

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

AS-20
Year's End in Sofia

Bircaninova 28b
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
January 15, 1964

Mr. Richard H. Nolte
Institute of Current World Affairs
366 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Nolte:

I spent the last week of the old year in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia, and a strange, uncomfortable, depressing week it was! We came, Christmas night, for the trial of a former diplomat named Asen Georgiev on charges of spying for the C. I. A.; we expected, I suppose, just another routine case like that of Oleg Penkovsky in Russia last spring. It was nothing of the kind. The trial itself turned out to be a proceeding of the old Stalinist type which we



SOFIA STREET SCENE

thought had disappeared with its originator. That in itself was food for thought, especially in view of the widespread notion that Bulgaria had been in a period of "liberalization." But the Georgiev case as it gradually began to emerge from the miasma of the proceeding was more fascinating still. Because one could not begin to do justice to its manifold mysteries within the confines of a short newsletter, I am enclosing a rather long report on the case. I hope that it will be read at least by that handful of people who may be in a position to shed further light on some of its details.

The trial itself was not the only reminder of the Stalinist era. Quite apart from the poor, depressed, beaten look of people on the streets (far worse than Bucharest or anything in Russia) and the dishonest behavior of the officials assigned to us, there were such "objective" items as the pretentious Dmitrov Mausoleum, the exhibit of Georgiev's "spy" paraphernalia right next door to the U.S. Legation, and an outdoor display (on Sofia's main boulevard) of the most vicious anti-American cartoons penned in the Communist world. There was, also, the press, which manifested that complete contempt for the readers' interests and for genuine news which is the hallmark of Stalinist journalism. All of this was a far cry from the current practice in Poland and Hungary, and the developing practice in Czechoslovakia.

Then, of course, there was the storming of the U.S. Legation. We got our first inkling of it (although we made no connection

at the time) when, at a recess on the second morning of the trial, the Foreign Ministry press department official assigned to us suddenly excused himself and said he would be back later. That was on Friday (December 27) at 11 A. M.; we did not see or hear from him again until Monday. The trial session lasted a couple of hours longer; and, on leaving the courthouse, we saw the sight photographed at right. The sign reads "Death to the enemy of the people." An official hanger-on then told us that, yes, there had been a "spontaneous student demonstration" during the morning; of course, he did not know any details.




It was, thus, several hours before we learned of the assault on the American Legation, which had begun at 11:10 and had not been dispersed until 12:10. The first police had arrived at 11:40, although the main station is two blocks away. Bulgarian television and newsreel cameramen were on the scene to record the "demonstration" for posterity, although they never did show the crowd doing any damage, such as breaking the Legation windows and mounting their own placards in the place of the earlier exhibits. (One detail omitted from the news dispatches our group filed on the riot was that the windows had been devoted to pictures of President Kennedy's funeral, President Johnson's appearance at the United Nations, and Christmas scenes in the U.S. As the photo at right demonstrates, the crowd



showed as little respect for the memory of the late President as for any other part of the premises.) The Bulgarian press also waited a couple of days before reporting the "demonstration," and in doing so made no mention either of the violence done or the "regrets" expressed afterward by the Foreign Ministry to the American chargé d'affaires.

The atmosphere of menace continued for some time. The police had managed, at last, to clear the crowd away from the Legation itself, but it remained across the street almost all afternoon (as shown in the photo at right). Why they waited remains a mystery to me.

We had all begun to calm down a bit when, on Sunday (December 29), a foreign Communist journalist informed us that the Bulgarian state television network had implicated the U.S. consul in the "spy" case. The whole thing was rather preposterous upon investigation: films purporting to show the consul ap-



pearing at rendezvous arranged by coded radiograms from the "U.S. spy center in Greece," except that the films merely showed him passing one of Sofia's main intersections on his normal route home. Nevertheless, for the remainder of the trial we were expecting to be informed at any moment that the young man had been declared persona non grata, or that Washington, fed up with these provocations, had broken diplomatic relations. Neither event actually occurred, however.

I must say I was a bit puzzled by stateside reaction to all these events. Everyone in the U.S. seemed to believe that they constituted a sudden reversal of what had been a rather cozy relationship between the United States and Bulgaria, and a rather liberal policy on the part of Bulgarian party chief and Premier Todor Zhivkov. I am aware of the sources of these notions, but I confess myself unable to see any realities on which they may have been based. The U.S. "achievements" in Bulgaria may be summarized as follows: permission to exhibit at the Plovdiv Fair; permission to hold a plastics exhibition; a concert by Eugene Istomin; two appearances by Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, the U.S. Minister, on Bulgarian television; several appearances by Bulgarian Government officials at dinner in her residence; and settlement of an old claims dispute between the two countries. I suppose this is not too bad for the four years since relations were restored, although even some of these "achievements" were soured by incidents which the U.S. did not see fit to publicize. (At Plovdiv, Mrs. Anderson had to distribute handbills personally to prevent them being taken away by police; the plastics exhibition was robbed of a large part of its souvenirs in an overnight raid on the warehouse in which they were being kept.) Yet this rather slight improvement in bilateral relations had to be set against the prevailing police-state climate in the country as a whole, in which there has been (by nearly all accounts) practically

no change over the years. Mr. Zhivkov got the reputation of being a "liberal" and "de-Stalinizer" because he rose to power from obscurity after the fall of Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Stalin. But that fall had been engineered at least partly by the Russians and certainly to a large extent by Anton Yugov, closest surviving associate of the purged "Titoist" Traicho Kostov. At the Eighth Party Congress in November 1962, Zhivkov -- taking a strong position in favor of Mr. Khrushchev and against the Chinese -- succeeded in ousting Yugov and linking him with the already-disgraced Chervenkov. A few weeks later, returning from a meeting with Khrushchev in Berlin, Zhivkov stopped for a couple of days in Belgrade, where he and Tito issued a rather routine communique. The Yugoslavs, who know how the wind blows in such matters, gave Zhivkov some rather favorable publicity for a few months, but then stopped. The "liberalization" and "de-Stalinization" they, and others, had hoped for never did materialize. Yet even so, there are people now saying that the events of December 26-31, 1963 were aimed by unknown "Stalinists" at the "liberal" Zhivkov. They may yet turn out to be right -- one never knows; but the burden of evidence suggests that at least some American observers had been applying mechanically to Bulgaria a scheme of thinking that has considerably more validity in Khrushchev's Russia. The "Stalinists" may well have the upper hand in Bulgaria today, but one must, I think, until shown otherwise number Mr. Zhivkov among them. The Georgiev trial -- which, inter alia, implicated a number of former and present high officials -- indicates that things will get worse before they will get better.

"We'll never get another visa after what we've written," said one of my journalistic colleagues as we crossed the border back into indubitably revisionist Yugoslavia.

"Oh, that's all right," replied another, "we'll be back in the spring for the revolution."

It wouldn't surprise me.

Sincerely yours,



Anatole Shub

Received New York January 20, 1964

'S P Y T R I A L' I N S O F I A

Notes on the Case of Asen Georgiev



Anatole Shub

January 1964

"The Communists in the Bulgarian regime did not confine themselves to arresting and trying each other. There was seldom a moment when some sensational trial was not in progress."

-- Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time

"The martyr without publicity dies the death of the sparrow, which may be recorded in heaven but which is certainly not recorded elsewhere." -- Edward Crankshaw

A common spy, avid for money, profligate with women, a petty tool of the United States Central Intelligence Agency -- this was the picture of Asen Georgiev presented by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria when it announced his indictment for espionage and treason on December 22, 1963. A class enemy, an enemy of the people, a hypocrite, a typical bourgeois intellectual, a man of no morals or virtues whatever -- these were some of the epithets hurled at him during his trial by the Bulgarian Supreme Court of three justices and four lay jurors, which took place in Sofia's Palace of Justice on December 26, 27, 28 and 30. It was not surprising that on December 31, he was condemned to death by shooting, that his appeal for mercy was denied, and that the execution of the sentence was announced on January 5, 1964.

Yet in the course of the strange and perplexing trial, another picture of Asen Georgiev began to emerge -- a picture of a brave and talented member of Bulgaria's prewar elite, the translator into Bulgarian of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, his country's representative at financial negotiations with the United States and in international conferences on space law, a Communist since the 1920s, police chief of staff during the seizure of power, a near-victim of the Stalinist terror of the late Forties who arrived in the mid-Fifties at conclusions remarkably similar to those of the Yugoslav heretic Milovan Djilas. But, whereas Djilas fought openly for his beliefs, soon became a "disarmed prophet," and has spent most of the last seven years in prison, Asen Georgiev -- until his arrest in Moscow's Hotel Metropol on September 8, 1963 -- chose to remain at his post high in the Bulgarian "new class." Remain and -- do what? This was perhaps the greatest mystery raised by a trial which in nearly all respects raised more questions than it answered.

Along with three other Western journalists (David Binder of the New York Times, Ronald Farquhar of Reuter's, and Emile Guikovaty of Agence France Presse), I was present at the open portions of the trial, which lasted some forty hours in all; two closed sessions, to which we were not admitted, are said to have lasted about five hours. We labored under considerable difficulties; The acoustics in the courtroom were poor. Movie cameras, television cameras, spotlights and four large Kleig lights were often focused on us. We were compelled to rely in large measure on officially-provided translators, at best inept, who frequently censored or garbled factual details although they could translate denunciations of American "imperialism" with remarkable speed and zest. We were, almost daily, the subject of attack or innuendo in the Bulgarian press. We were unable to check courtroom references to people, places and events in the Western world.

Nevertheless, we heard enough -- and I hope that our experience

can serve as at least a preliminary basis for a serious investigation of the case, for an attempt to bring some order out of the chaos communicated all too faithfully, I fear, in these notes. In any event, what follows is a reconstruction of the case as we heard it, as it emerged from the indictment, the defendant's "full confession," the testimony of some thirty witnesses, the concluding speeches of the prosecutor and four "defense" lawyers, and the verdict:

The Defendant. Ivan-Asen Khristov Georgiev was born on March 28, 1907 in Sofia, the son of a lawyer, "the offspring of a progressive family" (according to the indictment). The name Asen, by which he was normally called, is that of a medieval Bulgarian dynasty. His boyhood was the time of the Balkan Wars and First World War, the rise and assassination (1923) of the great Agrarian leader Alexander Stambulisky, the bombing (1925) of Sofia Cathedral -- all of which, in sum, brought Bulgaria national humiliation and political reaction. Georgiev "in his early school years was a member of anarchist groups," which we may take to mean that he joined non-Communist protest organizations in the mid-Twenties. Before his twenty-first birthday, he entered the Communist movement, then underground.

In 1928, Asen Georgiev went to Paris to study law at the Sorbonne. From this period dates his acquaintance with the distinguished Bouvrain family, mentioned several times at his trial; the head of the house was a professor of law at the Sorbonne. Georgiev continued active in "progressive" student organizations while in Paris. (Among the other Balkan students on the Left Bank at the time was the Serbian millionaire's son, Koča Popović, now Yugoslav Foreign Minister; Chou En-lai, Ho Chi Minh and Enver Hoxha had also passed through not long before.)

In 1931, Georgiev returned to Sofia, where he completed his law studies in 1934. For the next ten years, he was a member of the Sofia bar. Although (for reasons which will become apparent) his wife never appeared in court and no information whatever was divulged about his marriage, one may infer from circumstantial bits of testimony that Georgiev married sometime during this decade. He was undoubtedly a good catch: well-to-do, Paris-educated, "progressive," dynamic and handsome. (Even at the trial, with the pallor of a hundred days in prison on him, he radiated a certain magnetism: about five foot seven, perhaps 180 pounds, the strut of a proud rooster, rugged shoulders, close-cropped hair, firm jaw and arresting blue-gray eyes.)

There is a conflict in the trial record concerning Georgiev's Communist affiliations during this period. The indictment says that he was expelled from the party for "inactivity" in 1934, readmitted in 1937, expelled again in 1942, readmitted in 1945. Georgiev himself testified that he was active in the party until 1940, dropped out at that time, and re-established his connections in 1943. Since this was one of the perhaps dozen occasions on which he went out of his way to openly contradict the authorities, one must presume the point to have had some political importance. What he was trying to say, apparently, was that he quit over the Stalin-Hitler Pact and rejoined the party to fight fascism.

On September 9, 1944 the Soviet Army entered Bulgaria, and

power was seized in Sofia by the Otchestveni (Fatherland) Front -- a coalition of anti-fascist groups which the Communists had deeply infiltrated but did not yet dominate. Asen Georgiev at once became Secretary General of the Interior Ministry in the new government. The Interior Minister was the Communist Anton Yugov, who was to serve more or less continuously in the regime until his removal as Premier at the Eighth Party Congress in November 1962; since his removal, he has been rather loosely labelled a "Stalinist," but diplomatic observers in Sofia consider that this label is as essentially misleading toward Yugov as it is when applied to Georgi Malenkov in Russia. In any event, Georgiev served as Yugov's deputy in the key ministry during a crucial year and a half in the Communization of Bulgaria.

(During this period, another important figure in the case visited Bulgaria. In October 1945, President Truman sent the editor Mark Ethridge to investigate the execution of the Yalta agreements in Bulgaria and Rumania. The mission's chief expert was Cyril E. Black, then 30 years old, the son of the former president of the prewar American College in Sofia, himself resident in Bulgaria until August 1939, for some years now chairman of the Slavics department at Princeton University. The Ethridge-Black mission found that the Yalta accords had been travestied, but the State Department kept the report secret. The indictment says that Professor Black was also part of another U.S. mission in 1947, but I have no independent corroboration at hand. In a recent brief statement reported by United Press International, Professor Black denied categorically the charges made against him at the Georgiev trial, noting also that this was not the first time his name had been raised in a Bulgarian spy trial.)

In 1946, Asen Georgiev was posted to Paris as Counselor of the Bulgarian Legation. His only activity there reported at the trial was an attempt to persuade Leon Blum that "anti-Communist propaganda" concerning Bulgaria was untrue. One of Georgiev's colleagues in the Paris Legation was Rosa Aronova, of Jewish origins. She and he were apparently the most disturbed by the fall in 1949 (March-December) of Traicho Kostov, Communist party secretary since 1940 and leader of the "home" (as opposed to "Moscow") group in the regime. A wave of arrests followed Kostov's fall. Yugov, who had been Kostov's closest associate as well as Georgiev's former superior, was demoted; Evgeny Kamenov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Georgiev's friend since Sofia law school days, was removed; Vulko Chervenkov became the Bulgarian Stalin. Menacing rumors began to surround the name of Georgiev, particularly his relations with Leon Blum. In May 1950, he was called back to Sofia, but (according to his testimony) Chervenkov sent him back to Paris. Later in the year, however (precise date unclear), Georgiev, Miss Aronova and the Bulgarian Minister in Paris (name not given) were recalled.

For somewhat more than a year (the dates given for this period are either contradictory or unclear), Georgiev continued, apparently, to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But by the end of 1951 he had left the government for the law faculty of Sofia University. He was to remain in private life for five years -- the last years of Stalin, the first of "de-Stalinization" (marked in Bulgaria by the

"April plenum" of 1956 which rehabilitated Kostov, and served Yugov and Todor Zhivkov as a lever for the eventual ouster of Chervenkov). It was after Stalin's death, one presumes, that Miss Aronova succeeded in reaching safety in Israel; the trial left obscure the question of whether she had been penalized in any way after her recall from Paris, or whether charges raised against her in 1950 were still considered valid.

In October 1956, having achieved the rank of dozent at the law faculty, Georgiev was nominated Counselor of the Bulgarian permanent mission at the United Nations. He arrived in New York on November 2 to take up his duties, which were those of deputy chief of the mission. He took part in the regular meetings of the Bulgarian delegations to the General Assembly, as well as the regular conferences with other Communist delegations. He also headed the team which negotiated a settlement of wartime financial claims with the United States. In December 1961, after five years at the U.N., he was recalled. It is these years which figure most prominently in the case. Historically, they are the years between the Hungarian Revolution and the Sino-Soviet clash at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist party.

On returning to Sofia, Georgiev apparently resumed academic work only briefly. Early in 1962 (according to his testimony), the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, upon the request of the Foreign Ministry, suggested his nomination as Bulgaria's representative at the international conference of astronautical organizations to be held in Varna. That conference set up an International Institute for Space Law, and agreed that the two major executive offices be shared between East and West. On the recommendation of Soviet scientists, Professor Georgiev was chosen President of the Institute; an American scientist, Andrew Haley, was named Secretary. In this role, Georgiev traveled widely to international discussions on space law. He was due at such a discussion in Paris last September when arrested in Moscow.

At the trial, Georgiev submitted two manuscripts which he had written: a study of ancient Sparta, and an analysis of French politics during the Second World War. Another manuscript was also mentioned, of which more later. It is not known whether he wrote anything, even for his desk-drawer, on Hegel. None of his works have been published.

The Indictment. The essence of the formal charges against Professor Georgiev was that, in November 1956, he entered the service of the Central Intelligence Agency; that he continued his spying until the day of his arrest; that some \$200,000 was paid for his services; and that he performed them primarily for money, and especially for the support of his "ten mistresses." Let me anticipate a bit by noting that the money actually mentioned in the testimony does not add up to anything near \$200,000 and that only three women were actually named as having been Professor Georgiev's mistresses (one of them denied it, the second was Miss Aronova who was not heard, the third -- as we shall see -- seemed an improbable mistress). However, the details of the indictment are worth bearing in mind:

1949-50, Paris: Georgiev had contacts with a Bulgarian-born French banker, Angelo Kuyumdzhisky, described as a former U.S. intelligence colonel (presumably the wartime O.S.S.). In March 1950, Kuyumdzhisky attempted to persuade Georgiev to seek political asylum in France; Georgiev hesitated but refused. In December, however, when notified of his recall, Georgiev sought out Kuyumdzhisky at the Hotel Crillon and declared his readiness to defect if he could be assured a living; Kuyumdzhisky offered 60,000 (old) francs a month -- not enough for Georgiev, who returned to Sofia.

October 1956, Paris: On route to the U.N., Georgiev met Kuyumdzhisky and asked to be put in touch with American intelligence; at a second meeting, Kuyumdzhisky said Georgiev would be contacted in New York.

November 2, 1956, Idlewild Airport: In the glass booths then used for identifying foreign passengers, Georgiev was hailed by an apparent customs official, who said "I'm a friend of Angelo's," introduced himself as "George Anderson," and arranged to meet Georgiev next day in Central Park. Georgiev's collaboration with the C.I.A. began with the meeting in the park. His chief collaborator is "Anderson" (by coincidence or design, the same name as that of the present U.S. Minister in Sofia, Mrs. Eugenie Anderson). According to the indictment, "Anderson revealed to Georgiev that his real name is Cyril Black, and that he is the son of the former director of the American College in Sofia, Floyd Black." As we shall see, Georgiev's own identification was not quite so positive.

November-December 1956, New York: Georgiev and Anderson met in the Hotel Croydon.

January-September 1957, New York: Georgiev and Anderson met at the Beverley and Statler Hotels, in rooms let specially for these occasions.

Fall 1957-October 1958: Georgiev and Anderson continue their meetings in an apartment at 44 East End Avenue, let under the name R.S. Moss, "Office of Juridical Studies." (Double-translation is involved here; the name may be Bureau of Legal Investigation, or the like.) Georgiev had been given, earlier, the pseudonym "Georges Duval" and the C.I.A.'s phone number (National 8-0972, ask for Saillance); here he was also given a false passport (never produced in court), and a Miniphon P-55 tape recorder, with its microphone in the shape of a tie-clasp. (The indictment said the tape recorder had been "specially built" by the intelligence agents; Georgiev, later, said it was an ordinary West German machine which he used for recording lectures.) In the course of this year, too, Tonka Karabashova, allegedly Georgiev's mistress (see below), was brought to the United States three times to visit him; in August 1958, Rosa Aronova was also brought to the U.S. for the first of three visits. In 1957, Georgiev persuaded the C.I.A. to pay Miss Aronova a monthly stipend of \$300. In 1958, an account was opened at a "Wall Street bank" for Georgiev himself, under the name "Belov," with an initial deposit of \$3,000.

October 1958-March 1960: A fuzzy period, in which Georgiev supposedly quarreled with Anderson and broke off his connections with C.I.A. The indictment indicates that Anderson objected to Georgiev's prodigal spending on his mistresses; Georgiev's account is rather different. A crucial episode in this period is a letter Georgiev wrote personally to Allen Dulles; the letter was signed "Georges Duval," it reviewed Georgiev's quarrel with Anderson and offered his services anew to C.I.A. Georgiev later testified that the letter began as a message of condolences on the death of Mr. Dulles' brother, the former Secretary of State (May 24, 1959). The only apparent response came when Georgiev, ill in a New York hospital in September-October, was visited by an agent whom he had previously met with Anderson.

March 1960-December 1961: This is apparently the most important period. It began when Jackson, an agent Georgiev had met previously, introduced him to Bonnard, identified as a higher-up. Georgiev and Bonnard met continuously through this period -- first at the Sheraton Hotel, then at an apartment at 338 East 77 Street. (After the New York Times revealed that there was no such address, and that Numbers 336 and 340 were contiguous, Bulgarian television presented a film clip of Georgiev saying that he may have mistaken the number, and describing a rather typical East Side high-rise.) At the last meeting, in the 77th Street apartment in December 1961, Bonnard gave Georgiev two sheets of white, chemically-treated paper suitable for secret messages, and a bottle of developing fluid for the same purpose (disguised as medicine). Georgiev was to send his messages to "Mme. R. Wagner, 27 Avenue Bettusy, Lausanne, Switzerland." He was also given two telephone numbers: Extension 3319 at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, where he was to ask for Henry Robineau (or Robin); and Munich 445915, where he was to ask for Dr. R. Mayer (or Meyer). Finally, he was given an address to cable in case he was in trouble: "Miss Helen Godel, 430 West 118th Street, New York City."

There are three other important events in this period: In September 1960, Georgiev was named to head the Bulgarian delegation in financial talks with the U.S., and it is said that he revealed the Bulgarian position to American agents. (Final agreement was reached in July 1962, and both sides still claim the settlement as a victory.) In "the fall of 1960," Rosa Aronova paid her second C.I.A.-financed visit to the U.S. And in "1961," a revolving account of \$5,000 was opened for "Georges Duval" and another for Rosa Aronova, at the Geneva office of the Union des Banques Suisses. A special clerk, Albert Moser, was in charge of these accounts. Georgiev's account number was 574-684 EB. A contradiction within the indictment itself: It is also alleged that Rosa Aronova's account "at the end of 1960" had reached the sum of \$23,438.

January 1962- September 1963: Georgiev, in the course of United Nations and space law work, traveled to France, Switzerland and Austria where he met with Anderson, Pen, Jackson, Robineau, Saillance and other American agents. He met with Anderson in Geneva in May-June 1962, and in Paris in March-April 1963. In March 1963, in an apartment near the Swiss Legation in Paris, Anderson and an American cryptographic expert gave him a coding block, a decoding block and a conversion table. He was also given special earphones for his Hamarlund SF-600 radio receiver, which does not have a loudspeaker.

On this radio he was to receive secret coded radiograms from the "U.S. spy center in Greece." (The powerful Sixth Fleet transmitter on Mt. Imetos near Athens was apparently meant.) The broadcasts were scheduled on the first and third Friday of each month (beginning May 17) at 9:30 P. M. Bulgarian time, on a wave-length of 5243 kilocycles, 57 meters. If the broadcast began with Schubert's Unfinished Symphony, it was to be disregarded; if it began with Beethoven's Fifth (Emperor) Piano Concerto, it contained a real message.

Another event in this period: "in the summer of 1962," Rosa Aro-nova paid her third visit to the U.S. at C.I.A. expense.

The indictment declares that, over a seven-year period, Georgiev divulged classified information concerning the Bulgarian U.N. mission, Foreign Ministry and other government institutions; that as Counselor of the U.N. mission he used his position to the detriment of Bulgaria and other socialist states; that he betrayed the Bulgarian side in the fiscal negotiations with the U.S.; and that he divulged economic and political information on internal conditions in Bulgaria.

As published in the press, the indictment went no further. When it was read on the first morning of the trial, however, the chief judge, Angel Velez, added one significant charge: that Georgiev had revealed secret information "on the differences between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist party of China." This additional charge was not, to my knowledge, reported in the Bulgarian press afterward either. Finally, in the course of the trial itself, still another charge was added: that Georgiev had revealed the Bulgarian code system.

None of the "facts" listed in the chronology above were proved (or, for that matter, disproved) in the course of the trial itself. However, in terms of the internal consistency of the prosecution case itself, it is worth noting that Georgiev's main contacts with American agents allegedly occurred in two periods: November 1956-October 1958 and March 1960-December 1961; the espionage paraphernalia produced in the case enters the scene afterwards, the radio only in 1963.

The Court. Formally, Bulgarian justice is modelled along familiar Continental lines (Code Napoleon); the chief judge is expected through his questioning of witnesses to develop the relevant facts of a case, which may then be explored in further questioning by the prosecutor, defense attorneys and the other judges or lay jurors. In fact, however, the trial of Asen Georgiev saw precious little serious questioning at all. Chief Justice Velez asked most of the questions, but they were vague, leading questions ("Tell us what happened after you arrived in New York") which simply cued the defendant and witnesses to make more or less rambling statements. At few points, indeed, did he attempt to nail down a fact in detail (for example, when Mrs. Karabashova told of her trips to the United States, he did not attempt to learn exact dates, the type of planes she traveled on, her means of transport while in the U.S., etc.). The questions of the prosecutor, Ivan Vachkov, were in the same vague genre; the other six members of the court asked no questions at all. As for the four "defense" attorneys, they asked perhaps a dozen questions all

told in the entire course of the trial; none of them represented "cross-examination" in any sense, since the state's case was conceded from the outset, and a few actually seemed to incriminate the defendant. Thus, whatever else the trial may have been, it was not an adversary proceeding; nor was there a serious attempt to make the leading facts of the case stick. In this, the proceeding resembled the Yezhov-Vishinsky-Ulrich productions in Moscow during the 1930s rather than the more recent Powers and Penkovsky trials.

One should also note the many evident limitations on what one might call the sovereignty of the court. A number of the exhibits of spy paraphernalia were, during the trial itself, on display in a propaganda window next door to the U.S. Legation. The courtroom was filled with television, movie and still cameramen and their harsh lights; after a while, one realized that they were aware of the trial "script," for the lights invariably went on a few minutes before the appearance of a new witness or the introduction into evidence of some fearful-looking apparatus. (Georgiev was photographed holding each and every bit of spy paraphernalia in court.) Several facts were disclosed in the newspapers before they were explored in court (notably, the circumstances of Georgiev's Moscow arrest). And we found it intriguing to hear the local correspondent of Tass, the Soviet news agency, phoning in her story one morning pegged on testimony which was neither given nor foreshadowed until late that afternoon.

In short, the trial was not a trial; and therefore one has no reason to conclude that Professor Georgiev was a spy. Yet, granted that the proceeding was (like most Communist show-trials) a political morality play, four large questions immediately arise:

1. What was the political purpose of the trial, so far as the general public was concerned?
2. What was the political purpose so far as the Bulgarian regime was concerned?
3. What was Georgiev's real "crime" in the eyes of his prosecutors?
4. Why did he "confess" and thus make possible a public trial?

The trial furnished a clear answer only to the very first of these questions; however, it provided quite a few clues with regard to the other three, and some of these lead in fascinating directions. In recounting the testimony, I will try to focus on these apparent clues, while passing over the reiteration of facts or charges already mentioned above.

The Confession. The trial opened on the morning of December 26 with the reading of the indictment, including Judge Velev's unpublicized charge concerning Sino-Soviet relations. Immediately afterward, Georgiev took the stand. He pleaded guilty, and declared that he had made a full confession at the moment of his arrest "in the Metropol Hotel in Moscow." This was the first time it was revealed that he had not been arrested in Bulgaria. In response to questions, he drily said that he was in Moscow as a "tourist," and had been arrested by "Bulgarian militiamen." (Despite this complaisance, the Bulgarian press and the court felt impelled next day to point out that the Bulgarian security police, learning of Georgiev's crimes, had applied to the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. for permission to arrest him on

Soviet territory. No names or dates were given.) I think one may assume that he was arrested by Soviet police; what he was doing in Russia remains unclear.

"I did not confess to lessen my guilt," Georgiev said. "I deserve the highest punishment and am ready to accept it because I have committed the greatest crimes." The defendant was then asked to describe his meetings with Angelo Kuyumdzhisky. First, he declared that he had had two meetings with Kuyumdzhisky in "the first days of November," 1956 (the indictment has Georgiev arriving in New York on November 2). Then, he revealed that he had known him originally in 1949 "in an official contact, as a jurist." In describing their 1950 meetings, Georgiev introduced another character, "Silbert (or Zilbert), a Bulgarian Jew, a lawyer.... who was part of the network of U.S. intelligence." Silbert as well as Kuyumdzhisky warned him against returning to Bulgaria because of the terror-ridden atmosphere surrounding the Kostov case. "I was afraid because I was sure Kostov was not guilty," Georgiev said, "I was worried because I had very many people against me. I lived in fear; my hair turned gray in that period." (This runs counter to the current Khrushchevian myth of de-Stalinization, according to which nobody really knew at the time that the trials were cynical frameups and their victims innocent.) Georgiev was then asked why his attitude had not changed after the Kostov rehabilitation at the April 1956 Bulgarian central committee plenum: "I could not understand the changes that were taking place in our life." (In other words, I saw no difference.)

The defendant then turned to his arrival in New York on "November 3," 1956. He revealed that, in addition to himself and his wife (the first reference to her existence), there were two other people in the Idlewild glass-enclosed identification cabin; he did not say, nor was he asked, whether they were Bulgarians or Americans. "Angelo's friend" then introduced himself, but did not identify himself as "George Anderson" until the meeting on a Central Park bench the next day (Sunday, November 4, by this chronology, the day the Soviet Army intervened to crush the Hungarian Revolution).

Anderson's "face seemed familiar," Georgiev said, "from my days as a Communist party secretary (first reference to any such work) and my work in the Interior Ministry." He maintained contact with "Anderson" until the fall of 1958. "Later I learned that he was Cyril Black, the son of the former President of the American College in Sofia." For an identification of Professor Black as a spy, this is worse than no identification at all. For the Black family was well known in Sofia intellectual circles before the war; Black himself had been in Bulgaria with the Ethridge Mission in 1945, investigating Communist police pressures at the very time Georgiev was (in effect) police chief of staff; he had been there again in 1947 with another U.S. mission; and he was already the best-known U.S. expert on Bulgarian affairs, situated fifty miles from U.N. headquarters, when Georgiev served there. I think it may have been quite possible that Georgiev and Black met, perhaps at some U.N. reception; but in that event Black was Black, not "Anderson." Georgiev's "later I learned" leaves the clear implication that the idea of Black as a spy was placed in his head during police preparation of the case.

Georgiev then went on to describe his quarrels with the agents, which led to the alleged break-off of relations with them for a year and a half. He said he was disappointed in them because they were less interested in political intelligence than in trivial details, such as his opinion of "some petty Bulgarians who had crossed the border" and defected to the West. (This is one of the few remarks which indicate that Georgiev, from whatever source, may have had some knowledge of the prevailing C.I.A. mentality.) Then, changing his tack, he said what he really had wanted from the Americans was aid in financing the creation of an international philosophical institute, in which scholars from the capitalist and socialist countries would take part. Later, he made it clear that this was to be an institute of Hegel studies. It was eventually created after Georgiev returned to Bulgaria; but, when Georgiev proposed it, Anderson was favorable but "the others" vetoed the idea. "I didn't need money," he said. "I had a perfectly good salary from the Bulgarian Government." Up to October 1958, "I furnished them (unclear whom) with information... without any conditions or speaking about money."

Georgiev was then asked whether he had not arranged money for women friends, particularly Rosa Aronova. Yes, because to her he felt a "moral obligation." But, he wanted to emphasize, he was "offended and hurt" when the Americans did not agree to the creation of the Hegel institute; "If they are listening now, they will know I am speaking the truth. I wanted money for the Institute, not for myself." At the last meeting in the East End avenue apartment (which, Georgiev indicated, may have been a lawyer's office), he broke off his contacts with the Americans because he was "not treated seriously. I wanted to inform them that I would not work as a common spy."

A few minutes later, Georgiev described his letter to Allan Dulles. He did not mention here using the signature "Duval," and he revealed for the first time that the occasion was the death of John Foster Dulles. (It seems possible that a real letter was involved: a formal note of condolences from the Bulgarian U.N. mission on the death of the former U.S. Secretary of State.) Shortly after this revelation, the court recessed for lunch. When it reconvened, Georgiev looked quite pale and worn. The questioning initially turned to the "hospital visit" in the fall of 1959. The night visitor, whom he had met before with Anderson, came to say goodbye; for, Georgiev revealed without further explanation, "I was supposed to go back to Bulgaria." He later decided that he could re-establish his former connections, but only if he could work with "people of the highest qualities," with the "ability to judge facts on the development of socialism." On this basis, relations were restored in March 1960 with Bonnard, who was "intelligent, well-educated, interested in the building of socialism" and who "understood my conceptions." He met with Bonnard, he said, in the Hotel Beaux Arts or elsewhere (the indictment mentions two other hotels for this period); the last meeting was in the secret apartment on East 77th Street.

At this point in his recital, the defendant declared that he was not used to such intense sessions without rest; that he was used to working only from 9 to 2, or at most 9 to 3; that he was advancing in age and that for some time he had had high blood pressure. (This

detail calls into question his various airplane flights, which were not documented or otherwise substantiated in any case.) The court agreed to a twenty-minute recess, and in fact took an hour. Georgiev appeared quite refreshed when he returned; however, Judge Velev adjourned the court until the next day. There seems little point in speculating on what happened during the two intervals.

When Georgiev took the stand again on the morning of December 27, the questioning turned to the matter of false passports. He said he had not seen much point to one because the only real way to get out of the country was to cross the Bulgarian-Greek frontier (quite mountainous most of the way) on foot, and because "it is difficult to change one's character." However, he at last admitted that Anderson had given him a false Iraqi passport in 1958. He never used it, he said, because he feared recognition by the security police at airports or railway stations. "The system of this country, and the collaboration of the Bulgarian people with the police, make it impossible to leave." (Once again, as in the reference to the Kostov trial period, a definition of Bulgaria as a police state.)

Since the identification of Professor Black on the first day was clearly inadequate, Georgiev was then asked to describe Anderson again. This time he said that Anderson spoke Bulgarian well, that he was about 50 (whether now or seven years ago was unclear; Professor Black is now 48 and rather youthful in appearance), that he was restrained and talked very little. He seemed a bit "narrow-minded," much more so than Bonnard, for example. Georgiev then began to generalize about the various agents he had met. "No matter how they are educated, when it comes to really understanding, they are formalistic idiots... I felt that there were several tendencies in the C.I.A., and that there are those who would like to get rid of the people who wanted a better understanding of developments." (Another fair insight.) For the third time now, Georgiev was again asked how he knew that Anderson was really Professor Black. This time his reply was: "I remember that Black told me that his father was the director of a college."

Now the confession turned to the secret paper, the addresses of Mme. Wagner and Helen Godell, the phone numbers in Paris and Munich and at last the radio and code. Anderson had given him the code blocks in March 1963 in Paris, Georgiev said: "I had been working a great deal with code, and knew how to operate it.... The Americans use the same code principles as we do, just as all nuclear weapons are fundamentally the same." (An interesting expression of a political intellectual's contempt for petty espionage.) He received the earphones in June 1963. He himself had sent only one message using the code, in April 1963, presumably by letter (the radio was a receiver only, no transmitter was ever mentioned). He listened to the radiograms but "did not answer them regularly because within myself I felt repelled by this sort of thing." The Hamarlund radio was "nothing special, but an ordinary receiver" which he had brought to Bulgaria in 1958. The Miniphone tape recorder was a "West German make," which he had used to record "lectures" between 1958 and 1960; it could, however, be used to record conversations. (All these details tend to contradict, or at least to diminish, the formal prosecution case.)

The court now focused on Georgiev's earlier claim that he had not committed his treason for money. This time he was ready to oblige with details -- and new contradictions. The C.I.A. had paid for Mrs. Karabashova's three trips from Paris to New York, also for his own surgical operation; it had helped him travel to Lake Placid, Washington, the Pacific Coast. Why did Mrs. Karabashova come to New York? "She was my mistress. She had gone to Paris at my personal expense. I decided to ask American intelligence to bring her to the United States in order that she could see it... Due to the lack of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Bulgaria at that time, it was difficult to bring her in the ordinary way." Why did American intelligence satisfy this request? "They knew I was an important political figure. I could get whatever I wanted because I had joined them at the time of the Hungarian events." In the first part of this passage, I think that Georgiev has effectively quashed the entire Karabashova story (three trips simply to see America?), which is a key element of the prosecution case; in the second part of the passage, I rather suspect that he has provided us with an important clue -- which, however, I am at a loss to interpret.

Next came the matter of the bank accounts in New York and Geneva, to which Georgiev added another detail likely to discredit the tale. Despite the presence of "Albert Moser" at the Geneva office, Union des Banques Suisses, Georgiev on one occasion had "some trouble getting money." He contacted Anderson, who then (according to Georgiev) told the bank that if they did not pay Georgiev, American intelligence would cut off all relations with the bank.

At this point, Georgiev made an apparently irrelevant remark (its relevance was obscured by the fact that our translators missed a minute or two of testimony): "I wanted the Americans to photostat all the articles about Hegel that were published in the West." With this, the questioning proceeded to Rosa Aronova. She had been his mistress, they had worked together in 1950 in Paris when she had been "wrongly accused of spying," she had returned to Bulgaria and "after several years" went to Israel. Georgiev felt a "moral obligation" to her (it is difficult to avoid the inference that she had been jailed in the post-Kostov hysteria, perhaps in a case involving Georgiev himself). She visited Georgiev three times in the United States "between 1958 and 1960" (the indictment places the visits in 1958, 1960 and 1962). The Americans spent some \$30,000 on her; "I got the money and sent it on to Rosa" (this disposes of her Swiss bank account); "she didn't want the money, but I insisted; later, she wanted to return it."

The discussion of money continued, Georgiev mentioning sums received in Bulgarian leva. He gave 4,000 leva, he said, to Mrs. Evgenia Delcheva, to provide for care of his sick mother while he was away; Delcheva, he said, "was also my mistress." To how many ladies, Georgiev was asked, did he feel "moral obligations"? "Only one," he answered, rather testily, "to Rosa Aronova I felt a definite moral obligation." What about the others? "Oh, those," he said, rather offhandedly, "those were love relationships." He had asked the Americans to help set Miss Aronova up in business, so

she could earn a living. But didn't he also ask the Americans to help support Mrs. Karabashova? Yes; he had tried to get her a job with the World Health Organization, but failed. After a discussion of Georgiev's alleged financial quarrels with the agents, he was once again challenged on his claim that he had not collaborated with the Americans for money. Once more, he held firm: "I didn't go for money.... I had money and I have money. The Americans never supported me."

After a brief recess (coinciding in time with the storming of the U.S. Legation in Sofia by an organized mob), Georgiev turned to his work in the field of space law. "I very much wanted to create a vivid, working organization. My life was not confined to spying." Georgiev revealed at this point (heretofore unmentioned) that he had been nominated for head of the space institute by "Soviet scientists." His Western vis-à-vis, and secretary of the institute, was Professor Andrew Haley, "who had nothing to do with the C.I.A." Although he asked Anderson to establish a foundation for subsidizing the institute, he was told that this was impossible. Anderson said that the C.I.A. would indirectly influence Haley to have good relations with Georgiev -- "but Haley was a stubborn Irishman... who complained about my Communist pressure on him." Haley once showed Georgiev a letter from an English member of their group which said that Georgiev was an awful man, always "going on with his Communist pressures."

Shortly after this account, prosecutor Vachkov took up the questioning. Several interesting points soon emerged, though in rather incoherent sequence: (1) Georgiev revealed that he had reported his 1949 talks with Kuyumdzhisky to Foreign Ministry superiors. (2) Had he, on route from Paris to Sofia with Rosa Aronova in 1950, met anyone in a neighboring capital? Yes; in Bucharest they had met Manolov, who is now the Bulgarian Ambassador to France. (3) Had he read the statement made by Mrs. Karabashova during the pre-trial examination? Yes, he remembered what she said, but he did not remember the details of the episodes involved. (Again, a shadow of doubt cast on her testimony.)

Why, in view of his fears, had Georgiev decided to return to Bulgaria in 1950? This was a question of "real internal contradictions." "If I were not a man of such contradictions, I would now be drinking coffee in Geneva."

What about Georgiev's confession -- what was the attitude of the security police toward him, were the facts stated in the indictment true, had he confessed voluntarily? He answered approximately as follows (the elipses each represent a sentence or two missed by our translators):

"Before, I had the idea that the methods of security would be the same as in 1950. I thought that after my arrest I would be thrown into a dungeon and tortured, that I would have to sign reports denouncing my relatives and friends, etc..... On the whole, this was the idea I had... I must make it clear that I still had this idea when I was arrested in 1963.

"However, when I was taken to prison, I was given a room eight by six meters (26 x 19 feet), with two big windows, a very sunny room. I had very friendly relations with the other prisoner in the room (not identified); we discussed Marxist problems and played chess. ... I could go to the toilet freely, whenever I wanted. The living conditions were better than those I had at home.

"Not only the material conditions were excellent, but I was treated by the investigators with such humanism! We had many really interesting conversations. The chief investigator had a very intelligent mind and a really humane attitude.... The public tragedy of our movement (sobs in the voice) expressed itself in the time of the cult of personality, in the false condemnation of Traicho Kostov and similar proceedings.... When, knowing these methods, I saw the fine conditions afterward, how was it possible (banging the rostrum) that I betrayed my country, that I committed such crimes! (Pause, now calmer) Because of the high intellectual standards of the state security service -- probably the highest of any in the entire world -- I decided to confess everything. Everything!"

I do not believe one can interpret this statement in another way than as deliberate irony: first, a recollection of the real conditions of Bulgarian justice; then, a wild exaggeration of the current myth he had been asked to endorse. Small wonder that prosecutor Vachkov, in his summation, cried that Georgiev had been a "hypocrite" in his dealings with the security police; for in the above passage and in others he managed to discredit the entire proceeding.

After this unusual statement, the court adjourned -- to reconvene in closed session later that afternoon, in open session the next morning. The closed session, we were told, was devoted to Georgiev's testimony on the various "secrets" he had divulged to the C.I.A.

The morning session on Saturday, December 28, was not far advanced when it yielded another sensation. The session began with Georgiev answering routine questions about the C.I.A.'s interest in members of the Bulgarian delegation to the U.N.; the only eye-raising bit in this exchange was the admission that one of the Bulgarian team in the financial talks with the U.S. was a member of the security police. Then Georgiev was asked about the reasons for his betrayal. He said, rather warily at first, that "political instability and ideological confusion played a great role." He had developed certain notions -- he would not call them fully developed concepts -- after the trial of Traicho Kostov, certain notions about class relations in the socialist countries.

What were these ideas? "I would not call them ideas exactly; I had not really worked them out. But at that time, considering what was going on, I came to believe that there was a definite type of class struggle in the socialist countries. The low level of economic and social development in our countries had imposed the creation of two new classes. On the one hand, there were the masses of manual workers in the factories and field, who were expected to build socialism, but whose work took up all of their time so that they could not reflect on or participate in social life. On the other hand, there was the class of intellectual, political workers who guide,

direct and manage political life and are responsible for the structural phenomena of society. These people, of course, had a great deal of leisure and their living conditions cannot even be compared with those of the workers. It would be impossible, in our country, to give all the workers living conditions such as these people enjoyed. Thus, despite common ownership of the means of production, I thought that society had been divided into two such antagonistic classes. These ideas might, I thought, explain the deformations in various socialist countries."

Georgiev was apparently asked at this point by Chief Justice Velev whether he had been impressed by the views of the Yugoslav theoretician Milovan Djilas. "Yes, I read the book later and was impressed by his theories, which were similar to mine. But I must emphasize that I had these ideas before the book was published (1957), probably before the book was even written. And I had a slightly different perspective. I believed that the task was to achieve a great increase in the productivity of labor. I did not believe any real socialism was possible before there was an increase in labor productivity sufficient to give the workers time to reflect, to study social phenomena, to participate consciously. But this will be only in the distant future."

AS Georgiev continued in this extraordinary vein, the audience (invitation only) stirred and rustled with growing uneasiness. Judge Velev felt compelled to intervene, but in a rather mild way. That is a strange theory, he said, because Lenin never discussed class problems in such a way. The October Revolution had been victorious in Russia despite the backwardness of the people and the economy. It was absurd to picture our society this way, he said, because as you know there is a constant flow of people from the working class who become managers, political workers, etc. "These were just my ideas and thoughts at the time," Georgiev said, "they were not firmly settled." But for a number of years, asked the judge, you were discussing similar problems at the Sofia law faculty; how did you treat them there? "Since you are the chairman of the court," replied Georgiev, "and I am the defendant expecting the death penalty, this discussion is very unequal." The laughter greeting this remark broke the tension in the courtroom, and the questioning passed to other matters, most of them routine and already described.

Yet a few minutes later Judge Velev returned to Georgiev's motives. How was it, he asked, that his attitude had not changed after the April plenum, when the government showed its confidence in him by appointing him to the U.N. post? "My fault was," Georgiev replied, "that I couldn't see the changes that were coming." But in 1962 and 1963, you came back to Bulgaria, you saw changes; yet even after the historic Eighth Congress of our party, you not only resumed your collaboration but became more skilled as a spy -- you began using the recording facilities and other instruments. "Yes, it is true," Georgiev replied, "that I received all this equipment only this year (contradiction of former testimony). But the investigators know very well that I hesitated about my collaboration with the Americans as far back as 1961.... I was afraid, however, of being denounced so I continued to collaborate." This last passage also, I believe, contains some sort of clue to the realities which

it is difficult to interpret. Georgiev went on to say: "If I had been an ardent spy, I would have received all of their broadcasts; but last summer I missed all of them." (This in effect made the radio and codes completely irrelevant.) A bit later, he was asked why he continued to talk about the "false documents" in his file, even though the decision in 1950 had gone in his favor. He replied that he still lived in fear that "these things could happen again." In Vienna, he had said (presumably sometime in 1962 or 1963) that he was sure that he would be arrested upon his return to Bulgaria; why, then, had he come back? "There was no serious problem about fleeing to the West. I could have stayed there; I have the ability, the intellect, the culture to work there. I came back because I couldn't stay away from my country, my people and my culture." (This produced snickers in the invited audience.) A few minutes later, Georgiev left the stand.

The Witnesses: Tonka Ivanova Karabashova: The first and most important witness at the trial was a woman who admitted to 56 years of age: short, stooped, rather squat, bespectacled, with the air of a longtime spinster or career woman. She was in fact a microbiologist. She had known Georgiev since 1928, in their student days; her husband (otherwise unidentified) had been a fellow student of Georgiev's and a close friend. The two families had close relations. She had been aware that he was a Marxist, for he was regarded as the leader of the progressive students in 1934.

The friendship between the Georgiev and Karabashov families had strengthened after the war. When the Georgievs returned from Paris, they became neighbors of the Karabashovs. "After 1950, Asen began his scientific career. We tried to encourage his academic work, and his writing. At that time he wrote one of his best books." (The book was not otherwise identified.) In those years, the two couples often went together on holidays.

When, the judge now asked, did you and Georgiev begin having sexual relations? In 1955, Mrs. Karabashova replied, and I do not think that anyone who saw her could believe this. One might have accepted the claim of a love relationship thirty years ago; but that the handsome, worldly, confident Georgiev, who had known this woman for a quarter of a century, would make her his mistress at the age of 48 seemed highly improbable. The fact that Georgiev's wife was not in court underscored these doubts; had she been plainer than Mrs. Karabashova, there would have been every reason to produce her; seeing Georgiev, one is almost positive that he had a handsome wife, whose presence would have destroyed not only the entire "libertine" theme of the prosecution but Mrs. Karabashova's subsequent testimony on Georgiev's relations with C.I.A. -- practically the only testimony apart from his own confession.

Mrs. Karabashova then began describing how she came to visit New York at the expense of the C.I.A. She had come to Paris in 1957 to attend a course on the use of atomic isotopes in medicine. Because she had been ill and because she had been "so delayed by passport formalities," the course was nearly over when she arrived. She wanted to see Professor Bouvrain -- this was the scientist son

of Georgiev's old law professor -- but he was on holiday. She also had some hopes of attending a UNESCO conference in New York, but this did not materialize. Nevertheless, she arranged for an extension of her visa and stayed in Paris -- first at the Hotel Allemand, later sharing an apartment with a young lady named Julia Ivanova, daughter of the Bulgarian professor of architecture Sazdo Ivanov.

Mrs. Karabashova at last was introduced to a prominent French microbiologist, Professor Graubard (or Gaubert), who invited her to work in his laboratory. He told her that, if she could demonstrate the importance of her project, she would be able to obtain a grant from the World Health Organization. Meanwhile, Professor Georgiev was begging her to come to New York, and told her to get in touch with a certain Mrs. Bakalova (not otherwise identified). This lady asked for six photographs of Mrs. Karabashova, and said everything would be arranged. At last, after a few shady phonecalls and abortive rendezvous, "a big grey-haired fellow about forty, who spoke poor French" met her, showed her her photograph, and at last provided her with a false passport. She was given an American emigrant visa and a West German passport in the name of Margaret Anna Saddler, nurse; her own passport was taken from her. On the appointed day, she took a taxi to the airline terminal and went from there (presumably by bus) to the airport (whether Orly or Le Bourget was never made clear). Were there other passengers on the plane? "Not many."

On her arrival in New York, Mrs. Karabashova was met by a "charming" lady named Mary Graine, whose mother had been Bulgarian and who spoke the language fluently. In the taxi to the hotel there was another gentleman (otherwise unidentified). Mrs. Karabashova did not remember the name of the hotel because they arrived late; however, she remembered that there were a number of Russian-speaking waiters in the hotel restaurant. That night, presumably, or possibly the next day, she went out for a walk and on her return found her suitcase broken into and jewelry missing; also missing were several documents which contained her real name. Mrs. Karabashova testified that these were given back to her after her return to Paris.

Mrs. Karabashova and Mary Graine then moved to the Hotel Statler. However, on the third day after moving, she encountered in a large department store Mr. and Mrs. Evgeny Kamenov, and was rather frightened. (Kamenov, testifying later, was never asked about this meeting.) She wished to leave New York and go live in a motel. It is unclear exactly when she moved to the motel, how she got there, or where the motel was located.

The scene now shifts to Washington, where Mary Graine introduced Mrs. Karabashova to "George Anderson." Mrs. Karabashova identified him at that time (1957) as a man of "about 50" with a mustache (Professor Black was then 42 and, I believe, clean-shaven). Anderson referred to Georgiev as "Uncle Asen," knew all about Mrs. Karabashova, and talked familiarly about Bulgaria. He then accompanied her back to Paris and on arrival took her false passport and gave her back her real one and her missing documents.

In Paris, Mrs. Karabashova concluded an arrangement to work for

six months in Professor Graubard's laboratory. She received an extension of her visa and unpaid leave from her job in the Sofia medical faculty, and was told that she could remain in Paris for two years. Professor Graubard, as well as Georgiev, advised her to seek a WHO scholarship. In January 1958, it was noted, Professor and Mrs. Sazdo Ivanov visited Paris, and their daughter Julia stayed in Mrs. Karabashova's hotel room.

(At this point in the day, there was a brief recess, during which the lady representing Tass, the Soviet news agency, phoned in a story to the effect that the Americans had wished to publish Georgiev's book on the two classes in socialist society, a work of "reactionary contemporary bourgeois sociology." None of us, nor anyone else, had heard a book mentioned. The correspondent of L'Humanite commented drily: "Elle ecoute toujours la voix de Staline.")

After the recess, Mrs. Karabashova described her second trip to the United States, this one in February 1958. Once again, arrangements were made in Paris by a mysterious figure who again took her real passport, gave her the same false one, and advised her when to go. This time she stayed a short time at the Statler and then went with Georgiev and Mary Graine to Lake Placid. At the resort, Mary and Asen quarrelled, and "another man" tried to settle the quarrel. On the return to Washington, Anderson was waiting for Mrs. Karabashova and Mary. Once again, he accompanied her to Paris.

Mrs. Karabashova then wanted to return to Bulgaria, but Georgiev was still trying to get her the WHO grant. She agreed to come to the United States a third time, and did so in July 1958. Anderson met her at the airport in the company of a tall girl, Miss Shell, "a typical American... polite... serious," who told her that Mary Graine could not be present. They went this time to a "spa," otherwise unidentified. After an interval, Georgiev sent a message that Mrs. Karabashova's husband and son would be in Paris. Miss Shell accompanied her to the airport.

The questioning then turned to various sums of money which Mrs. Karabashova allegedly received from and through Georgiev. The first figure mentioned was "more than \$1,000" between July 1958 and the end of 1959. It is not clear whether this was in fact the WHO scholarship which she did, at last, receive in the fall of 1958. Mrs. Karabashova said that, after receipt of the WHO letter appointing her and offering her a choice of three institutes in which to work, she received for eight months the sum of 100,000 (old) francs monthly. The money was given to her by a man named Matery -- who, of course, turned out to be another American agent. She introduced Georgiev to Matery in the spring of 1959, and she also had contacts with another agent, "Penn," whose father had been a diplomat in Bulgaria.

Mrs. Karabashova finally returned to Bulgaria at the insistence of her son. Her relations with Georgiev had deteriorated "because of his insincerity and his refusal to explain satisfactorily his relations with Anderson." Anderson tried to dissuade her from returning to Bulgaria, offering to find her a job. He also complained to her

that Georgiev was "neurotic" and "very capricious." The last questions to Mrs. Karabashova concerned Mme. Lorraine Bouvrain, wife of the scientist, daughter-in-law of the old law professor. They had been introduced by Georgiev, they had corresponded frequently and become good friends.

"Am I free?" asked Mrs. Karabashova when there were no more questions. The audience tittered; the judge, smiling ironically, nodded. She walked briskly out of the courtroom, looking for all the world like a woman who had swallowed a bushel of locusts.

Julia Ivanova: Tall, slim, 29, with a beehive hairdo and a mole over her right eye, this young blonde might have made credible the prosecution case that Georgiev was a lady's man. However, her role in the trial was along different lines. She testified that she had met Georgiev for the first time in 1958, when she was working in the Paris Legation and he was on route from New York to Sofia. Mrs. Karabashova, she said, had come to Paris for medical treatment and specialization. Georgiev paid her bills, and Mrs. Karabashova made no attempt to hide the fact. She was aware that the two had "close relations," although she had no proof. She had also met Mme. Bouvrain, "a very polite lady," Dr. Bakalova, and Penn, "a middle-aged man of about 40-42, well-educated, who spoke good Bulgarian." When Mrs. Karabashova had been away, she had thought she was in a rest home; at any rate, Mrs. Karabashova had looked "refreshed" on her return from these absences. Miss Ivanova, who now works in the Bulgarian Legation in Algiers, provided the only corroboration of the Karabashova story.

Evgeny Kamenov: Tall, rugged, distinguished, dignified, this was the former Deputy Foreign Minister and Minister to Paris. He had known Georgiev since their third or fourth year at the law faculty in Sofia. He remembered the election of Georgiev as president of the progressive students' union at the time. Later, the two men worked together as lawyers. Georgiev, he revealed, often defended the victims of political persecution under the regime of King Boris. He recalled one case where the court had refused to hear the accused testify to beatings he had received from the police; Georgiev had cried out, "You are spitting on legal procedure," and had "made a great impression."

Mr. Kamenov also knew Georgiev during his period as Counselor in Paris, and after his recall. He was Minister in Paris at the time Georgiev was in New York, but saw him on his trips home. In 1962-63, Georgiev had given him two letters to mail: one to Mme. Bouvrain, the other to Professor Haley.

Mr. Kamenov also had known Rosa Aronova. She was the relative of "a friend of ours, the lawyer, Dr. Nissim Mevorach" (a rather famous Bulgarian jurist, according to courtroom observers). She had been recalled from Paris together with Georgiev; there had been "accusations against him and her."

What was Mr. Kamenov's estimate of Mr. Georgiev? "In the Interior Ministry, he was very active. But the opinion of his colleagues

was not so high because he was unfocused, disorganized in his work. These were normal shortcomings. Otherwise, we considered him a good Communist...."

In the U.N., Georgiev was "one of the good, qualified members of the delegation. He worked in the financial committee, in the political committee, and also used to assist the chief delegate in the preparation of speeches. He had the qualities of a well-educated and experienced worker, but was not as well organized as he had been before. He wrote very long speeches, and then they had to be cut down."

As an academic, Georgiev displayed "erudition and a great knowledge of Marxist-Leninist science. Nevertheless, he did not produce results. Not even a single article of his was published in the newspapers." He was apparently one of those men who are "good talkers but cannot write."

Mr. Kamenov also testified that Georgiev often spoke of the idea of an international institute of Hegel studies, and that he, Kamenov, had put him in touch with French Hegel scholars. Georgiev had been elected a member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1958, on the basis of his dissertation on French policy in World War II.

The Kamenov testimony was the trial's first real surprise. For, if he was critical of Georgiev, it was for being "disorganized"--hardly a capital crime. At the same time, the preponderance of his testimony was highly favorable to Georgiev; and he had "incriminated" himself by revealing that he had mailed letters to Mme. Bouvrain.

Kiril Shterev: The first witness after the lunch recess on Saturday, December 28, was an aggressive young man who had known Georgiev since his appointment to the U.N. post in 1956. At the time of his appointment, he had "heard good things about him" -- that he was a good lawyer, that he spoke fluent French. When Georgiev came to New York, Shterev was "impressed by his culture, good manners and command of French." However, Georgiev seemed uninterested in his work. "In a way, he ignored the work of the mission.... Of course, he fulfilled his own tasks... But he showed no desire to work on problems that concerned the Minister and other members of the delegation." The Minister, Petar Vutov (present Minister of Culture), was -- according to Shterev -- "irritated that Georgiev showed such little interest in his work." From 1959 on, Shterev noticed that the relations between Georgiev and Vutov "were not good."

In 1959, Shterev testified, Georgiev invited the members of the Bulgarian delegation to the General Assembly to a dinner. At the dinner, Shterev noticed a "special phonograph he had not seen before." Also in 1959, he noticed that Georgiev carried with him a dictaphone ("larger than the Miniphone" on exhibit at the trial) which he used to dictate his speeches in French; a secretary would then transcribe them. "He always carried the dictaphone with him to give the impression that he was always working."

In 1960, the leader of the General Assembly delegation (this may have been Premier Yugov) gave a secret speech in Washington, which Shterev attended as a member of the Bulgarian Legation there.

Georgiev asked permission to take notes on the speech, which he said he would send to the other members of the permanent mission in New York.

Shterev was asked whether Georgiev dealt with codes during his work in New York. He replied that it was the official custom for the Counselor to deal with the code in the absence of the Minister. Usually, the Minister shows the Counselor most coded telegrams anyhow. What about Georgiev's speeches at the U.N.? Shterev replied that they were "very long and 'more Catholic than the Pope'.... very sectarian." To be sure, "from the theoretical viewpoint, the speeches were in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory." The Bulgarian press the next day, reporting Shterev's testimony, said merely that he had characterized Georgiev's speeches as "unsatisfactory": the word sectarian was not used.

Ivan Panov-Ivanov: This witness was called upon to corroborate the existence of Angelo Kuyumdzhisky. He himself had been a political emigre in Turkey in 1942-43. In 1944, "after the American bombing of Sofia," he had gone to Istanbul, where "a Bulgarian Jew, another emigre" had introduced him to Kuyumdzhisky. He had also, at that time, met Cyril Black; they had all discussed aid to various Partisan groups.

Evgenia Alexandrova Delcheva: Georgiev's confession had named this woman as one of his "mistresses." She turned out to be a slight, birdlike little creature who admitted to 43 years of age. She trembled visibly at several points in her testimony.

Mrs. Delcheva had known the defendant since 1950, when her husband had worked with him in the Paris Legation. (The present whereabouts of Mr. Delchev were not revealed.) At that time the Georgievs and the Delchevs had become close, exchanging visits and news, etc. Later on, when Georgiev was on route to New York, he visited the Delchevs and expressed discontent with his post. He said he would work hard and try to get a higher position. During Georgiev's holidays in Bulgaria, the Delchevs saw them again several times.

Did Georgiev give you money? "When he was in New York, we became friendly with his brother and his mother.... When his mother fell ill, he borrowed money from my husband, which he later returned. ... (Later still) he left money to my husband and myself to give, through his brother, to the woman who was tending his mother. We put the money in the bank." When the accusations against Georgiev were published, she decided to take the remaining money to the Foreign Ministry. "But we had given a lot to Georgiev's brother."

Did you have friendly relations with Georgiev? "Yes, the two families were close." Did you have sexual relations with him? "We had no personal relations whatever." The question was restated, and again Mrs. Delcheva nodded her head negatively and in a near-whisper repeated "No... no... no."

Had they not met alone once after Georgiev's return to Bulgaria in 1961? Yes, he had called at the Delchev house once when her hus-

band happened to be out. He was rather depressed. "I work hard," he told her, "but nothing will come of it." He also mentioned a book that he had written, which he had left with friends in New York-- "something like the book of Djilas." He said he was a man of global talents who was unappreciated.

Tinka Stoicheva Velkova: This was a plump, plain woman in her fifties, perhaps older, who had worked as a housekeeper in the family of Georgiev's father. She had known the defendant since 1938-1939. Did you have any personal relations? "No, not really. Though I did like him as a man." Did you have sexual relations? "Some, around 1946." After Georgiev left Bulgaria in 1946, she was married, but divorced in 1957. She had visited Georgiev's mother several times after her divorce. In 1958, she had met Georgiev twice at his mother's home. Had she received money from him? Yes, "6,000 or 16,000 old levas," she didn't remember. (This would be \$500 or \$1500 at official exchange rates; it was never made clear, though one got that impression, whether Mrs. Velkova was the woman who tended Georgiev's mother during her illness.)

Did you ever personally help Asen Georgiev? Yes, in 1963 he had asked her for the key to her house, and she had given it to him. He had complained that the telephone was ringing too often in his office and he wanted someplace to work quietly. He brought a typewriter with him. Did he intend to come alone? No, he would come with the sister of Evgeny Kamenov's wife.

Vera Todorova Lukanova: This was the sister of Karlo Lukanov, a close associate of the late Vassili Kolarov and Foreign Minister until November 1962. She had been introduced to Georgiev in Paris in 1950. She saw him again when she was serving as a Bulgarian representative to the U.N. Commission for Europe in Geneva. He came there in May-June 1962 as a delegate to its juridical subcommittee. "One Sunday morning, I accidentally met him on Mont Blanc Bridge in the company of a well-dressed lady, not young, whom I had never seen at U.N. headquarters in Geneva. I was struck by the early hour of the excursion." Could Mrs. Lukanova say anything about the quality of Georgiev's work? No, she had had no opportunity to judge it. She had, however, discussed him once in a general way with Kum Khristov, another Bulgarian diplomat; the latter remarked that it was strange that, after concluding his speeches, Georgiev inevitably whistled the opening bars of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. (This was the musical signature of the BBC, the V-for-victory theme, during World War II.)

Ljubomir Tonev: A prominent architect, Professor Tonev had known Georgiev since they were students together in Paris in 1927-28, although their close relations had begun only after World War II. When Georgiev was in Paris, Professor Tonev's wife had been sent there to organize some sort of exhibition and became friendly with Mrs. Georgiev. After 1950, the two couples had seen each other quite often, and had spent holidays together.

Did Georgiev give you a letter to mail? "Yes, in January 1963 I was traveling to Tunis and wanted to take my son to an eye doctor in Paris. I told Georgiev about it and he gave me a letter to Mme.

Bouvrain. My son delivered the letter to Mme. Bouvrain." However, Professor Tonev pointed out, there were many letters back and forth between the two men and between their wives. Georgiev, for example, had congratulated him on winning an international architectural competition in East Berlin. In another letter, Georgiev had expressed "a negative opinion of the American way of life."

Dimiter Grekov: Now the Communist party secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had known Georgiev in 1950-51, after his return from Paris. "Due to some negative facts," Grekov said, Georgiev "was released" from the Foreign Ministry. Mr. Grekov also said that he had heard at the time that Georgiev had had intimate relations with Rosa Aronova. The two men's paths had not crossed afterward.

Ljuben Vasiliev: Like Kamenov and Professor Tonev, he had known Georgiev since university days. Although they had been in different classes at the law faculty, he remembered Georgiev as president of the students' union. They had met again in 1944 and discussed old times. In 1950, there was a meeting of the law faculty to discuss introduction of a new course on the general theory of law and the state. "Professor Mevorach proposed the name of Asen Georgiev." In 1956, Vasiliev saw Georgiev shortly before his departure for New York. Thereafter they met only casually, during Georgiev's New York period. At the law faculty, of which Vasiliev became director (date unclear), Georgiev was "well appreciated."

In 1962 or 1963, the two men had had two quarrels. First, Georgiev tried to persuade Vasiliev that a space-law paper he was working on required more time than Vasiliev (apparently supervising the project) would grant. Then, there was "unpleasantness" about a book written by a Bulgarian lawyer (unnamed). In private conversation, Georgiev criticized the book; but a few days later published a commentary in the press praising it. Vasiliev asked him: "How is it possible for you to say one thing and write another?" Georgiev allegedly replied: "You're pretty stupid if you don't understand a basic political principle -- the unity of opposites." Vasiliev felt Georgiev had not been sincere.

At this point Georgiev interrupted the testimony, and asked the witness if he knew the opinion of Soviet lawyers on the book in question. Vasiliev replied with a brief discussion of the book itself, without, however, giving the Soviet view.

Nisim Mevorach: A man of 72, with a large head and mass of gray hair, he had known Georgiev since 1935, when the latter practiced law in his office. In 1942-43, Georgiev became a lawyer on his own. The two saw each other from time to time, however, in 1944-45. When Georgiev was in Paris, Professor Mevorach was often there with various Bulgarian delegations, which Georgiev assisted. After 1950, they saw each other quite often, for Professor Mevorach was dean of the law faculty and Georgiev a lecturer. He saw Georgiev only rarely after 1956.

Professor Mevorach was then asked about Rosa Aronova, whom Mr. Kamenov had identified as a relative of his. Professor Mevorach said nothing about such a relationship. He had met her in Paris, he said, during her service at the legation there. He had also heard a story that on one occasion a Frenchman in a car had taken her to some office; what had actually happened, nobody knew. Miss Aronova had gone to Israel with her mother in 1955, supposedly on a visit; but she had stayed there. Earlier, she had complained to Professor Mevorach that her salary was too low; and had indicated that a flat was available to her in Israel. (This apparently inconsequential remark, if true, invalidated a contention in the indictment that Georgiev had obtained C.I.A. money to buy her an apartment several years later.) He had also heard a story, from a woman who knew Miss Aronova, that she might be a spy for France, that she was dangerous, and that Georgiev might be her helper.

Slavko Vasev: The editor of Literaturen Front was the first of three witnesses identified as having been called by the defense. He testified that in 1946 he had worked closely with Georgiev in Paris, where he served as a member of a Bulgarian delegation. Georgiev had helped the delegation; he had good contacts in France.

Ljubomir Pipkov, identified as a composer, was absent; absence unexplained. He was actually the second absentee; earlier in the day, Miladin Kolev, a member of the Bulgarian delegation to the financial talks with the U.S., was also absent.

Lora Bakalova: A tall, erect, heavy-set, grey-haired woman of 54, Professor Bakalova had been mentioned by Mrs. Karabashova as the lady who had taken her six passport photos and promised to arrange everything about her first trip to the U.S. Young Miss Ivanova had also mentioned meeting Dr. Bakalova. She was, however, never questioned about any of this. She testified that she had known Georgiev since his student days in Paris; his mother had been a friend of their family. He had been a member of the Communist student group. She had regarded him as a "good young man, very capable." He had showed a wide interest in many fields. "I think he was a good party member." Dr. Bakalova then indicated that she had studied two years in France. Had she had close relations with Georgiev in Sofia? Her answer was that she and he had not been in Bulgaria at the same time, so she could not answer the question. And that was the end of her testimony.

Judge Velez then announced that open sessions of the court would be resumed on Monday, December 30. However, the court would, after a suitable recess, resume in closed session by hearing witnesses to the grave secrets disclosed by Georgiev. We were later told that a dozen witnesses had testified in the secret session. Only four, however, were identified: Karlo Lukanov, twice former Foreign Minister (he had been dropped in December 1953, then again after the Eighth Congress in November 1962), whose sister had already testified; Petar Vutov, present Minister of Culture and former chief of Bulgaria's permanent U.N. mission; Boris Manolov, present Ambassador to France and former Ambassador to Bucharest, whom Georgiev and Aronova were said to have met in 1950; and Lozan

Strelkov, the present director of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency, a member of the party central committee, cultural attache in Paris at the time Georgiev served there, and a former editor of Literaturen Front. The testimony given in secret session was never revealed, although prosecutor Vachkov referred to it in his summation.

Andrey Tsvetkov: He was the first defense witness called when the trial resumed on the morning of Monday, December 30. He was absent.

Gencho Donchev: A young man of 35, he testified that he had known Georgiev since 1955, when "he edited my translation of Hegel's Logic.... He showed himself a big intellect, a serious philosopher, with great understanding."

Vasil Serafimov: absent.

Prof. Ljuben Rachev: absent.

Prof. Petar Georgiev: No relation to the accused, this witness testified to the circumstances of the defendant's promotion to dozent. The promotion was based on the draft of Asen Georgiev's dissertation on France. When Asen Georgiev was out of Sofia, Petar Georgiev delivered his lectures. When Asen Georgiev returned from America, he "delivered a speech in which he decorated the situation.... He said that American capitalism was unlike European capitalism, that it had special qualities. He pointed out that the unemployed in the United States live better than many of the workers in Europe." In the opinion of the witness, Asen Georgiev "didn't go into details or explain the essence of the subject."

Rajko Krstov Pavranov: absent.

The Experts: The stand was now taken by various groups of experts, who testified about the spy paraphernalia "found" in Georgiev's apartment. I shall not go into great detail about their testimony because, as we shall see, none of it was apparently taken seriously in arriving at the verdict. In brief, the first group of experts analyzed the coding and decoding blocks, and concluded that they had been prepared by special services and coincided with U.S. codes "despite the French key." (An intriguing detail never again pursued.) The second group of experts talked about the secret radio broadcasts from Athens, then turned to Georgiev's code activity in 1958. When Minister Vutov left New York, they said, Georgiev, in charge of the mission, immediately wired the Foreign Ministry that the code clerk wanted a vacation; this was July 1958. In the winter of 1958-59 and again in the summer of 1959, Georgiev also substituted for the code clerk. The experts also denied Georgiev's earlier contention, and declared that the Bulgarian and American codes were not fundamentally similar.

A third group of experts talked about the radio and the tape recorder. They described a broadcast from the "spy center" on September 20, 1963 (twelve days after Georgiev's arrest), and played a

tape which they said represented this broadcast. After some indistinct bars from the last movement of Schubert's Unfinished, the music was cut off in mid-passage, and one heard first a voice repeating monosyllables and numbers ("Ach... one... four... ukh.... two.... ah," etc. then Morse code, then further numbers. The tone of the tape differed considerably between the music and the alleged "message," and sounded like a rather ineffectual splice. The performance was, to say the least, unconvincing.

Three more experts then testified about the secret paper, and finally Dozent Vakarelsky -- who doubles as a university lecturer on criminal law and head of the Justice Ministry's "experimental law laboratory" -- testified that Georgiev's handwriting in his various address books, and various letters, was really his own.

Judge Velev then read two depositions from witnesses who could not attend the trial. The first was Mrs. Manolova, described as ill. She had known Georgiev in the Ministry of the Interior in 1944-45, and described him as a man with a good knowledge of French, and of the French Communist party members. In 1962, Mrs. Manolova had traveled together with the Georgievs to New York. Earlier, Georgiev had asked her to give a letter to a friend in Paris. He described the friend as older than himself. Mrs. Manolova met the lady, whom she described as old but still very beautiful. (This was, apparently, Mme. Bouvrain.) The lady knew all about Georgiev, and asked her to deliver some presents for him. Mrs. Manolova met her several times. Mrs. Manolova also said that, when the American press reported Georgiev's arrest, she had received a letter from a lady in New York asking about him. The lady knew that, from Moscow, Georgiev was to go to Paris for a space-law meeting. She asked Mrs. Manolova for information about the trial, because it came as a great surprise; the letter described it as "very awful and a great crime."

The second deposition came from Jordan Chubanov, who had met Georgiev for the first time in 1959, when he was named chief of Bulgaria's permanent U.N. mission. They worked together, according to the deposition "until January 1962." The deposition described the various committees in which Georgiev had worked, and said he had taken part also in all meetings of the mission and of its party cell. He had also taken part in the meetings with other delegations from the socialist countries. Chubanov had shown him many coded messages; for two months in 1961, Georgiev had been temporary chief of the mission and was informed of all coded messages. Chubanov described Georgiev as a "man who knew French and English and was widely informed on world events." However, he often forgot his tasks; and, when reprimanded, complained against "bureaucratic formalism."

"What impressed me," said the Chubanov deposition, "was his ideologic impurity. It was easy for us to notice when we discussed the speeches he was to deliver. He did not follow his colleagues' advice but left the speeches in their original version...." Once, after a talk by Milko Tarabanov, First Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgiev went ahead, ignoring Tarabanov's theses and simply improvising a speech. On another occasion, he proposed to discuss in a meeting of the Economic Council Bulgaria's agricultural difficul-

ties in 1950-51 and 1956-57. However, declared the Chubanov deposition, the only contacts with Americans on the part of Georgiev of which his former chief knew were official contacts.

After the reading of these two depositions, the prosecutor and defendant each asked for the introduction into evidence of various documents. The prosecutor introduced two: a "top-secret letter" of the Foreign Ministry, and "notes on ideological understanding" written by Georgiev (apparently during his interrogation). The defendant introduced clippings from the American press concerning his U.N. speeches during the Bizerte crisis of 1961, plus the texts of his unpublished history of Sparta and study of France in World War II. The court was then recessed for lunch, and the summations began that afternoon.

The Prosecutor's Summation: Mr. Ivan Vachkov, the state prosecutor, is a tall, handsome, rather sun-burned man of about 50 with thick, marcelled-gray hair; extremely well-groomed and careful in his movements, he bears somewhat of a resemblance to Yugoslavia's Aleksandar Rankovic. During the first three and a half days of the trial, he was quite mild-mannered, almost lassitudinous in his questioning. In his summation, he came into his own. Not that he ever raised his voice appreciably -- his tone was of the sort equally appropriate for a speech on raising chemical production; but the rhetoric was of the sort which, no matter how often one reads the more vicious elements of the Communist press, never fails to shock.

The trial of this "traitor," Mr. Vachkov began, was an event of "great political importance." The reactionary, aggressive imperialist circles headed by the United States employ espionage and diversion as state policy. American imperialism is "the most dangerous enemy of the peoples of the world" (Peking-Tirana formula). Fascism, which we all recall, was no worse than the present warmongers.

In less than twenty years, Bulgaria has built a new society. The historic decisions of the Eighth Congress are being realized, in the new oil and fertilizer factories being dedicated (by Premier Zhivkov) this very week. Bulgaria and all the socialist countries, "headed by the Soviet Union," are working for peace. The Soviet Union demonstrated its will to peace by reducing its military budget, as well as by the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. All the socialist countries are doing their best to enlarge economic and cultural relations with "other" countries. But this should not be used to slow socialist construction in our country; it cannot be allowed to interfere with our ideology.

The trial of Oleg Penkovsky in the Soviet Union, the recent exposure of spies masking as tourists in Moscow and Kiev, the recent trials of spies in Poland and East Germany all show, as does this trial, the fierce ideological struggle and underground diversion being waged against the socialist countries. This trial and other trials of this kind demonstrate that the aggressive forces of the United States are making great efforts to fight socialism. The actions of the Central Intelligence Agency show how dangerous its activities are for the peace of the world. Because the American imper-

ialists are frightened, they bend every effort to stop our progress. The reactionary American Senator Goldwater declared the other day that money should be given to underground leaders to create discontent in the socialist countries.

The imperialists use the increased cultural and scientific exchange in order to send agents into our midst. A brochure distributed in West Germany advises Western tourists to spread decadence among our people. In another brochure, tourists are advised to make contact with our youth, and even to give presents to pretty girls. There are, moreover, many Western business firms and companies attempting to collect information on the socialist countries.

It has been proved that the imperialist intelligence services attempt to use Bulgarian diplomats as spies; they prey upon the weak features of their character. American intelligence is spending a great deal of money and using it even in the headquarters of the United Nations. In addition, great sums are devoted to radio propaganda (still jammed in Bulgaria, unlike Rumania and the U.S.S.R.). Every night, the radio spy center sends its deadly messages.

"The chief aim of all this activity is to undermine the unity of the Communist parties, the peoples of the socialist countries and the anti-colonial liberation movement." The imperialists chiefly rely on the remnants of the old bourgeois classes, and on ambitious people who are dissatisfied with their positions.

This trial shows that the vigilance of the people must be increased, even though Bulgaria seeks to live in friendship and cooperation with all countries.

The wrath of the Bulgarian people against this traitor is great. "True to his hypocritical nature, he made a comic farce of his confession." He told the court that he became an American agent through ideological instability. "That is an absolute lie, through which he tries to cover his activity." His insincerity is evident when one considers his claim that he went over to the Americans in 1956 because of instability; why should one believe that he has repented now? He has tried to prove that, while serving the C.I.A., he has also upheld Bulgarian interests. Yet everything we know about the case proves that "spying is a typical feature of his character." It is difficult to believe that he did not commit these crimes simply for money. When he talks of his moral obligation to Rosa Aronova, he is "trying to achieve cheap political effects."

Georgiev "did not understand the attitude of the investigators or the attitude of the court toward him... but proved his own hypocrisy and two-facedness." Socialist legality was absolutely observed in this case. On the first day after his arrest, Georgiev confessed "the most basic things" in the indictment; he gave "other details" in the course of the investigation. According to our legal code, confessions are not sufficient, and other proof is needed. During the period of investigation, many experiments were made by experts; Georgiev was given an opportunity to contact the radio center in Greece, and the experiment proved that he was an agent of the C.I.A.

It is very clear that Georgiev performed great crimes. He became an agent as a result of his meetings with Kuyumdzhiskey in 1950; had Kuyumdzhiskey offered him more money, he would have remained in France at that time. There were people repressed during the period of the cult of personality, but none of them became a traitor. Six months after the April plenum, Georgiev was appointed to the United Nations; he immediately saw Kuyumdzhiskey and entered American service as Georges Duval, under the spy Anderson, "well known as Cyril Black."

An examination of Georgiev's effects showed much incriminating material, and this was done at a time when Georgiev did not think he could be captured. (Mr. Vachkov did not say when this search took place.)

Georgiev's appointment as chairman of the space law committee gave him a great opportunity for spying.

At a meeting with Matery, he asked for a scholarship for Karabashova. This is proved by Karabashova's testimony. She knew Matery "even though Georgiev said he did not."

Georgiev's letter to Allen Dulles shows that he had not stopped his spying activities in the summer of 1959, even though he claims he had quarreled with Anderson because he was unwilling to undertake "small police activities." "Allen Dulles later used the arguments furnished by Georgiev's letter, which expressed his political ideas, in a speech to businessmen.

Mr. Vachkov then discussed the chemical paper, the radio messages, the secret addresses of Helen Godell and Mme. Lucienne Bouvrain (14 square Montsouris, Paris -- this was the first direct statement that the Bouvrains had served as espionage "maildrops"). Many witnesses, said Mr. Vachkov, confirmed that Georgiev knew Mme. Bouvrain; and some even carried letters to her. Mr. Vachkov then discussed the mechanism of the code tables.

"Because Asen Georgiev's spying took place in the context of the United Nations," the prosecutor felt it important to explain that he had been present at all meetings of the Bulgarian permanent mission and delegations to the General Assembly, "and at meetings with other socialist countries."

In 1960, Georgiev "informed Bonnard about the decisions and proposals to be made by the socialist countries in the Second Committee of the U.N.... He advanced information of great interest.... At the time of the visit of an important Bulgarian figure in New York (Yugov? Zhivkov?), he gave his report to the Americans...

"During the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Georgiev told the Americans in advance of the proposals, opinions and decisions taken by the Soviet delegation...." Here was a bombshell, indeed, for that was the session at which Nikita Khrushchev appeared in person to bang his shoe, attack Dag Hammarskjold, propose the "troika" reorganization scheme, launch the "general

and complete disarmament" plan, and attempt a partial reconciliation with Marshal Tito. More was to follow:

"In the same period, that is in the summer of 1960, he gave information about the secret discussions at a meeting of very important socialist leaders..." This was, indubitably, the Bucharest conference of June 1960, which Khrushchev opened with a sharp attack on the Chinese but at which he was forced to consent to what became the famous meeting of the 81 parties in Moscow that fall.

"Georgiev gave full information about the various diplomatic tactics employed by the socialist countries in the committees of the U.N. In September 1960, after he was appointed head of the Bulgarian delegation discussing financial questions with the United States -- and these negotiations, I assure you, ended in a complete victory for socialist Bulgaria -- he informed the C.I.A. of the opinions of high Bulgarian institutions and various political figures....

"In 1961, Karlo Lukanov told him to become acquainted with the discussions going on between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and other fraternal parties, on the one hand, and the Communist party of China, on the other. (This is the Moscow formula for the dispute). He read very confidential materials, taking notes even though the material was secret. He transmitted these notes to the Americans...

Georgiev also allegedly gave full information about the organization and work of the Foreign Ministry and its links with the party central committee; although, according to Mr. Vachkov, "he claimed during the investigation that this was not important because the Americans already knew it." He used the Bulgarian codes in 1958 and took them to the Americans; he claims, falsely, that the two systems were similar; the experts have proved that these code blocks can be removed, opened, closed again and returned without leaving any trace. The deposition of Mr. Chupanov shows that he knew the contents of coded messages.

"In 1960, he gave information concerning the naval base of a friendly socialist country..." This was later confirmed to be the departure of Russian submarines from the Albanian submarine base at Valona; although Georgiev apparently claimed, according to a remark by a defense lawyer, that this news had already been in the newspapers.

"Pressed by Lukanov, Chupanov and Vutov, Georgiev admitted committing treason and espionage...."

Mr. Vachkov then discussed the various bank accounts and the alleged transportation of Georgiev's mistresses to the United States. Miss Ivanova's testimony "proved that Karabashova was absent from Paris." Karabashova was neither sent by the Bulgarian Government nor given its funds. Georgiev gave her money and promoted a scholarship for her with the World Health Organization "through American intelligence."

Georgiev's activities were aimed at "discrediting the social system in our country.... He betrayed vital secrets... He is a class

enemy.... He gave information which was directed against all the socialist countries. The very fact that he joined the Americans in October-November 1956, at the time of the counter-revolution in Hungary, shows he is a profound class enemy...."

Georgiev cites his political and ideological "uncertainty" as a motive; how does he explain then that his information strengthened the imperialist countries? For those are the practical results of the activity of this traitor. "Even during the crisis in the Caribbean, he did everything to help American intelligence, forgetting that his own country would suffer from a world catastrophe."

Georgiev was a traitor, a "paid servant of American intelligence ... who knew what he was doing." His activity was activity against peace, "because he served the American warmongers." Treason was "the logical end of his constant process of defeating his own personality.... He twice joined the Communist party and withdrew from it." After the 1944 revolution, he did not become a loyal worker but instead "a typical bourgeois intellectual." He is a man "of no morals whatever and of no virtues whatever." His "debauchery and careerism have no equal."

This trial has shown, concluded the prosecutor, "that the people must be more and more vigilant.... There is no place on earth for this spy and traitor!"

With this call for Professor Georgiev's blood, the invited audience burst into frantic applause. Women smiled and laughed, television cameras whirred, kleig lights blinked on and off. Four foreign journalists and two old women refrained from the jubilation. The condemned jurist sat impassive between two young armed militiamen.

The "Defense": Four defense lawyers each spoke for twenty-five minutes. Each began by stating that "no doubt he is guilty" or a similar formulation. The plea that they were making was not for acquittal or pardon, but for commutation of the sentence. One of the lawyers cited the fact that the Soviet Union had on several occasions abolished the death penalty; this drew only cynical snickers. Another claimed that Georgiev could be "rehabilitated" by modern penal methods, and might yet contribute something to the building of socialism in Bulgaria. Only the last attempted anything like a serious plea. He noted, in a gingerly manner, that many of the secrets which Georgiev was supposed to have revealed were not real secrets. They were certainly not military secrets. The documents he had revealed "concerning the Bucharest and Moscow conferences" (in 1960) were "internal propaganda materials," and propaganda was not all that serious. In any case, the harm done by his spying was very little compared to the achievements of his work; even the Prosecutor had admitted that the financial talks ended in Bulgaria's favor. Georgiev had rendered many signal services over the years; he was an internationally respected jurist. "I ask you to find within yourselves the strength not to condemn him to death." With this plea, the court was recessed in order to hear Georgiev's final plea in closed session. Sentence would be passed the next morning, Tuesday, December 31.

The Sentence: Passing of sentence began at 12:30 p.m. on the last day of the year, and was concluded five minutes later. In the morning, Bulgarian television had shown what purported to be Georgiev's final plea to the court the night before; the film had no sound-track, so one may presume that the accused was unrepentant.

Georgiev was, at last, condemned to death by shooting on two counts: (1) "between November 1956 and December 1961... in the United States, France, Switzerland and Bulgaria... in the interests of the United States, he collected and delivered to United States intelligence organs... state secrets which he had learned in the course of his work"; and (2) "from November 56 to December 1961... as counselor of the Bulgarian mission to the United Nations, he intentionally carried out his duties in a manner detrimental to Bulgaria and other states..."

The limitation in the sentence of Georgiev's activity to the 1956-61 period in effect rules out not only the early Kuyumdzhisky episode, but -- more important -- all his work in the space-law field and the entire apparatus of spy paraphernalia, coded radio messages to the "spy center in Greece," and all the "expert" testimony based on this hocus-pocus.

In addition to sentencing Georgiev to death, the court confiscated all his funds, ordered him to pay all court costs, and confiscated the bank accounts of Mrs. Karabashova (2,074 leva), Mrs. Velkova (1,338 leva) and one Anka Ruceva Koleva (386 leva), who is presumably the lady charged with taking care of Georgiev's sick mother. (One dollar = 1.17 leva.) All evidence in the case was also ordered to be confiscated.

Some Interpretations

At last we are able to return to the four questions raised at the beginning of these notes (page 8) -- the public purpose of the trial, the internal-regime motivations, Georgiev's real crimes in the eyes of his prosecutors, and the reasons for his confession. It is virtually impossible to say anything definitive and final about any of these questions, because of the haphazard nature of the trial itself, the two secret sessions which appear to have been crucial, and -- not least -- the incompleteness of our own record. The record is incomplete not only in large matters but in small -- e.g., we could not determine whether the references to "Mme. Lorraine" and "Mme. Lucienne" Bouvrain were made to two different members of the same family, or simply reflected confusion about one and the same person. One could doubtless discover dozens of questions raised by our notes themselves; and there were, equally, dozens of lacunae which (granted the non-cooperation of Bulgarian officials) we were in no position to explore or clarify.

Nevertheless, for want of a more solid record, and in the hope of perhaps eliciting pertinent additions to and corrections of our record, it is permissible to speculate briefly on the questions raised by the Georgiev trial.

The purpose of the trial, so far as the general public was concerned, is perhaps easiest to clarify. It was, I think, effectively summarized in Mr. Vachkov's speech. The trial was a warning to the Bulgarian people, and particularly to Bulgarian educated people, to maintain their "vigilance" toward cultural and scientific exchange, toward Western business firms, toward tourists, toward every possible contact with the West. The morality-play demonstrated how an intellectual started off by studying in the West, became exposed to revisionist ideas, and ended up in the most sordid espionage. There was, also, an element of epater le bourgeois -- always good for a ride among the "workers" in a primitive country like Bulgaria. Finally, the condemnation of Georgiev to death demonstrated that, whatever changes may have been bruited about since 1956, anyone caught fooling around with the West would be shot regardless of his previous services and regardless of the skimpiness of evidence against him.

The purpose of the trial, so far as the regime was concerned, is somewhat more difficult to estimate. Undoubtedly, there was the desire for scapegoats for Bulgaria's economic difficulties, which are vast. Undoubtedly, there was a desire to manifest solidarity with the Soviet party after the Penkovsky affair; similar solidarity had already been manifested in Czechoslovakia and East Germany; and the Bulgarians over the years have not only been most slavish in their obedience to Moscow but have gone to most ridiculous lengths in their spy trials. (These two characteristics in some measure pre-date Communist rule.) Probably, too, as the American Legation in Sofia would like to believe, there are elements in the regime who fear that Mrs. Anderson's mission was gaining too great an influence and desired a "firm" anti-American demonstration to restore ideological "order." (Since the trial, the Bulgarian Government has demanded that the U.S. close its display windows; the demand was made at just about the same time the Hungarian Government agreed to permit the U.S. to open its windows for the first time since 1956.)

Yet to leave our analysis at this point -- or with the mere assertion that the "Stalinists" wished to crack down on the "liberals" -- is to miss some of the special peculiarities of this trial. First, there is the intriguing connection with the Soviet Union itself: Georgiev's arrest in Moscow, his nomination to the space post "by Soviet scientists," the omission of his space-work from the final sentence, the emphasis placed by the prosecutor on revelations concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute. (These were the only specified revelations which really mattered: the expert testimony on the codes was prima facie incredible, and the C.I.A. was surely not vitally interested or completely ignorant of the Foreign Ministry's links with the party central committee.) If Georgiev's arrest was simply a "spin-off" of the Penkovsky trial, why was the space work omitted from the final sentence? If, on the other hand, Georgiev's connection with Russia was political rather than scientific or military, what was its real nature? We are aware (or should be, since the days of General Krivitsky) that the more serious Soviet political-intelligence organizations are not purely Russian, but international in character. We know that when Beria fell in Moscow, Zaisser and Herrstadt fell in East Berlin, and so on; and of all the parties and countries of

Eastern Europe, Bulgaria was the one most directly dominated by Russian citizens. So that one may accept, at least for the sake of argument, the possibility that Georgiev worked for and/or was repudiated in the end by one or another Soviet "apparatus." If so, however, the question immediately arises: what Soviet purposes or intrigues does the case reflect or serve? Does it, perhaps, have some connection with the strange circumstances surrounding the arrest in Russia of Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn? One can only raise these questions, not answer them. But I believe that any explanation of the case that does not clarify the Russian connections is no explanation at all.

Second, there is ample evidence in the conduct of the trial that it reflected a struggle within the Bulgarian regime, a struggle either already decided or still in progress. There is, to begin with, the vast contrast between the sweeping nature of the indictment and the narrower scope of the sentence -- which neither attempted to tar Georgiev for his behavior during the Stalin period nor condemned his conduct in space work during 1962-63. Since the essential principle of most Communist trials (and that of the prosecution here, too) is "once a spy, always a spy," one must regard the final sentence as a kind of a compromise. (I do not believe, by the way, that the compromise was struck among the seven judges, but in the highest circles of the party.) Another interesting point in the sentence was that it made no mention of Rosa Aronova, or of the whole anti-Semitic theme bandied about at various points in the trial.

More impressive still, in this same context, was the parade of witnesses who in effect supported the defendant or, at worst, did not incriminate him; the former deputy Foreign Minister Kamenov (who called him a good Communist); the diplomat Shterev (who hinted at a quarrel with Georgiev's superior, and characterized his speeches as "sectarian"; Mrs. Delcheva (who, despite mentioning the Djilas-like manuscript, denied being Georgiev's mistress); Karlo Lukanov's sister (who refused to judge his work); the architect Ljubomir Tonev (who quoted Georgiev's negative opinion of America); Professor Mevorach (who refused to incriminate either Georgiev or Rosa Aronova); the literary editor Slavko Vasev (a brief but completely friendly witness); Professor Bakalova (who refused to incriminate either Georgiev or Mrs. Karabashova); young Gencho Donchev (who praised Georgiev as a philosopher); and even Jordan Chubanov (who despite criticism of Georgiev's disorderly, individualistic ways said that Georgiev's only contacts with Americans that he knew about were official ones). There were also the half-dozen absentees, including one member of the Bulgarian team at the financial talks which Georgiev allegedly betrayed; their non-appearance must also be construed as resistance to the prosecution case, for if they had been favorable they would have appeared or given depositions.

One may interpret the behavior of these witnesses in two ways: Either they were boldly resisting the sponsors of the trial as part of a larger political struggle in which they have certain hopes; or else they have already lost, and their performance here was only the first round in a series of trials and prosecutions in which they will play larger roles. I am personally at the moment rather

inclined to the first hypothesis, to a struggle still in progress and only partly compromised by the terms of the sentence. I am inclined in this direction not merely by the sentence and the explicit attitude of certain witnesses, but also by a peculiar sentence in the prosecutor's summation. He said that "when pressed by Lukanov, Chubanov and Vutov, Georgiev admitted that he had committed espionage and treason." Now Vutov and Chubanov were Georgiev's immediate superiors at the U.N., while Lukanov was Foreign Minister in this period; Georgiev's guilt implicated them, at the very least, of negligence. Without this statement by the prosecutor, these men were certainly under a cloud; the prosecutor's statement, on the trial's final day, implied that they had been absolved of complicity and were aligned with the forces of order, justice and rectitude.

Despite this, it is not impossible that this trial may be the prelude to further struggles, in the court and outside. I do not know enough about the internal maneuverings of the various Bulgarian factions (Zhivkov, Yugov, Chervenkov, etc.) to pretend any knowledge of the ultimate targets of such prosecutions. I think that to present the struggle as one of "Stalinists" vs. "liberals" may be essentially misleading; it is at least equally possible that they are all Stalinists. In any case, all is not calm in the Bulgarian party (or, as a Communist correspondent put it, "the new course has not yet been stabilized"); and the fate of the friendly witnesses, particularly that of Mr. Kamenov, should furnish us with a good index to future developments.

Georgiev's real "crimes" seem the most difficult to define with any confidence of accuracy. So shoddy was the trial as a juridical proceeding, or even as a convincing piece of character-assassination, that one may speculate only in the most primitive manner, by elimination. It is fairly certain, for example, what he did not do: namely, engage in cloak-and-dagger espionage, use secret codes and radios, turn over the Bulgarian code system or other military secrets. Had he done any of this (and there was no real evidence that he had), it would have been quite unnecessary to make any sort of to-do about his behavior in 1950, his revisionist ideas, his mistresses, his radio set, his meetings with agents in 1962 and 1963. In fact, had he been an orthodox spy, I rather suspect he either would have been summarily shot, or else brought to trial in a manner determined (as in the Powers and Penkovsky cases) to impress Western opinion not only with the reality of the spying but with the improved quality of Communist legal proceedings. Nor do I believe so many witnesses would have been ready to defend him, in effect, had he been guilty of anything along such primitive lines.

What seems somewhat more likely is that Georgiev during his period in the West did attempt to communicate to sympathetic circles there something of the reality of the Communist world. He may have made his revelations directly to C.I.A. agents; or to officials of the various "semi-private" organizations and "cut-outs" through which they have been known to operate; or perhaps merely to members of organizations or institutions which the Communist authorities consider to be "objectively" part of the American spy network (i.e., journalists, research scholars, etc.). In any case, what he communi-

cated was, I think, largely political information on the disarray in the satellite nations, the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute, etc. I am aware of the prevailing state doctrine that any one who reveals information stamped "confidential," no matter how trivial the information, is guilty of a serious crime. Yet, I submit, Georgiev did not, and could not, regard matters in such a static and conventional framework. He was aware of the criminal mess in the Soviet bloc as well as of the strong forces of resistance and schism within it; he was aware of the futility of emigration; he realized the largely unutilized capacity of the Western world to influence directly events in the East. He therefore, I believe, undertook to play what was undoubtedly a very dangerous game: to attempt, by strategic "leaks," to use the Western powers as a lever to influence developments in the Soviet bloc in the direction he desired. That direction, it is clear from his entire career as well as his explicit statement, was "revisionism" and beyond.

In using the West to influence the internal development of his own camp, Georgiev had ample precedent. In the crisis of October 1956 and afterward, prominent Polish Communists, including several in the Central Committee, used the Western press and Western diplomats against Khrushchev and the intervention-party in the Kremlin. In 1959, no less than Anastas Mikoyan told Western journalists of Soviet concern over the growing irascibility of China. There have doubtless been many other less-publicized occasions in which high Communist officials, trained in the dialectic and engaged (after all) in a cut-throat life-and-death struggle, have attempted to "play" Western cards against their Eastern opponents.

Yet the question arises whether Georgiev could have played this game as long as he did without some protection or encouragement from higher quarters. It is difficult to believe that he did not regard himself, with adequate reason, as the mouthpiece of a larger faction or group within the Bulgarian regime or the "camp" as a whole. And here one comes upon the circumstance not only of his Moscow arrest but of his previous service as Secretary General of the Interior Ministry under Anton Yugov. This was hardly a post as Park Commissioner, and it is unlikely that the qualities which commended him for such service were not employed in later capacities. The posts of counselor in Paris and in New York which he received later were of the sort often given by Communist regimes to police-intelligence types; his familiarity with code work, and the various equipment found in his home (and brought into Bulgaria over a period of years), might well reflect his real status in Bulgarian diplomacy -- namely, as an intelligence agent. I am suggesting, in short, that Georgiev may have been in some way what is commonly called a "double agent" -- that he was assigned by some Bulgarian (or Soviet) police-intelligence apparatus to make contact with his American equivalents, either for the purpose of obtaining information or in order to "open up" some present or future line of policy. The latter is not at all novel in our experience; it was precisely the conduct of elements of the Abwehr and later even the Gestapo in the last years of the war, not to mention even higher figures in the satellite regimes of Italy, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. There is ample evidence, Lord knows, to sup-

port the belief that elements in the Communist world now realize that the cold war is in its last years or, in any case, can no longer be won (Beria apparently reached this conclusion in 1953.) If that is so, then the principal task for such people is extrication -- by grand strategy if one is Mr. Khrushchev, by trade agreements if one is Mr. Gheorgiu-dej of Rumania, by less respectable means if one is in a more circumscribed status. "They realized I was an important political figure," said Asen Georgiev; "I could get whatever I wanted because I came to them at the time of the Hungarian events." These words hint at a role that went beyond Georgiev's personality or status in the Bulgarian diplomatic corps. In this light, one may easily understand the court's easy tolerance of the various testimony and materials designed to prove Georgiev a scholar; that whole show may have been a blind to distract attention from his real role as an intelligence operative. One can also understand somewhat better the chronology of Georgiev's confession: for the two periods in which he admitted great activity (November 1956-October 1958 and March 1960-December 1961) were both periods of considerable instability and tension within the Communist world. It is impossible now to go any further than this -- to speculate on Georgiev's sponsors, on their role in inter-bloc politics, on their reasons (or those of their foes) for cutting Georgiev down. Whether in the course of his original assignment he betrayed his sponsors to the Americans, or whether the entire line of activity he represented was overthrown (in Sofia or in Moscow), is impossible to determine. One cannot even say surely whether his activities were undertaken on the order, or simply with the toleration, of higher persons. Yet one must doubt, very strongly, that he acted alone, and successfully, all those years.

Why Georgiev confessed, and thus made possible a public trial, is a question susceptible to numerous answers, none of them wholly satisfactory. The most obvious, of course, is physical pressure against relatives and friends; these would include not only Mrs. Georgiev and Mrs. Karabashova (whom Georgiev seemed determined to protect), but perhaps the never-identified Mr. Karabashov and others as well. Such an explanation is so simple that it immediately offends students in the field who have been raised on Darkness at Noon and other more subtle rationalizations. In truth, it does not quite explain why Georgiev, having struck such a bargain, proceeded to upset it in the courtroom in the way that he did. By his "hypocrisy" and "two-facedness," he did in fact risk whatever safety may have been promised to his dear ones; yet he failed to challenge the indictment frontally (as had Traicho Kostov) and thus redeem his own reputation.

Another explanation, also simple, is that Georgiev was in fact guilty of the essential charges of collaboration with American agents, that he felt (or was persuaded to feel) a certain remorse, and then went along voluntarily to embroider the script according to the current agit-prop needs of the party. This theory derives its essential support from the fact that American denials were singularly weak (the C.I.A. said nothing while a State Department spokesman merely called it a "showtrial" without commenting on the charges). Yet it must be said against this theory that, had the Communists been in possession of incriminating truth against Georgiev, they would have

used it in a much more convincing manner. Why, if the police really had the goods on an authentic C.I.A. spy, concoct the entire theme of Mrs. Karabashova's tourism with so little to support it? Furthermore, if Georgiev had decided to confess in order to do his "final duty" to the party, why did he then proceed to discredit so many details of the confession, as well as to mention his Moscow arrest and expound his Djilas-like views?

My own tentative hypothesis is far more complicated but impossible to prove. I believe that Georgiev, detected in his dangerous game, faced a choice between dying "like a sparrow" or using his death to some purpose. That purpose could only have been to uphold his own line of conduct, strengthen his friends and check his foes. In order to avoid a private oblivion, he chose to confess, and perhaps even led his interrogators (those great "humanists") on to a few improbable paths. His cooperation in the interrogation made a public trial possible, to the delight of his foes, who saw in it the opportunity to press their advantage against his friends and collaborators. The latter, however, were not inclined to surrender so easily (as perhaps he had known, even counted on). Once in court, Georgiev felt free to struggle by the only means possible in that environment. Open denial of all the charges, portrayal of himself as a complete innocent, would have forfeited the support of all those who had some knowledge of his activities and purposes -- not only his foes and the many "neutrals" but even those who sympathized with him. For Georgiev was not playing to the gallery of the Western press, but rather to the higher circles of the party itself, rent by contradictions which he was determined to press further. His performance in court seemed to say: "Here is where it all leads. Here I am, a loyal party man to the last, willing to go along with even the worst nonsense. And what does it add up to? Stupidity and worse. My death achieves nothing against the United States, as you know; all it does is make everyone fear the days of the Stalin terror will return. Perhaps those days are coming back -- look how easy it is to revive the whole business. Already my friends and old classmates are implicated in this ridiculous proceeding; they know no more about its real meaning than you do. Will you be next? Is this progress?"

I confess that this hypothesis is extremely involved, but it is the only one which appears to make some sense of Georgiev's character and conduct. (Or what we know of it; the omission of any data on how Georgiev behaved during World War II is only one of many striking gaps in the record.) The man who translated Hegel into Bulgarian is, almost by definition, a man who lives by abstract ideas, who would view his own trial conceptually, "politically," dialectically. He is, above all, an intellectual. (Asked by David Binder whether he had written any books, he snapped back, angrily: "Yes. Seven! But none of them were published!" The police prevented further conversation.) But he is not quite the "typical bourgeois intellectual" described by the prosecutor. He is, rather, a special type of Communist intellectual described by Malraux, Koestler and other former Communists -- the type who can present his own opportunism as "the unity of opposites," who must insist that he conceived Djilas's theories before Djilas, who must in his contempt for those around him ironically eulogize the "humanism" of the security police.

He did not wish to die cringing and discredited, like Zinoviev or Rajk; he did not wish to die silently, like Ordzhonikidze, Rudzutak and all the others; he could not, perhaps, because of his past, die completely defiant, like Kostov. So he chose to create a new form, a dialectical form if you like: a confession credible enough to be heard and not credible enough to be believed, a trial that ended by accusing the accusers, and raised the very questions which they had sought to bury with him.

So, at least, it appears to me on the basis of a very fragmentary and contradictory record.

A Personal Appeal

Simply because our small and inexpert group constituted the only impartial witnesses to the trial of Asen Georgiev, we have developed an interest in it perhaps far beyond its intrinsic merits. Our interest is not in "clearing" Professor Georgiev, or the C.I.A., or anyone directly or indirectly linked with the case. Our interest, rather, is in doing the job which the Bulgarian Supreme Court manifestly did not do -- namely, to sift out the facts and to determine, as best we can in the circumstances, the real meaning of the happenings and alleged happenings alluded to at the trial.

For obvious reasons, it is somewhat less than certain that the Bulgarian Government will publish, in the foreseeable future, a complete and undoctored transcript of the trial, including some hint of what was said in the secret sessions. This is, therefore, the only available record of the case, and it is surely faulty in its commissions as well as omissions.

I would therefore appreciate it if any persons who have any knowledge of even the slightest details in the case -- the trial itself, the personalities involved in it, the political background to it -- would communicate their knowledge to us. We will be grateful even for corrections in spelling.