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2/4/1956 - Indonesia--1955 by Boyd R. Compton

BRC Indonesia NOT FOR PUBLICATION INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS Knor Poe Modjokerto Fast Java Indonesia February Mr W S Rogers Institute Current World Affslrs Fifth Avenue New York New York Dear Mr Rogers In ldonesia substantial progress building rationalizing state administration failed again formulate implement program economic development Her gains might compared humdrum provisioning organizing which precede great voyage venture Yet increased prosperity social Justice accepted national goals voyage attain hardly begun TWo developments Were exceptional worthy Asian African Conference Bandung April general elections September December I ndonesia wears these bright events medals should Otherwise catching stories isturb corruption leading arrest conviction Minister JUstice continued rebellion three islands President Sukarno apparent swing radical several types economic mismangement Yet behind stories there significant progress basic levels Before discussing developments I would distinguish among various fields where Indonesia successes failures A useful distinction between spheres routine state sministrtion national development There important difference between fields politics1 conflicts affect policy those which politics plays minor It field normal state administration Indonesia contlnud forge Exmmples cited civil service executive corps m_mon State Police several technical bureaus Further prmgress these spheres tends bring Indo toward extremely standards government administration which prevailed colonial period fields development Correspondingly experimentation worst failures recorded Government pblicles transportation implemented through Mihistry Communications resulted partial breakdown inter State cgntrol distribution purchase vital commodities copra textiles failed achieve purposes The government bureaus offlcs operating spheres often characterized direction corruption The government performance those spheres Which norms uring coloni period which Indonesians administrstive experience Perform satisfactory where government obliged build bureaus almost scratch implement ideas policies Thi distinction alone however explain enough Eucation sense field In4onesla registered greatest single achievement building stsfflng thousands schools development other fields remarkable Part answer politics The whole question economic development meshed politics The problem development manufacturing trade mining communications first matter adopting policies towar4 foreign business firms dominant these fields Here obstacle progress previous years agresslve ultra nationalism rather uncertain wavering nationalism postponed decisions shifting attitudes In years Indonesia really begun economic course At there seemed little prospect battling political leaders Djakarta would accomplish future GA IZI NG_THE S TATE Not Indonesian newspapers their readers notion important excellent being civil service executives pam0nz_ o_r_ad charged carrying state policy provincial level district Unpraised unrecognized group Indonesia together 4uring years frustrating Ora corps Heavy unseasonal rains harvest obstructed government program buying Decreased approprlatlons public works slowed local schedules building Government funds agricultural loans limited rural credit remained disheartening village problem Policy other fields coordinated oamOn policies failure despite their Sfforts Yet listed triumph vamon principally their Job organize carry general elections September members Prliament DecemberI members Constitutional Assembly Both elections remarkably successful Altogether sixty million votes The involved business building polling booths distributing ballots registering voters training committeemen maintaining security insuring honesty casting counting ballots managed administrative poise which could hardly expected government young The election demonstration inherent orderliness Indonesian people energy leaders whose clearly Yet pople still Who election The question points major weakness election system count The frustrating delay announcement official results apparently foresight planning On September votes counted polling place committees thousands Indonesian hamlets The method proved unworkable votes being recounted provincial level The snarl Will entirely untangled weeks For December election votes being counted second lowest committee level istrict This accomplished rapidly smoothly The elections produced wealth stories tales The newspapers agree Indonesisn Nationalist Party PNI first election margin total votes The Nahdlatul Lrlama Indonesian MasJuml seats Communist Perry followed close behind The December election apparently HNI greater margin which revealed tension underlying orderliness election For month north coast Java panicked coordinat poisoning campaign Unproved unfounded stories raced through Guards wells stands heavily The panic Ugly proof tensions which revolution political competition brought people accustomed authoritarian ruble In pIaces political method clashed custom A Javanese woman threatened divorce husband support Communist Party He resisted stubbornly until local religious official start proceedings Finally signed traditional Letter Reconciliation stating would Masjumi election Not disputes nicely settled during thousand divorces handed political reasons The giddy political change being throughout society The organization general election credit other branches government The local branches Ministry Information finally received assignment incontestable import commendable explaining election millions villagers Local police units worked Drad Sa_ guarding security election In short individual performance coordination excellent The possibilities productive executive coordination brought plans intensify government along important border regions Timo Kalimantan Borneo where Indonesia neighbor colonial Observers certain political implications schemes given exampl development plans could launched coordina economic public works educational projects hands The events again showed administration notably effective efficient local levels nation capital This apparent Damon _Dra_d technical departments agriculture irriati forestry Insofar these bureaus performing tasks executed before their spite immense obstacles Perhaps remarkable being irriation service which successfully administering water needs economy 4espite almost complete graduate engineers The Irrigation Bureau point departure however illustrating problem development While succeed generally routine administrative bureau effective measures against floods Action taken prevent recurrence floods which wiped great gains agricultural production during The problem maintenance however construction The bureau faced typical problems fundS aine4 technicians funds available coordinated planning With other government agencies effective leadership pressure Djakarta Major floods problem Their control demands types government coordination Problems nature scale faced first Djakarta where obstacles develop found A similar situatlon found inter commun_cations For years Dutch owned K P M shipping companyhheld virtual monopoly inter island shipping In keeping program nationalizing enterprises government competing company P E L N I heavily subsidized another During reign All Sastroamidjojo Cabinet certain routes turned national companies In action began premature thousands copra piled eastern islands severe shortages island outside Java At height shipping crisis midyear several stories light mismanagement waste national shipping companies The government venture shipping field desirable necessary apparently costing nation heavily service foreign exchange Other problems shared government nreaus Perhaps important these problem official salaries corruption A middle level official Djakarta receives Rupiah month To support family simple austerit which typical Indonesian officialdom should least Rupiah With salary could family simple clothing school books children hmself cigarette money But makes third amount monthly salary fifteenth month The official caught humiliating borrowin sponging morale suffers Or takes outside official suffers Or often finds workable means petty corruption state suffers several Most corruption Indonesia luxuries necessities The corruptors their friends resort bungalows lampooning deserved movie The Housing Crisis But their cases atypical The worst demoralization lower levels government brought Indonesia underpaid officials minor concrete improvement major A which added small fraction current salaries already wiped prices A greater found consune cooperatives state officials By October central cooperatives provinces Each promised working capital Rupiah given government Through govern eteen potential members cooperatlves three million members their families eventually access cheap government reduced prices sugar kerosene textiles cigarettes The officials oranlzed great speed urpose For moment experiencing growing pains several sorts coordlnation other agencies competition existing cooperatives available supplies inability officials scrape together modest initiation Eventually however could serve check demoralization petty corruption If corruption major internal threat Indonesian bureaucracy insurrection banditry serious outside challenges Not Indonesia general chaos fifteen percent nation endangered disorder rebels actually organized capable 0flar scale operations The rebeiIions state treasury which continued extraordinary maintenance government forces relief affected areas The money badly needed economic development Government troops substantial progress against three rebellions West Java North Sumatra AtJeh Sulawesi The Darul Islam movements West Java Atjeh become debilitating attrition government controls strong points regions finds impossible prevent nightly forays poorly adversaries The situation Sulawesi serious There government controls fifteen percent southern island Visitors Macsssar cannot leave sometimes airport rebel activity Rebel bands local militia hinterland exert varying degrees control their areas Some stabilized collect taxes operate schools The situation appears novel modern continuation period warring principalities described Conrad Lord Jim The Sulawesl situation shows sentiments regionalism motivate Indonesia rebellions One facet feeling 4islike Javanese dominate Djakarta government A important seems economic concerns goverrment control copra trade During vigorous movement started loyal areas against management Copra Foundstion government which buyer exporter Indonesian copra Resentful heavy handed central control their livelihood local growers merchants demanded higher prices greater voice determining government copra policy concezsions clearly insufficient The smuggling trade Phillplnes continues large scale rumored provi ncial authorities their these operations Such conflicts between regien state obstruct extension central authority island In addition corruption insecurity third factor appears obstruct growth rationalization fledgling Indonesian government It spoils system political appoint ments which became almost universal during period Indonesian Nationalist Party Cabinet under All Sastroamldjojo By cabinet reign almost influential posts state apparatus F N I favorite allied partles To extent development natural affinity between N I westernlzed officials upper class origin Many naturally joined Others naked unashamed politics still rather dirty having field weakness particular To outside spoils system placed political appointees unimportant sinecures executive technical posts With All Cabinet government strong measures began replace political appointees The system become permanent obstacle development professionalized civil service Whatever merits spoils system Indonesian political institution Allowing weaknesses failures total performance Indonssian government encouraging Most develop ments direction rationalization growth Those charged routine administration state outdid themselves meeting extraordinar administrative problem general election ithin limits described their budgets staffs technics bureaus holding their better fields irrigation forestry agriculture fisheries The poverty greater officis increasing drain morale efficiency inclosures official promised relief The failures state economic activity controls cannot ounted should perspective Officials bureaus controlling government transportation material ourchasing distribution licensing operating comparatively fields In these first years learning through trials expensive errors assumed actually learning The Indonesisns studying overseas bring order knowledge these Such hopefulness cannot about political aspects development Political uncertainty threatens remain major obstacle economic progress A rationalized development program cannot emerge efficiently implemented ntion highest political ership fails agree methods CO OF POLICfL AIMS The Indonesian politics years Sukarno articulate brilliantly perceptive young Blitar became President Republic Indonesia Like years since became personal stage Sukarno Ie strode energetically across rallying Indonesian nation preaching fivesPl endid principles called Panchasila Yet events passed Sukarno AVms A modest proportioned program American technical tance beneficial these fields Its approprlstlon seven million dollars magnetism podium seemed undiminished personal influence still immense But somehow great events appeared tbmeat position The general elections development political parties warning political influence being excercised through normal controlle channels modern state During Sukarno continued operate outside these channels leader effective chiefly through emotion impact personality It forsaken father state order perpetuate himself father revolutionary movement His characteristic effort failure After Indonesia West Irian United Nations Sukarno called convening All Indonesian Congress whose described mobilization national unity completion revolution To Sukarno winning West Irian evidently principhl unfinishe4 revolutionary The Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet still power All Indonesian Congress given government hacking Committees sprang quickly They constituted shift democratic machinery standing outside normal hierarchy goverrment Very evident efficient commun gaining their proper share control local committees As All Indonesian Congress Djakarta shaken crisis Its sence struggle between Sukarno Cabinet against greater officers corps control appointments Sukarno candidate Army Chief Staff unfortunate Colonel Bambang Utojo snubbed embarrassing fashion associates By Sukarno Mecca July battle When returned officers firmly control Bambang Utojo Shrewdly Sukarno seclusion Hatta acting chief state short period The Sukarno cabinet Masjumi coalition sworn Sukarno influence never The excitement crisis pushed All I ndonesian Congress background convening congress August fiasco The onesian ationa Party already 4ecided participate called right Masjumi allies Sukarno elivered speech closing session event ignored nation Surprisingly Sukarno chose All Indonesian Congress podium again brought ideas puhllc attention The congress since formed itself permanent nationwide hierarchy committees Under auspices West Java committee presented audience Bandung sensation inconclusive story foreign intrigue Indonesia Basing comments documents possession Sukarno described phase foreign destroy Republic Indonesia A first phase active sabotage which culminate armed attsck nation already failed A second attempt being however overthrow republic turning group against group destroying national unity An important weapon second phase supposed maLmoth bribes doled foreign powers Indonesi politicians He ended speech without naming foreign powers Indonesians supposedly olved Sukarno treason documents became momentarily famous reporters asked documents public pqssibly false Sukarnv replied Believe Believe The documents false Weeks newspaper printed alleged principal document letter Kuomintang Chinese police official offering payment certain politicians would All Cabinet The listed parties opposed P N I source money listed American Imbassy Djakarta The newspaper printed evidence police handwriting expert letter forgery The brief hullabaloo inconclusively start general election campaign Sukarno major effort vigorously conducte4 speaking before December election According newspaper spoken million people before leaving Java He outer islan4s speaking favorite themes West Irian Panchasila I imply charge foreign subversion The Jungschlager trial proceeding Djakarta uncovered strong evidence individual Dutchmen instrumental smuggling Darul Islam West Java The conduct trial subject strongest Dutch criticism state witnesses presented absurd testimony Notwlthstand state built strong convincing charges against Dutch defendants At Purworedjo touched ideas stressi during It fault West Irian become Repubiic Indonesia It because united enough revolutionary enough trumpet people It I Sukarno function express feelings people We toward state which prosperous capitalism In Surabaja according unofficial results recent election Indonesian Communist Party received votes It therefore illogical Indonesian Communist Party whose ideology ideals supported sixteen million people should excluded government In unfair Sukarno quote single sentences paragraphs speeches His forte speech Writer logic extremely perceptive collecting symbols attitudes which popular appeal significance He usually propose program concret rather certain style personality He speaks often unlty revolutionary attitude consciousness nationalism firmness Or speaking about foreign intrigues calls vigilance recommend Attorney General action Wet Irian become Indonesia indicate listeners bring about except adopt attitudes which revolutionary Whatever ressons Sukarno continued overwhelming stress political attitudes rather economlc goals during When speak national development spoke general terms In August address spoke Pancha Dharma tasks necessary supplement Panchasila They I Restoration national unity The fight against insecurity Development fields The struggle West Irian No postponements carrying general election The problem national unity which admitted obsession mainly attitude In order sujugate other nations imperialists power abstract weapon effor weaken mentality destroy unitv would filled mutual hatred result Dutch effort Is utlook Indonesians prefer colonial because advances economy builds highways Because first mission national movement eliminate mentality planted Indonesian nation Dutch imperlalists They Indonesia because united The Mdjapahit empire destroyed because disunity Hence nationalist movement 4eveloping mentality atmosphere unity I difficult associate group belief Marxist Fmsjumi My unity I certain Indonesian exist without unity The extreme contra Sukarno temperament Vice President Hatta In opinion cannot success struggle Irian short The answer develop country develop If become advanced country_ outsioe realize West Iria progress turned So first tremendous effort national development At first glance Sukarno Hatta seeme constitute balanced Sukarno devoting attention higher politics Hatta specific problems cooper tives public works small industries economic development general Their efforts however conflict harmony In listening Sukarno citizen especially Javanese complimented discovering President understands intuitively already average Hatta other often patience emotional problems average advocates things unexciting actually foreign citizen organization rationality concreteness choice Together Sukarno represented extremes Indonesian outlook temperament These extremes conflict their nflict mirrored policies cabinets which office THE ALl CABIhT The Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet which office July July called Suksrno Cabinet If creation certainly supporter ideas The targets policies nationalistic political The impressive success All Cshin Asian African Conference April Never concern national istic Indonesisns colonlalism revolutionary unity moral purpose shown attractive The organized conference ccess partly because spoke rather twenty delegations present The conferees produce definite program action pretend their mission What crested modest considered state shared sentiments The style attitude idealistic nationallsm suitable Asian African Conference evident domestic policies All Cabinet An important controversial policy Implements4 Minister Economis Iskaq Through close control trade licenses foreign exchange allocations government succeeded doing great damage foreign trading comoanies Indonesia When All Cabinet Idonesia foreign exchange imports being given foreign companies When cabinet being Indonesian firms The percentage figures indicate rsdlcal policy successful Actually principal immediate effect create large class Indonesian license brokers substantial profits reselling their licenses foreign Chinese trading firms It early Indonesian businessmen actually become entrepreneurs engage seriously foreign trade Present evidence indicates realy taken If Iskaq policy brought doubtful temporary advantages small group Indonesians Djakarta brought great power profits members Chinese community This energetic caosble grouo appears increased control commerce almost extenh Dutch firms theirs The Indonesian license brokerage imports reflected skyrocketing retail prices commodities Luxuries course sky_high midyear P1 nouth Dodge equivalent O00 U S official rates O00 black rates Still sensational probablyhad important effects O textile prices The inflationary process propelled loopholes import export management which allowed laramie scale smuggling foreign exchange country A number factors disturbed export economy Transporta snaorls limited copra export Domestic inflation prices costs rubber production export decreasingly profitable Suzr exported amount being distributed among entire producing group In September estimated disparity between domestic world market prices exports averaging between forty seventy percent The cabinet answer export problem offer inducement foreign exchange allocations immensely profitable imports Export bolstere4 policy offered solution basic problem production Export production remained focal point Indones immediate economic problem Most field still dominated foreign capital That sector foreign control largely hands Chinese In4onesian citizens During foreign factory owners squeeze government import policy Essential materials spare parts difficult obtain unreasonably expensive because cumber import machinery General Motors closed sssembly plant Djakarta Generally foreign capital continue process indirect liquidation lifting greatest possible profit their opera tions failing reinves machinery materials The industry remained great exception Caltex Stanvac continued invest exploration explsitation production As result percentage state income derived industry continued expand Oil threatened surpass rubber Indonesia valuable export The auses Indonesia discouraging circle export import problems cannot found policies All Cabinet World market prices several commodities during government would eliminate problems inflation productivity decree Neither could All Cabinet blamed entirely condition national budget which necessity included items operations against rebels running general election Such extraordinary expenditures inflationary their effect domestic price levels hence exports could scarcely avoided The weakness All government errors because nationalist sentiments rather quslity nationalism The mportant field nationalistic policy making import trade might expected creation small class native Indonesian importers would ensive project state consumer Perhaps results policy someday justify expense But meanwhile coordinated policy being carried basic field export The understandable Indonesian political groups national control Indonesia economy including vital export sector The policy All Cabinet policies imp0rts interinsular transportatlon Garuda Airways electric power control quickly It carried these policies courageously enough whole performance called erratic operated fringes problem The epping stone large scale econ6mic develepment creation basic attitude foreign investments No appeared years Indonesian sovereignty during All period there evidence being seriously considered A draft basic stment mineral exploitation reached cabinet presented Parliament No heard draft basic foreign investment formulated under preceeding Wilopo Cabinet substitute arrangement revealed vaguest statements subject Minister Finance The vacuum foreign investment regulations manifold effects It first barrier foreign investment though there indications Indonesia would attrac sizeable investment regulations existed Of immediate import vacuum serious harmto foreign operations already progress Processing machinery rubber sugar other exports deteriorating rapidly being replaced The Dutch rubber estates replanting trees prodclng their prime years production Difficulties delays transferring profits compounded troubles oreign entrepreneurs nourished their pessimism The situation threatens produce absolute deline export pro4uctlon these fields coupled increasing costs production The principal losses under All economic policy sustained Indonesian govern merit whose revenues originate great various export levies related taxes imports Another appreciable slice state revenue comes direct production foreign firms The policy All govern tended restrict these revenue sources would eventually tended If Indonesian economy nationalized accomplished principally government itself There simply enough private domestic capital mobilized There alternative courses government force through radical tough nationalization program sacrificing great revenues curren originating foreign sector economy attempting difference harsh mobilization economic resources carry coordinated expansion national sector economy financed continued enlarged revenues originating largely foreign firms whose investments would guaranteed protected government stipulated period Actually these extremes markers fixing limits channel through which future development The first radical alternative clearly beyond capaci desires All government which showed ability clear squatters plantation limit illegal woodcutting Java forest preserves action limiting strikes The harshness failure government force acceptance Copra Foundation policies Sulawesi govern inability fulfill quotas purchasing Java From archipeligo other there evidence administrative moderation which characteristic Indonesian government since independence This moderation strongest foundation stone Indonesian democracy exaggerated negates essential government author The second alternative gradual nationalization failed materialize Scattered industrial public works projects being carried funds available fairly substantial being given handicraft cottage industries through loans government allocations materials But there government would finance large integrated program increase production Indonesian sector economy Nationalization generally Indonesia transfer control foreign Indonesian hands state private Nor there evidence coordinated program foreign export enterprises staff Indonesian personnel The State Plantations Board hands managing plantations already under control while Chinese buyers grabbing smaller plantations being Dutch Nationalization simply coming about decisive sectors economy Thus All Cabinet tended drift along basic economic policies between extremes radical foreignism conservative planning The direction drift generally determined weight political sentiments within Indonesian Nationalist Party where ascendant All faction continued reflect feelings President Sukarno THE BURHANUDD N When Ali Cabinet July replaced Msjumi Party coalition Burhanuddin Harahap The cabinet sworn Vice President Hatta policies until revealed temperament outlook close Hatta OWI The Burhanuddin Cabinet rushed quickly Ali policies The Central Import 0ffice whlch become corruption abolished replaced bureau controlled Minister Finance Sumitro Indonesian Socialist Party Importers rescreened foreign firms found themselves better obtain foreign exchange Prices imported goods tumbled twenty percent weeks black market U S dollar The domestic prices export commodities rubber copra pepper began toward level world market prices goverrment offered direct inducements exports As approached apparent government radically Shifted focus attention political economic considerations The reign cabinet disturbed revelation tremendous pening shortage A snarl shipping planning complicated disaster ously unsessonal rains The shortage threatened The great Sha foreign going Indonesian firms early In sudden skyrocWeting price mrket Emergency orders placed Rangoon quick delivery eversl shiploads grain situation could quickly untangled Rice prices which ranged between Rp Pp fluctuated between Rp Rp outer islands By clear Indonesia would import least O00 offset immediate shortage The great gains under All Cabinet production cncelled weather Burhsnuddin government office political responsi bility Despite troubles cabinet pursued policies single minded disregard political Cons equences It popularity probably increased settlement dispute strong shortlived campaign against corruption Opposition ukarno Indonesian Nationlist Party Parliament killed csbinet emergency corruption regulations several dozen arrests including hlgher prties supporting All Cabinet Ali Minister Justice arrested tried finally sentenced prison Ali Minister Economics Iskaq country In other fields csbinet policies courted violent criticism In October Foreign Minister requested increased foreign under Colombo Plan The Planning Bureau DJuanda confident announcement Five Year Plan would ready publication On December short government statement described policy investment foreign capital The interested unfriendly attitude All government toward foreign enterp dropped replaced friendliness As ended risky departure foreign policy taken Following announced intention improving relations Netherlands government prepara tions level conference Dutch discuss Irian financial economic matters The Burhanuddin Cabinet approach trsdltional enemy conciliatory confident manner Nahdlatul Lama Indonesian Federated Islamic Prty refused support negotiations cbinet fallen before first results announced The election results indicate clear choice between proud sensitive nationalism Sukarno confident development mindedness associate Hatta If there mandate inplicit returns demand styles comblned The P N I elections mrgln It Big Four arties received following percentages total September MasJuml Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesian Communist Party total The future government fairly broad coalition which 4esires demands participants compromised extent Of MasJumi Indonesian Communist Party shown clearly_where stand matters economic development The Masjuml strongly influenced small Indonesian Socialist Party favors coordinated development which foreign capital given opportunity inducement operate Indonesia The communists course opposite position The Nahdlatul Ulam apparently determined stand It participated All Cabinet Joined MasJumi Party cabinet which undid Ali NOw N U pulled Burhanuddin Cabinet because negotiations being Dutch It would ppear N U willing Join combination which produce major domestic conflicts providing combination include communists As local leaders N U experience national international politics expected develop concrete views economic political problems Presumably these conform manner ultra conservative religious outlooks party In meantlme N U holds decisive position between MasJuml P N I following first other The P N I probably holds developments It could continue along indicated Sukarno All party wavering between caution truly radical nationalist program Or party cotld rediscover moderation again Masjumi Wilopo Cabinet The future P N I policy depends depth party dicalism Viewed domestically conservative party which nothing radical social policy To great extent party bureaucracy elite Its victory election built support local leaders positions authority village chiefs central officials Its apoeals during election moderation unity West Iran foreign importers campaign issues hinterland where P N I millions votes The party radical economic policy carried under Minister Economics Iskaq The close controls excercised government import licenses permits insured development large group capitalists ranks P N I politicians The material gains party members party certainly justified policy practical point The policies however slightest strctue foreign economic power Indone Other aspects P N I radicalism seemed built concrete considerations But concrete nstionalis pride national interest The fight West Irian largely matter pride P N I leaders within framework nationalist logic their claim certainly extreme unreasonable The refusal measures which would attract protect foreign investment seemed matter pride concrete interest Indonesia bound suffer economically policies alternative method national development adopted Yet national pride Dutch Indoneslan measured ruoiah The popularity P N I represents Or understands national pride better competitors Like Indoneslsn elite P N I willing anxious negative stands issues involving relations foreign wealth chosen positive direction which The mixed radicalism P N I Communist Party Informal cooperation communists three years lrgely matter convenience politics It immensely profitable P N I communists themselves Now there evidence sizeable segment P N I leadership believes fther cooperation communists unwise The communists power state administration police armed forces their support growing swiftly their dominance urban centers centr Java disturbing If P N I rather tenuous bonds which connect Communist Party refusing advice President Sukarno advocated inclusion communists coming government In making national unity obsession Suk indirectly advocated steps taken internal development which would offend greatly displease major group Any decisive toward national planning development conservative radical would bound estrange communists party would obliged oppose taxes labor regimeta almost would foreign investment The communists would P I continue recent course proud rather indecisive nationalism At rationalization political process proceeded Indonesia through election representative parliament But unpredictable ungaugeable factors loomed background Sukarno All Indonesian Congress functioning intermittently outsi4e regular channels politics providing rallying ground extreme nationalists parties communists At other political stage still seemed seriouslz unite efforts create professional standards espoused during squabble All Cabinet The future political either lndonesian Congress could become significant administrative political gains followed economic grozth The message elections goals Ih4onesian development future easily chosen The government administration shown ability carry through important tasks people indicated willingness follow leadership remains higher political leaders compromise objectives which would equal service country honor livelihood SincerelySs Boy R Compton Received New York