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FAO AND MOROCCO

Notes on the First Year of a New Member State

A Letter from Charles F. Gallagher

Rome
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At the foot of the pine-shadowed Aventine Hill in Rome, between the two-thousand-year-old ruins of the Colosseum and the Baths of Caracalla, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations makes its home in a huge, white marble structure once designed to hold the ephemeral Ministry of East African Affairs of fascist Italy. There, on September 13, 1956, some six months after its establishment as an independent state, the Kingdom of Morocco was admitted to the FAO by a unanimous vote of the sixty-six nations present. Entering with the Sudan, but preceding it by grace of its alphabetical superiority, Morocco became the 73rd member of the international body in a simple ceremony. After the roll-call vote had been taken the red banner with the outlined green single star was brought into the assembly hall and placed next to the other national flags. The Moroccan Minister of Agriculture, Si Nejai, was asked to step to the rostrum and deliver the traditional acceptance address.

It was soon clear that the representative of Morocco was not going to limit himself to the pleasant generalities of international courtesy. Like the well-prepared candidate for an honors examination he had boned up on both his general field and his particular project, and in a speech which may have upset a few delegates by the frankness of its approach, he set the tone for Morocco's relations

with FAO and delighted the organization's technical services. "It was," said M. P. Terver, Director of Programming and Budgetary Services of FAO, and later Chief of the Emergency Drought Mission to Morocco, "almost entirely as a result of this remarkable speech that we were able to begin planning our program in Morocco at once."

In brief what Minister Nejai had done was to outline the agricultural history of Morocco under the protectorate, from 1912-56, in all its aspects. He gave credit where it fell due but he was not reticent about stressing the illegal acquisitions of property under foreign rule and the resultant effects on the Moroccan rural economy. Turning to the future he spelled out just what Morocco was prepared to do in cooperating with FAO and what it hoped to receive from membership in the organization.

> "For its part Morocco will be more open than ever for the training of foreign specialists eager to see Moroccan activities. It is determined to play an active part in the life of the organization. It will communicate its observations to it, and it will make known the results of its own efforts whenever these can be helpful to other states. It will take part in collective studies in the same spirit. It will look forward to suggestions, projects and propositions tending to create or develop regional agreements between countries having the same problems to be solved and the same interest in solving them together."

And in return,

> "Morocco would be most interested in receiving

CHARLES F. GALLAGHER has since 1951 been a student of the affairs of Northwest Africa. He started his higher education at the University of California just after Pearl Harbor and soon was shifted to the Japanese language school at Boulder, Colo. He served out the war as an officer in the Navy and then became fine arts advisor on Japanese cultural property during the occupation of Japan. In 1949 he entered Harvard University to major in Far Eastern languages and history. He was graduated *summa cum laude* in 1951. Subsequently he was twice offered Harvard-Yenching fellowships to continue in the Far Eastern field, but decided instead to study Islamic society. Under Fulbright and Ford fellowships, he worked for two years in Paris and three years in North Africa. After completing his research in Rabat, he settled in Tangier to write a history of Morocco and a grammar of Maghrebian Arabic. He joined the AUFS in July 1956 as a staff member and participated in the 1956-57 program of visits to member institutions. In the summer of 1957 he returned to North Africa under AUFS auspices.

experts in drainage and specialists in specific foodstuffs, as well as engineers specializing in agricultural equipment and hydraulics. Morocco would welcome in the economic field experts with a knowledge of price formation, and distribution costs and mechanisms.

Morocco also thinks it desirable that a group of consultants be named to investigate in what way its agricultural structure is unfavorable to the increase of agricultural production, and how general, collective, and specific reforms could be carried out in this field."

Although FAO was obviously not without knowledge of many of the pre-existing conditions and the future needs of Moroccan agriculture, there is no doubt, according to FAO technicians, that this succinct summary presented by one of the few persons acquainted with the ensemble of problems facing Morocco did much to stimulate early thought and action on them.

The thought preceded the action, however, for although FAO's Planning Division was occupied with Moroccan affairs throughout the next few months it was not until early 1957 that the first real contacts were made. Two events coincided at that time: the establishment of the Permanent Country Mission, and the emergency which was beginning to arise from the serious drought which had wasted Morocco during the winter.

The initiative, with regard to the drought emergency, came from the government concerned, as it must in all cases where FAO is to take action. Abderrahim Bouabid, Minister of National Economy, drew the attention of the Director-General to the possibilities of a forthcoming famine and asked him to send a special mission to Morocco to look into

INTER-NORTH AFRICAN CO-OPERATION sponsored by FAO. Seedlings of eucalyptus sideroxylon, whose bark is rich in tanning materials, were brought from Morocco to Libya which has a growing tanning industry

the agricultural situation and the supply position and appraise the need for external aid. A group of four experts was named, headed by Programs Chief Terver -- a forthright but unchauvinistic Frenchman who was at the same time a talented diplomat -- and including an economist, an agricultural analyst, and a nutritionist. They left for Morocco in the second half of March and spent ten days on tour inspecting the country.

The Drought Mission found a two-fold problem on its arrival. It was not only a question of emergency relief measures in a situation where the grain harvest had been estimated on March 1 at about one-third of normal; it was also a matter of the endemic difficulties of Moroccan agriculture, and the special problems faced by a country recently become independent. Since the Permanent Country Mission was being set up at almost the same time that the Drought Mission arrived, a general division of labor left these longer range problems to the former, while the latter reported only on the immediately critical food problem.

THE DROUGHT MISSION

The outlook in March was bleak. Rainfall during the preceding winter had ranged in the south of Morocco, arid enough in ordinary years, from ten to sixteen per cent of normal. Not only was rainfall deficient but it was abnormally distributed. The ordinary pattern is for the rains to begin in October and reach a peak in January before tapering off gradually in April. In 1956-57 there were no rains until the middle of November, and a few days of heavy precipitation at this time was followed by a long completely dry spell until the end of the year. Normally, in areas farmed by Moroccans with traditional methods, plowing and sowing begin with the first rains and extend over a long period; the few days of precipitation in November were too short for any extensive plantings this year, however, and most of the grain crop had to be sown around the beginning of the year, too late to insure satisfactory yields. Once again the highly disparate, dual nature of the agricultural economy was brought into relief by the relative lack of damage to modern, European-owned farms. Most of these are found in the coastal areas of the north-center where the drought, although felt, was much less severe than elsewhere. Among these one million hectares (out of a total of nearly eight million cultivated) the situation was subnormal but not acute; in the 110,000 hectares under permanent irrigation it was almost normal, although where irrigation depended on underground water the drying-up of springs was causing concern.

The drought was striking hard at livestock -- and after cereals animal husbandry is the main source of income for Moroccan agriculture. Even in ordinary years there is a disequilibrium between the number of livestock and the capacity of the country to feed them. The stock are fed "on the range" and forage crops are little cultivated except by the European settlers. Anyone with a cattleman's eye traveling through Morocco in a normal late summer before the autumn rains set in will mark the run-down look

of much of the stock. Animals lose weight in summer and their mortality rates go up noticeably.

This spring the feeding capacity of the range in the southern regions was exhausted by the time the Mission arrived -- in March rather than in July or August. The Moroccan government in some cases had to bring in water by truck to fill depleted wells and cisterns, and a considerable migration of flocks toward better grazing grounds in the north was noted in early spring. At the time of the Mission's visit mortality rates for lambs in some districts were reaching 80 per cent and ran as high as 35 per cent for adult sheep; a program for emergency slaughter and preservation was one of the first suggestions of the visitors.

The nutrition man, Autret, was meanwhile struck by the direct effects of the emergency on certain sectors of the population. Normal levels of food consumption in Morocco, based on 1952-53 figures run to a daily intake of over 2,500 calories, including 77 grams of protein of which 17 are of animal origin. These figures compare favorably with most countries, although they conceal to some extent disparities between different elements of the population. But under the double impact of the tight food situation and the growing unemployment in the cities (see CFG-4-'57: "Unemployment and Underemployment in Morocco") nutritional status was found to be deteriorating rapidly in the first months of 1957. In urban areas Autret found notable loss of weight in expectant mothers; higher morbidity rates (in Casablanca public health records for February showed medical consultations for almost half the population); an increase in hospitalization requests; and a seriously increased infantile mortality rate, which in Casablanca had risen in a few months from 90/1000 to 150/1000. Many of these symptoms, which foreshadow true famine conditions, were also remarked in rural areas, where a voluntary tightening of the consumption belt had already begun.

The first question that the FAO Mission asked was: "What had the Moroccan government itself done to deal with the emergency?" It had not been inactive, as a summary record shows. From the beginning of February, when the extent of the drought became fully appreciated, all exports of wheat, barley, and maize were suspended. Fifty thousand tons of wheat were brought from Argentina with the meager financial resources available, and 100,000 tons were requested from the United States under Title II of Public Law 480 dealing with agricultural surpluses. Some 30,000 tons of barley were shipped to the most critical urban areas of the south. A widespread publicity campaign was begun late in February to encourage farmers to increase their spring sowings of maize, sorghum, and chick peas, and supplementary credits for seed purchase were allotted. Emergency public works were begun in the cities -- financed by deficit in some cases in reliance upon later French and American aid -- and a school lunch program reaching nearly 300,000 children was begun in April. The last program was helped by gifts in kind from the United States Catholic Relief Services.

DESERT LOCUSTS over a town in Southern Morocco

The Mission's survey was completed at the end of March and on-the-spot recommendations were made to the government then. The Mission suggested that, at an emergency level, (1) all exports of feed still in the country, such as dehydrated lucern, oil-cake, and so forth, be frozen from export, and all available supplies of bran, and molasses be reserved for animal feeding; (2) the new pulse crop be withheld entirely for internal consumption even at the risk of adversely influencing the export trade; (3) that a constant check on the livestock situation be kept by the Moroccans and made available to FAO as the emergency progressed during the later spring and summer months. (This was to result in the later appointment of an FAO livestock expert versed in slaughtering and preservation techniques who had already had experience in Libya, a neighboring country with similar problems on a smaller scale. On a medium-range basis FAO suggested that, if member governments whom it would ask to alleviate Morocco's need for foodstuffs during the summer and autumn responded favorably, a more efficient marketing system would have to be worked out for the internal distribution of emergency supplies; this subsequently became one of the principal problems of the permanent mission and the marketing expert who was assigned to it.

But again and again the Drought Mission tried to concentrate the attention of Moroccan authorities on the more permanent nature of their food problem, and to propose steps which would prevent, or at least minimize, the extreme effects of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production in the future. These suggestions in the field of feed resources, animal slaughtering, reorganization of the Ministries of Agriculture and Health, technical assistance training, nutrition and desirable changes in national dietary habits, were conceived of by the Drought Mission as falling within the framework of co-operation between the government and the Permanent Country Mission just then being established. A brief recapitulation of the vicissitudes of this group in its first six months of operations is enlightening in terms of international co-operation.

THE PERMANENT MISSION

The whirlwind tour made by the Drought Mission contrasted sharply with the slow and humble beginnings of the FAO Permanent Mission in Morocco, although the two were for a time overlapping in personnel: Dr. I. Masar, a Turkish marketing expert, was named head of the Permanent Mission and served as an advisor to the Drought Mission, while Terver, who headed the emergency group, had come to Morocco first to lay the groundwork for the Permanent Mission.

LOCUSTS ON A ROAD in Southern Morocco. The FAO-sponsored Desert Locust Control Committee meeting, held in Tangier, June 19-29 this year, was the first international conference on Moroccan soil since independence. The committee warned that the locust peril in North Africa is the worst in the past twenty-five years

At the outset FAO had not been sure whether the Moroccans wanted a preliminary survey made of the over-all agricultural situation, as had been the practice in many countries. It was decided by the new Minister of Agriculture, Omar ben Abdeljelil, that this

was not necessary since it would duplicate the work of a private French contracting firm, SERESA, which had already been engaged to do this. The Minister stressed the wish of the government that FAO begin the implementation of its TA program as had been outlined by Si Nejai the previous September.

Dr. Masar, in his first weeks in Morocco, found other hands besides SERESA in the agricultural harvest. One of them was the International Fund Against Hunger, a private body headed by Dr. José de Castro, a former President of the FAO Council, who was visiting Morocco as a personal guest of the King.[1] In spite of a lack of liaison between the two, relations were cordial; it became evident, though, that the Fund's resources, which were limited to the upkeep of its own secretariat, would not allow contribution of anything substantial to Morocco at the moment, and co-operation between FAO and the Fund remained on the high plane of verbal politeness.

The FAO Mission itself was operating on a stringent budget. It began life in a small two-room office, one for Masar and one for his French secretary who did not know English but would type his letters if they were carefully penned out in clear handwriting. A more serious failing was the shortage of Moroccans trained in agricultural specialties. Although an administrative officer from the personal cabinet of the Minister of Agriculture could help Masar from time to time on an informal basis, he found that there were only 25 Moroccans with a degree of any sort in Agriculture. Most of these were in important positions within the Ministry and Masar could not find anyone technically qualified as a permanent assistant, and the problem was made no easier by his having to ask permission to pay a salary of 50,000 francs (about $120) a month for the job. Working relations with the Ministry he found excellent, both on the level of Moroccan officials and French technicians -- worlds which in some ministries are far removed from each other.

Physical immobility plagued the mission for a time. It was not until late in April that Masar got hold of an old Citroën which, he said, was good enough for the city and an occasional main road, but useless for the essential back-country trips. Masar was then holding down at least two jobs: that of Mission Chief, with all the responsibilities of protocol and preliminary organization (without help), and that of a technical expert. In that capacity he prepared a paper on meat marketing for the Ministry, and helped organize the fight against the wheat pest Eurygaster. Meanwhile, as an unofficial liaison officer he had to take out valuable time to set up the Desert Locust Control Committee conference to be held in Tangier late in June.

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[1] The Moroccan government requested in August that the Sultan of Morocco be henceforth referred to as the "King of Morocco" and that the "Sherifian Empire of Morocco" be called the "Kingdom of Morocco."

It was not until May that he began to get a real feeling for the country -- traveling through the north, visiting a model government farm near Larache, inspecting cold storage facilities in Casablanca with regard to the growing problem of expanding them to take care of the animals which had to be slaughtered owing to the drought, and looking in on a cotton station in the Tadla where selection work was being done on Egyptian Pima cotton, whose prospects (average of 600 kilos per ha.) he found promising. Doubling as a financial expert, he outlined to the Ministry an "ideal" FAO program costing $135,000, and a smaller "bargain" program to cover the immediate desires of the Ministry for only $69,000. The Moroccans, pinched for money, mulled over the suggestions and finally agreed to a $60,000 program for technical assistance, to be divided $37,000 for expert consultants, $11,000 for special equipment (used for demonstration purposes in connection with the experts' work), and $12,000 for scholarships for Moroccans to study abroad.

Meanwhile the FAO experts on small tools and tea-growing had arrived. The tea man, Schoorel, began looking into the possibilities of growing tea plants in the north. Meat freezing plans began to take shape after a series of talks. The government, on FAO advice, planned to establish a revolving fund of around 200-300,000,000 francs (about $500-750,000) to help establish a semiprivate company which would handle all transactions.

The Mission grew up in May to the extent of getting better quarters and finding a driver for the Citroën. The King received Masar in a private audience and asked him to report in three months' time what solutions he could offer to Morocco's agricultural problems.

As was perhaps natural for a marketing expert, Masar became more and more convinced that internal distribution was a principal obstacle. He found that the problem of supplying three different societies, i.e., the 5 per cent European, the 10 per cent which represented the better-off Muslim and Jewish urban population, and the 85 per cent urban proletariat and rural element, was more complex in Morocco than he had seen it anywhere else. Masar's experience in general marketing covered much of the field, but he finally concluded that meat marketing deserved special treatment and called for a specialist who arrived late in August.

Also tackled -- again on the initiative of the Moroccans -- was the reorganization of the animal production program. The Chief of the Animal Production Section of the Ministry, Dr. Benkourdel, prepared a draft paper and asked Masar's opinion. The FAO recommendation was that a British expert from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, come to spend a month advising the government, and this was arranged. In later trips in June Masar became aware of another issue, grain storage facilities, which, although adequate in the southern (ex-French) zone, were poor to nonexistent in the north. As he traveled about he jotted down notes on suitable spots for silos and storage bins, and he suggested financing these through

the United States aid program.

Such in short was the busy spring of Dr. Masar from March to the end of July, when he left for a month of well-earned home leave in Turkey, and his work reflects the simple and intimate level at which a seemingly impersonal international program must work during its inceptive months.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

While Masar was putting the Permanent Mission on its feet this spring, the technical assistance men began to arrive for varying terms of duty, and they turned to some of the specialized problems which were worrying the Moroccan government. The most interesting story is probably that of the tea-growing specialist, Schoorel.

The rate of consumption of tea in Morocco is one of the highest in the world, and the drain on foreign exchange from the importation of it (now mostly from Formosa) has been a source of worry to the government. The ritual three cups which every visitor must drink when calling on a friend is only a small part of the endless glasses of strong green tea, flavored with mint, which are sipped throughout the day at home and in the Moorish cafés of the medinas. Related to the tea problem is the question of sugar consumption. The average daily sugar intake is calculated at about 100 grams a day (almost a quarter of a pound, representing about 400 calories of the daily 2,500, or approximately 20 teaspoons of sugar.) As with tea, most sugar must be imported, but here it is a question not only of finances but of health, for nutritionists feel that far too much of the caloric intake comes in the form of sugar which could better be diverted to cereals.

Although the Drought Mission had recommended reductions in the imports of sugar and tea, the Moroccan government was looking for a solution permitting consumption to stay at its present levels by undertaking or increasing domestic production of both products (some sugar is now grown in the coastal valleys of the south). The Moroccans feared psychological repercussions if the people began to equate independence with a reduction in their national drink, and there were grumblings last year when sugar was temporarily in short supply in some regions. In addition the drought, by cutting down protein and cereal consumption, had increased the amount of tea drunk, particularly because tea quiets the hunger pangs of an underfed stomach.

French technicians in the Ministry of Agriculture were skeptical of the possibilities for tea, but the government felt that an all-out effort had to be made, and so Schoorel toured the country for almost two months, only to come to disappointing conclusions. He found little chance for tea-growing, except perhaps in small regions in the northwest and around Meknes. Although disappointed, the Moroccans now have the reassurance

which comes from impartial expert advice; it remains to be seen whether they will experiment in the areas considered slightly possible for cultivation.



MOROCCAN AGRICULTURE MINISTER Si Nejai making the acceptance speech on the occasion of Morocco's admission to FAO

The marketing problem, another specialized subject in Morocco, stems from the fact that the peculiar nature of the dual European-indigenous economy is unfavorable to the rational distribution of farm products, particularly those produced by native cultivators. Most of the export crop, i.e., the citrus fruit, specialty vegetable, and soft wheat crop, goes from European farms in the fertile regions to European, largely French, markets; the remainder supplies the separate, higher-income groups (principally European) in the cities. These farmers, well-organized and until recently politically all-powerful, had their own distribution system operating quite independently of the Moroccan system. Internal consumption, notably in the rural area, suffered as a result. Many farm products went irrationally from the farm to Casablanca for handling or processing then back to the region around the original production site.

The marketing problem is particularly acute for livestock. The European farms had the money, the know-how, and the organization to slaughter, freeze, and, in some cases, can meat. The French canned-meat company, Olida, for example, has a factory in Fedala, for pork and ham products, supplied by the European farms nearby. But to the Moroccan shepherd the idea of regulated slaughter is foreign; his view is that the larger the flock the more prosperous he is, and so, having let his flocks overgrow, he is often hit by a bad year. When he then sees his flocks beginning to be decimated because of the shortage of feed and pasturage he rushes to get rid of them, but he finds that the demand does not exist and the market does not have enough storage facilities to take the animals off his hands.

When Masar discovered how grave the situation was this summer he called for a meat marketing specialist, Dr. E. M. Rascovitch, of Trieste, who is now spending two months in Morocco. Previously Rascovitch had helped the Libyans meet the same sort of emergency in two ways: internally, by planning the construction of enlarged cold-storage facilities in the capital, and externally by persuading the Greek government to take in a large number of

Libyan sheep on an emergency basis outside the normal quota. Rascovitch thinks the same might be done in Morocco; first, by enlarging the European export markets, and second, by a kill-now-pay-later plan under which the government would pay the flock owner part of the animal's price at slaughter time and the rest when it had finally disposed of the meat. FAO has already suggested to the government the setting-up of a Livestock Marketing Board to co-ordinate and stabilize the marketing of surplus stock in this way.

THE BALANCE SHEET

At this writing almost exactly a year has passed since Morocco joined FAO. The questions that come to mind in taking stock of the year's activities are: What were the tangible results of the co-operation? How did Morocco benefit from its participation in this international organization? The reader himself will certainly have made judgments on his own in perusing this résumé; it might be pertinent for the writer to add a few comments on his own feelings about the atmosphere of the year's collaboration.

Looking first at the weaknesses in FAO activities, it is obvious that the organization is woefully understaffed in regard to the ideal objectives it might attain. The heroic efforts of the Permanent Mission Chief underline that fact. Lack of money, on both sides, is a primary concern. FAO, like many of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, is a stepchild to whom funds are only grudgingly given by member governments -- although its work causes many fewer violent outbursts from nationalistic politicians than do, for example, the efforts of UNESCO.

Its position, as the apolitical representative of a group of sovereign states, dealing with a sovereign state, is quite distinct from that of the aid mission of a great power which often has the means, direct or indirect, of influencing decisions and enforcing its will. FAO can only suggest, advise, and co-ordinate -- and this only after a member state has requested help. There is furthermore no obligation for the member government to accept the recommendations of FAO experts when, as may be the case with the tea and sugar situations in Morocco, their conclusions run up against official hopes and entrenched habit.

In Morocco, FAO faced several rather special problems. One of them, the possible susceptibility of a newly-free country to external counsel, seems counterbalanced by the broad outlook of the most influential members of the Moroccan government and their desire for outside help, indeed for specifically international help which will reduce their dependence on the tutelage of one or two powers. This internationalization of advice, however, posed another problem: the need for FAO advisors to get along not only with Moroccan officials at top level but with

French technicians left over from the protectorate; these, long accustomed to carrying out their plans without question, might well spoil the broth if not carefully handled. That there was a minimum of friction seems due to the skillfully combined teamwork of the Franco-Turkish pair in charge of the two missions -- and the very appointment of a Muslim as Permanent Mission Chief is a delicate point not to be overlooked.

Finally, FAO activities may be somewhat constrained by the presence of many cooks for the above-mentioned broth; not only Moroccan officials, but the French contracting firm, the International Fund against Hunger, United States agricultural attachés, Point IV specialists, and various private relief agencies must be consulted with, co-ordinated with, and co-operated with. This does not imply any past friction, or the probability of future snags, but simply to point out that the men of the FAO mission are not the only ones interested in Moroccan agriculture problems.

When all this has been said though, the advantages that Morocco has gained from FAO help seems overwhelmingly evident. No one who has talked to Moroccan leaders can forget the tremendous longing which possesses all of them for "belonging" to the rest of the world, and showing their maturity through an egalitarian co-operation free from any tendency toward one-sidedness; they are usually as quick to accept friendly suggestion as they are to reject out of hand anything smacking of overbearingness or constraint.

In dealing with Morocco FAO has as its opposite numbers a group of top-rate men at the highest level -- the Minister of Agriculture himself (for whom knowledgeable foreigners in Morocco profess the highest esteem) and a small nucleus around him. But these few men must for some time play the role of eleven iron men on a football team without reserves. In agriculture, as in almost every field, a crash program has been devised to complete the training of a larger corps of technicians, but it is not yet certain to what degree this process can be speeded up without a deterioration of quality. The FAO fellowship program, small as it

AN FAO EXPERT inspecting a flock of North African-bred sheep

is, will certainly help in this direction.

In assessing the year's results objectively it seems clear that the Drought Mission was far less effective than the Permanent Mission, for unavoidable reasons. The Moroccans, in their first contact with FAO, doubtless had a tendency to expect the moon and sixpence from the special mission. They had not yet grasped the idea that all FAO could do was to advise them and report to other member governments the state of the emergency. Although recently the grain situation has improved from the first black prognostications to the extent that famine is now a remote threat, the outside help which has come in to balance the subnormal crop was largely negotiated by the government directly. The first 10,000-ton shipment of American grain, of a total allotment of 50,000 tons recently arrived in Safi and is being distributed. Nevertheless, the psychological value of the FAO emergency survey probably cannot be measured in tons or dollars -- one Moroccan official said that, like the patient who is gravely ill, Morocco felt better as soon as the FAO doctors had arrived at the bedside.

The Permanent Mission on the other hand, as can be noted from the foregoing account of its work, quickly got down to brass tacks and dealt with the most concrete problems in an effective way. If at times its activity seemed small in scale and lacking the grandiose appeal of a vast utopian plan for agricultural readjustment, it must be remembered that the betterment of a people's livelihood is a painful process requiring, under democratic practice, prolonged personal efforts. It is just this sort of grass-root work which the handful of FAO men in Morocco have been engaged in this past year. The fruit of their work may not yet be evident to the mass of farmers and shepherds in the country, but the technicians most directly concerned with Morocco's food and farm problems are aware of their contributions and know how much they have benefited the country and what can be expected from their continuing presence in it.

Charles F Gallagher

[Photographs courtesy of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations]