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6/30/1975 - Thai-US Relations by Jeffrey E. Race

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT WRITER S CONSENT INSTITUTE OF CURRENT VORLD AFFAIRS JEF Soi Sukhmnvit Road Bangkok Thailand Thai US Relations June Mr Richard H Nolte Institute Current World Affairs Fifth Avenue New York New York Dear Mr Nolte My recent visit United States provided opportunity exchange views large number people Over months I about observations arising these discussions begin following essay Thai US relations I Bangkok beginning uproar Mayaguez Affair major issue Bangkok US I writing essay I suggest though midst temporary upsets Americans should sight larger forceoving abuto S Race I write result shock leaving Bangkok May carrying perce ptions images current there entering discussions Washington starting There jarring between perceptions realities Bangkok these perceptions realities possibilities creative statesmanship senior levels American government I believe serious matter would share observations issue Domestic Politics Foreign Policy As I written earlier letters Thai domestic situation changed drastically probably irrevocably weighty implications decision making process course substantive outputs process including foreign relations There momentous domestic changes uprising elections The upshot uprising eject Marshals Thanom Prapat power constitution permit groups enter decision making process These groups members National Assembly labor movement students media intellec tuals informed public general In short Thailand become Jeffrey Raae Institute Fellow studyin institutions influence people behavior toward another today His current interest Southeast Asia United States openness society sharing power That similarity should easier American officials understand behavior Thai government ironically reverse A second momentous development January National Assembly elections which formation present Kukrit government The election contested parties obtained seats distribu which permitted party faction obtain clear majority The result coalition largely conservatives enough diverse interests government necessarily lacks authority anything beyond least common denominator policies might result collapse coali This particular election outcome greatly enhanced power politically active public groups contributed inability present cabinet decisive action The impact substantive content Thai decisions potent Thai leaders first their history public their policies They Fourth July speeches They subject public accountability The example project commercial airport concocted Prapat While there valid arguments airport project proposed colossal swindle This became apparent everyone after October project collapsed disadvantage involved The lesson learned Bangkok policy including foreign public acceptability Regarding foreign policy there widespread public fears counts longer close US policy tight alliance US another gigantic swindle biggest benefits going generals their associates The curious thing domestic shift foreign policy plications understood noticed echelons US officialdom As Thai alone Southeast Asia decisively toward democratic regime which US claims fight Vietnam there encouragement recognition Mr Kintner Mr Kissinger Mr Ford This apparent other American public officials appear genuinely misunderstand Thai domestic politics necessity American July speeches The entire Thai elite West least American US American troops noble reasons otherwise Public statements which suggest contrary cannot taken value Yet American officials impatient Thai leaders upset somehow longer running tight Prapat Park There statement frequently heard government offices Washington God But occupying those cabinet seats through vicissitudes single election newborn parliamentary system experience elections months different results Furthermore prudent depends largely US wants When American leaders recover shocks which subjected recent months surely realize II The Southeast Asian Power Game The Thai leaders constituencies their present situation domestic satisfy office peninsular satisfy ensure peace peninsular constituency consists importantly communist states especially Vietnam The urgent satisfy these constituencies structures Thai leaders perception their world determines their foreign domestic policies I discussed domestic constituency above Let speak peninsular The history thousand years peninsular Southeast Asia marches countermarches among contending empires kingdoms petty principalities millenium major actors Thailand disappearance others Chams Mons enfeeblement others Burmese Cambodians Lao While earlier times conflicts understood carried strugg local advantage recently particularly about middle Century local struggles became blended finally submerged larger struggle world power centered Europe The tools conflict shifted dramatically recent years In former times conflicts waged massed armies kings elephant The modern instruments subversion insurgency which China playing Burma which Hanoi playing Laos Cambodia South Vietnam which Thailand playing Laos Cambodia The reasons shift apparent elaboration extra regional alliances longer overt attacks furthermore struggle longer resources opponent slaves treasure handicap regional struggle dominance If opponent repressing rebellion hardly support internal nemies contest adventures abroad At point range process consolidation contestants facing other Thailand Vietnam In twenty years Thailand waxed while Vietnam wracked internal conflict Thailand logically acted exacerbate Vietnam internal problems through assistance U S bombing territory DRV sending ground combat forces support southern contestant claim Vietnamese national leadership Thailand benefited handsomely American military spending At Thai leaders little hindered domestic constraints dictatorial nature their regime The U S helped perpetuate useful domestic structure means assistance police other internal security elements This Thai forward strategy remarkably successful period Vietnam potentially entity continue fragmented Thai leaders perpetuate similarly fragmented regime Laos cooperation South Vietnam harass Cambodia The Vietnamese authorities Hanoi attempted their obligatory means against Thailand aiding ongoing insurgent movement The evidence Vietnamese interest support movement Thailand North Northeast clear reveals since perhaps earlier Hanoi maintained steady purpose design Bangkok energy attention national resources advising supporting rebellions among tribes North disaffected ethnic Thai Northeast It plain domestic upheavals years Thailand unification Vietnam America flagging interest force major change course action The obviously continue uncertainty troubles ahead Thailand III The Unseen Triangle The Thai leaders military civilian somehow adjust realities increased Vietnamese decreased U S power They national interest their politically active public demands We seeing emergence specifically local conflict after century partial submergence If transition clear suddenly emerged sunlight regionalism understanding might would unambiguously emerge reflect local power balance But cannot because U S This makes problem difficult parties outcome indeterminate As stands Thailand evaluation close afford U S depends commitments which UoS willing Thailand America takes attitude waits Thail Yet Thailand calculation safety include estimate relationship between U S Vietnam Vietnam perceives U S still threatens might years local allies effect American designs peninsula obviously Thailand exaggerate independence order uncocked which Vietnam Thailand Thus structure which party behavior depends behavior others dangerous situation multiple reciprocal influences which least shock system reeling In ordinary times stable domestic systems serve flywheels prevent happening these ordinary times The Thai leaders fragile coalition satisfy wider domestic constituency power plays alleged American military presence Vietnamese planes Mayaguez affair blasted their credibility appearance country selling Prapat tradition Concurrently grasp foreign policy American Executive slipping under impact allegations deception suspicions about identities beneficiaries policies Congress responding arrangement American constituencies beginning insist substantive participation policy making happening Thai The situation Vietnam differs structure promises threatens fluidity outcome We about structure decision making Vietnam there reappraisal surely The existence centers Hanoi another Saigon offers further source fluidity Thus local mainland Southeast Asian system state great fluidity possibility profound rapid shifts Anything might emerge More specifically seems clear future intensity Thai U S relations crucially related emerging relationship between United States Vietnam If relationship remains hostile threatening Thai leaders follow course despite their preference another If U S demonstrate longer poses threat Vietnam sympathetically understands Vietnam problems regional because Congressional popular limitations another Thai responses ensue Precisely because structural indeterminacy situation possibilities creative statesmanship broad But short IV Closing Books What speaking final settlement century Western intervention Southeast Asia The region autonomous international relations period until Western interven swamp indigenous structure No century later receding obviously leaving contours changed relics lying beach Southeast Asia never again closed system kinds relations which outside powers undergo significant shifts intensity style And these dimensions determine degree strain which continue peninsula It context current American policy toward Thailand should viewed contrary tendency things pieces negotiation agreement there Policy makers linkages important these historic antagonism between Thailand Vietnam To specific future U S rights Thai territory U S interests elsewhere world crucially contingent Washington Hanoi Saigon There perception incorporated bureaucracy perception world The Thai leader under extreme pressure domestic constituency result events Vietnam Laos Cambodia gratuitous shocks which U S administered recent weeks The Vietnamese similarly crossroads They pragmatic methodical people should clear evaluating right options They looking U S looking Thailand They their bureaucracies coordinate their constituencies mobilize As I mentioned earlier because structure present situation actor homing perceptions others because domestic systems suddenly become unhinged stability years system whole great indeterminacy which almost anything might emerge relatively short But perceptions begin burea ucratic coalitions become mobilized around particular policies whatever might mutually reinforcing chain events ensue The system suddenly course which govern politics whole foreseeable future Countless bureaucrats diverse capitals their images perceptions their predictions commit plans paper system acquire rigidity which human sacrifice around The Implications America What stance United States complex situation The plainly should modulate interaction between multiple domestic constraints structure Southeast Asian regional politics produce outcome which consistent U S interests Doing implies sensitivity nature problem willingness limited leverage points which reful study situation shows available We cannot victims I short thinking subjectivity attitude aggressive followership Whatever however limited possibilities action uncovered exploited adopt widest possible angle vision control perfectly understandable feelings rejection pride bureaucratic public opinion Speaking first problem horizon short advantae durability conflict Whether instant history final settlement century Western inter vention Southeast Asia being hammered That vision guide activities whatever agreements example regarding bases consistent these larger processes order durable It perfectly conceivable dangerous should short advantage making commitments legal government which neither capacity honor deals Thai military Mr Kissinger recently supposed according Far Eastern Economic Review anger Thai prime minister Mayaguez incident consequence because Thai military happy Whether Mr Kissinger really occasion reported immaterial holds other senior American cials Making separate peace Thai military remains option these cannot exclude American encouraged Laos A related point Southeast Asia simply residual after accommodating interests elsewhere US domestic politics The character content relations penin sular Southeast Asia important implications erests elsewhere example Japan China Middle East The second point subjectivity I hesitate there other describe affliction We suffered powerful shocks American people level officials large sonal stake certain policies Were there subjective reaction should surprised But permit reaction becloud tasks opportunities In regard statements frequently highest levels One Well This pulsiveness present situation indeterminacy profound consequences because domestic constraints reaction which operate ordinary times broken Once certain tracks start rolling switch The second statement frequently They That abstract sense Saying dignity pride sense power feeling importance The question remains though whether proper conduct affairs great nation I suggest because overlooks funda mental international relations which powerful remain forming relationships powerful So while definition there difference power association This another saying fashionable crawl attitude perspective hardly conducive exploring common interests which stuff international relations certainly doesn fathom search domestic motivations Thai leaders which order easier things prefer difficu particular domestic configuration The third issue leadership Another statement frequently heard usually middle someone sentence There point pursuing point because X never accept where X Vietnamese Thai leaders Congress Muncie This statement usually offered irrefutable justification doing nothing Doing nothing I suppose policy doing nothing about relations Vietnam going serious consequences relations Thailand interests there elsewhere We arrive decision nothing considered judgment hopefully stand pattism pride custodial mentality liking passivity The meshing complex independent processes against opposition apathy public opinion bureaucratic interests function leadership Constituencies created persuaded positions prepared I dwell since methods known The point strong leadership likely produce outcome Southeast Asia aggressive followership produce another We consciously choose continue present stance aggressive follower choice costs should clear VI Conclusion I tried things describe actual structure politics Thailand peninsula offer answers attitude thinking about problem I cause conviction troubles decade about information though there lacks attitudes assumptions If I offer final thought routine activities persistent effort understand larger events frankly icult order accede graciously inevitable better antici Only preserve ourselves freedom action where truly avoiding traumatic experience decade being bludgeoned through portals world Received New York July