

CRR-(14)

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

What We Might Yet Lose by Chandler Rosenberger

Peter B. Martin
c/o ICWA
4. W. Wheelock Street
Hanover, N.H. 03755 U.S.A.

PRAGUE - For years countries like
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary

lay under a grey sheen of mystery.

Few of us had any friends there; the

way we might have had friends from

an exchange in Bremen or Rouen.

Fewer still spoke any of the native

CHANDLER ROSENBERGER is a John O. Crane Memorial fellow of the
Institute writing about the lands of the former Habsburg Empire.

Since 1925 the Institute of Current World Affairs (the Crane-Rogers Foundation) has provided long-term fellowships to enable outstanding young adults to live outside the United States and write about international areas and issues. Endowed by the late Charles R. Crane, the Institute is also supported by contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations.

languages. Interest in them was reserved mainly for the denizens of fluorescent-lit think tanks or immigrant beer halls on the outskirts of town. They simply were not normal countries; they were sound sets for the real and imaginary intrigues of the Cold War.

In 1989, cities like Prague and Budapest called out for the attention of more ordinary Americans. At first, we dwelled on the peculiarities of their experience, in the way one might discuss a relative's crippling ailments with morbid fascination. Ponderous essays on the lessons of totalitarianism both thrilled and repelled. Cold warriors, again both real and imaginary, toured the long inaccessible capitals to relish the defeat of a foe; all too often they wore the gloating grin of the saved listening to the torments of the damned. But anyone trying to muster a deeper appreciation must have wondered if these countries didn't have more to offer than overheated concrete hostels and brutal pasts.

Fortunately, they did, and were eager to show it. Within months, too quickly for some on both sides, the past torments were forgotten and the long-buried treasures were put on display. On the Strand in London, productions of Vaclav Havel's grim plays disappeared as quickly as the newspapers that had shown him leading the "Velvet Revolution." In their place came the delights of Janacek revivals. Prague slipped off the itinerary of the intrigue addicts, replaced by Tashkent and Belgrade. Foreigners strolling along the Vltava might have taken note of the apartment of the president, but they mostly indulged in cheap beer, golden Baroque domes and the random adventures, sexual and cultural, of typical tourism. Prague, like Budapest and Warsaw, were suddenly normal.

In the early 1990s, as the Central European countries shook off their pasts, every new MacDonald's I saw gave me a quiet thrill. Not because they were outposts of an American empire, but because they were little signals that countries I loved were coming back into the circulation of civilization. For every fast food stand that opened Prague, three seminars were starting at universities back home on Central European history and literature. For every subtitled Schwarzenegger film that opened there were ten Americans who now realized that Milos Forman came from somewhere with a real name and a real past. No expatriates out here have ever made me angrier than the ones that looked nostalgically back on sour service, cheap warm beer and toilets with scraps of newspaper piled on the lids.

Three years ago Tomas Hrivnak, a Slovak who was then a poet and cultural

critic, played with my obsolete Apple computer with glee. Today he writes advertising copy and, when his boss isn't looking, plays computer games on a machine twice as sophisticated as mine. But to see my friend and delight in his successes, I must now travel up to Prague. And therein lies a tale of foreboding.

Like many talented and ambitious Slovaks, my friend abandoned his home town, Bratislava, to become an immigrant in Prague. He's staying; both he and his wife plan to take Czech citizenship as soon as they can. They left because the rise of national communism in Slovakia had ruined their hopes of making something of their lives at home. For the political intriguers, the election of Slovak premier Vladimir Meciar brought back all the toys -- tapped phone lines, press censorship -- that had been taken away from them. But for men and women who had other things to worry about, such as raising children, buying good books, building a firm, the return of political tremors meant nothing but trouble, best avoided.

No, there is no MacDonald's in Bratislava. And if you look at recent discussions of NATO policy towards post-communist countries, you will see that Slovakia has quietly slipped the loose ties that bound it to a future in Europe. One British diplomat was so bold as to say it openly. While the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland could expect the alliance offer them membership first, Slovakia would be "on a different timetable."

"A different timetable?" cynics in the other "Visegrad" countries ask. "What timetable are we on?" Despite his inspiring speeches about the future of whole and healed Europe, President Bill Clinton did not bring a schedule, or, some said, a real commitment to Central Europe, with him when he visited Prague in January. And although his "Partnership for Peace" proposal offers reason for hope, more easily embittered Central Europeans see their countries -- Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary -- in danger of slipping back into the netherworld from which they had just begun to emerge, and back into which Slovakia has begun to slide.

Partnership for Peace: the plan(s)

The U.S. proposal for how to manage the expansion of NATO is called the "Partnership for Peace" (known as "P4P" in diplomatic circles.) It is essentially an offer of NATO apprenticeships to all the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the ex-Soviet Union -- about 22 in all. Such countries may request visits and training from NATO experts who will advise them how best to upgrade their forces, restructure their chains of

command and reform their military finances. Officers may also participate in NATO training and exercises at a new planning cell to be established at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. The idea is for the countries to be shown how to make their military forces more "western." Military budgets, for example, must be published and civilian control of the military is strongly advised. Countries may also offer NATO whatever strategic assets they have, i.e. a good infantry in a sensitive region or airfields.¹

At some as yet unforeseen date, NATO will offer full membership to those countries that have both made their military structures more "western" and have something to offer. The so-called "Visegrad Four" -- the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland -- are considered first in line for two reasons. These four countries, including Slovakia, are streets ahead of the rest of the ex-Communist world in military and economic reform. They are also the countries near the eastern border of Germany, the current alliance's largest member state on the European continent.

The second part of NATO reform, the establishment of "Combined Joint Task Forces," is, unfortunately, often left out when discussing plans for NATO expansion. Yet it is designed to help NATO pursue missions "out of area" in exactly those regions that matter most to Central European states. Cooperating with NATO on such missions might also be one of the last steps an applicant country takes before joining.

A "CJTF" would most likely be a shadow command structure set up separately from NATO but able to use NATO resources in an emergency. Say, for example, that NATO wanted to prepare a contingency plan to deal with a violent uprising of the Kosovo Albanians in southern Serbia. NATO could begin now by appointing a senior officer from Allied Forces Central to set up a staff that would assess what it would need to deal with such an emergency. It would need good intelligence, so NATO facilities in Greece might be listed. It might need aircraft to enforce a "no fly zone" in the province. In the worst case, it might need troops to patrol the Macedonian and Albanian borders. In that case, if the Czech Republic, say, were far enough along with its military reforms, Czech soldiers might be listed as the ones to call up.²

The CJTFs are designed to bridge the gap that now stands between NATO and the United Nations. Crudely put, NATO has the command structure and

(supposedly) the political will but no mandate to work "out of area." The U.N. Security Council has the mandate to go anywhere but, as the Yugoslav crisis has shown, lacks the coordination and political will.

The CJTFs are also designed to bridge the growing gap between U.S. and European military interests. If, for example, the European powers decided they had vital interests to pursue in Georgia, the current NATO structure would neither allow them to go "out of area" nor work without American consent. If American disagreed, the Europeans would be frustrated; if the Americans went along against the grain of public opinion at home, U.S. leaders would risk the wrath of the ballot box and a brewing isolationism. With CJTFs, however, countries that felt they needed to send troops to Georgia could do so under a separate command but with the use of NATO assets.

Taken together and ignoring political reality for a moment, the plans are elegant, almost mathematical, solutions to a vexing problem. First, they offer the Central Europeans as much opportunity as they are willing to take for themselves. As former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin put it, the P4P agreements are "self-selecting." NATO need not sit down now and draw a line through Europe that would reward some and embitter others; distinctions between countries "are going to be drawn according to their own efforts . . . The more a country does, the more relevant its defenses become to NATO and membership."³ Second, it is, as it should be, a cheap way to help. Like U.S. aid efforts, P4P is designed to help post-communist countries to help themselves with minimum outlays from the West. It offers a helping hand without costing so much as to risk an isolationist backlash at home.

But no plan, however subtle, can ignore the political realities of the region it is meant to address, especially not those of an area as fraught with history and hysteria as the blood-spattered lands between Germany and Russia.

Dealing with Russia

In a political vacuum, Central European leaders might have welcomed P4P. But political vacuums do not have radical Russian nationalists like Vladimir Zhrinovsky. The success of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party in Russia's elections the month before soured the "Visegrad Four, as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are called, on P4P. Suddenly it

seemed inadequate. Worse, it looked like appeasement, especially given the rather bitter memories Central Europeans associate with the word "peace."

No one was more disappointed with P4P than Polish president Lech Walesa. Days before flying to Prague to meet Clinton and the other Visegrad leaders, he let loose on Polish television. Poland's bid to join NATO had had the blessing of Russian president Boris Yeltsin in August, Walesa said, but had lost it when the West had dallied in taking up the offer.

"The reason Yeltsin now objects to our plan," Walesa said, "is because of the short-sightedness and lack of vision of the West. Only those who are strong place conditions on those who are weak."

Once in Prague, Walesa nearly wrecked the party. Rumor had it that he only decided to attend a working lunch of the four leaders with Clinton after serious arm-twisting. Some dismissed this as typical Walesa grandstanding. But like a mischievous child throwing barbs from the back of the classroom, Walesa merely blurted out what others were whispering.

With typical elegance, Czech president Vaclav Havel was both firm and accommodating. At the same luncheon, Havel welcomed P4P as a "good point of departure in NATO's quest for a new identity and a new role in new conditions." A "partnership for peace" was no substitute for full membership, Havel said, but rather a "first step towards joining NATO." Nor would the Czechs accept excuses about inflaming Russian opinion. "We are an independent state," Havel said, "and we decide ourselves about our affiliations and our policies."

At a press conference later that night, Havel let slip one of those code phrases of his that demands unpacking. The West, he said, ought not back down in the face of Russian pressure in order to accept an "illusion of peace."

Nine years earlier, Havel had written that Czechs were suspicious of "peace" as an aim in and of itself because Soviet domination had "drained the word of all content." By sponsoring "peace marches," appointing official "peace fighters" and decorating every open public space with slogans such as "The Soviet Union, guarantor of World Peace," the Communist regime, Havel pointed out, had made the word "peace" unsavory.

"Can you wonder," Havel wrote then, "under these circumstances, that this word awakens distrust, skepticism, ridicule and revulsion among our people? This is not distaste for peace as such: it is distaste for the pyramid of lies into which the word has been traditionally integrated. . . the word 'peace' in our country means nothing more than unserving concurrence with the policies of the Soviet bloc."⁴



A "Peace March" in Prague in the early 1980s. The men in front are secret police agents. (*East European Reporter*.)

At the same press conference, Havel also insisted that the West not once again treat dismiss his country as one "far away and not worth fighting for." The appeasement of Hitler in 1938 had demonstrated, Havel said, that those who appease at the expense of Central European states "always end up paying more in the end, since they have had to fight more." Indeed, a look back at the essay quoted above reminds one that, to Havel, appeasement risks not only more conflict in the future but a loss of life's meaning in the present. "Is it any wonder," Havel writes,

that in this country, whose present decline began at Munich, people are especially sensitive to anything even remotely reminiscent of the pre-war capitulation to evil? . . . [t]he inability to risk, *in extremis*, even life itself to save what gives it meaning and a human dimension leads not only to the loss of meaning but finally and inevitably to

the loss of life as well. . ."5

Clinton and NATO commander Manfred Worner both gave supportive speeches in Brussels. It is probably a bit early to condemn P4P as "appeasement" of the Russians. But it ought to be noted that that's what it looks like to the Central Europeans, however polite they were in Prague.

Germany: does P4P meet the needs of NATO's eastern flank?

Much of the debate about P4P assumes that the plan is merely one way of extending a security umbrella to needy new democracies unable to defend themselves. Whether it takes European, especially German, security interests into account is rarely addressed.

Clinton made it clear in Brussels that he has proposed the plan in order to strengthen the "European pillar" of defense. "The new security," he said, "must be found in Europe's integration, an integration of security forces, of market economies, of national democracies." German chancellor Helmut Kohl welcomed the plan as a step towards the integration of Eastern Europe into both the European Union and NATO. Both NATO and the EU were working, he said, toward "the same goal of integrating the new democracies of Eastern Europe into existing Western communities."6

Comparing the speed of their future integration into NATO with the thus far slow pace of their approach to the EU offers the countries of the "Visegrad Four" small comfort. And as Christoph Bertram, diplomatic correspondent of *Die Zeit* has argued, slow integration into NATO necessarily means slow integration into the EU, since the Maastricht Treaty on greater European integration requires that nations defend one another much as NATO would.7 If the European nations are not yet ready to take Central Europeans under their NATO umbrella, will they be any quicker taking them into the EU?

Perhaps the new European pillar of NATO, especially the CJTFs, will give the West Europeans the means by which to embrace their Eastern neighbors quicker. Kohl, a strong advocate both of a European defense system and of broadening NATO and the EU, links the two. The Visegrad countries can only expect NATO membership, he told *The European*, "in the course of further development of pan-European security structures."8

As the Bosnian crisis has shown, no European security pillar yet exists.

What should the Central Europeans do in the meantime? It depends whom you ask. Speaking in Budapest in November, German Defense Minister Klaus Kinkel suggested that the Central Europeans use their membership of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to meet a crisis. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking in the same city in the same month, offered the services of the 52-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Willem van Eekelen, secretary general of Europe's existing security system, the Western European Union, said the West was "still groping in the dark as to how NATO can become more receptive to security needs in the region."⁹

Despite this menu of security structures, Central Europeans themselves feel safest with the one they trust -- NATO. "We do not see any reason for projecting bold constructions of security architecture in the immediate future," wrote Pavol Bratinka, deputy foreign minister of the Czech Republic. "The foundations are already there in existing organizations."¹⁰

And however confident Kohl may be that Europe will be building a new kind of defense quickly, his political opponents are even more confident that he will not be the one to build it. Opinion polls show that the 1994 German election's are likely to be the *Gottterdammerung* of both Kohl's Christian Democrats and the main opposition Social Democratic Party, leaving neither with a strong majority. As Germany turns inwards to sort out its own problems of forming a coalition of disparate new groups, it is likely to have little time for its neighbors. A vacuum in Central European security is opening fast.

One of P4P's advantages, the fact that former Communist states select themselves for membership, might in that case work against it. Since no lines are likely to be drawn between now and some NATO evaluation of different countries' progress (set tentatively for 1995), Germany's neighbors are left in the same broad swath as, say, Kazakhstan. Aspin said he thought this was necessary, since "to start drawing lines now would be destabilizing. What would it say about countries that were excluded if others were taken in right now? Would it signal to the Russians that it was O.K. to attack countries that were left out?"¹¹

It need not. It need merely say, these other countries are not right on our largest European member's eastern flank. As Tamas Waschler, a Hungarian defense specialist put it: "It is one thing not to want to create 'new dividing

lines; it is another stubbornly to overlook that fact that these already exist."¹²

And if the NATO reforms are designed to help it work "out-of-area," then the Central European states would be ideal partners, their leaders argue. The states can offer "good contacts in and knowledge of, regions with actual or potential security problems," Bratinka wrote. Indeed, they have already begun to cooperate, as Waschler pointed out. "Hungary is clearly useful to NATO. If not, why did the latter request permission to monitor the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia from Hungarian airspace through AWACS flights?"

But the Central Europeans cannot go on cooperating long without guarantees in return, Waschler wrote. "Compliance with this request (for use of airspace). . . has only increased the strain on relations with Belgrade. In effect, Hungary is contributing to the security of NATO member states at the cost of jeopardising its own."¹³

Central Europe is willing and able to help NATO out in its new role. It just asks for some help in return. As Havel said over lunch during Clinton's visit:

Our country feels it is a legitimate part of the Western Euro-American civilization, and shares all of its fundamental values. It does not see itself as someone looking for a new home. We have our home. For centuries, we have helped shape its spiritual and political values. If today we are aspiring to become a regular member of NATO, we do so above all because we subscribe to the same values of civilization which it protects, and because we want to take part in protecting them."

Affect of P4P on Central European states

"The beauty of the (P4P) proposal," one Western diplomat told the *International Herald Tribune*, "is that it is a frame on whose canvas we can paint whatever we want."¹⁴ The problem with it, of course, is that it is also a frame on which anyone else can paint whatever they want.

One way of reading Clinton's Brussels statements on Bosnia would give him credit for not dragging NATO into a conflict it was ill-prepared to solve.

Clinton opposed mentioning Bosnia in the summit's final statement because, he said, NATO ought not make any threats it was not willing to carry out. "What is at stake is not just the safety of the people of Sarajevo and the possibility of bringing this terrible conflict to an end," he said, "but the credibility of the alliance itself."¹⁵

The same might be said of P4P. Aspin has said that although the plan does not guarantee the security of Central Europe in the way that full NATO membership might, it "offers some protection: if a threat appears, NATO will come and see what it can do."¹⁶ Bill Clinton himself was explicit. "Let me be absolutely clear," he said. "The security of your state is important to the security of the United States."

But does the ghost of Bosnia hang over such promises? Not if one believes that it was a failure of "system," i.e. of the rigidity of NATO in its current form, that kept Europeans and Americans from intervening. But if one believes rather that it was a failure of will, well then, yes -- it does.

Even after meeting Clinton, Polish Foreign Minister Andrezej Olechowski felt unsatisfied. "We need to obtain a clear perspective of NATO in Europe," he said. "Poland thinks it would be tragic if Eastern Europe became a grey zone. We do not want any 'signals,' like 'reinforced interest.' All we want is to be future-oriented, to find our place in Europe, and not become a grey zone, a buffer zone, or anything else."

And the academically elegant "self-selecting" nature of P4P has caused friction within the Visegrad Group. The country perceived to have the best prospect for joining NATO, the Czech Republic, has struck out on its own. The Czechs (perhaps with American approval) arranged bilateral meetings and subverted attempts to present the Visegrad case as a whole. "The time is over," Havel said, "when it was important to show unity, for example, when we cooperated to break the Warsaw Pact. Now it is more important to cooperate on a specific basis and maintain good relations with our neighbors."

That leaves the others, particularly Hungary and Slovakia, to squabble about who is hurting who's chances.

There are still problems in the region. Most have to do with Slovakia. Its government recently went back on a promise not to gerrymander Slovak

districts that are predominantly Hungarian, thus infuriating their southern neighbor. At the press conference following Clinton's visit, Slovak premier Vladimir Meciar restated his long-standing claim that the Czechs owed Slovakia several million dollars' worth of gold stored in the Czech National Bank. (The gold had been taken from the wartime independent Slovak state, a Nazi puppet regime.)

Given these entanglements, one might say that the post-communist states still must demonstrate that they can get along before they could be offered any guarantees. One could argue that Slovakia's troubles make the self-selecting aspect of the plan all the more important. The country still has a chance to prove itself; if it does not, we would be grateful for not having extended security guarantees to it.

But those who question the reluctance to "draw a line" now might say that it is already clear that at least three of the four Visegrad countries will be at the top of the list for future NATO membership, if only on the basis of what Germany's needs are. Accepting them plus Slovakia now would help to diffuse problems that otherwise will only get worse.

Although Slovakia seems to be causing most of the trouble in the region, it cannot be ignored. No other state borders all three of the other members. Until the Ingolstadt oil pipeline from Bavaria to the Czech Republic is completed, the Czechs will rely on Soviet oil flowing through Slovakia. In addition, Slovakia has the only sizeable minority of another Visegrad country -- 600,000 ethnic Hungarians. Were NATO to accept the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians and leave Slovakia out, it would leave two of its three new members "held hostage" by an even more paranoid state in their midst.

"If Slovakia is excluded from NATO," wrote Svetoslav Bombik, a Slovak security analyst, "it will be prey to destabilizing influences from the East including the movement of criminal mafias from the former Soviet Union via Slovakia to the West. It is vital that such threats are eliminated." ¹⁷.

Slovakia could also be seen as having merely gone further down a road of disillusionment with the West that Hungary and Poland may slide towards without strong Western support. The very act of drawing the line, some say, is healing in two respects.

First, the promise of NATO support at some future date is a poor incentive to reform compared to NATO membership "on probation." The latter would give the alliance virtual veto power over failure to reform defense structures, while the former allows states to keep promises of change as vague as the promise of acceptance.

Take, for example, Meciar's recent request to have his Secretary of Defense make him a general. Given Meciar's choleric character, this is nothing less than one more (small) step towards military occupation of southern Slovakia and, possibly, war with Hungary. Is the West now in a position to dissuade such a step and possible future consequences?

Much of the same applies to Poland, so strategically vital that it too cannot be ignored but plagued with a president as inclined to military intrigue and, some would argue, as choleric as Meciar. One Polish commentator on defense issues saw threats from both the left and the right if his nation was not relieved of its sense of "strategic homelessness."

The former Communists had already benefitted from Western dallying. Jerzy Marek Nowakowski wrote. "The sense of rejection by the West, cleverly exploited by the propaganda apparatus of post-communist forces in several countries, has contributed to the rise of power of these forces in Lithuania and Poland." The threat from the far right was yet to come but loomed. "A lack of evident progress in bringing Poland closer to NATO," Nowakowski wrote, "may discourage the most worthy individuals, however, and could bring about a *volte face* and reliance on alliances with neighboring states (the NATO-bis formula) or on the nationalist security formula of "every man for himself." 18

Second, while future NATO membership may be something of an incentive to stay on good terms with one's neighbors, probationary NATO membership would soothe a lot of frazzled nerves in the region. War between two NATO states is unknown. Slovakia and Hungary would be much less likely to go to war as members than as rival aspirants.

No one less authoritative on future threats to stability than Meciar himself put it best, although apparently unaware of the irony of his making such a statement. If the West did not offer explicit guarantees to Central Europe now, he argued, its nationalist problems would get worse. "Then we won't have one Zhirinovskiy -- we'll have millions of little Zhirinovskys. What are

you going to do then?"

What we might yet lose

When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, many writers thought that the gift Central Europe would bring to Western culture would be its unique experience of totalitarianism. And indeed, novels like Ivan Klima's *Judge on Trial* offered us a world we had, thankfully, never known in such extremes -- a world of unrelenting fear, grinding dismay and moral impoverishment.

But so much more came as well, such as the rediscovery of another view of our own landmarks. You could have read *The Good Soldier Svejk* before 1989, but you could not easily have walked around the eastern Slovak villages its author describes. Even if you did, you would have continually to imagine them without the grey veil of communism -- the battered steel security service booths, the megaphones strung high above the town squares -- if you wanted to feel that you were in a town that had once been mixed up in the same First World War you knew from Rupert Brooke.

Since 1989, the countries of the "Visegrad Four" have begun, like long-lost grandparents, to awake from their cultural coma and to tell us their memories of things we had only heard from our half of the family. For a few years we have been able to gather around them and catch up on old times. For anyone who has seen a relative's grave for the first time, or eaten a dish that an emigre family used to prepare in the States, it has been a moving reunion.

One of these four forgotten relatives, Slovakia, has been slipping back into sickness. The plans young Slovaks used to make just after the revolution are now again hedged in by the old fears. When I go to Bratislava now I hear, "We will expand *it* . . .", "We will buy an apartment *it* . . ." For my friends time has been compressed again into the permanent present of one waiting late at night next to a hospital bed.

For those who couldn't wait, like my friend Tomas in Prague, even the excitement of new prospects can't erase the bitterness. Tomas has taken to reading Churchill's accounts of 1930s and, after a few beers, rails against the loss of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher -- people he feels could have dealt with the likes of Zhirinovsky. Asked to produce a small newspaper add for a breakfast drinks company that wanted to welcome Bill Clinton to Prague, Tomas typed up a satirical version first: "You're not

exactly our cup of Tea, Mr. Clinton."

"Partnership for Peace" is not necessarily appeasement, Munich-style. If the Central Europeans can muster the strength once again to jump through a few hoops, it could offer them the security and responsibility they crave. But we in the West ought to realize how much we are demanding of our long-lost relatives before we let them cross our thresholds. If you think health care reform in the States is difficult, visit a Polish hospital; if you think your job is at risk, talk to a Slovak steelworker. And we should also see how much ~~we~~ we have to lose if Prague, Budapest, Warsaw and Bratislava suffer relapses. They won't revert to Communism, true; but they all might slide into instability, lawlessness and corruption and become alien parastates to guard against rather than family to welcome home.

Yours,


Chandler

Footnotes

1. Di Rita, Lawrence. Paper on NATO, Heritage Foundation, 1994. p. 5-6. I would like to thank Mr. Di Rita for taking the time to talk to me about "P4P" and the trouble to fax me his paper.

2. *ibid*, p. 8. I'm not sure that "P4P" applicants could participate in in CJTFs -- the details have yet to be worked out. Personally, I think it would be a great idea if they could.

3. "U.S. Sees Self-Selection by East on Joining NATO," *International Herald Tribune*, Jan. 10, 1994. p. 1.

4. Havel, Vaclav. "An Anatomy of a Reticence," in Living in Truth, Faber and Faber, London, 1990. p. 166. Unfortunate name, "Partnership for Peace."

5. *ibid*, p. 183. The entire essay is a must.

6. "Kohl Extols Merit of Partnership Pact," IHT, Jan. 14, 1994, p. 5.

7. Bertram, Christoph, "Take Your Partner but at Arms Length," *The European*, 19-25 November, 1993.
8. "Kohl turns his Foreign Policy Eastwards," *The European* 12-18 November 1993, p. 1.
9. "West Coy, East Eager at NATO Discussion Here," Budapest Week, 18-24 Nov., p.1.
10. Bratinka, Pavol. "The Challenge of Liberation," in *NATO: the Case of Enlargement*. Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies for the Windsor Group. London, December 1993. p. 14
11. "U.S. Sees Self-Selection by East on Joining NATO," *International Herald Tribune*. Jan. 10, 1994. p. 1.
12. Waschler, Tamas. "Where there's a Will. . ." in *NATO: the Case of Enlargement*. p. 33.
13. Bratinka and Waschler in *ibid.* p. 15 and 31.
14. "Can the U.S. Persuade Eastern Europe to be Patient on NATO?" *IHT*, Jan. 5, 1994.
15. "Clinton Warns of Threat to Credibility," *Financial Times*, Jan. 11, 1994.
16. "U.S. Sees Self-Selection by East on Joining NATO," *International Herald Tribune*. Jan. 10, 1994. p. 1.
17. Bombik, Svetoslav. "Returning to Civilization," in *NATO: the Case of Enlargement*. p. 23.
18. Nowakowski, Jerzy Marek. "In Search of a Strategic Home," in *NATO: the Case of Enlargement*. p. 26-7.

Quotations of politicians not given references are taken from press conferences or copies of speeches distributed in Prague during the "Visegrad Four" summit, Jan. 11-12.