

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

DAWJ # 10  
The Western Provinces in the  
The Middle North IV  
"Back to Batoche"

Scott Polar Research Institute,  
Cambridge University,  
Cambridge,  
England.

June 11th, 1968.

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Executive Director,  
Institute of Current World Affairs,  
366 Madison Avenue,  
New York 17, N.Y.

Dear Dick:

It is unfair - and misleading - to write a newsletter on northern Saskatchewan and deal only with the Indian problem. All parts of the middle north and all parts of Canada are equally involved in the kind of situation I am about to describe.

"Red Power" is the inevitable slogan. I would like to avoid it altogether because it is too fashionable a cliché to have much particular meaning anymore. But, in the Canadian prairie provinces it does have a ring of history to it. If, like me, you are a Canadian from (formerly) Tory Toronto you remember Cut Knife Hill and the Battle of Batoche. If you are an American to whom these names are meaningless, then remember "The Maine" or St. Juan Hill and you will be on the same wave length. For the British, substitute the Boxer Rebellion or Chinese Gordon.

By 1869, when Canada took over the jurisdiction of the West from the Hudson's Bay Company, and before the homesteaders arrived in strength, the prairies had the beginnings of a new culture. There were still thousands of Plains Indians living their own lives but there were also, by 1870, several thousand Metis, people of mixed Indian, French and Scottish ancestry. These Metis hunted buffalo, trapped fur and had small farms along the principal rivers of the southern prairies. Most of them had French names, most of them were Catholic but their society was a mixture of Indian and European culture. Their independence was brief. Ottawa knew little about them and paid scant attention to their squatting rights and land claims. The Metis objected to being overlooked. Eastern Canada, wary of the Americans exploiting anarchy on the prairies, replied with military expeditions in 1870 and 1885. The result was two successful classic, colonial brush wars and a good deal of irrelevant nonsense. The Metis were put in their place and suffered thereafter as eastern Canadians raged in pungent recriminations between Protestant and Catholic, between French and English, between the True Blue Orange Lodge of Toronto and the St.-Jean Baptiste Society of Quebec.

In the west the Metis and their Indian cousins shrank back from the orderly, peaceful settlement which followed. They had little cause to object to the impartial, drum-head justice of the Mounties and by nineteenth century frontier standards they were not much worse off than the

homesteaders in their sod huts. Their brief assertion of power was forgotten except in Ontario regimental armouries where the excitements of Batoche and Cut Knife Hill are toasted still at Mess dinners.

That is not the end of the story. The usual statistics are now taking over. The 70,000 Indians and Metis make up about 8% of Saskatchewan's population. Their average life span is 34 to the European 64 years. Infant mortality in the predominantly Indian and Metis settlements in northern Saskatchewan is twice the southern figure. Their education and income are fractions of the province's figures. In Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta 53% of prisoners are Metis or Indian. And so on.

The Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada included in its annual report of 1967 the results of a public opinion poll which had asked people to list the major issues in Canada. In the overall result Indians got no mention. In western Canada they rated thirteenth place in a list of eighteen subjects.

In another five years Indians will be nearer the top of that list as Canadians are forced again to look at the situation which led the 10th Royal Grenadiers and the Queen's Own Rifles to Batoche and Cut Knife Hill.

There are many reasons for the new surge of power amongst the Indian and Metis. I believe however, that all the motives resolve into the rebirth of courage, pride and self-respect in these people. The image of the hangdog and docile native is in for a change. Discrimination, (I sometimes think "hatred" is less euphemistic), and indifference have done their job. After a time, people begin to fight back. Leadership, sometimes partially sparked by renegade Europeans, is growing. There are new spokesmen and a new sensitivity among provincial and federal politicians.

When I worked for the Yukon government I asked myself what these people wanted. It is a common question for the whiteman to ask. He feels he must sort out in his own mind the conflicting claims of native and European culture, and make the choice for the Indian between life on the reservation and assimilation, between middle class values and the virtues of a society which lives on the trap-line. It is a question too, which bureaucrats have had to ask and to answer for generations, themselves. It is a question which has been almost exclusively in the whiteman's domain, the puzzle which Royal Commissions, conferences and study groups have contended with since Charles II established an Indian administration in British North America.

The fundamental point now is that the Indians and Metis are beginning to provide their own answers.

I heard the testament from a prominent Metis leader in Saskatoon one day in December over a cup of coffee. He ticked off these points:-

1. complete autonomy on the Reservations. This is the stickler. There are two centuries of tradition in Canada behind the present Indian policies. In the nineteenth century it was expedient to settle the Indians on Reservations, to get them out of the way as tidily and quickly as possible. This was done efficiently and it was justified as a humane solution to protect the Indians and the Metis from the land grabbers, the rum-runners and the hunting parties out for native scalps. The Indian administrators who came after the Treaties thought of themselves as Guardians, men, who often in defiance of white public opinion, prevented the worst forms of exploitation and who also had to speak up for those small special rights which native peoples were given under the Treaties. It was an unpopular role to play in the free-wheeling days of settlement and westward expansion.

The argument now is that Indians must still be protected, that if they are given full control of their affairs and finances, the unscrupulous white-man will move in with his carpetbag.

This threat is real enough but is there any useful future for a system which considers the Indians as incompetent to look after their own affairs ?

2. all primary education in the local Indian language. The only people who can do this will be Indian teachers and there are few of them now;
3. obliterate (his word) all vestiges of church participation in Indian and Metis schools. This is a harsh verdict for the missionaries who, until recently, were often the only source of education for many natives, but understandable in an age which turns away from the sectarian struggles and competition of a religion which preaches brotherhood but which charts success in the number of denominational souls;
4. a revitalization of the Reserve as a place where Indians can maintain their foothold. I believe he meant by this that the Reserve must be a place where an Indian can live and prosper; a place with a viable economy and an attractive society. This upsets another old notion and policy. Indians were expected to live on Reserves and then graduate into the white man's world in the process of time. The Reserves were expected to disintegrate. Now, the Indian says that the choice to move off the Reserve is solely his and he must be able to make that decision free from

compulsions of economics or discrimination. There should be no disadvantages to life on the Reserve; and no glib assumption that the Reserve will disappear sooner or later.

This concept adds a new dimension to Indian affairs in Canada. If Indians stay on the Reserves, if they achieve the right to run those Reserves without interference, they will be creating a series of small independent communes outside of the structures of local government which presumably might be subject only to Canadian criminal law and to civil law where contracts are involved. The resources of the Reserve, (which in a few cases may be considerable) would be shared and administered by all residents. This would tend to heighten and preserve the differences between Indian and whiteman and could be a source of resentment. But it is what many Indians and Metis now want and what they are working towards.

Will the whiteman pay the tax bills to support life on the many uneconomic Reserves, and in the style to which the Indians now aspire ?

5. the destruction of the image of the cigar-store Indian; the display of feathers and bead work in the whiteman's side-shows where you can take a snap-shot of the native for two bits and then move on to see the other freaks. Amen, - but will the Indians resist the temptation to make 25¢ ?

I am not going to delve into all of the legal and social ramifications of the Indian and Metis in Canada. To do this you must spend time discussing the differences amongst the Indians themselves and the distinctions between Treaty Indians, non-Treaty Indians, Indians of status, people of mixed blood, and Indians who have ceased to be Indians. The most recent government-sponsored study on the subject took several hundred pages of detailed work to cope with the subject. It is complex.

I have already drawn out what I believe to be the basic issues and facts which will ultimately push the other aspects of the issue into the background. What is all this going to mean to the middle north in Saskatchewan and in Canada ?


The middle north is Indian and Metis territory. The middle north, particularly western Canada, is where the Indians and Metis are a substantial part of the population. In the cities they are thin on the ground and greatly outnumbered. In the northern parts of the provinces and southern regions of the Territories they are often in a majority. Whiteman's medicine and their slowly increasing prosperity are bringing a rapid growth in their numbers. The middle north is going to be the geographical source of their power.

By coincidence, parts of the middle north in the west are the places where the Indians and perhaps Metis, may have a potent political weapon; land claims. In the south most of the Indians are settled on Reservations, areas set aside by Treaties. The Treaties may be of dubious moral value but their legality is pretty hard and fast. Treaties were not made in some parts of the north. If southern Indians have specified land rights, why not northern ones? In the United States, in Alaska, the Eskimo and Indians have recently tied up huge areas of the State in just this kind of jurisdictional dispute. The immediate result is to draw attention to their problems and to throw a nasty scare at the status quo.

There is also the worse scare of violence for which in the 1960's there is no lack of examples.

There are people in Canada who welcome the new stance of the Indian and Metis and who will support the trend of what they are trying to do. I mention violence only because I think we would be foolish to pretend no such threat looms in a part of Canada, where like the Metis and Louis Riel of the 1880's the original inhabitants are a potential power.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'David A. W. Judd', written over a horizontal line.

David A. W. Judd

Received in New York June 28, 1968.




DAWJ

# HOW WE MARCHED FOR PEACE

A personal account of the London Peace March

Sunday, 27 October, 1968

I don't know why they chose Victoria Embankment as their starting point. Revolutionaries usually prefer the congestion of downtown streets or the panorama around national monuments. The scene on the Embankment is neither squalid nor heroic. It is restful, a look on the full sweep of the Thames between Big Ben and St. Paul's, and a place to have tea.



## THE THAMES AND VICTORIA EMBANKMENT

This was George Villiers' front yard when he was second Duke of Buckingham. His evident ambition and ultimate distinction was to exceed in debauchery in Charles II's court. The later Victorians tidied the place up and turned it onto one of their favourite social devices; a sedate, leafy necropolis. A sense of worldly comfort dominates but you can contemplate here (as the Victorians did) on such sweet themes as death, merit, duty, and other people's heroism. Statues, busts, stark plinths, weeping angels and grieving maidens are monuments to the departed. The richly embossed or engraved phrases pile up in your mind's eye as you stroll along..... "To the Glorious and Immortal Memory; ... GBE: ... Steadfast Friend; ... Hill 265; ... Fidelitur; ... KCMG; ... Pure and Unworldly Life; ... Fortiter; ... Imperial Camel Corps; ... Feliciter; ... KCVO."

And then you come to Robbie Burns sitting chunkily in the middle of the park and that rather spoils your serene preoccupation with virtue.

But it was from this respectable spot, raised by the Eminent Victorians to their own immortality, that we left to march against Imperialism, Agression, Capitalism and, incidently, the wage freeze.

I arrived at 11.00 a.m. on that Sunday about three hours before the

already filling up with scattered groups. There were several old Marxists near Charing Cross Tube Station on the pavement well away from the park. They were all male and all the Cassius type; lean and hungry and loath to foresake the image of deprivation which must have been part of their lives when they were the scourge of the Thirties. A few wore red neckerchiefs. Two or three had crash helmets on. Their faces were seared with that kind of surly conviction that comes from lying in your teeth for forty years. One of them strode by, jaw out-thrust, carrying a sign advertising a publication about "Student Power in Russia." His bleak face dared the world to challenge that preposterous advertisement.




### SENTIMENTS IN A VICTORIAN NECROPOLIS

There were old Fabians there too. They come in both sexes and wear sensible walking boots. They don't like the pavements which nourish the flinty souls of their Marxist rivals. They are a pastoral breed (remember, "dark satanic mills"), and they soon take to the grass and trees. I found them that morning sitting contented on the fringes of the park against their packsacks and munching wholewheat sandwiches.

The other middle aged contingents were scattered oddments usually representing some Workers' party or other, and a few lone wolves such as the prosperous City solicitor, in his bulky weekend sweater, who was handing out leaflets advising people about their rights under arrest.





TEA WITH A LITTLE MILK OF HUMAN KINDNESS  
AN ENGLISH REVOLUTIONARY PREPARES TO MARCH

This business of handing out paper became the principal occupation of all of us on the Embankment. By noon there were about two thousand people there. We were offered handbills, magazines, broadsheets, essays and exposes, books and photographs. By 2.00 p.m. when we started out I had seventeen of these specimens shoved in the front of my anarak and I moved off like a mother kangaroo in full pouch. I had accepted only about a third of what was offered.

What is the power of the printed word in this sort of situation? Virtually nil I would reckon. These harangues, arguments, denials, disputations and contradictions - and there was every variety from the one about Palestine refugees to the exhortation for something called the "Fourth World" - remind me of those Tibetan prayer flags; the written word left to flap ineffectually in the breeze. Perhaps printing has already declined in our society as a medium of communication. Others had felt compelled to write and we accepted the results. The authors had done their bit for the cause, the canvassers were now involved and we, the recipients, stroked the paper as though the thoughts printed there would be absorbed through our finger tips. This was a ritual - a sacrament before the march.

There were people there marching for Free Wales, for the Freedom of Chief Obi someone, for Biafra, for Libertarianism, Anarchism, for Chairman Mao and Leon Trotsky and for the Guildford School of Art. The English Internationalists wanted us to condemn the "Playboy mentality". the Friends of Palestine were against Jewish aggression, and someone else was against Rhodesia. All were against the Americans.

This is not the cohesive, single-minded stuff of real revolution. I looked at the cacophany of slogans and I remembered that first of modern

English revolutionaries, John Ball and his compelling, incisive couplet;

"When Adam delved, and Eve span,  
Who was then a gentleman?"



Much more to the point, And it was here, where Savoy Street runs down to the Embankment that Ball watched his victorious (for a time) followers burn John of Gaunt's palace in 1381. Our march on Sunday began on that precise spot but I doubt if anyone knew it. I remembered it because I had some ancestor there, one Jud of Essex, a lieutenant of Wat Tyler. I was whimsical enough to think that if his ghost was there on Savoy Street on Sunday it was revelling in a sense of history; he would think it nice to see people marching for the millenium again.

VICTORIA EMBANKMENT AT SAVOY STREET  
AN  
HOUR BEFORE THE MARCH



1.30 P.M.  
THE STUDENTS

2.08 P.M.  
TARIQ ALI  
IN THE LEAD



The crowd gathered more slowly after lunch but at 1.30 p.m. there was an abrupt change. The students came in. They had been assembling on the south bank of the Thames, a quarter of a mile across the river by the Royal Festival Hall where there had been only the glint of banners and flags over the water to betray their presence. Now they came across Waterloo Bridge, arms linked, tramping solidly behind their colours and practising their militant slogans, "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh;" and "We are all foreign scum." That last one seemed to tickle them no end. Two days before, a Member of Parliament had said indignantly in the House that this march would be led by nothing but "foreign scum".

They were not all students by a long shot. I would guess that less than fifty per cent of our final marching contingent of some 15,000 were from universities. But they were young. By the end of the day it was clear that all of this peace march, its organization, planning and momentum was the work of people under twenty-five. I have never seen any great concourse of human beings anywhere before with such a dominating majority of youth. The older people I mentioned in the beginning were swallowed up in this trudging mass of the young.

They came in blue jeans, sandals, desert boots, old great coats, sheepskin jackets and other scruffy oddments. They looked like refugees but they were happy, and they were proud of their appearance. Why do they have to be so pimply? Is it in fact, our diet? I never remember young Russian or Pakistanis with acne en masse.

We started at 2.08 p.m. "Comrades, we march together, arms linked"

said the man on the bullhorn, and we stepped off behind a Deputy Superintendent and Constable Q 450 of the Metropolitan Police.

There was order rather than command. The order came from the common purpose of marching together at least as far as Trafalgar Square. There was no command possible. I walked just ahead of the front rank where Tariq Ali was marching. He is the most prominent of all the protest leaders and perhaps the most promising. He is forceful and energetic, the kind of man who can fling himself in the midst of squabbling human beings and shout them down. He could make his personality felt down the first hundred yards of the parade but after that there was general democracy.

We left the Embankment under the profile of one departed Victorian who did not really fit into his age. Perhaps that is why his small plaque is stuck away from the rest of the monuments. "W. S. Gilbert" (the plaque said) and went on to give us his parting benediction;

"His foe was Folly and his weapon Wit."

Along the Thames, (Robert Falcon Scott's "Discovery" on the right) to Blackfriars Bridge, up to Ludgate Hill turning our backs on St. Pauls, west on Fleet Street (Cheshire Cheese there on the right and then St. Clement Danes dead ahead), Nelson hovering on the horizon, The Strand, Somerset House, Constable Q 450 took it at an easy pace, the parade heaving and stopping; stretching street wide; slogans, cheers and chants; banners, placards; the loudspeakers blaring "comrades."



CONSTABLE Q 450 IN THE VAN



A SAMPLE OF INDIGNATION  
SOME SURPRISED MEMBERS OF THE OLDER GENERATION LOOK ON



MARCHERS AND SPECTATORS ... TRAFALGAR SQUARE  
LOOKING INTO THE STRAND

Trafalgar Square in sight. I ran ahead. Until now we had had a moving crowd of spectators. The Square was full of people waiting for us and Nelson's lions were covered with perching human beings. Charles I, who has his back to Nelson, shares his triangle of curb with a lamp post, one of those old fashioned, ornately convoluted things rich in gewgaws and Cupids. It's a civilized lamp post which, like the old running boards on cars, can accommodate human beings. I climbed up over metal wings, chubby hands, snub-nosed faces and looked back at the parade. This was its moment. London is not a beautiful city (I maintain). It has no splendid views like Paris or Washington or even New Delhi. It is not a city to be looked at. It does not overwhelm or overshadow the people who live in it. London is a backdrop for its crowds. It is a setting for the British, for that "full tide of human existence" that Samuel Johnson saw at this spot two hundred years ago. For fifteen minutes I watched the parade and the crowd meld into a spectacle. It was the slow, flowing movement of thousands of people crammed into the streets from wall to wall which made that Square noble and vibrant.

Tariq Ali and the October 27 Ad Hoc Committee were to march from Trafalgar Square to Hyde Park and as far as they were concerned everyone was to follow this official route. The October 27 Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam thought this too tame. They wanted the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square for a goal and target. I had run ahead into the Square to gain a vantage point in order to see if the parade would split and, if so, who would go where.

It was a slow business watching these people advancing. I had time to wonder on my grimy London lamp post why there was this fundamental division in a crowd brought together to protest against the Americans in Vietnam. In a similar march last Spring everyone had gone to the American Embassy and Britain had seen that night on the television sets the kind of punch up between police and demonstrators that was reminiscent of the old days when Sir Oswald Mosley's fascist Blackshirts had taken violence to the streets in the 1930's. It was rough stuff and it put the fear of God into many quiet citizens. Now Tariq Ali and the proliferation of committees behind him had publicly eschewed violence and had decided to avoid the American Embassy altogether. Their new policy could have been based on their fear that further violence would discredit the movement. There may be some truth in this speculation but I think it is an incomplete analysis.

I suspect that this new breed of revolutionaries has already been seduced away from its original, pure, single-minded preoccupation with revolution. On Sunday something within themselves compelled them to choose the royal route. They had to identify themselves, their names and their cause with London's great landmarks. When you can march along Whitehall and surround the Cenotaph, when you can sweep by Westminster Hall and Houses of Parliament, when you and your comrades can swing beneath Big Ben and stream by that thousand year old Abbey on the left, when you can cross within sight of Buckingham Palace and make for Hyde Park Corner and the Duke of Wellington's house - why with a route like that, should you be content to stumble along the back streets to some

obscure local square unknown to the rest of the world? Of course if these kind of thoughts linger even in your subconscious you may be compromising and diluting your gospel. You may be admitting that you and your current dogma are only a part of a greater whole and a mere wave in a sea of history. In short, you may be developing a sense of proportion.

So they turned slowly south to Whitehall and the Horse Guards Palace and as they did so they seemed to change. They had approached Trafalgar Square in a congested mass but they went out as a procession.

After some rerouting and last minute changes about three quarters of the marchers followed Tariq Ali. A ginger group of Maoists broke away and took the most direct route to Grosvenor Square, and the American Embassy.

I slid down the lamp post as the Anarchists came by. I had looked at these people carefully during the morning rendezvous on the Embankment. They seemed to have a higher proportion of psychopaths in their group than the mere Maoists, Leninists, Labourites, etc. I wanted to see how they would act.

They went by my lamp post with their vivid black and red banners. It is an odd thing how their colours attract. These new revolutions in Asia have produced flags and banners that seem pallid beside the traditional brilliant emblazonry of western imperial culture. Those Maoist and Viet Cong colours in the streets on Sunday reminded me of the subtle, almost washed out, tints of a Chinese brush sketch. They are still foreign in a culture which produced the strong tones of a Turner landscape or sunset. The Anarchists, with the contrasting richness of jet black and blood red in their flags, attracted the eye. They were something familiar and robust.

We stopped at the Cenotaph and the leaders were able to silence the first few thousand. The banners and flags were lowered, a piper played a lament and then, in a stunning surprise, a man dipped the Red Flag in salute at the base of this Memorial. The gesture electrified many of the spectators. (If you are an American, imagine a tribute to the Viet Cong in Arlington). It must have seemed an immense and perverse sacrilege. But there was poignancy there even though the actual ceremony appeared to be nothing but a sheer travesty of the real thing.

The police Inspector in front of me stared at the Cenotaph. He was a veteran of the Second World War. When he realized what was happening he turned his back. His face should have been frozen but his jaw worked from side to side. A man at a desk will move his hands or feet when he tries to hide anger. A policeman works his jaw. I could see a double line of London bobbies at that quiet moment standing absolutely rigid, stock-still, except for a hundred swaying chin straps.





THE FACE OF OFFICIAL LONDON AT THE CENOTAPH

We went on again and the newspapers on Monday said the majority followed Tariq Ali to Hyde Park for their final dispersal. My Anarchist brood broke off on their own after Hyde Park Corner and headed for the American Embassy to join the renegade Maoists. There were about three hundred of us under the black and red flags. The banners came from the United Libertarian Group (whatever that is), the York Anarchist Group, and the Brighton Anarchists.

The pace picked up when we were on our own. For the last hour there had been a T.V. truck in front of us. Suddenly the front rank of marchers pounced on it and started to beat it. The driver was a little slow to get the message and the cameramen on the roof, while they did their duty and took pictures, were anxious to be away. After a five second pause the truck screamed away and disappeared for the day.

We were respectfully silent going by St. George's Hospital near Hyde Park Corner but the gesture seemed a little trite and contrived on what must be one of London's noisiest intersections. It was the Dorchester Hotel which brought on the first real stirrings of violence. We shouted and railed against the bourgeois sitting behind the plate-glass windows and the police nearby were greeted with "Backs to the wall you mother fuckers," this in a mesmeristic chant led by a girl and repeated by the mob. Arms were no longer linked and we pounded along at short trot in a straggling pack.

People began to bend down and run at a crouch. One or two would stop and ferret along the boulevard. They were picking up stones, bricks, bottles, bits of wood and all that debris you can find in any city if you start to look for it. We were preparing to repel police brutality.



At 16.50 we ran into South Audley Street about 400 yards south of the west entrance to Grosvenor Square. Someone threw a bottle and smashed a plate-glass window in a posh antique shop. The sound of the shattering raised our spirits (or lust, depending on your point of view). We poured on by. There was no looting. The quarry was clearly visible at the top of the street.

It was twenty-five constables in those ridiculous helmets. We tore down on their line during the last few seconds of our Audley Street rush but I had the odd sensation as I moved my legs that it was we who were stationary and that the policemen were coming at us. As the gap closed they grew bigger and we shrank. They were silent and stock still and that always implies strength. They were inanimate, a kind of impregnable geological formation rather than mere frantic, fragile organisms like us. And they were in uniform, dark blue from helmet to boot with no frills to detract from that wall of solid colour which obscured even their faces. Helmets came down over the eyes and chin straps across cheeks and jaw.

They impressed me. But at the last moment I realized what a ridiculous farce this mad rush was. These big, blue-coloured men at the end of the street had nothing to defend themselves with but twenty-five pairs of pale, ludicrous hands. The only martial implement in the lot was the sub-Inspector's boy scout whistle.

The whole thing was a show. The blue trench coats were thin, unquilted material and the boots had no steel tips or heels. The helmets were only an impressive stage gimmick, totally impractical, and indeed sheer menace to the police who lost them as easily as a top hat in a snow-ball fight. The Greeks had buskins for their demi-gods and heroes. The English have bobbies' helmets to impress cantankerous mortals.

We met this line of theatrical policemen with a thud, several yells and the whizzing of debris overhead. Those behind cheered mightily. I did not speculate much at the time on what I was watching but now that I am writing in the past tense I can contrive to insert my subsequent reactions here.

Monday morning's newspapers were bursting with praise. Someone recalled that Bobby Kennedy had referred to Britain's moral leadership a few months before he was murdered. Here then, was clear proof of what he had been talking about. A few of Monday's headlines will make the point:

"Tolerance, Britain's message to the World."  
"Good Sense"  
"Discipline and Restraint"  
"Britain to be Envied"  
and "Nowhere Else".

Britain forgot, for a moment, that modesty and understatement are supposed to rank first in that honoured pantheon of British virtues and good form.

I winced when I read all this because I have always counted smugness to be high on the list of British national vices. I had been impressed on Sunday and I did not want to see the lessons of that day lost in a whelter of irrelevant self-adulation.

I think I learnt four things on South Audley Street during the ensuing two hours before sunset. First, the police had been splendidly organized for this one operation. There was no "muddling through" here. It was the British at Waterloo or El Alamein, and not at Khartoum or before Dunkirk. There had been months of preparation (and also, evidently, of infiltration into all manner of politically radical groups.) The strategy was masterful and now, in the front lines of Audley Street, the tactics were cunning and well executed. The bobbies knew how to absorb charges, how to disintegrate and retreat, how to reform and how to charge. They were a rugby scrum at its best.

Second, the discipline and command was superb. There was no democracy amongst the police. This came out most clearly during the three police charges that I saw. Each time they charged (and they did so only when their own safety was seriously threatened) they scattered the opposition like chaff. It was really a most embarrassing rout for the Anarchists, but the police never ventured to step beyond their own 25 yard line, so to speak, and instantly reformed back on their own touch-line. No-one was carried away with the taste of victory. They simply showed their strength and retired to let the enemy consider. This is the English class system still at work. Even now, in a tight spot, the British trooper will fall in behind his officer and turn himself into a willing robot. The officers on Sunday had instant obedience which is a better and more reliable quality for work like this than the self-discipline of the individual.

Third, the psychology of it all was shrewd. The sight of those bare hands brought out my admiration and I am sure that by the end of the evening the police had the respect of all but their most cretinous opponents. They consistently used less force than was used against them and they depended greatly on their deportment, appearance and uniforms. They were not dressed for battle or even riot. They were indestructible symbols of public order.

They understood this symbolic role. The British still depend on the power of suggestion because they know it can prevent a showdown. The police made no attempt to outflank, infiltrate or surround us. They could have cooped us up in South Audley Street without any trouble. Our rear was vulnerable all afternoon and the police knew it. But they also knew that they had nothing to gain by turning Grosvenor Square into a battle field. The result would have been dangerous panic among most of the rioters and the opportunity for a few to become death or glory boys.

My final conclusion about the London police on that Sunday is not a conclusion but only a hunch. I am still trying to divine the root cause of all of this remarkable public behaviour. The lack of weapons, the traditions, laws and attitudes of the English and British are only symptoms of some

deeper, root cause. Somehow, I think, the English (I cannot speak for Glasgow or Belfast) have a distinctly different concept of their manhood, of what makes for virility and masculinity. The police were taunted and, in anyone else's terms, thoroughly insulted by all manner of obscenities, remarks about their anatomy, sex habits and so forth. They were physically threatened, punched, kicked and subjected to rather frightening volleys of bottles and bricks. It was clear too that the police did not have much sympathy for the demonstrators or their causes. They had every reason and provocation (and opportunity) to turn this Sunday afternoon into a real Chicago-style Donneybrook.

But the police would not react. And they kept their mouths shut. There were no fatuous shouting matches, none of that childish reciprocal piling on of insults and oaths, no urge to assert either physical or moral superiority no urge to punch out, to shut up or to prove yourself a big guy. This applied not only to the police but apparently to eighty percent of the demonstrators who went to Hyde Park to listen to speeches before tea.

Has the ordinary British or English male been raised in a society which teaches that the hallmark of his manhood is his ability to distain? Does the Englishman feel that he will lose face if he lets himself be provoked, if his temper is unleashed and if he starts to hit back? Does he think that violence is simply a sign that you have lost your nerve?

This is what I thought I saw on Sunday during that two-hour battle around the south-western approaches to Grosvenor Square. Perhaps it is this distain, this psychological snobbery, which makes the English look so ridiculous when they stand on their dignity. But it also gives them that wisdom, that rare genius, to turn the other cheek. And what makes this gesture so potent is that it springs from pride, from manliness and not from mere cringing.\*

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\* This lengthy mental excursion of mine could be utterly wrong. Perhaps in fact, the British have a totally different sense of values about Man and his place in the universe. One senior police officer was quoted as follows:

"Nobody could have been prouder of their men  
than I was. The horses were outstanding."

God help us if the revolutionaries had taken after the four-legged beasties on Sunday! The English policeman might then have lost his cool. Mercifully the horses were never used.

If you feel I am too analytical and mean for refusing to join in the local chorus of unquestioning praise let me say an "Amen" to the Washington Post correspondent who ended his London dispatch for Monday with this sentence:

"One sadly reflects that if (Robert) Kennedy were an English politician he would have been alive yesterday, addressing the students."



#### 5.30 P.M. STALEMATE IN SOUTH AUDLEY STREET

The residue of my sympathy goes to the marchers and to some of their causes. The Anarchists have my sympathy too but for rather different reasons. The ones I saw on Sunday were the perverts of the Anarchy movement. An Anarchist should be a man who does not like Society. The ones I marched with did not like people.

I did not go down to London that Sunday to see the fun. I went to try to gauge the characteristics, strength and success of those who protest. It is a movement with obvious flaws. Rebels are always hard to organize. Their only cohesion on Sunday was a hatred of the Americans. Many would probably deny this motive and say that they were not against the American people but only against Americans in Vietnam. I would mistrust this reply. The United States, its culture, beliefs and way of life represents to the protest movement here all that is wrong with mankind. It is Sodom and Gomorrah. This fixation, this single-minded revulsion to all things

American, enabled the marchers to pass by on the other side of such events as Prague and British racial strife. There was no mention of either of these trifles on Sunday.

It's an odd thing, this rampant anti-Americanism. I do not think it is due to mere envy in this country. Few of those marchers on Sunday were old enough to remember the Empire before the sun set. Imperial glory is as unreal to them as the First World War was to me when, as a child, I had to stand still for Two Minutes and try to remember things I never knew. I felt like a fraud.

When Vietnam, in its turn, is gone and forgotten many people will still be grizzling about America. It is the epitome of the Phoney Society, the conglomeration of brainless values, of broken promises, psychopathic materialism, and the smug satisfaction of personal success that closes the mind to the failure all around. In sum, it is everything that is wrong in this country. And since there is much wrong in Britain and elsewhere I suppose we are all going to harp on this Anti-American bit for a long time. This is the Vicarious Revolution.

Vietnam got rather lost in this catalogue of grievances. The Sunday march did that cause little good. It was not like the old, broadly-based pilgrimages of ten years ago against nuclear weapons. There were no middle-aged, middle class there, none of the chic from Chelsea, none of the people who read the New Statesman, no Vicars, no actresses of note and certainly no politicians.


Monday's newspapers were full of delight and derision. Two photographs predominated. One showed a youthful demonstrator dramatically crumpling between two policemen, his face covered in gore. It turned out to be self-daubed red paint. The other photograph showed a policeman in the middle. One demonstrator was bending the bobbie over double while his mate kicked the constabulary face. "Police Brutality!" said one caption. This sarcasm was deserved. There were people on that march who had no thought but to provoke authority.

It was this image of the crowd's brutality which kept many people away from the march. On that Sunday morning before the march began there was a general sense of foreboding throughout this country. There had been six months' warning of the event and the newspapers had been full of predictions about an organized dust-up on a grand scale. Several weeks before 27th October some newspapers claimed that the militants were planning a tour de force to take over the B.B.C., the Bank of England and 10 Downing Street. The Times mentioned the Gent's Lavatory in Piccadilly as a possible target. All this sounded a bit grim.

It was easy to imagine such a fracas with Paris still fresh in everyone's mind. Two prominent politicians said the march should be banned and in England this is pretty stringent talk. Iain Macleod, the Tory notable, spoke for many others when he said on Friday evening, that he was leaving London



THE SUNDAY PUNCH - discreetly hidden.  
The Empire's Best.



6:00 P.M. - Grosvenor Square

for the weekend and that he hoped fervently that it would rain all day Sunday. He was not being facetious. It did not rain but perhaps this was because the Archbishop of Canterbury got his ear in. He prayed that the march would go forward without violence.

By 7.00 p.m. that Sunday evening with nightfall in London it was clear that the Archbishop's prayer had been granted. There had been some violence but it had come from probably no more than 2000 people out of an estimated total of 30,000 marchers. The scenes around Grosvenor Square had been exciting but the final control of the police had never been threatened. There would be no martyrs, no desperate symbolic acts and the American Embassy would not burn. The only moment of triumph had come at 6.00 p.m. when the Stars and Stripes were lowered from the flagstaff on the Embassy roof. The crowd roared and exulted but it was only the resident U.S. Marine who preformed the routine nightly chore.

I left shortly after feeling rather disenchanted. I had seen a failure and I knew that it would be represented as such in the news. The march had failed because it was an anti-climax after weeks of alarm, because 30,000 people can hardly be counted as a significant crowd in this country and because 100,000 had been expected as a minimum turnout. I had seen immense quantities of energy, enthusiasm and idealism go down the drain.

I felt too that the idea of marching and of public protest would be held up for derision. The march I had just seen had turned out to be a bit ludicrous. But all of it was better than lethargy and indifference or the mass, stupifying conformity which I've seen elsewhere. This needed to be said but I knew it would be lost in the noise of congratulation the next day. And it also needed to be pointed out that, when marches fail, terrorism can become fashionable.

So I walked back to my hotel. The sounds of Grosvenor Square faded behind me. London was busy and alert. Down below Oxford Street I suddenly struck another group of militants on the march, this time wheeling around the corner of a small park behind a band. I ran towards the drums and even in the dark of a London side street I could see again the familiar black and red colours of the Anarchists. They swung by me under the street lights and in the gleam I caught sight of their defiant motto: BLOOD AND FIRE.

It was the Salvation Army on their way to evening service. I had had enough of marching for the millennium for one day.

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**INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS**



This article by  
David A. W. Judd,  
an Institute Fellow  
concerned with north-  
ern development, is  
sent to you with  
the courteous per-

mission of the POLAR RECORD.

R. H. Nolte

August 18, 1969



## CANADA'S NORTHERN POLICY : RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

BY DAVID JUDD\*

[MS. received 10 January 1969]

### CONTENTS

Sovereignty . . . . .	593	The north as a Canadian liability	600
Public health . . . . .	597	Conclusion . . . . .	601
New social policies . . . . .	599	References . . . . .	602

### Sovereignty

"The object in annexing these unexplored territories to Canada is, I apprehend, to prevent the United States from claiming them, and not from the likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada" (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1879).

That sentence referred, in fact, to the impending transfer of the Arctic islands to Canada in 1879, but it could have applied, just as aptly, to the whole of northern Canada. The first part of it was largely correct; the second part is still a matter for conjecture, debate and experiment.

Most of the Canadian Government's sporadic forays into the north from 1880 onwards were motivated by the reaction of politicians and officials to aliens in the Arctic. There was nothing else in the north for a government to be concerned about. The fur trade was important to the Hudson's Bay Company, and it was to become important to many of the Eskimos, but it had lost its pre-eminence in a nation where trans-continental railways and millions of immigrants were the priorities of the day. The great age of Arctic exploration was ending: a North West Passage was irrelevant in a world that was planning a Panama Canal. The whalers too would depart from northern waters, and the missionaries and the Hudson Bay factors would be left to themselves.

The only eruption of the north into southern consciousness before the end of the century was the Klondike gold rush of 1897-98. Ottawa went into the Yukon with the flag. There were international borders to be protected and the attraction of Crown revenue to be had from the gold. That brief episode of Canadian northern history was bizarre and spectacular but it was soon over, and after 1900 it appeared there would be little in the north to distract Dominion Governments again.

By 1900, Canada had done virtually nothing to make use of, or settle, the northern fifty per cent of her country. Then, in 1903, she lost her claim to the Alaska "panhandle". Canadians had lived with the threat of United States' expansion since 1776 and had, by and large, been successful in damping down

\* Visiting scholar, Scott Polar Research Institute, formerly Administrator of the Yukon Territory.

American enthusiasm to own the rest of North America. Canada may never have taken Seward, the American Secretary of State, seriously when he said that "Nature designs that this whole continent . . . shall be sooner or later, within the magic circle of the American Union". This was only an American dream. The settlement of the Alaskan "panhandle" dispute, however, was harsh reality. Canada learned two things. First, that she could not depend on Britain to protect Canadian interests, and second, that legal arguments and historic claims to land were a poor substitute for rights established by effective occupation.

From 1900 to the 1930s almost all Canada's scanty northern policy was devoted to the task of fending off claims and incursions from American, Danish and Norwegian explorers. In 1922 she even exerted herself to take the offensive and tried to colonize Ostrov Vrangelya [Wrangel Island] off the north shore of the Soviet mainland, but this ended in a fiasco and the claims were later dropped. Once more the phase of active Canadian interest in the north waned. The threat to sovereignty appeared to have passed.

An inventory of northern activity in Canada in 1939 is surprisingly short. In the Yukon, the population had fallen from a high of some 30 000 in 1900 to 4 000. They subsisted mainly on the dwindling supply of gold from the Klondike Valley. In the Northwest Territories, with a population in 1939 of 12 000, there was a modest oil field at Norman Wells, half a dozen small gold mines around Yellowknife, and the new pitchblende mine at Port Radium on Great Bear Lake. In northern Manitoba there was a railway to the little port of Churchill on Hudson Bay. The Dominion Government's main activities had been a series of small maritime expeditions to the north, and the establishment of about a score of police posts in the two Territories and Arctic Quebec. Ottawa's legislative programme for the north had been principally confined to an attempt, through the Northwest Territories Council, to protect the native fur trapper. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals manned a communications network in the Mackenzie Valley and in the Yukon. There were three government radio direction finding stations in Hudson Bay for ships. The fur trade and the mission posts made up the rest of the northern picture. It was a quiet part of the world. Change was coming, however. After 1945 Canada went north again as an anxious landlord; nervous about the behaviour of her northern wartime tenants.

The Second World War brought the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of Canada an importance unequalled before or since. The Canadian eastern Arctic, including Newfoundland and Labrador, was an integral part of the Allies' air staging routes to Britain and the war in north-west Europe. Several manned airfields were built, and a network of Allied radio and weather posts established. In the west, the Japanese threat after 1941 wrought immense change: the Alaska Highway; the Canol pipe lines; a road from the Mackenzie Valley to the Yukon watershed; an oil refinery at Whitehorse; a winter road system into the Mackenzie Valley from Alberta; the Northwest Staging Route of airfields; and an American military population throughout northern Canada between 1941 and 1946 which must have out-numbered Canadian residents by at least three to one.

Once again Canada's exclusive ownership of its north was open to question and, once again, it was this which made the Dominion Government react.

The history of the early post-war period of northern affairs in Canada is not yet fully documented. The most helpful account has been written by a Canadian civil servant who was privy to many of the events which took place in senior official circles and in the Cabinet between the crucial years 1945 to 1953 (Phillips, 1967). It is clear that Ottawa was concerned about the casual United States attitude, particularly of the armed services, towards Canadian ownership of the Arctic mainland and islands. There was never any official attempt by the Americans to claim parts of the north but, as one prominent Canadian said in his diary in 1943:

[The Americans] have apparently walked in and taken possession in many cases as if [northern] Canada were unclaimed territory inhabited by a docile race of aborigines (Massey, 1963, p 371).

It was this uneasiness in Ottawa which prompted the design of a new policy for Canada's north.

In 1946, the Royal Canadian Air Force was given the assignment of photographing and making an air reconnaissance of the Canadian Arctic mainland and islands in order to establish a wide-ranging, Canadian presence in the region. At the same time, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were instructed to re-open the posts which had been closed due to lack of manpower during the war, and to plan for the expansion of their northern Division.

The same year, the Canadian Army took over the operation of the Alaska Highway in Canada and the RCAF assumed responsibility for the airfields of the Northwest Staging Route. The armed forces also began the first of several large-scale manoeuvres in the Arctic.

In 1947, the Dominion Government decided to build and commission its first supply vessel for the eastern Arctic instead of, as in the past, being dependent on chartered vessels; there would now be an official Canadian ship in the Canadian Arctic.

In Ottawa itself the first significant step was the appointment, in 1946, of a senior Canadian civil servant, experienced in diplomacy and international relations, to the dual post of Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources and of Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. The selection of a diplomat was probably due to the prevailing opinions about the north in the Ministry of External Affairs in Ottawa. Vincent Massey's diary for 17 May, 1943, has this notation:

I was interested to see how alive [External Affairs] had become to the danger of American high pressure methods in Canada . . . We have far too long been too supine *vis à vis* Washington and the only threat to our independence comes from that quarter.

Massey at that time was Canadian High Commissioner in London, and thus in daily contact with the senior members of the government and officials in Ottawa (Massey, 1963, p 372).

In 1947, an Advisory Committee on Northern Development was established

in Ottawa to be a clearing house for all of the new, and renewed, Dominion Government projects in northern Canada.

By 1950, the old Department of Mines and Resources had become too unwieldy for efficiency and was split up. A new Ministry in which special attention could be given to northern administration and Eskimo affairs was planned. In 1951, Ottawa undertook to reorganize the government of the Northwest Territories by providing for the election of three members to the previously all-nominated Territorial Council. By 1952 it had been further decided to create a Ministry which would, in part, bear the title of "Northern Affairs". In 1953 the Canadian Parliament approved the establishment of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, now the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

It is perhaps generally, and naturally, assumed that Canada's northern involvement after 1945 was her response to the threat of intercontinental air attack. This assumption presents not only an incomplete picture of Canadian motives, but a distorted one as well. Canada herself could have done next to nothing to defend the American continent. In 1946 her total population was still only about 12 million. It was the United States which initiated schemes for defence in the north and for several years Canadians seem to have reacted unfavourably or unenthusiastically to such proposals when, and if, they were consulted. In 1946, for instance, the Americans had made plans to establish several permanent weather stations in northern Canada. Just as their ships were about to sail for the north on this mission, the Canadian Government found out about the project through a newspaper advertisement. The American ships did not sail, negotiations in Ottawa were begun, and when the weather stations were established a year later they were under joint Canadian-United States control.

R. J. Sutherland, for several years an outstanding Canadian expert on defence policies and strategy, has written the history of Canadian-American military negotiations during this period. He implies that the Canadian Government was generally either slower to recognize the potential threat of intercontinental attack over the North Pole or that they preferred to do nothing to attract foreign military interest:

It was recognized that major installations in the Canadian North . . . might give rise to a need for local defence. The simplest solution to this problem was not to build the installations in the first place . . . This general concept was described expressively by Mr Pearson [in 1953] as that of 'scorched ice' (Sutherland, 1966, p 264).

During these post-war years, and certainly up to 1953, the major preoccupation of the Canadian Government in the north seems to have been: . . . Canadian aversion to the presence of American forces in Canada and extreme sensitivity to the potential derogation of Canadian sovereignty (Sutherland, 1966, p 261).

There is no place within the scope of this article to debate whether this, "Canadian aversion", was justified or whether it was mere panic or chauvinism. What is suggested is that, between 1945 and 1953, Canada's northern plans were made in the name of sovereignty rather than in the interests of strategy.

Ottawa's new policies for the north, and the administrative machinery for those policies, were conceived and designed before NATO was created, before the first Russian atomic test, before the great post-war strategic thrust into high latitudes began, and before technology had carried the front lines of the "Cold War" into the Arctic. It was not until 1954 that definite arrangements were made for the DEW Line, and not until 1955 that the first impact of that epic construction was felt in the north.

### Public health

If there was any new dimension in Canada's northern activities immediately after the Second World War it was in the realm of public health. Since the 1880's, there had been a small vocal group of critics who had spoken up on behalf of the Indians and Eskimo, the few who described the generally wretched living conditions, the disease and epidemics, and the high mortality rate among Canada's native peoples. These voices were disregarded. Canada in the south had its own problems after the confederation of 1867. There was new territory in the west to be won and held, and the immense task undertaken of building railways through 5 000 km of uninhabited wilderness.

Periodical economic slumps, droughts, the First World War and then the disaster of the depression in the 1930's meant a nation preoccupied with, and in, the south. In 1900, Canada's population was 5 000 000 and by 1931, after a period of heavy immigration, it was only 10 000 000. These people could hardly have been expected, in the second largest and one of the youngest countries in the world, to have generated the resources and money to cope with, or even learn about, one of the remotest regions of the globe. The only hard political reason for looking north had been the sovereignty question, and that was not enough to evoke much concern about the living conditions of the Eskimo.

During this time, however, and particularly during the 1920's and 1930's, Canada was learning how to control and eradicate the diseases of settlement and congestion. The public learned that it did not have to live with smallpox, typhoid fever, diphtheria and scarlet fever, and above all, that the great scourge of tuberculosis could be wiped out. It had become virtually a conditioned reflex at all levels of government in Canada to spend money on public health and to legislate for control of infectious diseases. It was a responsibility no politician could afford to shirk, and it was a burden which the taxpayer would uncomplainingly shoulder.

It was with this experience, and with this knowledge, that Canada looked north again after 1945. There had been rumours and reports of epidemics and high mortality rates among the Eskimo for years. The occupation of the Arctic by the Allied Armed Forces after 1941 helped to reinforce with first-hand opinion these sporadic reports. In 1945, the medical secretary of the Canadian Tuberculosis Association visited the settlements down the Mackenzie River. He returned with a depressing picture. "It is high time (he said) that the Department formulated a health policy founded on the needs of the people . . ." (Jenness, 1964, p 84). Ottawa reacted to this report. Disease in

the north became a kind of national obscenity, not only a threat which might contaminate the south, but an insult as well. It could also have become an international embarrassment to a country which was giving vigorous support to the United Nations and to the new concept of foreign aid. The north was a skeleton in Canada's closet.

Moreover, the post-war period began with a series of disasters which accentuated the need for a huge increase in medical and social aid for the north. Between 1946 and 1950 there were epidemics of polio, typhoid and diphtheria among the Eskimo population. At the same time, the fur trade, which had been the chief support, particularly of the Eskimo in the western Arctic regions of Canada, went to pieces. The market value of the White Fox fell from \$26.00 a pelt (the average price between 1940 and 1944) to \$8.88 in 1948 and by 1949 to \$3.50. The inland Eskimo in the Keewatin District experienced even greater calamity for their mainstay, the caribou, dwindled to about one-fifth of their former numbers (Jenness, 1964, p 88).

It was into the midst of these epidemics and natural disasters, and into the economic vacuum left by the abrupt departure of the Allied Armed Forces, that the doctors thrust themselves. In 1946, Ottawa organized the first year of its medical programme for the whole Canadian Arctic and, from that year on, the summer survey of Eskimo health, the annual tuberculosis X-rays, and the Bacillus Calmette-Guerin vaccination teams became a part of the northern scene. The intensity and the impact of this new public health programme can be measured from two statistics. By 1956 almost one-sixth of Canada's Eskimos were under treatment for tuberculosis. The *per capita* expenditure by the Dominion Government for Eskimo health rose from some \$4.00 in 1939 to something like \$400.00 by 1961.

But there was more to public health in the north than hospitals and travelling medical teams. Again from their own experience in the south, Canadian administrators knew that literacy, formal education, vocational training, employment, housing, rehabilitation, disability programmes and the whole range of developing welfare services were an integral and necessary part of improving Eskimo and northern health. That same report of 1945 which called on the Dominion Government to respond to the medical "needs of the people" of the north, also correctly predicted the variety of government programmes which would have to follow:

. . . health cannot be divorced from socio-economic conditions, and a health programme will fail if, at the same time, efforts are not made to improve the economic status of these people (Jenness, 1964, p 84).

It was medicine which showed the way in the north after 1945. Hygiene and sanitation took charge. If babies were dying, poor housing was to blame. If nutrition was inadequate, then it stemmed either from unemployment, lack of resources, ignorance, or all three. If patients were cured of tuberculosis, there was little virtue in returning them to the same conditions which bred the disease. If doctors saved lives they also ensured the survival of many men and women who were no longer fit for the aboriginal life of the north.

And what would be the point in raising a new, healthy generation educated into the ways of the white man if that white society could not, or would not,



make available in the north its own economic and social opportunities to replace the traditional ones it was destroying? There were ready answers to this question. Once committed to take an interest in the north, Canadians and Canadian governments decided that there was no choice but to change the style of Eskimo and Indian life and replace, almost entirely, the native cultures with white man's education, technology and social organization. There was debate and disagreement, but usually over questions of degree and tempo rather than fundamental goals. There was dismay; there was regret. There was the opinion of the majority that Canada was doing the right thing for her northern people. There was also the solid conviction of some that Canadians were doing the north a favour. Above all, however, there was a sense of inevitability. Logic and good intentions prevailed.

The issue of sovereignty faded. It became less and less a fillip to northern development. It was replaced by a lively social conscience.

### New social policies

The extent and cost of the new social policies which followed for the north can be seen from a few representative categories:

In 1947 the first Dominion Government school was founded in the north. By 1965 there were fifty-one such schools employing 326 teachers in the Northwest Territories; this figure does not include the Dominion Government schools in northern Quebec, nor does it take into account the considerable subsidy from Ottawa to the Territorial schools in the Yukon. In the Yukon in 1965, 3 178 students were enrolled in twenty-two schools with a full-time staff of 149 teachers. Most of these schools were either new foundations or were new buildings replacing schools which dated from the "Gold Rush"; before 1947 the number of employees working in the north in the Ministry directly responsible for the north was about 200; by 1964 it was over 2 000.

Between 1954 and 1966 Dominion Government expenditures for the north increased four times (*Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*, 1955-67).

Since 1959, thirty-five Co-operatives have been incorporated and supported by government action in the Northwest Territories and northern Quebec. One in five Eskimo families now has some connection with a Co-operative; in 1965 the Department of Northern Affairs announced a new programme to construct 1 600 new houses across the north to be rented on a subsidized basis to Eskimos.

Perhaps a few less obvious figures and statements demonstrate most vividly how much the texture of life in the Canadian north has changed since the Second World War. In 1967, for instance, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police patrolled by dog team a total of 28 000 km; but by aircraft and vehicle over 3.5 million km. North of the sixtieth parallel there are now more than 12 000 telephones for a population of 41 000. Radio broadcasting has been a feature of northern life for decades, but in 1967 the first government-sponsored northern television service was started in Yellowknife. Whitehorse has had its private TV station for five years. In 1957 the Post Office reported the cost

of its northern operations at \$576 546; in 1967 it was \$2 200 000. In the Yukon the new library handled 5 000 books in 1962, and 43 000 in 1967, (*Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*, 1957, 1962, 1967).

With all of this government activity in the north since 1945 the possibility of any legal claim against Canadian Arctic sovereignty is now remote. The principal issue of 1879 and of 1945 will no longer spur Ottawa to northern action; the social problems will now be the chief impulse. Canada cannot afford northern squalor again. Dominion Governments will be sensitive to criticism about the welfare and living conditions of the Eskimo and Indians, and modern communications will mean a steady and easy flow of information out of the north. Northern social problems will no longer be out of sight and out of mind. They must be faced and solved and this task will, in the main, fall on Ottawa.

### **The north as a Canadian liability**

Dominion Government in Canada exists, in part, to carry out some kind of balancing function among the various regional economies of the country. A government in Ottawa has to try to spread national wealth nationally, and to attempt to ensure that all Canadians have more or less the same standard of living. In the past, Canadian efforts to share national prosperity and ease regional poverty have been almost exclusively in the south. Now, the north will have to become an integral part of the Canadian economic community. It will join as an underprivileged member for, despite change and progress, the social problems of the north are still acute and the cost of resolving them will be great.

For example, Indian and Eskimo infant mortality in the north is four times the Canadian average and, among the Eskimo, the death rate of children up to the age of four is thirteen times the national average (Carrothers and others, 1966, p 69). Even in 1964 the average age at death among the Eskimo was 32.2 years.

In the education of the young there has been real advance, but among the older generation illiteracy is common. In the Yukon, 5.2 per cent of the population over fifteen years of age have not been to school; this is four times the national average. In the Northwest Territories thirty-four per cent of the adults have had no formal education (*Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*, 1968, p 10). If nothing else, these figures demonstrate a continuing employment problem in the north for at least another generation.

In 1965 about twenty-five per cent of Eskimo children were without school service and, while that percentage can be expected to diminish steadily, it will be some time before schooling is available for everyone. Among those who do go to school, there are many dropouts. Fifty per cent of Indian students in Canada do not go beyond the first six years of schooling and this figure may be higher for the north (McEwen, 1967, p 15).

Indian and Eskimo earning power is still small. The *per capita* income for

the Indians of the north is one-sixth of the national average and twenty-eight per cent of that Indian income is from government welfare schemes. Indians and Eskimos together comprise three-fifths of the potential labour force of the north, but in fact form less than one-quarter of those actually employed (Carrothers and others, 1966, p 69).

Native housing throughout the north is still generally poor. A survey in 1964 of some 817 one-room houses in the Arctic showed that the majority of these contained from five to eight people (McEwen, 1967, p 13).

These social statistics do not tell the whole story of the costs of the north to Canada. Any kind of enterprise in the north is expensive, and government is no exception. The local government of the Northwest Territories is underwritten by Ottawa. Some eighty per cent of its capital expenditures and seventy per cent of its operating revenue, originate in one form or another from the Dominion Government (Carrothers and others, 1966, p 133). The situation in the Yukon now is only slightly more viable.

Behind these two local Territorial governments stands Ottawa. Dominion Government ministries and agencies in 1966-67 spent some \$90 million in the Canadian north. The total revenue accruing to the Dominion Government from the north in that same fiscal year was about \$12 million. (*Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development*, 1967, p 253). It is unlikely that these revenues will rise markedly in the near future. Government, for example, is still the mainstay of the northern labour market. The total experienced labour force in the two Territories in 1967 was approximately 14 200. Out of this total, some 6 000 men and women had full-time jobs with either the Dominion or Territorial Governments in the north, and another 3 000 were employed by those governments on a part-time or seasonal basis.

The mining industry is the backbone of the economy of both Territories. In 1967 the value of all minerals produced in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon was \$125 million. This is a small return from forty per cent of Canada's land mass when the other sixty per cent produced \$4 400 million. In other words, the north is now producing only about 2.8 per cent of Canada's mineral wealth (Toombs and Janes, 1968).

Fur trapping is still an important source of income in the north, particularly for the Indians and Eskimos. It accounts, however, for only about one-tenth of the value of wild fur trapped throughout Canada and provides a total revenue of only \$25 *per capita* in the two Territories. It is a way of life, therefore, that implies only subsistence for many trappers and, for most, it cannot be the only source of income (Marsden, 1966).

### Conclusion

This account of economic and social problems is not meant to denigrate Canada's endeavour in the north since 1945, nor is it intended to draw attention away from the considerable investment of time, money, labour and imagination which has gone into the attempt to solve northern problems in the last two decades. It is meant however, to emphasize at least two facts:

- (a) Canada is now committed to a continuing, active and expensive northern programme. The pressing issue of sovereignty, excepting, perhaps, future

- definitions of territorial waters, has passed and has been replaced in Canada by a moral and political concern for the welfare of her northern people. These social problems will keep successive Dominion Governments active in the north for decades more; and
- (b) there is as yet no final rejoinder to the contention of 1879 that the north is unlikely to prove "of any value to Canada". The north today, means subsidy.

The high costs of social programmes for the north have done away with the older "do nothing" economics which characterized much of Ottawa's northern policies over the last sixty years. The north has now become expensive and the Canadian Government would like to see the region pay more of its own way. It is probable, therefore, that, in the future, the economic motive will become more important and that in government policy the development of northern resources will be given a high priority.

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**INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS**



This article by  
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R.H. Nolte

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## SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF RESOURCE ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN CANADA

BY DAVID JUDD\*

[MS. received 6 June 1969]

Law and order after 1894 . . . . .	791	1920 to 1931 . . . . .	797
Resource legislation for the Klondike . . . . .	793	After 1931 . . . . .	799
The inspection services . . . . .	795	The wartime administration . . . . .	800
The all-Canadian route . . . . .	796	1947 to 1957 . . . . .	801
Ottawa and the Klondike mining concessions . . . . .	796	1958 to 1968 . . . . .	802
		Conclusion . . . . .	805
		References . . . . .	806

### Law and order after 1894

But I learned . . . that while the Canadian laws were no better than . . . our American laws, their execution was more stringent and energetic (Lynch, 1904, p 30).

These words were written by an American senator from California about his experience in the Klondike Gold Rush of 1898. In the Canadian north of the 1890's, government meant public order. The first resident servants of the Dominion Government were an Inspector and twenty men of the North-West Mounted Police who were assigned to the Yukon in 1894 to "represent all the different departments of government in the district" (Canada, Department of Interior 1907, p 15).

The Police began their mission by banning dance-hall girls from wearing bloomers in public performances, and, over the next decade, and in the midst of "a vast mob of non-descript fortune hunters from all over the Universe" (Dafoe, 1931, p 174), they established a rule of law which, for effectiveness and efficiency, was probably unequalled anywhere on the American continent during its pioneer days.

This early style of government in the Canadian north was neither accident nor innovation. It was an extension of a policy which Ottawa had devised in the 1870's when opening up the prairies for settlement. And it was enforced in the Yukon by the same men who had brought government into the Canadian west.

To Ottawa in the 1870's the idea of a "wild west" was frightening. This revulsion to a lawless frontier was not only a moral stance. Canada had to avoid war; it would have been too costly an enterprise for Canadian resources. In 1872, the year Ottawa began to make detailed plans for western settlement, the United States had spent \$20 000 000 on Indian wars and ancillary

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operations. The total revenue of the Canadian Government in that year was \$21 000 000 (Longstreth, 1928, p 7). But while war and Indian massacre were out of the question, control of Canadian frontiers was the essence of national survival. As one historian put it:

It should be remembered that this daring, almost foolhardy nation-building [in western Canada] was carried on during continuous threats of annexation by the United States . . . (Brebner, 1960, p 293).

Lawlessness could not be tolerated anywhere near the Canadian-American borders because it would betray weakness. One of the first acts of the Police in the Yukon was to abolish the community meetings of miners which had been the basis of "kangaroo" justice before the Government arrived. The miners in the Yukon in 1894 were mostly Americans; their "laws" and customs were American and their collective decisions were sent to Washington for confirmation. This had to be stopped, and the Queen's writ established in its place. That this ban was effective is attested by the fact that the only subsequent Vigilance Committee mentioned during the Klondike Gold Rush, or indeed throughout the Yukon's history, was that set up by the matrons of Dawson City to ensure that no woman of doubtful reputation was invited to the annual St Andrew's Ball.

Law and law-making followed public order as official priorities for the north. In 1898, a Commissioner of the Yukon, a Legislative Council, a legal adviser, a registrar, coroners and justices of the peace were appointed to this new northern government. A territorial court was also immediately established and the whole weight of the Canadian legal system of magistrates, judges, appeal courts and the Criminal Code of Canada bore down on the north. At the height of the Gold Rush, Ottawa was spending almost \$400 000 a year on the administration of justice in the Yukon, and this was considerably more than the amount budgeted for schools, health and road building.

The reminiscences of a Klondike lawyer contained these revealing figures about the place of law in the north:

The condition of the Yukon today [1912] may be fairly estimated when you are told that nearly all the lawyers and judges have retired from the country . . . We had forty-five lawyers [in the Yukon] in 1902; today there are only four (Goggin, 1913, p 214 and 217).

With all this law and policing, *laissez-faire* was never a predominant or feasible social philosophy for the Canadian north. The sub-Arctic environment of the Yukon would not permit the application of a political and social theory conceived in temperate Europe. The sense of community in northern life has always been strong and it expresses itself in a natural tendency towards paternalism. It was this instinct to which Ottawa's lawmakers and police were able to appeal. As one chronicle describes the reaction of the Yukon miners to the arrival of government: "There was no serious trouble. The miners accepted the change philosophically" (Steele, 1936, p 28).

After 1894, and for the following decade, government became almost an exercise in martial law. During the Gold Rush the Police "... ran the stampede like a military manoeuvre" (Berton, 1958, p 272). They turned back from the Yukon borders anyone whom they felt was undesirable. They decreed that



no man could enter the Yukon without a year's supply of food; an order which usually meant weeks of hard toil for the gold seekers. They insisted that the stampeders travel in organized convoys, that the boats carried serial numbers and that on certain stretches of the rivers pilots must be hired. They cleared Dawson City, on their own authority, of excess population when famine threatened in 1897. There was no murder in the Yukon at the height of the Gold Rush when 50 000 prospectors crowded towards the gold fields. There was virtually no theft even during the ten years when \$100 000 000 of gold was taken out of the Klondike. For the obnoxious, the police offered (and enforced) two choices "Down the river [to the US border] or the wood pile!" (quoted in Lynch, 1904, p 231). For the man who broke the mining laws there was a worse fate. He could be forbidden to mine again in the Yukon Territory.

This was the pattern and philosophy of government in the Yukon; the priorities were public order and law. The only early departure from this single-minded government was the establishment of a school system in 1902. Health services, hospitals, libraries, fire protection and the care of the luckless and unfortunate were taken on by the people and their private organizations.

### **Resource legislation for the Klondike**

This brief account of the beginnings of law and order in the Yukon is, perhaps, a surprising introduction to an article about the growth of resource policies and administration in the Canadian north. It is, however, a necessary preface for the urge to impose a symmetry on the north, to build a well-managed and well-mannered frontier, was behind all policy in the 1890's. This same government, and many of the same men, who were dispatching the Police to the Yukon, who were raising the Yukon Field Force, who were recruiting the self-reliant and stern-minded for northern service, were also—and often at the same time—trying to devise new law for the exploitation of resources. Their opinions and convictions explain much of the content of the Klondike's resource legislation and the vigour with which those laws were enforced.

Before the Dominion Government sent its police into the north, prospecting and mining in the Yukon was an informal business. A prospector would stake a claim by recording his name on four boundary posts. Custom respected his right to work that claim in his own way and at his own pace, and if there was any dispute to ownership it might be discussed and settled at a miners' meeting. The miners elected their own recorders, made by-laws, decided the size of claims, and set any fees they thought necessary for the control of staking. Their power, when they had to use it to enforce a collective decision, was often the role of the lynch party.

These customs were not unique to the Yukon. They represented almost a century of accumulated tradition. Placer gold mining in the United States had been largely conducted in this way. But this system, or lack of it, was not to the taste of a government which was determined to disprove the assumption that lawlessness must accompany pioneer conditions. The Yukon miners themselves found it inadequate and during the winter of 1897 they

sent a deputation to William Ogilvie, the Dominion Land Surveyor in the Yukon " . . . to learn if it were possible to have something done to settle the muddle things were in" (Ogilvie, 1913, p 164). They subsequently petitioned him to survey their claims and to adjudicate the disputes which had arisen. Ogilvie did this to the satisfaction of the fractious miners for they recognised him not only as a skilled craftsman but as a disinterested and honest civil servant. His work was, however, only the beginning of a prolonged effort by the Dominion Government to introduce order and system.

The Yukon mining laws and regulations evolved out of several opinions and precedents then current in Ottawa. First, the Crown was the landlord; it owned all land and all the surface and under-rights to the land. It was, therefore, within the Crown's exclusive jurisdiction to decide the terms under which those lands and resources would be leased or sold. Second, the Government of Canada would ensure that what it considered to be an adequate share of the exploitation of those resources would go to Canada. It would frame its policies to secure " . . . for Canadian business houses the largest possible share of resulting trade" (Dafoe, 1931, p 153). Third, there was to be law and order in all phases of gold extraction.

The experience of half a century, covering a dozen countries, all went to show that a gold camp, even in areas comparatively accessible to the influence of government, tended to become the most lawless on earth . . . what would happen in the Klondike . . . ? (Dafoe, 1931, p 155).

Sir Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the Interior, provided the answer and the policy. He assigned a Commissioner for the Yukon, " . . . with powers little short of dictatorial . . ." (Dafoe, 1931, p 156).

The results of these policies were, for a time, almost chaotic. There was bungling, dishonesty and ignorance. Prior to the Klondike Gold Rush the Dominion Government's " . . . mining regulations were in a very embryonic state" (Ogilvie, 1913, p 138). In fact, Ottawa had to write an entirely new set of mining laws for the north, and in 1897 it began this task in haste by sending cabled requests to several countries asking for information about placer-mining law. The result was a set of " . . . tentative regulations subject to change . . ." (Dafoe, 1931, p 154). This was an understatement. The length of mining claims was altered several times from extremes of 500 feet to 100 feet. The number of claims to be owned by the Crown changed markedly during the first few years and the amount of royalty levied varied between 20 per cent and 2 per cent.

But throughout these alterations ran attitudes and convictions which were the beginning of economic legislation:

There were limits to the amount of ground an individual could acquire from the Crown. In the Yukon, for placer mining, it was one man, one claim.

Individuals or private companies could acquire from the original stakers any number of mining claims.

No one was to hold ground without working it or without paying an annual sum in lieu of that work. The title to idle ground would expire after a set period.

Nationality was no bar to mining in the north. (In Alaska, only American citizens could stake a mining claim.)

The government would derive revenue from royalties, fees, and miners' licences and renewal certificates.

The government was to employ professionally trained mining and claims inspectors to provide technical opinions and evidence about privately owned mining properties, and to ensure that, in all phases of resource extraction, the law was enforced.

While these policies, in themselves, did not represent much innovation in mining law in southern Canada, they were a clear statement that the north would not be left on its own and that the placer miners would not be able to control their industry to the degree that they had done in the gold camps of the American west. With little change, they set the pattern of all northern resource legislation until about ten years ago. They have influenced, as well, the training and outlook of resource administrators up to the present day. And they explain how and why a resource administration was sustained during the ensuing fifty years of official indifference. Once it had been established, a system of this kind could not have been easily abolished or left to disintegrate.

### **The inspection services**

The first task of the government inspection service in the Klondike was to make mining into a tidy, well-behaved industry. Illegal staking had to be controlled and the letter of the law enforced. The service also had to discourage the tendency of many miners to short-change the Crown on royalties.

By 1900 the role of this small inspection service was already expanding. It had to arm the courts of the Yukon to deal with all manner of perjury and fraudulent mining promotions. Government engineers were also required to pass judgment on the economic viability of mining claims and testify whether an individual claim could be worked profitably by one man or whether the title to the claim should be turned over to a mining syndicate.

Government, in its urge to control and regulate, found itself drawn into the economics of the mining industry and, presumably, in the process it was gathering information and opinions about how to mine, how not to mine, and where to mine. What could be done with this expertise which was accumulating at the taxpayers' expense? In 1912 the Honourable Mr Justice Craig, who had worked in the Yukon, suggested that the government should provide technical advice to the Klondike prospector. He felt that "... this is a kind of paternalism which may be justified on the highest public grounds" (Goggin, 1913, p 220).

Craig's opinion probably had little or no effect at the time, but his speech represented an idea which eventually was accepted. Government was determined to enforce resource legislation, and if it was to do this effectively it had to employ its own experts. The tendency then, (perhaps more a matter of human nature than logic), was for government, through its experts, to insist on participating in some of the technical and management decisions of private

enterprise. And private enterprise became interested in knowing what governments were learning about northern resources. It was a relationship which evolved with considerable friction, but by the 1920's the Dominion Government had begun to spend money to provide itself with detailed, professional advice about resources in the north and it did so, in part, to stimulate investment in the Territories.

### **The all-Canadian route**

There was another episode in the Klondike story which introduced a perennial Canadian problem which is still keenly debated today; foreign control of resources and transportation.

The principal routes into the Klondike were through American territory. In the autumn of 1897, Sir Clifford Sifton announced that government was determined to find an all-Canadian route to the Klondike gold fields. It was not just a matter of inconvenience that the only feasible routes to the Klondike were through foreign territory. A Canadian overland route

. . . would be extremely profitable. If retained in Canadian channels the trade . . . would in many ways assist in developing the resources of the country (Dafoe, 1931, p 159).

After several false starts, Sifton chose a railway from the head of navigation on the Stikine River to one of the sources of the Yukon River system on Teslin Lake. His policy, however, was defeated and there was to be no Canadian route built to the Yukon until 1943 when the Alaska Highway was completed and this, ironically for Sifton's memory, was entirely financed and built by the Americans as a defence measure.

Ottawa's only alternative was to charge customs duty on all goods brought into the Territory from outside Canada. The duty varied according to the commodity, but most Americans and other aliens had to pay tax of about 25 per cent of the value of their outfits.

### **Ottawa and the Klondike mining concessions**

In 1900, \$22 000 000 worth of gold was mined from the Klondike. By 1907 this figure had fallen to some \$2 896 000. The supply of easily extracted loose gold was growing scarce. Mining in the Klondike was becoming a problem of mechanization and financing. The magnates began to arrive. A. N. C. Treadgold was one of these, and he predicted the new economics in an article in 1898:

While the days of the poor man's opportunities have passed, the time for comparatively equal opportunities for the capitalist, large and small is now at hand. There are here miles and miles of ground [in the Klondike] that cannot possibly be worked at a profit by individual claim-owners, but which taken up in blocks by capitalists and operated by means of hydraulic machinery would be exceedingly profitable . . . Herein lies the ultimate destiny of this country, and it is in this way only that its vast stores of wealth will be extracted (quoted in Cunyngame, 1953, p 49).

Ottawa's response to the changing economics of the Klondike was based on the miners' need for two vital commodities: water to wash the gold and to float the huge dredges, and electricity to drive the machinery. Adequate supplies of both were an expensive proposition and there was considerable agitation at the time to have the Dominion Government build pipelines and hydro-electric power stations. After surveys and costing, it was decided not to provide either as public utilities. Instead, Ottawa made two changes in its northern mining policy. It allowed the duty-free import of heavy mining machinery into the Klondike, and it devised a system of "grouping". This latter provision referred to the statutory annual expenditures which were required to keep the title to a claim in good order. Now, development money spent on one, or a few, claims could be applied to a large block of claims. This provision made feasible a kind of northern enclosure movement, and large-scale mining thus made its debut in the Canadian north at little or no expense to the public exchequer.

This decision of the Dominion Government to back away from investment in the north marked a new phase in official policies which lasted until the early 1920's. It was a period of government indifference, and private enterprise was left to prosper or fail on its own. The only direct government involvement, apart from its role as administrator and referee of resource development, was the occasional granting of mining concessions. These amounted to exploration monopolies. One of the most important of these was the Coppermine River concession of 1918 and even this was revoked in 1930 after it had produced little exploration and nothing of value.

After 1905, government, both as an economic and social presence, diminished steadily despite its vigorous participation in the Yukon and the Klondike of the 1890's. This decline of official interest and involvement was significant for the future because it stemmed not so much from any rigid adherence to the fashions of an economic philosophy or a political programme, but rather from the more durable assumption that northern development could only be ephemeral. Sir Clifford Sifton expressed this attitude in a letter written in 1897:

The Yukon is not the same as any other gold-mining country in the world, and the difference consists in the fact that it is good for nothing except mining, which in all probability will be temporary (quoted in Dafoe, 1931, p 154).

This prediction became conviction after 1905. The north was not worth Ottawa's investment. The Klondike provided ample evidence to the convinced that enterprise in the north was, by nature, impermanent. By definition, there could be no such thing, therefore, as a long-term plan for northern development.

### 1920 to 1931

It was not until after the First World War that there was any detectable change in the government's attitude. It was the discovery of a modest oil field at Norman Wells, in the Northwest Territories, in 1920 that made Ottawa

react. And it was a reaction which was similar, in smaller scope, to the Klondike-style of government twenty-five years before. Civil servants were sent north to keep order in the midst of the staking rush which followed.

In 1921, the first resident civil service in the Northwest Territories was established at Fort Smith near the northern Alberta border. The Agent in Charge was given a multitude of minor assignments, but his principal task was to cope with the oil prospectors who went down the Mackenzie River to Norman Wells during the summer of 1921.

In the same year, a Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch in the Department of the Interior was set up in Ottawa to look after the work which the commercial activity in the Mackenzie District was generating. Once established, the Branch produced its own momentum and its own programme. The senior officers tried, with some success, to introduce new dimensions into northern administration. Much of their time was spent on clerical routine, but they were able to sponsor a variety of fact-finding investigations to correct maps, to explore mineral resources, and to examine northern ecology. These expeditions were not simply the impulse of a few curious-minded civil servants, they were a conscious attempt to begin an inventory of resources and to gather information on which to base a new economic policy.

Little was destined to come of this investigation until after the Second World War, but there was one phase of it which found its way into law in the 1920's, and which took northern economic policy one small step beyond the Klondike. It concerned the management and conservation of wildlife.

The state of the Eskimos and Indians in northern Canada in the 1920's presents an uneven picture. In some regions, particularly in the Mackenzie Delta and on the west coast of Hudson Bay, there was relative prosperity based on the fur trade, and on a steady supply of game. In other areas the natives were in trouble. Inland from the west coast of Hudson Bay, the caribou were dwindling and the Eskimos were becoming dependent on loans and charity, both coming from the resident traders and missionaries more than from the government. All over the north there were periodic epidemics, chronic malnutrition, sporadic famine and a high rate of infant mortality. The Danish explorer Knud Rasmussen, who traversed the Canadian north by sledge between 1921 and 1924, had drawn disturbing and unfavourable comparisons between the condition of the Canadian Eskimos and their Greenland cousins. There was little public recognition of this in Canada, but the Police and the Northwest Territories Administration were at least partly aware of the slow erosion which was going on among the Eskimos and northern Indians. The official answer was to try to conserve " . . . the game and fur-bearing animals as a means of livelihood for the Indians and Eskimos . . ." (Bethune, 1937, p 5). The number of white trappers was restricted by law, fur traders had to be licensed, large game reserves were set aside for the sole use of the natives, and game sanctuaries were established to protect the breeding grounds of certain species. In 1926, the government began a detailed study into possible reindeer pasture and, by 1929, 3000 of the animals had been purchased from Alaska to be driven to a permanent camp in the Mackenzie delta.

The motives behind the new game laws and the reindeer project were mixed. There was concern about the survival and livelihood of the natives. There was also the conviction that the native way of life must be preserved; this, to the white man's outlook, meant trapping. It was easier and less contentious to spend a relatively small sum on transplanting reindeer and on the enforcement of game laws than to establish government schools, training centres and adequate hospitals. And any expenditure was better than relief or charity. The game laws were meant to keep the Eskimos in a commendable state of nature and to encourage them "... to follow their natural mode of living and not to depend upon the white man's food and clothing which are unsuited to their needs" (Bethune, 1934, p 54).

These well-intended policies had few results but they were an attempt, and probably the first attempt in the north by government, to manage and control a small, but vital, part of the economy.

### After 1931

The annual report of 1929-30 of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch of the Department of the Interior began:

Not since the days of the Klondike gold rush has there been so much interest manifested in northern Canada as during the past fiscal year.

(Canada, Department of the Interior, 1931, p 7).

This statement was destined to become an obituary. In 1931 the Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch was abolished when the Government reduced expenditures during the Depression. The innovations of the previous ten years ended abruptly. The staff of explorers and northern specialists departed leaving only "... minor clerks and executives" (Finnie, 1948, p 68), who were confined to paper work and the allocation of relief to destitute northerners.

Mining activity in the 1930's went on, particularly in the Northwest Territories, despite government economies. The discovery of pitchblende in 1930 on the eastern shore of Great Bear Lake led to the establishment of a mine there in 1936. In 1938 the first of several successful gold mines opened at Yellowknife and the town itself quickly became the largest and most prosperous settlement in the north. Private industry built a 4 200 kW hydro-electric generating plant to supply the mines and settlement with power.

During the 1930's the Geological Survey of Canada were able to continue in one sphere the sort of work which the former Northwest Territories Branch had striven to promote. Using aircraft from the Royal Canadian Air Force, they photographed about 264 000 sq km of the Mackenzie valley and produced maps from these photographs.

It was also during this time of meagre government that an investment was made in transportation facilities. In the Northwest Territories in the 1930's the transportation services were "... essentially those of the fur trade" (Blanchet, 1930, p 17). In the Yukon there were a few score kilometres of secondary roads and several hundred kilometres of sledge trails through the bush. The fact that one Yukon road was nicknamed the "Liberal trail" and

another the "Conservative trail" betrayed their dubious political origins. Electioneering in Canada has always meant road building and, in this, even the remote north ran true to national form.

As a part of a scheme to provide jobs for the unemployed throughout Canada, Ottawa spent a few thousand dollars each year after 1931 to improve roads in the Yukon and river facilities along the Mackenzie waterway. Some of this work was done in co-operation with the mining companies. This programme, while it meant little at the time, was subsequently used as a minor precedent for the Roads to Resources policy of 1958.

Any ambitious projects were far in the future. In the latter part of the decade, just before the Second World War, Ottawa backed away from American proposals to build an overland route through Canada to Alaska.

### **The wartime administration**

During the Second World War, strategy and sovereignty were the paramount issues in Ottawa's northern policies and the economics of that time were hardly a consideration. There were, however, a few minor administrative innovations during the latter part of the war which had some effect on subsequent economic policy:

In 1943 the Department of Mines and Resources in Ottawa set up an office for geographical and economic research to compile and analyse ". . . information concerning the geography, natural resources, and peoples of the Northwest Territories" (Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, 1946, p 72). This represented a revival of the task which the old Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch had set itself in the 1920's.

In 1943, Canada and the United States agreed to sponsor a joint study of the potential of northwestern Canada and Alaska. By 1944 the Americans had withdrawn from this project but the Canadians continued their investigations and in 1947 published a report entitled, *Canada's new Northwest*. The study included not only the Yukon and the Mackenzie valley but, as well, those parts of British Columbia and Alberta north of the 53rd parallel. This was the first time that this whole Arctic and sub-Arctic region was treated as a potential economic unit (The North Pacific Planning Project, 1947).

In 1944, the Dominion Government expropriated the pitchblende mine on Great Bear Lake which was producing uranium for the American atomic bomb project. The mine and its ancillary air and water transport services were henceforth operated as a Crown Corporation of the Dominion Government.

The takeover was part and parcel of a policy to control the production of strategic minerals during and immediately after the war. It was an isolated incident which had no effect in promoting, for instance, the idea of government ownership of mines but it did introduce an element of public control and investment in northern transportation. The Northern Transportation Company is still the principal freight carrier on the Mackenzie River system, and has a virtual monopoly of that business.

The study by the North Pacific Planning Project and the work of the government office for geographical research drew attention, not so much to the little research that had been done in the north, but to the vast ignorance



of Canada and Canadians about their two northern territories. Even as late as the 1940's it was difficult to say anything intelligent about the north which had not already been said by someone during the previous century.

At the end of the war Canada fell heir to northern construction worth hundreds of millions of dollars, but these installations were considered more of an embarrassment than the beginnings of an opportunity. The pipelines, the oil refinery at Whitehorse, the mass of construction equipment, many of the airfields, the communication systems and the military camps were sold as scrap, turned over to private enterprise or simply abandoned. The new highways, however, were maintained and improved since they were still considered to be essential to continental defence.

In 1946, the government set up the first professional forest and game service in the Territories and surveys, research and technical services of all kinds followed. Geological reconnaissance and mapping, geophysical and geochemical surveys and air photography made up the greater share of this work, but it included research by botanists, zoologists, hydrologists, fisheries experts and design engineers. Today, virtually every discipline connected with economic development is represented in the north, and most of this work is financed either directly, or indirectly, by government.

A detailed analysis and description of this increase in northern research over the last twenty-five years, and the motives and priorities involved, has never been made but it would undoubtedly reveal much about official attitudes and changing policies since the last war. It can be assumed that there were at least three basic reasons and justifications which were repeatedly used to commit the Dominion Government to a programme of northern research; defence; the need for information on which to base a northern policy; and the desirability of having permanent government technical services in the north to encourage private investment. Perhaps, too, the government and the civil service were embarrassed into action now that their ignorance of the north could no longer be disguised or excused.

### 1947 to 1957

In a previous article in the *Polar Record*\*, it was suggested that the principal reasons behind the expansion of Canada's northern administration after 1947 were Ottawa's response to the problems of sovereignty, social disintegration in the north, and polar strategy. Expenses of exploration and administration of renewable and non-renewable resources rose steeply, as did the number of scientists, technicians and administrators working on northern resources. But it can be argued that until about 1958 this increase represented no fundamental change or innovation in a northern resource policy. Northern inventory and investigation were often accepted, and usually justified, as an adjunct to northern defence and sovereignty and, where there was inventory and planning of renewable resources, it was, as it had been in the 1920's, an attempt to prop up the traditional economies in order to alleviate embarrassing financial and social distress in many parts of the Territories. Many of the economic

\* Vol 14, No 92, 1969, p 593-602

programmes of the post-war decade were a reflection of "... the increasing concern of the government for the welfare of its Eskimo citizens ..." (Jenness, 1964, p 97). During the 1950's, the Northern Administration Branch of the new Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources experimented with a variety of projects to introduce eider-down collection and processing, sheep raising, boat-building, tanning, gardening, blue-berry picking, handicrafts, and soapstone carving. In 1956 a "... small flock of domestic geese was introduced and raised successfully on tundra vegetation" (Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1957, p 26). In the words of an earlier annual report, these types of experiment "... were studied in an effort to broaden and diversify the basis of livelihood of the Eskimos ..." (Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1955, p 21).

There is no intention here to belittle the importance of this work or its motives, but to place it in the context of historical development. The Department of Resources and Development, and its successor, the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, had begun energetic new programmes for educational, health, social, and welfare services of all kinds. By 1953 it was apparent that the thrust of this work was concentrating on social and medical problems. There was a fundamental change in outlook and ability among those who were designing the new social programmes. But, even as late as 1957, the resource administration for the north was still functioning largely as it had between the wars, and during the 1950's it stood for a rather old-fashioned, centralized civil service, good records, control, inspection, investigation, mining concessions and cottage industry. It represented the best ideas of the 1890's and 1920's; ideas which had been proposed before their time, or proved impractical, or stifled by events.

### 1958 to 1968

The selection of 1958 as the year in which Canada's northern resource administration began to undergo important changes is a matter of convenience. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to see certain new directions in northern policies from 1958 onwards which had either not been suggested between 1947 and 1957 or which had remained on paper only as plans.

The first was a shifting emphasis in the proposed solutions to the Eskimo problem. The annual report of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources in 1957-58 began:

It becomes increasingly evident that Arctic lands will no longer support the traditional hunting and trapping economy of the Eskimos; even less will they support the rapidly growing Eskimo population (Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1958, p 25).

This was an official admission that, regardless of investment, ingenuity and experiment, the Canadian Eskimo would not be able to live off the land and aspire at the same time to a southern standard of living which the government

was proposing to give him as a right of citizenship. Presumably, therefore, the only answer, if the Eskimo were to remain in the north, would be wage employment made available by some massive increase in the exploitation of northern mineral resources. This assumption was not immediately, or widely, accepted, nor were the conclusions to be drawn from it obvious at the time. In any case, it was not a solution which could be implemented in a year or a decade. It has, however, become almost an article of faith in the administration of the north during the 1960's. And it is now regarded almost as a panacea; the ultimate solution to northern poverty.

It was in this era of slowly evolving attitudes that new economic policies grew and that specific schemes were implemented on a scale never before known in the peacetime administration. The first of these was the construction of a railway from northern Alberta to Pine Point on the south shore of Great Slave Lake.

In 1954, and after fifty years of sporadic exploration, it was definitely known that there existed at Pine Point, on Great Slave Lake, an immense deposit of lead and zinc which could be mined at a profit if transportation were provided to carry the ore over the intervening 640 km of wilderness to the south.

By 1958 the government had decided to build a railway to Pine Point. It was to cost about \$86 000 000 in public funds before it was opened in 1965.

This project was important not only for itself but because it was a new kind of project for the Territories. It was large enough and complex enough to require professional skills on a scale never before needed. There were several hundred million dollars involved, there was a tangible resource which could be measured and predicted, there were potential markets, there were precise costs and apparent benefits. There was, as well, informed argument for and against possible routes for the rail line and these arguments were based on economic analyses and (at certain stages) on political considerations. From 1955, when the first proposal was put forward to a Royal Commission, to 1962, when construction began, the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was closely involved in the entire project.

Pine Point and the Great Slave Railway have been a success. They have benefited the economy of northern Alberta and the upper Mackenzie valley, and have also proved to be a useful exercise for Canada's northern administration.

Another formative project during this period was the Roads to Resources programme proposed in 1958. This was a political gesture not intended primarily for the Territories but aimed principally, during the election campaign, at the northern parts of the western and central provinces of Canada whose hinterlands were still wilderness. The Dominion Government proposed to spend \$75 000 000 in a cost-sharing scheme with the provinces to build new roads where none existed. The administration of this fell to the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, perhaps because of the vigour of its Minister at the time. The idea was enlarged to include as well an expenditure of \$100 000 000 on new roads in the two Territories.

The programme was a virtual gift to the north, and evidently the Department did not take the time to, or run the risks of, debating whether the \$100 000 000 could be better spent on railways or other development projects in the Yukon and Northwest Territories. It was to be roads, and these "development roads", as they were called, were a new departure in northern planning because they were not intended to be roads to specific places or to the sites of proven profitable resources. In the slogans of the day they were "roads to nowhere" or "roads from igloo to igloo"; roads to open up country and roads to be part of a network of transportation. This involved different criteria and goals from the Great Slave Railway and elements of planning and forecasting on a greater scale and with greater risks than had been the case with any other northern transportation up to that time. The wartime highways, and the subsequent peacetime expenditures to improve and extend them, had been military ventures with defence and strategy at stake. Now, in 1958, it was long-range economics and short-term political advantage which were to be the ingredients of planning.

There is one other experience which must be added to this catalogue of significant events centering around 1958. This was an application made to the Department of Northern Affairs to prospect 1.6 mil hectares in the Arctic Islands for oil. The application was not granted until 1960 and in the intervening two years Ottawa had to devise oil and gas regulations for the region.

Partly as a result of this northward trend of the petroleum industry, Ottawa commissioned a study of the economics of oil and gas in northern Canada in 1960 (Quirin, 1962), the first detailed study of any major potential resource in the north. It also began to recruit a new administration for northern resource management and these men, many of whom came from industry and government in the western provinces, subsequently played an important role in overhauling and up-dating procedures, legislation and policy for the exploration and exploitation of the major resources of the two Territories.

The period from 1962 to the present saw a number of new programmes in which government undertook to invest its own funds. Some examples of these recent innovations are:

The Prospectors' Assistance Programme which was set up in 1962 as a subsidy to encourage mineral investigation in the two Territories. Each year \$60 000 is budgeted to pay part of the expenses of prospectors.

The Northern Mineral Exploration Programme, which, in 1966, allocated \$9 000 000 to underwrite large-scale mineral exploration in the north. A firm may receive up to forty per cent of the cost of exploration and this government contribution is refunded only if the venture results in profitable production.

Panarctic Oils Limited, which was established as a consortium of private firms and government in 1967. The participating companies invested \$11 000 000 and the government \$9 000 000, both sums subject to increase. This consortium has exploration rights to 264 000 km<sup>2</sup> in the north.

A scheme announced in January 1969 which provides a \$10 000 000 fund to finance loans to small businesses and secondary industry in the two Territories.

### Conclusion

Resource administration in the Canadian north began as an integral part of a strategy to impose system and conformity on the frontier, and it remained as such through half a century, even when the force of that strategy waned and as the hope of economic development faded.

There are now new factors and new purposes in the north which are re-shaping this resource administration and the economic policies it embodies:

International competition for markets for Arctic resources has become a reality.

Continued Canadian ownership of even a share of her northern resources will require, in the face of growing foreign investment, more Canadian ingenuity than before.

Within Canada herself competition is emerging among the western provinces, the two Territories and the Dominion Government for jurisdiction over the north and for control of its resources.

Within the two Territories, local governments and local public opinion, which until now have been weak, will give strident support to economic development.

The resource administration of the north (and behind it interested supporters in commerce and universities) is growing; and a large civil service can generate its own momentum and commitments which make it less vulnerable to the checks and prohibitions of shifting political fashions.

There is the long-term problem of poverty in the north. This, perhaps more than anything else, is responsible for the most fundamental change of all — the eroding of the notion of the impermanent north, for it means that Canadian governments can no longer look on the north and plan for the north as a short-term phenomenon.

The response to these new factors will be based largely on a policy which now embodies three quarters of a century of northern endeavour. Precedent is always important to governments. Politicians and civil servants use it as the first justification for what should be done and, if this past is any indication of what may happen to resource administration in the future, we can expect greater efforts from Ottawa to ensure the participation of Canadian capital in the north, increased expenditure for northern transportation, government investment in northern enterprise, and, as well, more government subsidy to industries which can provide substantial employment.

This will be a response not so much to opportunity as to need. In 1966, a former Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs summed up the prevailing attitudes to the north in Ottawa in this way:

A major human crisis is upon us in the north; the question is whether we will have the imagination to respond or the willingness to apply the modest share of our intellectual and economic resources that its solution will require (Robertson, 1966, p 11).

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