

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

Kantor Pos
Modjokerto, East Java
Indonesia
November 14, 1955

Mr. W. S. Rogers
Institute of Current World Affairs
522 Fifth Avenue
New York 36, New York

Dear Mr. Rogers:

The official results of the recent Indonesian Election will not be released for many weeks, perhaps not until after New Years. Meanwhile, the newspapers have been keeping the public informed, though somewhat confused, with unofficial tabulations.

The unofficial figures vary according to the political bias of the source. All sources, however, agree that,

- (a) More than eighty percent of the registered voters in Java have cast ballots. The turnout has been lower in the outer islands.
- (b) Close to eighty-five percent of the votes have been won by the four biggest parties:

Masjumi
P.N.I. (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
*N.U. (Nahdlatul Ulama)
P.K.I. (Indonesian Communist Party)

- (c) First place in the election will be won by either the Masjumi or the P.N.I., followed by the N.U. and P.K.I. in that order.

The unofficial figures have been compiled from information released by the thousands of Polling Place Committees on election day or from tabulations that leaked out from higher level committees. The original calculations made by the village and kampong committees were evidently so inexact that the entire procedure of counting is now being repeated by the Area Electoral Committees. The process is necessarily slow, for

* The Nahdlatul Ulama is an orthodox and conservative Muslim party with great strength in East Java. It was at one time a member organization of the Masjumi.

some committees have close to ten million votes to recheck. Their results, rather than the figures of the Polling Place Committees, will be official and final.

The unofficial tabulations are not only inexact but incomplete. Many thousands of votes from South Sulawesi and North Sumatra are not included in the newspaper calculations which I shall quote below. Since these are strong Masjumi areas, the Masjumi totals below should be weighted accordingly.

The most important difference of opinion among unofficial sources concerns the Central Java vote. All sources agree that the P.N.I. won there with a vote of slightly more than three million. They disagree, however, on the Masjumi total. The P.N.I. newspaper gives the Masjumi less than a million, while pro-Masjumi sources give a figure closer to two million. Since the final margin between the nationwide votes of the two parties will certainly be less than this gap of around 800,000 votes, the final winner cannot even be guessed until the official Central Java returns are published.

Outside of Central Java, the unofficial figures from various sources do not differ widely.

The Unofficial Figures

After the returns are in from those regencies where the election was postponed, the total vote in Indonesia will be in the neighborhood of thirty-five million.

According to Suluh Indonesia, the P.N.I. newspaper, the four largest parties have received more than twenty-eight million votes:

P.N.I.	8,320,156
Masjumi	7,204,431
N.U.	6,885,043
P.K.I.	6,113,164

The calculations of the Indonesian Press Bureau (P.I.A.) give the Masjumi a slight boost:

P.N.I.	8,078,552
Masjumi	7,858,990
N.U.	6,465,378
P.K.I.	6,008,502

The smaller parties follow far behind the leaders. The Indonesian Islamic Federation Party (P.S.I.I.) claims slightly more than a million votes, garnered principally in Sulawesi, West Java and Sumatra. Perti, another Muslim party, claims close to 400,000 votes. The Indonesian Socialist Party has evidently received only in the neighborhood of 500,000 votes, most of them from West Java and Bali. I.P.K.I., the party of the army officers corps, has also received around half a million votes. Parkindo, the Protestant party, may turn out to be the fifth largest party with a total of more than a million votes, principally from North Sumatra, North Sulawesi and the far eastern islands.

The regional breakdown of the vote shows the P.N.I. leading in the nation as a whole, but the Muslim parties ahead in twelve of the fifteen electoral districts. The figures below are quoted from the Java Post, which has been consistently optimistic about Masjumi chances.

<u>District</u>	<u>P.N.I.</u>	<u>Masjumi</u>	<u>N.U.</u>	<u>P.K.I.</u>
Djakarta (official)	151,733	200,478	120,696	96,351
West Java	1,501,440	1,834,678	646,558	693,589
Central Java	3,042,930	1,732,047	1,806,755	2,386,693
East Java	2,204,450	1,086,656	3,210,522	2,277,566
Total for Java	6,900,553	4,853,868	5,784,531	5,454,199
North Sumatra	274,318	519,991	75,356	236,107
Central Sumatra	36,160	807,149	49,897	89,007
South Sumatra	238,203	621,022	121,004	192,260
West Kalimantan	60,693	162,748	37,496	8,206
East Kalimantan	24,962	34,664	17,102	7,185
South Kalimantan	30,546	251,036	372,784	13,393
North/Central Sulawesi	48,991	62,347	16,887	19,498
South Sulawesi	3,110	28,983	14,101	4,910
Molluccas	29,934	114,186	----	7,448
Lesser Sundas				
East	27,500	63,008	8,078	499
West	462,747	264,402	103,740	69,068
Total outside Java	1,237,164	2,929,516	816,445	556,081

The division of seats in the new Parliament, which will probably convene in February, 1956, will correspond quite closely to the votes received. Two hundred and sixty seats have been apportioned to the sixteen electoral districts according to population. East Java with a population of more than seventeen million will receive fifty-eight seats; the Molluccas will receive three, as will West Irian.

It is quite possible then that the Masjumi will win a plurality

in parliamentary seats while the P.N.I. winds up with the largest total of votes.

If the results I have quoted above are approximately correct, the distribution of seats in Parliament next year should fall within the following limits:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Maximum</u>
Masjumi	60	70
P.N.I.	62	68
N.U.	50	55
P.K.I.	45	50
P.S.I.I.	8	10
Parkindo	8	10
Indonesian Socialist Party	4	6
I.P.K.I.	2	3
Perti	2	4
Catholic Party	2	3

Two or three smaller parties may receive a seat apiece.

The greatest change brought about by the election has therefore been the increase in Muslim representation. If they are to be considered as a bloc, the Muslim parties will control about fifty percent of the votes in the new Parliament, where they previously held only twenty-eight percent.

The P.N.I. has increased its representation considerably, but the smaller nationalist parties all seem to have disappeared, leaving the P.N.I. the only articulate spokesman for President Sukarno's concepts of the Panchasila and Marhaenism.

The communists have increased their parliamentary representation from ten percent to approximately eighteen percent, a tribute to their finely organized election campaign.

Even with these changes, it takes no gift of intuition to realize that the basic nature of the political process in Indonesia has not changed decisively with the election. As before, the Indonesian cabinet must be a coalition. In keeping with the experience of the past five years, the coalition must include more than two parties to stand and perhaps as many as four to operate successfully.

The possibilities for coalition government next year remain a mystery, for the parties generally shied away from concrete stands on issues during the election campaign. How are we to know what stand will

be taken by the P.S.I.I. or the N.U. on the crucial matter of foreign capital investment? Or relations with the Netherlands? These matters have certainly been considered in party councils, but decisions have apparently not been reached.

The parties supporting the present Burhanuddin Harahap (Masjumi) cabinet have won a clear majority of the seats in Parliament; the attitude of this government toward the Netherlands has been conciliatory and it is vigorously pushing forward a Basic Law on foreign investment. But the member parties and supporters of the recent Ali Sastroamidjojo (P.N.I.) cabinet have also won a majority, and the Ali cabinet took an angrily negative stand on both these issues.

The whip position in future cabinet formation will be held by the unpredictable N.U., which has participated in both the Ali and Burhanuddin cabinets. In both coalitions, the N.U. has played a conservative role, acting as a brake to radical action but compromising its position for the sake of joint action and unity. On November 15, the N.U. faction in Parliament voted to support the present cabinet and "give it a chance to work". If the N.U. remains constant in its attitude, the same type of coalition may again come into power when the new Parliament convenes. The P.N.I. may of course attempt to draw the N.U. away from the Masjumi again to form a new radical-nationalist coalition. In either case, the ulama and shrewd Muslim politicians of the N.U. will have a decisive voice in determining the composition of the cabinet and the nature of its policy.

The "Big Four"

The election campaign and results have given us valuable insights into the character of the four major political parties and the nature of their mass support.

The P.N.I. has shown itself to be largely a Javanese Party, with immense support in the area of traditional Javanese culture in Central Java and the western regencies of East Java. As the campaign progressed, it became clear that P.N.I. hopes rested on the active support of civil service officials, a great many of whom joined the party during the free-wheeling days of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet.

The strength of the P.N.I. in the ranks of the Indonesian--especially Javanese--officialdom can be interpreted in two ways. It has been claimed--probably with good justification--that the P.N.I. used its position in government from 1953 to 1955 to bring officials into the party, especially the governors, residents, regents and sub-district officers who constitute the Indonesian executive hierarchy. It is also claimed that these officials were instrumental in gaining

the political cooperation of the thousands of village headmen in their areas. P.N.I. enemies also point out that the Ministry of Information, which propagandized the general election down to the most isolated villages, has been dominated and run by the P.N.I. The criticism, therefore, is that the P.N.I. won its support by using the authority and influence of government officials who joined the party under pressure.

This interpretation is somewhat shallow. The P.N.I. has played politics to the limit--and perhaps a little beyond--in the past few years. It has not passed up any opportunities to extend its membership or influence, and it has probably succeeded in pressuring many officials to take party cards. Granting all this, the backing given the P.N.I. by officials can't be explained away as the fruit of intimidation, and the support of the villages doesn't lie outside the realm of clean, proper politics. It seems rather to have been more a case of natural affinity.

The most valuable recruits to the P.N.I. in recent years have been the civil service executives at the regency (kabupaten) and sub-district (ketjamatan) levels. In central and East Java--where more than fifty percent of the total Indonesian vote was cast on September 29--the great majority of the high officials in the executive hierarchy are members of the former Javanese aristocracy (priaji), and a great number of the lower executives have been recruited from the fringes of this class. Pre-war titles (raden, raden mas, etc.) are not so much in use these days and the obvious signs of caste are avoided as undesirable and "feudal". The fact remains, however, that the aristocrats retain importance and influence as the spokesmen for the traditional Javanese culture.

The P.N.I. is by no means a party of the aristocracy, nor is it a conscious vehicle of ideas that could be tabbed as "feudal". Still, the P.N.I. party philosophy contains the spirit of Javanese traditionalism in abundant measure, and former aristocrats have evidently found the party a comfortable meeting place, where the style and values of their class are blended subtly with modern western concepts. The speeches of Sukarno exhibit this remarkable mixture of aristocratic style and radical slogan.

The value of these recruits to the P.N.I. is of course not their aristocratic lineage, but their official position. The Regent or the Sub-district officer is respected, feared and emulated not so much because he happens to be a raden or a raden mas, but because he is the voice of government authority. Even if he limits his P.N.I. activities strictly to his free hours, his influence on commoners or village headmen is bound to be immense.

The paradox of the P.N.I. is that it appears to the villager

in Java as the most "modern" of Indonesian parties, yet it tends to mobilize its forces through traditional channels. The pivot of the paradox is easy to find: before the war, the traditional elite in Java enjoyed a near monopoly on western education. Now these new leaders--men of Sukarno's generation and background--exert a double appeal in Javanese society, with the moral superiority of the traditional Javanese gentleman and the twentieth century savvy of the Dutch high school graduate.

There is thus nothing surprising or unnatural in the fact that the combined appeal of the P.N.I. in Central and East Java has attracted millions of votes. It is unthinkable that great numbers of important officials would have joined another major party, for example the Communist Party, and the influence of these officials on the villages and village headmen is not an accident but an important fact of Javanese political life. The strong P.N.I. showing should be heartening to those who fear radicalism and social disintegration. If anything, it proves that the traditional channels of authority are more intact than most of us assumed.

The Indonesian Communist Party has also proved to be a party of the Javanese, with great strength in East and Central Java and very little in the other provinces.

The pattern of voting in the centers of traditional Javanese culture was revealing: a strong communist vote in areas of agricultural depression and a P.N.I. victory in areas of greater prosperity. The P.K.I. also piled up surprisingly large victories in most of the cities of Central and East Java and in the areas of plantation production agriculture. One of its strongest votes was in the Residency of Madiun, scene of the 1948 communist rebellion. Another strongpoint was the impoverished Residency of Solo, where the party won nearly 750,000 votes.

Outside of Java, the P.K.I. made an even worse showing than the P.N.I. The heaviest communist vote in the outer islands was in the plantation area of East Sumatra and in parts of South Sumatra. Both areas have large Javanese transmigrant populations.

If the regions of P.N.I. and P.K.I. support are nearly identical, the support of the two major Muslim parties--the Masjumi and the Nahdlatul Ulama--is geographically split. The N.U. is generally the party of the east, with its greatest bastion in East Java. The more modern-minded Masjumi has its most solid support in the west (Sumatra and West Java), but may also end up as the single largest party in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Moluccas. Only in a few places did the two Muslim parties really compete for the vote.

The relations between the Masjumi and N.U. could become

vitaly important during the coming year, for the two parties could very nearly dominate the government if they cooperate.

The Nahdlatul Ulama was at one time an under-organization of the Masjumi, but it withdrew in 1950 to become a separate political party. The split has emphasized the religious differences between the two bodies: the N.U. recognizes only the Sjafi'i school of law while the largest organization in the Masjumi (the Muhammadiyah) is eclectic in law and fundamentalist rather than legalistic in matters of doctrine. The spirit of the Masjumi organizations tends to be evangelical and uncompromising, and the outlook of the N.U. might be termed more "Javanese", with its tolerance for the infusion of non-Muslim practices into its religion.

The election has been a surprising success for the Nahdlatul Ulama, just as it may be considered a failure for the Masjumi. In all of its areas of expected strength, the N.U. succeeded in mobilizing an impressive vote. The Masjumi, on the other hand, attracted a meager vote in Central Java and won only a slight plurality in West Java. Observers are asking, "Why?"


One reason for the apparent Masjumi weakness in Java may be that anticipations of strength were false and unfounded. Some observers have assumed the Masjumi to be overwhelmingly strong with no real basis for such an assumption. The vision of a huge Masjumi Party is really a memory of the period before the N.U. went off on its own. If the total votes of the two parties are added together, the result is nearly fifteen million votes and more than forty percent of the total vote. Separately, the Masjumi and the N.U. merely constitute two of the Big Four.

The reasons for the Masjumi failure in Java may be more concrete. First, it is quite probable that the Masjumi antagonized many conflict-weary voters with its attacks on the Communist Party. In East Java, the over-all effect of the campaign waged by the Anti-Communist Front seemed negative, while the communist slogans for "national peace" were apparently quite successful. Secondly, the Darul Islam rebellion may have been directly responsible for the disappointing Masjumi vote in affected areas. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the paltry Masjumi vote in Tegal, Tjilaptjap and the eastern regencies of West Java. Finally, the Masjumi seems to have failed most completely in those areas where the P.N.I. succeeded in gaining most complete control of the government executive hierarchy (Central Java).

The election has highlighted many problems for the future. The moderately large communist vote shows the depths of poverty and social disorganization which disturbs so much of Indonesia. The P.K.I.


has emerged as the fourth largest party, but its opponents are divided. The regional concentrations of political strength reveal the cultural gap which separates the Javanese from the other ethnic groups of Indonesia, and the emergence of four nearly equal blocs of power indicates that future governments will again sacrifice decisive action for the sake of coalition.

Generally, the election should be reassuring to those in the west who wish Indonesia well. It was well run, and it gave emphatic notice of the vitality of political life in Indonesia. If the final official election figures correspond closely to the figures we have, Indonesia is not "going communist" or "going Muslim"; by free choice she has accepted the type of multi-party rule which her diverse nature seems to demand. A sound foundation for democracy has been constructed.

Yours sincerely,

Boyd R. Compton

Election Scenes

A P.N.I. (Indonesian Nationalist Party) election poster in front of the village headman's house. The veranda was used as a polling place.




A Masjumi Party poster--deluxe size--in front of the mosque in the small town of Bangil. Each of the major parties spent millions of rupiah on posters.



A typical communist sign in a kampong lane in Modjokerto. Communist posters seemed to be concentrated in the living areas of the poor and near the entrances to factories.



The communist women's association in Surabaya set up this baby-sitting service for women voters.




Outdoor polling place in a residential area of Surabaya. The silence and self-discipline of the crowds was strange, almost forboding.



Voting. Three committeemen are giving out ballots and checking names against the registration list. In the background a woman is voting for the Catholic Party. The booths will be curtained for the next election.

Into the ballot
box, in public
view.



Lists of all candidates were
posted inside the polling
booths. Here is a list tacked
up on the outside.