

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

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17 Pegangsaan Timur
Djakarta, Indonesia
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Institute of Current World Affairs
522 Fifth Avenue
New York City, 36

Dear Mr. Rogers:

After the October 17 demonstration against Parliament, Indonesia witnessed a succession of political disturbances. For six weeks, it seemed that the slightest pressure from any direction would throw this very young republic into anarchy or civil war. But Djakarta is quiet again; Parliament is once more in session, and the crisis has temporarily dissolved.

Obviously, the deep rifts recently revealed in the political elite have been only temporarily hidden. The antagonisms which produced the recent disturbances will almost certainly give rise to new tensions and clashes in the future. The current political lull provides an opportunity for an approximate evaluation of the factors which have been operating in the recent crisis and will continue to determine events in days to come.

I say "approximate" evaluation because much of the basic information connected with the October affair has not yet been made public. The following summary is based on daily reading of four Djakarta newspapers, as well as interviews with several journalists and politicians.

In one aspect, the crisis has been a complicated skirmish for political power among groups and individuals of the Indonesian elite. From other points of view, it has been a jurisdictional struggle between Parliament and the Ministry of Defense, or between Djakarta and the various regions. Underlying these struggles has been the contention of two generally opposed views on national development in general, and the reorganization of the army in particular.

The occasion of the crisis was a series of parliamentary debates on the Armed Forces. The story can be roughly divided into four parts: (1) the parliamentary debates, (2) the anti-Parliament demonstration, (3) repercussions in the army, and (4) government attempts at a solution.

The Parliamentary Debates¹.

The dramatic story began early this year, when a certain Colonel Bambang Supeno openly expressed dissatisfaction with the situation in the army. As one of the group of Japanese-trained officers who assumed positions of military leadership during the early days of the revolution, he was strongly critical of a new army policy, initiated under Minister of Defense, Sultan Hamengko Buwono IX of Djagjakarta. He charged that the spirit of the 1945 revolution was being destroyed in the army, that corruption and mismanagement

were widespread, and that the Indonesian Socialist Party (P.S.I.) of Sutan Sjahrir was gaining politically and financially from its contacts with high army leaders.

These charges should be considered in light of criticisms which had been levelled against Bambang Supeno and the Tjandradimuka officers school of which he was director. It was claimed that a Japanese style military spirit prevailed at the school, with an emphasis on the army's political and ideological mission. When this spirit was criticized by exponents of a non-political, professional army, Bambang Supeno went directly to President Sukarno with the problem. News of this meeting reached Army Headquarters in Djakarta.

Bambang Supeno was questioned and reprimanded on July 12 in a meeting of high army officers. Claiming that the meeting constituted a trial, he declared his case outside the competence of his superiors and reportedly left the meeting. After this reprimand, he presented his criticisms directly to the Defense Section of Parliament and the Cabinet in a series of letters which have not yet been made public. On July 16, he was dismissed from his post for having bypassed his superiors and having attempted to form an opposition bloc within the officers corps. The final order of dismissal was signed by Hamengko Buwono on July 29.

Less than a week later, the matter was being discussed in the Cabinet, according to the Djakarta newspaper Merdeka. This report goes on to say that the Sultan accepted full responsibility for the conduct of his ministry, but that he would not accept the President's interference. During the next week, newspapers spoke of a sharp conflict between Hamengko Buwono and President Sukarno over the Bambang Supeno case and the matters referred to in his letters. On July 28, the Sultan admitted, "There is no conflict with the President, but there is a difference of opinion."

It seems clear that the President did not participate directly, or openly, in the Armed Forces-Parliament dispute after the last week of July. His name, however, was used constantly by the opponents of the Sultan and the Armed Forces leadership. After the dispute was weeks old, the newspaper Keng Po recalled a long standing disagreement between Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta on the nature of Indonesia's Armed Forces.² It claimed that Hatta favored the development of small, professional army, while Sukarno argued for the maintenance of a revolutionary, "ideological" army. The content of this dispute—and the meaning of such terms as "professional" and "ideological"—are difficult to understand except in the context of the complicated history of the revolution. Especially pertinent in this history have been the struggle between Sukarno and Sjahrir, the contention between those who worked with the Japanese and those who did not, and the degree of compromise that could be tolerated with the Dutch. These and related issues figured prominently in the army dispute as it developed in Parliament.

Parliament's reaction to the Bambang Supeno letter was immediate and explosive. It was discussed first in the Defense Section, then brought to the floor for closed plenary sessions on July 28, 29, and 30. After the August recess, the matter was pursued

further and finally presented in open session on September 23, at Hamengko Buwono's insistence. In the open sessions, which lasted until October 16, the highly combustible excitement of Parliament was exposed to public view.

Why did one letter cause such turmoil in Parliament? Primarily because it touched on so many live issues.

The first issue was army reorganization. It was perhaps accidental that when Bambang Supeno's letter reached the Defense Section of Parliament, a major dispute with the Ministry of Defense was already brewing. The ministry's reorganization plan, which was so disturbing to Colonel Bambang Supeno, called for a rationalization of the army's organization and a gradual reduction in its size from around 200,000 to 100,000 men. Inevitably, the process of selection would have eliminated many of the poorly-educated, old-line fighters of the revolutionary armies. The plan also called for the continued presence of a small Dutch military mission, which had been giving the army technical advice since the transfer of sovereignty in December, 1949. To certain violently nationalistic elements in Parliament, the plan seemed not only an attack on the spirit and personnel of the revolutionary army, but also a surrender to western influences.

A second major issue was Parliament's jurisdiction over the army. Several members of the Defense Section made press statements in September to the effect that sound development of the Armed Forces could only take place on the basis of statutes provided by Parliament. Three years of parliamentary sessions had not produced these statutes, but this fact did not alter the stand of the Defense Section. The Bambang Supeno case gave its members an opportunity to attack not only the plan of the Ministry of Defense, but also its competence to deal with disciplinary matters before a regular procedure was legalized by Parliament. Representative Pitoei of the Greater Indonesian Party (P.I.R.) urged that the Bambang Supeno case be reviewed by a court martial consisting of the President, certain Cabinet members, plus a few representatives from the army.

The political composition of the Defense Section was also a factor in the quick development of the Armed Forces crisis. Twelve of its twenty members come from parties which are strongly opposed to the Indonesian Socialist Party, especially sensitive to charges of western influence, and in general agreement with President Sukarno on the Armed Forces issue.⁴

The Bambang Supeno case was natural ammunition for party warfare. The unpredictability of the Indonesian party struggle can be seen in the fate of the three motions advanced during the parliamentary debates:

1. The Baharuddin motion of no-confidence in the Minister of Defense, demanding the reorganization of the Armed Forces leadership and the recall of the Dutch Military Mission.⁵
2. The Manai Sophiaan (P.N.I.) motion to create a State Committee to investigate the Armed Forces and recommend changes in their leadership, calling also for the recall of the Dutch Military Mission.

3. The Kasimo-Natsir (Parkindo-Masjumi) motion creating an investigation committee, but not concluding a priori that changes are necessary in the Armed Forces.⁶

The motion of Zainal Baharuddin, vice-chairman of the Defense Section, was supported by a coalition of extreme left and right wing groups: the Proletarian Party (Partai Murba), a collection of anti-Stalinist Marxists; the Greater Indonesian Union (P.I.R.) and the National People's Party (P.R.N.), two conservative, anti-western splinters of the Indonesian Nationalist Party; and finally a small regional party from South Kalimantan (Borneo). This amazing coalition constituted the original opposition to the Wilopo Cabinet when it presented its program to Parliament earlier this year.⁷

The Manai Sophiaan motion was supported primarily by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (P.N.I.), Indonesia's second largest party. Additional support was offered by two right-wing Islamic parties (the P.S.I.I. and the Nahdatul Ulama) and the Indonesian Communist Party, which has recently been following a rather quiet policy of united front. The P.N.I. stand is baffling in view of the fact that passage of the Manai Sophiaan motion seemed to pose a threat to the existence of the P.N.I.-sponsored cabinet. This destructive role is not a new one for the P.N.I.; the Natsir Cabinet was forced to resign in 1951 because of a P.N.I. backed motion which later proved impossible to carry out.

In this excited atmosphere of right and left wing activity against the Ministry of Defense, the much criticized Indonesian Socialist Party remained virtually silent. The P.S.I. leader in Parliament, Subadio Sastrosatomo, made one public statement to the effect that Parliament should not interfere in the executive functions of government. This theme was taken up by the socialist press, which roundly criticized Parliament for abusing its position and neglecting more vital tasks of national construction.

The job of combatting the two extremist motions was left to the Masjumi and its young leader, Mohammad Natsir. The Masjumi joined with several smaller middle-of-the-road parties to advance the third motion listed above. Strategy apparently called first for the acceptance of this motion as a substitute for the two already put forward, then an official government statement accepting the contents of the compromise motion. The motion would then be withdrawn and the crisis could end.

The Masjumi strategy failed completely. The Masjumi withdrew its motion, but the P.N.I. insisted on supporting its own proposal when the voting started on the morning of October 16. The P.N.I.-sponsored cabinet had not expressed willingness to accept this motion. On the first vote, the Baharuddin motion was defeated easily, but its backers switched their support to the P.N.I. motion, which passed handily, 91-54.

After the session ended, Mohammad Natsir admitted to the press that he had no idea what was going to happen next.

The Anti-Parliament Demonstration

Early on the morning of October 17, a crowd of approximately 10,000 demonstrated in and around the Parliament building in Djakarta, breaking furniture and carrying signs which demanded Parliament's dissolution. Another crowd milled around the nearby Cabinet building. The demonstrators finally found their way to the President's palace.

While troops took positions around the mob, President Sukarno launched into a brilliant speech, delivered in his deliberate, stirring manner. He claimed that he could not dissolve Parliament, and that he had no intention of becoming a dictator. He told the crowd that they were only one small segment of the population of one city in Indonesia; he would have to tour the country and assess public opinion in other regions. When he finished, the mob dispersed.

The demonstrators were generally peaceful and good-humored, despite the breakage of furniture in Parliament. Their signs had been printed in advance, and their handbills were machine printed. Some of the crowd had arrived in army trucks.

Swift steps were taken by the local military command to "insure order". Martial law was declared, an eight to five curfew was put in force, meetings of more than five people were prohibited, two newspapers and a magazine were closed down, and six prominent politicians were jailed. The newspapers and politicians had been vigorous opponents of the Minister of Defense during the parliamentary debates.

The atmosphere was tense in Djakarta, as troops and gun carriers patrolled the streets. The steps taken to insure order seemed all out of proportion to the seriousness of the demonstration.

A few days after the demonstration, I visited friends in one of Djakarta's poorest districts and found them almost totally uninformed on the Parliamentary debates, the nature of the demonstration, or the attitudes of the political parties. They were vaguely aware that there had been a demonstration and very conscious of the troublesome curfew. Judging from their attitudes, the excitement of October 17 was a monopoly of the upper classes.

During the next few days, news reached Djakarta of similar demonstrations in Semarang, Bandjermasin, Djogjakarta, and other large cities. The following week, tension in Djakarta eased as the politicians were released, the banned newspapers resumed publication and the curfew was lifted.

Both the demonstration and the actions of the army came to be known as the "October 17 Incident." While President Sukarno visited Sumatra and East Java, newsmen, politicians, and ordinary citizens were busy damning, lauding, and defining the October 17 events.

The newspapers and politicians who had fought the Minister of Defense during the preceding weeks claimed that a coup d'état had been attempted. Most vociferous of these was editor B. M. Diah of the

daily Merdeka, who openly charged that Sjahrir had masterminded the demonstration and attempted coup, with the assistance of high placed confederates in the army.

What had actually happened on October 17?

Several statements shed light on the incident, but no complete explanation has yet been offered to the public.

The first statement was a tearful admission by retired Colonel Mustopo, a dentist, that he had organized the entire demonstration. He made the startling claim that preparations were made well in advance for a peaceful demonstration, but he had learned that irresponsible elements were going to utilize the demonstration for their own purposes; President Sukarno himself requested personally that the demonstration be called off. But the message came too late, and the earlier plans materialized.

A second clarifying statement was made on October 30 by Colonel Sutoko, Assistant Army Chief of Staff and head of Army Intelligence. According to Sutoko, two meetings of high army officers were held during the final week of parliamentary debate. It was agreed that the parliamentary debates constituted a threat to the state, and that all regional commanders would stand behind the Armed Forces leadership in the current crisis. Among those present were Lieutenant Colonel Suwondo of East Java and Lieutenant Colonel Kosasih of South Sumatra. The same group met with the President before his speech on October 17. In the presence of Hamengko Buwono and Army Chief of Staff Colonel Nasution, they presented a request that Sukarno dissolve Parliament and appoint a more representative body. Sutoko claims, "We were like children who could see no way out, so we went to 'papa' and asked him to settle the matter."

Sutoko's statement goes on to describe the October 17 demonstration. He claimed that no officers participated directly, but that one "hot-headed" unit did aim its cannon at the palace. To counteract this dangerous step, Sutoko ordered another unit into the palace, "so there were two units face to face. I also saw to it that the ammunition was placed far from the cannon...If one shot had been fired, the whole situation would have exploded. I could only pray to God."

A different version of the October 17 meeting with the President was given in early December by the Armed Forces Bureau of Information. This statement claimed that Colonel Nasution had acted as spokesman for the group and requested not only the dissolution of Parliament, but also the arrest of scores of its members and certain military officers. It quoted part of the conversation:

Nasution: We ask the President to declare a state of danger throughout Indonesia and take power as Commander in Chief.

Sukarno: Do you propose that I become dictator?

Nasution: If necessary.

Sukarno: If I become dictator, what if I dismiss all of you from your posts?

The President turned down the officers' request. The veracity of this information has since been hotly denied by Army Headquarters.

It seems reasonable to conclude that, before and after the passage of the Manai Sophian motion, Colonel Nasution and a group of sympathetic officers—some of them regional commanders—improvised a hasty defense of what they considered their own and national interests. They seized the opportunity provided by the demonstration to present a request to President Sukarno that he take charge. His refusal was accepted despite the fact that Nasution had command of military units at least in West Java. This can hardly be considered an attempted coup d'état, though the officers involved can certainly be accused of dangerous excitability and direct meddling in political matters.

No proof has yet been offered by editor Diah of Merdeka that the October 17 affair was a coordinated plot conceived by Sjahrir. It may be a mistake to consider Sultan Hamengko Buwono and the officers at the palace meeting as a "Sjahrir group", just because they have shared certain ideas with the P.S.I. The Sultan is a political force in his own right, perhaps with a greater political potential than Sjahrir himself. Injo Beng Goat, editor of Keng Po, has analysed the entire crisis as a chapter in the long-standing competition between Sjahrir and Sukarno; it seems just as reasonable to view it as a struggle between Sukarno and the Sultan, since it started with their disagreement on the Bambang Supeno case.

It also seems inconceivable that a man of Sjahrir's intelligence would plan a coup d'état with the principal military participants in Djakarta, far from their troops.

From available information, the crisis seems to have been not so much the result of planning and plotting, as it has been a series of strong reactions to real or imagined facts: first, the President reacting to the Bambang Supeno case, the Parliament reacting to the army reorganization plan, P.S.I. influence in the army, and the Dutch Military Mission, and finally a group of army officers reacting to Parliament's decision. The most disturbing reactions of all took place outside the capital.

Surabaya, Macassar, Palembang

In the month following the October 17 incident, young officers in three of the nation's eight regional military commands desposed their superior officers and seized power.

(a) East Java On October 18, Lieutenant Colonel Suwondo returned from Djakarta to his post as temporary commander of the Brawidjaja Division in East Java. Soon after his arrival in Surabaya, he was arrested by his subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Sudirman, for complicity in an alleged attempt to seize power in Djakarta on October 17. Two days later, an official delegation from Army Headquarters in Djakarta confirmed Sudirman in his new post. On October 24, Sudirman made a radio speech in which he professed loyalty to the President as Commander-in-Chief, asked that the army return to its original revolutionary spirit, and gave his opinion that "the steps taken by the official leadership of the Armed Forces contradict the principles of democracy."

Two weeks later, the Minister of Defense visited Surabaya and stated that the East Java problem was already settled. Sudirman immediately registered public surprise at the Sultan's statement, stating that there was really no "East Java problem", only a "Djakarta problem".

(b) Macassar⁸ On Saturday, November 15, Colonel Gatot Subroto,⁹ military commander of Territory VII (East Indonesia) was relieved by his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Warouw, who issued the following statement:

After hearing of an attempted coup by a number of high officers against the President and the principles of the state, and noting the attitudes and actions of the Commanding Officer of Territory VII...and after the failure of an attempt of the Chief of Staff to bring the Commanding Officer to the right path...we have decided to take over the command of Territory VII in order to bring the leadership back to the right path.

We will surrender this command after the issues within the Armed Forces have been settled by the Commander-in-Chief, President Sukarno.

The next week, Warouw stated that he was unwilling to receive the Minister of Defense and Army Chief of Staff on their proposed visit to Macassar, unless they came with a special mandate from the President. He explained further that he had taken measures against Colonel Gatot Subroto because he had sided with the Minister of Defense and Vice-President Hatta in the army controversy.

(c) South Sumatra Three weeks after his return to Palembang from the October 17 meeting with Sukarno, Lieutenant Colonel Kosasih, Commanding Officer of Territory II, told the press that no split existed among the officers of his command. He admitted, however, that some officers were disgruntled with the army reorganization program.

Two weeks later he was removed by his subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Kretarto. Following the example of Sudirman and Warouw, Kretarto charged his Commanding Officer with participation in the October 17 affair, then pledged his own allegiance directly to Sukarno as Commander-in-Chief. He also called for a renewal of the revolutionary spirit of 1945 within the Armed Forces.

Government Attempts at a Solution

The problem of October 17 and its many repercussions remains basically unsolved over seven weeks after the catalytic demonstration against Parliament. This lengthy period will eventually be described as one of patience or hesitation, depending on the final effectiveness of the government's actions.

To date, these actions have been limited.

Faced with the task of staying in power and preventing the

right (Islamic) or the left (Communist)?

The government's propensity to compromise seems related to what Sartono (P.N.I.) called the "Eastern Way" in a recent speech to Parliament.

We are men of the East, our State is an Eastern State, our Government is an Eastern Government, and our Parliament is an Eastern Parliament...The Eastern Way is difficult for westerners to understand...The Eastern Spirit prefers to seek a possible solution, rather than arguing over problems that would very possibly give rise to disagreement. The Eastern Spirit prefers to seek a synthesis of many factors, rather than allowing these factors to destroy one another.

Sartono's observation is penetrating, and there is no denying the value of patience and compromise in such a stormy political climate as Indonesia's. But does such an attitude lead to the solution of problems, or merely to the postponement of consequences?

(2) Will personal loyalty and emotional ties remain the cornerstone of political organization, or will functioning bureaucratic organizations be developed?

Personal devotion to friends and leaders, such as Sukarno, has been an outstanding feature of the recent struggle. In general, there has been little evidence of organization life within the army or political parties being run impersonally, according to fixed rules and programs.

Is this merely the "Eastern Way", as some writers claim? Or is it an indication that political groups are not yet organized according to uniform and clearly defined group interests?

Of all the Indonesian political parties, the Masjumi, P.S.I., and Communist Party are perhaps the most predictable. This may be because they have rather clearly defined interests and have developed something approaching organization and discipline. The P.N.I., on the other hand, is an alliance of elements of extremely diverse origin and interest; its policy wavers and its proposals contradict. Will the P.N.I. split further into more meaningful groups? Will it take root or continue to slide around? Perhaps next year's general election will tell.¹⁰

The importance of personal loyalty in organized politics also seems to be a characteristic of rule by a relatively small elite group. Will Indonesia's tiny political elite be gradually enlarged through education and new economic opportunities? Will the elections draw new leaders into the elite from labor, rural cooperatives, and Islamic organizations?

(3) Will a professional and disciplined army develop in Indonesia?

Both sides in the crisis represented a particular military

group. Almost every day of the crisis saw military officers present unauthorized political statements to the press. The actions of Nasution and his group—or of Warouw, Sudirman, and Kretarto—would be considered impossible breaches of discipline in most armies. But Indonesia's army is only three years old; perhaps it should not yet be judged by foreign standards. However, the attitude of a North Sumatra newspaper is difficult to reconcile with hopes for military stability in Indonesia:

We approve of relieving one's military superiors, if it is done in a quiet and orderly manner, and if there is really sufficient proof that the territorial commander has infringed upon the military oath.

Will some type of militarism develop in Indonesia? If it does, will it more nearly resemble Japan's mystical and aggressive militarism, China's former Warlordism, or the rule of an officers' caste as periodically appears in Thailand or Venezuela?

(4) Will regionalism become a destructive centrifugal force in Indonesia?

Lieutenant Colonel Warouw has denied that his action in Sulawesi has anything to do with "provincialism", yet separatist slogans were seen in Macassar following his leap to power: "Long live the East Indonesian State" and "United Sulawesi". The Sulawesi situation is somewhat reminiscent of China in the thirties, when the Kuomintang achieved the appearances of national unity through deals with local warlords, who pledged allegiance to the government, but retained control of their regions.

Will factors such as Islamic unity, the national language, real or imagined threats from abroad, or central control of the vital East Sumatra revenues tend to overcome regionalistic tendencies?

(5) What is the future role of the Masjumi and the Islamic community in Indonesian politics?

The Masjumi is currently a stabilizing force because of the security of its position and its conservative nature; its task is not to gain power, but to organize the tremendous support it already has in its component Islamic organizations. To what degree will the Masjumi succeed in this organizational work? Does the Indonesian Islamic community have enough real unity and common interest to support a strong political party?

There are already three major Islamic parties. There is a chance that the Masjumi itself will split because of the conflict between its progressive (Natsir) and conservative wings. Will the Islamic parties continue to split, so that eventually they represent diverse social and economic, rather than religious, groupings?


(6) What will be the effect of extreme nationalism on western influences in Indonesia?

Nationalistic symbols continue to exercise a powerful appeal in Indonesian politics, especially those which are connected with the Dutch. An example is the attitude toward the Dutch Military Mission in the army controversy. The use of such symbols can be both positive and negative. When Sukarno delivers a speech on Indonesia's rights to Irian (Western New Guinea), he is presenting a symbol which strengthens national unity. When the P.N.I. argues that military disturbances in West Java are due primarily to foreign influences, it is ignoring the desperate economic situation in West Java for the sake of political advantage. Such misrepresentation, whether intentional or not, is certainly a threat to national unity.

The attitudes of the P.N.I. and other parties toward foreign oil concessions in Sumatra will be a useful gauge of the continuing vitality of anti-western nationalism during the coming year. Oil threatens to become the next major problem after the general elections and Constitutional Assembly.

The issues raised above are not so much specific questions as they are general divisions of the Indonesian political problem as seen through the disturbances of the October 17 crisis. The answers depend on literally hundreds of factors, ranging from the general elections to the production of synthetic rubber in the United States. While waiting for these answers to become apparent, the events of each passing day are of momentous importance to Indonesia. It is possible that decisions have been made—or postponed—during the last seven weeks, which will determine the fate and form of the future Indonesian state.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Boyd R. Compton". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name.

Boyd R. Compton

Notes

1. Indonesia's present temporary Parliament is an appointed body. It is the result of the amalgamation of the legislative bodies of the Dutch-sponsored Federated Republic of Indonesia (R.I.S.) and the Republic of Indonesia (R.I.) in 1950. Its 213 members are divided into 19 political factions.
2. Keng Po is one of the oldest Indonesian language newspapers. It is Chinese owned and considered quite reliable. Merdeka, edited by crusading B.M. Diah, is intensely anti-Sjahrir and anti-army. Its news sources are apparently good, but the selection and writing of news is outstandingly biased, even in this country of party newspapers. Pedoman is the Indonesian Socialist Party newspaper. It has been highly critical of the present Parliament and generally favored its dissolution. Abadi, the Masjumi Party organ, tried to stand in the middle during the crisis. Evidently controlled by the party's Natsir faction, Abadi did not support Sukiman's anti-army stand.
3. After the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945, a number of armed bodies ~~indies~~ supported the revolution. From 1945 to 1947, the most official of these was the Tentara Republic Indonesia, to a certain extent based on officers and units from the Japanese created P.E.T.A. By mid-1947, largely through the efforts of Defense Minister Sjarifuddin, this body was amalgamated with many other units in the Tentara Nasional Indonesia. With the creation of the unitary Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1950, the T.N.I. was combined with elements from the Dutch native army (K.N.I.L.) to form the present army (A.D.R.I.)
4. Indonesian Nationalist Party (P.N.I.) 3
 Nahdatul Ulama 2
 United Indonesian Islamic Party (P.S.I.I.) 1
 Progressive Union 1
 Greater Indonesian Union (P.I.R.) 1
 National People's Party (P.R.N.) 1
 Labor Party 1
 Indonesian Popular Alliance (S.K.I.) 1
 Zainal Baharuddin (non-party) 1

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The two Communist Party members should be added to this figure, to make fourteen members in all, who must be considered unfriendly to the army reorganization plan.

5. "The Armed Forces leadership" refers to the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Nasution, Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Major General Simatupang, and Ministry of Defense Secretary General Alibudiardjo. The phrase sometimes includes the Minister of Defense.
6. The Masjumi Party is an Islamic union. As co-sponsor (with the P.N.I.) of the Wilopo Cabinet, it has generally supported the Minister of Defense. Control of the party passed to the Natsir wing at a recent congress. Since October 17, more and more official party statements have been coming from former Chairman Sukiman or his friends. These anti-army statements

indicate an intra-party dispute and the possible ascendancy of the Sukiman faction again.

7. This cabinet has been generally popular. The P.N.I. and Masjumi each have four seats. Prime Minister Wilopo is P.N.I. and the important post of Minister of Internal Affairs is held by Roem of the Masjumi. The P.N.I. and Masjumi representatives are from the more progressive wings of their parties. P.N.I. backing of the Manai Sophian motion in Parliament was led by the parties most nationalistic elements.
8. Macassar is the largest city on the island of Sulawesi, (formerly Celebes).
9. Before the October 17 demonstration, Subroto claimed that he would quit if the Sultan were forced to resign. Subroto was said to be unpopular in his command, perhaps because he is Javanese.
10. The P.N.I. resembles the prewar Kuomintang in certain ways, except of course it does not have the communist type organizational structure which held hold the Kuomintang together. The mystical nationalism of Chiang Kai-shek's China's Destiny is recalled by many P.N.I. statements. Many P.N.I. members are both government officials and businessmen, in a solid old KMT tradition. This of course applies to other Indonesian parties too.

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