

ICWA LETTERS

Since 1925 the Institute of Current World Affairs (the Crane-Rogers Foundation) has provided long-term fellowships to enable outstanding young professionals to live outside the United States and write about international areas and issues. An exempt operating foundation endowed by the late Charles R. Crane, the Institute is also supported by contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations.

TRUSTEES

Carole Beaulieu
Bryn Barnard
Richard Dudman
Peter Geithner
Kitty Hempstone
Thomas Hughes
William E. Knowland
Samuel Levy
Stephen Maly
Mildred Marcy
Peter Bird Martin
Joel Millman
Carol Rose
Edmund H. Sutton
John Spencer

HONORARY TRUSTEES

A. Doak Barnett
David Elliot
David Hapgood
Pat M. Holt
Edwin S. Munger
Richard H. Nolte
Albert Ravenholt
Phillips Talbot

The Institute of Current World Affairs
4 West Wheelock Street
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755

ASA-15 1996
EUROPE/RUSSIA

Adam Smith Albion is an Institute Fellow writing about Turkey's regional role in the former Soviet bloc and the emergence of independent Central Asia. He is based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan

Tamerlane Rides Again

TASHKENT, Uzbekistan

June 5, 1996

By Adam Smith Albion

TENDENTIOUS HISTORIOGRAPHY

The orchestration of history-writing to suit the interests and policies of a ruling elite has gone on for well over two millennia and arguably found its best development in the twentieth century under the Soviet Union. Soviet ideologists were not the first to appreciate the serviceability of a properly tailored history. It was a commonplace known even to Cicero and the Julio-Claudian emperors that "whoever controls the past, dominates the present." Under the Soviet regime, however, the dictum probably found its most comprehensive expression.

Iron filings, under the influence of a magnet, can be made to point along the dominant lines of force. So, too, history as manipulated by the cardinals of Marxist-Leninist doctrine could be made to flow in prescribed directions. All permitted historiography was rigidly patterned to prove that certain aspects of the present were inevitable. Teleological history, to repeat, was not a new discovery. It has flourished wherever apologists or propagandists have relied on the patronage, or feared the displeasure, of their political masters. However, the recasting of history in the Soviet Union was distinguished by its scope and universality. The Julio-Claudians labored primarily to ensure that the construction put on vital *recent* events underscored the legitimacy of their dynasty. Spokesmen for the Spanish Conquistadors or the early Romanovs had similarly restricted objectives. (Mythological or religious arguments of older provenance might be adduced in support as well.) The ideologists of the Kremlin were more ambitious. Tendentious interpretations of the past were expanded to embrace a wider range of human activity than ever previously attempted. The Soviet achievement was to organize *all* historical data, recent or remote, toward a single end. This end was justification of the status quo and the legitimacy of the governing elite, the communist party.

How does historical revisionism work as an organ of political control? Ideally, it shapes people's world-views sufficiently to precondition them to an acceptable level of political passivity. It succeeds in proportion to the ease with which people can be persuaded to accept the approved lessons of history taught to them. The privileged elites are conservative by nature, and anti-revolutionary by definition. Their preferred values are disseminated among the canaille along their avenues of influence, such as public education, social science and history textbooks, national museums, funds for the promotion of arts and culture, and so on. The "lessons of the past" inculcated by Soviet ideologists using these and other instruments are well known.

(They are only the most notorious examples of a general rule, however. It is easy to cite other "lessons" currently in vogue in other parts of the world that serve the interests of the local ruling echelons pretty well: *e.g.* "history proves that no ethnic group can flourish without its own state"; "economic reform must precede political liberalization in Asian countries"; "the outcomes of events are determined by Great Men," etc. Although the subject under discussion is Soviet historiography, even First-World democracies would be well advised to look for the humps on their own backs.)

Additionally, historiography was used in the USSR as a tool of mass socialization.

In fact it is very difficult to draw a line between political control and social conditioning. The former smooths the way for the latter. This tendency is especially pronounced whenever people are already resigned to live within certain limits. First they accept the political status quo; then they believe in it as a fact of society. Once it is established that the agent curtailing one's freedom is nothing less than ineluctable History itself, the ideologist's prestidigitation is half done. The Marxist scheme proved especially conducive to the Kremlin leadership's schedule of implementing social conformity on a mass scale. It was a short step from teaching that there are iron laws of history, to acclimatizing the population to the iron bars around society.

Moscow's practical demonstration of the power of historical propaganda has never been equaled by any institution except, perhaps, the Catholic Church.¹ In fact, the tenacious conservatism of the Catholic Church where historiography is concerned is another arresting illustration of the point in hand. It may be restated as follows: In every society where the written word has carried weight, and where they have had the power to do so, political elites have exerted themselves to influence the transmission of past events to ensure that received history supported their power, their privileges, their agendas, their claims to precedence.

These reflections have been introduced as a framework for discussing Uzbekistan's approach to historiography. The situation can be summarized in a few sentences. Since declaring independence on 1 September 1991, Uzbekistan has set about determining an official version of its national history. It is well-known that every self-respecting country requires a national history as much as it needs a national airline. Despite initial dismay at the dismemberment of the USSR, Tashkent has acquired the latter in the form of Air Uzbekistan, and is still engaged with supplying the former, as part of its broader agenda to shake itself free of Moscow's hegemony.

In interviews at the Ministry of Education, the adjective most frequently encountered to describe the new school curriculum is "objective." Previously, history viewed through Marxist lenses was "objective" and all other versions were non-scientific and "subjective." Nowadays, Soviet history is held to have been ideological and "subjective" and the aim of the new education lords in Tashkent is to restore objectivity and a "correct understanding" of the Uzbek past.

It is ironic, then, that many of the tricks being used

to massage Uzbek historiography into the proper shape were learned at the knees of the Kremlin's ideologists. "Subjective," revisionist history is not gone, it is just a vehicle serving new masters. Practices have not improved, any more than Air Uzbekistan has improved on Aeroflot. The same carriers are flying, offering the same service — only the destinations are different and the names have been changed.

In the field of teleological history, sovereign Uzbekistan is proving in many ways to be a host body for Soviet-style thinking. Crudely or subtly, the past is being adapted with present needs in mind. Uncoincidentally, the message being elaborated is that the ruling elite under President Islam Karimov is governing according to the best traditions of Uzbek history. This result has been achieved at the cost of multiple distortions and omissions in the historical record that are highly economical with the truth. The only radical post-communist reforms in Uzbekistan, where the economy is stagnant and politics is as usual, have been achieved in the history field. In particular, some portrayals of Uzbek heroes have suffered shock therapy. Central Asia's most colorful figure in undergoing an especially striking reevaluation.

1336 AND ALL THAT

By means of justice and honesty I pleased God's created servants. I showed mercy both to the sinner and the sinless, and passed judgment on the basis of the truth. Thanks to my charitable works I found a place in the hearts of men.

With the help of wise men and doctors I healed the sick. With the aid of astrologers I observed the stars and planets and determined auspicious and inauspicious days. I built famous buildings and laid out gardens.

In order to further knowledge about foreign lands I extended a helping hand to travelers from all provinces and countries. I sent out traders and caravan leaders to all the ends of the earth.

A prince possessed of such conspicuous virtues as justice, honesty, mercy and charity, and who was devoted to the sciences, a patron of architecture and a friend to trade, should be the object of unequivocal admiration. Certainly it would stretch the imagination if, at the same time, he turned out to be one of the most vilified characters in history, whose name had become synonymous with rapine, pillage and monstrous acts of cruelty. Surely the world has turned topsy-turvy if Vlad Dracul turns out to have been a Renaissance man and Genghis Khan was a patron to orphans? The foreign visitor to

1. Comparison of the screening processes for official Catholic histories and Soviet propaganda yield many intriguing parallels. It is unproven, for instance, that the effects wrought on free thought by Soviet censors were more deleterious than the Vatican's *Index* of proscribed historical works.

Uzbekistan may require an adjustment period to assimilate the news that Tamerlane was both those things.² He was also an outstanding general, statesman, writer and visionary.

The name Tamerlane (known here as Amir [Emir, *i.e.* Prince] Timur) is much more widely recognized than the name of the country that regards him as its own. The Uzbeks' claim to Timur (1336-1405) is grounded in the fact that he was born near Shakhrisabz, a city in present-day Uzbekistan, and made Samarkand his capital. (The concomitant assertion that he was Uzbek will be discussed below.) His original power base was Transoxiana, the land between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, better known by their classical names, the Oxus and Jaxartes.

He must have been one of the most restless men ever born. To judge by the amount of territory he covered, he had an average lifetime velocity equal to Genghis Khan's, and greater than Alexander the Great's, Bolivar's or Napoleon's. Beginning in the late 1360's, Timur embarked on a career of conquest that encompassed the steppes, most of Persia, the Caucasus, eastern Anatolia, the Levant, the Punjab, northern India, and the strongholds of the Golden Horde (the successors to the Mongols) in southern Russia. He was still campaigning at the age of 69, when he died near Chimkent on the way to China to launch an invasion against the Mings. He is reported to have perished of a fever induced by a protracted drinking bout — an example, if true, of how the mystique built up during a lifetime can be undermined by a ludicrous death.

This year marks the 660th anniversary of Timur's birth. Lavish public entertainments in Tashkent and Samarkand are planned for October to celebrate the jubilee. One of the main buildings in the capital has been painted to read "Amir Timur, 1336." For anyone habituated to the Western (and Soviet) tradition about Timur — the man who executed 50,000 innocent captives before the battle of Delhi, and left Central Asia dotted with towers of skulls *pour encourager les autres* — an anti-celebration on his 660th birthday might have seemed more grimly appropriate. However, the rehabilitation of Timur is in full swing in Uzbekistan. His life is being recast as one of the finest periods in the country's history, and nothing whatsoever to be ashamed of. Whereas a scornful denunciation of Timur as a feudal barbarian could only have improved one's chances of advancement in the Communist Youth League, today's children are taught to love Timur as their patriotic duty. In fact, Karimov's *farmon* [decree] of 26 December 1995 ends with the words:

"With the intention of developing still further the national pride and patriotic feelings of the people of Uzbekistan and the

younger generation, 1996 is hereby declared 'Amir Timur Year.'"

In short, the vicious, nomadic leader who decimated more than his share of the civilized world is nowhere in evidence. That picture has been explained away as the malicious slanders of Moscow's now-defunct propaganda machine. The old Timur was vilified and tarnished. The new Timur has been burnished and put on a pedestal.

Literally. Today the standard picture-postcard shot of Tashkent is the equestrian statue on Amir Timur Square. The hero sits aloft a charger, his right hand held high. It may be a gesture of greeting, or a signal to his troops to halt. He tugs on the reins with his left hand. His beard is neatly trimmed on his up-turned chin, and his noble mien indicates resolution. He wears a crown topped with a long plume. He is dressed in a capacious cloak that swirls behind him — rather illogically since his horse is standing still. His legs are clothed in greaves, and a sword and buckler hangs at his side.

The statue accentuates Timur's regal qualities, his authority and poise. It deserves attention not as a work of art, for it is mediocre, but as an exercise in symbolism. The message that it is propagating should cause the uncommitted observer some concern, since the monument is a sterling example of art as propaganda. The sculptor, I. Jabborov, is subtly manipulating his material, and the onlooker, to endorse the new view of Timur. A deconstruction of some of his sleights-of-hand might touch on the following points:

1. The very choice of monument is significant. The equestrian statue is an identifiable genre of Western art that encodes certain messages about the rider, and conveys a ready-made repertoire of associations to the onlooker. Marcus Aurelius on the Capitol in Rome is dignified and imperial. Donatello's statue of Gattamelata in Padua conveys his strength, his self-confidence and ability to command. A man who can control a horse can, by extension, hold sway over his fellow men. He sits higher, so his view is loftier. From a distance, the Amir Timur monument is indistinguishable from the equestrian statues of Western kings and emperors, also wearing crowns, in a host of European cities. Thus the point is made artistically that Timur was a ruler in the tradition of civilized royalty. If he had been portrayed standing in front of a tent, or even seated on a throne, the impression would have been quite different. Showing him mounted on a horse clinches the association.

2. That horse did not belong to a fourteenth-century Central Asian nomad. The only mount that big that

2. e.g., "Whenever I conquered or annexed a country... I took care of the region's eminent people as if they were my own responsibility, even if they were children or babies" — from *Pieces of Advice by Amir Timur*, #106. See, footnote 18.

Timur might have ridden is an Arabian, and this is not an Arabian. In fact Timur's steed almost looks like a *haute école* horse, about fifteen hands high. Its front left hoof is raised, as if it were a Lipizzaner about to curvet. The steppe from the Caspian Sea to the mountains of western Manchuria is semi-arid. Such an animal would be fagged out just crossing the barren Zeravshan flatlands between Tashkent and Samarkand, known until recently as the Hungry Steppe, and would be on its last legs long before reaching India. By way of comparison, native strains of Mongolian horses like *Equus przewalski* are hardy, dun-colored ponies about twelve hands high. The Amir Timur statue, however, is not interested in genus accuracy. This is a pity, since Central Asian horses (Nogai, Turcoman steeds) were famed for their stamina and speed and would not have shamed a monument. The sculptor's agenda, however, calls for a prestigious mount, a "noble" European charger such as Timur's contemporary, Charles VI of France, might have ridden.

3. Timur's complement of weapons is incomplete. He carries a sword and small shield, but neither of the weapons most readily associated with nomadic warriors: the spear and the bow and arrow. Persian miniatures show his troops outfitted with both these weapons. In fact, the Mongols and subsequent nomad armies owed their supremacy to the bow and arrow. They were invincible for over four centuries because of their ability to shoot accurately while moving. Their rise followed the invention of stirrups because stirrups permitted mounted archers to balance on horseback. The balance of power turned against them only after the introduction of gun powder. I cannot definitively fault the sculptor for failing to provide Timur with a quiver, or indeed any identifiable nomadic trappings at all — but the omission does match a general pattern of denial that Timur's culture was a nomadic one. Uzbek historiographers are pulling out the stops to prove that Timur was not a nomad at all, but a king in the sedentary mould who preferred a palace to a tent.

4. According to the sculptor, all of Timur's limbs were in fine working order. His name passed into English as Tamerlane via the sobriquet Timur-i Lenk, "Timur the Lame." When the Soviet Archeological Commission opened his tomb in 1941, they discovered that he had sustained arrow wounds to his right arm and leg: the arm had withered, and he limped. The statue ignores Timur's handicaps. His right arm gestures strongly and his legs appear sound. I do not insist that the physical blemishes of national heroes be reproduced in detail. Lincoln's moles are not on exhibition at the Lincoln Me-

morial or on Mount Rushmore and Roosevelt, I hear, is not to be memorialized in a wheelchair. It does, however, seem a willful and naive act of censorship to omit any reference to the single inalienable fact about Timur known to every schoolchild in the West and Russia — *i.e.* that he was lame. A monument to Lord Nelson that restored his corporal integrity would be an object of universal ridicule. There comes a point at which glossing over noteworthy physical defects becomes a corruption of the truth.

In this sense, there is a certain lack of moral honesty about turning a blind eye to Timur's lame arm and leg. Petty censorship of this kind — like the removal of Gorbachov's birthmark from his official photographs by Soviet censors — is always the beginning of a chain of disturbing tendencies to cover up more important truths that prove inconvenient to admit. Also, it is not difficult to discern something in the way of a prejudice that a healthy body must clothe a moral soul, *mens sana in corpore sano*; and that conversely the spirit that dwells in a defective body must be defective itself.³ In fact, I have met many Uzbeks who are unaware that Timur was lame, and deny the assertion vehemently. "He was big and strong," they retort angrily. In summary, the Amir Timur monument is deeply implicated in the efforts to recast Timur's image. It is a plastic contribution to the "rewriting" of the Uzbek past through judicious distortions and omissions — techniques borrowed from tendentious historiography.

Timur then and now

I have implied hitherto that there was a monolithic "Soviet version" of Timur, which is being replaced today by a single official "Uzbek version." This is largely, but not completely, true. The vantage ground from which accredited authorities viewed Timur shifted more than once, especially after the war. To reduce the rehabilitation process to a chiaroscuro of vituperative hostility before 1991 and unqualified worship after 1991 is a simplification, albeit one that captures the changes in broad outline.

Any attempt at rehabilitation during the Soviet period had to work within the ideology. No Soviet historiographer could exactly give Timur a cordial welcome, since the Marxist hierarchy of economic forms would not permit it. History, not to mention social anthropology, was made to conform to the Procrustean beds of that rigid system. Having no language to explore the subtleties of nomad-urban interdependence, Soviet scholars were

3. A century ago, in an age struggling to define the role of the hero in history, notions such as these were particularly prevalent. Byron, with his club foot, suffered keenly on account of them. Their demise is a source of comfort to Stephen Hawking. Their triumphant revival in America does much to explain the body-building craze and the success of Herbal Life. In Uzbekistan, discussions of history, sociology and psychology still orbit around concepts and assumptions dominant in the nineteenth century, since those were the touchstones of Soviet ideology. As regards the connection between physical and mental well-being, Soviet Man was superbly healthy on both counts. And so is Timur.

obliged to describe socio-economic interactions in early Central Asia as feudal. This categorization does great violence to a true picture of the medieval steppes. Timur's environment was one where pastoralist nomads ranged over extensive territories in fixed rounds to graze their herds and flocks. Timur himself, when not on campaign, would commonly move between winter and summer pastures, bringing his retinue with him.

It is true that steppe nobility were often served by commoners performing corvée labor. There were even trading dynasties, magnates overseeing agricultural communes and absentee landlords among the Chinggisid and Timurid elites. However, the differences between Central Asian institutions and Western feudalism were considerably greater than the similarities. There were no oaths of fealty, no vassalage, no rigid caste or class system, no obligations to fight for one's lord and, incidentally, *no droit de seigneur*. Nor, for that matter, was medieval Europe familiar with princes who lived in felt or silk tents on the edge of town, or landlords who disappeared for four months to graze their yaks. No parties of horsemen nomadized between Bolzano and Flanders in annual cycles, calling at Rhineland towns along the way to exchange their livestock for cloth, iron or salt. Central Asian cities coexisted in tandem with a parallel, nomadic culture that generally scorned their sedentary way of life, even though it was gradually assimilated into it.⁴

The classic distinction that nomads made was between themselves as "people of the horse" and urban dwellers as "people of the chicken" who were content to live in noisome towns amid their own filth. The Mongols had demonstrated that nomads did not even need to invent cities in order to control them; they simply dominated the trade and communication routes between them, as if steppe cities were French ports and they were the British Navy. These details are drowned out in Uzbekistan for perfectly discernible reasons amid misconceptions about Timur the beautifier of Samarkand. The city is Uzbekistan's finest selling point, and its drawing power as Timur's capital is clear. Timur expended great efforts to make the town lavishly impressive, and he certainly basked in the prestige that his trophy capital gave him. (The same can be said of the great palace at Shakhrisabz that he was still building when he died.) However, the picture of Timur established at court in Samarkand needs some cold water thrown over it.

What should prove quenching to all the overheated talk about him, as if he were Central Asia's answer to

the Holy Roman Emperor, is the fact that he preferred not to live in Samarkand. In the best nomadic tradition, he had a peripatetic court. So did Charlemagne, but whereas Charlemagne *did* sit in state in Aachen, Timur would call in at his capital irregularly, and after visiting the city for two or three days would pitch an encampment on the outskirts, or in one of the sixteen vast parks he created around Samarkand. The plenipotentiary from the court of Castille from 1403 to 1406, Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, has left a description of Samarkand surrounded by tents for the wedding of six Timurid princes in his *Diary of a Journey to Timur's Court in Samarkand*.

Soviet ideological exigencies filtered out the details of Central Asian nomadic and subsistence-based economies so successfully that even educated Uzbeks have expressed disbelief at my description of Timur as one in a long line of nomad warriors. Once Timur had been portrayed as a feudal lord, as Marxism required, any discrepancies between the historical record and the imposed paradigm were erased or explained away. In this form the new dogma about Timur was transmitted to the masses. Since feudal elements had to be cast in a bad light, historians who subsequently discerned positive sides to Timur faced an uphill struggle. Another problem of their own making was Timur's links to the Chinggisids: these had to be covered up, since Genghis Khan remained the nearest thing in Soviet historiography to the devil incarnate.

Despite these obstacles, two partial reevaluations of Timur somewhat lightened the weight of Soviet censure against him. The work of Yakubovskii in the 1940's and Muminov in the 1960's will not be discussed here in any detail. They deserve mention as a reminder that partial rehabilitations of Timur have been attempted before. In neither case was ideology abandoned, of course; only "corrected" ideological interpretations replaced the old ones. A nuanced understanding of steppe society — nomad-urban economic interdependence, public vs. private resources under Timur's administration, the process by which the Timurids became sedentary — was naturally impossible. He remained a feudal exploiter of the laboring classes on the Western model, but with some positive traits: a talented military organizer and commander, a shrewd strategist, a patron of artists and architecture, an amateur scholar himself with a taste for history, a lawgiver and a keen chess player.⁵ He also safeguarded the Silk Route caravan routes that ran through his empire. Most importantly, he emerged as the champion of a strong centralized state, an interpreta-

4. For further discussion of the differences between Western feudalism and Central Asian institutions, see Lawrence Krader, "Principles and Structures in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe-Pastoralists," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* (Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 1955), pp. 82-84.

5. See Edward A. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), pp.242-245.

tion that obviously had propaganda value for Moscow.

In sum, by taking the first steps, Yakubovskii and Muminov set the tone and agenda for today's complete rehabilitation of Timur. One can say that they sketched the blueprints that post-communist historians are working from. The ideology has gone, but many of the fallacious assumptions remain. The new Uzbek historiography has simply pushed farther along the avenues marked out by these two men, boldly trumpeting what they more timidly asserted, but without correcting the fundamental misconceptions that they introduced to ensure their picture conformed to the ideological prerequisites. The sedentary medieval prince sitting at the heart of a vast centralized state is the crucial carry-over.

However, the straight-faced lie that takes the breath away is that Timur, a Barlas Turk of Mongol origin, was Uzbek. Uzbeks were a tribal confederation originally living north of the Aral Sea, from whom Timurid writers carefully distinguished themselves. Uzbeks spoke Kipchak dialect, whereas Timur's languages were Turki and Farsi. By the end of the fifteenth century the Uzbeks were a significant presence in Transoxiana and had begun attacking Timur's empire, defeating Timur's grandson Ulug Beg in 1426; Samarkand fell to them in 1500 (the capital had since moved to Herat). The supreme irony in calling Timur an Uzbek is that it was the Uzbeks led by Muhammad Shaybani who were primarily responsible for smashing the Timurid dynasty and destroying much of its architecture at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Nevertheless, after the Uzbek SSR was artificially created out of the "frontier delimitation" of Turkestan in 1924 and incorporated into the USSR a year later, the Soviets began to cast around for Uzbek heroes to populate the new republic's history and hit on the Timurids. Thus the Timurid figures selected for the new Uzbek identity turned out to be the very men defeated and humiliated by the Uzbeks — Mirza Ulugh Beg, Zahiriddin Muhammad Babur, and the like.⁶ Up to that point, Timur had been invoked by Central Asians as a symbol of Turkestani greatness, a source of inspiration to be shared by a variety of peoples from the Afghans to the Uighurs whose histories were entwined with that of the Timurids. Thenceforth, Timur was highjacked as the exclusive property of the Uzbeks. Yakubovskii's work provided the capstone that established Timur as an indefeasible part of the Uzbek SSR's, and now sovereign Uzbekistan's, history.⁷

Yakubovskii and Muminov's revisionist efforts were exceptional among the run of Soviet historians, whose animosity toward Timur still ran high. The dominant paradigm until 1991 was of a grim barbarian, now Uzbek, with a predilection for physical damage:

In some of the historical literature published under the Soviet Union, Timur's socio-political and military achievements are elucidated with a predominantly negative slant; the accent is on his campaigns of conquest and practically nothing is said of Timur's constructive contributions. In the 1960's in the USSR the fight against "idealizations of the feudal past" was intensified. The historical literature blackens the Timurid epoch and he is characterized as a ruthless sovereign, a bloodthirsty sovereign and the destroyer of civilization.⁸

This character description chimes with the presentation of Timur in a Soviet textbook for eleven-year-olds:

"Timur was very cruel. He dreamt of subduing the whole world. When the army of Timur met resistance, at his command the inhabitants of those towns would face mass extermination. They would cut off their heads and make high pyramids out of them. They usually sold the children into slavery. Timur ordered that the town of Urgench be razed to the ground. For ten days Timur's soldiers looted and destroyed the town. They cleared the space where houses and the town walls had stood and planted barley there [sic]."⁹

Since the Bogeyman *eats* little children, the eleven-year-old reader should be relieved to learn that Timur restricted himself to *enslaving* them. After touching upon the destruction of the Golden Horde at Saray Berke and the architectural highlights of Samarkand, the book dispenses with Timur in six short paragraphs. A standard Soviet historical work for adults assesses Timur's achievements in the following words:

"Great works of replanning and rebuilding were undertaken in Samarkand. However, neither magnificent building projects, nor an artificially engineered flourishing of crafts and trade in Transoxiana, nor widespread irrigation works, could justify Timur's laying waste civilized countries, his pillaging of cities and his enslaving of craftsmen. Timur's rule had a negative effect on the Central Asian nations themselves, insofar as all Timur's ephemeral successes served to maintain a

6. Allworth, p. 239.

7. Timur has been appropriated so completely that other Central Asian countries accept the *fait accompli*. The Kyrgyz have even announced that they will be celebrating Timur's 660th anniversary as "a gesture of friendship" to Uzbekistan and will adopt the Uzbek spelling of his name.

8. Abdulla Abdunabiev, "Amir Timur in Russian Historiography," *Pravda Vostoka*, 27 July 1995.

9. *Stories from the History of the Uzbek SSR for the Fourth Class* (Tashkent, 1987), p. 26.

lawless regime in Transoxiana and led to destitution in the countries he conquered."¹⁰

This conclusion would find many backers in the West, who might argue that Timur glorified Samarkand at the expense of many other fine cities whose artisans were kidnapped (e.g. Damascus) or whose treasures were plundered (e.g. Delhi). Like Alexander's before him, Timur's empire fell apart rather quickly amid fratricidal strife between his successors. The destruction of the steppe's economic bases (Urgench, Azov and Astrakhan) inaugurated its decline; and although Persian culture recovered from its battering and flourished in Herat under Timur's son Shah Rokh, by the end of the sixteenth century the "Timurid Renaissance" was over, and Central Asia was producing little except carpets, gold thread and embroidery.

Turning to the revised, post-1991 schoolbooks in Uzbekistan, the visitor to the Ministry of Education is struck to hear that Russian-language and Uzbek-language texts are being prepared *by separate committees*. This is a fact of potentially great import for the future. National history is the subject *par excellence* intended to mitigate differences between citizens from separate communities by making them focus on a common past. However, inasmuch as the tone and content of the textbooks (and the teaching) will vary from Russian to Uzbek, children will be educated into divergent opinions about the past. A cleavage that is relatively minor now could be amplified over time into an irreconcilable bifurcation of attitudes running along ethnic lines and undermining national unity.

Russian textbooks have been printed already, but new Uzbek schoolbooks are still widely unavailable; the Ministry of Education promises to have revised history texts ready by September. All the teachers that I talked to at Uzbek schools clip articles from newspapers and magazines to teach their students about Timur. As one would expect of the state press, such material is extremely uncritical and occupies an emotional range that never sinks below admiring and regularly hovers around adulatory. Examples will be discussed at length later. The Russian primers, in sharp contrast, have barely moved beyond Soviet models. They make only the most grudging concessions to the demands of Uzbek revisionists; whereas they used to pour down scorn on Timur, now they only sprinkle it. The following extract, from a Russian textbook for sixteen-year-olds, deserves to be quoted at length:

[Description of the sack of Delhi, the "merciless slaughtering of 100,000 unarmed Indian prisoners" and the moun-

tains of plunder.] "The desire for plunder should not be seen as the sole motive behind Timur's aggressive campaigns. The goal he set himself was to control the world's caravan trade routes. He sacked the commercial cities Azov, Saray and Urgench, which played an important role in caravan trade. He sought to destroy the northern trade route that passed through the territory of the Golden Horde and redirect commercial avenues through Central Asia. The northern caravan roads were liquidated, and all the trade caravans began to pass through Otrar, Tashkent, Samarkand...Samarkand became the center of the caravan trade routes through Asia.

"Beside the looting and savage exploitation of the national masses in the countries he subdued, Timur aimed to establish economic ties, liquidate interne-cine feudal fighting and create a centralized state.

"Timur's achievements are profoundly contradictory. It is not an accident that K. Marx, speaking of Timur, wrote that "besides the horrors that he inflicted on the country, Timur gave his kingdom a government structure and laws" (K. Marx and F. Engels Archive, vol. 6, p.185, 1936). Under Timur there was established in Central Asia the absolute rule of the feudal lords. [...] The life of working people did not improve under Timur, feudal lords strengthened their hold over peasants and tradesmen, and taxes increased. Captive slaves, artisans, architects, artists and scholars labored to erect the palaces and mosques that are masterpieces of eastern art.

"Though crushed down under a heavy yoke, the peasants and tradesmen did not submit and their discontent often led to serious national unrest. Despite his harsh methods of rule, Timur showed himself a strong political figure who, thanks to his outstanding personal qualities, expressed and defended better than his rivals the aims and interests of his class — the class of feudal lords."¹¹

The piece speaks for itself. As you twist the sapling, so grows the tree. The following essays, written by twelve-years olds, provide an indication of the divergent historical educations Russian and Uzbek children are already receiving, and what these differences might lead to in the future. In both the Kurchatov High School, a Russian school, and the nearby Chilanzar Uzbek school, the fifth classes were required to write end-of-term essays on Timur. The form-mistresses kindly let me borrow the work they rated most highly. Such essays do more than provide insight into children's minds. They reflect the teaching at school; the expectations of the teachers who

10. *A World History* (Moscow: Gos. izdatel'stvo pol. literatury, 1957), vol. III, p. 574.

11. *History of the Nations of Uzbekistan, Classes 8-9* (Tashkent, 1994), pp. 110-113.

were proud to show these essays to me; and the attitudes of the parents who probably vetted the homework or even helped write it. The extract below is by a Russian girl called Vera:

"In 1336 Timur was born in a regional town outside the city Kesh. Timur's close friends called him Sakhibkiran, which means "born under a happy star" [actually, "Lord of the fortunate conjunction."] Timur grew up very quickly and started to run around and be naughty. At times his nurse-maids were not able to keep him in order. The older he became, the more trouble he got into. As a boy he had an extraordinarily rich imagination. But finally Timur's carefree childhood came to an end and he began his military service, which lasted more than sixty years. At the end of the hot summer of 1343 Timur turned seven years old. He had grown very noticeably, but his body had still stayed bony. That spring, in a family council [soviet], it had been decided that it was time for Timur to start to learn reading, writing and arithmetic. He had to understand the alphabet to read books, after all. Timur's education lasted 4-5 years, at least....

"Of the seventy years of his life, he devoted thirty years to campaigns. Timur fought with enemies more than one thousand times and he never lost a single battle. [A recitation of his principal conquests.] Timur was always convinced that the task most worthy of a prince was to support holy wars, fight infidels and try to conquer the world.... And success always accompanied him. Timur subjugated twenty-six countries, and that's why he is called The Great. Timur made preparations for a few years to attack China but 11 February 1405 he suddenly fell ill and died at the age of sixty nine."

Amid such charming details as the weather in 1343 and Timur's bony frame, Vera presents him primarily as a fighter. Her depiction of him as a warrior for the faith is ominous. She reprocesses myths about his education, of which there is no evidence whatsoever, but does not suggest that he was interested in scholarship, architecture or even the arts of a statesman. Lurking beneath a thin veneer, the conquering barbarian of Soviet days is still clearly discernible.

Durbek, an Uzbek boy, has quite different ideas:

"Amir Timur was born in 1336 in April near the town of Shakhrisabz [new name for Kesh]. His father Amir Torogay was independently wealthy. Timur's father worked for Amir Kotagan from 1333-1348. When Timur turned seven, his father sent him to a madrasa. In the madrasa he began learning about science and culture. When he was fifteen he learnt

how to ride a horse. By the time he was eighteen he knew how to use a sword. He used to go hunting. And when he was twenty, he knew how to use a sword while riding on a horse. The teacher would select some pupils, divide them into two groups, and make them fight one another. Timur's group would always win."

Timur sounds as if he had a pleasant bourgeois upbringing. He had a well-off father with a steady job, and he certainly enjoyed a leisurely education. Durbek identifies his school as an Islamic madrasa. The prefiguring of Timur's future superiority through success in childhood games is a common device used for many leaders starting with Cyrus the Great. An Uzbek girl named Iroda narrates a later passage in Timur's life:

"In 1370 the sheikhs of Termez recognized Timur as their Muslim leader. From then on he worked with them in friendship. Soon after that, he moved from Kesh to Samarkand and began fortifying the citadel and the walls. The city was strengthened in case of attack by anyone who wasn't happy that Transoxiana had been unified. It was the first construction work that had been done in Samarkand for 150 years since the destruction of the city by the Mongols. Timur's buildings and gardens were the wonder of the whole world.... [Description of military campaigns up to 1400.] Timur ruled his huge empire wisely so that it became very rich, many caravans were crossing the land. In 1404 he attacked China. But he was not able to conquer it because he died in 1405."

Iroda positively identifies Timur as a Muslim, and recognizes that shared faith is a motive for cooperation. (But it did not stop him slaughtering his fellow Muslims in India.) She sees him as a centralizing statesman forced to defend his accomplishment, the unification of Transoxiana. Timur actually never attacked China, only marched toward it, but Iroda seems to feel that it would have fallen to him if he had lived. The Ministry of Education should feel proud of Iroda: her interpretation of the hero is measured, eschewing sensationalism and colorful adjectives, and is all the more persuasive for it. When she meets her fellow citizen Vera in later life, the two women's instincts towards Timur, and toward a country that draws spiritual sustenance from his legacy, will be as different as chalk and cheese.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE JUBILEE

A few steps from the Amir Timur monument is Amir Timur metro station, previously called Square of the Revolution. Amir Timur Avenue, once named for Engels, intersects Amir Timur Square. Nearby, a new history museum designed exclusively to house Timurid artifacts is going up at a feverish pace: the foundation

stone was laid 10 January 1996 and it is nearly finished. It is a squat, domed building that looks like a planetarium. On 27 April, the Order of Timur even became a part of the Uzbek honors system.

Primary and secondary schools named in honor of the hero are too numerous to mention. The new Uzbek flag is partly blue because it was the color of Timur's flag. Books about Timur, or purportedly by Timur, are multiplying alarmingly on street stalls. There is no news kiosk that cannot supply magazines or journals to any important reader not yet surfeited to death with Amir Timur. Stores sell Amir Timur theme calendars, and posters with his picture.

A standard likeness has already been generated: he is a watchful, handsome man of about 50 with intelligent eyes and a dark beard shaved down off the cheekbones. He is light-skinned, emphatically Turkic, with no hint of the Mongol blood in him; actually, he could pass for an Italian. He wears a gold crown with a dome and crenels, an embroidered silk cloak over his shoulder. Usually he is posed on a throne, holding a sword, with a ring on his finger. Although this complement of features is absurdly specific, an artist whose imagination wandered too far from the template would meet with the same sharp disapproval as an icon painter who rendered Jesus clean-shaven with a ponytail. I attended the *zashchity* (end-of-year oral defenses) at the Tashkent Institute of Fine Arts; students who had painted Timur adhered without exception to the conventions set out above. The same can be said of the artists selling their work to pedestrians on Sayiloh Street, the local version of Moscow's Arbat.

The Uzbek State film company, whose studios when I visited them were near-moribund, has been injected with cash this year by presidential order to produce at least two films about Timur. The aim is to produce a celluloid version of the hero as definitive as Soviet classics like Eisenstein's *Alexander Nevskii* or the film of *Peter I* adapted from Alexei Tolstoy's novel. Hurshid Davron, a well-known writer of historical fiction depicting the Timurid era, is toiling over a third screenplay about Timur at this moment.

At the Khidoyatov Theater, all minds are focused on an extravagant production likely to consume the troupe's energy until autumn. The theme is a caravan wending its way along the Silk Route through Timur's

empire. Staged on Registan Square in Samarkand, against a background of shifting scenery, music and dance, the show will consist of a series of vignettes depicting the adventures and exotic places encountered by the caravan as it plies its trade. Musical material binds the conception together: there is a "walking theme," for instance, for the intervals during which the caravan is traveling between oasis towns.

Actually, the structure is very reminiscent of Musorgsky's *Pictures at an Exhibition*. Although the score (by Mustafa Bofoev) is essentially complete, the director's too-fertile imagination, and his design team's enthusiasm to tackle any cultural idiom along the Silk Route's 8,000 miles, are making the project so ambitious as to be impractical. At the moment it is a cross between *Aida* and *Carnival of the Animals*: will there really be serried rows of camels on the Registan? I fear that, without some pruning, a theme that was coherent enough for a stroll around a gallery will fall apart somewhere along the way between Shanghai and Cadiz.

The State Art Museum has opened a show called "Science, Learning and Civilization in the Timurid Period" (*Temiriyalar davrida ilm-fan va madaniyat ravnaqi*). It is essentially the same show that went to Paris in the last week of April for the UNESCO conference on Timur, where it was displayed under the motto "*La Force est en Justice*." This maxim is attributed to Timur himself, although whether these words (in Chaghatay Turkish?) actually were ever uttered by him is unascertainable. The tension between the popular Western understanding of Timur's political philosophy, and the version currently ascendant in Uzbekistan, emerges unambiguously when one is presented the picture of Timur devoted to the principle that "Right Makes Might."

The culmination of this explosion of interest in Timur will be the official jubilee celebrations in autumn. The government has seized the opportunity to advertise Uzbekistan on the back of a historical figure who is a household name worldwide.¹² The UNESCO conference was excellent cultural publicity. Promotion of tourism is a priority at the highest levels in Tashkent. The ticket price for foreigners flying between the capital and Samarkand was reduced in January to encourage visitors, and Uzbekistan Airways opened new routes between Samarkand, Bukhara and Urgench (the airport for Khiva). An international fair entitled "Tourism Along the Silk Route" is

12. In similar fashion, Romania and Mongolia are trying to attract attention to themselves by exploiting Vlad Dracul and Genghis Khan. The Mongolians have gone the Uzbek route. Apparently the Great Khan has been raised to the status of a national hero in Ulan Bator. The Romanians earn my admiration by doing everything backwards, as usual. Whereas Ceausescu-era historiography saw Vlad in a positive light, the Romanian tourist industry is doing all it can to blacken his name. My friends in Bucharest who organize bus tours through Transylvania regret only that there are not more surviving castles, crypts, oubliettes, torture-chambers and hard evidence generally that Vlad was outrageously cruel/schizophrenic/sadistic/sexually perverted/driven by a monstrous thirst for blood, etc.

scheduled for October to develop the tourist infrastructure, linking up with destinations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. An electromechanical plant in Samarkand is even being dismantled because it is an eyesore that mars views of Timur's tomb.

Karimov personally chaired a meeting on 4 January 1996 that concluded that no expense was to be spared in restoring buildings associated with Timur. In the mad rush to be ready by October, the desecration being committed in the name of restoration on architectural masterpieces of incalculable historical worth is a subject for a future newsletter. Suffice to say that, whereas the cleaning of the Sistine Chapel was closely monitored and refereed for artistic sensitivity and authenticity, yet provoked an international outcry nevertheless, restoration techniques that are causing the utmost dismay to foreign experts are proceeding here at breakneck pace without a whisper of protest.

The government is actually so enamored with the idea of jubilees that Uzbekistan is glutted with them. In 1994 it celebrated the five hundredth anniversary of the birth of Timur's grandson, the astronomer Ulug Beg (1394-1449). 1996 is Amir Timur Year. In 1997, to keep the ball rolling, the limelight will fall on Khiva and Bukhara. The president's office has rather opportunistically decided that both cities will be turning 2,500 years old next year, implying that both were founded, improbably, at the same time in 503 BC.¹³

What are all these festivities in aid of? Attracting the curiosity and dollars of the outside world is one motivation not to be overlooked. As a rule, where tourists lead, investment follows, although there are some notable exceptions, e.g., Turkmenistan. Moreover, Karimov reportedly enjoys presiding over these affairs, and still basks in the attention whenever local and foreign dignitaries assemble to pay their respects to independent Uzbekistan in the person of the president. It is not inconceivable that Karimov even feels a genuine attachment to the country's history, given that he is from Samarkand and secured his political career as First Secretary of the Communist Party in Bukhara. However, the most commanding reasons for official interest in jubilees are probably to be sought elsewhere.

Jubilees are elaborate mummeries that rehearse sim-

plified messages about the past for the consumption of mass audiences. They are historical education under the guise of entertainment, reinforcing in the popular mind an approved interpretation of past events. Conformity to the given version is required in the name of patriotism. These generalizations hold for all countries, not just Uzbekistan.¹⁴ In the Uzbek case, however, it is simple to see how jubilees relate to the process of post-independence nation-building. The government is taking the lead in instilling in Uzbek citizens pride in the sovereign state's glorious past. It is also orchestrating the historiography, so that citizens know exactly what glorious past to feel proud of. Each set of jubilee ceremonies is a sensual new history lesson, awash in light, music and dance, but nonetheless propaganda for all that.

Keeping one's people focused on the past by means of rituals and ceremonies is also an acknowledged method of distracting them from the present. I suspect this consideration plays a part in the government's decision to sponsor repeated jubilees. Certainly there are as many articles on history and culture in the newspapers as there is anything that might conceivably be called news. Keeping the shops stocked with food while organizing public spectacles was a successful formula for the Romans. It is not utterly unreasonable to suggest that the bread and circuses lamented by Juvenal have been resurrected in Uzbekistan as plov and jubilees.

As the summer rolls by, the specific features of the Amir Timur celebrations will become clearer. It is safe to say, however, that all of this year's activity is being coordinated to fix Timur in the Uzbeks' pantheon as the supreme figure of their past. By the end of the year, Timur should be established as Father of the Country — or perhaps more accurately Grandfather, since Karimov is more likely to appropriate the title *Pater Patriae* for himself. The aggressive marketing of Timur is a relatively recent development. It is extremely telling that in the History Museum that opened in March 1995, the exhibition cases devoted to him are not significantly greater than the space given over to many other figures. The equestrian statue is also only about eighteen months old. Uzbekistan's revisionist historians may have been slow to appreciate Timur's potential as a legitimizing element for the present political order, but they have worked hard to exploit him since.

13. Samarkand marked its 2,500th anniversary in 1969, and paradoxically, its 2,300th anniversary in 1971 (on the grounds that the first written record of it dates to 329 BC. In fact, that was the year the city was overrun by Alexander the Great: not an obvious reason for celebration). Legend has it that Samarkand was founded 5,000 years ago by its first ruler, King Aphrsiab.

14. A moment's reflection on the 200th anniversaries of the Declaration of Independence in 1976 and the French Revolution in 1989, or Elizabeth II's Silver Jubilee celebrations, will allow the general validity of this assertion. Democratic countries do make room for sideshows — e.g. academic conferences, television documentaries, etc. — where dissenting voices may be raised, but even in democracies these doubts will not appear in the mainstream state-funded celebrations. In controlled societies like Uzbekistan, the sideshows do not exist at all, or are kept on a tight rein, e.g. the conference "Amir Timur and his Place in World History," Tashkent, 18-19 October 1996. Applications to attend or deliver a paper are being "overseen" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

THE VOICE OF TIMUR

The “I,” in the three italicized quotations on page 2, is of course Amir Timur. His voice is measured and wise. His tone is oracular. His sagacity and humanism, captured in pithy maxims or snatches of autobiography, are displayed throughout the land in the form of signs and posters. Mass-produced by the state printing house, they are usually written in Uzbek in a blue calligraphic script and have become the standard accoutrement of any public building. I transcribed the three quotations, respectively, from the front wall of the Navoi State Library’s main reading room; a corridor in the building of the Council of Ministers; and the glass doors of the State Art Museum.

The proper attitude to adopt while reading these signs is pious reverence, preferably rounded off with a contemplative moment. Certainly I was severely scolded by a secretary in the Council of Ministers when I giggled at one, much as if I had laughed aloud at a Marxist slogan. (Inspirational selections from Karimov’s speeches, which are ubiquitous, posted *de rigueur*, and often hung in tandem with a picture of the president, also require the profoundest attention.¹⁵) Since the proximate effect of running off thousands of copies of even the finest utterances and wallpapering your country in them is to cheapen their value, it is not surprising that Timur quotes often come across like “thoughts for the day,” or descend into bathos: re-read the three italicized quotations aloud as if they were part of a *son-et-lumiere* script and the point becomes clear.

The favorite treasury from which to pluck Timur’s gems of wisdom before sticking them on the wall is the *Institutes of Timur*.¹⁶ It is a compilation of observations on the art of governing, redolent of a medieval genre popular in Byzantium and elsewhere, the *Mirror for Princes*. Together with precepts of general applicability there are laconic references to Timur’s own achievements or *res gestae*. Here is a further extract from this document to suggest its flavor:

*It is necessary to a king that he adhere to justice in all his actions, and that he receive into his service ministers who are just and virtuous... If the minister be unjust and cruel, it shall speedily come to pass that the edifice of his master’s power and dominion shall be leveled with the earth.*¹⁷

Material of this nature lends itself well to excerption. It can be easily segmented into discrete pieces and portioned out as sound advice, patriotic exhortation or deep thoughts for the layman. It has directness and, insofar as the voice is supposed to be Timur’s own, personality. Two other books from which Timur’s words can purportedly be culled or retrieved include *Zafar-nama*, begun in 1404 by Shami and completed long after Timur’s death in 1424 by Yazdi; and the account of Timur by Ibn Arab shah (1389-1450).

Put together, these three works provide the primary source material for some uncritical grab-bag plundering by Uzbek scholars anxious to find punchy things that Timur may have said. They are not shy about polishing his sentences, or putting words into his mouth. They even extrapolate from his deeds to invent the principle that must have guided him, and then summarize it in a *mot* to which they affix Timur’s name.

A book notable in this regard for its patent dishonesty is *Pieces of Advice from Amir Timur*.¹⁸ It is a slim volume, sold widely, that I saw on a lot of people’s bedside tables until buying it myself. Drawing on the three sources just mentioned, it is a cento of doctored scraps numbered one to 188. It reads a lot like a light-hearted book that used to enjoy considerable vogue in the USA called *Management Strategy of Atilla the Hun*. The difference is that *Pieces of Advice from Amir Timur* is not amusing. Needless to say, the Introduction entitled “Famous Counsels of a Great Man” is reverential. Significantly, its tone, verging on sycophantic as it exhorts the reader to learn from Timur, would have been appropriate introducing a work of Lenin’s. Timur coined many well-known maxims, we learn. His improving advice includes:

#102: “Don’t put off today’s work until tomorrow.”

#124: “Trust — but verify.”

#176: “The tongue is sharper than the sword.”

So much for small-time fabrications of this nature. The *Institutes* are being put to more disturbing uses. Since it presents itself as something in the way of Timur’s political testament, it is a serious document that deserves attention. Unfortunately, although it is lucid and literate, it suffers from a fatal shortcoming in that it is virtually certain to be a forgery. Allworth circumspectly says it is “tentatively attributed to Timur.”¹⁹ I can be more forth-

15. In the Navoi Library reading room, the unidirectional seating arrangement ensures that the wandering eye *must* fall on a quotation from Timur, a quotation from Karimov, a picture of Timur, and a giant photograph of the president who watches the readers with an Orwellian gaze that makes concentration impossible.

16. *Tuzukat-i Timuri*, the “Code/Laws” of Timur, but translated into English by one Major Davy in 1783 as *Institutes Political and Military*. The name has stuck.

17. Quoted in Allworth, p. 24.

18. *Amir Timur Ugitlari* (Tashkent: “Navruz” nashriyoti, 1992).

19. Allworth, p. 24.

right: the likelihood that Timur authored this work is equivalent to the likelihood that Henry VIII composed "Greensleeves."

The probability that any successful practical man of affairs — *i.e.* not incarcerated, in exile or retired, but actively engaged in governing or fighting — has actually written his own books is always tiny anyway. This certainly holds true for Timur, who, although he was certainly interested in scholarship, was illiterate. He could have dictated to scribes, but this too implies a sedentary lifestyle and considerable leisure. The chances are extremely high that the *Institutes* belong to a long tradition of works where the putative authorship is either very speculative or has been definitively shown to be spurious, among which the Homeric Hymns, Plato's Letters, much of the Old and New Testaments, the Donation of Constantine, Ivan the Terrible's correspondence with Prince Kurbskii, Peter the Great's last will and testament (never seen but rumored), the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the Hitler Diaries and Kennedy's *Profiles in Courage* are obvious examples that come to mind.

Of the list, Timur's *Institutes* probably share the most characteristics with Ivan the Terrible's letters. Both works seem to be products of later ages when dynasties were looking for historical justification to underscore their own right to the throne — the Timurids and the Romanovs, respectively. In both cases, the dynasties were trying to establish their authority after civil wars. Presenting illustrious ancestors who embodied firm, just monarchy was a weapon in the propaganda wars. If Timur could be rewritten as an exemplary and enlightened king, branches of the House of Timur could appeal to that legacy and more easily stake claims for themselves. Similarly, Ivan's letters reveal a sensitive, philosophical man, alive to the nuances of political theory but convinced of the need for absolute monarchy — excellent arguments in support of the Romanovs who were related to Ivan but came to the throne unexpectedly. *Institutes*, in other words, are themselves an example of tendentious historiography.

To say any of this in Uzbekistan is heresy of a high order. When I tried to say *exactly* this on a radio talk-show (Venera Ablyayeva's "Studio Tashkent", 18 May 1996), that section of the discussion was excised and listeners were left with my impressions of Tashkent and yet another failed attempt to explain ICWA clearly to outsiders. Uzbek academics have nervously refused to discuss my ideas about the *Institutes* with me.²⁰ The new canons of historical thought utterly discountenance the possibility that the *Institutes* are spurious. On the contrary, they

are held up as a literary production by a famous ancestor whose voice resonates down through the centuries and whose authority invests the work with a unique importance. Not only can Uzbeks feel proud of this written evidence of Timur's genius and magnanimity, they are encouraged to regard it as a text with relevance for today. Writers in popular journals often trawl through the *Institutes* for a quotation to support their argument. Since the press is completely controlled, Timur is always press-ganged to serve the government's point of view. Once again, propaganda for the status quo masquerades as the historical truth about Timur.

The next section of this newsletter is given over to illustrating this point. Having examined some Russian sources in the pages above, we now turn to three excerpts by Uzbek authors writing about Timur. The first passage is an object lesson in tendentious interpretation of the *Institutes*. If the core thesis of this letter is still in doubt — historical truth is perverted to legitimize the ruling elites — the examples below should prove conclusive.

INTERPRETING THE SCRIPTURES

1. The following excerpts are from the Ministry of Defense organ *Vatanparvar* ["Patriot"].²¹

[Title:] "A Treasury of Wisdom on the Art of Command: the Military Precepts of Timur."

Comment: The word used for "precepts" [*zavety*] is a code word that sets the tone for the article by explicitly reminding the reader of Lenin [cf. the set phrase *po zavetam Lenina*, "in accordance with Leninist precepts"], just as editors at *Le Monde* would be making a reference to Pascal in an article entitled "*Les pensées de M. Chirac*." Timur's "precepts," in other words, make up a text of apodictic truths as definitive as Lenin's. The title thereby alerts the reader to the indisputable nature of the material that follows.

[The *Institutes* are not a "confession" by Timur, but represent] "a sincere desire to help future generations to guard against mistakes and miscalculations, to give good advice on how to build a state the correct way, and how to ensure the welfare of the nation."

Comment: Timur cannot be making a "confession" [*ispoved'*] because a confession is an outpouring of subjective emotions that admits the possibility of error. Rather, he has his eye on the long view, as any good Marxist might, and has set out precepts of universal validity and scientific rigor. "To guard against mistakes

20. Even at Oxford, where dons defend their territory like fighting bulls, Professor Fennel who built a reputation editing Ivan the Terrible's letters was willing to *entertain* arguments that they were not genuine, and would usually charge the red rag. But academics here refuse to see the cape at all, or rather cannot be coaxed into the arena in the first place.

21. "A Treasury of Wisdom on the Art of Command: the Military Precepts of Timur," *Vatanparvar*, 12 March 1996.

and miscalculations" is a threatening phrase lifted directly out of communist textbooks. "The correct way" sounds similarly ominous, since it is obvious that there can be only one correct way and that individual choice will be too subjective to discover it unassisted. The Marxist jargon establishes the text as scripture. We have been prepared for the substitution of Timur for Marx ever since slogans from Marx and Lenin were removed from public buildings and replaced with quotations by Timur and Karimov. Scripture needs interpretation, however. Since the reader is fallible, the article goes on to explain the scripture to us lest we interpret it subjectively and fall in to egregious error.

"Amir Timur understood well that an army as large as his required not only a well-organized structure but continuous spiritual sustenance. By what means could this be ensured? Yes, as he says, "I concerned myself with spreading the religion of God," and yes, "I defended Islam at all times, in all places." But this was not the spiritual driving force behind the warriors of the great Timur. There was something else forever feeding the warriors' patriotism, inspiring them with loyalty to Timur, his deeds and achievements."

Comment: Islam catches the Karimov regime between a rock and a hard place. By showing tolerance the government can attract supporters, but the prospect of Muslim opposition groups organizing if religion is given too free a rein is alarming. Hence Karimov may begin a press conference with a prayer, but has banned political parties formed on religious grounds. (Also, by fostering the impression that Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan could be dangerously destabilizing, he gets the West, including a credulous America, to eat out of his hand, offering promises of aid and political support.)

Interest in Timur's specifically Muslim achievements is fairly widespread, although uninformed. He is respected for his mosque-building activities, and for making Bukhara a religious/educational hub of his empire. The vision of the just sultan whose introduction of *shariat* (Koranic law) ensured his people's happiness has cropped up more than once in conversations. The boys painting souvenirs for the tourists at Tashkent's Abdul Khasim Madrasa pressed me for over two hours to admit that the Timurid period represented *Asr-i Saadet*, "the Golden Age of Islam," to contrast with today's culture of *kafir*, "unbelief." Even though I would not agree, their view of Timur's rule as the age when mankind enjoyed the greatest felicity (rather like Gibbon's view of the Antonines) was completely unthreatening — the *gazi* warrior engaged in *jihad* against the infidel (as Vera would have it) or the fundamentalist carrying a bomb (as Karimov would have it) had no place in our gentlemanly conversation.

Nevertheless, the Karimov government is concerned. To decouple Timur from Islam altogether would be de-

sirable but is impossible. Therefore, the article under discussion acknowledges the religious dimension to Timur's achievements, but grudgingly: "Yes... yes," writes the author. The article will make its point not by ignoring the role of religion, but by diminishing its importance. In particular, the claim that Islam is a suitable binding element for large masses of people (Timur's army) is about to be refuted. This will be a blow against political Islam, the government's bugbear. Clearly, the "lesson" to be learnt from the organization of Timur's army is part and parcel of his "good advice of how to build a state the correct way." The "lesson" is immediately explicated for us:

"This something, which Timur — with his keen understanding of human hearts — instilled into his warriors, as he underlines in his *Institutes*, was 'their consciousness of their participation in a great task' — the liberation of their native land, the creation of a powerful centralized government, and the fight against invaders."

Comment: Note that the quotation from the *Institutes* — lifted out of context anyway — mentions only "consciousness of their participation in a great task." The gloss that follows, explaining the "great task," is a fiction by the writer of the article. Liberating and defending one's homeland are understandable concerns for the Ministry of Defense newspaper (although "liberation of their native land" implies a more modern attitude towards nationalism than was likely in the case of medieval nomad warriors.) The legitimation of [Karimov's] "powerful centralized government" is patently the point uppermost in the writer's mind. The grey work of centralizing the state hardly recommends itself, at first sight, as "the spiritual driving force... forever feeding [Uzbek citizens'] patriotism." However, the picture of Timur's warriors [Uzbek citizens] enthusiastically engaged in the "great task" of helping the regime to consolidate its power is lifted directly from communist propaganda that cheered on the proletariat as they built socialism.

"Keeping this precept of Timur's in mind, we can definitely say that today every one of our soldiers is profoundly conscious of his participation in the noble task — the building of a mighty, independent and flourishing state — and derives his strength from it and loyalty towards our independent motherland."

Comment: The "noble task" is reaffirmed exclusively as service to the state, and it is raised to the level of a "precept." Interestingly, love for the leader is not invoked. Neighboring Turkmenistan is completely engulfed in the personality cult of its president. It would not have been difficult to contrive a reference to Timur's dynamic personality — which probably inspired his troops more than the task of building a centralized state — but in an argument by analogy the subject of charisma was probably best avoided since Karimov has none.

The article goes on to pick and choose other tidbits from the *Institutes* smorgasbord, but the foregoing is sufficient illustration of the writer's method.

2. Another common technique used in communicating propaganda under the guise of history is the bald, unsupported assertion. Mind-readers and mediums of extraordinary perspicuity set down for us Timur's thoughts, intentions, preferences — the whole fantastic topography of his inner life. Mr. Gradgrind, the apostle of concrete facts, will find much ground for grievance in the following example:

"In Amir Timur's view, there were two necessary conditions to ensure the tranquillity of the population and peace and prosperity for the country: administrators and moral leaders — imams — working to the rule of law [qanun-qoidalar asosida], and a perfectly unified, unanimous consensus over the conception of society.... Timur listened carefully to different social concepts. He said that it was possible to determine their relative advantages only after repeatedly testing and trying them out — and that, for that reason, the fate of the country and the nation would ultimately be determined by decisions made by the people at large.... All in all, it should not be forgotten that Amir Timur was the first Turkic ruler who brought a democratic agenda to the throne of Transoxiana."²²

Comment: The emphasis on "the rule of law" echoes the slogans posted around town reading "Uzbekistan is an Independent, Democratic, Law-based State." Timur, the first democrat of Transoxiana, is the forerunner of Karimov, the first president of Uzbekistan and officially the head of the People's Democratic Party (ex-Communist Party). The notice that Timur pursued "a democratic agenda" should raise some eyebrows but frankly the claim is not more implausible than the claim that "Uzbekistan is an independent, democratic, law-based state."

Timur's version of democracy, like Robespierre's, seems to have consisted in understanding "the Will of the People" (the "unanimous consensus over the conception of society") and implementing it. The correct model of society must be achieved empirically ("after repeatedly testing and trying [innovations] out") — a spuriously "scientific" notion of sociology. Social innovations are inadmissible until they have been approved (*i.e.* made unthreatening to the power of the state). Social harmony is the state's priority. The very idea of perfect, social unanimity among the masses is absurd — the writer has no concept of civil society but draws his imagery from the myths of homogenized proletarian class consciousness. Then, to add insult to injury, he assures the reader that he is describing democracy. Communist-

style "people's democracy," to be sure, to be implemented by the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. This small excerpt, worthless as history, masquerades as analysis in order to reinterpret elite rule as democracy and justify the status quo in Uzbekistan today.

3. The final illustration²³ is the most pernicious of the three, as its projections backwards are more ingenious. The analogies are cunningly drawn and the conclusions jump out with surprising éclat.

"Throughout the territory of his huge state Timur eliminated customs barriers and duties of all kinds. He created, to use modern language, a free economic zone covering a huge expanse. The government of Timur — that was the single writ, the common law that prevailed amidst truly chaotic conditions caused by feudal disintegration, when "rights" were the prerogative of whoever commanded the most armed men. Here was the stability, in other words, that is so necessary for progressive economic development."

Comment: The crucial distinction here is between "feudal disintegration" and the iron hand of Timur. Note the difference in presentation from the Russian books: Timur is no longer feudal. In fact he has transcended feudal and stands guarantor *against* the chaotic state of nature that "feudal disintegration" brings in its wake. To crack the code, substitute "clan" for "feudal" and "the civil war in Tajikistan" for "truly chaotic conditions." Karimov is widely credited here for having staved off any kind of social implosion, such as has happened on Uzbekistan's doorstep, by ruling firmly and carrying a big stick. "Well, there's no fighting here" is an answer I encounter frequently to the question "How's life in Uzbekistan?"

Since the origin of the Tajik civil war can be neatly summarized as north-south clan rivalries plus Islamic fundamentalism, Karimov can market Uzbekistan as a modern, secular island of stability, won at the necessary cost of political authoritarianism. To drive the message home, the official slogan for independent Uzbekistan is "Discipline and Order." Like Timur, Karimov is strong but just: rights are secured by law, not "armed men" (*cf.* "Right Makes Might.") The writer lands a further blow on the chins of all doubters in Karimov by pointing out that stable government is the prerequisite for "progressive economic development." The Timurid model turns out to be the Chinese model: economic liberalism but political authoritarianism. In other words, democracy in Uzbekistan must wait until economic reforms are in place — Timur's example proves that it is "a lesson of history."

"World history had not known such an interlacing of

22. Mansur Bekmurodov, "Amir Timur and the Conception of Society [*Jamoatchilik fikri*]," *Guliston* (4, 1994).

23. B. Abaturov, D. Rustamov, "The Golden Age: from the Past — into the Future," *Vechernii Tashkent*, 20 November 1995.

state authority with invention, science and art as during the Timurid dynasty. The age-old dichotomy between authority and creative impulse, so characteristic of the Western tradition, here finds a completely different solution: the enlightened state can and must safeguard the development of human creativity... Man's artistic aspirations were not constricted by [Timur's] state, but were organically interwoven with it."

Comment: If pressed to the wall to justify this passage, I suppose the writer would shuffle around a bit and point out that the Timurid poet Navoi ("Melodious," the pen-name of Nizamaddin Alisher) was a state councilor in Herat, and that Ulug Beg, a justly famous astronomer whose tables were used in the seventeenth century by the Royal Astronomer in Greenwich, was Timur's grandson ruling in Samarkand. In that narrow sense, state authority was interlaced with invention, science and art. On a wider view, the claim is so absurd that one can only admire the writer's *sang-froid* in making it. Leaving aside the jibe about "the Western tradition," authority and creative impulse are *always* in apposition; reports that the conflict had been overcome ("solved") — a standard feature of Soviet ideology parroted here — have proven premature.

It goes without saying that a Timurid "enlightened state," dedicated to developing its human resources, is an anachronism. Timur did support Islamic education in madrasas, but the hyperbole of "Man's artistic aspirations" flourishing such as "world history had not known" is easily punctured by noting that the literacy rate in ancient Athens or Rome probably exceeded the literacy rate in the whole of Timur's empire. We are jousting with windmills, however: behind the historical rhetoric, the real issue is the defense of state censorship in Uzbekistan. Like the beneficent state founded by Timur, Karimov's is a lightning rod attracting and channeling "human creativity" in the correct way. The "age-old dichotomy" has been harmonized so that no tension whatsoever is felt between what the citizen *wishes* to express and what the citizen is *permitted* to express. Timur's legacy lives on in Uzbekistan, in the metaphysical sympathy that exists between the drives of individuals and the objective requirements of national development.

"In the history of a few nations on this planet, there can be observed one take-off point, one period of astounding growth, one hour of triumph. And the nation of Uzbekistan, like the Phoenix, is continually reborn in the history of brilliant states: Bactria, Khorezm, Sogdiana, Parthia, the empires of the Hephthalites [Huns] and the Kushans, the Turkish Khaganate, and the dynasties of the Samanids, Karakhanids, Timurids and Shaybanids."

Comment: I do not hold that human beings should trace

their pedigrees like dogs, and may take pride only in ancestors with whom they share blood. Nevertheless, the implied ethnogenesis of the "nation of Uzbekistan" given here oversteps a limit. First, the Uzbeks appear on the scene only as the very last entry in the author's list — a catalogue extending to ca. 600 BC. There are no conceivable cultural, historical, linguistic or even imaginative overlaps between the Shaybanids and most of the peoples whose dust they trod when they arrived in this area. Second, whether many of these marauding regimes were "brilliant" (foremost the Huns and the Turks) is disputable. Third, at least six of the peoples mentioned were non-native invaders. Enlisting them as an argument for Uzbekistan's greatness is actually a peculiar thing to do: consider the effect if a Pole were to write, "Poland is continually being reborn through the regimes that have conquered part of its soil: the Mongols, the Teutonic Order, Catherine the Great's Russia, the Nazis and the Soviet Union."

Theories of ethnogenesis that explain people by the piece of territory they occupy can be traced directly to Soviet scholarship: "Russian scholars thought that immigrants, invaders, emigrants and refugees could affect the process of ethnogenesis, but the theories made land the core, centering on the region in which the group under scrutiny lived at the time of the theorizing."²⁴ Whatever the value of this approach as history, it makes good cultural propaganda. The new state seal of independent Uzbekistan shows the legendary Simurg bird, the symbol of national awakening for a country that "like the Phoenix, is continually reborn."

"The spiritual legacy of the nations of Transoxiana was not obliterated by the Mongols [sic]. Indeed, it was precisely the creation by Timur of a state which was organically interlinked with the cultural development of society that predetermined the dazzling Golden Age of Transoxiana that followed.... If we are to draw historical parallels, then the time through which we are living is analogous to when Timur was forging his great state with a firm hand, laying the foundations for the consequent economic, scientific and cultural flowering that included the fruitful work of Ulug Beg and Navoi."

Comment: The phrase "If we are to draw historical parallels" is ingenuous. Timur, Ulug Beg and Navoi are emerging in Uzbek historiography as the core Trinity at the heart of the new historical doctrine. Particularly in recent publications, their names are regularly mentioned in one breath. Why this particular configuration? Because they represent the personifications of three life-principles: politics, science, and culture, respectively. On this reading, Timur laid down the state infrastructure without which no higher human activities can happen. By establishing justice and stability, he created the

24. Allworth, p. 236.

preconditions for future developments. The astronomer Ulug Beg is the symbol for science and material progress. As the apostle of learning and education, he represents the future. The poet Navoi is the symbol for language. He also stands for wisdom through culture, historical experience (transmitted by words) and hopes for the future — “which are expressed,” the article says at one point, “through art, and in the East first and foremost through language and poetry, the foundations of which were laid by Navoi.” Their relationship can be diagrammed as follows. Timur, Ulug Beg and Navoi stand at the vertices of an isosceles triangle: Timur is at the top, two equal lines lead from him to Ulug Beg and Navoi, and all three make up a single indissoluble unit.

The proper translation for “the dazzling Golden Age of Transoxiana” is to be found, written in huge letters, on the roof of the buildings in Independence Square: “Uzbekistan — the Great State that is to Come!” Note the future tense; and note that Ulug Beg and Navoi came *after* Timur. The present relevance of the message is clear: an explosion of art, culture and free speech is historically guaranteed *after* the work of state-building has been completed. *History teaches* that the government’s power must be consolidated first. In asking people to wait a little now, the Karimov regime is conforming to a *historical necessity* that emerges clearly from a correct understanding of the Timurid past.

The treason of the intellectuals

Why are Uzbek historians serving the state in this way? Why are intellectuals forfeiting their title to respect as unimplicated thinkers? How have they become so over-committed to a demonstrably false version of their own history? Even when Soviet ideology has been formally abandoned, the impresses of that ideology are still visible in minds that were moulded by it. Phenomena are generalized and categorized in an identical fashion. Class-based formulas to divide up societies are still instinctual; assumptions remain unchanged about the existence and benefits of historical progress. Any grasp of historical methodology is primitive at best, or non-existent, or in the worst cases scorned as fashionable Western clap-trap. Many professors whom I have met are simply unable to escape from mental prisons of their own making. Like people who have spoken bad English all their lives and now desperately realize that their mistakes are too ingrained ever to be extirpated, I see pain in their eyes when they hear themselves helplessly repeating old patterns and mouthing discredited slogans and I pity them.

There are other professional scholars who have always written in journals and have trouble conceiving of themselves doing anything else. They have been able to flip-flop from Soviet ideology to the new line demanded

by editors because public writing of this kind was, and is, a job undertaken for money that did not engage one’s personal sense of truth and fiction. In the past they excused themselves on the grounds that they were overmastered by political compulsions more vigorous than their own consciences. Today they are required by financial exigencies to write whatever will be published in order to supplement their income.

Then there are others who are Uzbek nationalists who so yearn for something to be true that their distortions and omissions become unconscious. They are like Anglo-Saxon phrenologists a century ago, measuring cranial capacity by packing skulls with ball-bearings. If a phrenologist found a threateningly large African skull, perhaps he would not pack the ball-bearings as tightly as he might. But if a disturbingly small Caucasian skull fell into his hands, he would jam them in with his thumbs. The desired result was attained and the researcher was pretty much unaware he had manipulated the experiment to get the result he wanted — or if he was aware, the level of guilty uncertainty about his own motivations was manageable.


My impression is that most Uzbek historians conform to this pattern. There are very few cynical zealots in this world explicitly devoted to the propagation of false information, although every state gladly makes use of them whenever it can find them. Encouraged by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, and the Council of Ministers committee that is coordinating the Amir Timur jubilee, historians blindly commit historical forgeries for the best possible motive, patriotism. Initially at the back of their minds is Barres’ maxim “Even if the country is wrong, we must think it in the right,” but soon their consciences are lightened because they discover that their historical research *proves* the country/government to be in the right.

The lack of unbiased source-material in Soviet libraries contributes to the problem. Errors propagate and amplify errors in a vicious circle. But the weight of blame falls on the human agent manipulating his material, sometimes heavy-handedly, sometimes with deft legerdemain, because he is in the grip of a controlling vision so grand that inconvenient facts can be overlooked and discarded. When Hegel demonstrated that the apex of Being was the triumph of the German world, was he being intellectually dishonest? When Mommsen wrote a history of the Roman Empire that paralleled his contemporary Germany so closely that it has been called a “history of Germany with Roman names,” was he deliberately distorting?

No. But as Julien Benda rightly charged in *La Trahison des Clercs*, intellectuals have fewer excuses in the twentieth century, where truth has been more at a premium

than ever before, for allowing themselves to be co-opted by regimes that will always use them to serve their own ends. All historiography in Uzbekistan is state-controlled; all state-controlled historiography is tendentious; that tendency is always to legitimize the ruling elites. Only when power becomes more diffused can this chain be broken. The American reader is in no position to adopt a

holier-than-thou attitude on this score. Until recently, the Beards' *History of the United States* was a standard text that taught some extremely questionable theses about America's past to the pre-war generation. Any one of the claims about Amir Timur quoted in these pages, however implausible, compares favorably with the proposition that George Washington never told a lie. □



Institute Fellows and their Activities

Adam Smith Albion. A former research associate at the Institute for EastWest Studies at Prague in the Czech Republic, Adam is spending two years studying and writing about Turkey and Central Asia, and their importance as actors the Middle East and the former Soviet bloc. A Harvard graduate (1988; History), Adam has completed the first year of a two-year M. Litt. degree in Russian/East European history and languages at Oxford University. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

Christopher P. Ball. An economist, Chris Ball holds a B.A. from the University of Alabama in Huntsville and attended the 1992 International Summer School at the London School of Economics. He studied Hungarian for two years in Budapest while serving as Project Director for the Hungarian Atlantic Council. As an Institute Fellow, he is studying and writing about Hungarian minorities in the former Soviet-bloc nations of East and Central Europe. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

William F. Foote. Formerly a financial analyst with Lehman Brothers' Emerging Markets Group, Willy Foote is examining the economic substructure of Mexico and the impact of free-market reforms on Mexico's people, society and politics. Willy holds a Bachelor's degree from Yale University (history), a Master's from the London School of Economics (Development Economics; Latin America) and studied Basque history in San Sebastian, Spain. He carried out intensive Spanish-language studies in Guatemala in 1990 and then worked as a copy editor and Reporter for the *Buenos Aires Herald* from 1990 to 1992. [THE AMERICAS]

Sharon Griffin. A feature writer and contributing columnist on African affairs at the *San Diego Union-Tribune*, Sharon is spending two years in southern Africa studying Zulu and the Kwa-Zulu kingdom and writing about the role of nongovernmental organizations as fulfillment centers for national needs in developing countries where governments are still feeling their way toward effective administration. [sub-SAHARA]

John Harris. A would-be lawyer with an undergraduate degree in History from the University of Chicago, John reverted to international studies after a year of internship in the product-liability department of a Chicago law firm and took two years of postgraduate Russian at the University of Washington in Seattle. Based in Moscow during his fellowship, John is studying and writing about Russia's nascent political parties as they begin the difficult transition from identities based on the personalities of their leaders to positions based on national and international issues. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

Pramila Jayapal. Born in India, Pramila left when she was four and went through primary and secondary education in Indonesia. She graduated from Georgetown University in 1986 and won an M.B.A. from the Kellogg School of Management in Evanston, Illinois in 1990. She has worked as a corporate analyst for PaineWebber and an accounts manager for the world's leading producer of cardiac defibrillators, but most recently managed a \$7 million developing-country revolving-loan fund for the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) in Seattle. Pramila is spending two years in India tracing her roots and studying social issues involving religion, the status of women, population and AIDS. [SOUTH ASIA]

John B. Robinson. A 1991 Harvard graduate with a certificate of proficiency from the Institute of Kiswahili in Zanzibar and a Master of Fine Arts in Creative Writing from Brown University, he and his wife Delphine, a French oceanographer, are spending two years in Madagascar with their two young sons, Nicolas and Rowland. He will be writing about varied aspects of the island-nation's struggle to survive industrial and natural-resource exploitation and the effects of a rapidly swelling population. [sub-SAHARA]

Teresa C. Yates. A former member of the American Civil Liberties Union's national task force on the workplace, Teresa is spending two years in South Africa observing and reporting on the efforts of the Mandela government to reform the national land-tenure system. A Vassar graduate with a *juris doctor* from the University of Cincinnati College of Law, Teresa had an internship at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies in Johannesburg in 1991 and 1992, studying the feasibility of including social and economic rights in the new South African constitution. [sub-SAHARA]

The Institute of Current World Affairs

4 WEST WHEELLOCK STREET
HANOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE 03755

ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED

Author: Albion, Adam Smith
Title: ICWA Letters – Europe/Russia
ISSN: 1083-4273
Imprint: ICWA, Hanover, NH

Material Type: Serial
Language: English
Frequency: Monthly
Other Regions: Mideast/North Africa; East Asia;
South Asia; SubSaharan Africa;
The Americas

Chosen on the basis of character, previous experience and promise, Institute Fellows are young professionals funded to spend a minimum of two years carrying out self-designed programs of study and writing outside the United States. The Fellows are required to report their findings and experiences from the field once a month. They can write on any subject, as formally or informally as they wish. The result is a unique form of reporting, analysis and periodical assessment of international events and issues.

ICWA LETTERS

ISSN 1083-4273

ICWA Letters are published by the Institute of Current World Affairs Inc., a 501(c)(3) exempt operating foundation incorporated in New York State with offices located at 4 West Wheelock Street, Hanover, NH 03755.

The letters are provided free of charge to members of ICWA and are available to libraries and professional researchers by subscription.

Executive Director

Peter Bird Martin

Program Administrator

Gary L. Hansen

Publications Manager

Ellen Kozak

Phone: (603) 643-5548

Fax: (603) 643-9599

E-Mail: ICWA@valley.net

© 1996 Institute of Current World Affairs, The Crane-Rogers Foundation.

The information contained in this publication may not be reproduced without the writer's permission.