

AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES FIELD STAFF

15 Peak Road (Small House)
Hong Kong
November 15, 1953

Mr. Phillips Talbot
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522 Fifth Avenue
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Dear Phil:

During the past six weeks I have visited the capitals of five countries where I talked with either leading officials or China specialists in the government organs concerned with foreign affairs. I found that there is still no general agreement among the non-Soviet countries of the world on what to do about China.

In the State Department in Washington, Communist China is viewed primarily in its relation to a global conflict between the Soviet bloc and the West, and it is felt that continued pressure on China is required to check its expansionism.

The Foreign Office in London seems to have accepted a new status quo in the Far East and wants to minimize conflict and friction with Communist China by a policy of accommodation.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, China is looked upon almost entirely in its relation to the war in Indo-China, and the French are ready to bargain with Peking if they can thereby move nearer to some solution of their problem in Indo-China.

The Yugoslavs are obsessed by the idea of possible Titoism in China and, convinced that it will come, they favor a conciliatory policy designed to woo the Chinese Communists from the Soviet bloc.

The Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi accepts the Peking regime and has established "friendly relations" with it. The Indians say that they believe Communist China does not have aggressive or expansionist aims in Asia, but they may well be uneasy about a powerful new neighbor on their northern border; whatever their motives, they are strong advocates for general acceptance of Communist China into the community of nations.

Of the five, only the United States seems to favor indefinite ostracism of Communist China. The other four, for varying reasons, seem more prepared to accept and to deal or bargain with the Peking regime. And this division is likely to become wider if some sort of prolonged truce is concluded in Korea.

Sincerely yours,
A. Doak Barnett
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1 - 1953

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NEW YORK 36, N. Y.

FIVE POLICIES TOWARD CHINA

A. Doak Barnett

Churchill confessed to the House of Commons this week that he thinks the world is in an "awful muddle". He added, hopefully, that "time and patience and goodwill" might improve things a bit.

The rise to power of a Communist regime in China has contributed a good deal to the "muddle", for today, four years after the establishment of the Peking regime - and three years after Chinese Communist aggression in Korea - there is still no general agreement among the non-Soviet countries of the world on what to do about China. And the international status and relations of the Peking regime are a source of almost constant confusion and dispute on the international scene.

In the United States, problems related to China policy have played a particularly important role in both domestic and foreign affairs during these years, and differences of opinion on China policy continue to be if not a major problem at least a cause of constant friction in relations between the United States and its international friends and acquaintances.

Many Americans find it incomprehensible and completely unreasonable that the governments of numerous non-Communist countries do not see eye to eye with the United States on China policy, and this attitude is reciprocated by large numbers of people in the other countries concerned. The resulting lack of understanding has increased the already difficult problems of formulating common policies - or, when this is not possible, agreeing to disagree in an amicable fashion - in order to meet the situation created by the rise of a new Communist power in the Far East which has upset the balance of power in Asia.

There are many factors which contribute to differences on China policy: varying assessments of Communist China's relations with Russia and her foreign ambitions, divergent conceptions of national aims and interests in the Far East, and different domestic pressures and problems. The same situation, in the light of these varying factors, does not look exactly the same when viewed from different national capitals.

During the past six weeks I have visited the capitals of five countries which in one way or another differ in their policies toward China - Washington, London, Paris, Belgrade, and New Delhi - and, although my visits were brief, in each place I talked with either leading officials or China specialists in the government organs concerned with foreign affairs, as well as with numerous other persons, and received some impressions

of the factors and attitudes which contribute to differences on China policy. It is impossible in a brief report to record all the impressions I received even on these short visits, but perhaps I can throw some light on a few factors which contribute to existing policy differences. Unfortunately, almost all the interviews which I had were off-the-record, and this fact - rather than a desire to deal in generalizations - will force me to be vague on my sources,

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Washington

It is not a simple matter to describe present United States policy toward China when on the same day (November 9) Vice-president Nixon on Formosa stated that the Nationalist Government is the "only government which the people and government of the United States recognize as being truly representative of the Chinese people" while Secretary of State Dulles in Washington (according to UP) said "that he did not believe that the Eisenhower Administration had ever said that it would be forever opposed to recognition" of Communist China. Confusion and contradiction seem to be the order of the day on China policy. Despite this fact, however, during the latter part of September there appeared to me to be a fairly consistent viewpoint among the majority of policy-influencing specialists on China in the Department of State, a viewpoint which differed substantially not only from previous ones I had encountered during the Truman Administration but also from current thinking in the other foreign ministries which I have visited in subsequent weeks,

This does not mean that even within the Department of State there is unanimous agreement on all the issues involved, but one can discern a policy line which might be described in a simplified way as follows. The existing evidence, one State Department official said to me, indicates that a China policy should be based on the following assumptions: (1) that the Chinese Communist regime is firmly in control of the mainland and is unlikely to be overthrown in the foreseeable future, (2) that the policies of the Chinese Communist regime are inimical and hostile to the United States to such an extent that regardless of U.S. action there is no immediate prospect for a reasonable modus vivendi, even on a live-and-let-live basis, (3) that Mao Tse-tung is neither a puppet nor a Tito but that current Sino-Soviet relations have created a close "axis" based on mutual dependence and interests, making any split unlikely, and (4) that the Chinese Communists' aim is to increase their influence in all of Asia in every possible way and to attempt to eliminate American influence in the area. On the basis of these assumptions, it is believed that United States policy toward China should be one which might be described as a policy of "limited pressure" on China, to restrain China's expansive tendencies and, perhaps, to force a change of attitude upon the Chinese Communist leaders or cause friction between China and Russia,

Even within the Department of State I encountered some qualification, doubt, and dissent, with one or more of these assumptions and the policy thinking based on them (one high-ranking official divided existing opinion into three schools which he defined as one favoring "limited pressure", another favoring "limited accommodation", and a third somewhere in-between), but my strong impression was that the supporters of "limited pressure" are clearly in the ascendancy.

The "limited pressure" line of thinking calls for United States non-recognition of the Peking Government, opposition to the seating of Communist China in the United Nations (although not necessarily use of the veto for this purpose), and continued restrictions on trade with China, all for an indeterminate future, "until China changes its attitude" and is less expansionist, or until frictions develop between China and Russia, neither of which is considered imminent. It is a sort of "containment plus" policy, the immediate aims of which are negative.

Supporters of this policy argue that if all we can expect of China in the foreseeable future is a combination of hostility and expansionism, the best we can do is try to restrain and weaken her. United States recognition, they assert, would give a substantial boost to Communist China's prestige and therefore would be undesirable even in return for sizeable concessions (one key State Department official said that the United States should not recognize Communist China even if they are willing "to turn over Korea to Syngman Rhee"), unless there is proof of a basic change in Chinese Communist attitudes and aims. They maintain that membership in the United Nations would have the same undesirable effects, and in addition would complicate the already numerous difficulties of that organization. And they state that since Communist China is trying to industrialize, and industrialization would increase its power, every effort should be made through continued trade restrictions at least to slow down this process. All of these facets of China policy are viewed by supporters of this school of thinking not as contingent upon the outcome of the Korean war but rather upon indications of basic changes in Communist China's whole foreign policy. They argue, also, that these policies may create strains between China and Russia, if China becomes weary of depending upon Soviet representation of her case in international relations, or if the Soviet bloc is unable to meet China's economic needs for industrialization.

Formosa seems to be generally regarded as a side-issue. I discovered no one in the Department of State who questioned United States support for the defense of the Nationalist regime on Formosa, or anyone who seriously thought the Nationalist regime has significant offensive capabilities against the mainland. The legal fiction that the Nationalist Government is still the Government of China appears to be maintained because it is a logical corollary of non-recognition of Communist China, rather than because of any conviction that Nationalist China can reestablish de facto control of the mainland.

The defenders of the policy described above are sensitive to their critics, both at home and abroad, and try vigorously to refute many of their arguments. In answering those who say that recognition should be granted any government in de facto control of a country, they maintain that recognition is not merely an automatic, legalistic act but rather is an act determined by its effects on national interests. They resent charges that the United States Government is unwilling to negotiate, pointing to the two-year negotiations in Korea and stating that signs of compromise on the Communist side are a pre-requisite to further concessions from the United States. To those who say, "Russia is in the UN; why not Communist China?", they answer, there is a UN charter which the Chinese are violating. To counter the argument of those who believe that since the United States recognizes Russia it is difficult to defend non-recognition of Communist China, they assert that recognition of the USSR probably would not have taken place in 1933 if we had been fighting a war with Russia and if Russia then showed the hostility which Communist China now exhibits. If a critic argues that once the Korean War is ended trade restrictions applied to China should be no more severe than those applied to all East-West trade, they answer that in trade with the European members of the Soviet bloc the West gets the better of the bargain, whereas China, which desperately needs materials for industrialization, is a different matter.

The reasoning I have outlined seems to be the actual basis for present United States policy toward China. There is little doubt that it is strongly influenced by the prevailing mood of American public opinion, and in particular by the most vocal congressmen, pressure groups, newspapers and magazines who oppose policies of accommodation or bargaining with Communist China. Occasionally Secretary of State Dulles has hinted at a policy involving bargaining, and Foreign Operations Administration Chief Stassen has talked in terms of a more flexible trade policy, but the idea of "limited pressure" seemed to me to be the actual basis of policy when I was in Washington in September.

London

After Washington my next stop was London. The muted atmosphere of the Foreign Office and of tradition-laden clubs where members of the British "F.O." have tiffin was in sharp contrast with the brisk efficiency of the Department of State's marble corridors and cafeterias. In Washington people are, in a hurry: the British are more leisurely and, perhaps, think more in terms of years than months.

In both the Department of State and the Foreign Office the people I talked with minimized Anglo-American differences on "fundamentals" of China policy, but they failed to convince me that there is not a fairly wide gap - not in aims or assessment of the situation but in thinking on strategy and tactics.

The United Kingdom was one of the first non-Soviet powers to recognise the People's Republic of China in Peking. At that time the incumbent Labor Party undoubtedly had illusions as to the type of regime the Chinese Communists were establishing and the possibilities for friendly political and economic relations. These illusions have been dispelled, however, if not in British public opinion, at least among the professionals in the Foreign Office. Today, four years after United Kingdom recognition, the Chinese Communists "have not recognised them in return", and none of the three "Representatives of the United Kingdom for Negotiating for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" who have waited patiently in Peking have even had an interview with Foreign Minister Chou En-lai. And British traders have a fairly pessimistic current view of commercial possibilities in China,

The Foreign Office now seems to agree in general with Department of State thinking on the kind of regime in China. They are fully aware of its hostility, although perhaps they don't feel the brunt of it as the Americans do, and they do not think a split between Russia and China is likely in the near future, although they seem to be slightly less pessimistic than the Americans about long-run possibilities of this sort. They do not, however, agree that the way to meet this situation is with pressure against China. Instead they favor accommodation and conciliation - but not "appeasement" - to reduce tensions - in any way possible.

The British are in favor of recognition of China and assert that they have no intention of withdrawing their representatives despite the rebuff received from the Chinese. Recognition, they say, should not be a political weapon, or be linked to approval or disapproval; it should be extended to any government in de facto control of a country. Furthermore, they argue, any contact with the Peking regime is better than none, for it at least allows for future possibilities of influencing the Chinese Communists and perhaps having a moderating effect on them. On the question of a United Nations seat for China, they feel that ultimately the Chinese Communist regime, as the de facto government of China, must be admitted, but as long as the Korean War is unsettled they are not going to press it, and they have publicly stated that they are against consideration of it this year. The Foreign Office at present goes along with the idea of restrictions on strategic trade with China, but in the British view this is linked directly to the Korean War, and the British would undoubtedly remove or minimize restrictions if a peace were concluded,

Attitudes toward trade constitute a major difference between thinking in Washington and London. The British position is that maximum trade is essential to their survival, that in non-strategic trade they gain at least as much or more than members of the Soviet bloc, and that even during the course of a limited war such as the one in Korea trade restrictions should be confined to strategic goods. If the United States pursues a long-term program of economic warfare versus China, therefore, there is little doubt that it will be done without British support. Pressure from business groups, particularly those in Far East trade centers such as Hong Kong, have a very real influence on the

Foreign office's position, but in my opinion this influence is not as important as some Americans believe; the Foreign Office position on trade is based on a general principle which is believed to be important to the country's national interests rather than upon the pressures of small business groups alone,

There is another important difference in general, outlook between London and Washington. In military-strategic terms the British feel that they are extended to the maximum, if not over-extended, by their present world-wide commitments, and the Far East has become for them an area of low priority, much less important than Europe, the Middle East, and perhaps even Africa. For some time the British have been extricating themselves from the Far East - Malaya and Hongkong being the most important remaining exceptions - and they are anxious to avoid conflicts or situations which involve further commitments. The United States, by contrast, has been steadily increasing its commitments in the Far East since the end of World War II and has been building a security system on the basis of an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines and anchored on the Asian continent in Korea and Indo-China. The United States faces the Far East across the Pacific and feels that the Far East is a higher-priority area from a military-security point of view than do the British. This does not mean that the British oppose United States policy in this regard - they can still remember that in 1902, during a period when British interests in the Far East were much greater than at present, they made an alliance with Japan for strategic motives similar to those now of concern to the United States - but it does mean that the British feel they cannot make the same kind of commitments, or take the same kind of risks, in the Far East as the United States does.

The influence of Indian attitudes on the Foreign Office is also an important factor in British policy. Not only do many British, particularly on the left-wing, sympathize with the nationalist and self-consciously Asian Indian outlook, but even hard-bitten realists in the Foreign Office feel that to keep India happy, and in the Commonwealth, British policy-makers must take into consideration India's attitude toward China and try to accommodate themselves to it. India is widely regarded among the British as the leading country in Asia, as well as a king-pin in the Commonwealth. This view is very different from that prevailing in Washington, where India's importance east of Singapore is minimized and Japan is regarded as the key country in Asia,

Finally, domestic public opinion is an extremely important influence on British policy toward China, perhaps to a degree no less important than in the United States, and the difference between British and American public opinion on China is striking. With notable minority dissent in both cases, the British seem to take a relatively tolerant and rosy view of Communist China while Americans for the most part see a totally black picture. The strong influence of left-wing writers in

Britain is one important reason for the difference, and the Socialists who recognized Communist China four years ago undoubtedly feel a continuing necessity to justify their past actions,

All of these factors add up to a policy in which the British accept the new status quo in the Far East created by the rise of Communist China and would like to try to get along with the Peking regime with a minimum of conflict. They expect a certain amount of hostility, and do not have any illusions that friendly relations with Communist China are possible in the foreseeable future, but they feel that conflict can best be minimized by accommodation and conciliation rather than by pressure. They also believe that pressure drives the Chinese into closer ties with the Soviet Union and eliminates what slim possibilities there may be for a split or falling out between the two largest countries of the Soviet bloc,

Paris

In Paris, the Far East appears to have quite different dimensions, and is viewed from a very different perspective, than in either Washington or London. In fact, few people in Paris talk about the Far East; they talk about Indo-China, and all other situations and problems, including China, are examined almost wholly in relation to France's major problem in Indo-China.

When I was in Paris, during October, the Indo-China question was sharing headlines with the issue of Western defense in Europe as one of the two top national problems facing France. This is not surprising. The war against the Vietminh has dragged on interminably and has been a tremendous drain on France's economy and strength. At present about two-fifths of France's national budget is devoted to military purposes, and roughly one-third of this goes for the Indo-China War. What this means for a country operating on an economic shoestring, and still dependent on foreign aid, is obvious. The degree to which France can build up her military strength in Europe and reduce her dependence on American aid is directly related to the cost of the war in Indo-China. France's contribution to NATO, for example, could be fifty percent larger if the Indo-China War were liquidated. In addition, a large percentage of France's non-com's and young officers are being expended in Indo-China.

The French stake in Indo-China has changed radically since the beginning of the war there. At the start they were clearly fighting a colonial war to retain a profitable piece of their empire. Now they are trying to fight a rear-guard action while they figure out how to extract themselves without too much damage to the rest of their empire (especially in North Africa), to France's international prestige, and to the anti-Communist front in Asia. This change in aims has not been voluntary; it has been forced on the French.

In the meantime, however, the war itself has changed character and withdrawal is not easy. Up until the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the Vietminh were only able to fight guerilla warfare with small units, but Chinese Communist recognition and aid have changed this. On a newly-built rail line down to the Indo-China border, the Chinese since 1950 have been shipping substantial quantities of arms, trucks, food and medical supplies into Indo-China and the Vietminh have graduated into the big leagues and are now fighting with units up to division size. This increase of Vietminh strength, made possible by Chinese aid, has necessitated increasingly large French commitments of troops, and it has forced the French to accept the idea, which they long resisted, of really building up local anti-Communist Vietnamese forces.

A special supplementary American grant of \$385 million this year, specifically for the war in Indo-China, has made possible the current Navarre plan which the French are now trying to implement. This plan, named after the new French commander in Indo-China, aims first, to take the initiative and begin offensive actions against the Vietminh; second, rapidly to expand local Vietnamese military forces from a total of over 200,000 to about 400,000 next year; third, by these two steps to "gain the upper hand in the war"; and fourth, to force the Vietminh to negotiate a settlement of some sort which will make possible, among other things, a withdrawal of French troops without a complete collapse of the non-Communist regimes in Indo-China. There are numerous problems, besides the obvious military ones, in carrying out this plan. Persons in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs admit, for example, that they "have not even considered yet" what kind of a negotiated settlement might be possible (the Indo-China War is really an "awful muddle" with no clear front lines as in Korea), and although the French think of the future in terms of the three Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia remaining within the French Union, there are signs that they may not choose to do so. Nonetheless, the French are proceeding with this plan.

The Chinese Communists fit into this picture as the colossus to the North. Chinese aid has built the Vietminh up to their present strength. A complete stoppage of Chinese aid would, in the opinion of many, make possible a French-Vietnamese victory, but almost no one expects this. Consequently, the French are not thinking of complete victory but of "negotiating from a position of strength". Increased Chinese aid, however, might defeat the aim of the Navarre plan. And direct Chinese Communist intervention in Indo-China (the Chinese have sent advisors only, and no troops) could result in a complete debacle; the French say they cannot possibly fight Communist China in Indo-China. But very few people expect the Chinese to intervene directly, particularly since the public warnings against this possibility made by the United States.

This is the context of France's policy toward China. On the surface, her China policy seems to conform completely with that of the United States. China specialists in the *Quai d'Orsay*

agree that the Communist Chinese regime is strong, they see no signs of a split between China and Russia, and they are intimately aware of China's hostility and expansionism, but they fervently hope - they have no alternative - that they can bargain with Communist China. Their hope feeds upon the fact that the Chinese Communists to-date have not intervened in Indo-China to the extent of their capabilities,

Therefore, although French policy toward China seems to conform with United States policy in almost every respect at present - they do not recognize Peking, they oppose seating the Chinese Communists in the United Nations, and they fully support severe trade restrictions against China - their motives and aims are different. They want ultimately to negotiate a graceful withdrawal from Indo-China, which depends partly on Chinese as well as Vietminh intentions, and they want to be tough now so they can be easier later. As one person in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said to me, "If the military situation shifts against the Vietminh, the Chinese might be involved in negotiations, and if we negotiate, we must have something to give." If the French could get Chinese acceptance of a satisfactory negotiated settlement, and cessation of aid to the Vietminh, the French would undoubtedly be willing to give on recognition, United Nations membership, and trade restrictions. These things, in other words, are short-term and tactical in the French view and could be used in bargaining.

Public opinion is an important factor in French policy as in American and British policy. In recent months, pressure within France for either a "settlement" or a "withdrawal" from Indo-China has grown to such an extent that twice within the past two weeks Premier Laniel has felt compelled to publicly state his government's approval of a negotiated peace. On November 12 he said France would be "happy" to solve the war "by diplomatic means", "at the local or at the international level". So far nothing has resulted from these feelers, but the French are still hoping,

(Rome was my next stop. While there I talked with the China Specialists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but I will not take time to report their views. Despite the continuing tradition of Marco Polo, and the current problems of Italian Catholic missionaries unable to leave China, the orbit of actual Italian interests and policy barely touches the Far East these days. From Rome I went to Belgrade.)

Belgrade

The interest of Yugoslavia in China is a curious thing, Tucked away in the Balkans, with few ties east of Suez and almost no material interests in Asia, Yugoslavia is nonetheless a country where many people follow events in China closely and have pronounced views on the whole situation in the Far East. In Belgrade I found that despite the boiling controversy over Trieste everyone I talked with from Tito's Secretary-General to a young

girl teaching in Belgrade University was willing to forget other subjects and discuss China at the drop of a hat. I was also surprised to learn that this interest in China is not entirely a product of Tito's break with the Cominform. Even before the war, I was told, Yugoslav interest in China was such that Pearl Buck's books, translated into Serbian, were consistent best-sellers. This mysterious link between the Balkans and the Orient still baffles me; it would undoubtedly require a long Kon Tiki voyage of discovery through a good library to discover what cultural currents are responsible for such an illogical phenomenon.

Although the origins of Yugoslav interest in China are obscure, the reasons for Belgrade's intense current interest in Communist China are more understandable. The Yugoslav Communists would like moral support for their heresy against Stalinist dogma (or, as they would put it, for their Communist reformation reverting to Marx and Lenin), and China obviously is the best potential candidate. Yugoslavia is not likely to have much direct political influence on the situation in the Far East, but because of the symbolic significance and consequent indirect influence of Yugoslavia's position in the world-wide ideological struggle, the views of leaders in Belgrade are of some interest.

The Yugoslav leaders with whom I talked are thoroughly convinced, on the basis of their own experience, that an eventual parting of the ways between Russia and China is almost inevitable. Tito himself put it this way during an interview with a foreign correspondent in Yugoslavia last August: "An absolute break need not occur, but what may happen is that China may begin to pursue an absolute independent policy and may begin making independent decisions about her own future, and free herself from the influence of anyone." The belief that something of this sort will happen is not based on detailed facts or knowledge of China but on visceral reactions and general analogies between China and Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia's China policy, to the extent that it has one, is based upon this hope for Titoism in China. The Yugoslavs maintain that the major powers all should recognize Peking, that Communist China should be admitted into the United Nations, and that every effort should be made to establish contact with the Chinese Communist leaders in order to wean them away from the Soviet Union. And they persist in this viewpoint despite the fact that Yugoslav recognition of Communist China, which was extended immediately after the Communist regime was set up in China in 1949, has never even been acknowledged by Peking,

If one is skeptical about the inevitability of China following the path toward Titoism, the Yugoslavs whom I met argue along the following lines. (Not all of their assertions are supported by known facts, but their opinions are certainly of interest.) "The Chinese and Yugoslav Communist revolutions differ greatly from the 1917 October Revolution in Russia. Whereas the Russian revolution was carried out by a small elite which seized power by a coup d'etat and then gradually imposed its control on the country, the Chinese and Yugoslav Communists

gradually developed strength on the basis of indigenous mass movements and armies. Our revolutions, therefore, had a greater strength from the beginning than the Russian revolution had, and consequently lacked many of the compulsions operating in Russia. Our revolutions differed basically, also, from those in the satellites in Eastern Europe, where the regimes were imposed from the outside and changes started from the top. Neither we nor the Chinese were beholden to, or dependent on, the Russians. In fact, both Mao and Tito started without Moscow approval, and both of our movements developed for a long time in isolation. The Comintern's relations with the Chinese Communists were often bad. Russia was never interested in a free and independent China; it wanted fullest control. But one of the strongest drives in China has been toward independence. Another of the aims of the Chinese Communists is industrial development, and if they haven't already, the Chinese Communists certainly will discover in time, as we did, that Russia is interested in subordinating all members of the Soviet bloc to a central Russian plan, not in fostering independent economic development. Both the past and the present indicate a clash of real interests between Russia and China, therefore, and this is more important than theoretical ideological factors."

"But", they argue, "China cannot be expected to break with Russia when she is being pushed into greater dependence upon Russia both by the policies of the West and by shrewd Soviet policies. Russia wanted the Chinese to enter the Korean War to create the worst possible relations between China and the rest of the world, to burn the bridges, to isolate China. And the war certainly had that effect. But the Korean War has been hard on China. Her army was defeated, and the economic strain has been severe. China would undoubtedly like to get out of the position she is now in, but she has to have some out, which doesn't exist now."

One top Yugoslav official, who is regarded as one of their leading "China experts", was extremely critical of American policy. "The United States", he said, "has pushed China in the Russian's arms. And the key to the future is United States policy. If America encouraged China to break with Russia, this might be the beginning of defeat for the Russian's strategy of world domination. The alternative is war in two or three years."

A somewhat less extreme opinion, expressed to me by another Yugoslav leader, is that since China may well have "imperialist ambitions" (his phrase) of its own in Asia, it is necessary for the West to define clearly a line which China cannot overstep, but that once this is done every effort should be made to avoid pushing China into dependence upon Russia, and to encourage either a split with Russia, or at least greater Chinese independence.

One thing the Yugoslavs seem to forget, in speculating about China's responsiveness to western policy, is that Yugoslavia herself broke with Russia not as a result of western wooing but despite western hostility. Their hope for a Chinese break seems

to be based on wishful thinking to a large degree, since most objective observers see few signs of significant friction between China and Russia at present. And it seems likely that if a break is to come, it will be the result primarily of bad relations between China and Russia rather than improved relations between China and the West. Nonetheless, the strong conviction of the Yugoslavs is that a policy directed toward encouraging a split between China and Russia might have results, and they are critical of any other policy toward China,

New Delhi

By the time I reached New Delhi I needed no further evidence to realize how much particular national interests, and subjective attitudes, are related to policy toward China. But nowhere else did I encounter the degree of emotionalism in regard to China than I discovered in India. Probing below the surface, however, I concluded that the realities of the situation! as viewed from New Delhi, have a greater influence on India's attitude toward China than one might think at first glance.

The Indians with whom I talked agree completely with only one of the four basic assumptions about Communist China which I outlined earlier as the basis for American policy thinking. They agree that the Peking regime is in firm control of China. They then proceed to assert that the Chinese Communist regime is supported by the majority of Chinese, is interested primarily in internal development rather than expansion, and is allied with but not controlled by Russia.

The majority of Indians with opinions on the subject seem to think about Communist China almost entirely in a purely Asian context, rather than in relation to world Communism. The Peking regime, in their eyes, is the result of a revolution in China against foreign domination and economic backwardness. To them it represents a successful overthrow by the Chinese people of imperialism and reaction. As such it is looked upon as part of a general revolution in Asia, of which they consider India to be a part also, even though India has chosen a different road to follow. This general viewpoint is not restricted to Communists, or even to the fairly large body of leftist opinion in India; it is shared by many of those who are most anti-Communist in domestic Indian politics and who support policies of strict control over Communists within India.

Of the five countries whose attitudes toward China I explored on my trip, India is the only one which has actually established normal diplomatic relations with the Peking regime. (The other four include two which still oppose such relations and two which have tried without success to establish normal relations.) And the Indians try very hard, despite developments such as the Chinese occupation of Tibet, to convince themselves that Sino-Indian relations are cordial. "Our relations with the Chinese Government," said Nehru on September 23, "have been,

right from the day of the new Government's coming into existence, friendly. They are very friendly today, That does not mean that the Chinese Government likes everything that we do' or that we like everything that the Chinese Government does in their country. We carry on in our own way trying to learn, if we can, from China or Russia or America, and if they want to learn anything from us they may or they may not; it is up to them. But keeping our internal sovereignty secure, we cooperate with other countries in a friendly way. "

In actual fact, however, the attempt to be friendly has been made much more strenuously on the Indian than on the Chinese side. The most spectacular example of this was the Chinese Communist military invasion of Tibet. The Chinese embarked upon their "liberation" of Tibet without consultation with or even notification of India, despite the fact that Tibet is obviously an area of special interest to India. It is known that this was a shock to Nehru privately, but publicly the Indians have acquiesced, recognizing full Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and asserting that the presence of Chinese troops near India's northern border has no effect on friendly Sino-Indian relations. The Indian Army, however, has responded to the disappearance of Tibet as a buffer state by sending a 'mission of' almost two hundred men to help modernize the military forces of Nepal; and by establishing military check points all along the India-Tibet border. In some respects, therefore, the friendship between India and Communist China is rather cool and uneasy, despite public statements to the contrary, and although the Vice-president of India described to me the "close affinity between the two countries" based on three thousand years of cultural contact, an official in the Ministry of External Affairs admitted to me that Indians don't really understand the Chinese mentality very well.

The overall Indian approach to foreign affairs is an important influence upon specific China policy. This approach - called "independent" by the Indians and "neutralist" by most foreign observers - is based on premise that since India is overwhelmed by domestic problems it should avoid diverting its resources and energies to international conflicts (except for Kashmir), and therefore should avoid all foreign alignments and should try to get along with everyone. Indians like to quote George Washington's famous dictum on foreign entanglements and point to America's long history of isolationism in support of their position.

The specific China policy which India bases upon these various factors is one in which she vigorously espouses the seating of Communist China in the United Nations and the regularization of relations between China and the rest of the world. Because of their particular emotional bias, however, Indians seem to close their eyes to Chinese Communist expansionism and obstructionism and place the blame for the existing conflict and hostility almost entirely upon the United States. I could not help but feel, however, that despite the aura of idealism and high principle with which the Indians like to surround themselves on international issues, a strong undercurrent of realpolitik helps to explain their viewpoint, Communist China is, after all, a strong power which looms over

the horizon to the north and could be a threat to India. The Indians are trying to avoid all causes of friction with China, at the same time convincing themselves that what they hope is true is actually true, namely, that Communist China does not have expansionist ambitions which could directly threaten India.

On the plane from New Delhi to Hong Kong I tried to sort out the impressions I had received in the previous six weeks. It was quite clear that all of the countries I had visited differed in significant respects in their approach to a China policy.

In the State Department in Washington, Communist China is viewed primarily in its relation to a global conflict between the Soviet bloc and the West, and it is felt that continued pressure on China is required to check its expansionism.

The Foreign Office in London seems to have accepted a new status quo in the Far East, and wants to minimize conflict and friction with Communist China by a policy of accommodation,

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, China is looked upon almost entirely in its relation to the war in Indo-China, and the French are ready to bargain with Peking if they can thereby move nearer to some solution of their problem in Indo-China.

The Yugoslavs are obsessed by the idea of possible Titoism in China and, convinced that it will come, they favor a conciliatory policy designed to woo the Chinese Communists from the Soviet bloc,

The Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi accepts the Peking regime and has established "friendly relations" with it. The Indians say that they believe Communist China does not have aggressive or expansionist aims in Asia, but they may well be uneasy about a powerful new neighbor on their northern border; whatever their motives, they are strong advocates for general acceptance of Communist China into the community of nations.

Of the five, only the United States seems to favor indefinite ostracism of Communist China. The other four, for varying reasons, seem more prepared to accept and to deal or bargain with the Peking regime. And this division is likely to become wider if some sort of prolonged truce is concluded in Korea.

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