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A MOROCCAN POLITICAL PARTY: THE ISTIQLAL

A Letter from Charles F. Gallagher

Tangier
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The Moroccan political party, like those in most countries under colonial rule, was born primarily as a league of intellectuals, or as a clandestine grouping, and it was designed to be at its beginning a machine for propaganda and protest rather than an organization for political action. In Morocco, political parties, except for the so-called "moderate" parties which were the creation of the protecting powers, were illegal at most times up to 1955. From time to time their existence was recognized, however, if only in a negative way by the decrees outlawing them, and occasionally they were dealt with -- either when the political situation seemed calm enough to permit certain liberalities, or when it was so grave, as last year, that no other recourse was available.

Not only at their birth but also during their two decades of existence so far, Moroccan parties have differed from the conventional Western party. They have never, with the exception of the Moroccan Communist Party, fallen into the usual political spectrum of rightist or leftist politics. And today the points of discord between the Istiqlal (Independence) Party and its chief rival, the Democratic Independence Party, are more the result of personal friction and disagreements over past activities on behalf of Moroccan independence than representative of a class struggle.

The cleavage point of all the parties lay at all times in their attitude toward the French, and occasionally Spanish, colonial authorities. Within each party there still exist elements of the right or left, but the demand for unity in the face of what was considered a national danger has held together what would be disparate groups in other countries and different circumstances. It remains to be seen whether centrifugal forces will not soon begin operating on the parties, however.

Furthermore, the artificial splitting-up of Morocco by treaty created regional parties rather than national ones. The parties that functioned clandestinely in one zone, and were focusing their struggle on one particular oppressor, often found it difficult to use the same tactics in another zone, especially if the political line of one colonial power happened, as it often did, to be opposed

to that of the other. The National Reform Party in the ex-Spanish zone is an example. This year it fused with the Istiqlal, announcing that a secret agreement years ago had provided that it would function separately in the north, but that it had always really been the Istiqlal. Clearly Istiqlal agitation in the ex-French zone in the '30's against the so-called "Berber dahir" (establishing separate courts for the "Berbers" and removing them from the jurisdiction of the Moroccan central government) would have meant little to Moroccans in the ex-Spanish zone where problems were quite different. Although the National Reform Party now says that it was always the Istiqlal, it certainly functioned as an independent force during most of its life, especially in its wartime flirtation with the Axis powers. In Tangier on the other hand, strength has centered on the Unity and Independence Party, whose title betrays the small International Zone's fear of being left out of the all-Morocco political picture.

It has been pointed out that Moroccan parties until now have existed in a kind of limbo, which does not allow one to say whether they will develop along any particular path -- conservative, reactionary, fascist, socialist, or communist. For most of the people party activity is a completely new experience. Unlike the family, the clan, or the tribe to which they have belonged before, all of which sought to defend a common heritage from the upsets and dangers brought about by external change, the party tries to spread the understanding of new principles introduced by the progress of civilization. Membership in a tribe is a birthright, and almost all Moroccans have ties to some hereditary suprafamily grouping; belonging to a political party is a voluntary act which requires faith, hitherto reserved for other-worldly matters, and reason. Only one political movement in Morocco was a clanlike organization, and that was the artificially aroused Movement of Opposition of the Pashas and Caids, directed by the Glawi and a few feudal lords. Their objective was to preserve privilege and the status quo, and primarily for this reason their short-lived efforts ended in bitter failure.

The most important and representative party in Morocco today is without doubt the Istiqlal Party. It commands the allegiance of an overwhelming majority of the people, it is in the closest accord with the Sultan, and its leaders are in the majority in the present national coalition government. Because of this predominance it has been selected as a model for Moroccan parties, in the following description of its development and its role in the nation's life.

The Istiqlal was born late in 1943 and now, with thirteen years behind it, has already had the longest continuous life of any Moroccan political party. At the time of its founding it was a party of cadres, with a committee of intellectuals as its nucleus. Around the committee were grouped notables, religious figures, and businessmen, but it sought at first no contact with the masses.

At the end of the war, in October 1945, the Istiqlal

-3-

underwent an important reorganization of structure, in the belief that the time had come for action. The basic element was constituted by the jema'a, which means "assembly" but which, in the light of the actual setup of the party, is best translated as "cell." The cell of the Istiqlal was a grouping of a limited number of members, usually by profession. At first the number was restricted to ten or fifteen. When the grouping was not by profession it was by neighborhood. Younger members still in school were grouped with a teacher whose job it was to provide for the political as well as the formal education of his pupils. Gradually over the years the neighborhood cell was preferred to the professional cell and seems to have prevailed in periods of reasonable normality. Grouping by neighborhood allowed convenient evening meetings at a friend's house where the political lecture and the reading of the party newspaper could be broken by humor, light conversation, and the radio. Conversely in more troubled times the professional cell had advantages; secret watchwords and boycott injunctions could be passed within a factory without attracting attention or running undue risks. In rural districts, where the organization was less formal and discipline harder to enforce, the professional cell often was a simple corporation of artisans or the like, indistinguishable from any ordinary association.

The cell contains an office with a secretary and treasurer, and is directed by a leader (musiyyer). The musiyyer must be an educated man because his principal functions are giving political lectures, organizing comments on the party organs, and teaching reading and writing. In this way the cell serves as a night school for adult education, and this function has now been put into practice on a national scale by the new Istiqlal-dominated government. Early in the party's history -- around 1947 when political conditions were reasonably favorable -- the number of members in a single cell rose to as many as thirty, but after the outlawing of the party in 1952 security caused the number to be reduced to from three to five, and professional cells became the rule.

The educative role of the cell is one of its most important functions. An excellent definition is furnished by an extract from the Bulletin interieur de l'Istiqlal, as quoted in one of the party's newspapers, Al Istiqlal:

"The cell, in the organization of the Istiqlal Party, is a school devoted to forming the citizen."

The article goes on to say that the party has always considered attendance at weekly cell meetings obligatory because of the importance of the civic formation obtained there. Learning and self-improvement are presented as patriotic duties and literacy as a treasure which has been kept from the people by the colonialist oppressors.

"Since the beginning of the occupation of Algeria in the last century, imperialist politics have favored analphabetism and faith in obscure myths for the

countries they were occupying, in order to leave the peoples [of the occupied countries] outside the mainstream of life, wandering in the deserts of ignorance and spending their strength in destroying each other."

The party prides itself on the fact that many of its leaders have come from its own "free schools," and that it has formed "citizens useful to their country, a goodly number of whom, having no diploma and having never taken an examination, were able to raise themselves to the level of the thinking elite."

The cell school, apart from giving a basic education to the people, is designed to complete the political education of those who have gone through the French-organized school system, for "the instruction given them generally has serious lacunae and traces of poisoning." The party's theory is that the scholarly knowledge of such graduates can only be put to the use of the country after a course of political indoctrination directed by it.

The article concludes by stressing the necessity for continued attendance at cell meetings and for unflagging interest in these terms:

"The success of party schools depends essentially on the activity of its disciples, their assiduousness at meetings, and their interest in its publications and teachings, which they discuss and digest so that their patriotism may be based on faith and not simply on a copied attitude."

Needless to say the party faces a considerable crisis in this respect at the present time, and its reiterated appeals for self-effacement, work, and sacrifice show its concern with the possibility that the people's interest may slacken now that the independence which has been the party's raison d'être has been won. The uncompromising nature of the party's stand on the independence question, and its refusal to have any other platform than "independence," gave it strength and unity during the last three difficult years; but it is the same single-mindedness which has now made it necessary to redefine its objectives and present for the first time a constructive program dealing with the more technical and often more knotty secondary problems.

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An analysis of the 58 signers of the January 1944 manifesto shows how great was the role of the intellectuals in the make-up of the party at that time. Eighteen signers were teachers and ten were doctors of religious law ('ulema); twelve were judges, government officials, or lawyers, and eight were merchants; the others were scattered among different professions. During the riots that accompanied the 1944 manifesto many of these signers themselves went into the streets and led the people. In the demonstrations

-5-

of 1952 they no longer did so; by then they were able to rely on a well-organized nucleus of demonstrators led by cell chiefs trained for this purpose. The essential difference between the demonstrations lay in the fact that in the meantime the Istiqlal had become a popular party, and a great deal of its success was due to the strict control exercised over political education by lesser leaders during this period.

Immediately after the war, until 1947, admission to the party was restricted and was accompanied by an intensive educational effort. As soon as one group was formed and "graduated," another was admitted and the process repeated. Rather than attract a large number of unstable or indifferent followers the party preferred to form a core of politically-conscious, enlightened shock workers. This process, however, was slow and unrewarding to some of the more dynamic party spirits. And when, in 1947, some relaxing of French Residential authority was evident and it seemed that progress toward independence might be made in a short time, caution was abandoned. Members were enrolled in large numbers -- so many that their indoctrination could not be carried out with the same care as before. This mass enrollment occurred, in addition, at a time when the first great wave of postwar immigration to the cities was taking place, and when many unskilled workers had begun to work in the booming industries of Casablanca. Such action presaged a lowering of the party's standards and several years later, around 1951, the Istiqlal realized that the carefully-directed policies of its inner group might be wrecked by demands for direct action from the newer, politically-ignorant members who were often fanned by the slightest breezes of fanaticism and demagoguery.

The decision was then taken to "purge" the party, but indirectly and bloodlessly. Many cells, of doubtful quality or insufficient orthodoxy, were left on their own, and cell leaders were ordered not to convoke meetings. Many of these formations died a natural death, for at all times an effort was needed to keep attendance up; others, however, composed of ambitious or politically-conscious figures, continued by themselves and, while sometimes maintaining a tenuous link with the party, became in fact autonomous political organizations. It was these groups which, after the abduction of the Sultan in 1953 brought matters to a head, passed first to terrorism, and it was they who formed the heart of such associations as the Black Hand, the Black Crescent, and others, whose activities have more often resembled Chicago gang warfare in the '20's than a resistance movement. Although these racketeering groups were keeping Casablanca in a state of alarm as late as the spring of 1956, they have been disavowed by the Sultan, by the Istiqlal, by the Army of Liberation, and by all other legitimate action-groups. The recent transfer of police power to Moroccan hands seems to have aided considerably in eliminating them.

Paying dues has always been an obligation of party members, and as a reflection of the "social" nature of the party

the amount is assessed according to the member's financial standing. The poor are exempt, average dues for a laborer run about 100 francs (\$0.28) a month up to more than 1,000 francs for those better off. In addition to these regular contributions, party finances were buttressed by special levies at different times but especially in the dark days of 1952-55. Extremely effective boycotts, or worse punishments, were carried out against wealthy merchants who were unpatriotic enough to resist these appeals for funds.

The Istiqlal was the first party in Morocco to extend its control to a multitude of subsidiary associations of a theoretically nonpolitical character, and in so doing it much strengthened its position as the country's leading force. Among its "front organizations" were, and are, the Association of Former Students in the leading cities, whose ranks are swelled each year by new graduations; and the charitable organizations of Casablanca and Rabat, whose directors and membership belong almost in toto to the party. Party leaders saw early that the key groups were youth and sports organizations. In the first demonstrations of 1944 the Naja Sports Club of Fes took a prominent part, and by now almost every sports club in Morocco is Istiqlal-directed and -oriented. Scouting was likewise used. Two main groups of scouts now exist: the Royal Scouts, under the patronage of the Sultan and therefore of an apolitical nature, and the Hassani Scouts -- named for the Crown Prince Mulay Hassan -- formed by the Istiqlal. The Hassani Scouts were outlawed in ex-French Morocco when their head signed the 1944 manifesto, but continued covertly there and openly in Tangier. The attraction that the party wields is shown by the greater éclat in dress and spirit manifested by the Hassani Scouts in their public performances.

The scout movement in Morocco, unlike its counterpart in Western countries, groups young men of all ages up to the thirties, and the median membership age is much higher than would be expected for such an association. Members of the troop act as unofficial police for the party during parades, demonstrations, and public events, and late in 1955 when the police had almost ceased to function in the turmoil of political upheaval they were primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order among the Moroccan population. Another scoutlike group, the Young Moroccans, was organized in 1946 in Casablanca by the Istiqlal; it devoted itself among other tasks to touring the country with instructive playlets aimed at the country people and emphasizing the shame of illiteracy, ridiculing drunkenness and selfish behavior -- in sum spreading the Istiqlal social and political gospel to remote rural areas where direct political action was severely censored by the French.

A final subsidiary organ par excellence lay in the "free schools," private institutions directed and financed by the party, giving a primary and in some cases a secondary education to the sons of party members and a town elite. After the dissolving of the party in December 1952, they were removed from its control and placed under the Office of Public Instruction. They are now again in existence, but in the new Morocco it is probable that their

-7-

role will not be what it was before, although it is likely that the present Minister of Education, Muhammad al Fassi, himself an Istiqlal leader, will incorporate into the national education system much of their program and attitudes.

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The history of the Istiqlal party properly begins long before its official constitution in 1943, with the story of the intellectual and emotional forming of the man who is its head, Allal al Fassi. A devout Muslim from a serious, traditionalist family of Fes (his father was a teacher ('alem) at the famous Qarawiyyin University), he studied in the religious capital as a young man. In between two arrests for political activities he managed to pass his last examinations leading to the title of 'alem at the age of 24 (in 1930), but when he refused to sign a formal engagement to "carry out all the orders of the government and obey it at all times," he was denied the position. In spite of this he taught unofficially and his courses, which included a new biography of the Prophet Muhammad, attracted a large following from the bourgeoisie of Fes. After a hurried visit to Paris, his first to the outside world, he became a member of the Moroccan Action Committee in 1935. Arrested and released in the following year, he was exiled in 1937 after demonstrations in Khemisset, to spend nine years in French West Africa where he finally learned French, which he had always refused to speak in Morocco.

During his exile and through the early years of the war nationalism was relatively dormant. But the effects of the French defeat of 1940 and the American landings in Morocco in November 1942 were deeply felt. It was in January 1943 that the famous private meeting between President Roosevelt and the Sultan took place -- the first time that the French Resident, as the sovereign's Minister of Foreign Affairs, was not present at a meeting with a foreign head of state. Reports of this conversation, in which Roosevelt was reported to have given encouragement to Moroccan independence hopes, swept the country and made the Sultan, perhaps for the first time, a really popular figure. The nationalist parties drew new breath and a group of collaborators of Allal al Fassi -- headed by the young, urbane, French-educated Ahmed Balafrej, scion of an upper-class Rabat family which had come from Andalusia originally -- formed a new party, the Istiqlal Party, which was an outgrowth of the previous Action Committee.

The first official act of the Istiqlal was to present on January 11, 1944, a manifesto to the Sultan, the Resident, and the representatives of the Allied Governments in Morocco. The manifesto called for the independence of Morocco and paid allegiance to "liberty, necessary for the development of the individual in society," adding that:

"It is only liberty which makes men capable of enjoying liberty; this proposition is more exact than its opposite, to wait until they are ready to obtain it."

No answer was received from any of the addressees of the manifesto and the French population in Morocco, outraged by this declaration of rights, worked itself into a panic. The Istiqlal thought it necessary to issue a statement that it did not intend to resort to violence to attain its aims, but in vain. In order to quell the alarm of the colons, a pretext of military security was invoked and Balafrej, Lyazidi, and several other party leaders were arrested. The arrests led to riots in the principal cities, and these in turn to further arrests. The pattern of 1937 was repeated and established as a model for the repressions of the next decade. Balafrej, now Foreign Minister in the Moroccan Government, was exiled to Corsica; Buabid, now Ambassador to France, was held in jail until 1946; Lyazidi and some of the others were given lighter sentences.

In the following year, 1945, it was Lyazidi who appealed to the San Francisco Conference, asking for Moroccan independence and its admission to the United Nations, citing the sacrifices made by Moroccan troops in the war and the welcome given the Allied forces by the people. The appeal marked a change in Istiqlal policy: it had gone over the head of the French government and addressed itself to world conscience. It was the beginning of a series of such pleas for the next seven years.

A serious violation of Moroccan sovereignty was committed by the French government in 1945, in allotting three seats in the new French National Assembly to the French of Morocco. Relations improved, however, in 1946 with the appointment of a more liberal Resident, and the Istiqlal presented him with a report which complained of the lack of elementary liberties, of the dissolution of numerous organizations, and above all of the maintenance (since 1914) of a state of siege throughout Morocco.

Balafrej had returned from Corsica, and Allal al Fassi from West Africa in 1946, under the new policy of relaxation, and the political parties as then constituted remained in being with only minor changes until now. The Moroccan Independence Party, favoring a republic rather than a monarchy, found most of its support in the middle classes, but its mass appeal was very low; the Moroccan Communist Party operated openly, but with negligible success, from 1946-52; the northern part of the country had its own parties, often engrossed in petty Spanish politics. But it was the Istiqlal, with its dynamic leaders and its simple program of "no program except independence," which was already dominant; and its dominance has grown from then on until a conservative estimate of its membership today encompasses more than 75 per cent of the population.

In order to insure a wide distribution of its views, the Istiqlal put out in 1946 the first nationalist paper of any stature in Morocco, Al Alam (The Flag), a daily, and in 1947 began to publish a weekly in French. Although the circulation of Al Alam (about 7,000 before the outlawing of the party in 1952) was always small, it reached a much larger audience in reality, for it was passed from hand to hand and read by one literate reader to groups surrounding

him in cafes and market places.

The year 1947 saw the Sultan's famous visit to Tangier, where he felt he would be able to speak with more freedom than in the French Zone. His speech, praising the Arab League and omitting a laudatory paragraph about France, was such a bombshell that it caused the downfall of Resident Labonne and brought Marshal Juin on the scene. It marked the end of the policy of concessions by the French, and for the Istiqlal it was a turning point as well. The party saw its hopes of early independence dashed, and it settled down to a long struggle of passive resistance and nonco-operation. The period 1947-53 was marked by a steady degradation of relations between the French authorities and the party, but by an ever greater popularity for the party among the people. The Sultan, officially aloof, was well known for his sympathies with the Istiqlal and maintained an informal contact through his son, Mulay Hassan, who was glorified by party publicity as the nationalist ideal.

The last success of the Istiqlal on an official plane was in the 1948 elections, when eleven party members and four party sympathizers were elected to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Second College of the Moroccan Section of the Council of Government (both of these advisory bodies with no legislative power). The Residency, alarmed by the party's accession to semi-official status, forced a showdown three years later and stormy words were exchanged between Juin and the Istiqlal representatives of the Council; the latter left and boycotted the institution. This brought a demand from the Resident that the Sultan formally disavow the party, and under threats of removal and possible bloodshed in the cities, he agreed to do so, while letting it be known that his hand had been forced.

The Istiqlal answer to this eviction from "respectable" political life was twofold: it intensified its action among the people, and in April 1951 it signed a pact in Tangier forming a National Liberation Front, together with the Democratic Independence Party, the National Reform Party, and the Unity and Independence Party. All the parties swore to fight for independence and to refuse membership in the French Union. No other goal was to be sought until independence was a reality, and no negotiation permitted with the French until then. Significantly the Moroccan Communist Party was excluded from the national front. The front functioned effectively enough during the ensuing year and a half to allow Morocco's case to be presented before the United Nations in 1951 and 1952. Much of the credit for these successes can be laid to the Istiqlal's overseas information offices, principally in New York and Washington. A large-scale publicity campaign was undertaken, and thousands of brochures were directed at influential segments of American public opinion. For the December 1952 discussion at the United Nations, a delegation of the national front came to New York, representing all member parties, while immediately before that Allal al Fassi had toured Scandinavia and Latin America on behalf of his country. His successes in Brazil, where he captivated the press and legislators alike and organized fund-raising campaigns, were especially noteworthy.

It was at this time that the serious demonstrations in Casablanca on December 7 and 8, 1952, brought this elaborate structure to a halt and drove the party temporarily underground. In this respect some observers have claimed that the preoccupation of party leaders with international support and their frequent sojourns abroad had deprived the masses of the top-level guidance needed at home; secondary leaders, they say, were unable, in the pinch, to prevent rioting and bloodshed by their followers. But the Istiqlal had always preferred to believe in a solution through the moral power of the UN, and had sent the best men out of the country in order to convince world opinion of the righteousness of its cause. In accordance with the party's belief in nonviolence this was the only possible solution they could envisage. It was only when the deportation of the Sultan in August 1953 removed the last hope of a negotiated settlement with France that they, along with all shades of national opinion, turned to direct, combative action. In 1955 when this writer talked to party leaders just after their release from assigned residence in southern Morocco, they still spoke with nostalgic bitterness of their hopes in the UN and the United States and their deception. The Istiqlal should be given credit for this confidence so long maintained, but it should be kept in mind that a popular song of 1956 says:

"It was with our guns and bullets that we won;
It was with our bombs and knives that we became free."

A more cynical view is that elementary prudence dictated the policy of keeping the best men outside the reaches of the French police. Knowing that a crackdown would sooner or later come, the party was able to maintain its leadership in exile and thus avoided complete decapitation. As it was, 112 Moroccans forming the core of the internal leadership were arrested or sent to forced residence, according to a statement of the then Resident, General Guillaume. The arrests were aimed at the extinction of the party; they had been long prepared and needed only an incident as a pretext for carrying them out. The Moroccan Communist Party was simultaneously outlawed, as if to establish a tenuous guilt by association. Although a charge of plotting against the security of the state was formulated against the Istiqlal, a non-lieu was handed down late in 1954 after many of its leaders had been in preventive detention for almost two years.

With the advent of terrorism on a widespread scale after the removal of the Sultan, the role of the Istiqlal becomes obscure. Certainly some of the resistance movement was controlled by it, but it is not certain just how much; and important parts of it were in the hands of latter-day secret, patriotic organizations which had until then exercised no open political activity. The turning of the tide came in the spring of 1955, by which time most of the arrested Istiqlal leaders had been freed. The Faure cabinet in France decided that the situation was so serious in the summer that negotiations with all shades of Moroccan opinion were necessary, and the result was the conference at Aix-les-Bains, in which the Istiqlal participated -- over the strong objections of the French

-11-

right-wing parties. The party itself had searched its soul before deciding to take part in the conversations, for their participation was a violation of their principle of "no negotiations before independence." Their stand at the conference was an uncompromising demand for the return of their legitimate ruler, and although a great show was made of talking (separately) to diverse facets of Moroccan opinion, it was obvious that the Istiqlal representatives were the real interlocutors. After the return of the Sultan was agreed to by France, in November 1955, following the Glawi's abandonment of his personal opposition, a government was formed in which the Istiqlal was allotted approximately 60 per cent of the seats, including the portfolios of foreign affairs, interior, public works, commerce, and education, with two additional ministers of state charged with negotiating with the occupying powers.

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The outline of the Istiqlal Party so far presented has dealt with the activities and objectives of the party from an external point of view. We now come to the questions: What does the party mean to the people? Why is it popular? What is its role in their daily lives?

To answer these let us turn the clock back to 1937, when the first number of L'Action Populaire, the organ of the original Moroccan Action Committee, appeared with this statement:

"What is Moroccan Action? It is more than a party: it is a profound national movement. It translates the hope of an entire people for an evolution worthy of its past and its civilization. It is a healthy and generous movement."

The Istiqlal, we have seen, grew directly out of the Moroccan Action Committee and throughout its development it has always reflected something of the above ideals. Allal al Fassi impregnated the one and the other movement with a spirit which his enemies term fanaticism and his followers a mystic idealism that transcends the ordinary activities of the politician. His speeches (perhaps because he, like Churchill, is poor at foreign languages) are remarkably impressive oral documents, delivered simply but powerfully with a resonant, almost prophetic voice and with a conviction that touches even the foreign observer. And their message has continued to be that of a spiritual movement rather than a political rally. This spring in Tangier he spoke at length of the uselessness of independence unless it is accompanied by a purging of the soul and a rededication to the national ideal and the country's future. His words, addressed to a crowd composed in large part of country Berbers, were often unintelligible to the untutored audience -- but there was no doubt that they were deeply moved by the spirit of the leader as he caught their mood of regained pride and dignity.

This renaissance to which the Istiqlal is devoted

presupposes a willingness on the part of the average man to remake himself. It is still far too early to say what will be the outcome of the radical transformation of Moroccan society which the Istiqlal is working for, but all the signs of a potential national rebirth are present. One cannot fail to detect among the people a strong desire to throw over the past -- including much of the good as well as the bad; an eagerness to be led; a feeling that a decisive moment has arrived when, if ever, a new life which promises to be better can be begun. It is from these feelings that spring the rush to take part in adult education, the desire to be literate, the increased politeness in public, and the excellent discipline which has been preserved in a time of stress, especially in the cities where the party's influence has always been strongest. Thieves and petty criminals, disturbers of public order, are often detained by the crowd, and usually taken to the Istiqlal neighborhood chief, who gives the man a long, moralistic lecture on the impropriety of his acts at this time. At all times in Morocco a strong strain of reform and almost puritan primness has clashed with tendencies to indifference and anarchy. There have been moments in the past year when the latter seemed on the verge of coming to the fore, but the impression is now gaining ground that the desire for reform, even at the cost of much sacrifice, is predominant. That this is so is largely to the credit of the Istiqlal which has been working painstakingly for the last decade to instill a sense of civic responsibility and virtue in all citizens.

To the average Moroccan the Istiqlal represents a kind of club to which he is proud to belong and which gives him a sense of social solidarity, formerly provided by the brotherhoods and religious organizations, and provides him with material benefits. It offers free entertainment, often with elaborate refreshments, on all important occasions (and there have been a score of holidays in the past year), gives plays, organizes parades and marches and entertainment of all kinds. It has a women's section which works for the emancipation of the Muslim wife, allows her a new freedom to participate in community life, and teaches her all sorts of useful domestic novelties. The scout movements provide for both his son's and daughter's free time. The party is closely allied, although unofficially, with the all-powerful national labor union, the UMT (Union Marocaine de Travail), and the Moroccan who belongs to both (and political opponents of the Istiqlal charge that their party members are discriminated against by the UMT) feels secure against exploitation by his employers and humiliation by foreigners. In short, it is a binding social force which has given him a new feeling of integration within his community and of self-respect in dealings outside it.

It may have been remarked that the Istiqlal, in many of its social attitudes, its organization, its objectives, its rather severe moral outlook, and its "big brother" attitude toward non-political annex-organizations, shows many affinities with the Communist Party. It does because it is basically a totalitarian party, which believes in the complete organization of the life of the individual and the existence of the country. It believes in a

-13-

constitutional monarchy and in the existence of an opposition, but it conceives of itself as the correct party and thinks that the opposition will eventually be enlightened and converted. The atmosphere in which it operates is that of a one-party state, a totalitarianism but of a liberal kind.

In spite of some surface affinities, the spirit of the Istiqlal is quite different from the communist spirit. It is, for one thing, empirical, and does not follow a semireligious dogma. For another, its leaders are devoted to liberty in their words and in their actions. A notable example is the refusal of the present Istiqlal-dominated government to censor the press or ban the sale of outrageously colonialist and right-wing French weeklies which have attacked Moroccan patriots for years and are still continuing the same violent tone. Party leaders say they suffered enough censorship, suppression, and imprisonment not to know the value of liberty, and colonial history has already given a number of examples of men who have emerged from the prisons of European colonial powers to become excellent statesmen. Its leadership, although collective, runs the gamut of personality from the mystic, fiery Allal al Fassi (who has no government post, but acts as a kind of senior statesman at present), to the Western-trained, soft-spoken, amiable Belafrej, with lawyers, doctors, and rich industrialists between. The leaders seem genuinely fond of one another and have a vast fund of shared sorrows to cement this affection. Many -- indeed, most of them -- were educated in a Western manner, and all have lived for some time abroad, often in several countries. None of them were professional class-revolutionaries; they came instead from either intellectual or upper-class families and they turned to politics as did -- given the difference of time and circumstance -- men like Alexander Hamilton and Jefferson. It should be kept in mind that the Moroccan Revolution has a social and class aspect only in relation to the resident European population, because 99 per cent of Moroccans are poor and 99 per cent of Europeans in Morocco are reasonably well-to-do or better. But the revolution is being directed by patricians and educated men who see that it will be incomplete unless there is social justice for all -- which means raising all the people's living standards. In Morocco there is a much smaller spread of wealth and a less important landholding or absentee landlord problem than in the Middle East, and it is quite possible that if a stable leadership can be maintained the country may bypass the period of inequality and corruption which many Islamic countries underwent after winning their political independence and before attacking their social problems. If the Istiqlal Party can assure this leadership during the coming years and complete the revolution successfully inaugurated, it will have rendered a most valuable service to its country.

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