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2/12/1968 - Vietnam 1968 by Takashi Oka

TO American Embassy M Vietnam Vienna Austria February Mr Richard H Nolte Institute Current World ffairs Madison Avenue New York N Y 10017 Deaf Mr Nolte To write South Vietnam tense break faith those Vietnamese friends worked hoped prayed trsic frustrating years their vision foreign domestic tyranny And since final letter series which I hoped would record South Vietnam progress however halting difficult towards these goals I I conclusions somber No would happier I proved wrong I Vietnam being fought today hopeless I prospect anything anyone change Worst whether United States loses I likelihood Washington correct conclusions therefore I every possibility either fight similar future retire ostrichlike believe security Fortress merica To saddest aspect Vietnam inability learn experience Nhat United States proved That richest mightiest nation truly awesome expenditure ordnance firepower insignificant sacrifice human lives fought small Asian people whose means modern warfare despite Communist allies fraction Washington And United Sta loses There dwell consequenceS Friend alike American Goliath defeated David sneakers black cotton shorts I THE AMERIC GOaL I started_writing final newsletter before Vietcong unleashed their recent continuing series brilliantly coordinated attack gainst Ha other major cities before General Giap senthis tanks against Ionely hilltop outpost Lang Vei Despite gravity these events I still believe strict military terms United States capable holding It political Vietnam conflict continually vexed bedeviled handicapped obstructed massive A erican effort eventually overwhelm This conflict I frequently pointed cannot Americans against ietnamese It fught originally between kinds Vietnamese Communists against Communists It because contestants haDpens Communist United Staes inwolved In essence American goalis preserv global frontier between Communist Western worlds frontier being overrun force American officials frequently point restraint which Vietnam waged They limited limited means limited And limited defined safeguarding South Vietnam freedom choice In other words South Vietnam Communist plain people their choice because coerced through terror outright occupa A sophisticated defining American Vietnam would preserve drawn between Communist North Communist South Just United Statutes other members United Ntions South Korea North Koreans Soviet crashed across parallel argued today United Staes parallel Vietnm though Communists infiltration subversion rather direct assault across frontier If United States there stability elsewhere along frontiers between Communist Communlst worlds And course there domino theory If South Vietnam Laos Cambodia follow Then Thailand Burma Malaysi andfinlly Indonesia India outflanked Austra isolated Mny pmoplefind domino distasteful seems But these people cannot question rming growth C ommunist guerrilla activity Thailand doubt activity would intensify Vietnam conflict victory Hanoi I Communist victory could domino effect I effect inevitable It conceivable Communists Vietnam still insurrec neighboring country For whenall Vietnam Isunique No other nation Southeast Asia mater world duplicates Vietnam terms combining geograhy recent hisorical experience Bu Thailand Laos geographically anlogous border close Communist China But their recent history totally different Vietnam In Vietnam Vietnam Ho Chi Minh Communist llowers cpture leadership national independence struggle against French Ho Gsmdhi Nehru Aung Sn Sukarno country whole Northern Without charisma having independence struggle having decisive battle Dien Bien Phu I doubt Communists Vietnamwould gotten today Burmese Communist leaders almost nationalist credentials Vietnamese But Ho They independence struggle Still waging guerrilla inside Burma twenty years If communismiself whether_f Moscow Peking variety provides infallible dnamic stoke fires national liberation movements there reason Burmese Communists their contiguous border With China should A Communist victory Hanoi would undoubtedly inspire Communists elsewhere including those Burma Thailand At jargon Mac Tse Communist triumph Vietnam would mainly Ho companions successfully applied universal truths Marxism Leninism concrete realities Vietnamese revolution Communists Thailand Burma other country would still problem apply Marxism Leninism their specific situation Neither victory defeat could automatic Either would depend leadership other capabilities shown Communists themselves effectiveness response thereto Communlst rulers country question Indonesia recent example Communist party enjoying support President least fourth electorate quite different Vietnamese suffered spectacular perhaps temporary defet To recapitulate American Vietnam preserve defacto boundary between Communist Communist worlds Alloing breached Vietnam would destroy whole precarious basis which World War II world order rests Moscow cannot claim inviolability postwar boundaries Europe without recognizing Asia This seems summary argument comes Washington A modification holds while global frontier defined Europe Asia especially Vietnam altogether clear The Geneva greement provided Vietnam elections years They because South Vietnam refusal North The North refused accept refusal started guerrilla South The purpose American involvement Vietnam parallel whatever reason clearcut uncrossable parallel boundary between East Nest Germany Until North Vietnam Communist powers recognize continu The United States threatening North Vietnam right existence Communist state It prepared economic assistance Hanoi But insists Hanoi reciprocate respOting Sa right existence ommunist hopefully democratic Those rebut argument their reasoning point recognized Washington Geneva agreement nowhere referred parallel permanent frontier between Vietnams contrary provided Vietnam elections within years The neither Nashington Stae Vie whose Chief State emperor Bao Dai signed Geneva agreement invalidate argument since Washington specifically recognized would respect other Geneva powers concluded Therebuttal convince altogether It quite Geneva agreement clear point elections It South Vietnam blame refusing these elections But difficult determine minds gnatories drafted provision The signatories including Hanoi aware examples East West Germany North South Korea which partitioned temporarily Did Hanoi truly expect allowed South Vietnam peacefully after delay If victory agreement And other signatories believed country would reunited years provide regrouping Communist troops North Communists French South substantial movement civilian population directions Why should Catholic Buddhist CommUnists South O00 Communist cadres sympathizers North parallel truly expected temporary I cannot feeling signatories called parallel temporary dividing saving mericans Vietnamese Communist Communist their minds important thing hings could happen within years fighti stopped whatever arguments might either would difficult crank machinery worst Communist capture Vietnam years while Vietnms would coexistence marke utual recriminations armed incidents fullscale hostilities I critics official Washington first textually Geneva agreemen Hnoi grounds reunification country would follow years unrealized because Hanoi actions because South Vietnam specific refusal agree Vietnam elections extent Vietnam differs markedly either Germany Korea Withthisresew Igo nelwithofficial Nashingon explanation Vie preserve defaoto boundary between Communist Communist worlds refuse allow whatever reason boundary overrun force The American South Vietnam clearly defensive offensive And arises Washington global resDonsiili leader Western THE VIETNAMESE GOAL Independent American Vietnam however Vietnamese Quite distinct global aspect conflict Vietnam there purely Vietnamese aspect The ofcourse interrelated This whamakes conflicsocomplex difficult solve local_ issues involved would United Ses ineene UntileVietnamese spect colict uneseuntiltheVie nesegoal thereofisenergeically wholeheedly worked erican objective cannot chieved ashion proposition I stroly doubt hasrelypse lbeliee Nashiton understo taken decisivemeasures implement understandi enormous mility escalation bombi North coronta Mmscow million erican troops South Vietnam would necessary I believe until Washington acknowledge essential nacre Vietnamese aspect ofthe collier bombin North troops South achieve superficial tempmrary victory South I suprficial temporry victory possible pessimism Vietnam arises doubts Washiton understa dthatifbysomeracleitdoes SouthVietnitself beyond saris Perps lesson aDplied ailand Philippines other threatened country But consolation friends Saigon fsrated faithl efforts hieve their within limits seemed possible Vietnamese Vietnamese aspect colict In simple terms Vietnese people objectives first freedom foreign domination second goverent satisfies heir_loi justice national dimity while ensuri their physical security modicum economic oppornity objectives preceded erican involvement country Revolution polar Vietnamese because Vietnamese without without bottom systems government verystructure society their objectives unattainable Democracy notion individual rights repres ataive government another popular slogan concept I vaguer justice A Vietnamese would probably along paternalistic government it_was demonstrably ultimately ccountable preferably through elections If elocutions rigged government etuates itself arbitrary means clearly favors expense themany centuries right ebellion agains invoked Confucian notion revoc Heaven manda comes Until Communist victory Di Bien Phu which above Vietnamese national ctory overwhelming preoccupation ofallVietnamese first objective freedom foreign I Communists under Ho Chi followers Vo Nguyen Gip PhamVaDng others independence struggle I pointed earlisr Home bitterly Communist ietnamese I acknowledge Ho Chi Minh unquestioned leader independence struggle against French Before World War I French resistance movements mandarins Imperial court Western educa Nestern influence intellectuals began twenties thirties Neighboring China uphesal example Hun Yat Chinese Nationlists overthrowing Manchu dynasty struggling modernize nation struck responsive spark So Russian Revolution Nguyen Ai Quoc Ho Chi first Socialist Communist headquarters Canton recruited young intellectuals Vietnam In Nguyen Thai Hoc young schoolteacher influenced Chinese Nationalist revolution abortive uprising Yen Bay north Hanoi He captured guillotined Hoc became national party Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang savgely repressed French remnants China Nguyen Ai Quoc meanwhile patiently concentrating longterm organizational Among brilliar recruits Vo Ngu Giap Pham Van Dong Lmong Communists there patriots intelligenae determination dedication BUt their organization riddled cliques individual rivalries Many inspired ideas Rousseau Montesquieu others found their emamples Hitlerite Germany militarist Japan After outbreak World War II Japanese occupa French Indochina Communists collaborated Japanese Ho Chi Minh Communists worked underground cultivating contacts among others American O S S In August following Japanese Communists captured commanding heights thenationalist movement obtained Emperor Bo Dai bdiction their favor proclaimed Democrs Republic Vietnam Thereafter throughout years negoti tions guerrilla warfare against French Communists continued control until culmina victory Dien Bien Phu May In addition charisma nationalism Ho Chi Mirth cohorts showed consummate political skill their Communist compatriots In Ho government functional unity broadbased coalition against French Playing rivalries jealousies among Communist tionalists Ho outfoxed outmaneuvered every He willing point after World War II disband Communist party accept minority status followers coalition government Bu Communists always understood their opponents constituted essential political opposed trappings They tenaciously these essentials while entire Tonkin delta their center support under occupation Communist troops Nationalist China However failure Communist nationalists before cannot ascribed exclusively their shortcomings their petty squabbles political adeptness I agree Vietnamese friends place entire blame failure external factors rench Americans Japanese Chinese Yet these countries therein The rench colonial overlords principal share responsibility They missed opportunities First could gracefully accepted independence Democralic Hepublic Vietnam helped shore position Communists within government Chin still under Nationalist control would remain until Bao Dai young emperor abdicated favor republic enjoyed prestige within country mening scion dynasty which unified exended Vietnam before rench conquest Second rench decided break He could offered Bao Dal genuine independence ruler alternative regime This Bao Dai still uncompromised The Communists meanwhile begun enemies because their harsh areas controlled But Fourth Republic incapable showing empire divesting statesmanship displayed Labour government Britain They shadow substance independence Bao Dai accepted pottage people birthright The formation Bao Dai ruled State Vietnam Communis nationalists acute dilemma They regime really independent But sense colonial breaking Britain giving India Holland Indies FTanCe alone could hardly continue cling colonies Some nationalists therefore accepted positi under Bao Dai reasoning could increase their control their country their freedom action visavis French Meanwhile French would defet Communists It choice between rench Communists nationalist We could example other countries Communists would beable dislodge _time Whereas rench bound sooner So purely temporary expedient chose Pr Many nationalists rationalized decision saying Ho taking advice Chinese Russians After Chinese Communist takeover mainland China nationalists played Vietnamese dislike Chinese claiming Ho Peking puppet But Ho regime Vietnamese recognized without question The contrast between Communist regime making itsown decisions while accepting advice limited material outside called nationalist Bao Dai regime completely dependent French existence Vietnamese ionalists eriod choose Communists ground least fighting ntional independence The French meanwhile succeeded inveigling Americans Indochina conflict saying Korea struggle between Communisl world West Communists allowed transgress world Communist world border would impunity others Thus United States found itself helping French fight communism Indochina countr where prior question independence versus continued colonial solved This egregious error fortunately repeted elsewhere world least blatant degree The Genev agreement anomlous unsatisfactory sitntion After dlssstrous battle Dien Bien Phu rench retire Indochin They ccepted saving formula Vietnam elections years meanwhile dividing Vietnam rllel between French Union forces including those Bo Dai ruled State Vietnam those Ho regime Though there controversy about exact meaning Geneva sreement defcto result Communists control North Vietnam Communists similr control South The Prench Expeditionary Corps country first mmunis Vietnamese house alhough huseby Ngo Dinh Diem became premierwih Anerican epppor eplaced Bao erarefeenm prclaimeeRepubliceVietnam ution naional assembly paries oher_ zappings Wes demooraCyo Where Bao Daihadbeen meanlr indeoisive Diem heroghl ooianathoroughly convinced heaven resed onhim alone Ne begam dilemma U States Before problemiie mhadbeenwhetherorno ofight communism befre onalIndepenemcehadbee achieved er1954 national indepeenoewasmeleer issue esecondp Ofhe Vie gal_lmeniod eazlier goverent jsice opportunity democracydeeono progress became For namese comnism alrea allshed system which For Vietnamese he_Sou still oppor competition between CeleSte nonomnis system would prove better ergazed responsive people needs demds economic uplif social reform eColonists terms efeemce sropoint their leadership independence In every possible tried people So believe fight inked ericans the_ench If majori South Vietnamese couldonly persuaded Comnis battle B waged exclusively second issue system of_goveren Conis nonounis would Vietnamese wanted nonommunis still chance Many Americans hoped Diem weuld ahlish egime sufic democratic offer Vietnamese meningful alterntie tCommunist Numbers idealistic Vietnamese filled hope_returned broad instuce Communist offer newPresi their services But fulfilled Diem brothersimpnsed people_of South Vietnam authoriltarian regime whichimitted Communists institutions methods secret police elitist party trary arrests added these tradi tionaloices nepotism corruption The Diem regime efficient Communists III RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ANERICAN AND VIETNSE GOALS Let discuss third major point interrelationship between American Vietnamese goals As I earlier Washington interested lmostexclusively global aspect ietnam conflict The Vietnamese however fight primarily struggle between opposing Vietnamese forces which enjoys supper escow Peking while other overwhelmingly relies United Staes Already I period before Americen allowed themselves become involved Vietnam struggle national pendence Communists Communist participation gainsl French Washington ustified early involvement aspect global confrontation between Western Communist camps Af French bowed Vietnam For practical purposes United States became external supporter Communist _Vietnamese restricted Vie south 17th_parallel In immediate years Communist military activity South Vietnm minor though infrastructure established during preceding eight years remained Washington tried utmost improve Diem regime image among people South Vietnam Privately Waahington officials disllusioned fairly early about austere sharkskin suited Presi devotion understanding democraic inciples practices In public muffled their doubts rarely expressed polite concern about particularly egregious example unfairness towards osition figures In instance Saigon invalidated electionof Harvard educated Dr Phan Quang Dan after popular doctor surmounted obstacle after obstacle assembly The American British Australian ambassadors President Diem occasion effect Now They brought enough pressure Pr esident irritate enough achieve their obective which wasto allow Dr Danto almost solitary opposition representativ It inlhis atmosphere heavy disillusionment disappointed hopes Communist Vietnamese Hanoi having failad obtain promised Vietnam elections reactivt guerrilla warfare terrorism means achieving unificalin country under Communist The Communists began terrorism increasingly largescale ambushes pitched battles Using South Vietnam N tional Liberation Front stheir political Comnist leders South reactiveted progressively strengthene orgniza cntrol apparatus vulnerable villages South Vietnamese ountrysid The growth active military threat Communists confirmed strengthened Washington original preoccupalion global confrontation between Communist Nestern camps sanctity parallel world frontier between camps The concept competing Communists offer thepeople better government justice freedom economic opportunity forth never disavowed smothereduder increasing weight preoccupation Communists military challenge Nashington trapped vicious circle It recognizdthat Communist challenge military political It could counter military threat pouring equipment money eventually ground troops To political challenge however Washington could little This Vietnamese Only popular government popular leader coulddo But leders growing onany Diem might ideal Washington argument whoculd placa If Vietnamese forward seized Diem place affair Vietnamese themselves But could Wasugton itself engage cloak dagger overthrow President could certain better successor Meanwhile every every helicopter every sheet roofing material every cement fertilizer United Staes brought strengthening Diem regime capcity teeth Communist rebellion every other domestic opposition So Diem brothers change their harsh repressve internal policies military economic United Stles nothing increase their popularity Vietnamese population taied United States Diem unpopularity family It Communists identify Diem Americans substantiate their theme again leading struggle national libera against Americans instead gainst French It entirely Communists claim Washington SuppOrts reactionary dicta torial regime world remains Communist In Washington often doing itsuffers iutermittent pangs conscience especially newspapers Congressmen start publicizing unsavory aspects regime Washington favor tactical reasons I cynic profound believer doctrine United States advocate practitioner democracy should comes naturally thatwhen allows communism other of_extremism distort perspective acting mntrary nature interests Washington cannot successfully imiat Communist methods other totalitarian methods either extensively period because there something within thsna American permit practices continue When Washington condones practices ntions supports officia Is charged executing American policy these countries themselves wrestling inner onflics reflected inconsistent indecisive external behavior This sound impossibly naive I believe ambassadors immune inner conflict In Washington continued supporting Diem regime despite obvious authoritarianism grounds viable alternative Communist challenge The powerful threaiening challenge became repressively regime respond incline towards moving direction cultivating broader popular support through relaxation instead intensificati controls Diem survived rooper November bombing palace pilots February finally toppled November military revolt Washington abandoned Diem during final months after summer contest theBuddhists clear popular support reduced jailing school children order himself power I agree those Washington deliberately betraYed Diem generals But betra another sense It could tried earlier haveforced Diem change before authoritarian style fully crystallized while degree meaningful political opposition still existed above ground Theeffort succeeded At never tried Diem reason believe_ United States would abandon remained uncompromisingly Communist All isnow water under bridge Diem years But perhaps Washington official occupies important policymaking recall conversation I summer while Diem still riding He rebutted doubts about thefuture cited equipment helicopters support aircraft concepts strategic hamlets Ranger companies defense forces brought campaign expressed confidence capabilities President Diem brother Ng Dinh Nhu principal ministers victory possible within framework those American ground troops bombing North He things going United States could continue support South Vietnamese necessary until Communists struggle The Communists willing fight twenty yearsm match I This propaganda Surely practical terms immediate period within which evaluate progress decide Oh official replied I would three years Unless three years doing better I would would serious situation whether worth going ffort It exactly three summers later first American ground troops frankly intended fight South Vietnamese landed beaches Vung Tu Earlier MaTines landed Danang their original purpose protect bases which bombing North Vie being conducted The Nombing Norlhbegan February Today United States armed ferces inSeuth Vietnam approaching halfamillien morethanwhattheFT enchExped tlonaryCorpshain whole vietnm before There South Korean _visions Australian New Zealand brigade Thai brigadeand Philippime combat fightingalongside Americans course South Vietnamese under But sight And I submit thedlfficulti heartaches frustrations United States suffers Washington inability intelligently relate limited goals those partners Communists South_Viatnamo I repeat American preserve the_glmbal frontler between Communist Western worlds frontisr fromheing overrun force South Vietnmlies athwart frontier achievedonly preserving Communist South Vietnam Even bombingofNorthVietnamisdefensiveipurpose tleast themindsof officials ordered The purpose conquer_North Vietham weaken effectiveness North Vietnamese troops fighting South The South Vietnamese Communists South Vietnam including nearly million Northern refuge building safeguarding government justice ntional dignity physical economic security The territorial preservtion So Vi etnam entity distinct North Vietnam cannot Vietnamese either Communists Communists cause every Vietnamese recognizes entire country people tonoe culture national deutty Vietnamese fighting whether Communist Communist national independence Vietnam survival Vietnam issue exceot official propagandists Hanoi claims Vietnamese against American imperialist aggressors Saigon tently lesis successfully claims Vietnamese aided Americans repel foreign ideology charges Hanoi victory would Chinese domination Vietnam Vietnam survive whoever although American bombing North Southern villages continues present enough poeriod wonders survival The question between Communist Communist Vietnamese simply which Vietnam emerge fighting Vietnam completely controlled North South Communists Vietnam which least South Communists continue chance demonstrate their government humane effective Hanoi The contest between Communists Communists Sou Vi etnam taking place under conditions closer closer approximating total To inhabitants Saigon other major cities savage street fighting weoeks brought dimension terror previously known peasants longsuffering palmlef hutted countryside I final psychological effect terror citydwellers But claim generals leading Saigon government brutal confrontation realities galvanizing dwellers misjudge current temper South Vietnamese people whole The tragedy Vietnam precisely point neither cityfolknor rural peasantry actively prefer Communist Communist You I prove I certain Communists enjoyed support claim really commanded loyal adherence majority South Vietnam eople would phenomena heralded final Chiang Ki regime mainland China whole armies deserting Communists intellectuals politicians professional leaders flocking Communist cause No amount American troops would suffice The_fact erosion occurred tribute superior morality leadership Communist Hther telling indictment inflexibility inhumanity Co mmunist Dring fight independence gainst French Co mmunists under HoChi Minh unques ioned leders nationalist cause Today tever charisma retinrests almost exclusively credit built during those bygone years They added little their lustre their current fight because South Vietnamese American because Communists shown little generosity imaginmion towards their Southernbrethren They chosento drive singlemindedly victory looked disregarding should obvious jsrou objective circumstances radically changed I cannot ccept claims forward Western supporters Cmmunist Liber Front essentially different Hanoi pepresents itself coalition South Vi under Libera Front control would remain separate North Vietnam These arguments could conceivably Washington itself fcesaving withdrawing Vietnam But fundamental conflict Vietnam still squarely between Communists Communists The Communists because demonstrably support jority population But equation Wshington consistently glosses Communists desDite theUnited Stles gigantic effort their behalf because gined psitive allegiance popul End pessimism future course springs before Vietcong attacks against cities warweainess cynicism sttled thick across unhaopy across untended paddy fields fetid refugee camps obscenely gaudy lights mountainous garbage heaps Saigon Generals Thieu Ky about sacrifice reform believes Everyone knows corruption continues grows highest places yether little purposeful public indignation because people compromised I suspect although I cannot prove under these conditions fewer fewer people asking Give government cause worth asking simply Give peace The demand totlly natural totally understandable It nevertheless tragic demand because factor I mentioned erlier today majority population relly prefer Communist C mmunist In ountless convers tions ihopponens presen Saigon regime ranging cashiered general conservative merchant radical bonze I struc pathetically wishful nacre _their common refrain that_somehow achieve understanding arrangemen Communists because re_present people while generals obviously manage secure peace withou Communist ighting stops overwhelming aversion people Communist mnifest itself clear manner Communists forced ccept merely shring political power minority status coalition government And where Co mmunist Vietnamese company Western opponents Washington Asian policy These opponents generally Communists still represent Vietnamese national cause Washington should struggle because cannot singlehndedly fight Vietnamese people forever These Western opponents ignore dilemm South Vietnam Communists first still comprise majority population second mjority supports neither Communists present regime corrupt fction generals Saigon IV SOME POLITICAL AND EGONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN AID TO VIETNAM What enormous American militar material effort Communist Vietnamese It staved military collapse successive Saigon regimes It other words bofght non3ommunists South Vietnam whole But Washington colossal expenditures canno From beginning American involvement obvious unless political Vietnamese themselves Washington Vietnamese together something weeks months years gained through American bombs helicopters assault craft lives would still Washington always reconized theory practice taken tentative inconsistent steps towards implementation On military Washington efforts Vietnam continuous consistent steep upward curve On political there constant zigzag accompmfed mutual recriminations between Washington Saigon between Americans Americans Yet American South Vietnamese gools incompatible Prescrva Co South Vietnam ground common Washington would satisfied preservation The Vietnamese further What South Vietnam preserved This crucial issue Washington ambitious unattainable unless measurable progress towards solving insistent question If problem Vietnam purely military rising input military effort whether Vietnamese themselves Washington Vietnamese together Washington alone should sufficient I problem purely military Washington admitted times military means thorns elves The Vietnamese could beocause Hanoi military victories because inuing political failures Saigon I animpartial Qbserver II cnnot bring myself categorically thatSaigon failed already therefore irrevocably doomed But honest I record belief political terms Saigonhas brought times isster ccasion rescued political sagacity additional incremento American military This unhappy situation result notomistakes inadequacies Communist Vietnamese alone American insensitivity bungling In Americnsmy greater culprits The first serious political mistake Communist Vietnamese after Genev treaty confirming their control Houth Vietnam order priorities adopted Ngo Dinh Diem He establish strong gowernment stable government effective government All energies those brothers concentrated first points The United States which could helped stability ultimately dependend great measure justice effectiveness government allowed establish power structure borrowed copiously Communist example Diem American advisers plethora advice echnlcal aspects running administrion budget police training cadres But important question political conten American timid manner maiden rather partner venture equally important sides Diem generals succeeded committed Communist Vietnamese leaders second serious mistake They faled realize energy enthusiasm especially young could harnessed building government freedom opportunity after Diemist uression They refusedto sere_ urgency sweeping political reform While temporized impatiently carried against others Again Ameri remained silent Thus began succession oountercoup continued until ouster Nguyen Chanh Thi crushing Buddhist rebellion Throughout process Washing demanded stable government governmentwhichin effect would enable United State continue Communiss Washington refused stable government parcel about If political stability Washington would would clean those Vi etcong The presidential legislative ction campaignsof_1967 third perhaps serious mistake committed Communlst Vie tnamese whoform power elite Saigon The whole point these elections establish government could claim unimpeachably speak people Communlst South Vietnam But conducted manner merely confirm generals already controlling government power Nguyen Van Thieu Chief State Nguyen Cao Ky Premier first themselves rival candidates civilian running Alarmed splitti military ticket American officials their utmost secure withdrawal either Thieu Ky The volatile sentimental Ky stepped accept presidential nomination under Thieu From point results foregone conclusion The generals rammed through provisions stipulating plurality rather majority would assure election They pressured Constituent Assembly turning candidacies known Communists Buddhists peace partisans popular general threatened their position The civilian candidates course fault The principal civilians Phan Khac Suu Tran Van Huong their partisans failed unite forces Generals Thieu Ky On American there Was effort bringing civilians together comparable pressure earlier brought Qn military Im _dmspite impressive peace garne scarcely nowncandidae Tru Dinh Dzu Thieu election although secured third total wetes The repression discriminationagainst militant_Ti Quang Buddhists which accompanied campaign unwlse unimaginative tactics Buddhists thems elves ensureda Senate hevily weighted favor Catholics whocomprise 12percent tQtal_population Thegenerals gictory likely prove Pyrrhic The total popular response toSaigon appeal national solidarity following recent Communist attoks urban centers shows little crediithe regime managedto Buildup during three andahlfyearsin conlinuous power But generals alone suffered erosion popular support The realvictim dreary series ofevezts I afraid _isthe whole viability nonommunist toust effective govarnment Elections currency ofdemecraoy Unfair elections debseand discredit currency popular When Vietnamese conciliar comes viewed power struggle between dicatorships Communists always claim claim acknoJledged better organized efficient The generals performance would creditable civilian politicians proved incapable governing country generals activities their proper field defense nation gratitude nation But civilians never really chance The generals continuous control except short months period Diem downfall November present During period South Vietnamese proved ineffective coping Communist insurgency million American ground troops their places In their election cmpaign generals sweeping promises corruption infuse administratio spirit reform In other chose their record spite against Who could statements perhaps gnllible members American Congress Today South Vietnam facade democratic constitutional government President Vice President elected terms Senate House Representative elected There slender possibility alternative leadership present develop within ranks legislature But running people warweariness grows South Vietnam hothouse atmosphere plants shoot unseasonably their stalks trimmed The result these series political mistakes domestically Saigon government possesses little credit credibility people while externally reputation probably lower during years Diem regime Ngo Dinh Diem conducted fairly active diplomacy United States various West European African states His successors international support preoccupied trying themselves power international field almost exclusively United States sending envoys ministers occasional forays aopeal friendlier world press In practically every foreign country where Saigon representa United States Information Service Vietnamese Embassy supplies rapid information about progress tries counter flood Hanoi Liberation Front propaganda More important almost direct proportion escalation American military effort South Vietnam Saigon government sense political responsibility atrophied All Communist Vietnamese including course members Saigon government American absolutely essential All thatWashington decide continue intensify bombing North Vietnam negotiate refuse negotiate roops Vietnam withdraw without slightest reference Vetnamese desires All ifWashington should decide withdraw Communist Vietnamese would suffer Washing On these Communist Vietnamese particularly generals years controlled government American military presence growing They periodically President Johnson Dean Husk Robert Macnamara receive categoric assurances United States continue whatever necessary On other demonstrations United States elsewhere They presidential election coming Vietnam bound issue They President Johnson periodic offers negotiate Hanoi American contacts Vietcong South Vietnam National Liberation Front Nashington repeated promises Saigon evidence Saigon generals around massive nature American military shield diminishes almost point absolution Saigon responsibility success failure If badly Washington concerned Saigon Saigon redress balance compared unlimited resources available United States Under these circumstsnces Saigon concern seems appearances If Washington worried about corruption Saigon dismiss province chief If Americans complslu about large number young Salgon streets generals draft calling eighteen The possibility spite assurances Washington might suddenly terms Communists increases Saigon insecurity sense hopelessness about relevance actions visavis final outcome I believe Washingt0n intentions escalating Vietnam conflict entirely honorable I believe escalation planned advance Topsy aptly Frankenstein In President Kennedy basic decision change nture sending helicopters vastly stepping military adviser program I advisers thought within years million American ground troops would fighting South Vietnam In would probably argued after frustrating experience Korea never should American fight Asian At I believe American military escalation South Vietnam unnecessary defecating Unnecessary because nonommunist Vietnamese truly capable competing Communists politically their military modest American program perhaps somewhat Hanoi infiltration South should beensuffioient balance Self defeating because giwen United States takes military economic bnrden responsible Saigon becomes difficult becomes develop kind_of leadership Communists compete effectively Communists Washington seems suffer illusion about leadership which damaging illusion about politics underdeveloped countrle In underdeveloped countries often people ready Western style democracy elections parliaments Pater nalistic needed Only after considerable period oftutelage democracy learned But democratic practices cnnot learned except through practice A political party cannot become responsible party until fought elections To responsible political parties before holding elections before horse A political responsible voters through elections nothing clique coterie The whole point political parties fight elections As leadership again developed througha tutelage having decisions Nations children thrown water learn through experience flounder about until under The primary reason Communlstsr Vietnam failed develop effective leadership devilish cleverness Communists continuous dependence Communists outsid support inest Chinese Japanese French Americans Each these outside powers Communist nationlists promote their interests their goals Each could entrust Vietnamese nation nationalist proteges Washington argue motives better those predecessors backwards respect Vietnamese sovereignty manner involvement Vietnam conflict nothing diminish Vietnamese leadership sense utter dependence United States Recently I Finland Finnish friends about Winter War their desperale three months fight agaust Soviet invaders after rejected Soviet demands territorial concessions naval Finnish veryone Nest aoplauded called heroic Finnish friend exclaimed But We fight alone The Finns again after Hitler invasion Soviet Union In managed separate peace which saddled territorial concessions enormous reparations But their stubborn fight given Russians healthy respect Finnish military capacities Meanwhile Finns reevaluated their position counsel among themselves might survive They people million geographically adjoining Soviet Union sensitive strategic They could change geography If arose would fight again themselves They decided would retain sufficient defensive capacity Soviet invasion would walkover At about determinedly prove Soviet Union would never allow third country Finland channel invasion against Soviet Union In every possible sought ngthen economic other their giant eastern neighbor while retaining freedom action domestic field And largely succeeded Today Finland remains communist control while externally managed elbow itself Stalinist atmosphere European detente If chance United States aided Finland against Soviet Union would Finland position today happier actually No A thousand years Finns still unchristianized tribesmen living Vietnamese already behind centuries civiiz ation withstood nearly thousand years Chinese without absorbed strongly developed sense nationhood Nho would worse Finns forced facts without crutch American Washington fatal mistake Vietnam seems escal ation itself escalation place before Communist Vietnamese achieved consensus regarding desirability escalation Washington mesmerized Communist rushed supplies finally troops obtaining facto recognition governments without effective channels communication their citizenry It takes enormous discipline government people resist corruptive effects sudden massive American If government lacks discipline begin withy American geometric effect whatever tendencies towards corruption influence peddling already exist recipient country I great poverty I recognize American given excl1sively military purposes trickledown effect living standards areas economy directly related But nineteenth centur laissez faire attitude towards enough There purposive American merely military emergency national goals recipient country If American helps achievement these goals If there institutional societal governmental obstac hindering fforts ashington enccurage recipient government these obstacles rdless charges interference domestic affairs United States itself constitutes grossest direct interference country internal affairs The secret communism successes China Vietnam penetration village government competition Communists likewise through villagers This enormously difficult practice The Communist always starts inside village government frequently outsider trying magic password hearts It certainly under conditions cruel civil Vietnam Communists automatically respond immediately needs villagers forces Saigon But probably Asian lands Communists adept manipulating villagers government I believe principal reason nimbleness Communist doctrine Communistshve choice The village absolutely essential Communists Without would hilated The government however especially government enjoying massive American support along without village For instance Saigon bsolutely dependent Mekong delta order population citfes deficit areas would direct economic policies towards obtaining This would merely unimaginative military sweeps during harwesting season whole complex measures warehousing transport distribution incentive system producers But Saigon without delta rather cushion itself against sharp fluctuations supply delta thanks American which grain either Thailand direct United States Therefore without grower It cannot course dispense altogether But under direct pressure something peasant would desperately needed produces But Vietoong depend peasant He their source logistic support Saigon propaganda would believe Vietcong simply confiscates grower This being whole story Certainly there terror certainly there confiscation there judicious combination carrot stick continuous stream propaganda aimed making individual villager essential success Liberation Front cause All Saigon efforts hitherto those Saigon American backers directed towards getting Communists village These efforts inconsistent On Saigon tries attract farmer Communists through material favors fertilizers schoolhouses modern pigsties On other seeks village Communists bombing forcibly moving population their ancestral refugee camps destroying crops provide villagers livelihood I believe Sigon efforts should rather directed towards tying villager cities This thing Communists cannot Their villagers Jlive economic political isolation government controlled towns If farmer other products given price townmade goods readily available through peratives distribution credit system farmer favor would given schoolhouses maternity clinics government favors would income build things himself Any Communist efforts break village links would resented farmers themselves would their prosperity depended these links But Saigen suchmeasures Saigon American advisers actively For Saigon exist without village thanksto American And Americans enthusiastic about teaching villagers fertilizer improved seeds awayfrom institutional reform I Saigon changing attitude towards village Nor matter I Bangkok Vientiane New Delhi Rawalpindi doing within limits political system under which thoey operate To farmer produce because better seedsor fertilizer thing To become sufficient prosperous entrepreneur through reform system bution credit network another Too powerful vested interests oppose upsetting trnsform simple peasant entrepreneur In these countries heavy doses foreign often palliatives putting revolutionary changes structure society required before energies released Nho going bring changes The Communists Ne evolution revolution answer lking about This course qmestion larger circumference immediate problems Vietnam I means arguing Communists developed infallible approach towards establishing effective control economically politicall2 backward societies Bu I believe Vietnam perhaps elsewhere original Ammrica assumptlon easygoing therefore unrealistic namely escalating injections military material would sufficient restore country political economic health however desperate condition The number courageous ghted Vietnamese repeatedly pointed basic mutual commitment Vietnamese Americans program sweeping institutional societal reform The commitment basic And mutual Without commitment without recognition causes Vietnam critical illnesses Washington massive material progressively disintegrative effect eroding Vietnamese reliance sense responsibility Saigon Washington frequent service commitment misusing overworking revolution slogan rather program fulfil eanwhile weeks turning months years options early conflict disappear leaving Nashington increasingly unpslatable choice between total victory surrender V PEACE WAR Nhat I already postulated I afraid going happen United Stakes along Saigon proteges probably suffer defeat because tarily inferior Communists cause period frittered opportunity after opportunity offer people South Vietnam meaningful effective round alternative Communi because enormous weight American effort insufficient still bring opportunities But because I myself emotionally involved conflic sorely tempted laest round Communist ataok Dien Bien Phu atmosphere minds Vi enamese people provide Communist cause oppor unity The positive aspect CQmmunist cities renewed proof provided Hanoi cause still lacks majority support cities There little response Communist appeals pular uprising enthusiasm Saigon generals This could moment I effor nationaloonsensus It asking Saigon geneals expec would accept personal responsibility having grievously miscalculated Communist military capabilities therefore Bu could perhaps persuaded poentially significant Washington reallyo inclined The cenrl esion Vietnamese asking today because relaes direct manner their daily lives question Hithert Saigon simply assumed II Communists werefr It never allowed airing question I brands peaue partisans traitors As result Communists while waging savage terroristic against civilian targets monopoly exploitation complex nearly universal Vietnamese longing peace If nsensus something nproaching consensus could reahe after debae question governmen uonsensus would first assert degree independence Washington Hanoi _because first would taken Communist Vietnamese whole hands But _question important debaed slolely press which event still muzzled important Senate House Renresent A better forum would anational salvation conferance called Pre sident himself discuss laest Communist ataoks possible onsequencas significant Communist elements including soldiers civilians Buddhists Catholics neutralists march north extremists should invited their presentatlves The Sena House_ Representatlves would course included Outstanding figures outside these bodies should invited The question peace should thrown searching discussion The United States should matter course clear would abide decisions conference whether peace continue The Communists would certainly sabotage conference dissenssion disrupt delibermions If enference decided peace Hanoi Liber Front might flatly preposa vaguely while fighting Militarily would period great But would unseen risks Saigen Washington running today because refuse associate people South Vietnam crucial issue whether peace continue How could representative character conference assured I believe there determination fundamental point conference empowered discuss question there would difficulty selecting membership might think Besides Senators Representatives there would astrong military representatives balanced represent tives various religions Conroversil popular figures Generals Duong Van Mirth Nguyen Chanh Thi could called abroad participate important advocates peace should given unpressured opportunity Despite muzzling press importnt these dvoctes known Names suchesAu Truo ngThanh ndVOVanHuyencomeimmediatelytomind Catholic Song Dao Buddhist La Boi groups Politics possible I foresee torrent objections ideas lined above I great confidence adopted But partial mutilated version oomsidere _carried I believe there would clearing effect stale cynicism Saigon politics The point proposal horogh_ ventilation_be given question peace advocates peace given hearing The Saigon generals airing because think could snowballing demand negQtiations This azeal possibility Saigon wants recapture ashington initiative sense responsibility As Washington clearly Vie_tnmese decision either peace would solve cruel dilemmas allowing either dignified withdrawal program renewed assistance based mutual rights obligations dangerously unbalanced nearly singleh aaded effort Washing crrently fight against Communists The conference could conclde after thorough examination issues involved including direct contacts Liberation Front Hanoi peace Communist terms unobtainable except abject surrender Any decision continue resulting conclusions would first enjoy degree popular support because first public would throughly informed about consequences opting either peace If there right people South Vietnam rural urban peast merchant soldier school teaoher housewife peddler earnel through journey across blood reaed children tricked conned cajole nwalked adults capable weighing determining POSSCRIP The writing these newsletters privilege Ithasforcedmetodisciplinethough psnotohedegree required far_more I _accustomed graeful Dick Insti having given opportnity those readers whose _comments criticisms challenged delve search Sincerely yours Takahi Ok Received New York February