China clear lthat expressing personal belief Yoshida letter extinct He thought would prove necessary ntually Premier Sato state publicly nullified Meanwhile Finance inister saying somewhat elliptically would Export Import Bank itself state corporation under direct control ofeinistry International Trade Industry decide whether finance exports China The Hitachi shipyards already revealed planning export ships China assumption seven years credit would available price terms Soviet Union there other evidence ships Government criteria granting credits Even greater developments foreshadowed statement Nichibo Company hoping start talks China vinylon plant previous negotiations having broken Export Import Bank credits It significant Chinese finally broke negotiations which going years German consortium Demag installation China large steel complex Japanese company already spoken making aroachms Thus while Japan concession principle gained concessions Chinese issue would Government position Export Import Bank loans changed significantly although would await opening first credits before assuming change complete Differences opinion within ranks Liberal Democrats still reported doubtless genuine enough eanwhile reactiens Taipei violent might expected presumably because loans granted Nationalists still reason forthcoming It mixture hesitation inaction legalism bland disregard legalities tightrope walking J apanese Government managed extremely delicate issue there still enough manoeuvre Sato April there change Government position Of equal immediate importance though symbolic significance credits issue volume trade envisaged agreement Once again Chinese insisted outset maintenance balance between imports exports which Japnese necessarily agreed principle least balance basic majority China trade agreements foreign countries always maintained China negotiating principle To extent there imbalance China trade Japan mostly represents friendly trade The requirement balanced trade raised important difficult point Japanese Jspanese imports China normally consist largely conodities various kinds grains beans variety agricultural products Rice beans crucial importance trade indeed reasons China imports wheat which lready heavily committed enable profitable other Asian countries In Japan theoretically maintained limit annum although larger smounts imported occasion instance It clear early stage negotiations limit would raised trade expand before Furui mission eking chemical fertilizer industry started press Government increase quota As trade discussions began Japanese delegation message saying figure would O00 minimum Ir Shiina Ninister International Trade Industry immediately promised the_e would increase regardless difficulties presented Japanese previous exceptionally In event figure never greed however The Japanese having clear after number conflicting statements various ministers final decision Ssto eventually offer contained official inistry statement O0 OGOtons However rumoured advanced negotiations OO0 laying certain conditions quslity origin shipped Evidently Chinese agreed their reputed insistence agreement sorts reached enshrined formula whereby joint communique would incorporate China demand imports O00 Jpanese promise utmost fforts demand further Japan promise future flexibility matter There similar haggling other vital commodity beaus Here Japanese embarrassment arose which I already referred dealers order cover themselves against serious possibility L To trade would renewed placed large orders elsewhere making rather swallow whole expected quantity Chinese exports particularly uncertainty prevailing about agreement The Chinese possibly because anxieties about their exports considerably heightened tension behind negotiations quantities being discussed arresting Japanese businessmen whovne living Peking representativesof friendly firms asanobu Suzuki first trader detaied recent months arrest coming special significance Japanese connercial world The fertilizer steel industries particular while feared theft outcome L T negotiations might favourable themselves pinning their hopes probability could China under agreement could through their friendly firms It graphically indicated friendly firms which depend China designation under suspicion liable serious disfavouro The Japanese reaction arrest immediate apparently unhesitating While Foreign Ministry Tokyo investigating matter JCPIT which responsible friendly trade forthwith unqualified abject apology Suzuki activities impliedly incriminating The after agreement finally signed Premier Chou En received Peking representatives JCPIT drove point statement about political stand which friendly firms would adopt continue business Subsequent developments confirmed friendly firms experiencing tougher conditions China Thus negoti ations began Canton April purchases Japanese steel steel industry agreement largely friendly channels participating companies negotiators instead allowing friendly agents represent It appears Chinese insisted sound political attitudes steel concerned Significantly enough Daichi Trading Company friendly subsidiary giant Iitsui formed entirely purposes trade China cornered friendly trade ceased operations altogether April ground representatives found impossible carry functions Peking F therarrests suggest likelihood other firms coming conclusion might their losses dropping trade The eventual signing agreement greeted might expected considerable relief Japan The price quite heavy however In first place total trade called about US represented considerable previous total US L T trade Such trade would beyond would through friendly firms promised subject greater political pressure before In obviously political sense price In political communique which issued stated Japanese delegation agreed three political principles Sino Japanese relations should apply trade future accepted principle inseparability politics economics concomitant improvement political relations means developing economic relations between countries The Japanese accept Chinese obstacles Sino Jpanese relations caused United States imperialism hostile policy towards China pursued Sato Government publicly recorded their under standing On after agreement signed Japanese Foreign inistry pointed emphatically Furui delegation despite presence Liberal Democratic member Diet represented neither Government Party authority whatever Japanese Government these principles Later however Foreign Ninister Diet Japanese policy towards China inconsistent spirit underlying three political principles question separability otherwise politics economics still debate A further feature arrangement unimportant change whereby agreement longer called Agreement downgraded Memorandum comnotation greater informality implication reduction obligatory ferce Further Chinese insisted changing names trade offices clear L T trade thing torpedoed Japanese policy WLiao Takasaki Trade correctly referred emorandum Trade Premier Chou En immediately after signing emorandum development trade accordance terms would depend wholly steps Jpau Liu Hsi Deputy Vice inister Foreign Trade charge negotiations rubbed point emphasizing fight gainst Sato Government American Chinese policy conducted al__l Japanese trading circles Ir Furul nwards friendly firms alone All political aspects emorandum particularly pleasant Japanese Government under considerable attack account nuclear policy Nor economic benefits spectacular The overall turnover US imporlance anticipated difference Japan sblnce pyments could great though improved Iarch CCPIT JCPIT signed agreement double total friendly trade result which doubtless Japanese acceptance earlier emorandum oreover Chinese neither gesture Japanese firms which suffered devaluation pound agreed settlement future currency sterling though indicated question would discussed separate talks Eventually agree French francs though whether currency settlement merely currency account known This Jpanese uncomfortable situation larch crisis gathering momentum China involve large sector Japan foreign trade whole certain industries particularly chemical industry critical Moreover limited recession country trade elsewhere pressure Government develop trade China increasing likely increase further The shipbuilding industry example already beginning competition newly rationalized European shipyards China aided Export Import Rank losns tempting The Chinese other reason conatulate themselves outcome negotiations Politically largely running their political preconditions agreement great extent In sense introduction greater degree politicization Sino Japanese trade relations Iemorandum joint communique which accompanied could looked triumph diplomacy Cultural Revolution At there remarkable degree continuity policy discernible which China conducted negotiations The precedents ollowed quite closely demands revived successfully pressed after Japanese criticized complying This conZinuity interesting light commentators about recent changes Chinese foreign policy possible decline Chinese diplomatic acuity In purely economic sense little given While China clearly anxious continue L T trade I iemorandum trade reduce smounts involved during period economic disruptions beginning seriously At since Memorandum predecessors outlines leaving_the deailed negotiation aricular contracts settled Japanese delegations various industries trades there still leeway bargaining The Japanese trade organizations started selecting their representatives China Nemorandum signed significant invited batch representing importers beans chemical fertilizer manufacturers Since invited together probable their several negotiations closely related By increased politicization change nomenclature their refusal extend agreement beyond Chinese retained maximum initiative future negotiations added advsmtage could asily attach political strings economic baits oreover Premier Chou remark development trade accordance iemorndum depended steps taken Japsn together change nomen clature agreement suggests actual commitments coming China regarded Chinese conditional rather binding subject unilateral revision political grounds outight cancellation Quite apart giving Chinese advantage keepinghJapanese firms which constant suspense aspect arrangement could useful cutting exports China suddenly found herself unable satisfy orders account internal troubles would involve awkward admissions could indeed turned political advantage analysis conditional character obligations undertaken China correct Memorandum would represent important China legal obligation economic security international trade The tendency would towards economic relationships based entirely variable political fctors vague conditions China hypoihes subject Chinese definition necessary The abandonment clear legal principles introduction avowedly fluid political principles variable content appearances considerable extension thought Chairman Nao field foreign policy The uneasy possibly unstable accommodation conflicting interests achieved certainly testimony China continued desire trade Japan countries still share common objectives however narrowly based What probably significant future pattern Sino Japanese trade though China evident interest making trade secure attractive profitable Japanese partners Yours sincerely Received New York June IQ68