

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

CITIZENS OF A SUPERPOWER

By  
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## CITIZENS OF A SUPERPOWER

### 1. It Makes a Difference

The nation (and its people) which best understands its friends, its enemies, and itself is the nation most conscious not only of its own power and the limitations thereon, but is also the nation most conscious of the power of, and limitations upon, other nations with which it must deal. Such a nation is most likely to conduct itself so as to encourage the world community to develop in a pattern consistent with its own needs, desires, and national interests.

It is most difficult for a democratic nation such as the United States to know itself. Its foreign policies are not written in a book or embodied in a law or a man. Its policies evolve with the understanding and support of many citizens. In the United States a substantial proportion of the electorate must support specific policies or, at least, must not oppose them if they are to be effective.

A Khrushchev, Nasser, Nkrumah, or even a de Gaulle, may determine his nation's foreign policies by fiat. Even if these policies are questioned, the instruments of propaganda and persuasion are so exclusively in the hands of the central government that it in fact exercises the decisive influence. This is not true in the American system.

In the United States it is the duty of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States in such a way as to keep the nation free, prosperous, and at peace. The President is limited in his ability to discharge this obligation, however, because the United States is one of the few countries in the world in which what the ordinary citizen thinks and does about foreign policy is significant.

The fact of the matter is that the President and his experts are not free agents to determine the substance or the direction of American foreign policy. Their views are important but always behind the Executive Branch of the Government there is the shadow projected by the American people. Every four years they judge the President and his conduct of foreign policy. At more frequent intervals citizens make their views known and felt through their representatives in Congress.

The American people speak in various ways but the voice of authority is unmistakable. Their views make a difference. Their representatives rejected the League of Nations. They approved the United Nations, the Marshall Plan and the Peace Corps; but they have clearly had doubts about Aid programs in recent years. Instances in which public attitudes have restrained

the Executive, or goaded it to action, are numerous. Each such case might be the subject for separate study of why public attitudes were formed and how they influenced policy. The mere listing of a few establishes the point, however, that American public opinion is an extremely important influence on the President in his conduct of foreign policy.

On the subject of war and peace, for example, public attitudes restrained President Roosevelt in his desire to involve the United States more deeply in World War II prior to Pearl Harbor. Ten years later President Truman in the name of the United Nations was able to commit United States forces to action in Korea with scarcely a dissenting voice in Congress or in the press. Subsequently, however, the Korean action became so unacceptable to public opinion that President Eisenhower campaigned on the promise that he would go to Korea and clean up the mess - which he did by concluding a truce with North Korea. President Johnson had the foresight to get a Congressional stamp of approval on his handling of the Gulf of Tonkin incident while public opinion was favorable.

On the subject of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, public attitudes are of great significance. Opposition to the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 came close to convincing one-third of the Senate to reject the treaty. Although the treaty was approved after prolonged debate, the vigor of the opposition flashed an amber warning signal in Washington to those officials who believed American interests might be promoted by moving more rapidly toward closer relations with the USSR. One of the opponents of the Treaty became the next Republican candidate for President. Opposition to the sale of wheat to the Soviet Union - a decision taken by the Executive without much of an idea of its public acceptability - has also flashed a warning. New leadership for relaxation of trade restrictions with the Soviet Union may be expected to come from the American trading public, rather than from the Executive Branch.

George Kennan, probably the most distinguished American authority on Communism, resigned in 1963 as United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia because of frustration with what has been described as the "untenable hobbling of his operations by Congress and by indecision in the Executive Branch"\* which is to say that at that time public support was lacking for his view that United States foreign policies toward Soviet Bloc countries should be more flexible.

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\* The Washington Post, May 6, 1964. Review by Murray Marder of book by George Kennan: On Dealing with the Communist World. Harper & Row.

On the subject of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, concern at the likelihood of a strong negative public reaction restrains those elements in the Executive Branch which believe American foreign policy interests would be promoted by bringing the Chinese Communists into the United Nations.

Should the time ever come when American soldiers are heavily engaged with an enemy - as they were in the Korean War - it can be anticipated that large numbers of American citizens will insist on the use of nuclear weapons regardless of the views of the foreign policy experts who may oppose such action for foreign policy reasons.

In each of these instances of involvement of the United States in important relations with foreign nations the attitude of the American public has been important and in some instances decisive. The attitudes of citizens as reflected in the Congress often determine relatively insignificant aspects of foreign policy. Secretary of State Rusk recognized this fact of foreign policy life when he recently expressed regret that Congressional opposition had persuaded the Executive Branch that its plans to assist the Indian Government to build the Bokaro steel plant should be dropped. As a consequence, said Secretary Rusk, the Soviet Union is doing the job.

In the opinion of the prevailing experts in foreign policy it would have served American interests for the United States to have had American engineers and know-how deeply involved in the steel industry in India even though the steel plant was to be a state enterprise and hence socialist. But in the opinion of the Congressional representatives of the people, as interpreted by the Department of State, the projected American aid for a state controlled steel plant was not a proper expenditure of foreign aid funds by the United States Government.

The attitude of the American people as expressed through their representatives in Congress made the difference. The policy of the United States not to help build the Bokaro steel plant may not have been the policy most of the experts wanted. It may not even have been the policy which in the long term will best serve American interests. But it was the policy the people (or at least the most vocal groups thereof) were willing to support.

The foreign policy of the nation in broad terms is the policy proposed by the Executive and his experts, but tempered by what the people and their representatives in Congress will support.

The United States is unique among nations because the views of American citizens have a greater and more immediate impact on American foreign policy than is the case with citizens of

practically any other nation in the world. This is not the place to consider whether this is good or bad; whether American parochial interests complicate unduly the conduct of policy and if so, whether there are compensating advantages. The point is that American citizens, sometimes as individuals, more often as groups, and sometimes as representatives of a geographical area, do have an impact on the nation's foreign policies. This being the case, one might properly ask "so what?"

The so what is that since the influence is there and since it is significant, then the influence had better be as intelligent as possible. It should be based on reason and facts, not emotion and rumor. After all, the influence exercised by the amorphous body of American citizens influences the policy of the most powerful nation of the world. As someone has remarked, if de Gaulle sneezes, the world catches cold; if the United States sneezes the world has pneumonia.

It isn't child's play when the majority of the thinking American public takes positions on such matters as the use of nuclear weapons, the expenditure of large sums of money for foreign aid, membership of Communist China in the United Nations, the defense of Berlin, and the problems of similar magnitude. In the total context of international relations involving literally the future of mankind the role of the United States is unique, first, because what the United States does with its power is more important and decisive than the action of any other nation and second, because what the United States does is more directly influenced by the common man - the American citizen - than is the case in any other nation.

It may be argued that it is naive to believe that an amorphous mass of American citizens can ever have an effect on foreign policy. This may be true if American citizens are thought of as a bulk commodity. They are not. For purposes of this analysis, American citizens who care about foreign policy may be divided into three general groups.

The first group of citizens who care are those who suffer an emotional collapse when they think about the complexities of foreign policy. The world is so complicated they rely on the experts in Washington who know what is best for America. They have the facts. Let them advise the President. All the good citizen can do is to support the President - that is, if he is a Democrat, or a Republican, as the case may be, and if his policies coincide with those of the confused citizen.

The second group of citizens who care are those who respond to the complexities of the world by a frustrated emotional response. They know the power of the United States is eminent. Their first response is to reach for a gun. Their answer to the complexities of the world is to do away with them by the use of power.

The third group of citizens are those who do not uncritically accept the judgment of the Executive on the one hand, or on the other hand believe that the answer to frustration is the use of power. They accept as a responsibility of citizenship the duty to think about the nation, its power, and its responsibilities. They subject the proposals of the Executive to analysis. They consider whether particular situations seem to require the application of power or moderation, knowing there are occasions for both. These citizens know that their individual judgment based on all the information they can get and based upon their own powers of reason may be faulty. They also know that experts are fallible and that they do not necessarily know what is best for the citizen. But these citizens accept the basic concept of democracy -- that the majority, while not always right, is more likely to be right more of the time than the minority, and that a minority may sometime become a majority. These citizens attempt with their own intelligence to be one of the swing group which puts the majority of citizens on one side or the other of significant issues.

In the United States foreign policy is the result of striking a balance between what the Executive Branch experts may want, and what the people will support. For this reason it is important what the people think and what they say and who they support in elections. Citizens who want to leave the tough foreign policy decisions to the Executive are as dangerous as citizens who want to shoot it out. Neither group has put its own thought into trying to decide what would be best for the nation. The citizen who counts is the citizen who puts some of himself into the positions he takes.

Obviously the divisions between these three groups are not distinct. Probably every citizen puts himself into the third group, though his friends may not. It is this third group which has the potentiality of giving the nation a strong and effective foreign policy, or of permitting the nation's foreign policy to wallow in the wake of expert advice cut to pieces by emotional cross currents of citizens who don't care enough about their democracy to think about it.

How does one go about thinking about foreign policy? Especially, how does the busy citizen concerned with making a living find time or information enough to be other than most presumptuous in expressing views on war or peace? The answer is that he does what he can, believing that a little information and a little thought and a fair capacity of critical judgment are better than none at all.

He reads all he can from as many varied sources as his time permits. He knows, or should realize, that most of the significant developments in the world are at least mentioned in the press and he would probably be startled to know how

many high government officials read the New York Times for information as readily as they read secret cables. He tries to read critically, sifting alleged facts as well as opinion through his own mind. He tries to avoid becoming addicted to one newspaper, to one news magazine, or to a few columnists each with their own point of view.

The citizen's capacity for using his own critical facilities starts with the realization that one columnist isn't right all the time; that all bureaucrats aren't boobs; that all about communism isn't necessarily bad any more than all about capitalism is necessarily good; and that the citizen's own judgment isn't necessarily right - but it's the best he can do with the facts and the brains he has available.

But beyond the development of the citizen's critical facilities and his constant search for information, there are the factors that Americans should keep in mind as they form their opinions on general as well as specific issues of foreign policy.

One such factor is simple recognition that foreign policy issues look different to the citizens of other nations. What may seem vital to the interests of the United States, may seem trivial to the citizens of another nation; and what seems vital to them, may seem inconsequential to Americans. The citizen should have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind even though they differ from his own.

A second factor to be kept in mind in considering the policies of the United States is that each man is in part the product of his own historical and cultural environment out of which he cannot escape. The foreigner - the citizen of a nation whose government has always been changed as the result of a coup or a plot - finds it hard to comment objectively on the assassination of President Kennedy. His background suggests almost automatically that the President must have been the victim of a political plot.

An additional factor to be kept in mind especially when considering the comments of foreigners on the United States and its policies, is that most foreigners are not citizens of a superpower. It is questionable whether any American citizen can ever fully understand the forces that influence the thinking of citizens of smaller powers, any more than those citizens can ever fully understand the attitudes of Americans who accept their status as citizens of a superpower as if it were a birth right. After all, they have never known anything different.

The tragedy of the twentieth century could be the failure of men to understand each other at the very moment when man has developed his greatest physical capacity to communicate and to destroy. The least he can do is to try.

2. THE UNITED STATES, SUPER-SUPERPOWER - or--  
Don't just stand there, Do something!

The United States means different things to different foreigners. But on one point there is almost unanimous agreement. The United States is the greatest power on earth today. The Soviet Union may be a superpower, but the United States is a super, superpower. Americans take this power for granted. They don't think about it much except when Khrushchev blusters on May Day. Then they may wonder if American defenses are adequate. But foreigners have a tremendous respect not only for the military power of the United States, but for its economic power.

Americans may be frustrated by Vietnam and Cuba and realize power imposes unpleasant restraints, but there are few foreigners who have any doubt whatsoever that the United States could by sheer power alone liquidate the communist military threat in Vietnam and Cuba in a matter of days. Whether such a use of power would promote United States interests is another question.

One of the post-war clichés is that the United States is the leader of the free world; that it did not seek this role which was thrust upon an unwilling nation which must now, however, assume the burdens and responsibilities of leadership. Whether this cliché is believed by Americans or not, the fact is that most nations and their governments and responsible citizens believe the United States has an almost omnipotent power to influence the course of international events. Omnipotence to influence events may be a myth as Professor Denis Brogan has suggested, but there is no doubt about American power.

Without getting into statistical comparisons of per capita income and the size and quality of armed forces, it should be enough to note that there is adequate basis for foreigners' respect for the power of the United States. A rough estimate of the wealth of the United States in contrast to that of the rest of the world is found by noting that the United States pays 33 per cent of the cost of the United Nations, which assessment is based upon careful estimates of the capacity of member states to pay. Within the political framework of the United Nations, it is always the vote of the United States which is the most significant. "A major fact of international life," wrote Connor Cruise O'Brien, who is not known as a pro-American Irishman, "is the preponderant American role at the United Nations." He describes this as a "large and obvious...phenomenon."\*

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\* Conflicting Concepts of the United Nations, The Twenty-first Montague Burton Lecture at Leeds University, March 1, 1963.



The fact that the United States is recognized as the world's most powerful state is not always an advantage for the nation. Power is a good thing for the nation if it can be used to promote the national interest. Americans need to realize, however, that power as such may not automatically promote the national interest. Mere power does not confer omnipotence. Indeed, power has some disadvantages. It excites jealousy; power invites coalitions to neutralize it; it attracts satellites not always of the most admirable type. Superpower encourages double standards (an African or Asian state can get away with such acts as the invasion of Goa, or driving refugees from its country, but could the U. S.?) and imposes standards of responsibility which less powerful states do not accept for themselves. Power is not an unmitigated advantage. Uncritical belief by Americans that they can have anything they want because they have power enough to get it, can lead the nation into great trouble. Suppose the United States were to issue an ultimatum to Castro to get out of Cuba or the United States would throw him out, which it could do. But by such an act would the United States thereby increase or decrease its influence (a form of power) elsewhere in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, or in Europe? Power involves more than military power or economic power. Great power judiciously used is likely to be far more successful than great power nakedly exercised.

One might expect that the almost universal recognition of the power of the United States would ease the path of American diplomacy. The opposite is often the case. Thus, incredible as it may seem to Americans, there is widespread belief abroad that the cold war is largely the fault of the United States and that the United States could put a stop to it. America's power is so great, runs the argument, that it could direct the cold war into economic and political channels and thus avoid the possibility of a nuclear confrontation. In this view it is preposterous that a nation as strong as the United States is so preoccupied with the threat of communism. The fact that the United States seems to be frightened by a nation which can't produce enough food to feed its own people and whose standards of living are so far behind those of the United States, suggests to some foreign critics of American policy that there must be something to communism which they haven't detected. Thus the very fact of American power tends to destroy credence in the nation's concern at the threat of communism.

Another consequence of the universal recognition of the power of the United States is that, regardless of its wishes, the United States becomes involved in virtually every international dispute. "Don't just stand there, do something!" is the challenge flung at American ambassadors around the world. Americans may long for the day when most of the world's troubles were not America's troubles. They may complain that Washington

makes statements on every issue. They may wish for a few instances when the President might comment that the United States didn't really care how a particular dispute might be ended because it was of no concern to the United States.

But the world expects the United States to take positions. Furthermore, the parties to particular disputes often insist that the United States involve itself in the disputes on their side.

The United States is more or less directly involved in serious disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia, between India and Pakistan, between the Arab states and Israel, between Greece and Turkey, and between the African nationalists and Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

Each party to each dispute believes the United States should be on its side. If the United States refuses to choose sides then it almost invariably draws fire from both parties. Thus, the Greeks feel their friend the United States has deserted them because the United States has not automatically supported the Greeks against the Turks on the subject of self-determination in Cyprus. There have been anti-American demonstrations in Athens. The Turks on the other hand believe the United States should support them outright. There have been anti-NATO and anti-US demonstrations in Ankara.

The Arabs blame the United States for the creation of Israel, and the Israelis believe American aid to the United Arab Republic strengthens the trouble making propensities of Nasser.

The Pakistanis believe that the United States has the power and should use it to force India to surrender Kashmir. But the Indians believe that American pressures on Pakistan would bring that nation to its senses.

African nationalists expect the United States to lead the parade for an economic boycott of South Africa to get that state to abandon its racial policies. And when the United States holds back, no matter how valid the reason, the African nationalists doubt the sincerity of America's support for self-determination. The white minorities in Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, believe that African nationalism is destroying economic growth in Africa and that it can only be held in check if the United States will see the justice in the cause of the white minority.

To a small power involved in a highly emotional dispute with another the expectation is that the United States must see, understand, and support it. The expectation is somewhat equivalent to the feeling that the Lord is on its side. But if for some reason there is doubt whether the Lord has taken sides, the

first inclination of the disappointed party is not to question its own judgment, but simply to denounce the Lord.

In these disputes emotions are usually so aroused that a rational settlement is virtually impossible. The Arabs say they would prefer to be dominated by communism than to be subjected to Israeli domination; Pakistanis prefer communism to Hinduism from India. The United States as a superpower is expected, however, to take sides. It finds itself in the unenviable position of being on the receiving end, for a change, of the charge: "If you're not with us, you're against us." International honest brokerage in such disputes is neither honored nor respected by the parties. If anything the parties to these disputes are likely to conclude that an American policy of non-alignment between the disputants hides some Machiavellian scheme of great power politics or that it has been conceived to serve some lobby or capitalist interest in the United States. Protestation of innocence of any design except that of peaceful settlement is hardly believed by either party.

A related consequence of being a great power and hence involved in most disputes, whether the United States wishes to be involved or not, is that when the United States takes no position except one which recognizes that all the right may not be on one side, or when the United States simply encourages the parties to work together for a peaceful adjustment of their differences, it is likely to be accused by the parties of being indecisive or lacking in principle. Even observers, not parties to the dispute, are likely to charge that the United States is indecisive. They ask: "What does the United States stand for?" They often complain that the only time the United States takes clear positions in disputes is when one of the disputants is anti-communist, and the other tends to be liberal or perhaps pro-communist.

Of course, there are plenty of reasons why the United States may wish to sit out disputes. It may wish to continue to be friends with both parties; there may be American interests involved which are of such overriding concern to the United States that local disputes are simply troublesome. The United States for example may be more interested in preserving NATO, than in taking sides in the dispute between two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey, over the issue of Cyprus; the United States may be more concerned at a Chinese or Soviet threat to the sub-continent of Asia, than in taking sides in the Indian-Pakistani issue over Kashmir; the United States may be more concerned with communist penetration of Africa, than in taking sides in the disputes between African nationalists and the white minorities in Africa; and in the Middle East the United States is

more concerned with maintaining stability in that critical area than judging the issues between the Arabs and Israel.

What is viewed as indecisiveness on the part of the United States may be nothing more than a consequence of the fact that the United States as a world power has interests which are of greater importance to it than are the national interests of regional powers.

In light of the feeling that the United States tends to be indecisive on taking positions on disputes between other states - except when the issue of communism is clearly raised - it is fair to ask whether a great power like the United States can afford not to have opinions on these issues of such burning importance to the participants? Is there no principle which guides America except that of expediency? Are the equities in disputes of the kind discussed above so evenly balanced that the scales weigh not one way or the other?

Consider an example to see how a principle might work out in practice.

The United States for many years has advocated self-determination. If this were the overriding principle to guide the United States in the position which it might take on specific issues, how would it work out in the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus? Would it be practicable and in the interests of the United States to insist that the future of Cyprus should be determined by the citizens of Cyprus exercising a free choice as to whether they should remain independent, affiliate with Greece, or affiliate with Turkey? In all likelihood, the people of Cyprus would choose to join with Greece. What of the consequences? For one thing, the United States would find it necessary to abandon any principle involving the protection of the Turk minority on Cyprus. A decision to make the principle of self-determination dominant would also involve tacit rejection of any treaty rights which the Turks acquired at the time Cyprus attained its independence. Finally, if the Turks decided to make an issue of abandonment of the Turkish minority to the mercies of the Greek Cypriot majority, they might use force to protect Turks living on Cyprus. This would raise for the United States the question of whether it would, if necessary, use force to resist a Turkish attack on Greece. And what would happen to NATO bases in Turkey in such an event?

Or consider applying the principle of self-determination to the dispute between the Arabs and the Israeli. If the Middle East area were considered as a unit, the decision of the Arabs

in their dealings with the Israelis would prevail, since the Jews are outnumbered six or eight to one. But if the principle of self-determination were applied within the boundaries of existing states, the principle of self-determination would not solve the dispute.

Application of the principle of self-determination to the dispute between India and Pakistan over the future of Kashmir might have more felicitous results, although it would be most dangerous. Suppose the United States refused to give military and economic assistance to either of the parties until such time as the people of Kashmir have had a United Nations' supervised plebiscite on whether they wished to be independent, to join Pakistan, or to join India. The likelihood is that the people of Kashmir would seek to join Pakistan, although that is not a foregone conclusion. What of the consequences? India would probably turn to the Soviet Union for friendship. The United States would surely be accused by the Indians of supporting a theocratic state and might feel itself responsible for the religious riots which would surely take place in India. It seems doubtful that an outright application of the principle of self-determination would bring peace to the subcontinent.

Application of the principle of self-determination to the tragic troubles in Africa between the white minorities and the African nationalists raises the question of just how far the United States would go if the principle were given more than lip service. Would the United States go so far as to lead in an economic boycott of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia unless those states agreed to establish governments characterized by one man, one vote? And if in fact such a move were successful, would that assure real self-determination, or might it instead lead to one-party government such as seem to be developing in other African states? And what would happen to the economic interests and the political rights of the white minority? Might not those interests be abandoned and the principle of self-determination lead to an oppression of a minority; might it not have substituted the oppression of a white minority for the oppression of a colored majority as is now the case?

There is a great deal of difference between preaching and practicing. It is one thing to enunciate a principle of self-determination, or one man, one vote, and then to get that principle adopted and practiced without at the same time creating other situations which may in fact be more damaging in their effect than to continue to live with existing inequities and try slowly and carefully to proceed toward the principle.

It is reasonably clear, however, that a superpower counsel of moderation in emotional disputes is often a lightning rod drawing condemnation by all parties to the dispute. The inability, or failure, of the United States to take sides on many of these issues loses friends without influencing anyone. Sometimes because the United States sees issues in a larger context -- or at least a different context -- than partisan disputants, the nation manages to make two enemies instead of one. Is the nation naive because it fails to take sides? Might it not be better to be decisive and possibly wrong, than to be indecisive or moderate and without significant influence or friends? As a prominent Pakistani suggested, a nation can have only a few true friends and too often the United States fails to distinguish between its true friends and its enemies. By siding with India, as this Pakistani thought the United States had done in the Kashmir dispute, the Americans "have chosen a big tub of dirty water instead of a small bowl of clean water." Perhaps the American dilemma is well put by observing that it all depends on the use of the water -- a small clean bowl isn't very useful in washing a big dirty camel.

Another consequence of American power is that every act, or failure to act, of the nation is scrutinized for its international political implications. The movements of United States military forces are often given a significance they do not have. Occasionally political developments in far off countries are attributed to American representatives or to agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In the Far East the deployment of units of the Seventh Fleet is politically newsworthy in nations stretching from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean. The same is true with respect to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. It is not denied that the movements of military forces of the United States are occasionally dictated by international political conditions. The point is that regardless of the American political motivation, or lack thereof, the overwhelming power of the United States subjects American military activities to interpretations not always contemplated by the originators of such actions. American power, therefore, calls for an unusual degree of sophistication on the part of the men who, in a less powerful state, might be able to deploy military forces with little consideration of the international political consequences of such activities.

As for the Central Intelligence Agency, its very existence as the intelligence agency of a superpower, invites credit or blame for virtually every unusual and inexplicable act of power politics in foreign nations. This is especially true when governments are overthrown and replaced by regimes favorably disposed toward the West.

The overthrow of the Diem Government in South Vietnam in late 1963 was attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency by large and influential elements in Asia and Africa. Despite Washington denials of involvement, a shudder of concern ran through much of Asia and Africa where supporters of certain regimes not especially friendly to the United States inferred that what had happened to Diem could happen to their own leaders. Many sophisticated Asians and Africans linked the overthrow of Diem (attributed to the C.I.A.), to the assassination of President Kennedy (attributed to a radical right plot), and out of their own warped experience concluded that the American morality which has been flaunted to the world for so long was a farce. These events, falsely interpreted though they were, did as much damage to the moral image of the United States as the Soviet agricultural failures have done to the image of Soviet productive might.

Recent American publications allegedly "exposing" the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency are required, if not popular, reading for many heads of state in Africa and Asia. The minds of many of the readers of such books are already conditioned to believe the worst of the "exposures", just as they are also already conditioned not to believe the finding of the Warren Commission should it conclude that the Kennedy assassination was the act of a single deranged mind.

American political elections are scrutinized more carefully than those of nearly any other nation. They are the subject of close reporting and editorial comment from abroad. This is one of the consequences of being a superpower and of having an open society. Everything shows; everything that happens, creditable or not, is the subject for comment by foreign critics, friendly and unfriendly. American citizens may bristle when foreigners express preferences as to the results of American elections; they may complain that elections are matters of domestic concern and that the United States can manage domestic problems without advice from abroad. Enough bristling on the part of Americans may even silence the critics. But the fact is that foreigners are not only interested in American elections, they may be the beneficiaries or the victims of those elections. While a German, a Frenchman, a Chinese or Russian cannot vote in an American election, he may be blown up as the result of an American action directly traceable to the results of an election. The role of the United States in the world today, and its citizens, is so important that no knowledgeable foreigner can remain unconcerned about American elections. His judgment may tell him to keep quiet because he can't influence the results, but his mind and heart will not remain neutral. "Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee."

Americans must learn to live with their power, accepting its advantages and its disadvantages. The price is often high.

Americans will find themselves involved in conflicts against their will. They will find their motives questioned. They will find themselves damned if they act, and damned if they don't. When America stumbles there will be cheers. Americans, because of their wealth, affluence, and power, will be targets of hate for many governments and peoples of less fortunate states. At the same time because of America's wealth and power it will find other states and peoples believe it is an American duty to help them. And one of the tragic ironies of the situation is that the more the American system succeeds in producing wealth and power, the greater the demands that the wealth be shared and the use of power be curtailed.

Added to these unpleasant burdens of power and the jealousies which power incites, the United States finds that it bears special responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, for the presence of justice, and for the development and well-being of the poor. And when there is instability, danger of war, or slow development, the United States is likely to find that it carries much of the blame for such conditions also.

Perhaps the greatest price of power is responsibility and moderation in its use. The United States Government is subjected to constant pressures from abroad as well as at home to use its power or influence on one side or another of emotional international issues. When the United States counsels moderation in the settlement of political disputes, emotionally involved partisans may be expected to accuse the United States of a lack of principle; when the United States imposes economic conditions on its aid programs it may be expected to be charged with attempting to impose its economic system on other nations as the price of aid.

Although the United States gets both credit and blame for an omnipotence which exceeds its capacity to influence international events, the fact is that it labors under a world-wide scrutiny equalled only by that directed at the Soviet Union. But in the case of the United States, in contrast with the Soviet Union, its policies are open and subjected to constant world criticism and comment. This exposes the United States to charges of lack of constancy in policy and burdens the nation with special responsibilities for foreign policies that are even-handed, and consistent on a world-wide basis.

The responsibilities of the United States as a superpower devolve upon the individual citizens of the nation. It is not enough in a democratic nation for only the President and his Secretary of State to understand the power of the nation as well as the limitations and burdens of that power. They can influence, but they cannot control the response of individual citizens. For this reason it is essential that each American citizen carry part of the burden and responsibility which power has imposed on the nation.



3. "Oh wad some power the giftie gie us  
"To see oursels as others see us!"

Robert Burns

It is possible that there is nothing wrong with American foreign policy. It may be that the nation is doing the best it can with what it has -- its form of government, its democracy, and the calibre of its citizens, politicians, and civil servants. But if that be the case, there are a good many dissatisfied Americans and a large number of unhappy foreigners. It may be helpful to examine some of the things that foreigners think are wrong with American foreign policy, not because Americans should tailor their policies to please foreigners, but because the foreign-eye look at United States policy may be revealing to Americans.

American foreign policy in its broadest sense is the total of the national effort to try to influence people and nations not under the control of the United States to conduct themselves in such a way as, at a minimum, not to damage the American way of life and, preferably, to promote it. American foreign policy, therefore, conveys to other peoples and nations an image of the United States.

The American citizen will be better able to understand how well his nation is doing in attempting to promote and maintain a world compatible with American interests if he can see himself through the eyes and emotions of those who are on the receiving end of United States policy. This does not mean that the foreigner has a better perspective on the United States policies, but he clearly has a different perspective, as is illustrated by the African who summed up his view of the United States as "a place with lots of money and a big race problem."

A good case can be made for the claim that Africans and Asians understand Europeans and Americans better than vice-versa. This may shock some of the old colonial types but, many Africans and Asians have worked in close intimacy with Westerners and their families. They have cooked, driven cars, nursed the children, acquired a smattering of Western languages, seen and heard family quarrels, made the beds, and done the laundry. They have often been educated in Europe and circulated in European society. How many Europeans or Americans have been as intimately exposed to Asian and African society? And since Europeans and Americans have not, is it not reasonable to believe that they may lack complete understanding of Asian and African concepts of national pride and the personal motivations of individuals?

Foreign critics may have an insight into American motivations and policy which Americans themselves do not possess. And that insight may come from experience based on a familiarity with Western life and customs which is far better based than one may superficially believe. If Americans understand how they appear from this different perspective they should have a better idea of the effectiveness of their foreign policies.

Friendly foreign critics of United States foreign policy do not object to the fact that American policies are for the purpose of promoting American interests. They expect this. They also see many instances in which the foreign policy interests of their own nations and those of the United States coincide. But in conversations with such critics of United States policy, almost invariably the first complaint heard is that United States policy is so anti-communist oriented that, while it is clear what the United States is against, it is not clear what the United States is for. The second almost universal criticism is that the United States constantly enunciates moral generalities, but doesn't practice what she preaches. As a consequence, foreign critics are sure of the power of the United States, but they are unsure of where the United States is headed and why.

Whether these criticisms are soundly based or not, the troublesome thing is that they exist among large numbers of friendly observers throughout the world. There has been either a failure of communication between the United States and much of mankind, or American foreign policies require re-examination or further clarification.

Anti-Communism. Foreigners know that Americans are against communism. Indeed, many friendly critics believe that Americans are hypnotized by it. As an old Arab sheik remarked: "We Arabs have a complex about Israel, you Americans have a complex about Communism." It is a common view that "America sees the world through the eyes of Moscow". The United States, it is believed, determines many of its policies with respect to the United Nations and with other states by the effect those policies will have in combating communism. As one prominent and radical African politician said: "The United States aids us because the United States wants us to be anti-communist. The motives of the Russians and the Chinese are 'pure'. They don't want us to be anti-United States, they simply want us to be independent." False as this accusation is, many Africans, Asians, and even Europeans believe the basic reason the United States is interested in them is that their help is needed to defeat communism.

It is startling to find, for example, how few foreigners understand the attitude of the United States toward Cuba. Castro and communism in Cuba have mesmerized the United States, they feel. They find it difficult to understand American pre-occupation with Castro who could be wiped out in a moment by American power, but who seems somehow to threaten the great American nation. There must be something to Castroism and communism if the United States is so concerned with him. American concern with Cuba has given that nation a world image totally out of proportion to its importance. As a knowledgeable African remarked: "American concern about Cuba has made Castro the dominant image in the Americas. Very few Africans and Asians realize what a dinky little place Cuba is. They think there are only two significant nations in the Western Hemisphere, the United States and Cuba." And a belligerent and cynical Indian commented: "The American posture toward Cuba is hurting. The U.S. gets no credit for not using force. Look at what we did in Goa, and the Russians did in Hungary, and the world has already forgotten."

Presumably it is American concern with communism in Cuba which makes that state loom as such a large foreign policy problem. There was widespread understanding and approval of the forthright challenge of the United States to establishment of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, not because the missiles were communist but because they represented a great power challenge to the United States. Since the removal of that threat, however, there is very little understanding of the apparent ease with which Castro is able to irritate the United States. Castro's Cuba is not recognized as a power threat to the United States and there is very little comprehension of how his brand of communism can seriously threaten the United States or how it can be significant in Latin America where American influence has been dominant so long.

American aid programs are frequently cited as evidence that fear of communism dominates American foreign policy thinking. A common statement in the newer nations is that it pays to be neutral, but it pays even more to be threatened by communism. It doesn't pay to be pro-West.

There is wide-spread belief in Asia and Africa that the best way to get American aid is to be threatened by the danger of communist attack or subversion. Thailand, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Laos are cited as examples. If one is not under attack by communist forces, then the next best way to get American aid is to get help from the Soviet Union and threaten to take more help unless additional aid is forthcoming from the United States. India, Indonesia, the U.A.R. and Ghana are cited as examples of this technique. The best way to be

sure not to have more than token American aid, in this view, is to have internal stability and a government which encourages the role of private enterprise. Malaysia, the Lebanon, and Nigeria are cited as examples.

Of course this is an oversimplification of American aid programs. There are valid reasons for distinguishing between them and changes are constantly being made. Foreign observers, however, do not understand those distinctions. They assume, rightly, that one of the basic aims of American policy is to encourage the development of nations and that it is United States policy to help those countries that believe in private enterprise and free elections. But they do not see sufficient evidence that American aid is used in a positive way to encourage nations to move in political and economic directions compatible with the interests of the United States. They feel that the United States is so interested in emphasizing what is bad about communism and socialism, that it fails to emphasize what is good about free enterprise.

America's preoccupation with anti-communism, in this view, is robbing the United States of the ideological and moral leadership which it exerted in the past. The dedication of the missionaries is gone; the concepts of individual freedom, justice, and democracy have given way to materialism and anti-communism. Aid money put into airports, dams and highways is soon forgotten; what must be worked on is the mind and it is the communists who are doing that. The positive, constructive, leadership which the United States should exert to move men and nations toward greater freedom is lost because America's emphasis is against communism, not for freedom. "You don't have to be violently against communism to win this struggle", remarked an Arab, "We didn't pay any attention to what you said against communism, but when we saw it in Iraq, we knew it wasn't for us. We see African students on the way to the Soviet Union, and we see them on their way home. The United States should pay to send students to the Soviet, they come back anti-communist."

This anti-communist image which the United States carries is a heavy burden. Her friends are disturbed by its existence; her enemies encourage the belief that anti-communism is the most positive foreign policy goal that the American society can produce.

Practice What You Preach. Friendly foreign critics have little difficulty in accepting the generalities of American foreign policy. They have heard and read many times that the United Nations is the cornerstone of American foreign policy; that the United States is against subversion and for freedom, supports the Atlantic Community, favors the political integra-

tion of Western Europe, supports German re-unification with free elections, and is in favor of self-determination everywhere. So far, so good. The trouble arises when the practices of the United States in specific situations are measured against the general principles so often enunciated. Critics believe the United States says one thing, but does another; that it talks principle, but acts expediently.

This may be one of the dilemmas of American foreign policy. Things look different depending upon one's viewpoint. One is reminded of the old story of the three blind men and the elephant. Each described the elephant differently -- one thought it like a wall, another like a tree, and the third like a rope. Their points of view and their experiences were different. The United States, as a world power, believes it sees the whole elephant, whereas many other powers with regional interests see only part of the elephant. Serious misunderstandings are sure to arise unless Americans understand their critics may be seeing only part of the elephant and make allowances for that possibility. Similarly, foreign critics should be aware that some of the problems on which they comment may be of greater significance if viewed in a larger context. But even when that awareness exists, there is undoubtedly a frustration at being a small state. "What can we do for ourselves?", asked an African statesman. "Raise hell and vote as a bloc. That's about all."

It has already been noted that the principle of self-determination as an abstract principle sounds fine. But when that principle is examined in specific situations and viewed from a world context in contrast with a regional context, serious problems arise.

Perhaps it isn't always possible to practice on a world basis what one preaches in specific situations. Consider, for example, the Asian critic who asks: "If the United States is for self-determination, then why is it that in Asia and in Latin America the United States finds itself so often identified with military regimes and dictatorships and so infrequently with revolution and change?"

One answer is that there may be no choice. The two most orderly, disciplined, and educated groups in many of these new countries are the military and the communists. They represent the extremes of the right and the left. Neither would be freely chosen to govern by the relatively unorganized moderates of the middle who want neither a dictatorship of the right nor the left. Yet it is this moderate group which the United States most wants to support. What too frequently happens, however, is that moderate, middle-of-the-road government is by its very temperate and tolerant character unable to deal with the pressures of running a new state. It breaks down. Waiting to take over, are the organized, disciplined, and relatively educated -- but minority -- cadres of the left or the right.

Generally one finds that the Communist bloc has successfully organized, or is capable of controlling, the leftist cadres and that the Western powers have had an important hand in training and supplying the military forces of these countries. So when moderation breaks down, the choice is between the minority, but well-organized extremists.

It is circumstances of this kind which tend to force the United States toward support of the military regimes instead of the disciplined cadres of the left, which may only be strongly nationalist but which have shown a marked inability to resist communist penetration and control. The best that can be said for American policy when it has had to abandon a moderate regime and support a military regime as the lesser of two evils is that military regimes are more likely than communist regimes, in due course, to consent to elections and to the return of popularly chosen governments. There are a number of examples when military regimes have turned over their power to popularly-elected government, whereas there are no examples of communist regimes entrusting their fate to free elections.

It may be that history will show that in time of revolution -- the post war period from 1945 to 1965, when the number of sovereign states more than doubled -- the United States struggled to promote moderation in foreign governments but that it failed. The struggles for power within these new states, or their new nationalism, created new classes and new power alignments, but condemned moderation.

Just as it is easier to preach self-determination than to practice it, so it is with other American policies. As a matter of principle the United States is in favor of freer international trade. But the Japanese point out that the United States is quick to bring both official and unofficial pressure to bear to restrict Japanese exports to the United States when they hurt American business. The observer from a country that relies largely on the export of a single commodity such as coffee, cocoa, or rubber heartily endorses a policy of "trade, not aid", but finds, as a practical matter, that the prices of his export commodities are so unstable that his nation's earnings make it difficult to purchase abroad and his nation must rely on aid instead of trade. And as soon as these nations demand fixed, stable prices for raw materials, the industrial countries are likely to complain of restrictions of free trade. The United States sells wheat to the Soviet Union, but objects to Japan selling steel pipe to Communist China and to the British selling buses to Cuba. The United States objects to any Pakistan rapprochement with Communist China, but gives increasing amounts of aid to India which is also receiving both military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union.

Instances of this type are common. While the apparent inconsistencies may be reconciled by finely drawn explanations, the thing which sticks in the mind of the foreign observer is the apparent inconsistency, not the elaborate explanation.

One of the consequences of being a superpower is that it must express views on a wide variety of propositions. Often its opinions are delivered in the abstract and generalities are the rule. Then when the time comes to apply the principle to a specific case, it is found that there are many other factors that must be considered. It is this fact which leaves American foreign policies so often open to the charge that they are not based on principle, but are policies of expediency.

Many Voices Confuse. Much of the foreigners' confusion about American foreign policy is traceable to unfamiliarity with the American form of government and to inability to comprehend fully the freedom of press and opinion which exist in the United States. There are strong feelings that American foreign policy lacks stability. America goes to the brink with Dulles, and a few years later, to bed with Khrushchev. As the Paris Le Monde wrote when Senator Goldwater was nominated for President: "His nomination is a weighty argument for those who believe, like President de Gaulle, that Europe could not place her destinies entirely in the hands of a protector whose intentions, excellent today, can change tomorrow." (Quoted in Herald Tribune, Paris Edition, July 23, 1964).

The fact is that American foreign policy has been pretty steadfast since the War -- far more stable than the policies of a good many other countries, including France. But there is no doubt that the American society and the American form of government have created an impression abroad of instability and there is widespread belief that basic policies may be changed overnight. Europeans recall the unexpected withdrawal of the United States from Wilsonian internationalism to isolationism. A survey of the world's press in 1952 during the Eisenhower-Stevenson campaign shows that there was deep concern that election of a Republican President, even though he was an admired leader of Allied forces, would probably inaugurate vast changes in the foreign policy of the nation. The fears were not justified. Similar fears are common today during the Johnson-Goldwater contest.

One characteristic of American government which contributes as much as any other to the belief that American foreign policy is unstable is the freedom and frequency with which American politicians express themselves on controversial foreign policy subjects. Foreigners generally do not understand that American politicians are not bound to agree with their party leaders. The difference in attitude was made quite clear some years ago

when a distinguished Senator called on a European Prime Minister. It was at a time when the then Republican majority leader of the Senate, Senator Knowland, was at odds on an important foreign policy issue with his then Republican President, President Eisenhower. The European Prime Minister couldn't understand how a party leader in Congress could oppose a President of his own party. He blurted out: "I can't understand why President Eisenhower doesn't kick Senator Knowland out of the Republican Party!"

A great many foreign governments are patterned on the parliamentary system of government. The party, or coalition of parties, which controls the Executive Branch of these governments determines the foreign policy of those nations. Party discipline keeps party members either in line with policy, or quiet. Party members support party decisions. They do not, except in a very limited sense, represent a parochial constituency in the hinterlands.

In the United States the situation is quite different. Party discipline is not as important in determining the attitude of a member of Congress as are the views of his constituents or his personal views. Many of the most vigorous critics of foreign policies proposed by the President are the members of his own party. Many supporters will be found in the party of the opposition. Small wonder there is confusion abroad then when the President signs a nuclear test ban treaty and much of the opposition to it comes from members of his own party. In a parliamentary system the Prime Minister's party colleagues speak for him and support him. But in the United States this is not necessarily, or even usually, the case. Occasionally the foreign press reports that a "spokesman" for the Administration has made a speech which is labelled as a "trial balloon" for the President. The fact of the matter is that the alleged "spokesman" is usually doing no more than flying his own kite.

There is little doubt that the American system of the separation of powers, and lack of party discipline, creates an impression of disorder to the average foreign observer. He may object to this disorder. But two facts stand out. First, the system has survived for 185 years (making it one of the oldest continuous, constitutional systems of government in the world) and it has served the American people well. Second, the system is not likely to be changed substantially in our lifetime. This is not to say that another system of government might not have served the United States better in the past or that changes would not improve the system. The point is that the energies of the American people should be put toward making their system work better to meet the foreign policy problems of this era. The energies of some foreign



observers might better be directed to understanding the American system more fully thus enabling them to appraise more accurately the many voices of America and to give them proper weight.

Foreigners are often confused by the voices of the American press and the comments of foreign critics reflect this fact. More is known about what goes on in the United States than in any other country of the world. The news gathering business being what it is, this means that more of the spectacular, unusual, and frequently disparaging events that take place in the United States are reported abroad than from any other country. Furthermore, while other free world countries have news gathering organizations which are not subject to governmental control, news gathering in the bloc countries is severely limited. Unfortunately, there is a trend in many of the newer countries to create their own news services, thus placing under government control news passed to their own citizens.

The foreign critics' perspective is directly affected by the American press, whose freedom he often fails to understand especially in view of the experience he has had with his own press. The Soviet citizen, for example, sees almost daily vicious anti-American cartoons in his own government-controlled press. He assumes that similar emanations from abroad in the form of cartoons and press reports, which his own controlled press from time to time chooses to pass on, reflect the attitude of the American government. Even in non-bloc countries in Asia and Africa, the American traveller is constantly accosted by friendly critics who complain at the "irresponsibility" of the American press and the American motion picture industry. They cannot comprehend why the United States government permits the export of news, magazines, and films which often depict the decadence of American life. In early 1964 one of America's largest weekly news magazines ran a large section on teenage sex problems in the United States. "So this is America", was the reaction of many foreign critics. The explanations of the United States Information Agency that the press of an open society is a free press won't undo the damage to the American image created by that one story on American sex.

It is inevitable that the Government's voice must compete with the voices of the free citizens who make up America -- the press, the politicians, and the citizens speaking as members of a group or as individuals. Perhaps in some respects it is unfortunate that the voice of America is often confused and that it may be difficult in the cacophony to distinguish the theme. But it is there and it is distinguishable and strong.

The Machiavellian View of American Foreign Policy. Some foreign observers are tempted, and do, attribute Machiavellian purposes to much of the foreign policy of the United States. Such an attitude on the part of conspiratorial-minded leaders of some communist states is to be expected. But it is distressing to note this attitude among many observers in neutral and allied countries. Broadly speaking, as these observers search for American motives, they add together the elements discussed earlier. They start with an understanding of the power of the United States. They add to that America's pre-occupation with communism, its propensity for moralization, its seeming failure to practice what it preaches, and the many voices of the United States. And finally, they total these factors in a computer which does not take account of the differences between the American system of separation of powers, with its loose party discipline, and their parliamentary system with power focused in a disciplined, well-organized political party. Out of the welter of diversity which is America (but a welter which the American system has managed tolerably well) many foreign observers find Machiavellian patterns to suit a particular prejudice.

Any nation which develops its foreign policies out of the diversities of a society like that in the United States provides many handles for its critics to grasp. The fact that the United States has a large, well-organized, and vocal Jewish constituency, for example, gives the Arab states opportunity to allege that any American policy with which they do not agree is one stimulated by the pressure of the Jewish constituency. This charge is made whether it is true or not. The fact that the United States stood against the Israelis, the British, and the French at the time of their attack on the Suez Canal is dismissed as a temporary aberration.

Within the Arab States there is a strong feeling that the Machiavellian bent which they see in American foreign policy is something that developed after World War I. Thus, Arabs frequently recall the good old days when the United States was isolationist; when the Americans who came to the Middle East were educators and missionaries; when the imperialists of the area were the British and the French. But now all this is changed. The United States is viewed as an "imperialist" power supporting the Israelis in their alleged attempts to expand their power and influence in the Arab world.

It was during the period of America's isolation from the world that she was most admired. She had no significant foreign interests to protect, except those represented by missionaries, foundations, and limited American business interests mostly in Latin America. The United States was a refuge for the oppressed. To some it was a place to which men and women could flee when

baffled by the involvement of their own nations in war or the preparation for war. To others it was a land of opportunity. It was a place where a man could build his home and grow with his land and his abilities. The United States was admired not because she was strong, but because she was isolated and a place of freedom.

Today American power is great but her motives are often suspected. American prestige is high not because of her isolation, but because of her power. People look to the United States not as a place to get away from it all, but as a place to which to come either to be on the winning side or from which to seek support essential to victory for their cause, whatever it may be. While some of the old attractions of wealth and freedom still exist, in a world of recurrent crisis the appeal of the United States is largely the appeal of its power which may command respect but not necessarily admiration.

The United States with the abandonment of isolation and with its vast increment of power, finds its foreign policies have become suspect, no matter how pure they may be. Generally the weak do not believe the powerful can have pure motives no matter what the American people may believe. This is a burden which American foreign policy today must carry.

Consider again the case of foreign aid. Some recipients of United States foreign aid believe the preamble to the Act for International Development which stresses the highest moral motivations for American aid and states that American assistance is for the purpose of assuring the independence of recipient states and encouraging the development of political and economic systems compatible with those of the United States. By and large, however, American aid is viewed with widespread cynicism by recipients who believe nobody gives aid for nothing. Therefore American aid must have some selfish or Machiavellian purpose. Very few recipients of aid believe that it is provided because of some general concept that healthy states are likely to be stable and that the United States would like to see a world of independent states not at each others' throats. Very few aid recipients believe the United States is so soft-headed or naive that it provides aid with no expectation of a quid pro quo in return.

As a practical matter the motives of United States aid programs are mixed; far more mixed than would be the motives of most other developed nations extending aid. United States motives are mixed because aid proposals of the Executive Branch are changed by the legislative process when amendments are offered and approved which may tend, in the view of the Executive, to corrupt the motivation of the original proposal. United States aid bills are supported by a mixture of interest groups,

ranging from those motivated by a missionary complex to those interested in promoting the export of anything from comic books to bulldozers. If one follows carefully the legislative course of aid bills it is easy to understand the cynicism abroad about United States aid programs. A critical editor in Pakistan remarked: "Developing countries such as mine see little difference between old-fashioned imperialism and American aid. American missions come and stay and soon acquire power and influence enough to overthrow governments that the United States doesn't like. What is the difference between aid of this kind, and old-fashioned imperialism? We see very little difference and that is one reason why the Communists are able so successfully to brand the United States as a 'neo-colonial' power."

It is small wonder that some of America's more troublesome aid clients behave as they do. When they cannot seriously believe that the United States would extend foreign aid unless it is in the direct interests of the United States they do not readily accept the concept that aid may be "mutually advantageous". The only attitude their own new nationalism will permit (when in fact they must have aid to survive) is that such aid is something to which they are rightfully entitled because of their previous "exploitation" by the developed nations. If they do not get aid as a matter of right because of previous exploitation then they are likely to try to get it by playing the great power blocs off against each other. In either event, once aid is received in countries believing they are entitled to it either as payment for past exploitation or as a consequence of their carefully contrived neutrality, they insist aid is theirs to do with as they wish and without conditions.

Americans citizens would do well, as they contemplate the impact abroad of their foreign policy, to realize that no matter how pure they may believe their motives to be, no matter how sincere their intention to give aid to promote development and independence, many of the recipients suspect ulterior motivations, and in some respects they will be right. At the time of American isolation and during the period of relative weakness, American concern with the problems of other nations may have been relatively disinterested. But now the United States is always considered an interested party and foreigners are likely to ask: "What's the United States up to?" And there are among its citizens some, though doubtless a minority, who "don't spend their money for nothing."

One of the consequences of the eminent role of the United States in the world is that it is looked to for a statement of what it stands for. The United States has not produced a credo for the post-war world. Instead of a single clear understanding of the kind of world Americans would like to see built, America's image abroad is a bundle of miscellaneous impressions,

ranging from those created by the latest Hollywood production, to contradictory impressions attributable to the rise and the tragic death of President Kennedy.

Americans may realize that they draw much of their national strength from diversity. They may understand the right -- indeed, the duty -- of the dissatisfied politician, publisher, or citizen to speak out. They may understand that generalities must sometimes give way to acts of expediency. But the total impact of the American society as it projects itself abroad in the field of foreign policy does not commend itself highly to either friend or foe. Perhaps in part this is a result of the newness of the United States as a world power; perhaps it is in part the fact that the United States is the only power which has ever dropped a nuclear weapon in war; certainly, in part, it is a consequence of the diversity of the American society which is unique; perhaps it is, in part, that foreigners tend to read the United States as they would read themselves; perhaps it is that a great power can only expect suspicion of its activities and motives.

All these things tend to create doubt among foreigners as to the reliability of the United States as a great power. "I don't know what the United States stands for," is a common reaction of foreigners with some interest in the role of the United States in the world. It is ineffective to answer in general terms such as that the United Nations Charter sets forth the goals and aspirations of the United States, or to refer to President Kennedy's Inaugural Address -- although that comes about as close as any document to definition of what American stands for -- in a form recognizable to nationals of other states. America badly needs a political philosopher who can produce an American creed for the twentieth century.

What kind of world would most Americans like to see? First, they want a world of nations each free to decide for itself such questions as how to vote in the United Nations; what economic system each nation best believes will serve the interests of its own people; what political system it desires for itself. Much as Americans may dislike dictatorships, military juntas, one party states, or communist systems of government, there is little evidence that the American people -- in the absence of other factors referred to below -- would seek either by military or economic means to substitute an American judgment for that of the people of a foreign state who may freely have chosen a different form of government or economic system or even who may have succumbed to the internal imposition of such a system upon them.

Second, although denying intent to overthrow foreign governments or economic systems, Americans nevertheless believe

that certain principles of economic and political life are preferable for the well-being of the people of the United States and of other nations. Generally, they believe that the welfare of the greatest number of people within any state is best promoted by giving individual men and women the widest possible personal scope in the choice of the their governors and in their choice of a means of livelihood. Americans believe that political and economic freedom tend to go hand in hand and that they produce the greatest good for the greatest number in the shortest period of time.

Finally, just as Americans do not seek by military or economic means to substitute their judgment for that of the people of other nations who may have chosen or had imposed upon them internally forms of government or economic life, Americans are not willing to stand idly aside when other nations by aggression seek to change governments or economic systems of other states. It is on this basis that the United States seeks by peaceful means and in collaboration with states requesting assistance to prevent the export of economic or political systems from one state to another. It is on this basis that the United States will not accept efforts of the Castro regime to arm dissident elements within Latin American states which request United States assistance to prevent such activities. It is on this basis that the United States cannot condone efforts of North Vietnam to substitute its concepts of economic and political life upon South Vietnam so long as the government of that country requests American assistance.

This is the broad framework within which the credo or the ideology of America must fit.

An ideology is a combination of things. It is the concept of the place of an individual in society; the concept of the place of the state in society; the relationship between the rich and the poor; the standards of justice and equity; the freedom of man to choose and live his own life by his own standards and his relationship to the commonweal of his state and the world.

Somehow the United States has captured the power leadership of the world but not the ideological leadership. The potentiality of acquiring the ideological leadership of free men is in America and its presence is recognized by foreigners such as the former Indian Ambassador to the United States, G.L. Mehta, who told the Rotary Club in Bombay:

"...What is important in national development is not merely the gross national product but the gross national mind. It is possible to be overwhelmed by America's material advancement and dynamic economy...But below the sound of the dollar is the still, small voice of idealism in America. It is the sacrifice

of Abraham Lincoln, the humanism of Thomas Jefferson, the social discipline emphasized by Franklin Roosevelt, and the insights and endeavors of thinkers and selfless men of action -- whether in the realm of art, science, or religion -- that inspires the best in America. It is this spirit that kindles their phenomenal generosity and enables them to bear the burdens of massive assistance to so many lands. If materialism -- whether capitalist or Marxist -- is to be defeated it will not be by amassing personal fortunes or producing fearfully destructive weapons but by the purposes and ideals to which America has so richly contributed in the struggle for freedom, human dignity, and social justice."\*

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\* Address delivered to the Bombay Rotary Club on July 9, 1963, by G.L. Mehta, former Indian Ambassador to the United States.

4. "All the world is queer save thee and me, and even thou art a little queer."

The story is told of the two cross-eyed gentlemen, one an American and the other a foreigner, who accidentally bumped into each other. As they picked themselves up, the American remarked: "Why don't you look where you're going?" To which the foreigner replied, "Why don't you go where you're looking?"

The last few pages examined how American foreign policy looks to others, recognizing that the foreigner's view of American policy may be distorted by what he doesn't know or doesn't think about. The following paragraphs examine the American's view of his own nation's policy and how foreigners look to Americans, recognizing that the American's view may be distorted by what he doesn't know or doesn't think about.

Before inquiring how Americans view foreigners, there are several characteristics which most Americans will readily recognize as their very own and which undoubtedly affect an American's attitudes toward the rest of the world.

For one thing, America is a nation of impatient problem-solvers. If something is wrong, Americans want to fix it now -- not mañana. When they are told by their leaders that the problems of Southeast Asia or the underdeveloped world will be with them for many years, they don't like it. Americans have a tendency to want things to happen in two years which it took 25 years to accomplish in the United States. Americans have too much adrenalin for life in the tropics.

Another American characteristic is to think that most troubles can be solved with money. It cost \$14 billion to put Western Europe on its feet after the War and the job was done in four years. How much will it cost and how long will it take to make going concerns out of the new nations? It is difficult to realize that the methods which worked in Western Europe where money and equipment transfusions were adequate might kill the patient in Asia or Africa where there are no veins to absorb the transfusion.

Americans have a tendency to view problems in terms of absolutes. The actions of other states are good or bad, not half and half. They find it hard to accept the idea that the standards of world society are so varied that there are no universal concepts of good and bad. The American way of doing things may have been best for the United States but that way is not necessarily best for a completely different society. Closely associated with the tendency to view problems in terms of blacks and whites, is the matter of style -- the way Americans convey their views. Americans tend to be a blunt, forthright people who say what they



think. An American would tell a foreigner: "No. Don't do that." A Britisher would comment: "I say, old boy, it's your funeral. We wouldn't do it that way..." The difference is a matter of style, not substance.

Americans are often critical of, and exasperated with, the apparent irresponsibilities of the newer states and their leaders. Americans recognize that many of the new states are struggling in a morass of political and economic trouble but don't understand how under those circumstances these states find money to waste. They build new capitols, erect national monuments, build massive sports stadiums, establish national air lines, purchase the latest jets, open large embassies abroad, and so on. They insist on their right to make their own mistakes and they do, often at the expense of developed nations which are putting up the money. This is exasperating to Americans, to say the least.

What Americans may forget, however, are some of their own pains of national growth. Americans who are critical of the Brazilians and the Pakistanis for the expensive construction of new capital cities may forget that the United States when it was a young nation abandoned Philadelphia to create a new capital city on the swamp lands of the Potomac River. Americans who are critical of such nations as Indonesia and Ghana for endowing their first national leaders with office for life may forget that there was a strong movement to make General Washington the King of the United States and that it was only his good judgment which established the two-term tradition. Monuments to national leaders in some of the newer countries remind one of the Washington Monument, which was expensive and time-consuming to build.

The citizens of a developed and stable nation like the United States find it hard to understand the priorities of the people of a new nation. While an American might believe that a new water and sanitary system for Djakarta should be a first priority for Indonesia, the Indonesian is more interested in building a modern hotel, a super highway, or a sports stadium capable of providing facilities for the Asian Games. An American is likely to feel that Ghana is wasting money when it creates its own international air line whose planes often fly empty and which is a heavy burden on a strained budget. But to the Ghanaian, such a facility seems an essential ingredient of independence and statehood.

Americans are likely to be critical of the disorder and violence which often accompany the creation of new states. The birth of some of the new African and Asian states is time-consuming, turbulent, and occasionally bloody. But Americans may forget that thirteen years elapsed between the Declaration of Independence and the inauguration of the United States Constitution, which

was then promptly amended by inclusion of the Bill of Rights. Americans were offended to see the Indians take over Goa from the Portuguese, but may have forgotten the activities of some earlier Americans who rounded out the borders of the United States in wars with the Mexicans and who acquired Canal rights in Panama by encouraging revolution. Americans critical of blood shed in African and Asian states struggling to establish stability are prone to forget their own Civil War.

The growing pains of the United States extended over a hundred years and came at a period in world history when the United States was isolated from the rest of the world. American development took place in a virtually uninhabited continent separated by weeks of travel time from the then great powers which might otherwise have been vastly more interested in what was going on in the United States.

The new nations of Africa and Asia which today have their growing pains spread in the world's press are all less than twenty years of age. They are within 24 hours flying time of any place on earth. They are subjected not only to the normal pressures of growth and development, but what goes on within their borders is of vital interest to great powers locked in ideological struggles that easily precipitate brush fire wars and threaten to break into large scale military confrontations. These new nations often control vital sources of raw materials and important communications routes. They are recognized as large potential markets. Politically they are significant because they are so numerous that their bloc votes have an important influence on voting in the United Nations.

Many of the new states lack the homogeneity of most states of Western Europe and America. Just because most Africans are black doesn't mean they all speak the same language, have the same customs, or worship the same way, any more than white Europeans or North Americans are homogeneous in these respects. European states have boundaries which generally follow ethnic and lingual lines. Most new states, however, and especially those in Africa, exist within their present boundaries simply because they were defined to suit some political or economic purpose, or fancied need, of a former colonial power.

When colonial powers were dominant within these artificial entities it made no particular difference that borders cut through tribal areas, or that tribes were strong or weak, or didn't get along well together. But when colonial domination was removed and self-government became significant to the life and independence of the new states, the lack of homogeneity became terribly important. Trouble brewed quickly when the unifying force of the colonial master was removed and when tribal loyalties seemed

more important than national loyalties. The colonial powers had by the use of force imposed at least a semblance of national identity -- if for no other purpose than issuing stamps, drawing boundaries on maps, and arranging customs areas. But when this power was withdrawn, the new states discovered they had no national identity. They were merely a group of tribes.

One serious consequence of creating new independent states out of former colonial domains was that the native inheritors of colonial power found their most pressing need was to create a sense of national identity. In greater or lesser degree this problem exists in most of the post-war states.

Perhaps the comprehension which the citizen of a developed country has of the problems of a new nation may be enhanced by thinking of development as stages of growth, each of which comes in turn and cannot be skipped. It is doubtful, for example, if a new nation can have any substantial degree of economic growth, or any but the most primitive political institutions, until most of the people of such nation have achieved a sense of political identity or national consciousness. This is not yet true in many of the new nations, especially in Africa. In the new countries of Africa, for example, if a citizen is asked for his nationality he is likely to respond by naming his tribe. In Indonesia it has only been within the last year or so that citizens consider themselves Indonesians rather than Balinese, Javanese, Sumatrans, and so on. In Malaysia, citizens think of themselves as Malays, Chinese, or Indians. Some of the newer African states didn't have a national name until they were given independence. Who ever saw on a map such names as Mali, Malagasy, Upper Volta, and Malawi?

This point should not be dismissed lightly. Americans went through this part of the growth process. They had no potential for national development until citizens began to think of themselves first as Americans, and second as New Yorkers or Virginians or Swedes or Germans or Italians. Over a period of 180 years, after war and civil war, Americans today have a clear and strong identity. Now while Americans may argue about the further concentration of power in Washington and states' rights, even the most vigorous protagonists think of themselves as Americans first, not as Californians or Georgians.

New nations in order to develop into full-fledged members of the international community apparently need to proceed through certain steps of political growth. Mr. Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, has described the means by which nations move into a "take off" stage of economic development. The problem of bringing nations fully into the international community, however, involves more than

economic development. These states must also acquire reasonably stable political institutions. As they go through these stages of political development, they move from a period of chaos, and tribal or other rivalries, to dictatorship of individuals or groups, and hopefully they ultimately achieve a degree of political stability which will take substantial account of the views of the individual citizens of the society. It is not suggested that this political progression is necessarily orderly, but only that states must experience each of these steps before moving to the next.

In the long run, history is likely to show that the some fifty states that have come into being since World War II are only in the most primitive stage of political development. The people of these states, with a few exceptions, are tribally or geographically oriented. Their first instincts of nationalism are to identify themselves with their tribal group, rather than with the nation. Thus it is that the continent of Africa which has many common problems is likely to fragment even more than is now the case before headway is made toward such relatively simple concepts as a common market. Despite massive common problems, about all Africans can agree upon at the moment is to vote as a bloc at the United Nations on a very limited number of issues. It will be many years before they will be able to make practical progress toward some meaningful type of regional community such as is represented in Europe by NATO and the Common Market.

As new states go through the process of political and economic development the citizens of the developed world can expect some traumatic shocks. It is not easy to build a nation out of a miscellany of tribes and cultures which happen to have been thrown together by the independence movements of the twentieth century. For one thing, citizens of developed nations should realize that membership in the United Nations and the concept of one state one vote does not make all states equal. There of course are differences in size, population, and power. But there are also differences in the political maturity and political responsibilities of the governmental institutions of states. While states may have institutions with similar names such as "parliament", the "courts", a "cabinet", a "police force", the "army", the institutions may be so dissimilar to those with the same names in other countries as only to cause confusion. This is not an admonition to citizens to enroll in advanced courses of comparative political institutions. It is only a caveat to exercise care in the interpretation of events in new nations so as to avoid misunderstanding which may arise out of the use of familiar words which in fact describe institutions which are quite different from those which exist in the developed world.

One thing that often shocks Americans is the character of the leadership of some of the new states. On the basis of experience thus far, and despite unhappiness with the type of leaders, one is tempted to offer the proposition that the more spectacular and irresponsible the leaders of these states appear in the eyes of Americans, the more likely these states are to establish a national identity. Sukarno, Nasser, Ayub Khan, and Nkrumah are all virtual dictators who have made substantial headway toward creating national states. While the Western nations, including the United States, have managed to brand each of these leaders as irresponsible, demagogic, and wicked at one time or another, their capacity to generate a national spirit and identity has increased at about the same rate as they have been able to irritate the more mature states of the West. Yet they have managed to keep control of their states and to develop them both domestically and internationally into significant national identities. Often they have kept the attention of their citizens off local economic and political problems by focusing attention on the international scene. They have played East against West and have kept their own national interests foremost. Each of these leaders has the capacity to tell his people who to hate and when -- but not necessarily why, because the political sophistication necessary to raise that question does not yet exist in these states.

The leader who has the capacity to lead a nation toward national independence and to give his people a sense of national identity, however, does not necessarily have the capacities required to promote the full development of his own state. There is a glamour about the struggle for independence which elicits sacrifice. But at some point new states and their leaders must shift gears. They must get off the race track and start to climb the hills. And the going is often steep and muddy. One is sometimes tempted to think of a national leader like Sukarno as he would of a sport fisherman who finds the greatest personal satisfaction in catching fish, but he hates to clean them.

As Americans contemplate their role and that of their nation in the modern world they should realize that the standards of contemporary America and Western Europe are almost impossible of application to Asia and Africa and to much of Latin America. This is especially true with respect to the more than half the states of the world which have come into existence since the end of World War II and which now command a majority of the votes in the United Nations.

Americans want to see stability in the new nations; the new nations want change and revolution. Americans want sensible growth; the new nations want a national identity which they think is more important. Americans would like to see new states concerned about individuals and their rights; the newer states are

interested in society as a whole and not in the individual. Americans believe private enterprise promotes rapid growth; the new states are suspicious of private enterprise of which they saw too much when they were colonies. The United States is opposed to dictatorships and encourages free elections; the newer states welcome dictators so long as they are their own. Americans think recipients should be grateful for aid; the underdeveloped states believe the developed world owes them aid. Americans are opposed to corruption; in many of the newer states corruption or baksheesh is a way of life as normal as tipping at the Waldorf is in the West. Americans want to help new states avoid mistakes in development; the newer states demand the right to make their own mistakes -- they want to learn by experience. The United States wants the new states to be worried about dangers to their independence stemming from communism; the new states are still worried about imperialism which they know, and unconcerned about communism which they don't know. The United States seeks constantly to get the new nations to see international problems as part of the world scene; they are interested in their regional problems. The United States wants all nations to be involved (in principle, at least) in the problems of great power relationships; the newer states want to be left alone just as did the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries.

These are shorthand allegations of very basic differences of attitude between citizens and statesmen of the developed world and those of the underdeveloped world. Obviously not all people in the developed world are blind to the desires and motivations of the people of the underdeveloped world. Neither are all the people and statesmen of the newer states ignorant of the points of view of the developed states. Nevertheless, the differences of attitude are so common and so widely held that it would be dangerous and misleading to assume that these differences do not exist. Perhaps a more detailed examination of some of the differences in attitude would be helpful.

Freedom of the Individual. Ranking high in the American system of values is the concept of the freedom of the individual. Although one's freedom is always limited by the police power of the state, in general Americans are among the most free individuals of the world. They have freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of election, and freedom to choose their professions or their businesses. Americans would like to see new states concerned about individual citizens and their basic rights. In the words of a dedicated Indonesian nationalist, however, "Individual freedom to us means climbing over the bodies of other people. The only individuals in our society who ever had any freedom were the rich and the members of the colonial society. We're not

interested in any more of that. If we encouraged individualism here now we would be encouraging disorder."

Individual freedom remains only a hope in many of the newer societies. A nation must have resources before individual freedoms become significant. In an African society where there is a shortage of engineers and doctors, they must be trained at government expense. The government which provides the training then restrains the freedom of its trainees by insisting that their training be put at the service of the state. This is somewhat similar to the situation which exists in the United States when it trains officers in its military academies and then requires that they devote several years of service to the United States. In a country with shortages of trained manpower the state cannot afford to give freedom to the individual and permit him to choose when and where he will practice his profession.

Much the same situation exists when a nation has shortages of foreign currency with which it can buy things abroad. If a man has enough currency of his own to buy a foreign automobile and he wishes to do so, in a free society the government would not interfere with his spending his money any way he wishes. But the effect of exercising this individual freedom in a new state would be to limit the foreign currency available to the society to educate its youth abroad or to acquire basic industrial equipment, or to spend its limited funds in other ways that would seem to serve the total national interest more directly than would be the case if the individual were permitted to spend his funds in any way he might wish.

American standards of individual freedom are not applicable in these nations until they have acquired sufficient resources to make such freedoms significant.

Free Enterprise. Closely associated with the value which Americans place on the concept of the freedom of the individual is the belief that the most rapid development for new states would come if they were devoted to concepts of free enterprise, private enterprise, capitalism, or enlightened capitalism -- whatever one wishes to call the American economic system. Americans believe, and their own experience seems to prove it, that the best way to provide the most for the greatest number of people in the shortest period of time is to encourage private enterprise and to discourage socialism. True as this may be, the newer states and the majority of their statesmen have at one time or another been exploited by capitalism in one of its less enlightened forms -- either the capitalism of colonial entrepreneurs, or that of their own brand of robber barons. They want no more of this.

To many of the citizens of the newer states, free enterprise means imperialism and imperialism means the right of one man to exploit another. Free enterprise, in their view, is a form of imperialism and they have had all the imperialism they want. They are against it. Indeed, they have experienced the exploitation of imperialism and have not experienced the exploitation of communism.

Another burden under which such concepts as free enterprise and capitalism labor is that these are viewed as anti-nationalist words. There was a time in the nineteenth century when two words were closely associated -- private enterprise (capitalism) and nationalism. States with strong national pride and national consciousness protected their private entrepreneurs wherever they went. The British used the fleet and the Americans used the Marines. The colonization of Africa by the French, the Germans, and the British was an expression of the nationalism of those colonial states. Their nationalism demanded that the flag follow, or in some cases, precede, the private entrepreneur. Since World War II, however, the word nationalism has been appropriated by the newer states and the economic concept associated with the word nationalism is no longer "capitalism", but "socialism". A new state desires to develop its national identity and one of the ways it does so is by acquiring its own means of production. Its very nationalism orients it toward socialism. These new states believe the way toward rapid economic development is for the state to own the basic means of production. The newer states equate nationalism, which is essentially a political concept, with socialism, which is essentially an economic concept. In the newer states an individual can be a nationalist and a socialist at the same time; but he finds it very hard to be a nationalist and a capitalist at the same time.

The problem created for the developed states by this situation is more complicated than finding a new word for capitalism or free enterprise. These words are already far too unpopular for new definitions or for enlightening propaganda to redefine them. The word socialism is too popular to be destroyed. Perhaps the best thing that could happen would be to get away from the use of these words which have so many different meanings as to be virtually useless. Americans know that the word capitalism no longer means what it did in the early part of the century -- exploitation of labor, child labor, monopoly, the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer.

The same is true about the word "socialism". It has become a word to hide a multitude of sins, including differing social systems. Hitler's use of the word "Socialist" as part of the title of the National Socialist Party (Nazis) should not be confused with use of the same word in Sweden, or the use



of the word in Sweden confused with its use in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Despite the lack of any generally accepted definition of what the word "socialist" means, it is a popular word in the newer countries. One of the reasons for its popularity is that the former colonial powers and the United States are constantly attacking its use. They object to anything called socialism and in the minds of the citizens of the newer states this criticism implies rejection of their new nationalism. Their new independence demands not only that they be independent, but that they be different.

One of the ironies of the decades of development faced by the new nations is that at the time their nationalism is strongest and their desire for a separate national identity demands satisfaction, they find they must depend upon outside sources for assistance. At the time they most want to be independent and free from foreign influence, they must accept foreign aid if they are to survive. Yet the states most able to provide significant material aid are states whose own development was attributable to free enterprise and who still believe that free enterprise, perhaps with some modifications, is still the basis of more rapid and widespread economic development than is possible under a socialist pattern.

One of the most useful things that could be done by writers and public figures in all countries where the subject of economic development is of concern would be to avoid the use of such words as socialism and capitalism. Instead of the use of those words, when a country is poor and needs economic development, it would be helpful to discuss what happens and why. The question is not whether capitalism is better than socialism, or vice versa. The question should be how does a particular country or society go about creating the greatest wealth for the largest number of its citizens in the shortest period of time.

Americans should realize, however, that while this question may be of concern to some citizens of developing countries, by and large the inclination is to answer the question with a cliché, rather than to give it thoughtful analysis. Even in those instances when such analysis may suggest that growth might come more rapidly with less state operations, one is likely to find non-economic factors such as the drive of nationalism, the demand for government jobs, and vested bureaucratic interests have an influence which may mean that efficiency gives away to expediency.

Stability, Integrity, and Double Standards. Americans are impressed by such concepts as stability and integrity. But most people of underdeveloped countries aren't interested in either stability or integrity. They want change; they want a revolutionary break with the past. As one revolutionary has remarked,

it is only the "haves" who want stability; the "have-nots" have nothing to lose by change and violence. Stability represents an acceptance of existing ways of life which may be changed perhaps by evolutionary processes. But the revolutionary often feels the old fields must be thoroughly plowed before they can be planted. He may be wrong, but he doesn't know it.

While corruption exists sometimes on an unpleasant scale in the United States, it is the exception and not a way of life. In many of the newer countries, however, conditions exist which the citizens of those countries accept as normal, but which Americans would view as corruption. Probably no westerner fully understands the concept of "baksheesh". The beggar who demands baksheesh demands it as a matter of right. He is not asking for alms. The man who is well-off has a duty to pay baksheesh to his less fortunate fellow-men, whether they are beggars on the street, repairmen, or his servants who expect special payments at certain times of the year -- sort of a bonus, but not quite, because a bonus is voluntary on the part of the donor.

In Asia as well as in Africa a man has a very special relationship to his family and sometimes to his tribe. If he gets a government job his good fortune is that of his family and his tribe. After making an appropriate payment to the individual who may have helped him get the job, he then has obligations to his family -- usually an "extended family", which may run into the dozens or even the hundreds in numbers. If he has a car and a house provided by the government, his "family" may feel they have the right (and the employed man the duty) to live with him and eat at his table and travel in the government car. Since a member of the family has a government job, he has a special duty to take care of members of his family and tribe by giving them special government favors and preferences. Nepotism is viewed as a questionable practice in western democratic societies. But in most of Asia and Africa, the man who turns his back on the family by not engaging in nepotism is a scoundrel.

Other practices which westerners view with distaste are accepted as normal in many of these countries. For example, political parties are often supported by kickbacks on government contracts or by outright business or political subsidies which are used to buy favors. This occurs in western societies, of course, but is viewed as highly improper, rather than as normal and necessary.

These things are described not because they are bad per se, though most Americans may think them so, but because they are different from normal western practices. Since they are different, Americans may find that their understanding of foreign policy problems will be increased by recognition of their existence.

The American who expects at least a modest show of gratitude, for example, for foreign aid is likely to be appalled when a Moslem nation with its historical background of baksheesh views American aid as something to which it is entitled as a matter of right. It may be that the individual American feels that corruption is corruption wherever it is or whatever it is called. He may feel that it is the duty of America to conform the world to American standards of the good and the bad. But before embarking on such a crusade it is well to keep in mind the fact that there are no universal standards of righteousness.

As Americans look at themselves and at the world about them they must become accustomed to double standards of conduct, not because they condone double standards, but because they exist. Consider the subject of discrimination which exists in the United States. Discrimination is fully reported in the American and world press, with timely pictures flashed abroad. It is almost impossible these days to pick up a foreign newspaper without finding at least one picture of discrimination or related violence in the United States. The observer from Mars would need to be perceptive to conclude that discrimination exists anywhere else in the world than in the United States.

In Black Africa discrimination and segregation in the United States are subjects of constant comment. One would think that there was no discrimination within most African states. But in Nigeria or Kenya, to take two examples, there is plenty of discrimination but it is based on tribal differences, not color. Discrimination on the basis of color is bad, but discrimination on the basis of tribal origins is expected. Furthermore, a good many of the white, African-born citizens and residents of these new African states, and certainly Indians and "coloreds" know that while discrimination of white against black is viewed as unacceptable by their governments, discrimination of black against the whites or the coloreds or the Indians is condoned, if not encouraged. Discrimination on the basis of caste, religion, color, education, or origin is common throughout the world. But the United States is held to a higher standard.

Discrimination within the United States and South Africa is considered a fair subject for debate in the United Nations, but is there similar freedom to debate discrimination which exists within the newer states of Africa and Asia?

One need remind himself from time to time that "everyone's a little queer but me and thee" and that it is impossible for any man to divorce himself completely from his background and experience. His judgment of the acts of others is based upon his own experience in life.

Yet the thoughtful man will recognize that every other man (and nation) upon whom he passes judgment is also incapable of divorcing himself and his actions completely from his own background and experience. This is the first step toward understanding -- to try to comprehend and appreciate not only one's own background and experience and the effect it has on one's judgment, but the background and experience of others of an alien background whose reasons for reacting as they do are as justified by their experience as those of the observer.

5. So What?

It is dangerous to the peace of the world for a great nation to have its foreign policies determined by emotionalism or parochialism. For reasons discussed earlier, Americans have shown a propensity for reactions influenced by such considerations. Such words as "Cuba", "Communist China", and "de Gaulle", quickly arouse the emotions of Americans. Parochial reactions are roused by such words as "fisheries", "imports", "shipping", "wheat", "lumber", and so on.

The United States can do very little to influence the conduct of foreign policy by other great powers. It is a domestic matter for the United States, however, to determine the way it reacts to the world about it. The United States when it responds to international situations can be hard-headed or soft-hearted; cold-blooded or hot-blooded; calculating or emotional; moderate or immoderate. Whichever it is, the American system of representative government is well adapted to give quick effect to emotional and parochial pressures. Amendments can be tacked on legislation by a Congress which is in almost constant session. A free press, free assembly, free speech, and boycotts are a few of the numerous instruments available by which parochial and emotional pressures may be brought to bear on American foreign policies. It is seldom that the President finds it necessary to whip up sentiment for an emotional or parochial response to a foreign challenge. Instead, he finds that much of the time of his highest ranking officers is devoted to trying to restrain pressure groups of the right or the left. The Department of State probably spends as much time and effort in restraining adventuresome Cuban exiles and their American supporters as it does in trying to keep track of "Fair Play for Cuba" student groups.

There are those who believe that the President is in full charge of the conduct of American foreign policy because he represents all the people and that he can, therefore, control public pressures. To some extent this is true. But the crucial factor is that much of what the President does in foreign policy depends upon what he believes the public is willing to support. Undoubtedly the President as Commander in Chief can get the United States into war despite the constitutional provision that only Congress has the authority to declare war. However, the American people have the power to force a President to commit indiscreet acts, especially in an election year. This is just as potentially a cause for concern as the possibility that the President of his own volition may precipitate a crisis.

The role of the American people is significant and often decisive in determining the course of American foreign policy.

If Americans were citizens of a small state they could be irresponsible in the exercise of this role. If what American citizens believe and do had no effect on the policies of the United States, they could be irresponsible. But neither of these situations exists. As a consequence, the American citizen finds that a higher standard of conduct is imposed upon him than upon the citizen of any other power. This higher standard of responsibility is not limited only to the rationality with which the citizen exercises his influence on foreign policy such as the way he votes, the groups he joins, and the views he expresses. But it applies even to his domestic conduct as a citizen. Other nations are substantially influenced by the crime rate in the United States, by American educational standards, by housing in the United States, by juvenile delinquency, and so on. American citizens are scrutinized and criticized and held to special standards of conduct and reasonableness much as the children of the local district attorney or minister. This may be unfair and unpleasant, but it is true. And just as the conduct of the child reflects on his parents, the conduct of American citizens reflects on the international image of the nation.

Obviously every American citizen is not about to become a paragon of national and international virtue. That would indeed be frightening to contemplate. Nevertheless, in the final analysis it is the citizens of the United States who will, consciously or unconsciously, determine the world role of the United States, and the world role played by the United States is very likely to determine the nature of the world for the next century at least.

American citizens should play their role consciously and rationally because the total of all the small things Americans believe reflects the philosophy and attitude of Americans as citizens with world-wide responsibilities.

In earlier pages a number of factors were suggested which citizens should consider as they formulate their views on specific foreign policies. Perhaps even more important than those factors in the development of rational policies, however, are the qualities of mind which citizens bring to bear on foreign policy issues. Without attempting to be exhaustive these qualities include: objectivity, candor and honesty, patience, generosity, moderation in the use of power, and sympathy toward others and their points of view. These are all qualified by the existence of a healthy skepticism, but not cynicism.

These qualities will seem to some as nothing short of a description of American naïveté. How and why should Americans exercise qualities of this kind when so much of the world's

politics looks Machiavellian to the American? How can one expect to continue to be rational and enlightened when he sees trouble everywhere -- NATO in disintegration; Asia under communist attack; much of Africa in violent revolution; Latin America far from stable? Must American policy be nothing more than putting fingers in dikes all over the world?

The answer in part is that if the United States does not behave reasonably and keep putting fingers in dikes, no other nation will. Furthermore, if the exercise of these qualities seems only a prescription of naivité, it might be recalled that it has been these qualities which have made the American government and its development of a nation successful. Americans often think of the United States as a new nation. In fact, however, the United States is an old nation in terms of constitutional government. No other nation in the world has had the continuity of governmental experience that exists in the United States.

There is no reason to abandon these qualities when it comes to the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. Certainly one reason for the reservoir of good will which the United States still seems to retain (although in depleted quantity) is attributable in large part to the belief that American foreign policy has been straightforward, honest, candid, and generous -- yes, even idealistic. The United States has avoided thus far being tagged with a description such as "perfidious Albion", which was applied to Great Britain for so many years. America's long history of isolation, her politically disinterested missionary and foundation generosity, the haven she has provided for the oppressed and the poor from other countries, and her freedoms have all contributed to a world-wide respect which is unique, if not universal. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, a respectable portion of the world's peoples manage still to see their national interests coincide largely with the national interests of the United States.

History argues for the continuation of foreign policies based on candor, honesty, patience, generosity, moderation in the use of power, and understanding of the points of view of others. Over the long term it is these qualities that have prevailed. Despite discouraging setbacks when parts of mankind have seemed headed for the dark ages, in the long run the area of man's freedom has gradually expanded and the morality of his conduct toward his fellow man has progressed.

Perhaps never in the history of mankind have so many people been involved in determining its fate as is the case today with American citizens. The citizens of Nazi Germany who succumbed to Hitler and the citizens of the Soviet Union who lived under

Stalin had, in theory at least, the power to revolt and throw out their leadership. But even when they did not, the activities of those states, while they could destroy the peace and curtail man's freedom, did not threaten the existence of mankind.

In the United States today American citizens have the power to select and to throw out their leaders. And it is the course which the United States takes in its international relations which has the possibility of destroying not only the peace, but all of mankind.

The United States and its citizens today bear a responsibility not only for the preservation of man, but for the protection of and the enlargement of his freedom.