Around 200,000 Ugandans have sought refuge in the Sudan. Many have delayed for months along the borders, reluctant to flee but deriving only marginal subsistence. Taking the last drastic step, they arrive in the transit centers weak and malnourished. Many die awaiting assistance in the planned resettlement areas provided by Sudan and UNHCR.

Thousands of Ugandan refugees poured into the Sudan in 1982, most of them to Western Equatoria (the west bank of the Nile). The population of refugees in the planned settlements provided by the Sudan, which are supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), shot up from 9,000 in 3 settlements in March 1982 to 47,311 in 14 by the end of September. By October 8 there were 8,000 people in transit centers along the border, and every day 200 new people were registering for settlement. These numbers do not include the 65,000 in settlements in Eastern Equatoria nor the thousands of "spontaneously" settled refugees who found a place along the border or in towns in southern Sudan. In all, I estimate at least 200,000 refugees from Uganda in Sudan; UNHCR puts the figure at 160,000. Zaire also hosts Ugandan refugees, with some 40,000 living in settlements and as many or more living along the border. There, too, the influx has increased recently.

The numbers of refugees in Sudan, both those in settlements and those managing on their own without UNHCR support, have been building up since 1979, most having fled from Uganda's infamous elections and the withdrawal of the Tanzanian "liberation" army. From June 1982, about one-third of those registering for settlement still came from inside Uganda; the rest were those who had attempted to stay near the border, hoping the situation would improve and they could return to their homes. Their delay was catastrophic. Thousands died of starvation, while trying to eke out a living along the overcrowded border. Hundreds more died of the effects of malnutrition, even after they had entered settlements and were receiving food rations.

For some, the situation in Uganda is confusing - there are so many contradictory reports. But for Izarku Ajaga, the facts were starkly clear when on September 11 he came to the UNHCR office in Yei to report that his brother and another relative had been killed by President Milton Obote's troops, just eight miles from the Sudan border in Uganda. For the past two years they had been living near Livolo, farming on both sides of the border. They were on their way to collect their crops when they met the soldiers from Kampala. Ajaga needed transport to collect the two widows and five young children for their long journey to the settlements.

Mr. Adarito Caku, a primary school teacher, had an equally grim experience to recount when he arrived at Kaya transit center with a group of 50 other refugees - all directly from inside Uganda - on October 2. Only a few days earlier he had watched the torture and murder of a new sub-chief, or jago, of Omogo, Terrego County, with whom he had shared a prison cell. The victim,
Nathan Aliosa, had been beaten daily and finally left to die, his throat cut half-way.

Despite pronouncements to the contrary, the war in the West Nile area of Uganda continues. Moreover, little of the resistance is made up of former President Idi Amin's supporters. Indeed, few of them survive or are at liberty. One, Colonel Elly Hassan, is in prison in Juba, the capital of the southern region of the Sudan. Another, the last who claimed the right to command as an officer under Amin, was relieved from duty by the lower ranks of anti-Obote troops still fighting a guerrilla war within Uganda. Months ago, Brigadier Moses Ali, another Amis associate who had imposed his leadership on the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), was disclaimed.

The commander who leads the resistance forces around Abongi put it this way:

_When Obote came in, we didn’t want to fight. I advised my boys to surrender their weapons. It was a defensive action to protect the civilians who were attacked after the Tanzanians left. We are not fighting [now] for putting any one individual in power. That’s not correct. We want our people to elect the person they wish. We just want to make sure people are free to move in peace._

His sentiments were echoed by Okot James Kazin, a defector from Obote’s army, in a statement made on September 10 at Kaya transit center. He told me how, on their arrival in the West Nile (after the departure of the Tanzanians), the soldiers were instructed that “they should not leave anybody, be it children or helpless old people, living.” As time went on, some soldiers began to question the necessity for killing people for no good reason. Those who objected were always threatened. “That’s why I decided to defect and join with the struggling forces some time last year and defend the interests of my fellow Ugandans.”

I met one family of seven on the path near Yundu. They had walked 90 miles to reach the Sudan. When I asked why they had come, an old man replied “The children don’t have any more ammunition.”

Persecution is not confined to Ugandan soil. The refugees living just inside Sudan’s border, particularly around Kajo-Kaji, have, over the past four months, been repeatedly raided by Obote’s men, who have looted, burned, kidnapped, and murdered inside a border that is difficult to protect. On September 30, a small Ugandan plane flew low over the cluster of tents at the Livolo transit center, circled, and photographed the refugees. On October 7, in response to news of the rape and murder of a young Ugandan woman inside the Sudan by yet another Obote troop incursion, two lorries of soldiers from Yei were sent to strengthen the border defences. But the “children” still have some ammunition, and heavy fighting continues in Uganda. Resistance around Obongi is strong enough to allow traders on bicycles, carrying fish from the Kochi and Nile rivers, to sell inside the Sudan. Five miles east of Kaya it is still safe enough for women to cross regularly into Uganda to collect their cassava. Raiding of civilians goes on by day throughout the northern part of the West Nile, but at night government troops are confined to towns like Moyo, where several hundred civilians are held virtual prisoners in an area about half a kilometer square. Many of them sleep in the mission and in the cathedral, their suffering shared by three Europeans — two priests and a nun.

It is believed that at least 80,000 civilians remain inside the war zones. When the rains stop and the grass is dry enough to burn, the Sudan expects another wave of refugees. It is not likely that the resistance will be able to protect them from the actions of the undisciplined and vindictive soldiers. The suffering that has for so long been the lot of the innocent civilians of the West Nile seems likely to continue.

_"Are 14-year-olds heads of families?"_”

_“In Europe, are 14-year-olds heads of families?”_ The question is directed accusingly at me from the back of a crowd of Ugandan refugees who have lived since May 1982 in Goli settlement in Western Equatoria. How could I answer this boy when the next day, tears starting from his eyes, he asked “What did I ever do to Obote to make him kill my parents?” His tears are angry as he tells me that although he had finished building their house, he was just too tired to dig a latrine. His family consisted of four tiny tots, none of them big enough even to help with the cooking. These children had seen their parents shot down only a few months earlier inside Uganda, when government troops on one of their daily raids into the bush near Yumbe had found the family’s hiding place. Leaving their parents where they died, the children began their long journey to the Sudan and to Goli settlement.

An individual’s view of a situation depends on the vantage point from which it has been experienced. I have just completed six months of research among the Ugandan refugees in the Sudan. The objective of my study — worked out at a typewriter thousands of miles away — was to determine whether there are strategies that could be applied by aid agencies from the onset of any emergency to encourage self-sufficiency rather than dependency among refugees. I had read the literature describing the so-called “dependency syndrome” and had talked with aid people who observed, “The more you give, the more dependent people become.” Quite by chance, I found the situation in Western Equatoria, Sudan, ideal for my theoretical problem. There were Ugandan refugees who had been living in planned rural settlements for as long as two years, there were newly established settlements, and there was a continuing influx of emergency proportions. Moreover, the program officer employed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees welcomed the participatory action research I proposed.
During my stay there, I was involved in all aspects of an emergency program.²

Sitting down now to write this, memories of this 14-year-old boy divert me from my analysis. There is also Fadamulla Buja, a 22-year-old. Earlier in 1982, he was a student at Mbaia Secondary School, preparing for "A" level examinations in June. He went with other history students on a school-sponsored trip to Kala-lega National Park. On the way to Patiko to see Baker's Fort, soldiers stopped the bus. Four students, identified by the soldiers as Kakwa, and thus "Amin's remnants," were ordered off the bus at gunpoint. The teachers pleaded that the boys were only students. At the barracks, the soldiers burned the boy's school identification cards, challenging them now to prove they were students. One boy was, in Buja's words, "stubborn." He told the soldiers that, "Yes, I am a Kakwa, but I am also a Ugandan. Where do you want me to go?" He was bundled off and never seen again.

That night, at midnight, the 3 were taken from their cells, thrown into a Land Rover and driven about 17 miles down the Kitgum road. There they were pulled out and told to walk in a straight line away from the soldiers, who were brandishing guns. Buja advised his friends to make a dash for it since they were going to be shot in cold blood. He never saw his friends again, although he heard gunshots behind him for the time it took him to run two miles. He continued to run for what he guessed was ten miles, then collapsed. The next morning he found some cassava, ate it raw, and began his walk to the Sudan. Now Fadamulla Buja lives in Limbe settlement with no hope of ever completing his education.

I am surrounded by such images. They are not only in my mind but in the dozens of exercise books in which refugees have written accounts of their experiences, the tape recordings of their voices, the photographs – not to mention the case-histories in my notebooks. It is not easy to reduce all these to a systematic account. The picture they reveal is constantly moving, contradictory, dynamic. I am also conscious that many trees have been sacrificed already to supply the paper for the masses of reports about refugees. The authors appear to have no difficulty in describing what they saw. Many (whom I observed) could write reports after visiting a settlement for only half an hour: some "experts" never left their vehicles. While I was in northern Sudan, I was often advised that it was only necessary to visit one settlement as "they are all alike." Perhaps I stayed too long, talked with too many refugees, saw too much.

Assisting refugees

There are a number of ways in which the international community seeks to assist refugees, depending on where they have sought protection, the conditions obtaining in the country of origin, and, in some cases, the background of refugees in terms of education and skills. Americans are most familiar with resettlement programs where people are moved from the country of first asylum to another where it is expected they will remain. Ideally, this solution is only applied when there is little hope of a refugee ever being able to return to his own country. In Africa most assistance to refugees is provided in the country of first asylum, although there are exceptions.¹

Many refugees in the world are assisted only through relief programs. That is, they are centrally located and maintained through the provision of food, clothing, medical, and educational services. In some cases, such as in Thailand, this approach is necessary because the host government is unwilling to allow certain people to leave the holding centers. Alternatively, unemployed refugees may be given monthly subsistence allowances, as until recently in Nairobi.

Everyone involved in refugee assistance is too keenly aware of the problems engendered by relief programs. From the point of view of the donors, they are far too expensive, particularly when refugees remain in a host country for a protracted period of time. Some Eritreans have lived in exile in the Sudan for as long as 20 years and the problems that generated their flight appear to be no closer to a solution than when they fled. Over the past years more emphasis has been placed upon what are called "durable solutions." In practice this has meant mainly assisting refugees in rural, agricultural settlements, although in some situations efforts are made to set up income-generating programs in towns.

In southern Sudan nearly all the assistance channelled through UNHCR is focused upon creating self-sufficient agricultural settlements. There are, at this time, no programs or budgets for refugees who live outside the planned settlements. Relief assistance is provided on the arrival of the refugees at the settlement, but the expecta-

On the long road to the transit center from inside Uganda.
tion is that the refugee will be self-sustaining within a prescribed period of time.

Most programs that make self-sufficiency their objective limit the definition of the term to food production. But the notion of self-sufficiency has much broader implications. In this series of Reports on Ugandan refugees in the Sudan, I will be exploring this question of definition and the many obstacles that prevent refugee communities from achieving it.

The program developed in the planned settlements of Western Equatoria acknowledged the broader implications of self-sufficiency. A highly innovative program, it encouraged maximum participation by the refugees in the administration of their settlements and at every stage of decision-making. It aimed to help individuals gain a sense of identification with a place and a community of people, and to relate positively to the local population. Refugees were encouraged to take responsibility for developing an equitable and democratic community. But this idealistic approach was confounded by the quality of social relations and individual behavior within the settlements—the neglect of responsibility by professionals, general distrust, blatant dishonesty, desertion of close family members (even children), religious and ethnic antagonisms, arguments, and even occasional violence. In order to make sense of this situation, it is necessary to explore the events which led to the exodus and the experiences these people had undergone before their arrival in the settlements.

"Why did you wait so long to come?" was the first question one asked on seeing the appalling state of health of refugees registering for settlement from June to early September. Contrary to the opinion of some, these refugees had not simply rushed for handouts. The decision to leave Uganda had been delayed for as long as possible, and then most who crossed into Sudan attempted to care for themselves along the borders. The decision to register at a UNHCR transit center for settlement had been taken as a last resort for survival: the social relations and behavior observed in the settlements can only by understood within that context.

The Context for Assistance Programs

Understanding the broad context within which an assistance program is implemented is absolutely vital to its success. And this "context" is considerably more complicated than the histories of personal sufferings. Many, if not most, of the failures of programs can be traced directly to the lack of understanding and information about their environment, yet every refugee emergency is also unique in some measure. Moreover, the very fact of an emergency means the demands placed upon personnel prevent them from acquiring the necessary information and background. This is only one of the many contradictions implicit in refugee assistance.5

One of the more alarming aspects of this failure to have an ongoing source of information is the apparent inability of the responsible organizations to anticipate influxes of refugees. Procurement of food and other relief supplies is always a long process, due to the limitations placed on UNHCR and other agencies by the donors.6 Repeatedly, the international community finds itself confronted by the painful and humiliating situation of being unable to provide even basic food needs to a new influx of refugees. While it may not be possible to anticipate an emergency before its outset, refugee influxes once under way tend to occur in response to natural or human-inspired events that are observable and whose outcomes are to a great extent predictable.

The UNHCR program in southern Sudan aims to give uniform assistance to all refugees. It would be unreasonable to expect that emergency assistance could be tailored to suit individual or even small group differences, yet the differences in skills, education, place of origin, political persuasion, religion, and time of leaving Uganda all have direct consequences for the program's progress toward creating self-sufficient agricultural communities.

Another important part of the context in which an assistance program is implemented are the conditions in the host country and the history of relations between its population with its immediate neighbors. In Africa, where national boundaries imposed during the colonial period largely ignore linguistic or ethnic patterns, local people see such political demarcations only as occasional impediments to free travel. Ethnic groups, even families, span these borders and at times it is nearly impossible to ascertain who is a refugee. In Sudan, this problem is especially acute because of the aftermath of its long civil war in the south, which ended in 1972. Uganda had hosted hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees during this war, not all of whom returned after 1972. Many Ugandans chose to iden-
tify with these “returnees” when they entered Sudan after 1979.

Refugees are not granted asylum in a political, economic or social vacuum. The conditions obtaining in a host country immediately impinge upon an individual the moment he puts his foot across an international boundary. Not every country that hosts refugees is party to international agreements concerning their protection. In Thailand, which has not signed such agreements, the international community has faced numerous problems in responding to the refugee influx from Kampuchea and Laos, and such crises put UNHCR, with its first responsibility to protect refugees, in a difficult role vis-a-vis the host government.

In Africa, Sudan has the longest history of granting asylum to refugees from its neighbor states. It is a signatory to international conventions and protocols, both those of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). While this places Sudan among those countries where international assistance programs have the legal standing they require to carry out their functions, it does not begin to solve the problems on the ground. Considerable lip service is paid to the “natural” hospitality of Africans toward their brothers when they arrive in a country as refugees. Some African professionals involved in refugee assistance argue that the belief that refugees are welcomed by their kith and kin has been the justification for the failure of the international community to respond adequately, evidenced by the great disparities in assistance given to African refugees compared with others.7 While most would probably agree that social relations in Africa are humane compared to those in Western society, many factors influence the way people receive a stranger. Today in Africa, neither ethnic ties nor shared language are a guarantee that a refugee crossing a border will be sure of sustenance or safety. A multitude of factors influence his reception. This is certainly the case in southern Sudan.

The extreme poverty of southern Sudan, with its lack of infrastructure, is a significant aspect of the aid context. Assistance programs are intended to bring refugees up to the standard of the local population, but if this standard is unacceptably low, it follows that the program should raise the level of the entire community. This has produced ongoing debate concerning whether programs should be confined to supplying emergency relief or take a more developmental approach.

The continuing war inside Uganda is also part of the complicated context in which assistance is provided. Sudan hosts refugees from three countries which are still fighting civil wars (Ethiopia, Chad and Uganda). While the rhetoric of both UN and OAU declarations state that the granting of asylum and assisting refugees should not be interpreted as an unfriendly act, the reality is much more complicated. The war has an immediate and profound impact upon relations between the host government and that of the country of origin, and on those between refugees and civilians, local authorities, central government officials, and aid agency personnel.

Refugees are never a homogeneous population, neither in terms of in-
dividual differences of background nor in terms of their motivation for seeking asylum. The continuing war in Uganda profoundly conditions individual behavior. Each new influx of refugees differs from the one preceding it. Some refugees remain sympathetic to the aims of the fighters in the bush, others are totally apolitical and indifferent - or have lost confidence in those who are ostensibly fighting for their cause. Whatever posture an individual has assumed, the war is the continual point of reference, determining decisions about moving out of Uganda, accepting settlement and assistance, and deeply affecting relationships in the settlements.

Assistance programs are planned, financed, and usually implemented by international agencies and personnel. The role and involvement of the host country, as well as the nature of relations between agency and government personnel, vary enormously. Part of the context in which assistance programs are implemented includes the nature of these relationships and the many "actors" which are involved. As one Sudanese official put it:

**Host countries are alarmingly dependent upon aid agencies. Yet there is rarely an opportunity for indigenous professionals to question their approach or contribute to the general theoretical debate concerning their role in refugee assistance. It would sometimes appear that host governments, like refugees, are expected to receive assistance, without question in either the suitability of the gift or the competence of the giver.**

Regardless of how well-planned and idealistic an assistance program might be, in the end it is always implemented by people, who bring to the situation their own background, experience (or lack of it), values, motivations, and expectations.

The First Influx of Refugees into the Sudan

It is not possible to date the beginning of the social chaos independent Uganda has endured. Killings and detentions went on under "Obote I," as people often refer to Milton Obote's first prime ministership (1962-1971). The economy was already in serious trouble when Idi Amin came to power (coup, January 25, 1971), and it continued to deteriorate. Although the Western media gave the impression that Uganda under Amin was total anarchy, other evidence shows that life continued quite normally for the majority. The killings that occurred then were much more limited and "selective" than what has happened in Uganda since 1979, when the Tanzanian Liberation Army helped depose Amin. Many townspeople, including professionals, whose lives were endangered retreated to rural villages and began farming. Given the agricultural potential of the country and the remarkable willingness of all classes of Ugandans to work with their hands, people were largely able to feed themselves. The administrative structure began dissolving as Amin replaced trained civil servants with soldiers. Although there were those who sought asylum under Amin's rule, the number of refugees was small when compared to the situation today. (Between 1972 and 1978, only 2,000 refugees from Uganda were hosted in southern Sudan.) Ethnic and religious rivalries increased under Amin, but his time in office did not mark their beginnings. All the problems Uganda inherited from the past (including the colonial past) became exaggerated over the last decade.

Idi Amin belonged to the Kakwa-speaking community which stretches across the borders of Uganda, Zaire, and southern Sudan. Because he was also from the Muslim minority in Uganda, most of whom live in the West Nile region, he was identified with that area. The first refugees who fled in 1979 included many Kakwa-speakers and Muslims, as well as supporters of the Amin government who would have faced execution had they remained. They also included a group of mainly Muslim tradesmen, the "Nubians," who illustrate the complexities of defining the refugee. The Nubians have ancestral roots in the Sudan, but fled their homeland in 1840 to settle in Uganda. While many of the Nubians were able even as refugees to continue earning their living through trading, some of them accepted settlement. Not given to agriculture, as a group they managed to exaggerate their numbers sufficiently to use the relief food provided to the settlements to re-establish their trading activities.

Yet even this first wave of refugees were not all "Amin's remnants," a label still applied indifferently to all Ugandans living in southern Sudan. Many simply saw the writing on the wall, realizing that the situation would now develop into a bloody tribal and religious war, and decided to move their families out of the country before conditions totally deteriorated. Others, despite their personal repudiation of Amin, were too closely identified with his regime to risk remaining in Uganda. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Mawadri had been recruited and trained during British rule. He helped plan the liberation war from inside Uganda, leading his men in support of the Tanzanian forces. After Amin's supporters were defeated, he advised his troops to surrender their weapons and he left the country for Sudan. Others who had already suffered during Obote's first period in office opted for exile. Among these are many Buganda, including a close relative of the Kabaka who had been ousted by Obote.

Others were ex-soldiers from the Sudanese civil war, many of whom had joined the Ugandan Army under Amin, like the estimated 4,200 Anyanya fighters. Indeed, Amin used a number of the Sudanese (and Zairois), usually Kakwa-speakers and Muslims, in his "reign of terror." Lacking any personal links with local people that might have served to restrain excessive violence, they were ideally suited to protect Amin's position. As one Ugandan explained,

Amin recruited people who had nothing by way of military training and he uplifted them from virtually nobody to very high ranks in the army, specifically to keep a watch on his staff college-trained officers whom he feared would overthrow him. Like Brigadier Taban Lopayi [a Sudanese], a former houseboy. Some of these people couldn't even hold a map the right way up. But they were a watch on these officers whom he feared.

Among these foreigners Amin lifted to high positions was the head of "State Research," a group that carried out some of the most brutal killings. He later became Chief of Staff. Another was made governor of Gulu, Northern Province. Described as a "real terror who killed many," he was
nicknamed “drinker of blood.” Another was made the head of the military police. Yet another Sudanese was Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before he became governor of Mbarara, Western Uganda.

Such people returned home to Zaire and Sudan in 1979. Many of them are now employed in Juba; one is even working with a United National organization. Some at least continue to have links with the small section of those fighting in the bush who have loyalties to Amin. They hope that a victory by the resistance against the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) will allow them to return to high positions in Uganda. If there were a possible justification for the continued bloodshed in north-west Uganda, it would be the threat posed by such people, but most of them left Uganda in 1979. Yet, the effectiveness of the resistance to UNLA has been seriously undermined by the difficulties of distancing its organization from those who still bear the taint of Amin.

Other Ugandan refugees entering Sudan declared themselves to be “returnees” in order to get jobs. A former agricultural officer from Moyo, a graduate from Makerere University, is now in charge of the agricultural program in the settlements in Western Equatoria, employed by the aid agency contracted by UNHCR to do this work. We discussed this problem in terms of its impact upon the settlements where there is a serious lack of trained personnel. As he explained,

I am a big embarrassment to some of my friends here in Yei. They say to me, “My friend, why do you openly become a refugee? Why do you tell everybody?” I say, “but I am.” What’s wrong with that? Does it change me? The knowledge in me has no status. A refugee is somebody who has changed his home area because he has been chased by some situation. That is exactly what I am.

He explained how many of these people had been his colleagues in Uganda and they feared to associate with him because it could put their jobs in jeopardy. “If anyone bothered to check their knowledge of Arabic, they would discover they were definitely not Sudanese.”

I asked how many such professionally qualified people had declared themselves to be Sudanese. Easily 60 percent of the educated lot have declared themselves as “returnees,” and they are picking up jobs in the Sudanese government. They are well paid and they are fairly comfortable. Doctors are mainly in Kenya. But the majority of other medical personnel fortunately got picked by UNHCR or SCC or GMT[Sudan Council of Churches and German Medical Team — two organizations that employ refugees to work in the settlements].

I asked about agriculturalists:

As soon as I got work with GMT, I pulled in as many of the members who were on my staff [in Moyo District] as possible. But other fields — teachers in post primary school — the majority are declared returnees. . . and are teaching in government schools somewhere.

He went on to give other examples, like the former magistrate teaching in Juba:

There are a number of people like that. This is because on an individual basis — if you had an honorable job so to say — if you had to compete with a Sudanese you stood no chance of being employed, as a refugee. The Sudanese begin with nationality certification, not qualifications — assessments of age — and then qualifications may come as a last thing and it may not be taken seriously. . . . Individuals had to find a way to support their families by getting employed. To avoid the competition, they declared themselves as returnees. As there are Kakwa in Uganda and in Sudan, or Madi in Sudan, so they said they were Sudanese. You cannot prove the validity of anybody being Sudanese or Ugandan. They are having to do this to survive.

The Situation in Uganda after 1979

Although it is alleged that no shots were fired in resistance to the Tanzanian Army in towns such as Moyo or Arua, and that people welcomed the liberation army, it is clear that any semblance of a “normal” society had been severely disturbed by the march northward. John Jack Avudria, a refugee living in a settlement, described the situation he observed:

The liberators moved north to Koboko. Here they found nearly no living soul, for this was the place for more destruction. But the people were aware of this beforehand and had fled. In the course of moving to Koboko via a small country on the West Nile called Maracha, they left no hut, granary, chicken hut, unburned. All food crops from the fields were either slashed or uprooted.

Once the occupying army was in control, people began to move back to their homesteads. While conditions could hardly be described as peaceful, the people had hopes they would soon be left to resume their lives without harassment. Ariatre Simon, another refugee and head of a settlement school, described local attitudes toward the Tanzanians:

. . . the Tanzanian Army, who were said to have come to liberate Ugandans, made life hard for the citizens. They looted us proper. They snatched our watches, radios, television sets, bicycles, clothes, motorcars, forries, machinery in factories. . . . We did not care. . . . After all, they would leave the country in three years’ time. Good enough they didn’t kill.

However, the war of attrition against the people of the area with which Amin was identified had already begun. Again, in Simon’s words:

While the Tanzanians were busy looting, the Luo group was busy killing those tribes who had worked toward the downfall of Dr. Obote’s government. These immoral activities became encouraged when a military spokesman ordered the disarmament of what they called “Idi Amin’s soldiers” in July 1979. Many returned their guns to the new government and went to fill in surrender forms. They expected to be returned to the army because they were trained for Uganda’s national army. What happened in those days was very sad. Many soldiers who went to fill the surrender forms at their various army headquarters in their respective districts never returned to their homes. A good many never reached the prison yards. Their whereabouts are not known up to now.

The failure to integrate soldiers who had served under Amin into the new government’s military service, as Zimbabwe has attempted following independence, has subsequently been an important factor. As one Ugandan put it:

All soldiers became “Amin’s soldiers.” This is ironic. It is the
The tense situation was worsened when Dr. Obote's announcement that all members of the opposition parties were to be killed gave an announcement that all party leaders. Mr. Avudria was threatened to be killed. Nevertheless, according to the Uttar Pradesh's People's Congress (UPC), the house was not secure, so many fled to the Sudan or Zaire. Moyo District: The Head of the country had to go to fill some duties. Some went and ambushed their friends, the soldiers were owned by the military. The former soldiers were searched for, and once spotted, they were harassed, despite holding a surrender form. Their lives were not secure, so many fled to the Sudan or Zaire. Thanks go to these sister countries for giving those brothers human asylum. Many civilians were mistaken to be soldiers and these either faced death or were imprisoned. We must lament for these brothers who fled to Kenya and were returned by the Kenyan government to Uganda. Some of these faced death, others were miserably tortured and their whereabouts remains unknown.

The tene situation was worsened by the conduct of the elections, which were postponed from September 1980 to December 1980. Despite the Commonwealth team's official approval of the elections as reasonably free and fair, it is well known that Dr. Obote's party — the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) — manipulated the outcome of the elections before, during, and after the vote.

Avudria described what happened in Moyo District:

A week before December 10, 1980, the Head of State, Mr. Paul Mwanga, gave an announcement that all aspiring candidates from all over the country had to go to fill some forms in Parliament [in Kampala]. This plan was catastrophic for other parties, especially the Democratic Party [DP]. The DP party candidates were ambushed and detained until the day for this exercise expired. . . . In Moyo District the DP candidates were arrested and detained at Moyo Police Station. Similarly, in West Nile, the candidates were arrested and detained in Mondo barracks. This operation was carried out everywhere in the up-country districts. This dirty activity ceased [i.e., provoked] many party leaders. Mr. Y. Museveni, today a leader of armed resistance near Kampala, had threatened to UPC officials that he would go into bush [i.e., to fight] because elections were not held on purely democratic principles. By this time, the army lost their role. They took advantage of the situation to kill members of the opposition parties to weaken them.

After the elections, violence escalated throughout Uganda, but especially in the northwestern region. Amin's government to Uganda. Some of the soldiers were ap...
sat. She greeted me, but her voice sounded distant. She quickly covered up the cooked pumpkin in the cooking pot, grunted and sat down, looking away from us. I knew her thoughts and I was angry. I looked at Ben. He looked down, and I knew he was angry or ashamed at his mother's action.

... Here was Ben's mother, a woman who could call, and who indeed did call me her "son" on many occasions, suddenly transformed into something quite different. Ben's mother was kind and loving. She had always asked me to stay for every meal I found her preparing. But now she had to cover up the cooked pumpkin, for the same person she had so adored. I did not blame her. The forces of nature and activities of men could thus change charity into hatred and love into war. Human conscience is destroyed in them. The fiber of society are broken and men were set afloat — only their individuals remain to and for them. Ben's mother had previously had commitment to a larger community and lived and shared things with them. Now, when her life was threatened, she had as her community only herself and Ben, her son. Next, when we have to run and hide, when gunshots scatter us, she will only have herself to think about — not even Ben. How could we then talk or even dream of national unity when there is not even family unity among us? Has charity ever started abroad, not at home?

Resistance to Obote and the UNLA

The UNLA soldiers were not the only source of misery for the civilians during this tense period. There were still armed soldiers who had refused to surrender and took instead to looting and killing. One refugee — ex-Air Force — told me that although he had surrendered and begun farming, he had been forced to take up arms again to protect civilians from these marauders.

Early 1981 saw the spontaneous emergence of fighting all over the area. Peasants joined ex-soldiers attempting to protect people and property from the undisciplined guns of the UNLA and others. Initially impressive successes were scored against the government troops in many parts of the West Nile — Arua and the military barracks nearby were taken. Although there was no overall organization to this fighting, throughout most of 1981 the region was more or less under local control. A skeletal civilian administrative structure began functioning and some assistance was coming from outside the country.

While indiscriminate characterized the conduct of almost all who carried a gun, the antigovernment fighters were, on the whole, better trained than Obote's troops, most of them being career soldiers whose recruitment pre-dated Amin's rise to power, and they were skilled guerrilla fighters. People who had been displaced by the trouble following the withdrawal of the Tanzanian troops gradually began returning to their homes.

Most of the antigovernment fighting was organized under the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF). Moses Ali, a Minister of Finance under Amin, was temporarily designated as leader. He had funds in Europe which, as one refugee put it, he had been able to "divert" and, being Muslim, had connections in Libya. He had also satisfied those fighting in the bush that he had no desire to bring back an Amin government.

The initial success against Obote's forces encouraged some of Amin's officers who were living comfortably in Zaire and the Sudan to return to Uganda. One was Colonel Elly Hassan, who had been living in Zaire and arrived on the scene after the taking of Arua. Announcing that he had direct contact with Amin, who would supply arms, he demanded recognition as the highest ranking officer. He called his movement the Ugandan Army (UA) and designated Koboko as the central command headquarters. His real interest, however, soon became apparent. He and his men commandeered transport to haul television sets and other valuables out of the country, even neglecting to secure the heavy arms and ammunition which had been captured at the Arua barracks. Introducing further division into the loosely organized antigovernment forces, he announced that Koboko would belong only to Kakwa-speakers. Instead of fighting, he and about 60 of his men smuggled coffee out of Uganda to Zaire and the Sudan, becoming notorious for their atrocities against the civilian population.

Eventually UNRF coalesced and managed to push the UA out of Uganda, but with heavy losses. This internal fighting weakened the antigovernment forces, however, and allowed UNLA gradually to take control. At Arua, some degree of normality had returned by July 1982 and some refugees were returning to the district from Zaire.

Elly Hassan settled down as a refugee near the border town of Kaya in the Sudan. There he concentrated on his coffee-smuggling activities with the complicity of locals on both sides of the Zaire-Sudan border. As previously noted, however, he was arrested by Sudanese authorities in September 1982, ostensibly on the grounds that arms were found in his compound.

Among the exiled UNRF fighters, some favored formation of a government in exile which would include civilians; others wanted it to consist only of military leaders. Since Moses Ali was able to supply arms and ammunition, UNRF was loath to oust him, although his officers in the bush were reportedly corrupt. As one man who had commanded anti-UNLA fighters near Obongi explained at an interview in Nairobi, any officer who had money or cigarettes could bribe the men of another officer to turn against him.

The soldiers of UNLA had problems of a similar nature. First, it was nearly impossible for the government in Kampala to supply the troops in northwest Uganda, and the guerrillas were frequently successful at attacking convoys carrying food and arms. Standing by the UNHCR reception office at the Kaya border, one could watch UNLA soldiers digging cassava and there were incidents when these men sold their arms to Sudanese in exchange for food. A number of UNLA men deserted to UNRF. Second, ethnic and religious tensions sometimes led to violence in the barracks and a general lack of discipline.

In September, the UNRF held a meeting inside Uganda in an attempt to improve their fighting force. Officers who were "causing confusion" were discredited and Moses Ali's leadership was repudiated. Efforts were made to contact Major C. Mondo, another officer with a long career in the military who had earned the respect of the
troops. It was hoped that Mondo, a Christian, would agree to take command of UNRF forces. In November, at another meeting in Chei, Arua District, UNRF approved a civilian political wing. These efforts to change the character of the UNRF organization were futile, however, given the lack of new supplies of ammunition. In December when the Obote government made its big push northward toward the Sudan border, it met little resistance and thousands more refugees fled into the Sudan.

Civilian Movements
Throughout 1981 there had been no peace for the civilians. The fortune of opposing armies changed from day to day, and civilians moved in response. While some moved into UNHCR settlements, most waited on the border or hid in the bush in Uganda, attempting to keep within reach of food supplies. By the beginning of 1982, thousands of refugee families had established compounds along the entire length of the border. Because there were few Sudanese living there, they were able to get permission from local chiefs to cultivate the land. Staying on the border not only allowed the refugees to maintain their independence, they were also able to keep in touch with events inside Uganda. Many of the anti-Obote fighters kept their families in the relative safety of this area and there was a rotation system which allowed them to spend some time in the Sudan helping with the farming. Farming was extensive on both sides of the border. The lack of cohesion and order among anti-Obote forces, together with the general chaos and frequent guerrilla attacks on civilians, gradually led to a loss of confidence in the UNRF. Mounting shortages of food affected soldiers from both sides, as well as the civilians who kept risking their lives by returning to Uganda for food. Civilians were required to pay a modest “tax” to guerrilla leaders or the local administrators whom they had appointed. In return, a permit was issued which guaranteed safe movement in and out of Uganda. Civilians apprehended by anti-Obote fighters, if without such a permit, were suspected of being UNLA collaborators. While they could be released, usually a relative had to pay several head of cattle; in the absence of such resources some captured civilians were killed. One young woman returning to Uganda from the Zaire border escaped death only because a guerrilla commander decided to take her as his mistress. A former headmistress of a secondary school and a highly intelligent and principled woman, she agreed in order to save her life. She made her long journey to the settlement pregnant.

Elly Hassan’s men sat up roadblocks and looted civilians who tried to pass into Zaire. They even circulated in the town of Kaya, collecting taxes from refugees in Sudan territory! Such lack of discipline among the guerrillas led more people to opt for the settlements.

Within Uganda the main victims of violence were also civilians. The commander of an anti-Obote force in the Abongi region says he lost only three men during 1982 but the loss of civilian lives was staggering. UNLA soldiers, unable to confront the guerrillas in the bush, challenged every civilian who moved outside the homestead or village. Those captured were forced to reveal the whereabouts of others. At one point, many of these captured civilians — including women — were dressed in UNLA uniforms and this commander reported that after a long battle in March 1982 they found — to their horror — that they had killed their own people.

Dr. Umar, the only medical doctor working inside the guerrilla-controlled area, wrote a report on conditions inside Uganda. His report is a graphic description of the inordinate sufferings of the people who remained inside. After enumerating the population still trapped there and describing the appalling health conditions, he notes:

Death is so common it is no longer a bereavement. Life has lost its meaning. The dead are not even given their due respect. Many are unburied, especially those who perish from the barrel [of a gun]. Those who get buried are wrapped in banana leaves, for burial cloth has become a treasure hard to come by.

Although many thousands registered for UNHCR settlement during the March and April “emergency,” others who moved out of Uganda after January remained in the already overcrowded border area. There was space for houses, but it was impossible for the new arrivals to obtain cultivable land. They survived by selling their possessions, particularly any cattle they had escaped with, and by working...
for others — both Sudanese and Ugandan — for abysmally low wages. Many starved to death.

Why did they not move to the settlements? Rumors spread quickly among a refugee population, and some of these seem to have been deliberately planted by the guerrilla fighters who depended upon the civilians for their food supplies. Many refugees believed that to register in a transit center was to be subjected to forcible repatriation on UNHCR lorries. (Indeed, much earlier, some Ugandan refugees forcibly repatriated from Kenya were executed on their return.) There were rumors that people starved to death in the settlements and that there were wild animals and epidemics. They feared the loss of their property to local Sudanese en route, and they had heard they would be forced to pay poll tax. Many stayed on the border simply because they still held the vain hope that things would return to normal in Uganda, others because they had relatives fighting in the bush.

In May, the UNHCR assistance program found itself desperately short of supplies and totally unprepared for the growing number of refugees. Constant monitoring of the military activities inside Uganda and checking on conditions along the border could have provided the information needed to anticipate and prepare for the crisis but lack of staff in the field prevented this activity.

I made many trips to the border to interview self-settled civilians, many of them the families of resistance fighters. I found that refugees were the best people to collect this information and requested some to write reports. Some were ex-fighters who had abandoned the struggle but kept in close touch with events inside Uganda. Traders too moved in and out, mostly selling fish. One young man, who travelled along the border and inside Uganda in July, reported on conditions as follows:

The Kaya river divides Keria and Ajo, the place where a few refugees have taken up refuge. And they go back across the river to bring foodstuffs to eat and at times bring them to Kala [a refugee settlement] market. I witnessed two incidents where a woman with a baby on her back and another small girl who tried to cross, of course, on foot, and were almost carried away by the fast-flowing water. It was only good luck that two other men plus me were at hand to rescue them. Now the greatest risk here lies when rain falls heavily on the upper areas of the river, especially in the period from late July to November. Hence it will be difficult too, for those refugees to move.

In July he estimated that only a third of the self-settled refugees along the border had been there since 1980-81; the remainder are “all the newly fled June 1982 arrivals.”

The old settlers have opened areas for cultivation. They mostly grow food crops such as cassava, maize, sorghum, millet, peas, beans, groundnuts, etc. and are nearly ready to harvest. Some of the refugees who live across the river Kaya [inside Uganda] at Ajo have already done the harvesting. They sleep in poorly constructed shelters and lie on skins to sleep on bare ground or on locally made beds. There are many cases of poor health. Malnutrition, where most children appear in withering condition or have folded skin with thin legs, [was common].

He went on to describe the many cases of illness he saw and noted that starvation was “rising high, especially amongst the newly fled refugees. This is so because some came from distances so great they could not risk to go back to collect the food items they left behind.” But still he found people refusing to come to the settlements. The military situation in mid-July was also a factor, as the report continued: “The refugees feel protected within those areas for there is a moderately strong guerrilla seal from the UNLA infiltration.” But this “seal” was only effective at certain points along the border. He concluded his report with an appeal to UNHCR to send someone to convince the suffering civilians that life would be more tolerable in the settlements.

Despite the great suffering Ugandans endured on the border as the area became overcrowded and food ran short, I was told it was not UNHCR policy to encourage faster movement to the settlements, and there is indeed some justification for this policy. First, the means of assistance were already in short supply. Second, experience everywhere had demonstrated that when aid is available it sometimes has the effect of attracting people who might otherwise have remained within their own country. In other situations, such as in Eritrea and Tigray, the opposing forces have persuaded some voluntary agencies to supply assistance to the civilians inside the country in order to prevent the exodus of refugees.
This man waited too long to make the long journey to the settlement. His child died of malnutrition the night the lorry brought his family to Yei. Only a few months later his wife died as well.

The Bureaucratic Context
An important part of refugee assistance is the bureaucratic structure through which it is organized. This series of Reports can touch on only some aspects of the many problems that ultimately affect refugees. Many are characteristic of all bureaucracies, but they are intensified in the Sudan because of the country's extreme poverty and its dependence upon outside aid.

The Commissioner of Refugees (COR) office was established in 1967 as part of the central government in Khartoum under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Over the years, in response to different influxes of refugees in different parts of the country, the COR set up provincial offices which were directly responsible to the central office. The central office, on the other hand, was to channel information regarding the rules of granting asylum to other relevant ministries and departments, such as the security and the police forces. Second, it had the mandate to plan for refugee assistance and to coordinate the activities of international agencies. Most important, it was the implementing body for all assistance channelled into the country either directly through unilateral aid earmarked for refugees or UNHCR-financed programs.

From the beginning, the COR relationship with the Ministry of the Interior was ad hoc, with no institutionalized guidelines or separate budget. As its offices expanded throughout eastern Sudan, recruitment was most usually done through secondment of local government staff. There were many gaps in its authority. For example, the Foreign Office would, at times, negotiate directly with embassies, the OAU, the Permanent Mission in Geneva, or the Executive Council of UNHCR. This uncertain status affected the COR's ability to carry out its mandate or to enforce Sudanese law concerning refugee rights, to say nothing of weakening its position vis-a-vis the international aid community.

In 1979, when Nimeiry made his first moves toward the devolution of power to the regions, he reorganized the ministries. The Ministry of the Interior was dissolved and some of its different functions were attached to regional governments. In the process, the COR remained in limbo for six months, after which it was attached to the Council of Ministers. A further reorganization re-established the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in 1980, the COR was again made a part of it. Simultaneously, there was discussion of a proposal that COR should be established as a semi-autonomous body having four departments, all under a national council for aid for refugees. All ministries whose work was affected by refugees would be represented on it and the council would have a degree of freedom which would allow it to negotiate directly on various matters. For example, in times of financial restrictions, it would be able to appeal directly to international donors for support.

The COR remains under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but in 1982 a beginning was made toward strengthening it through the passing of The Refugee Fund Bill (1980). The Minister for Internal Affairs, not the Commission for Refugees, is executive of the Fund. This legislation requires, among other things, the pooling of all funds, both those obtained internationally and from the local budget for refugees. This will allow the COR to recruit its own staff without reference to other ministries. It also allows the COR to negotiate directly with government departments over certain matters — such as with regional offices over land allocation for refugee settlements, and with the Treasury over exchange rates allowed on funds given for refugee assistance, and duty on the import of relief items.

The financial burden of caring for refugees is enormous and countries that host them are forced to appeal for outside assistance. It should be noted, however, that the greatest financial burden is carried by the host government. For example, the UNHCR budget for refugees in the Sudan supports only a fraction of the actual numbers in the country. In 1979, the UNHCR program served 60,000 out of a total of 441,000 refugees. Most refugees manage to live independently of assistance programs, although this hardly means that they are self-supporting, or contribute to the economy. On the contrary, these self-settled refugees are an enormous burden for the fragile economy of the Sudan, affecting the price of commodities and rents, and straining social services to the breaking point, not to mention the effects of these pressures on relations between refugees and the host population.

Although the COR office is formally responsible for the implementation of all assistance programs, this is complicated in practice by the
The COR is often viewed by voluntary agencies as simply an obstacle to get round or to manipulate in order that they may get on with the work they have elected to fund in the country.

Relationships between agencies are similarly marred by competition. One agency was contracted by UNHCR to build schools and clinics in settlements in a certain area. Another agency, contracted to staff all the clinics, immediately began building another clinic started in the same place. It then contacted UNHCR in Khartoum — not the COR — to complain about the way the first agency was “duplicating” its work. The first agency decided to bow out of the conflict, since this was only one manoeuvre by the latter to push it out of the work entirely.

Over the years, relationships between agency personnel and the COR have become increasingly strained, with many COR officials expressing bitter resentment of, as they put it, the agencies’ usurpation of Sudanese sovereignty. From time to time, with staff changes on both sides, there have been attempts to resolve misunderstandings. However, even the best-intentioned individuals cannot resolve the contradictions implicit in relationships between indigenous professionals and foreign agency personnel. Chief among the problems is salary: indigenous professions are usually as qualified educationally as the foreign personnel and in most cases have considerably more experience, yet foreign agency personnel earn wages based upon European or American standards and further “topped up” as a result of their working in what are deemed hardship zones. Even if Sudanese working in refugee assistance enjoy better working conditions or higher salaries then they would have in the ministries from which they were seconded, they are keenly aware that these improvements are a measure of their dependence on the international donors who support the COR budget.

Another dimension of the bureaucratic context is particular to circumstances in southern Sudan. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which saw an end to the Sudanese civil war, included the granting of semi-autonomy to the southern region. Until 1979, refugee assistance programs were directed from the COR office in Khartoum. When the influx from Uganda began, the regional government insisted that it be given authority for dealing with the refugees. A Project Management office was eventually established in Juba, with authority over planning and implementation, but responsibility for coordination between central government ministries and international agencies was given to the COR in Khartoum. While the southern regional government was granted the right to appoint the Project Manager, the appointment had to be approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although the appointee was then directly responsible to regional ministries. Thus, proposals for aid and plans for assistance programs were to be processed through the COR office at the center, but the administration and implementation was to be done at the regional level. This meant that, unlike the project management in eastern Sudan which is directly responsible to the COR office in Khartoum, in the south, another bureaucratic level was established.

The roles and relationships of the COR in Khartoum with Juba are further complicated by the sheer distance of the southern region from Khartoum, the lack of communication and transportation facilities between them, as well as by the problems of the constitutional status of the south.

In 1980, serious conflicts arose which affected relationships between the COR and the office in Juba as well as between it and international agencies involved in refugee assistance. An incident occurred which required the dismissal of the Project Manager. The Deputy Commissioner for Refugees in Khartoum was sent to Juba as Acting Project Manager until the regional government had put forward a candidate to replace him. Then the selection process was delayed because of events totally unrelated to refugees. Elections which were scheduled first for 1981 were...
rescheduled for 1982. When a candidate for Project Manager was finally approved, he was unable to take up the appointment because of ill-health.

In the meantime, the delay as well as the specific events that had led to the dismissal of the first Project Manager had an adverse effect upon the relationship of the office in Juba with the voluntary agencies there. In the south there are only three voluntary organizations contractually involved in refugee work, all active in the Sudan since the close of the civil war. They came to help with reconstruction of the region and then got involved in different aspects of development work. They were asked to extend their services to refugee assistance, some of the funds coming from UNHCR. With the ever-increasing influx of refugees from Uganda, UNHCR expanded its offices in Juba and assumed responsibility for implementing the entire program, even food distribution, in partnership with the volags. Although the two Sudanese assistant Project Managers continued working as counterparts to UNHCR staff, the overall involvement of the Juba regional office was dramatically reduced.

The Borders
Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire are no strangers to the problems of refugees. All three countries have produced and hosted refugees for their neighbors. While granting asylum has been deemed a humanitarian and not an unfriendly political act, the presence of refugee populations from a country embroiled in civil war has serious political implications for relations between neighboring states. Moreover, as the previous section indicated, the internal politics of the host country are another variable affecting the treatment of refugees. Struggles for power among regionally based elites continue and refugee issues easily become their battleground too. Thus insecurity of refugees is increased as central government policy shifts from time to time in response to internal and to international pressure.

The border between Uganda and the Sudan is ill-defined and ill-protected. Fewer than 200 military personnel are assigned to the Sudan border posts between the Nile River and the Zaire border, a distance of 97 miles. The soldiers are ill-equipped and lack adequate means of transport and communication. This means the border is permeable not only for refugee crossings but for military activity as well. The repeated incursions by the UNLA noted earlier put the Khartoum government in a very delicate situation vis-a-vis the Ugandan government, with which it is officially on friendly terms.

From the point of view of some refugees, that the Sudan government did not take steps to defend the border (and the lives of the refugees who were living along it) was evidence of complicity with Kampala. (There is no evidence to suggest this is true.) In fact, many Ugandans as well as Sudanese derived advantages from maintaining stable borders. Some guerrilla fighters kept their families in the relative safety of the border area, just inside Sudan, and those who were sympathetic to their cause were a source of food and other support.

Local Sudanese too had interests in encouraging refugees to remain on the border. They had brought relative prosperity to an area which, until then, had been largely unpopulated. The refugees farmed, paid local taxes, and sold, usually at a reduced price, items such as bicycles, sewing machines, and roofing materials which they had brought with them from Uganda. Food prices dropped considerably because of increased production.

As UNLA pressed the fight to the borders, the local government's first reaction was to ask UNHCR to speed up the movement of refugees registering at transit centers near the border. Then, in September 1982, local authorities notified the selfsettled refugees that they must quit the entire area. Many locals interpreted the order to mean that the Ugandans, even those who had been there for some time, must abandon their crops and personal property as well. It is too easy to blame the Sudanese officials who are responsible for the security of the area. The problems reflect the poverty of the region and the extreme fragility of institutions to cope in refugee-affected areas.

Some two-thirds of the refugees registering at transit centers for settlement from September to November were thus people who had opted to remain on the border. Unlike the new arrivals from inside Uganda, they were not suffering extreme levels of malnutrition and illness. This change in the composition of the new influx had important consequences for the assistance pro-
Refugees who settled near the border have brought considerable prosperity to an area which formerly was sparsely populated.

program. The alarming condition of the refugees who had been arriving in the settlements throughout the preceding months had prompted an increase in the numbers of medical workers from abroad. Normal delays in making such arrangements meant that they had arrived too late to have much effect upon the condition of these people and some felt they had responded to a false alarm. In one case, an agency had begun arrangements to withdraw its emergency medical team. Fortunately, however, this arrangement was also delayed as the predicted escalation in numbers from inside Uganda began again in December.

The inherent boundaries that divide ethically related communities also intersect historical trading routes which have continued more or less uninterrupted, but this movement of goods is now defined as "smuggling." Differences in the value of the three currencies, (Sudanese, Zairoise and Ugandan), availability of goods, and internal pricing policies determined the direction of the flow of gold, coffee, ivory, skins, and other commodities, including manufactured items. This trade (or traffic - depending on one's point of view) is affected by the interests of the middlemen who control it and the local officials who are responsible for enforcing the laws which originate (so very far away) in the offices of the central government. It is an area ripe for manipulation and corruption. Even if local officials on one side of a border wish to impose customs or immigration procedures, at points like "Mile 38" the middleman merely has to cross a road to conduct his business in Zaire! Since control of this international trade is not seen as benefiting local people, there is little incentive to regulate it. Officials responsible for collecting duties may even recognize the advantages locally of the free movement of goods. One refugee claimed that the medicines for sale in Kaya, the border town just inside the Sudan, came from the hospitals in Uganda which had been looted by the UNLA. Some of the movement of goods included arms and ammunition. There were even reports that the UNLA was selling arms to the Sudanese.

The Infrastructure

The extreme poverty of southern Sudan has a considerable influence on the way refugees are received by the local population and the quality (and quantity) of assistance. The area provides ample argument for a regional developmental approach to refugee assistance. It is landlocked, and suffers from shortages of everything not locally produced. Even local production is hindered by the particular ecology of at least Western Equatoria. Such modern infrastructural development as there was disappeared during the protracted civil war and little has been replaced or repaired. Most imported items come by road, directly from Kenya or through Uganda, via Nimule. The air service between Khartoum and Juba, the capital of the southern region, is irregular, and transport by river across the Sudd is limited. There are several small charter flights connecting the south of Sudan with Nairobi, but few connect it with Khartoum.

Fuel is rarely available in sufficient quantity for even official use, and for the private consumer there is only the black market. A five gallon jerrycan of diesel fuel costs £50.00 (ES1 = US$.76). The fuel comes by road from Mombasa. Foreign exchange problems, particularly since the August 1 disturbances, have caused Kenya to reduce its imports and reduce its refinery capacity. As I left Sudan in October 1982 it was rumored that Kenya would no longer allow the export of fuel.

The poverty of the south which, it could be argued, is not much greater than that of any part of the Sudan, not only complicates the delivery of assistance to refugees on the part of the international organizations but makes the tasks of the local officials nearly impossible. Although UNHCR's chief mandate is the protection of refugees, in the end it can only monitor. It must depend on the capacity of local officials to deal with security matters. Their ability to do so is, in turn, rendered nearly impossible by lack of resources. An example from one settlement illustrates the problems. A Sudanese policeman ran amok in a settlement. He shot and killed a Sudanese, wounding others. He then terrorized the settlement by throwing a hand grenade into the house of a refugee, who barely escaped with her life. Finally, he set on fire several houses including his own - before walking down the road to Kajo-Kaji to turn himself in at the police station. When the message reached the District Headquarters in Yei, the Chief of Police was forced to go to the UNHCR office to ask for transport so as to investigate the problem; his own office had neither fuel nor a vehicle.
In another case, a Sudanese was found robbed and murdered near a refugee settlement. The local people panicked, certain that the culprit was a Ugandan. They armed themselves with bows and arrows and laid ambushes in the tall grass on the road leading to the settlement. Refugees were unable to move, even to their own farms. Only a local official with recognized authority and appropriate linguistic skills could handle this delicate situation. Again, without the loan of a vehicle to make necessary trips to the area, they would not have been able to maintain the security or protect the refugees.

All government offices suffer from such problems. The Inspector of Health for the district was unable to answer an emergency call in August to stem an epidemic of a fatal type of dysentery. When UNHCR began to coordinate its work in the settlements with the local education office, it was again necessary to provide the transportation for the officials to move from settlement to settlement to vet the qualifications of the refugee teachers. This dependence of officials on the relative affluence of the international agencies in the region (and it was indeed relative), hardly served to improve relationships between their respective personnel.

Providing assistance to refugees also affected their relationships with the local people. I have already noted that UNHCR’s objective is to bring the standard of the refugees up to that of the local population, but if that standard is unacceptably low, to raise it as well. The arrival of lorries laden down with supplies for refugees served to remind Sudanese locals of their own extreme poverty. Refugees often reported that local people would say angrily that when they had been in Uganda as refugees they had received no assistance from UNHCR nor anyone else. In southern Sudan it was often the case that even supplying such commodities as blankets caused problems, as the local people in some places had none. They used fires in their houses to keep warm at night, a recourse unavailable to the refugees who were, initially, living in tents. In one settlement, refugees often implored UNHCR officials to hand out blankets to the locals, but supplies were so short none could be diverted. There was a continuing debate between agencies concerning the relative standards of health of refugees and local people. Clinics (and schools) established in or near settlements were required to serve local people as well as refugees. However, the already established institutions, such as hospitals and schools, which were often overburdened by refugees, were hardly assisted and tensions between the Sudanese and refugees were exacerbated as a result.

Although this Report has highlighted some aspects of the political, economic, and social context affecting refugee assistance in southern Sudan, those familiar with this or similar situations will appreciate that the problems have necessarily been oversimplified. It would be impossible to portray in a written account the day-to-day difficulties confronting refugees, government officials, and agency personnel. Programs and budgets are always impersonal, but workers in the field must deal with people and respond to situations as individuals. Part Two in this series will describe the program of refugee assistance in Western Equatoria as it attempted to implement all the new fashions in refugee policy, including participation, self-sufficiency, and integration.

Acknowledgement

I am indebted to all the refugees who provided information. The conditions under which we worked were confused and confusing, so I sought confirmation of their reports from unrelated sources. For example, one refugee slipped out of the Sudan, through Zaire, to Arua and returned. He was interviewed and an account of his experience was recorded by another refugee. The accuracy of his observations on conditions in Arua was confirmed by reports made by OXFAM officials who visited Arua at about the same time.

Everyone who conducts research relies on the knowledge and cooperation of others. I thank the many who assisted me in so many ways, and so generously. These include agency personnel in Geneva, Khartoum, Juba, and Yei, but especially Sjoerd van Schooneveld and Berhane Waldemichael. My deepest sense of obligation and gratitude is to the Sudanese officials who offered hospitality in their country and provided information unselshishly. Sudanese assume the largest responsibility for hosting refugees, and often receive the least thanks for it. The people I want to mention particularly are Imet Jugbara, the Acting Project Manager for the southern region; Nehemiah Iyenga, the Project Manager for Western Equatoria; and all the local officials in Yei, Kaya and Kajo-Kaji.

My greatest intellectual debt is to Mr. Ahmed Karadawi, Assistant Commissioner for Refugees. My first conversation with him opened my eyes to a wide number of important theoretical issues, and he has continued to share his insights unselshishly. I am especially appreciative of his assistance in writing Part II: The Bureaucratic Context of Refugee Assistance.

I first began to learn about the problems of refugees in Sudan from Dr. Abd Al-Rahman Ahmed Al-Bashir, the former Commissioner for Refugees, as he was writing his thesis in Oxford. He encouraged me to go to the Sudan and introduced me to his colleagues working throughout the country. My knowledge of the background to the problems comes from their theses and other writings. I thank them.

My first visits to refugee settlements were in the company of the present Commissioner, His Excellency Abdel el Magid Beshir (and Karen Abu Zayd). I learned a great deal from this first experience. I thank His Excellency for allowing me to work under the authority of his office and for protecting, not only refugees, but also me during my work. His long experience as an ambassador for the Sudan government, together with his very remarkable personal skills, helped him keep in balance a situation which could easily get out of control.
NOTES

1. Sudan, officially on good terms with Uganda, is understandably reluctant to come into direct conflict with Obote's troops. In Yei local officials frequently reported incursions by UNLA forces. In August 1982, Uganda radio denied the reports and accused the Sudan government of using UNHCR funds to rehabilitate its own poor, alleging also that the thousands who were waiting in transit centers during August were Sudanese— not Ugandan refugees.

2. Information from Sudanese sources indicates that 14,000 new refugees entered the country in December and after January 4 the rate of entry increased dramatically. One report claimed 10,000 new Ugandan refugees entered Sudan following Obote's “Christmas exercise,” described as “particularly brutal.” Although some had predicted that such an influx could be expected, the international aid community found itself unprepared. There are shortages of food, medicines, tents, and blankets. Although the World Food Programme recently signed an agreement to supply food for 36,000 new refugees, the weekly ration recorded in one settlement was one kilogram of unground dura and half a cup of fish powder. While children under 5 need a very minimum of 1,000 Kcal for survival, they were receiving 533 Kcal. Water shortages became more acute as the dry season progressed, but the drilling rig flown in during November could not be operated until a local dispute over who is in charge of it was settled.

3. The Sudanese authorities, by facilitating my access to the settlements and allowing me to conduct my research, provided me with an opportunity available to few independent researchers, for which I am extremely grateful. Ordinarily, research concerning refugees—whatever its focus—is conducted by agency consultants who remain in an area for only a matter of weeks at the most. There are many reasons for this failure to support intensive research, for an emergency places an enormous strain on an already overworked field staff. It is also alleged that some situations are politically sensitive, although this argument is often exaggerated for complicated internal reasons. There are as yet no schools other than experience to prepare the field staff for the enormously complex and difficult work of managing an emergency. Often the field workers themselves are the least experienced. Agencies base their fund-raising appeals on reports of their successes; these reports are not written by outsiders. Critical observations made internally are kept as classified information. Not only do independent researchers have difficulty in obtaining such information, host governments are usually not privy to them either. Most aid agency personnel do not have an academic background which would prepare them to do empirical research, and even if they do possess these skills, time does not allow them to conduct it. Many are very defensive toward academicians.

One very serious consequence of this lack of in-depth studies is the absence of data upon which to plan assistance programs. As it is, most decisions are based upon individual impressions and serious disputes erupt if “impressions” diverge. Sometimes surveys are conducted in an attempt to gain more reliable information but most consultants admit that these are “quick and dirty.” In fairness, often this cannot be avoided; still the danger arises when there is (as is often the case) interest in portraying the situation as either better or worse than it is. The most-feared independent observers are journalists, and there are concerted efforts in many quarters to keep them out, or at least limit their access. From the agencies’ point of view, there are good reasons: it is generally agreed that one of the most damaging effects of dramatic reports of human suffering in the international press is the overresponse that sometimes occurs. Contrary to popular opinion, some voluntary agencies have difficulty in finding places to work and spend their money in the way they would like. An emergency attracts relief workers and most “development-oriented” agencies agree that the least valuable assistance is too many expatriate personnel. On the other hand, agencies compete over turf and manipulate government officials in their interagency struggles. Governments need independent observers as badly as do refugees. Both are relatively voiceless in the international
aid industry. While inordinate attention is given to the question of accountability of officials, spending, with accusations of corruption flying through the corridors of agency offices, agencies themselves are singularly unaccountable, addicted to be refugees, the host government, or even their own constituencies.

4. One exception is the resettlement program in Sudan for refugees from Ethiopia. Now that the result of the black lobby in the U.S., government officials extended the refugee quota to include Africans. While there are obvious merits to this decision, critics charge that most of those selected for immigration are skilled workers in settlements. One agency had to replace its medical staff three times over the period of a year as it lost its personnel to the resettlement program. There is also evidence that information concerning the resettlement program reaches deep inside Ethiopia and attracts officials who should not otherwise leave the country to seek asylum. The consulor in Port Sudan met some of these who had been working in Amara before the heart-pounding possibility of getting sent to the U.S.

5. The information I have gathered concerning the situation in southern Sudan is, in one sense, available too late to be of any use. Government spending, with accusations of corruption, plus new recruits to its donors, then comes the long process of procurement. In the case of food, as Tony Jackson has pointed out in his book Against the Grain: The Dilemma of Project Food Aid (OXFAM 1982), only 10 percent of all food given to poor countries is available for emergencies where it means the difference between life and death. The World Food Programme is the agency that is responsible for delivering food to refugees.

6. Each refugee emergency requires that UNHCR make a fresh appeal to its donors; then comes the long process of procurement. In the case of food, as Tony Jackson has pointed out in his book Against the Grain: The Dilemma of Project Food Aid (OXFAM 1982), only 10 percent of all food given to poor countries is available for emergencies where it means the difference between life and death. The World Food Programme is the agency that is responsible for delivering food to refugees.

7. Although half of the world's 10 million refugees are in Africa, UNHCR allocated only 21.9 percent of its 1980 budget for that purpose. Only 10 percent was spent on Asia. Per capita spending varies similarly: in Pakistan it was $40-50, while in Somalia, a program based on a paper delivered at the Ford Foundation-sponsored Conference on Refugees held in Khartoum, Sudan, in September 1982. The former Vice-President also brought his wives and 37 children. In July 1982, he came to the UNHCR office to appeal for assistance because he had already been four of his five cars and was, he said, now dependent on farming the land around the house he was living in near Yei, and on the transport company with which he had established. When advised that UNHCR could assist him only if he went to live in a settlement, he remarked that all over the world he was known as a Vice-President - how could he possibly go and live in a settlement? He thought that either UNHCR or the Sudan government should pay him at least a half-salary.

8. I have always tried to avoid the use of the term "tribe" and tried to convince UNHCR personnel in the field of the limited value of the term. Some of them were inventing new "tribes" much in the way some "tribe" names were originally made up by Europeans. For example, Lugbara speakers from Aringa County were thought to display different characteristics from others of the same ethnic background, and I learned on my arrival at Uganda that "tribe" names became "Aringa." Unfortunately, my efforts were defeated by the Ugandan refugees themselves, who also describe the world in terms of "tribe." The situation was made even within this country, there are enormous differences between programs for refugees from Ethiopia and those for Ugandans or Chadians. Some refugees do not get funded at all, or at least not as they should. For example, Algeria hosted Sahrawi refugees from 1975, but UNHCR allocated assistance (less than $2 million) for the 150,000 civil administration.


10. The former Vice-President also brought his wives and 37 children. In July 1982, he came to the UNHCR office to appeal for assistance because he had already been four of his five cars and was, he said, now dependent on farming the land around the house he was living in near Yei, and on the transport company with which he had established. When advised that UNHCR could assist him only if he went to live in a settlement, he remarked that all over the world he was known as a Vice-President - how could he possibly go and live in a settlement? He thought that either UNHCR or the Sudan government should pay him at least a half-salary.

11. Warfare in many parts of Uganda prevented voting. More than one OPC candidate publicly acknowledged defeat when the ballots were counted, only to hear over Kampala radio that they had won in their constituency! The Commonwealth Team were severely restricted in their movements. See both The Times and The Guardian, December 11 and 12, 1982, the Commonwealth Team's own report, para. 103, 137-9. One member of the team, who for obvious reasons cannot be named, admitted that he placed on the list by the Thatcher government to okay the elections in return for Obote's promise to permit the Asians to return to Uganda.

12. For symbolic reasons, nearly all refugees living in the Sudan kept their watches set to East African Standard Time, one hour earlier than Sudan Time. These words were attributed to Obote in a document printed and widely circulated during Amin's reign. It was extremely provocative propaganda, playing on tribal and religious antagonisms. One refugee told me the author of his book was Felix Onama, a former close associate of Obote's and, later, his competitor and enemy. Onama is said to have been one of the most important advisers. In an unpublished and anonymous account, "The Man Who Elevated Amin," the author describes Onama's shrewd political manipulations.

13. There appears to be no organized opposition that could be termed a "resistance movement" outside the country. The several anti-Obote groups living in exile include Popular Resistance Army, led by Yoweri Museveni; the Ugandan Freedom Fighters, led by Yusefu Lule (President of Uganda for the first 68 days after his overthrow), the Uganda Freedom Movement, led by Andrew Kayira (a minister under Lule); the Uganda National Rescue Front, led by Mokonori Ali (initially the ac-
Acholis and that they were going to fight that night. Each group became well aware and was well armed. A lot of guns were shot in the barracks that night but the end result was not known.

Yesterday, some Ugandan refugees, two women and children and one man, escaped from Uganda - Arua County - and reported the evil atrocities of the Ugandan troops still continuing in that part, capturing and killing civilians, taking some to their barracks to help them do tedious work such as drawing half a barrel full of water, heaps of firewood, and cooking for them the whole day, etc, etc. Some are taken and never heard of and some are said to taken to Arua town. Raping and killing and burning houses top amongst their activities. I was told the guerrillas clashed with them on 5-9-82 and shot four of them dead, and the rest escaped. It appears the guerrillas are gaining strength over them.

Refugees frequently report seeing wild animals, including lions, leopards, wild buffalo, hyena and deer.

In 1982, the refugee settlements in Western Equatoria have not suffered epidemics as such, although the death rate has been high. Last year, however, according to a nurse who had worked in the area, some 1,800 children died in a measles epidemic in the refugee settlements in Eastern Equatoria.

17. While the program suffered shortages throughout the emergency, from late May 1982 until after the first week of July there were no tents, blankets, clothing, cooking pots, tools, or milk powder for the new arrivals. Other food supplies for all of the settlements were very limited. At no time during my stay in the southern region of the Sudan did refugees in Western Equatoria receive all of the items in the World Food Programme's "food basket."

18. The entire program in Western Equatoria was managed by one UNHCR program officer. During the emergency, two consultants and one other UNHCR staff member were sent to help, each for only a few weeks. The protection officer and the education officer came on a mission lasting but a few days. The UNHCR office was strengthened only in August.

19. On one trip with the OXFAM field officer, we interviewed several fighters near Kaya. One, noting the failure of the international press to report the situation, asked us to try and obtain a scholarship for one of them to study journalism. He said that since no journalists were willing to come to report, they could then send their reports.


21. Sudan has more than one official exchange rate and there have been attempts to impose duty as well as defense tax on contributions to refugees.

22. Materials such as palm leaf, grass, and bamboo which Ugandans were accustomed to use for making mats and other household items were either unavailable or in very short supply.