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522 Fifth Avenue
New York 18, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Rogers,

Since my last letter to you I have traveled literally thousands of miles, visited scores of fascinating places, and talked with hundreds of interesting people (both "important" and "unimportant"). The immensity and variety of China is awesome, and for the first time many areas which heretofore have been merely spaces on the map to me have taken on the dimensions of reality in my mind.

A great deal of my time has been spent in moving from place to place, and I have used almost every conceivable form of transport -- from airplanes to horses and from steamships to river junks.

After leaving Chungking I traveled continuously (my longest stopover being one day) until I arrived in Tihwa, capital of Sinkiang. For various reasons I was forced to take a circuitous route: by boat through the Yangtze Gorges from Chungking to Hankow, by air from Hankow to Shanghai, by train from Shanghai to Nanking, and by air from Nanking to Tihwa.

I spent about a month in Sinkiang and divided my time between Tihwa and various nearby places. For the first few days I absorbed local atmosphere, read (or reread) all the material I could find relevant to Sinkiang, and collected and analyzed the available documents concerning the Ili Revolt in the northwestern part of the province. The American Consul, J. Hall Paxton, with whom I stayed in Tihwa, was extremely helpful in briefing me on the background of the present situation. Then I began a long series of interviews with Chinese, Uighur, and Kazakh leaders. Some of the more prominent men with whom I had conversations included: Liu Meng-ch'un, General T'ao Chih-yueh, Liu Tse-yung, Mesud Sabri, Aisabek, Burhan, Jarimhan, and Mohammed Imin (names which I hope will have significance for you by the time you have finished reading this report).

Using Tihwa as a headquarters, I made several trips to outlying places by truck and horseback. First I made a four-day trip to Bogda Ola, an 18,000-foot peak in the T'ien Shan (Celestial Mountain) and climbed up to the foot of the glacier (about 11,000 feet) to get a glimpse of the Kazakhs in their native habitat. I then visited two important military posts: one at the Manas River, which divides the rebel Ili territory from the rest of Sinkiang, and the other at Chitai, the command headquarters for the troops which garrison Peitashan on the China-Outer Mongolia border. The most exciting trip which I made, however, was a horseback trek into the T'ien Shan south of Chitai to visit the Kazakh leader and hero, Osman. There I slept in a yurt, ate large quantities of mutton, drank kumis (fermented mare's milk), talked with Osman and other Kazakh leaders (through Chinese interpreters), watched a review of Kazakh horsemen, and generally absorbed the exciting atmosphere surrounding that colorful and militant group of nomads.

After I had been in Sinkiang about ten days two friends whom I had known previously, Henry Lieberman of the New York Times, and Ian Morrison of the London Times, arrived in Tihwa and we joined forces during the rest of my stay there, making interviews and trips jointly.

The biggest gap of my experience in Sinkiang was due to the fact that I did not have time to visit the southern part of the province. I tried to fill the gap, however, by talking with people who had recently been there -- including the British Consul from Kashgar, E. E. Shipton.

During my month in Sinkiang I gathered an enormous amount of material on the present situation in the province. Much of this material is difficult or impossible to obtain elsewhere. So in this report I have tried to incorporate a good deal of it. I'm afraid I have done so at the expense of readability, and I have been forced to eliminate much of the local color which I would like to have included.

I am continuing my travels in Northwest China and have already completed a trip to Chinghai and a visit with the Panchan Lama (which I will describe in a later report). This report, in fact, has been written while traveling. I left my typewriter in Nanking to be repaired, but fortunately I have been able to borrow several along the way, and with the aid of vegetable oil lamps and dim electric bulbs in the inns and hotels where I have stayed I have finally completed the rough report on Sinkiang which I am now sending to you.

My next journey is one to Ninghsia. Then I shall return to Nanking and proceed from there to Hongkong.

Sincerely yours,

A. Doak Barnett

A. Doak Barnett

NOTES ON SINKIANG PROVINCE

The Manas River lies in northwest Sinkiang not far from the Soviet border. At a desolate army outpost overlooking the wrecked spans of the Great West Bridge which crosses the river, sixteen Chinese soldiers keep a watchful eye turned westward. They can see on the opposite bank of the river the silhouetted figures of six Uighur men who form the last military outpost of the unrecognized "East Turkestan Republic." These lonely soldiers are symbols of the "watchful waiting" on both sides of this frontier between Sinkiang Province and the rebel regime in the fertile Ili Valley. On the night of August 5 of this year six rifle shots rang out from the Ili side. Although no one was hit by these mysterious shots, they have been recorded as the latest incident in the unfinished history of the Ili Revolt.

On the northern crest of the Peitashan Range of mountains, where China and Outer Mongolia meet, Chinghai Muslims of the Chinese 14th Cavalry Regiment patrol the grassy slopes to prevent enemy infiltration. Through field glasses these patrols can see Outer Mongolian posts at the foot of the mountains below them. The atmosphere is one of tension, for Mongol and Chinese patrols frequently clash. On July 8 of this year 120 Chinese met and fought about 80 Mongols. According to Chinese figures, 14 Mongols were killed, and two casualties were incurred by the Chinese troops. Approximately a month later another clash of patrols took place, this time on the highway lifeline leading to Peitashan from the South. These clashes are the latest incidents in the unfinished history of the Peitashan border dispute.

The Manas River and the Peitashan Range are the two key points of military friction at the present time in the complex situation existing in Sinkiang and along its international frontiers. These points are extremely unstable and uneasy. They are not the scene of major military activity, however, for despite mysterious shots there is no fighting along the Ili border, and the Peitashan clashes have not developed into all-out fighting. These two uneasy frontiers are symbolic and symptomatic, though, of the many critical and unsolved problems in Sinkiang. These problems combine both internal and external factors. They have been produced by Sinkiang's geographical and economic position, its ethnic diversity, and its political relations, as well as by its turbulent past history. These various factors have produced problems which affect the whole province as well as its critical border areas adjacent to the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia.

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Sinkiang, China's largest and westernmost province, is a tremendous area which is a part of both Northwest China and Central Asia. It is bordered by Tibet, India, Afghanistan, the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia), and the Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan, as well as by the Chinese provinces of Kansu and Chinghai. High mountains and vast deserts cover a large portion of the province's 650,000 square miles (See Annex I. All figures for area, resources, production, and population which I will cite are based upon the latest data collected by the Sinkiang Provincial Government. They may not be completely reliable, but they are the best figures available.) Running East and West through the center of the province is the towering range of the T'ien Shan, or Celestial Mountains, which are said to have over 7500 glaciers. North of these mountains is Jungaria, a huge

expanse of pebble and sand desert bordered by mountain ranges, the most important of which is the Altai Range to the North. South of the T'ien Shan is the region sometimes called Kashgaria. The center of this region is the Tarim Basin, a low desert fringed by lofty mountains which include the Kunlun, Pamir, and Karakoram ranges.

In this region of mountains and wasteland, human activity is generally confined to areas where the water supply is sufficient to sustain agriculture or animal husbandry. Natural precipitation is exceedingly scarce in the lowland regions, and in some places the annual rainfall approaches zero.

Agriculture is concentrated in oases located at the foot of the mountains and along the edge of the deserts. These oases are fed by glacial streams which flow out of the mountains and are swallowed up by the dry wasteland. The largest oases, which are political as well as economic centers, are linked by dusty motor roads. Almost all agriculture is nourished by man-made irrigation works which divert water into the thirsty fields from the many glacial streams and the few small rivers in the province. Dry farming is restricted to a few areas in the northwestern corner of Sinkiang in the valleys of the Ili, Black Irtish, and Emil Rivers. Wheat, rice, corn, kaoliang, and barley are the main food staples grown, but other important agricultural products include cotton, silk, melons of all sorts, and a variety of fruits including grapes and apples. (See Annex II for figures on the volume of grain production.) Intensive methods of cultivation prevail throughout the oases, but surprising as it may seem the pressure on the land is not as great as it is in many other parts of China. The oases are not, as a rule, overcrowded or overpopulated, and they contain a considerable amount of agricultural land which is either not cultivated (See figures in Annex III.) or could be cultivated even more intensively. Furthermore, if irrigation was developed on a larger scale the amount of cultivable land could be increased considerably. (See Annex IV.) These facts mean that although agriculture in Sinkiang is intensive in character, because of its concentration in limited areas and its dependence upon controlled water, food is more than sufficient in most areas of the province, and the pressure of the population upon agricultural land is not excessive. Government officials in Tihwa estimate, furthermore, that if properly developed by irrigation projects the agricultural land in Sinkiang could be expanded to support a population of ten million people, or two and a half times the present population.

Animal husbandry supports fewer people in Sinkiang than agriculture, but it utilizes a larger area (almost five per cent of the total area of the province as compared with just over one per cent for agriculture), and the economy of certain groups, including the Kazakhs, Mongols and Kirghiz, is based almost entirely upon it. Pasture land is distributed throughout the major mountain ranges (See Annex V), but much of the available pasturage in the Kunlun Mountains is not used, and most of the utilized grazing areas are in the Altai Mountains and the T'ien Shan. Live-stock of all sorts, including sheep, goats, cows, horses, donkeys, and camels are raised in the province, but sheep and goats are most numerous and are the primary basis for the livelihood of the nomadic peoples. (See Annex VI.) These nomadic groups live an escalator existence, moving in stages up to the high pastures in warm weather and down to the low pastures in cold weather. Occasionally they supplement their animal husbandry with a small amount of cultivation, of wheat or other grains, in plots at the foot of the mountains, and this cultivation is phased so that the harvesting takes place when the animals are moved down to cold weather pastures.

The mineral resources in Sinkiang have long been the subject of unrestrained speculation. From time to time reports of the "fabulous riches of Sinkiang" have

filtered out of the "heart of Asia" to stimulate the imaginations of the credulous optimists who wanted to believe them. The fact is, however, that it is difficult to say definitely whether Sinkiang's resources are fabulous or not. According to Wang Heng-sheng, Chief of the Geological Survey Office in Tihwa only 3.6 percent of the province has been systematically surveyed and prospected by the Chinese. (The Russians are said to have sent about 200 geologists into the province during the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, but the results of their findings are not known.) The Chinese surveys have uncovered certain resources which are noteworthy, however. These include reserves of over two billion tons of coal, mostly of a non-coking type, about fifty million tons of iron, mainly siderite, considerable oil, wolframite ore (tungsten), lead, molybdenite, zinc, and gypsum, and some arsenopyrite and copper. (See Annex VII.) The Geological Survey Office has also made guesses which, if correct, mean that Sinkiang, although not "fabulously rich," is valuable to China as a potential raw material producer. The Geological Survey Office estimates that the total coal reserves amount to 32,900,000,000 tons, most of which is lignitic bituminous, placing Sinkiang in third place among Chinese provinces in coal reserves, behind Shansi and Shensi. It estimates the total iron ore reserves to be 700,000,000 tons, placing Sinkiang second, behind Liaoning in Manchuria. It estimates that the petroleum reserves cover 7300 square kilometers, and it presumes that this area contains the largest petroleum reserves of any area in oil-poor China. It also estimates that the province's gold reserves cover an area of 17,600 square kilometers, but that these reserves are not quite as rich as those in several other areas in China such as Heilungkiang in Manchuria. (See Map II for distribution of resources in Sinkiang.)

To date, however, there has been very little exploitation even of known resources in the province. A few scattered coal mines are working, but they do not produce much. Only a few of them operate on a large scale, and most are tiny, hand-operated shafts which may produce as little as a ton a day. Actually, the only important utilization of Sinkiang's mineral resources at present is taking place at the mines in the northern and northwestern parts of the province in the three administrative districts under Ili control. (See Map I.) Work is going on there (although production figures are not known by the Chinese) at the Fuwen and Wench'uan wolfram (tungsten) mines, at the Wusu oil wells, and at the Altai gold mines.

Virtually no industrialization has yet taken place in Sinkiang, and the few modern factories are government-owned. At present, according to Provincial Commissioner of Reconstruction Mohammed Imin, the only modern factories in the province are a glass factory, an animal serum factory, and a clothing factory, all in Tihwa, and a small silk factory in Hotien. There are plans for a small iron plant and a paper mill in Tihwa, oil wells and a sugar plant west of Tihwa, and a textile factory (the Provincial Government bought 5000 spindles in Chungking two years ago, but has no funds even to transport them to Sinkiang), but the construction of these units is not under way yet. The Northwest Development Company, a highly-publicized organization under Chang Chih-chung's headquarters in Lanchow, Kansu, has done little in Sinkiang except import clothing and a few other manufactured articles and export rugs, furs, and wool. Actually, the amount of industry in the province has declined in recent years, for the Russians took out most of the machinery which they had brought into the province during Sheng's regime when they left in 1943. Handicraft production is carried on fairly widely, and Hotien (Khotan) is famous for its rugs, silk, embroidery, and jade, but even these native handicrafts could be greatly expanded and developed.

In short, Sinkiang is a "backward" and undeveloped area. It retains an atmosphere which in most places bears only faint traces of the Twentieth Century, and it possesses the romantic feeling of a new frontier in an ancient setting which is partly Oriental and partly Middle Eastern. There are severe limitations to modernization and development, however. Primitive transportation is one of these limitations. Distances are

tremendous, and except for a few crushed-rock motor highways and airlines (Chinese and Sino-Soviet) touching at Hami, Tihwa, and Ining, modern transport is totally lacking. There is not a single railway in the province. The lack of any real economic market is a limitation also. For example, coal and iron resources are probably sufficient (in spite of the fact that most of the coal is of a non-coking type and the fact that deposits are scattered) to build an iron and steel industry, but there are no consumers near enough to make it economic at present. The nearest potential consumers of importance are the Russians, but they have major iron and steel centers not far away in Soviet Central Asia, the Urals, and Siberia. Development of a cement industry in Sinkiang would be possible and probably would be justified because of the demands for road and irrigation canal construction, but it is opposed by cement interests in Kansu. (The Irrigation Bureau is itself producing small amounts of cement in Tihwa nonetheless, but it would like to produce much more.) In addition to the lack of a market and the opposition of competitive interests, the lack of capital is another tremendous obstacle to development. And in addition to the economic factors, there are many political and social blocks to economic progress. It would be Utopian, therefore, to expect any rapid modernization or extensive development in the province in the near future, and Sinkiang undoubtedly will remain a colorful but economically backward region, with an economy based primarily on oasis agriculture and pastoral livestock breeding, for some time to come.

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The population of Sinkiang is spread thinly over the province's vast area. Its population of roughly four million is, in fact, one of the smallest among China's provinces, and ethnically it is the most non-Chinese. Between one-half and three-quarters of the population is found in the oases of southern Sinkiang, and the majority are concentrated at the western end of the Tarim Basin in the Administrative Districts of Aksu, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan (see Annex VIII).

The ethnic diversity of Sinkiang is a result of its long and complicated history. For centuries Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, has been a passage area swept by waves of invasion and migration. It is believed that originally the area was populated by one group which spoke an Iranian language and other groups which spoke other types of Indo-European languages, but Scythians, Huns, Uighurs, Mongols, Chinese, and many other peoples have at various times occupied the region either as conquerors, settlers, or both, and the present population is extremely heterogeneous.

The Chinese administration in Sinkiang at present lists fourteen different "racial" groups: Uighur, Kazakh, Han Chinese, Tungan, Taranchi, Kirghiz, Mongol, White Russian, Uzbek, Hsipo, Tajik, Tatar, Solon, and Manchu - in order of numerical importance (See Annex IX). In actual fact, however, some of these sub-divisions can be lumped together in larger groupings.

The Uighurs are a racial group whose name derives from a Turkic people from northern Mongolia who invaded Sinkiang in the Ninth Century A.D. and sometime thereafter embraced Mohammedanism. The present-day Uighurs are probably the result of some racial admixture, but they all speak Turki and are Muslims. Many of them have a very Caucasian appearance, and they dress in many-colored, embroidered skull caps, trousers, jackets, and leather boots. They are primarily an agricultural people, and the oases of southern Sinkiang are inhabited almost entirely and exclusively by them. They are, in fact, the predominant ethnic group in Sinkiang and account for roughly 75 percent of the total population. Their social and economic organization is characterized by

extremes of differentiation in the social and economic hierarchy and by strong localism. Traditionally, princes, mullahs (religious leaders), and begs (gentry) have been dominant in oases which were pretty much self-contained. This pattern of organization is only gradually changing. The Taranchi (roughly two percent of the population) and the Uzbeks (under one percent of the population) can be grouped together with the Uighurs as having the same religion, essentially the same language, and a similar way of life. Taranchi, in fact, is merely a special name given to a group of Uighurs who migrated from the southern part of the province to the North.

The Kazakhs, who make up over ten percent of the total population, are the second largest group. They are concentrated in the northern districts of the province. Although they speak a variety of Turki and are Muslims, they live a very different sort of existence from that of the Uighurs. They are a nomadic people who live in yurts and move with their flocks. They are a proud people and in many respects the most militant group in the province. Related to the Kazakhs, and similar to them, is another nomadic group, the Kirghiz who are concentrated in the mountains of southwestern Sinkiang. Although the Kirghiz account for less than two percent of the population of the whole province, they are numerically the second most important group in southern Sinkiang.

The Han Chinese are the third largest group, but they total less than a quarter million, which is slightly under six percent of the population of the whole province. They are concentrated in the northern parts of the province, particularly in the Tihwa, Ili, and T'ach'eng districts (although they may not be so numerous in the latter two now as a result of the events of the past few years which I will describe shortly). The Chinese are farmers and merchants, and because they are the ruling group many, quite naturally, are officials and government workers.

The Tungsans, or Chinese Muslims, are the fifth group in size. Racially, they are a Chinese-Turkic mixture, but they speak the Chinese language. Although only about two percent of the population is Tungan this group is an important one, for many of them hold government positions or are wealthy landowners or flockowners who have members of other groups such as Uighurs and Kazakhs working for them as tenants and flock-herders. Their influence is disproportionate to their numbers.

The Mongols, who total about one and a half percent of the province's population, are divided into three groups: one under Ch'ao Ch'ing Wang in the region between T'ach'eng and Ch'enghua, one under Min Ch'ing Wang at Wasu, and one under Man Han Wang in the vicinity of Karashar. Like the Kazakhs, they are a nomadic people.

The other minorities, each of which accounts for less than one percent of the total population, are mainly in the northern districts of the province. They include the White Russians (who fled Russia at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution), the Hsipo, Solon, and Manchu groups (all three of which are Manchu remnants of garrisons kept in Sinkiang by the Manchu Dynasty), and the Tatars. In the far southwestern corner of the province there is another small minority, the Tajiks, an Iranian people who are sedentary, belong to the Ismaili sect of Mohammedanism, and speak an Iranian language.

Although the existence of these many groups creates extremely complicated problems of ethnic relationships, there is more uniformity than it might appear, for 90 percent of the population speaks the Turki language in one form or another and accepts the Muslim faith, and the Uighurs alone constitute 75 percent of the population.

Many of the basic problems in Sinkiang, however, are caused by the fact that almost 95 percent of the population is different racially, linguistically, and culturally

from the China to which it belongs politically, and many of the complexities of these problems are caused by the existence of diversities and splits within that 95 percent.

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Sinkiang has been an arena for local and inter-regional rivalries for centuries. Conflict has been a recurring theme in its history for over two thousand years, during which time Chinese influence and control has expanded and receded with a sort of tidal motion. In periods when the Chinese Empire was vigorous and aggressive, such as during the Han and T'ang dynasties, Chinese control was pushed westward. In other periods the limits of effective Chinese control were contracted. Throughout this long period of changing relationships, China was almost continually confronted in the Sinkiang area by both local centers of power and opposition and outside empires or kingdoms interested in the region. China never lost interest in the region, however, for before China's reorientation toward the seacoast as a result of the impact and depredations of Western imperialism Sinkiang was China's principal front door and the entrance to and exit from Central Asia and the West.

Sinkiang is no longer China's front door, but it is still an important back door, and it is still a region of conflict.

In the period of modern international relations Sinkiang suddenly increased in importance about the middle of the Nineteenth Century. At about that time British imperialism, which was consolidating its position in northern India, and Russian imperialism, which was expanding throughout Central Asia, approached each other geographically in the Sinkiang region and eyed each other suspiciously. In 1851 and 1860 the Russians established consulates in Ili and Kashgar respectively and began urging the Chinese to actively oppose the British. The British, even though they were supporting the Manchus in coastal China, responded by supporting a Muslim adventurer named Yakub Beg in a revolt against Chinese rule.

Yakub Beg was a native of Khokand who started his career as a dancing boy and rose to be chief of staff to an ambitious Khoja leader who was expanding his power in southwestern Sinkiang. Soon after the Muslim uprisings which took place throughout northwestern China in the 1860's, however, Yakub Beg usurped the power of his leader and began a personal conquest of Sinkiang. The Russians thereupon occupied the Ili region in northwestern Sinkiang in 1871 and played a double game by making a commercial agreement with Yakub Beg and occupying strategic positions at the same time that they were aiding the Chinese troops sent to suppress Yakub Beg. The British, on the other hand, seemed to throw their unqualified support to Yakub Beg when a British envoy named Forsyth signed a treaty with him in 1874. The Chinese forces under Tso Tsung-t'ang, however, were more successful than perhaps either the British or the Russians had expected, for by 1875 the revolt had been successfully suppressed.

Once the Russians had moved into Ili it was not so easy for the Chinese to oust them from the region. A preliminary Sino-Russian treaty in 1879 gave Russia valuable parts of the region, an indemnity for occupation costs, and commercial privileges, but this treaty was denounced by the Peking Government. Finally in 1881 a treaty settling the problem was signed, and the Ili region was retained by the Chinese and evacuated by the Russians. The Russians continued to exhibit a lively interest in Sinkiang, however, even though British interest in the region declined after it was discovered in the 1880's that the passes to India from the Sinkiang region were too difficult to permit any real threat from that direction.

In 1882, not long after the suppression of Yakub Beg's revolt, Sinkiang was made into a Chinese province instead of a Chinese border region. Control of the new provincial regime slipped easily into the hands of the families of the military and civilian officials who had accompanied Tso Tsung-t'ang to Sinkiang.

After the Chinese Revolution in 1911, however, Sinkiang broke away from control by the Central Government authorities in China, and from 1911 until 1944 Sinkiang was ruled by Chinese but not really by China. There was a succession of local Chinese warlords, each of whom received recognition, as a matter of expediency, by the Chinese Government, first in Peking and then in Nanking, but these warlords were really autonomous. They maintained their position by playing along with both China and Russia without getting too friendly with either and without letting either exact too many concessions from them. The administrations of these local rulers were characterized, in varying degrees, by nepotism, graft, corruption, and misrule.

The first of these warlords was a Yunnanese named Yang Tseng-hsin who had been a member of the administration under the Manchus and assumed control in 1911. For a short period during his rule, Sinkiang's relations with Russia were disturbed, first by a Kirghiz revolt in Russia in 1916 and then by the Bolshevik Revolution, but Yang maintained a neutral position and refused to be drawn actively into either the pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet side. When it looked as if the revolution would succeed Yang established normal relations with the Soviet government. In 1920 he concluded a trade agreement with the Soviets and allowed two Soviet Offices for Commerce and Foreign Affairs to be opened in the province. The Soviet Mission in Ining, headed successively by Limerev, Borckak, and Kolikoff, fomented some trouble and encouraged at least two minor mutinies against the provincial regime, but Yang continued his policy of getting along with Russia. The establishment of formal Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations in 1924 had its effect on Sinkiang, even though the province had been following an independent course, and the first Soviet consulates were opened in the province in that year.

In 1928 Yang was assassinated and was succeeded by a subordinate named Chin Shu-jen who was a Kansu man. Although relations between China and the Soviet Union were severely strained at that time, because of the 1927 Kuomintang-Communist split and the events which followed in the next two years, including the 1929 Sino-Soviet railway dispute in Manchuria, Chin continued following an independent policy which would not antagonize the Russians. He signed a new agreement with the Soviet Government permitting a number of trade agency offices to be opened in Sinkiang, and reducing customs levies on trade between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union.

Governor Chin, however, was both avaricious and weak, and his attempts to increase taxes created widespread discontent. Following the death of the local prince at Qomul (Hami) in 1930, Chin took the prince's son into custody and tried to abolish the principedom, and the stage was set for a local revolt. The Hami revolt finally broke out in 1932, set off by an incident in which a Chinese tax collector tried to marry a Muslim girl. When representatives from Hami requested and obtained aid from Ma Chung-ying, a Kansu Muslim general who saw a chance for personal aggrandizement, the situation turned against Chin. As Ma's forces swept westward through the province threatening Tihwa, and after a serious rice shortage developed there, the troops and the people placed the blame on the Governor. Chin was forced to flee, and on April 12, 1933, power passed to General Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

Sheng Shih-ts'ai was a Manchurian who had been educated at the Hsaoakwan Military Academy and in Japan, had participated in the Koumintang's Northern Expedition, had

been appointed to a military post for frontier defense by Chin, and finally had become the active commander of the fighting against Ma. He commanded all of the provincial troops including a group of Manchurian soldiers who had fled from the Japanese via Russia to Sinkiang, but at first he did not make much headway against Ma. Ma advanced farther, and revolt also broke out in the Ili district under a General Chang Pei-yuan. Negotiations between Sheng and Ma were attempted, but were unsuccessful. At this point Sheng appealed for Russian help, and the Russians responded by coming into Sinkiang more deeply, perhaps, than ever before.

Probably motivated in part by a desire to counter Japanese penetration (the Japanese had set up a puppet Mongol regime and had provided Ma Chung-ying with military advisers), the Russians gave Sheng all-out support which included trucks, armored cars, tanks and airplanes. Ma was cornered, chased into southwest Sinkiang, and in 1934 was spirited away from Kashgar to Russia, never to be heard of again. The Sinkiang provincial regime set up thereafter was really a joint Sheng-Soviet effort. The powerful mechanized Soviet Eighth Regiment moved to Hami, key to the eastern approach to Sinkiang. Soviet capital and machinery was brought into the province, and the Russians built roads and airports. Several hundred Soviet advisers were attached to the provincial government. Oil wells and tungsten mines were developed. Soviet secret police cooperated with Sheng's secret police. A provincial three-year plan was started with Russian advice. All of these developments made the whole province of Sinkiang temporarily a Russian sphere of influence.

Then, in 1942, Sheng made a complete about-face. Perhaps because events were going badly for the Russians in Europe, he reoriented his policy toward China and began arresting Russians and pro-Russians. In the following year the Soviets withdrew their troops from Hami and took with them, as they left the province, most of the tangible assets which they had brought in.

Sheng's internal policies had been reasonably enlightened during the first part of his regime, and he had been unusually conciliatory toward non-Chinese groups. Gradually, however, he adopted oppressive methods, set up a police state, and antagonized all groups by indiscriminate arrests (it is estimated that he arrested upwards of 100,000 persons during his rule). By 1944, he was hated as few men have ever been hated even in Sinkiang.

When Sheng turned away from the Soviet Union toward the Chinese Government, the latter took advantage of this opportunity and moved in. Sheng was eased out of his ruling position in August, 1944 and shifted to a powerless post in the Central Government as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. In September, 1944, Wu Chung-hsin arrived, with two secretaries, as the first Governor of Sinkiang really appointed by the Central Government since 1911. On November 7 of the same year revolt broke out in the Ili Valley.

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The Ili Revolt which broke out in 1944 on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution began as a rebellion against the disorder, misrule and oppression which had reached a climax at the end of Sheng's regime. It had little relation to the new Governor, Wu, who had barely time to catch his breath before the revolt began.

The Ili forces, backed by Soviet Russia's moral support and by some Soviet material support (the amount of which has never been accurately determined) soon wiped out two regiments of poorly-equipped Chinese troops, consisting of about 4,000

men, and by January, 1945 had the whole Ili region in their hands. The leaders of the revolt proclaimed the establishment of an "East Turkestan Republic" and proceeded to enlarge their area of military control until it included by the latter part of 1945, the northern administrative districts of T'ach'eng and Ashan as well as Ili. Concurrent with the military action a fairly widespread pogrom against the Han Chinese took place in those regions. Some estimates of the Chinese killed during that period run as high as 25,000.

In the early fall of 1945, the Chinese Government, concerned about the succession of reverses the Chinese forces in Sinkiang had sustained, sent General Chang Chih-chung to Tihwa as the President's personal representative (in 1946 he became Governor). Chang is a conciliatory man and one of the Central Government's most experienced negotiators (together with General Chang Chun he had done much of the negotiating with the Chinese Communists), and it was hoped that he could find some peaceful solution in Sinkiang.

Then the Russians stepped in as mediators. The Soviet Ambassador to China, Appollon Petrov, sent a memorandum to Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh reporting that the Ili group had petitioned the Soviet Consul-General in Tihwa, Alexandre Savielieff, to intercede, and that the Soviet Government was willing to mediate. China accepted, and peace negotiations began in October, 1945 between Chang Chih-chung and three representatives of the Ili Group, Rahimjan Sabir Hodjayev, Achmadjan Kasymov, and Abdul Nair Jure.

The events which have followed the first halting steps to reach a settlement in the fall of 1945 fall into a pattern duplicated in many other trouble spots in the world since V-J Day. Weeks of haggling finally resulted in a negotiated peace settlement. A short period of cooperation and peace followed. Then the cooperation disintegrated, both sides claiming that the peace settlement had not been implemented by the other group. The final result was an impasse.

The first step toward what appeared at the time to be a solution of the trouble was a general Peace Agreement signed on January 2, 1946 by Chang Chih-chung for the Central Government and the three above-mentioned representatives of the Ili Group. This agreement called for popular election of hsien councils which would then elect hsien magistrates within a period of three months. Administrative district officers (chuan yuan) and their assistants were to be "recommended by the people." A new provincial council was to be elected by the hsien councils. In addition a general reorganization of the Provincial Government was outlined. According to this reorganization, the Provincial Commission was to be expanded to 25 members, 10 of whom would be appointed directly by the Central Government and 15 recommended by elected representative bodies and subsequently appointed by the Central Government. (Normally, all are appointed directly by the Central Government.) The 10 direct appointees were to include the Governor (Chairman), Secretary-General, Commissioners of Civil Affairs and Finance, Chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare, Assistant Commissioners of Education and Reconstruction, Assistant Chief of the Health Bureau and two Commissioners without portfolio. The 15 members recommended by elected bodies were to include two Vice-Governors, two Deputy Secretaries-General, Commissioners of Education and Reconstruction, Assistant Commissioners of Civil Affairs and Finance, Chief of the Health Bureau, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare, and five Commissioners without portfolio. An annex signed on the same day granted even more specific concessions to the Ili Group. Of the 15 above-mentioned members of the Provincial Commission, the Ili Group, although controlling only three of the 10 administrative districts in the province, was explicitly granted the right to choose six commissioners including one Vice-Governor, one Deputy Secretary-General, the

Commissioner of Education or of Reconstruction, the Assistant Commissioner of Civil Affairs or of Finance, the Chief of the Health Bureau or the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare, and one Commissioner without portfolio.

The agreement also guaranteed full freedom of religion, publication, assembly, and speech. Further, it promised use of both the Chinese and Turki languages by all administrative and judicial organs and in official documents. It enunciated the right of petition in one's native language and laid down the principle that native languages should be used in primary and middle schools, with both Chinese and Turki being used in higher institutions of learning. Other points included assurances of "free development of racial cultures and arts," taxation based upon "the real productive power of the people" and "their ability to pay," freedom of domestic and foreign trade within the framework of existing treaties, and the release within 10 days after the signing of the agreement of all persons arrested for political reasons by both sides.

In addition, the agreement provided for the formation of troop units made up of non-Chinese racial groups, which were to be trained and given orders in their own languages whenever possible. With regard to the Ili troops, they were to be reorganized and integrated into the National Army. The details of these steps were to be outlined in a separate annex.

The question of army reorganization is always a fundamental one in the solution of a dispute involving military conflict. It took almost six months for an agreement to be reached on this question. Finally, however, on June 6, 1946 the second annex to the Peace Agreement was signed. This annex provided for the reorganization of the Ili troops into three cavalry and three infantry regiments with a total strength not exceeding 12,000 men. One infantry and two cavalry regiments were to be enlisted in the National Army, and the other units incorporated into the Provincial Peace Preservation Corps. The responsibility of these troops was to be exclusively that of maintaining peace and order in the three northwestern administrative districts, and the responsibility for guarding national frontiers was to rest with the Central Government's border defense troops. The commander of the six Ili regiments was to be chosen by the Ili Group and appointed Assistant Commander of the Provincial Peace Preservation Corps as well as commander of the six regiments of Ili troops. However, he was to fit into the regular chain of command and follow orders issued by Chang Chih-chung's Northwest Headquarters (recently renamed Northwest Political and Military Authority), the Sinkiang Garrison Commander and the Peace Preservation Corps Commander. The Ili commander was to be consulted on the reorganization of Peace Preservation troops in Aksu and Kashgar, with the stipulation that replacements would be made from local Moslems. Military and other equipment for the six Ili regiments was to be supplied by both the Central and Provincial Governments. The commander of the six regiments was required, however, to report his troop dispositions and strength as well as the equipment of his units.

The signing of the military annex completed the basic Peace Agreement. It was supplemented, however, by an Administrative Program which was passed at the second meeting of the newly-organized Provincial Council on July 18, 1946. This Administrative Program was a Utopian document which promised the moon without specifying means by which the vague promises could be implemented.

By reiterating the political pledges of the Peace Agreement, it held forth the visions of fundamental financial reform, extensive agricultural and industrial development and far-reaching health and educational projects. As a basis for practical policy, it was meaningless.

During the summer of 1946 a coalition government was formed and elections were held as promised. Although Chang Chih-chung was Governor, the reorganization filled most of the top-level posts in the Provincial Government with non-Han political figures. The Ili Group appointees included Achmadjan as Vice-Governor, Abdul Karim Abasov as Deputy Secretary-General, Rahimjan as Assistant Commissioner of Civil Affairs and Seyfuddin as Commissioner of Education. As the coalition government took shape, many other non-Hans were appointed to high posts. These included Uighurs who are not in the Ili Group such as Aisabek Aleptekin, Provincial Secretary-General, and Mohammed Imin, Commissioner of Reconstruction. They also included Kazakhs such as Jarimhan, Commissioner of Finance, and Salis, Deputy Secretary-General; Mongols such as Erdeni, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare; Tungsans such as Wang Tseng-shan, Commissioner of Civil Affairs; and one Tatar, Burhan, Vice-Governor.

The reorganization did not satisfy the Ili Group, however, for the real power remained in the hands of the Chinese: Chang Chih-chung, his Secretary-General, Liu Meng-chun, and General Sung Hsi-lien, Commander of the Sinkiang Garrison. Furthermore, no miracle happened to transform the complete administrative and political situation in the province, and discontent spread. Within the Government both sides wanted ultimate control, and obviously both could not have it. So the coalition was doomed to failure.

On February 19, 1947 a "liberty mass meeting," held in the Uighur Club in Tihwa, drew up a petition to the Provincial Government. Two days later, on February 21, a Uighur demonstration of several hundred men took place in the streets of Tihwa. A second long petition was formulated, and was followed the next day by a third. The three petitions demanded reduction of provincial taxes by half, rapid reorganization of the Aksu and Kashgar Peace Preservation Troops, an increase of native personnel in the administration, cessation of "oppression" by Chinese troops and police, evacuation of the majority of Chinese troops in Sinkiang, prohibition of military purchases of supplies on the open market and the cessation of political arrests. They also called for reelections in areas where "oppression" had occurred, complete judicial reorganization, including the removal of "all" chiefs of judicial organs, release of all political prisoners, the end of secret police activities, and organization of a province-wide Uighur police force. In addition, the petitions wrathfully denounced a number of government officials, the most prominent of whom were Jarimhan, Salis and Hatewan (District Officer of Tihwa). Furthermore, they demanded the arrest and punishment of the Kazakh leader, Osman, District Officer of Ashan.

On February 24, Kazakh and Tungan petitions were presented to the Provincial Government. On the next day the Han Chinese of Tihwa did the same. These petitions (particularly the one drawn up by the Kazakhs) contained lists of minor grievances, but their effect was to counterbalance the Uighur demands, counteract Uighur pressure on the Government, and place the Chinese provincial authorities in a better bargaining position.

The climax of this sequence of events was a huge Chinese demonstration in Tihwa on February 25. A riot occurred during which four Chinese and four Uighurs were killed. Achmadjan, the top Uighur spokesman, was forced to acknowledge many of the demands of other groups and to modify the demands of his own group. The tension and fear created by the rioting lasted for over a week, and when calm was finally restored and martial law lifted on March 6 the only real result of the demonstrations and petitions was a general bitterness among all persons concerned.

The tension, which had spread throughout the province, was temporarily eased by a skillfully worded Provincial Proclamation drawn up by the Provincial Commission

under the direction of Chang Chih-chung. This proclamation, which was published on March 26, humbly admitted that not all of the objectives of the Peace Program and the Administrative Program had been achieved, but it reiterated that every effort was being made to achieve them. It was signed by the Ili Group members of the Provincial Commission and gave the strong impression that complete harmony existed among all the groups participating in the administration.

On May 28, 1947, the appointment of Mesud Sabri (alternate spelling: Masud Sabri) as Governor of Sinkiang was announced. Mesud Sabri was a 62-year-old Uighur, born in a wealthy Ili family, and educated in military and medical schools in Turkey. For the past twelve years, however, he had been in Central and Southwest China. In Chungking he had taught in the "CC"-controlled Central Political Institute and was considered by the Uighur nationalists in Sinkiang to be old, weak, and completely pro-Chinese. His appointment was interpreted as a Chinese attempt to undermine Uighur nationalism by working through a puppet, and demonstrations against the appointment took place at scattered points throughout the province.

On July 7, 1947, Uighur revolt broke out openly, this time in the Turfan, Shanshan, and Toksin oases. In Turfan it developed into a serious rebellion, but it was suppressed rapidly and efficiently by General Sung Hsi-lien, one of China's ablest young generals. A few of the leaders of the revolt, including agents who had come from Ili, were taken into custody. Shortly thereafter, on August 26, 1947, the Ili Group suddenly left Tihwa for Ining, the coalition collapsed completely, and a state of hostility commenced. The Ili-Sinkiang border was sealed, and open movement between the two areas ceased.

Since August 26, 1947, a number of futile note exchanges have taken place between the Ili Group and the Chinese Government, but these negotiations have accomplished nothing.

The first note was from Chang Chih-chung to Achmadjan and Rahimjan on September 1, 1947. It contained a long defense of Chang's "patience and conciliatory attitude." It claimed, on the part of the Provincial Government, "full execution of the Peace Agreement," adherence to the slogan "Peace, Unity, Democracy, and Cooperation," and the achievement of a democratic government. It contained a long list of grievances against the Ili Group including their failure to implement the Peace Agreement, particularly the military terms; their unwillingness to restore normal relations with the Provincial Government and the Central Government; and their efforts to win political control throughout the province. The note also accused the Ili Group of being responsible for the massacres of Chinese at T'ach'eng and Omin in early 1946, the demonstrations in Tihwa in February, 1947, the revolts in Turfan, Shanshan, and Toksin in July, 1947, and the riots in Kashgar in May, 1947. It further accused the Ili Group of "continuing the secret organization of East Turkestan," opposing unreasonably the Governorship of Mesud Sabri, sabotaging the sessions of the Provincial Council, and "trying to win party control of the Provincial Government with an attitude of conquering." Despite these accusations the over-all tone of the letter was conciliatory, and Chang appealed for a common understanding based upon support of the principle of national unity together with "an amicable pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese atmosphere" - as well as upon existing agreements. The note concluded by inquiring if the Ili Group was willing to reopen the negotiations.

The Ili reply from Ining on October 16, 1947, categorically denied the charges made by Chang. For example, it claimed that the Turfan rebellion was "a spontaneous result of overflowing Muslim anguish." In addition, it asserted that the violations of the Peace Agreement were "the work of the Chinese alone." The note contained a

long list of counter-accusations against the Chinese who, it said, had "created a situation which became intolerable." More specifically, it accused the Chinese of quadrupling their military forces in Sinkiang, of failing to reorganize the Peace Preservation Troops at Kashgar and Aksu, and of being unwilling to treat native troops on the basis of equality. The note complained that not only had the Chinese been remiss in providing ammunition and supplies to the Ili forces but that the Chinese Army was making "continuous preparations to invade" Ili territory and was supporting "bandits" such as Osman in campaigns against Ili. In addition, the note complained that the army and police personnel in Sinkiang made illegal arrests, manipulated local elections, and interfered with local administration. The Provincial Government was accused of instigating the Tihwa riots of February, 1947, fomenting racial friction, expanding its secret police, interfering with the "organization of democratic bodies," disregarding the "opposition of the people of Sinkiang" in the appointment of Mesud Sabri and other officials, and the use of "despotic methods." In the note it was also claimed that, "Since the day the Peace Agreement was signed, the Ili Party at no time proposed, directly or indirectly, secretly or openly, that Sinkiang should secede from China." The note ended by saying that the Ili Group was willing to reopen negotiations if four demands were met. These demands were that, "1. Oppression and torture of progressive elements in Sinkiang should be stopped immediately. 2. All Muslim prisoners should be freed, and those responsible for their imprisonment should be punished. 3. Mesud Sabri should be removed from the Governorship of the Provincial Government. 4. All the articles of the June 1946 Agreement should be fully implemented."

A second exchange of notes took place between December, 1947, and February, 1948, in which "the facts" were reexamined, accusations and defense arguments repeated, and new conditions for negotiation defined.

In a note written on December 9, 1947, Chang made a point by point refutation of the Ili Group charges. The number of Chinese troops in Sinkiang, according to this note, had actually been reduced by half since the Peace Agreement, whereas the Ili forces in the same period had been doubled. The note asserted that the reorganization of Peace Preservation Troops had been postponed and the supply of military equipment to the Ili troops halted because of the failure of the Ili commanders to reorganize their troops and allow Chinese inspection. Chang also claimed that the Chinese were not giving military assistance to Osman, and that in actual fact Osman had been badly mistreated by the Ili Group. He asserted that the police forces in Sinkiang had been reorganized and were in no way secret and that persons still detained in prison were there for violation of the law and constituted a "problem of jurisprudence and not one of politics." In defense of Mesud Sabri's appointment he argued that not only was Mesud Sabri a competent governor but that gubernatorial elections would soon be held throughout China and there was no reason to make a change in Sinkiang prior to that time. In this note Chang also emphasized that, "Freedom has a certain limit. No nation on earth could allow rebellion against the mother country to be carried out by its own citizens. People have no freedom to oppose their own country. Finally, the note proposed a renewal of the negotiations if the Ili Group would; a) eliminate "the irregularities" in their territory, b) use the Chinese national flag and the Chinese as well as the Turki language, c) stop military mobilization and preparation and voluntarily reduce and reorganize their troops, d) cease the "East Turkestan Movement" and anti-Chinese propaganda, and e) restore communications with the rest of the province.

The reply from Achmadjan and Rahimjan on February 17, 1948, accused Chang of producing "words but no deeds" and claimed that there was "no assurance that promises

would be kept." However, after repeating some of their major accusations against the Chinese they professed to be willing to renew negotiations if Mesud Sabri was removed from his position, if Osman was punished at a "public trial by the people," and if all the "progressive elements" in jail were released. The note did not even mention the conditions outlined in Chang's note of December 9. As a consequence, Chang's reply on April 1, 1948, was curt and stated that the fulfillment of the conditions he had already outlined was the "minimum symbolic proof" of Ili sincerity required before further steps could be taken. Since April 1 there has been a complete stalemate and silence on both sides.

These five notes exchanged between Chang Chih-chung and the Ili Group reveal some of the issues at stake in the present dispute, but in the notes both sides mixed truth with exaggeration and falsehood, and the most basic issues were sometimes hidden. The most fundamental split between the two sides was obscured by the mass of verbiage. It was the split over political power. The Ili Group wanted to achieve a position of predominance in the Provincial Government, while the Chinese were determined to maintain the controlling position which they already possessed.

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The Ili Group accuses the present provincial administration in Sinkiang of being an oppressive administration. Some of their specific accusations are true, others partly true, and others false. Taking all relevant factors into consideration, however, it seems to me that the present Chinese administration is not nearly as black as the Ili spokesmen claim. It is neither completely bad nor completely good.

Tradition and past history confront the Chinese in Sinkiang with a tremendous handicap. When the Central Government moved into Sinkiang in 1944, and took control for the first time in over thirty years, it inherited a bad name. Since the Revolution of 1911 Sinkiang had been ruled by corrupt and oppressive warlords who were Chinese even though they were not the Chinese Government. Furthermore, Chinese rule for decades and even centuries before that had not been enlightened. Under the Chinese Empire Sinkiang was a long way from the capital, and officials were often sent to such far-away posts as punishment for misdemeanors committed elsewhere. It was not uncommon for such officials to accumulate personal fortunes while serving out their terms in the remote and inhospitable borderland. Nepotism, graft, corruption, and even violence were recurring phenomena. Few Chinese officials learned the native languages or concerned themselves with local problems, and the Chinese administration generally maintained its rule by working through dominant native families (particularly the families of Uighur begs) and by promoting group conflicts in a policy of divide and rule. The long history of inept Chinese rule and Chinese misrule reached its climax in the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. This heritage plagues the Chinese in everything they do in Sinkiang.

Since 1944, however, the Central Government seems to have made a sincere effort to appoint well-qualified men to the top posts in the Sinkiang Provincial Government. As a result the principal Chinese leaders in Tihwa at present appear to be able men who are aware of their special responsibilities, are sympathetic with the aims of the minority groups, and are trying to solve Sinkiang's problems by peaceful and conciliatory means. This group of men works under the leadership of Chang Chih-chung. They have formulated policies which, if fully implemented, would really mean a New Deal for Sinkiang. Their approach to Sinkiang's problems seems to be one of conciliation - within limits.

Even among top level Chinese, however, there are a few who advocate force rather

than conciliation, and the changes which have been made at the top level have not filtered down very far through the administration. The local police forces and courts, in fact, still retain most of the people who worked under Sheng Shih-ts'ai. The policy of conciliation is completely foreign to many of these men, and they tend to employ traditional high-handed methods in dealing with the people.

The representatives of non-Chinese groups appointed to official positions by the Chinese are of various kinds. A few such as Yolbas at Hami are mere puppets. Others, such as Mesud Sabri, are nationalists but go along one-hundred percent with the Chinese and probably would never disagree with them on important issues. Others such as Aisabek and Mohammed Imin are strong nationalists who freely criticize the short-comings of the present regime to which they belong. The men in this category are real representatives of the aspirations of the non-Chinese groups. They are cooperating with the Chinese because they believe that it is impossible to work alone, that a choice must be made between China and the Soviet Union, and that China is the better of the two. In addition, there are a few appointees in the Provincial Government, such as Jarimhan, the illiterate Commissioner of Finance, who are undoubtedly popular figures in the minority groups from which they are drawn but who are unfortunate choices because they are not qualified for the positions they hold.

Although there are a good many qualified and competent men among the appointees selected from minority groups, the Chinese are severely criticised for not paying enough attention to popular sentiment in making these appointments. (In a similar way they are criticised for not selecting a few non-Kuomintang people in making their Chinese appointments.) This is particularly true in regard to Mesud Sabri, who for various reasons is far from being a popular leader among the Uighurs. There may be some justification for this criticism, but the most vocal critics seem to forget that in the original coalition government all of the major Ili Group leaders were appointed to responsible positions in the government - which they voluntarily abandoned. These critics also overlook the obvious difficulty, from the Chinese point of view, of finding men who are not only popular leaders among the minorities but are also unquestionably loyal to China. In undisturbed times this might not be a problem, but during a period of rebellion and revolt it is a real problem.

The persons holding local positions at the lower levels of government in Sinkiang are for the most part identical or similar to those who held such positions in the pre-1944 period. Not even the Chinese claim that the elections held during the government reorganization were a real expression of popular sentiment. In a situation where illiteracy is the rule rather than the exception and where a fairly rigid social structure exists this was almost inevitable. The elections were manipulated in many ways, and those with power and influence usually came out on top - sometimes with the connivance of local Chinese civil, military, or police officials. Blame for this sort of thing was usually placed upon the provincial authorities. In actual fact, however, the Provincial Government was not able to ensure honesty in local elections, and the persistence of localism and local rule under various combinations of begs and mullahs together with Chinese police, military, and civil officials presents the top provincial authorities with many serious problems. Mesud Sabri says that, "Perhaps the biggest problem facing the Provincial Government is the fact that the elections held after the government reorganization resulted in the selection of numerous men, particularly in the position of District Officer, who are incompetent and undesirable. These men, who include religious leaders, men of wealth, and others, were elected because of their long-standing hold over the people. The Government can't just step in and replace them for it would then be accused of being undemocratic."

Another problem which plagues the Provincial Government is a shortage of qualified and trained personnel. This has become particularly acute with the attempt,

which has been only partially successful, of bringing more Uighurs and other native people who have had little education or experience into the Administration. The goal of this policy is to reduce Chinese personnel to 30 percent and to raise minority group personnel to 70 percent of the total number of civil employees in the Government, but even minority leaders admit that there isn't enough qualified personnel at present to accomplish this goal. The Commission of Civil Affairs claims that the minority groups now hold 50 percent of the jobs, but this may be an exaggeration, and even the changes which have been made to date cause many difficulties. The kind of problem which this policy creates is exemplified by the Commission of Civil Affairs itself. According to the Commission's General-Secretary, formerly less than ten of its 134 members were Uighurs and Kazakhs, whereas now over half belong to those two groups. Many of the new employees, the Secretary-General states, are poorly qualified, with the result that much of their work has to be shifted to the remaining old employees. The branches of government least affected by this new policy are the police force and the courts which remain almost entirely Chinese (although in the city of Tihwa about 30 percent of the police force are now Uighurs). The personnel in these two branches of government, however, are far from being among the best Chinese government employees, for many are appointees of Sheng Shih-ts'ai.

Another hindrance to efficient operation on the part of the Provincial Government was the disorganization caused by the breakdown of the coalition. The posts held by the departed members of the Ili Group are still held open as bait to lure them back. As a result, a number of key posts are vacant, and the responsibilities of these posts are carried by assistants or by other officials.

The result of all these facts is that many of the old and undesirable characteristics persist in the provincial administration despite efforts to make improvements.

Even when one considers the question of attitudes prevalent among the top-level Chinese administrators in the province, it is difficult to paint a picture which is all white or all black. Certain attitudes have changed. Both the Chinese and Turki languages are used, for example, and religious and educational discrimination is certainly not a matter of policy even if it hasn't been completely eliminated. Some attitudes inherited from the past do persist, however. The policy of divide and rule still seems to be, consciously or unconsciously, an important element in Chinese thinking. The Chinese seem to encourage fragmentation among non-Han people (perhaps rationalizing it by arguing that "all" groups must be considered), and certain groups are given special consideration and support (at the present time this applies particularly to the Tungans and the Kazakhs under Osman). Furthermore, a certain cultural arrogance on the part of the Chinese still hangs on, for the Chinese appear to have few doubts about their cultural superiority. This arrogance tends to antagonize the other groups in the province.

Graft also persists. It is hard to put one's finger on specific cases, but even high members of the Provincial Government admit the existence of graft and deplore it. One form in which it occurs is the use of government funds for business purposes and speculation. Another form is graft in the collection of the land tax, only part of the tax being passed on to the Provincial Government by local authorities.

Although arrests have not been nearly so widespread as the claims of the Ili group might indicate, there still are political arrestees who have not been released. A Uighur member of the Government estimates that they probably total one hundred (some of whom were arrested legitimately for seditious agitation), and the same man claims that political arrests are still being made in Kashgar and Turfan. Personal freedom and freedom of the press and of assembly are partially protected in Sinkiang, but they are not complete by any means.

Financial reform has not yet been accomplished, and the Commission of Finance and the Sinkiang Commercial Bank (which issues local currency) are still the cause of considerable scandal.

Not much progress has been made toward accomplishment of the Utopian economic and social reform program outlined by the Provincial Government, and Sinkiang is still woefully backward in education and medicine. There are only about twenty hospitals in the province, not one of which is really modern and up-to-date (the Russian hospital in Tihwa is the best), and in the provincial capital there are only 500 hospital beds (150 of which are in the military hospital). The number of primary schools in the province has been increased during the past two years, but there are still only fifteen Middle Schools in the whole province, and the one institution of higher learning, the Sinkiang College, is rather a farce.

A few reforms and accomplishments can be listed in the Government's favor. These include the institution of training courses for administrative personnel and the development of irrigation, and last year the principal taxes were halved to lessen the economic burden on the people. It should always be remembered furthermore that the Sinkiang Provincial Government, like government organs in the rest of China, is handicapped by the chaotic conditions caused by the Civil War. It is also handicapped by its financial position.

Last year the provincial budget amounted to forty-nine billion dollars. Only eighteen billion dollars was received in tax income, and the rest was made up by Central Government subsidies and by the printing of unbacked currency. This currency added to local inflation and consequently to general discontent. The price inflation in Sinkiang (which is not as bad in food products as in the rest of China but is worse in manufactured goods) is also aggravated by the virtual cessation of external trade. The main trade routes to Russia via Ining and T'ash'eng are completely closed at the Ili border except for a very small amount of smuggling. The route to Russia west of Kashgar is also completely closed. The China trade via Kansu is just a trickle, most of the commodities being military supplies. The only trade which approaches pre-war volume is that over the mountains to India and even those routes are occasionally disrupted by banditry and political troubles.

The subsidies from the Central Government have been much less than requested, and even the small amounts allocated must be received from the Chinese military authorities in Sinkiang. All provincial requests for aid from the Central Government are channelled through the army and if the money is granted it is doled out sparingly. The problem of relations between the civil and military authorities in Sinkiang and the economic burden of the military on the province are fundamental factors in the present situation.

Apart from the involvement of military personnel in local politics, which has already been mentioned, the garrisoning of large numbers of troops in Sinkiang gives rise to two problems which are sore points among the local people. One is the problem of inter-marriage; the other is the economic burden.

The Muslims are extremely sensitive about marriage of their daughters to infidels. There seem to be very few cases of rape on the part of Chinese soldiers, but even respectable marriage frequently enrages the sensitive Muslims, particularly the Uighurs.

The economic burden of the Chinese military forces in Sinkiang is almost unavoidable in many respects. The garrison troops there are so far away from the

rest of China that they are forced to rely principally on local food. The natural result is the decrease in food supplies available to the local population, and the increase in food prices. In the past, furthermore, the problem has been aggravated by certain malpractices on the part of the military. Individual soldiers and, in some cases, responsible officers have used their position and power to buy food on the open market at specially reduced prices.

The Chinese authorities are aware of the friction between military personnel and the civilian population in Sinkiang, and they are attempting to lessen it, with some success. The irrigation projects in the province, which probably are the most constructive projects presently being pushed by the Government, are motivated to a large degree by a desire to lessen the economic burden of the Chinese garrison troops. The main project is in the vicinity of Tihwa (a food deficit area which formerly depended upon imports from the Ili Valley and more recently has imported food from Kansu and southern Sinkiang). The Tihwa irrigation project is being constructed by military labor, and the agricultural area which it irrigates is being cultivated by troops to feed the local garrison. The project includes a large reservoir which stores water diverted from the Uramshi River during the winter months and a thirty-five kilometer canal which carries this water to the area under cultivation. Lack of funds has delayed completion of the project, so that to date only 15,000 mow of land are irrigated, but when the plans have been completed the canal will irrigate 200,000 mow of fertile land through three branch canals and six distribution canals totalling about one hundred kilometers in length. (Other irrigation projects include a completed flood prevention dam at Aksu and plans for a 150 kilometer canal to irrigate a half million mow in the old river bed of the Tarim River, a water control scheme in the vicinity of Kuche where there have been repeated quarrels over water rights, and a canal in the Turfan area to supplement the unusual existing system of horizontal wells.) The Chinese authorities have also tried to curb irregular purchasing by military personnel, and the Provincial Government has a plan which it hopes to put into effect whereby the Government will make all purchases of food, fuel, and other local supplies for the garrison troops.

These measures, if successfully completed, will mitigate the economic burden of the troops in Sinkiang but cannot eliminate it. As long as there are large numbers of Chinese soldiers in the province, there will be a strain on the local economy and resentment on the part of the local population, and undoubtedly the Chinese Government will not find it possible to reduce the number of troops in Sinkiang to any great extent as long as the present military situation continues.

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The military situation in Sinkiang today is an extremely complicated one. In the northwestern part of the province there is a military truce. In the northeastern region next to the Outer Mongolian border there is intermittent, undeclared warfare. In the rest of the province, garrison forces occupy key positions throughout a huge territory which is still uneasy and unstable.

The Chinese have a total of not more than 100,000 regular troops in Sinkiang. When the Chinese moved in after Sheng's political about-face they sent into the province the 5th and 42nd Cavalry Armies and the New 2nd Army. Since then, a complete military reorganization has taken place, and all the divisions have been converted into brigades and their troop strength readjusted. The total Table of Organization strength of units now in Sinkiang totals about 100,000, but actually many units are down to one-third or two-thirds theoretical strength. During the

past three years the Chinese have replaced old troops and reinforced their total military strength in Sinkiang, but they do not seem to be bringing in new troops at present, contrary to some reports.

The military chief in Sinkiang is the Commander of the Garrison Forces, General T'ao Chih-yueh, who recently succeeded Sung Hsi-lien. The soldiers which he commands are often called "crack troops," and (on the basis of my observation in a limited number of places) they appear to be superior in organization, discipline, and morale. The high quality of these troops leads one to suspect that some of the complaints levelled against the Chinese Army in Sinkiang are probably due as much to natural resentment (which would be felt toward any garrison forces, good or bad) as to specific abuses on the part of the Army.

The majority of troops are stationed in the northern part of the province, but some are spread throughout other areas as well. Military headquarters are located at key points, but there are a few troops in every major oasis and town.

In southern Sinkiang are the 42nd Army, composed of two cavalry brigades, with headquarters at Kashgar, and two infantry brigades with headquarters at Aksu and Yenki (Karashar) respectively. The overall command headquarters, however, are located in Tihwa to the North. Major military responsibility in northern Sinkiang falls upon the 78th Division, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and the 6th Cavalry Brigade (but they are backed up by other forces which include the 231st Brigade at Turfan, the 179th Brigade at Tihwa, and the 178th Brigade at Hami). The 78th Division, which maintains headquarters at Khotubi, guards the Ili border, and its 227th Brigade at Suilai is in almost direct contact with the enemy forces across the Manas River. The 7th Cavalry Brigade of Chinghai troops guards the Outer Mongolian border and the Peitashan Range from its headquarters in Chitai. The 6th Cavalry Brigade, also composed of Chinghai troops, blocks the northwestern road approach to Tihwa.

The garrison troops in Sinkiang, who are almost exclusively Han Chinese and Chinese Muslims (only about five percent are Uighurs and Kazakhs), depend entirely for military supplies upon a long and dangerous supply line stretching over a thousand miles from Tihwa to Lanchow. All munitions and arms must be transported over this vulnerable route by a fleet of less than a thousand trucks, at least one-half of which are always out of commission. All oil and gasoline must be brought from the Yumen oil wells in western Kansu.

Not only do the Chinese troops depend on a vulnerable supply line; they are so scattered that it is estimated that the maximum effective striking force which could be mustered to fight in northern Sinkiang would not exceed 30,000. Despite these facts, the Chinese military commanders in Sinkiang are confident of their relative strength and are contemptuous of the Ili troops. They claim that they could easily defeat the Ili army if the Russians stayed out of the picture, but they add that they prefer to support the present policy of peaceful conciliation. Neutral military observers seem to back them up on their claims.

The Ili army is estimated to contain between 15,000 and 20,000 regular troops. Chinese intelligence officers believe that the army is made up of between eight and thirteen regiments, seven of which have been definitely identified. The 1st Infantry Regiment at Anchihai and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment at Ulan Usu (both under overall headquarters at Wusu) protect the road entrance from Sinkiang proper into the Ili Valley. Fortifications are said to have been constructed in this region along a North-South axis between the marshes at Shawan and the T'ien Shan foothills in the

South. Shawan is considered to be a key point from which any Ili offensive against Sinkiang would be launched. The 2nd Infantry Regiment protects the Wusu oil wells at Tushantse. The southern Ili flank is guarded by the 1st Cavalry Regiment at Tekesze. In addition there are three other known regiments: the 3rd Infantry Regiment at T'ach'eng, the 5th Cavalry Regiment at Ch'enghua, and a training regiment at the Ili capital, Ining. Behind these units, however, looms the shadow of the powerful, motorized Soviet 8th Regiment, which the Chinese believe stayed in the region just west of Ili after it evacuated Hami in 1943.

The Ili armed forces, which they themselves sometimes call the "Sinkiang Democratic Army," are reported to be conscripting and training men on a short, two-to-three-months basis - which is one reason the Chinese do not have a very high regard for their fighting ability. The Chinese say that they are doing this because they cannot support a large army on the basis of their economic resources and because they are short of arms in spite of Russian assistance.

The chief military commander in Ili is reported to be Isakjan, a Soviet-educated Kirghiz (conflicting reports claim he is a Taranchi) from southern Sinkiang. Isakjan commanded one of the Soviet army units which were sent to aid Sheng Shih-ts'ai. He is reported to hold dual Chinese-Russian citizenship papers and is said to be one of the most completely pro-Russian men in the Ili Group. The majority of his subordinate officers are Uighurs. It is claimed, however, that a few of his officers are Soviet Slavs, that many of his officers hold dual citizenship papers, and that in addition Soviet advisors (most of them Asiatics from Kazakstan and Uzbekistan) are attached to every major Ili military unit. It would be difficult to obtain absolute verification for all of these alleged facts even if one could visit Ili territory (because of the difficulty of racial identification), but it seems probable that the Ili army is definitely oriented toward the Soviet Union and possible that it contains many Soviet advisors.

Although leadership in the Ili army (as in the Ili civil regime) is monopolized by Uighurs, the majority of its troops at the time of the revolt in 1944-45 were Kazakh cavalymen. The Chinese front-line officers in Sinkiang assert, however, (and there is some evidence to support them) that this situation has been changed by a widespread disaffection on the part of the Kazakhs. The first large-scale desertion of the Ili cause was made by Osman and his followers, but it is reported that more recently, in November 1947, 10,000 more Kazakhs who refused to fight against Osman and the Chinese fled from Ili territory to the Chinese side. Chinese intelligence officers at Suilai now claim that only 30 percent of the Ili troops are Kazakhs, while 60 percent are Uighurs and 10 percent are Mongols and representatives of other minorities. If this is true, it probably means that the Ili army has been greatly weakened, for the Kazakhs were the backbone of their fighting strength.

Military supply on the Ili side is somewhat of a mystery even to Chinese intelligence officers. There is not enough industrialization in Ili territory to support sizeable numbers of troops. Although some of their arms, including German-made ones, were captured from the Chinese in the initial campaign, they undoubtedly have received aid from the Russians. Top Chinese military authorities believe that some Soviet military supplies are still being received in Ili, and they cite as evidence reports from refugees as well as captured arms. But for some reason the Chinese play down these assertions and discredit reports of Soviet tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns on the Ili side. It seems probable, however, that the Ili army is dependent upon Russia for some military supplies, and it is definitely known that the Ili troops wear a Russian-type of uniform.

Whatever the characteristics of the Ili armed forces are, they maintain complete military control of the territory in Sinkiang west of the Manas River and in the three administrative districts under the Ili regime. All movement between Ili territory and the rest of Sinkiang is completely cut off (except for underground agents and smugglers), and the Chinese, although confident of the military superiority over the Ili army, are keeping hands off - probably because of a fear of military involvement with Russia as well as preference for peaceful negotiations.

Within the past three years there have been military clashes in two other border regions in Sinkiang besides the Ili Valley area. The incidents in these two regions, Sarakol in the southwest and Peitashan in the northeast, were not directly related to the Ili Revolt, but they may have been indirectly connected.

Very little is known about the Sarakol Revolt which took place in the region of southwestern Sinkiang around Tashkurgan near the borders of India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union. It started about August, 1945, and lasted for roughly a year, during which time the "revolting" forces threatened Kargalik, Yarkand, and to a lesser extent Kashgar. Beyond these bare facts, information about what took place is difficult to uncover. However, one foreign observer in southwestern Sinkiang believes that it was more of an invasion than a revolt. It is his opinion that the fighting was done almost entirely by troops from the Soviet republics across the border, and that these troops actually antagonized the Tajiks and Kirghiz in southwestern Sinkiang by destroying their crops and flocks. (He further states that the region is now completely stabilized and peaceful under the Chinese regime, and that the local people tend to be pro-Chinese.) The timing of the trouble in the Sarakol region suggests, furthermore, that it might have been a diversionary incident designed to distract the Chinese authorities from the more important problems related to The Ili Revolt. In a similar way the periodic attacks by Outer Mongolia, a satellite of the Soviet Union, upon Peitashan may have been attempts to give indirect assistance to the Ili Group.

Peitashan is a small range of mountains, about 20 miles long and 10 miles wide, on the border of Sinkiang and the Mongolian People's Republic. The range runs in a Southeast-Northwest direction and at its highest point rises to 10,000 feet. It is an extremely important point, for it lies in the midst of a large gobi and sand desert region and dominates the whole Sinkiang-Outer Mongolian border from a strategic point of view not only because of its height but also because it possesses adequate water supplies. In addition, it flanks the Hami-Chitai-Turfan triangle and the Sinkiang supply line from Kansu and in non-Chinese hands could be a stronghold capable of severing Sinkiang from the rest of China.

A tripartite agreement among China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia in 1915 stipulated that the China-Outer Mongolia border should be demarcated by mutual agreement. The border line has never been formally decided, however, and the dispute over its location has become more critical since the formal recognition of Outer Mongolian independence in 1945. Both Outer Mongolia and China claim the Peitashan range. The Chinese insist that their claim is the valid one because they have garrisoned the region for many years, and the Chinese front-line commander in that area, Major General Han You-wen, asserts that the border should be about forty miles north of the mountains. The Chinese military authorities in Sinkiang are adamant about not relinquishing the Peitashan range because it protects their supply line. They don't fear any immediate attempt by the Mongols to cut the supply line to Sinkiang because, they claim, the Outer Mongolians do not have more than a regiment or so which they could effectively use in that area because of communications difficulties. But the Chinese don't want to take any chances.

The Peitashan Incident began on June 5, 1947, when, according to the Chinese story, the Outer Mongolians began an attack on Peitashan, with 500 men and five aircraft, which lasted for two days and nights and resulted in three Chinese and over 30 Mongolian deaths. Between June 5, 1947, and July of this year there have been a total of 13 clashes. At present the Mongols hold several positions at the foot of the northern slope of the mountains and maintain two companies of troops just north of these positions and one company at Tapusun to the northwest. In addition they have an airfield a few miles away which is used for observation aircraft. These Mongol positions face the Chinese 14th Cavalry Regiment which holds the mountain tops and the difficult supply line which cuts through the desert between Chitai and Ulun Bulak. A state of suspended hostilities prevails continuously, and is interrupted only by occasional open clashes.

Although there is no evidence of close cooperation between the Ili Group and the Outer Mongolians, there is some evidence of local collusion between their troops. Chinese intelligence officers at Chitai state that the Mongols at Tapusun maintains friendly relations with the Ili troops at Ertai, 42 miles to the West, and Osman claims that while he was still on the Ili side the Outer Mongolians were cooperating with the Ili Group in the Ashan District.

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Although information about the government set up by the Ili Group in Ining is fragmentary and incomplete, one thing is clear: although they have consistently disavowed any separatist intentions in their official dealings with the Chinese they have proceeded to set up an autonomous regime which they call the "East Turkestan Republic." They have established a completely new administration with their own leaders in top posts. They use their own flag which bears a white star and crescent on a green background. In short, they have achieved temporary independence from China.

The three administrative districts of Ili, T'ach'eng, and Ashan which are controlled by the Ining Government together form the most valuable part of Sinkiang Province. They include one-fifth of the total population of Sinkiang as well as the only two working tungsten mines, the only working oil wells, and some of the best gold mines in the province. The Ili River Valley is often called the granary of Sinkiang because it is the most fertile agricultural region in the province, and the belt of pastureland stretching from Ashan District to Ili District contains some of the best grazing regions in Sinkiang.

The population in the territory controlled by the Ili regime is extremely heterogeneous, and although the leadership in the administration set up by the Ili Group is predominantly Uighur the population in the region is predominantly non-Uighur. (See Annex X.) The majority group, the Kazakhs, comprise 53 percent of the total population. The Uighurs and Taranchis (second and third largest groups respectively) together make up only 23 percent of the population. In addition, the three Ili-controlled districts contain members of every other minority in the province. As a matter of fact, in terms of the percentage of each group in the whole province, these three districts contain not only a majority of the Kazakhs but also of the Taranchis, Mongols, White Russians, Manchus, Uzbeks, and Tatars. The principal Uighur concentration is in southern Sinkiang, and in terms of racial and cultural groups, therefore, the Uighur-led Ili Government is a minority government within the region which it controls. The Ili Group has obtained the cooperation of some non-Uighur groups, but it has antagonized others. In particular it seems

to have antagonized many Kazakhs. Although it made a strong bid for Kazakh support by appointing a few Kazakhs, including Osman, Talilihan, and Halibek, to political posts of relative importance (District Officer of Ashan, Assistant District Officer of Ashan, and Magistrate of Shawan, respectively), many Kazakhs (including Osman and Halibek and their followers) have deserted the Ili side.

The top posts in the Ili hierarchy are held by men who are not only Uighurs but are Russian-educated or pro-Russian Uighurs. The present Ili chief is Aremajan Kasymov, 33-year old son of an Ining carpenter, who was both a student and a teacher in the Soviet Union and was imprisoned by Sheng Shih-ts'ai after the latter's break with Russia. Around Achmajan is a small core of trusted men including: Rahimjan Sabir Hodjayev, pro-Russian nephew and son-in-law of Mesud Sabri; Seyfuddin, who originally came from Kashgar but was educated in Russia; Abdul Karim, a revolutionary who was educated in the Sinkiang College; and others. There are fairly reliable reports that not only most of the top leaders but also many others in Ili territory (some estimates place the figure as high as 20,000) have become Soviet citizens. There are other reports that top leaders such as Achmajan and Rahimjan are members of the Russian Communist Party. The Chinese in Sinkiang also assert that the Ili regime, like the Ili army, has Russian advisers attached to it at all levels. None of these claims are verifiable, but many of them are specific enough in details to lend considerable credence to them.

The broad base of the Ili Group's power seems to be a youth group, called the Yashlar Tashkilati, led by a man named Seyfullaev whose birthplace was Turfan but who later lived in Ili and was educated in the Soviet Union.

In regard to the degree to which the Ili Group is oriented toward Russia it is significant, perhaps, that the original leader of the Group, a man named Alihan Toere who had the reputation of being primarily a religious and nationalist leader and was not particularly pro-Russian, has disappeared from the scene and is believed to be under arrest in the Soviet Union.

There are some reports, which may or may not be true, that significant splits exist within the Ili Group on the question of how closely the Group should work with the Soviet Union. It seems almost certain, however, that the least one can say is that the Ili regime is subject to strong Russian influence. It is probable that this influence is exerted not only indirectly but also directly through advisers and through the three Soviet consulates in the region - in the cities of Ining, T'ach'eng, and Ch'enghua.

The available evidence indicates, however, that despite the fact that it is probably subject to strong Russian influence the Ili regime is following policies which are primarily nationalistic rather than ideological. To date it has neither sovietized nor socialized the region which it controls. It has maintained the Chinese forms of organization, including the hsien and the administrative district, and apparently no comprehensive economic reform policies have been formulated as yet. In regard to religion the regime has followed a completely non-Marxian policy, and the District Officer of Ili is a venerable Muslim religious leader named Hakimbeg Hoja.

Although socialism seems to play only a minor role in the thinking of the Ili leaders, the economic orientation of the Ili region inevitably must have been strengthened since the closing of the Ili-Sinkiang border. Before the Ili Revolt part of the surplus production of the three zones under Ili control was exported to

other parts of Sinkiang; the only outlet for this surplus at present is the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the most natural and strongest economic ties have been with Russia for many years because of proximity, convenience of transport, and the existence of complementary economies. (Ili agricultural and animal products and raw materials exchange for Russian manufactured goods.)

At present it is reported that Russians are supervising the operation of the gold mines under Ili control as well as the Fuwen and Wench'uan tungsten mines (which are among the best sources of tungsten in Central Asia). In addition, the Russians are said to be obtaining large amounts of wheat, wool, and animal products, as well as of gold and tungsten, from Ili territory. Reports of this sort are probably true since there are no other markets for these products of the rich Ili-T'ach'eng-Ashan region. (Wusu oil is said to be barely sufficient for local needs, so the Russians probably are not making use of it. Maximum production at the Wusu wells in the pre-revolt period was 600 tons a month, and two of the six wells were reported to have been destroyed by fire in 1947.) Some Chinese claim that the Russians are economically milking the Ili region in a systematic way, and that as a result price inflation in basic necessities is worse there than in the rest of Sinkiang even though it is the most productive region in the province, but it is difficult to know whether or not there is any truth in these claims.

The question of whether or not there is a link between the Ili Group and the Chinese Communists is even more of a mystery than most aspects of the Ili regime. There has been no concrete evidence, however, to reveal such a link, and recent editorial discussion in the leading Ining paper, the "Democratic Daily," over whether or not such a link should be established would seem to indicate that none has existed in the past.

Although the facts and the surmises already cited give some hints concerning the character of the Ili regime, it is difficult to know whether on balance the regime is an enlightened or an oppressive one. Its bitterest enemies and critics (a category which does not include all Chinese leaders in Sinkiang by any means) state flatly that it is an oppressive, Russian-dominated police regime. There is not enough evidence to prove or disprove such an assertion. Whatever its character, however, it still evokes the approval and sympathy of many (but not all) Uighurs and some other non-Han Chinese throughout Sinkiang. To these people it represents an embodiment of nationalistic aspirations.

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Stripped to bare essentials, the present situation in Sinkiang is caused by two basic factors which overshadow all others. One is Sinkiang's geographical position and the consequent importance of the area to two great nations, China and Russia. The other is the growth of nationalism among the people native to the province.

There are many factors responsible for the growth of nationalism among the native groups in Sinkiang. One is a natural desire for greater self-rule. Another is a desire to maintain cultural unity and racial homogeneity, about which the Muslim groups are extremely jealous and defensive. Still another is a resentment against the superiority complex of the Chinese rulers and the past policy of Sinicization by conscious neglect of native education and native languages (no Chinese-Turki dictionary was ever compiled, for example). Reaction against Chinese misrule, which

finally became intolerable under Sheng Shih-ts'ai, made all of these issues explosive. And the spark in the tinder box was instigation and moral support by the Soviet Union and by pro-Soviet agents, and perhaps equally as important what has been called the Soviet "politics of attraction" - the attraction created by the alleged cultural autonomy granted to similar racial and cultural groups within the Soviet Union.

The last factor has been an important element in the situation in Sinkiang, for it has provided much-needed moral support to the minority groups in Sinkiang. The Soviet Union, since the early days of the Comintern, has been extremely sympathetic toward Asiatic nationalist movements, and in addition to Soviet sympathy, in the case of most Sinkiang minority groups, have been the pull of racial affinity with people in Soviet Central Asia, geographical proximity, and economic ties. Further ties with the Soviet Union have been created by the fact that many Uighurs and other representatives of Sinkiang's minorities have been educated in Soviet institutions - principally because of the lack of educational facilities for them elsewhere.

Despite the attraction of the Soviet Union to some groups in Sinkiang, however, there is by no means unanimous sentiment among minority groups on the question of relations with Russia. Native nationalism in Sinkiang is, in fact, an indecisive force because of many splits, along racial, economic, and other lines, which deprive the movement of unity and cohesion. Even within the majority Uighur group there is fragmentation. When a dance performed in the Uighur Club in Tihwa depicts an heroic scene from Uighur history, everyone will cheer enthusiastically, but the cleavages appear when decisions must be made on political action.

One split among the Uighurs is along economic and traditional lines. The conservative and wealthy begs and mullahs generally line up behind the Chinese, who have supported them in the past and continue to do so in many ways, and oppose the nationalist movement. The leaders of the nationalist movement, on the other hand, are for the most part representatives from the middle class and from iconoclastic youth, many of whom have been educated in the Soviet Union or strongly influenced by Soviet propaganda. The Uighurs who oppose the nationalist movement are numerically a small (but influential) group, however, and the large majority seem to go along with the nationalists. The educated and articulate supporters (men from middle-class groups and men who have divorced themselves from an upper class background) are vocal in their support, while the mass of Uighur farmers go along with the movement more passively.

Even among the nationalist Uighurs there are splits, however. All the nationalists agree in a vague way that they want more cultural and political autonomy, but there are two issues which are particularly controversial: what the immediate goal of their nationalism should be, and whether they should work through China or rely upon the Soviet Union for assistance. Liu Meng-ch'un who is Chang Chih-chung's Secretary-General and is probably the most influential Chinese official in Tihwa, says that the Uighur nationalists fall into three groups: those who are working for independence, those who are working for a high degree of autonomy with the framework of the existing Chinese administration and Chinese sovereignty, and those who feel they must choose sides and be either strongly pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet. His analysis seems to be essentially correct. The number of adherents to each of these three groups varies considerably, however. Mesud Sabri says that, "no responsible persons have considered how real independence could be maintained if achieved," and apparently this is true. Only a very few Uighurs, I believe, think complete independence is a practical possibility now. (Although it is difficult to know for certain what the ultimate objectives of the Ili Group may be, it is possible that some of the group fit into this category.) A fairly large number of persons can be

placed in the third category. These include the most strongly pro-Chinese Uighurs working in the provincial administration in Sinkiang and the pro-Soviet members of the Ili Group. It seems probable, however, that the majority of Uighurs outside of the Ili territory still fall into the middle group, which is adamant in its demands for more self-rule and autonomy but is working to achieve its nationalistic objectives within the framework of Chinese sovereignty. This group includes a number of important leaders such as Aisabek, who is amazingly candid in criticizing the regime which he has joined but who says, "I believe the Chinese side, despite faults, is better than the Russian, and I will continue to work for autonomy under Chinese rule."

The situation in Sinkiang is further complicated by cleavages between various cultural and racial groups. One of these splits involves the Tungans, or Chinese Muslims. There is a considerable amount of ill-feeling between the Tungans on the one hand and the Uighurs and Kazakhs on the other. The most important cause of this ill-feeling is an economic one. A great many Tungans own land and flocks of sheep and act as landlords and "flocklords" over groups of Uighurs and Kazakhs. The feeling between the Tungans and the Uighurs, furthermore, was inflamed by the looting and killing done on a large scale by Ma Chung-Ying's Kansu troops over a decade ago, and the ill-feeling aroused at that time has not died out. As a result of this racial friction, the Chinese Muslims tend to line up with the Provincial Government rather than with the nationalist movement, and some of the most reliable Chinese troops in the province are the Muslim cavalymen from Chinghai. The Chinese Muslims in Northwest China have rebelled against Chinese rule many times in the past, but at the present time they are numbered among the strongest supporters of the Chinese administration in Sinkiang.

Another confusing and uncertain element in the overall picture in Sinkiang is the position of the Kazakhs, who are the most militant, the most colorful, and numerically the second most important group in the province.

As has been mentioned already, the Kazakhs are Turki-speaking, Muslim nomads who live by moving their flocks, herds, yurts, and families. Each Kazakh family owns its animals independently, but pastureland is used communally. An average family among the Kazakhs who live in the T'ien Shan owns about 20 to 30 sheep and goats, 20 horses, two or three camels, and one or two cows, but the wealthier families own much larger numbers of animals, and the poorer ones in many cases tend flocks which do not belong to them. These animals provide almost their entire livelihood - transportation, felt for their yurts and rugs, wool for clothing, dung for fuel, and milk, cheese and mutton for food. Their traditional pattern of life has not been changed to any great extent in recent years, although a few minor modifications have taken place. As a rule they now sell some of their animals in order to buy tea, sugar, and manufactured cloth. A few of them cultivate small plots of grain at the foot of their mountain pasturelands to supplement their animal foodstuffs. And their leaders are now given Chinese titles such as Pao Chief and Hsien Magistrate (in addition to their own Kazakh titles). But these changes have not altered their way of life, for they live in remote mountain regions isolated from urban, modern influences.

The Kazakhs are organized tribally. There are three main tribes in Sinkiang: the Naiman, concentrated in Ili District; the Kirei, formerly concentrated in Ashan District but now spread over several regions including the T'ien Shan; and the Auwak, scattered in small and unimportant groups throughout northern Sinkiang. Each of these three tribes, which are supposed to be related through close blood

ties, has a chief called the Wang (a Chinese title, meaning king or prince, bestowed on the chiefs during the Manchu period).

Each main Kazakh tribe is broken down into sub-tribes. In Sinkiang there are 12 in the Kirei, nine in the Naiman, and three in the Ouwak. Each sub-tribe has a leader called the Taiji who controls 1000 to 3000 Yurts. (A yurt is a round, collapsible felt tent owned by a single family.) The hierarchy below the Taiji consists of Okurday, who control 300 to 600 yurts; Zaleng, who control 100 to 200 yurts; Zangen, who control 50 to 100 yurts; and Kunde, who control 10 to 30 yurts. The positions of Taiji, Okurday, and Zaleng are inherited, but the lower two positions are held by persons who are sometimes chosen by the people and sometimes inherit the post from their fathers. In addition to these leaders, each sub-tribe has one or two Bi, elders who administer the law (a combination of Muslim precepts and local customs) in cooperation with the Taiji. Each sub-tribe also has an assembly called the Majlis, to which all leaders from Taiji to Kunde belong, which meets every year during the Muslim New Year period and irregularly (three or four times) during the rest of the year when called into session by the Taiji.

In addition to the regular tribal hierarchy, however, the Kazakhs have a number of popular leaders called Bator (Hero) who have achieved a position of prominence and leadership through their heroism and military prowess. These popular leaders are often more important and powerful than the regular tribal leaders. At present the real leader of the Kirei tribe is a Bator named Osman. The regular tribal chief, Ailin Wang, is an ineffective, hen-pecked little man who is overshadowed even by his wife, the 250-pound Hatan who is District Officer of Ili. Osman, by contrast, is a huge man with a tremendous frame, ham-like hands, and a terrific ego. He is 49 years old but has tremendous vigor. His cool grey eyes, his set lips, and his black beard make him look the part of a heroic warrior, and he reminds one of the Hunnish conquerors who terrorized a major part of the Eurasian continent centuries ago.

The Kazakhs are a proud people. The women, who look medieval in their long skirts and Muslim headgear which covers them completely except for their oval faces, do most of the routine work. The men, who dress in high black boots and wear colorful fur-lined, silk-covered bonnets, appear to spend most of their time riding through the mountains in a dashing, martial fashion, sitting together in their yurts drinking kumis, an intoxicating elixir of fermented mare's milk, or fighting.

The Kazakhs admit that they live to fight, and at the beginning of the Ili Revolt they joined the Ili side and did most of the fighting for the Ili Group. Since that time, however, they have split, and some of the Kazakhs in Sinkiang are now on the Ili side and some on the Chinese side. The majority of the Naiman stayed on the Ili side, under the leadership of Kazakhs such as Mustafa Achlachjik, Bashbai, and Talilihan. The Naiman are the largest of the three tribes which have members in Sinkiang, but many of the Naiman are in the Soviet Union, and they are outnumbered in Sinkiang itself by the Kirei. Many of the Kirei have deserted the Ili side and have migrated under leaders such as Osman from their Ashan homeland to pasture areas outside of Ili territory. They are now, temporarily at least, supporters of the Chinese regime in Sinkiang. It is difficult to assess the importance of the split among the Kazakhs, and to determine its real causes. Undoubtedly the geographical distribution of the two major tribes helps explain the cleavage, but other factors are involved too. Osman claims, for example, that the Naiman have been "infected by Russian propaganda."

Osman is an extraordinarily colorful figure, and he has had a career which is almost fantastic. During the past decade, he has fought on the side of every important

faction involved in the complicated struggles in Sinkiang.

Osman really began his fighting career during the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Between 1937 and 1940 Sheng antagonized the Kazakhs by arresting a large number of their leaders. This led Osman to organize widespread resistance, and on February 1, 1940, a long struggle against Sheng was started. Osman was not strong enough to achieve any signal success, however, and he was driven out of Ch'enghua in Ashan. As a result, he began, in January, 1942, cooperating with the Outer Mongolians and received their aid. He set up headquarters in Tayingkul, which is just inside the border of Outer Mongolia north of Ashan, and carried on a rather ineffective sort of resistance against Sheng. Then, on September 6, 1945, when the Ili army arrived in Ch'enghua with 6000 men, he formed an alliance with the Ili Group. Shortly thereafter he split with the Outer Mongolians, in November, 1945, but he continued cooperating with the Ili Group until April 1, 1946. On that date he divided company, denounced the Ili Group, and began a trek southward to Peitashan. He soon came to terms with the Chinese and fought with them against the Outer Mongolians at Peitashan. Then on August 26, 1947, he launched a large-scale raid on the Ili forces in Ashan. He captured Ch'enghua in the middle of September but was forced to evacuate it soon thereafter when, according to his story, 160 Russian trucks arrived with Ili troops. Osman alleges that in December, 1947, he received an emissary sent from Outer Mongolia. This emissary, who he says was a nephew of his, brought a Mongol offer to supply him with military aid if he would again cooperate with them. He turned the offer down, however, and handed his nephew over to the Chinese authorities (because, he says, "he was my enemy") in spite of the tearful pleas of his sister.

Osman rationalizes all of his past decisions and moves in terms of anti-Communist objectives, and if one believes all that he says at the present time he is a rabid Russophobe. In actual fact, however, his past moves seem to have been based primarily upon expediency and a desire to maintain his own power and the autonomy of his own group. He cites a long list of grievances which he had against the Ili Group, asserting that they were completely Russian-dominated and Russian-controlled, but his real reason for splitting with them seems to have been the fact that they tried to bring him under control and ensure his obedience to their orders.

At present, Osman lives with some of his followers (he says he has about 4,000 yurts and 15,000 Kazakhs with him) in the T'ien Shan just south of Chitai. He lives like a potentate and is surrounded by a group of loyal lieutenants including Hanatbai, his political chief-of-staff, Habas Bator, his military chief-of-staff, and Nurga, Lias, Lasihan, and Arumkan, his principal subordinate military leaders. He is not engaged in active fighting at present but in addition to his loyal old guard of supporters he controls three battalions of Peace Preservation Troops (all cavalry) assigned to him by the Chinese, and he is a force to be reckoned with, not only for his own military power but also for the influence he exerts upon large numbers of Kazakhs - including some of those still in Ili territory.

All of these facts make the Kazakhs one of the most uncertain factors in the situation in Sinkiang, and the position of the Kazakhs complicates the confused racial and group interrelations in the region.

"Sinkiang," says Burhan (a prominent Tatar who appears to be playing the subtle game of keeping in good graces with all sides in the hope of becoming Governor as a compromise candidate) "is like a guitar. All the strings must be in tune for it to play." The strings certainly are not all in tune at present.

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International rivalries and conflicts are equally as fundamental in the present situation in Sinkiang as the growing nationalism in the province. Sinkiang, primarily because of its geographical position, is a focal point where international boundaries meet and where national interests often conflict.

During the last century the strategic and other interests of three Powers met in the region. These three Powers were China, Russia, and Great Britain. Britain began to lose interest in Sinkiang by the 1880's, however, and now that the British have withdrawn from India they are turning over their last listening post in Sinkiang, their consulate at Kashgar, to the Indian Government. The major parties now interested in the province have been reduced to two - China and the Soviet Union.

China's interest and objective in Sinkiang is simple and clear-cut. The Chinese Government is determined to maintain its sovereignty over the province and considers its claims morally unquestionable and legally unassailable. The motives for China's determination on this issue seem to be based more on history, tradition, and prestige than on tangible interests. The Sinkiang region is an important one strategically, but it would be virtually impossible for China to defend it against a serious Soviet attack because of the supply problem, and a frontier defense could probably be established more successfully at points farther East. Economically, Sinkiang is a financial drain rather than an economic asset to the Chinese Government at the present time. It is probable, however, that the economic potentialities of the province (particularly as a source of supply for oil, tungsten, and gold) influence Chinese thinking. The most important concern of the Chinese, however, seems to be the defense of traditional rights and the maintenance of China's prestige.

Russia's interest in Sinkiang is based upon a number of factors. Economically, the Ili Valley in particular and the whole province to a lesser extent are oriented toward the Soviet Union. This is natural because of proximity, and it has been particularly true since the completion of the main line of the Turk-Sib Railway in 1930. Russian trade with Sinkiang has expanded rapidly in recent decades (with a few ups and downs). Between 1923-24 and 1930, for example, the total trade between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union rose from 3,433,000 rubles to 32,060,000 annually. This trade was a profitable exchange of Russian manufactured goods for Sinkiang's agricultural and animal products (See Annex XI). Although this trade is profitable, however, it certainly is not vital to the Soviet Union, and from a commercial point of view the Soviet interest in Sinkiang would seem to be simply the maintenance of a peaceful and orderly regime willing to trade freely with the Soviet Union.

As a source of raw materials Sinkiang is potentially of some importance, but actually the only raw materials in Sinkiang which would seem to be of real interest to the Soviet Union are tungsten, oil, and gold (with tungsten particularly important since the tungsten mines in northern Sinkiang are among the best in Central Asia). If this is a major interest affecting Soviet policy a friendly regime in northern Sinkiang, such as the present Ili regime, probably satisfies the Soviet Union's objectives at least temporarily, for at present the only working tungsten mines and oil wells and some of the best gold mines in Sinkiang are in Ili territory.

Most probably, however, the Soviet Union's main interests in Sinkiang are not economic but are related to national security. One aspect of the Soviet Union's security problem is an ethnic one. The people in Sinkiang are closely related to and in many cases identical racially with the people inhabiting the five Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenia. Ethnic groups overlapping national boundaries often create an unstable situation in which both nations involved fear instigation of trouble across the border line. In time of war a border of this sort is particularly unreliable and undesirable.

The geography of the Ili district makes it particularly important to the Soviet Union from a strategic point of view. The three important rivers in northwestern Sinkiang all flow into lakes within the Soviet borders, and their valleys provide an easy land approach to Soviet territory. This undoubtedly is a matter of concern to the Soviets even though the possibility of land attack from that quarter is fairly remote.

Perhaps the main Soviet strategic concern in Sinkiang, however, is the potential importance of the province in terms of a future air war. Some observers have speculated upon the possibility, if a Third World War occurs, of United States air attacks upon Western Siberia and Soviet Central Asia from a major air base on Okinawa. These same observers have concluded, probably correctly, that the Russians have considered this prospect and are interested firstly in preventing any possibility of the establishment of U.S. supplementary air bases in Sinkiang, and secondly in being able to establish Soviet air bases in Sinkiang in time of war for interceptor aircraft. Air attacks on Soviet Central Asia would strike at the vulnerable underbelly of the U.S.S.R., a region which has become vitally important with the development of industrialization during the past twenty years and the eastward migration of Russia's industries during the Second World War.

Sinkiang is within easy bombing range of such major industrial centers as the Magnitogorsk (iron) - Karaganda (coal) complex and the Lake Baikal industrial region, as well as many other mineral and industrial centers. To cite a few examples, possible air targets in the five Soviet Central Asian republics (which in 1939 had a population of roughly 17 millions) might include: (in Kazakhstan) lead mines particularly near Chimkent which in 1939 produced about four-fifths of the Soviet Union's lead output, copper mines particularly at Balkash, Karsakpai, and Irtish which in 1939 produced almost one-fifth of the Soviet Union's black copper, coal mines at Karaganda and elsewhere which made Kazakhstan the third largest coal producer in the Soviet Union in 1939, zinc deposits which contain fifty percent of the Soviet Union's reserves, oil at Emba, important chrome and nickel resources, a major meat packing plant at Semipalatinsk, large flour mills at Karaganda, a huge chemical combine at Aktyubinsk, and textile and cotton oil plants at Chimkent and Alma Ata; (in Uzbekistan) mines near Tashkent which made Uzbekistan the third largest copper producer in the Soviet Union in 1939, the largest vegetable oil plant in the Soviet Union, one of the largest chemical combines and valuable coal mines (all near Tashkent), and oil in the Ferghana Valley; (in Kirghizia) mercury mines working the largest mercury deposits in the U.S.S.R., and coal mines near Lake Issyk-kul; (in Tajikistan) important agricultural machinery plants, large cotton textile factories at Stalinabad, and many hydro-electric plants (in 1941, 57 stations which together produced over one-half of the water power developed in Central Asia); and (in Turkmenia) textile plants at Ashkabad and a large chemical plant on the Persian Gulf. (All the above information, which is based on the most reliable data I could obtain in Tihwa while I was there, is several years old, but although not up-to-date it should be reasonably indicative of the importance of the five Soviet republics mentioned.) In addition, Soviet Central Asia is a major agricultural production region not only for food but also for cotton, and the whole region depends on an excellent but vulnerable railway system developed in recent years. These facts would seem to suggest that it is probably important in Soviet strategic thinking, and Sinkiang lies across one of the most logical air approaches to the region. (See Map IV.)

On the basis of an objective analysis it seems likely that Sinkiang is an area of considerable security importance (and slight economic importance) to the Soviet Union, and the active policy which the Russians have pursued in the region for the past 80 years appears to confirm this. It is difficult, however, to determine

accurately just how important Sinkiang is in the minds of the U.S.S.R.'s leaders at the present time or what the specific objectives of current Soviet policy in Sinkiang are.

Some aspects of the Soviet Union's policy in Sinkiang in recent years are puzzling. The available evidence indicates that the U.S.S.R. is giving the Ili regime at least strong moral support and possibly a good deal of material support, yet it was the U.S.S.R. which intervened and sponsored mediation at a time when the Ili forces were at the peak of their military success. Furthermore, instead of intensifying their policies of penetration into the rest of Sinkiang outside of the Ili regime's territory, the Russians seem to have been following a policy of gradual withdrawal which began in 1943.

During the regime of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, all of Sinkiang was a Soviet sphere of influence. Today, Soviet organizations and activities in Sinkiang (outside of Ili territory), although they are continued on a scale much larger than those of any other foreign nation, are being gradually cut down. There are still five Soviet consulates in Sinkiang (a consulate-general in Tihwa and a consulate in Kashgar as well as the three consulates in Ili territory), but they are much less active than they have been at certain periods in the past. During the initial and critical stages of the Ili revolt they followed an ominous policy of enlisting Soviet citizens within Sinkiang by granting citizenship papers to large numbers of native people, many of whom had never even been in the Soviet Union (In 1946 alone, according to the Foreign Affairs Section of the Tihwa Police Bureau, the Soviet Consulate-General in Tihwa issued citizenship papers to an estimated 1000 persons in Tihwa, only 123 of whom registered their new citizenship with the Chinese authorities, and the Chinese were worried about the creation of a large group with dual citizenship and divided allegiance.), but this policy seems to have been stopped almost completely. In Tihwa there are active propaganda organizations such as the Information Bureau, the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association (which has the leading Chinese officials as titular heads), and the International Book Store, and there is still a Russian Trade Mission (inactive) in the city, but the total personnel of all these organizations together with the Consulate-General and the Russian hospital has been reduced from roughly 130 to 103 in the last six months, instead of having been increased.

Almost the only tangible asset belonging to the Soviet Union in Sinkiang at the present time is the Sino-Soviet Airline which operates bi-weekly flights between Alma Ata and Hami. This corporation was set up under a special ten-year Sino-Soviet agreement signed in 1939. The initial capital (US\$1,000,000, divided into 1000 shares - according to the Chairman of the Board of Directors) was contributed by China and the Soviet Union on a Fifty-fifty basis, and the corporation was to have been operated as a joint enterprise. Actually, however, the Soviet General-Manager has run it with very little reference to the Chinese. The key positions are held by Soviet citizens, and the Board of Directors (three Chinese and three Russians), which is supposed to meet annually, has not met for the last four years. The Chairman of the Board, Liu Tse-yung, has no voice in the management of the corporation. Even this last remaining Soviet asset in Sinkiang appears to be scheduled for liquidation, however, for the Chinese Government has recently announced that it does not intend to renew the airline agreement.

The Soviet Union's simultaneous support of the Ili regime and gradual withdrawal from the rest of Sinkiang during the past few years makes it difficult to interpret what Soviet policy objectives are. One can interpret those objectives in several ways, and all of the alternative interpretations may contain an element of truth. Perhaps the Soviet Union feels that the de facto independence of a friendly regime

in northern Sinkiang achieves its major short-run aims and therefore, to avoid further friction in the region, it is reducing its activities elsewhere in the province. It is possible that the Russians believe that an active policy is unnecessary in Sinkiang and that the whole province will ultimately fall into the Soviet sphere of influence either as a result of success on the part of the native nationalists in Sinkiang or as a consequence of a Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. Or perhaps the Soviet Union fears the possibility of serious international complications in Sinkiang developing from a more active policy and is unwilling to risk such an eventuality when it has so many problems and commitments elsewhere.

It also is possible, however, that the Soviet Union contemplates the possibility of adding the entire province of Sinkiang to the galaxy of satellites which it has established or supported along its borders but does not consider the present time opportune. It would be an easy matter, militarily speaking, for the Soviet Union to take Sinkiang if it made a decision to do so.

Whatever the specific objectives of current Soviet policy toward Sinkiang are, the attitudes and actions of the Soviet Union will continue to be vital factors in the situation in the province. The Chinese recognize this, and the present Chinese policy is to avoid antagonizing the Russians at all costs. The fact that international complications loom large in the Sinkiang situation should not, however, obscure the equally important fact that many of the problems in Sinkiang are indigenous and would exist even if no international rivalries were involved. "The crucial question in the Sinkiang Problem," says Liu Tse-yung, the scholarly Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tihwa, "is a Chinese one, and the solution of the problem depends upon our performance during the next two or three years. If we have a good administration the people of Sinkiang will support us; if we do not, the people will oppose us."

ANNEXES

(Note: Annexes I through VII are based upon information contained in documents mimeographed by the Tihwa Geological Survey Office in 1947. Annexes VIII through X are based upon information prepared upon request by the Sinkiang Commission of Civil Affairs. The population figures are the latest ones available. Annex XI is based upon statistics gathered from Russian sources by the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tihwa.)

ANNEX I. Sinkiang - Area

Total Area of Province - 1,734,750 square kilometers (approx. 650,000 sq. m.)

<u>Area by Type of Land</u>		Sq. Km.	% of Total	
Little or No Use to Agriculture, Forestry, or Pasturage	Desert	367,760	21.2	35.3
	Glacier and Snow-capped Mountains	76,329	4.4	
	Piedmont Gravel	158,264	9.1	
	Lakes (Salty and Fresh)	10,409	0.6	
Forestry and Pasturage	High Mountains with Snow Only in Winter (Summer Pasture)	411,650	23.7	47.2
	Low Mountainous Area (Winter Pasture)	406,750	23.5	
Agriculture*	Oasis Regions	218,579	12.6	17.5
	Saline Soil Regions	85,009	4.9	
		<u>1,734,750</u>	<u>100.0</u>	

*Note: The figures under the category "Agriculture" do not indicate areas actually used for agriculture but areas which fall into a broad category called "Agricultural Regions."

ANNEX II. Sinkiang Crops - 1944 Production of Grains (Figures Converted to Nearest 100)

<u>Administrative District</u>	<u>Crop Production (in piculs)</u>
Tihwa	1,121,700
Ili	2,102,000
Kashgar	2,121,800
Aksu	1,848,300
T'ach'eng	196,600
Ashan	95,100
Hotien	1,650,900
Yenki	287,500
Hami	77,300
Yarkand	<u>1,639,600</u>
Total	11,140,800

ANNEX III. Area of Sinkiang Oases and Cultivated Area

Administrative District	Area of Oases (Sq. Km.)	Population Density in Oases (Per Sq. Km.)	Area of Cultivated Fields (in Sq. Mow)	Mow of Cultivated Fields Per Person--average	% of Cultivated Land to Total Oases Land
Kashgar	4,628.8	207	2,250,431	2.4	30%
Yarkand	3,217.3	174	3,508,543	6.2	67
Hotien	3,634.2	167	2,299,337	3.8	39
Aksu	4,603.0	130	3,989,622	6.7	53
Ili	4,210.0	114	3,219,993	6.8	47
Tihwa	3,479.5	113	1,556,345	4.0	28
T'ach'eng	1,512.0	112	561,992	3.3	23
Yenki	953.7	111	679,774	6.0	44
Ashan	315.0	266	133,924	1.6	26
Hami	353.9	164	174,806	3.0	31
Totals:	26,907.4		18,374,767		

ANNEX IV. Sinkiang - Utilizable Land (In Square Kilometers Converted to Nearest 100)

	Possibly Utilizable	Easily Utilizable	Most Easily Utilizable
Area with Water and Grass	26,900	26,900	26,900
(Oasis Grassland or Pasture)	191,700	191,700	-
Saline Soil Area	85,000	-	-
Mountainous Area Pasture	83,000	83,000	83,000
Totals	386,600	301,600	109,900

ANNEX V. Sinkiang - Pasture Regions (Figures Converted to Nearest 100)

	High Mountainous Area Summer Pasture for Cattle (Sq. Km.)	Low Mountainous Area Winter Pasture for Cattle (Sq. Km.)
Kunlun Mountains	29,900	11,900
T'ien Shan (Southern Slope)	2,700	7,800
T'ien Shan (Northern Slope)	4,100	7,100
Altai Mountains	4,600	14,900
Totals	41,300	41,700
	83,000*	

*Note: This figure is 10.1% of the mountainous regions and 4.8% of the total area of the province.

ANNEX VI. Head of Animals in Sinkiang (Figures Converted to Nearest 100)

Horses	1,028,000
Cows	1,659,500
Camels	84,900
Donkeys	629,100
Goats	2,437,600
Sheep	9,828,400

ANNEX VII. Sinkiang - Surveyed Mineral Resources (Figures Converted to Nearest 100)

Coking Coal	88,000,000	Metric Tons
Non-Coking Coal	2,038,430,700	" "
Iron	46,016,000	" "
Lead	9,400	" "
Wolframite	9,000	" "
Molybdenite	2,000	" "
Arsenopyrite	900	" "
Oil (Area of Fields)	1,100	Square Kilometers

Note: For Zinc, Gypsum, and Copper there are no figures but the Chief of the Tihwa Geological Survey Office describes them in the following terms:
Zinc - "Rich," Gypsum - "Very Good," Copper - "Not Important."

ANNEX VIII. Sinkiang - Geographical Distribution (Figures Converted to Nearest 100)

District Name	District Number	Population - Early 1947 Figure (Based on Earlier Surveys)	Population - Figures from November, 1947 Census (3 Ili-Controlled Dists. Not Included)
Tihwa City		69,300	70,000
Tihwa	1	311,200	332,300
Ili	2	471,700	-
Kashgar	3	929,900	928,300
Aksu	4	620,100	632,400
T'ach'eng	5	170,400	-
Ashan	6	85,800	-
Hotien	7	648,400	639,400
Yenki	8	119,800	117,700
Hami	9	59,600	56,000
Yarkand	10	571,700	545,400
Totals		4,055,900	

ANNEX IX. Sinchiang - Racial Composition of Population (Figures Converted to Nearest 100)

Group	Population by Group	% of Total Population	Areas of Concentration	
			District Number	Group Population in the District
Uighurs	3,036,500	74.86	3	880,400
			7	645,000
			4	601,500
			10	565,800
			1	119,800
			2	76,200
Kazakhs	424,800	10.47	2	210,700
			5	103,200
			6	69,700
Chinese (Han)	235,700	5.80	1	106,500
			Tihwa City	38,600
			2	27,700
			5	26,200
Tungans	103,100	2.54	1	48,800
			2	17,700
			Tihwa City	16,000
Taranchis	79,300	1.95	2	79,200
Kirghiz	59,200	1.45	3	35,700
			4	14,300
Mongols	57,900	1.42	2	24,500
			5	15,800
			8	13,600
White Russians	19,300	.04	2	9,400
			5	6,000
			6	2,200
Uzbek	10,800	.02	2	4,700
			3	3,200
Hsipo	10,600	.02	2	10,200
Tajik	9,800	.02	3	7,200
			10	2,100
Tatar	5,600	.01	5	2,200
			2	2,200
Solon	2,500	Under .01	5	1,400
			2	1,100
Manchu	800	Under .01	2	500
			1	200
Total	4,055,900			

ANNEX X. Population in the Three Administrative Districts Under Ili Control

(Figures from Early 1947 Reports - Based on Earlier Surveys - All Figures Converted to the Nearest 100)

Total Population	725,900
Kazakhs	383,600
Uighurs	90,200
Taranchis	79,200
Chinese (Han)	58,000
Mongols	43,100
Tungans	21,500
White Russians	17,600
Manchus (Including Hsipoos & Solons)	13,600
Kirghiz	Under 10,000
Uzbek	Under 10,000
Tatars	Under 10,000
Tajiks	Under 100

ANNEX XI. Sinkiang - Trade with the Soviet Union in 1935

Sinkiang - Exports to Russia


Wool	5,000 tons
Skins	2,000 tons
Cotton	1,000 tons
Animals	17,000 head
Raw Silk	60 tons
Carpets & Furs	1,100,000 gold rubles

Sinkiang - Imports from Russia

Cotton Cloth	2,500 tons
Sugar	2,500 tons
Oil Products	3,000 tons
Metals (All Kinds)	700 tons
Electrical Goods	1,300 tons
Matches	115 tons
Pottery	250 tons
Rubber Goods	15 tons
Confectionary	140 tons
Tobacco Goods	160 tons

Note: The year 1935 was selected not as being a typical year but because the figures for 1935 were the most recent ones available (in Tihwa). These figures indicate the items of trade but not necessarily the normal volume of trade.

MAP I




Administrative Districts of Sinkiang Province

(Showing the three districts under the control of the Ili Government.)

MAP III

ASG - August, 1948




Military Situation - North Sinkiang - August, 1948

----- Approximate line
of Chinese Military
Positions or Control.

Based Upon Information
From Chinese Military
Intelligence and From
Neutral Observers.

MAP IV



Soviet Central Asia - Neighbor of Sinkiang