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5/31/1973 - Soft Governments and Hard Facts by Jeffrey E. Race

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT WRITER S CONSENT INSTITUTE OF CURRENT VORLD AFFAIRS JEF I Ngamwongwan Road Bangkok Thailand Soft Governments Hard Facts May Mr Richard H Nolte Institute Current World Affairs Fifth Avenue New York NY i0017 Dear Mr Nolte We surrounded institutions entire lives embedded By I course buildings walls rather people around having predictable pressure behave equally predictable We understanding physical forces acting Just because tangible little mystery ordinary We takes mortar cement bricks calculate portions factory We biological process hunger drives people malnutrition impairs working ability Social institutions impact people their intangible makes mysteries people In newsletters I marry insights technical literature observations Southeast Asia order institutions little understandable Among other things I shall institutions emerge holds together change benefits I believe vitally important reasons One social insti tution simply systemati behavior numbers people small family large whole society Thus I vitally impor understand institutions I shorthand collective behavior viewpoint coordination predictability With people every minute using world limited resources coordination predictability increasingly important A second reason discussion induced change economic development unjustifiab ignores institutional context which change supposed place There a4vice Let carefully institutions changed before devoting physical resources necessary accomplish changes agree necessary The approach I least newsletters examine specific institutions which intrinsic importance offer general lessons In newsletter I shall general observa tions institution paramount importance government In future newsletters I agricultural institutions business universities Each these important understanding happening inclusive institution society And happening Southeast Asian societies I ultimately The journey begins first At least principle institution responsible regulating other social institutions making effectively institution government Here I initial thoughts difficulties faced governments Southeast Asia dealing problems induced social change Let point departure observations Gunnar Myrdal AsJan Drama The national community characterized number institutional conditions unfavorable economic development notably tenure system detrimental agricultural advance undeveloped institutions enterprise employment trade credit deficiencies national consoli dation imperfections authority government agencies instability effectiveness national politics standards efficiency integrity public administration ineffective organs provincial local government rastructure voluntary organizations institutional conditions which together constitute these national communities states terminology At these institutional debilities degree popular participation rigid inegalitarian social stratification Soft states hampered Myrdal notes bringing about measures would stimulate economic development although course those measures ought hotly debated Nevertheless whatever kinds measures thinks should pursued pursued effectively states The larger though economic development extends measure alter behavior example policies increase social justice expand literacy education birth control bring about redirection consumption habits improve nutrition endless Improving effectiveness regulating agency itself puzzle moving whole society desirable directions We should recognize right though talking about power power edged sword That perhaps poetic whose benefit Thus I think important whenever about increasing power institutions government always distributive problem wh__o going benefit increased power reality public rhetoric There certainly efforts being carried increase power selected Southeast Asian governments without parallel concern whose interests being served effort I speak issue institutions accountable responsive endow greater capability anything To otherwise sponsible Is greater effectiveness matter greater coercion Many people believe To suggestive example Myrdal himself The serious dilemma covered verbal fuzziness about ideal voluntariness there little South Asia rapid development without sreater social discipline To begin absence discipline which appear without regulations backed compulsion measures rural uplift largely fective In principle discipline effected within framework whatever degree political democracy country achieve nothing dangerous democracy discipline But political social conditions these countries block enactment regulations impose greater obligations enacted cannot easily enforced What I suggest basis observations world answer compulsion extent works degrading people involved working contrary distributive justice Giving governments tools coercion solution I because there another solution apparent least There motivate people cooperate using positive incentives rather negative incentives This expand framework democracy Myrdal thinks possible reduce scope coercion reduce number people would resist ignore efforts their benefit The approach I suggesting possible sense easier another sense difficult current thinking about reforming governments It easier because require expenditure physical resources training courses buildings salaries expensive foreign advisors It because takes mystery governmental institutions ineffective It difficult deals currency Westerners accustomed dealing monetized economies little experience deals intractable social political problems going benefit current social arrangements compose government various levels psychic rewards receive Let couple typical developmental problems current spective bottlenecks First government trying bring about adoption varieties among farmers It wants agricultural extension agents framework existing cooperatives Assume credit available technology proven In country Thailand I think generally effort successful means Innovation follow S curve richest people adopting first The process never beyond S people innovation improve their incomes never adopt Here reasons happens For better going extension agent their information reading about innovations relying dealers cities They independent capital effort enough surplus survival though assume technology proven These people relying their infor mation market structure things For capital protection their resources They innovate profits further consolidate their economic ultimately political position The government effort intended provide pmrallel different structure particularly farmer market little The personal contact between extension agent farmer intended replace market source information The cooperative tended replace farmer access capital It might provide management inputs insurance This alternate government sponsored structure relatively effective market structure several reasons The government institutions themselves agricultural extension service cooperatives subject lities Myrdal mentions characteristic governments bureau cratic accountability failure carry orders tardiness failure provide information higher echelons occasional financial improprieties A second difficulty local cooperatives themselves opposed governmental superstructure endowed powers function requi level effectiveness A third entirely different problem extension agents government officials difficulty dealings villagers below Given institutional immobility solution currently chosen hearted efforts invigorate institutions without really knowing wrong while relying principally market resulting distri butive consequences contrary public policy Let second developmental situation rural unemployment underem ployment For variety reasons seasonality single farming there abundance labor power available rural areas various times At there capital projects which labor complete roads irrigation works wells It would desirable utilize labor Compul No This corve system abolished early century Cash payment T would drain national budget addition large scale might inflationary impact From conventional viewpoint there solution Have foreign donors Though framed terms specific examples problems general The kinds institutional immobilities which hinder agricultural innovation hinder innovation general similarly financial calculus applies across board trying motivate large numbers people If could break institutional blocks supplement motivation could economic social change financial alternatively could change given levels capital investment Well I believe there answers these problems though remain hidden arcane scholarly journals offered polemical context which turns reader To these ideas appear visionary impracti revolutionary It revolutionary governments adopted measures I discuss revolutions about I suspect revolutionaries ideas arcane scholarly journals actually going ordinary people In event faced unprece dented challenges quarter twentieth century I believe responsibility something different tells about selves Consider scene United States A ranking civil servant military officer walking corridor government office building From other direction subordinate approaches American courtesy dictates subordinate Good morning military Good morning passes superior What would scene Thailand In military location subordinate corporal sergeant would attention superior The norms civilian environment little different convey greater difference deference Thai pared American context This little story important moral Foreign advisors coming Thailand flattered pleased greater signs respect receive They should realize societies deference behavior prone poorly functioning public institutions Just understand think about It known sociology status differentiation impedes communication greater differentiation communication Two examples Fill strangers people obvious status marks speak New England accents speak regional accents other parts country After minutes kinds spontaneous groups formed Another example employee inner resistance walking On hi___s On president company As student inner resistance against walking professor The answers obvious these cases because internalized norms But thinking about realize since institutions require communication function social norms enforcing stringent deference behavior going bureaucratic institutions effective A slightly different aspect thing reluctance superiors perceived higher status accounts lesser display initiative situations Similarly paperwork going things whether orders carried The solution particular cause organizational neffectiveness there others reduce status differences In West happened gradually autonomously period places U S others France Spain It brought about rapidly eliminate least external signs exaggerated deference behavior Examples West German recently abolished onesuch deferential address officers Revolutionary governments extreme abolish deferential terms address remember French Revolution everyone citizen ferences dress One respond But government enforce enforce measures social norms The answer governments still things What their scarce resources where counts leading sectors economist might Status differentiation leading sector publi institutions better Another cause governments springs their social composition The civil service Thailand cannot provide living members middle ranks salary scales established decades inflation eaten originally handsome salaries For people problem For others however because civil service their enormous prestige money That prestigious consistent their social status outside Hence second grade civil servants earning month drive office their chauffeured Jaguars Mercedes It should plain particular incentive excel their since their status symbols tokens their social careers ordinary sense Thus rewards which could ordinarily motivate proper performance expected effect civil ervants In West change place which government bureaucracies became staffed career servants rather status adjunct their social standing Revolutionary movements revolutionary bureau cracies handle problem forbidding entry least making difficult members upper classes While justify equity grounds benefit individuals recruited coming lower classes highly motivated identical incentive A government Thailand obviously chosen revolutionary alternative neither society undergone gradual changes which would effect Both these processes result power within government inability superiors orders carried general ineffectiveness sluggishness That strictly within government hierarchy difficult superiors bottom But processes hinder spreading government influence among population itself vertical diffusion horizontal The status differences interfere contact between government people The latter prefer avoid contact signs deference enforced contact superior supposed inliate contact The Thai master attitude A typical example occurred Chumsri called police inquiry about automobile registration She identify herself official Chumsri Good afternoon May I please speak Lieutenant Phongnop Policeman Gruffly He Chumsri Will later Policeman Is called What nuisance Hangs Chum called immediately phone He turned private Such perceived position ranking public servant public A conversation illustrate another aspect obsession status Realizing futility using polite citizen approach calling police Chum ranking government official approach Note different attitude other Chumsri No Good afternoon polite particles Let speak Phongnop Policeman I Would office Chumsri Yes Run Policeman Returns panting telephone He Shall I While police extreme Thailand compared other bureaucracies there still large status differences between officials citizens regardless bureaucracy involved Thus these extreme incidents difficult contact between officials citizens Thailand compared bureaucracy another country exaggerated differences Not people themselves avoid contact officials declasse civil servant associate equal basis ordinary farmers agricultural extension agent under fingernails Since bureaucracies selves since people reluctant approach status problem result stagnation least rapid accom plishment programs different institutional environment I might petty corruption facilitated these status differences since impede communication With greater communication greater openness higher officials reluctance citizens demand redress public accountings abuses subordinates would frequently exposed decline Who recruited government similarly limits ability govern wants Right there fairly sharp demarcation between government officials civil service status hence power decisions district level people their leaders village level carry decisions To become civil hence enter arena power higher school certificate examination Entry restricted might expected there considerable overlap between social standing entry civil service Experiments shown situation power holders extend their influence sharing their power those below admitting limited circle power holders To return example underemployment Rather approaching villagers thing apart making demands there government offer decision making power local listened villagers these leaders using their influence villagers public projects Similarly status officials share their status local leaders citizens cooperate efforts public benefit This limited digging canal behavior government wants stimulate adoption agricultural techniques birth control measures redirection consumption increased savings What I saying there other kinds currency besides trying bring about desirable changes behavior should currencies disposal It seems modernization litera perhaps under influence Western educated economists talks about using payment assumes institutional rigidities constant which The benefits other kinds currency power status plain First saves scarce money Second diffusion power reduction status differences public institutions themselves better Third diffusion power reduction status differences greater social political equality Fourth lesser reliance market mechanism leads greater economic equality reliance incentives We innumerable studies capitalist development reliance profit incentive leads greater economic inequality several generations least Of course nothing world These kinds institutional changes But elites their power status which obviously rewards kinds governments talking about The reason these currencies would effective inspiring greater cooperation government because monopolized present One reason small interest present these currencies elites charge development plans It easier million World Bank think about sharing privileges Well maybe But I suggested earlier challenges facing unprecedented There enough investment capital accomplish tasks mankind decades ahead Sooner later going other kinds currency Some countries already surprising results general order broad outlines thinking In future newsletters I specific institutions changed better Received New York June