

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

DR-47

Krushchev on the Adriatic

Gosp. Jevremova 32A
Belgrade, Yugoslavia
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New York 17, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Nolte:

Nikita Krushchev has gone home after a fortnight's "holiday" in Yugoslavia. Behind him, along the highways he followed through five of the six republics in the Yugoslav federation, he has left a trail of crushed flowers and Western press speculations regarding the real significance of a visit which lacked dramatic moments, revelations, or any very obvious conclusions, but which one somehow feels will prove to have been an event of considerable importance both for Yugoslavia and for the evolution of the Soviet Empire.

What they saw

The program was an intensive one, but that seems to be compulsory for the foreign visits of leading statesmen in the mid-twentieth century. The Soviet party was greeted on its arrival at Belgrade airport with full honors and a 42-gun salute for its leader, first firm evidence that the trip was to be treated as a state visit, not a private one, whatever the term "holiday" had seemed to imply. On the second day the Russians visited the tractor factory at Rakovica, just outside Belgrade, which is a standard industrial showpiece in the immediate vicinity of the capital, and there Krushchev had an hour's talk with the workers' council of the plant and made his first public speech of the holiday. On the third day there was a foray by air to Skopje to see the ruins of the Macedonian capital. (And where, incidentally, I saw some things that make me wish to amend on a later occasion a couple of statements I made in DR-46).

On the following morning Krushchev and his company departed Belgrade to begin a 2,200 mile grand tour of the country, which took them by air to Titograd (capital of Montenegro, hard by the Albanian frontier), by car to Cetinje and Kotar, by yacht to Dubrovnik, Split, and Tito's summer retreat on the Brioni islands, and then by yacht and car to the mountains of Slovenia and to Zagreb. Whence they returned by train to Belgrade on 2 September, the eleventh day since their departure and one day before the Russians' return to Moscow.

At Rakovica they had toured a tractor factory. At Split they visited the shipyard which is one of Yugoslavia's most important producers for export. In Slovenia they called on a modern "agrokombinat," which produces pork and baby beef in accordance with the latest industrial-agricultural techniques, and on a model coal-mining community. And at Zagreb they visited a workers' university and an unfinished petro-chemical plant which will be the most highly automated factory in the country. Otherwise they saw a lot of scenery, all of it splendid and much of it Dalmatian and chock full of Yugoslav and Western tourists.

This itinerary calls for comment. It involved an irony which many of the Western correspondents following in the wake of the official party were quick to interpret as a subtle piece of deliberate planning by the Yugoslav hosts. The factory at Rakovica produces diesel motors and tractors under licenses from three British firms: Perkins, Massey-Ferguson, and Leyland. The shipyard at Split is full of Italian and British machinery, producing ships to Lloyds specifications for export to several Western countries (as well as tankers for the Soviet Union). The petro-chemical plant at Zagreb is being built with a \$23 million American loan under the supervision of American technical experts. The Krushchev party traveled in a fleet of Rolls Royces, Cadillacs, Chevrolets and Buicks, with lowly Mercedes Benzes at the end for lesser lights. And all along the Dalmatian coast Krushchev and his friends rubbed shoulders with tens of thousands of foreign tourists, spending D-marks, pounds, Schillings, francs and dollars in new Italian-inspired resort hotels and American-inspired roadside motels.


It was easy to conclude that President Tito was deliberately showing his guests the consequences of Yugoslavia's Western connections. One recalls that when Krushchev once told his followers, with reference to Yugoslavia, that "socialism cannot be built on U.S. wheat," Tito had replied: "Those who know how can do it, while those who do not know how will not even be able to build socialism on their own wheat." But that was in 1958, when the language of Soviet-Yugoslav exchanges employed a different vocabulary. In any case, I am compelled to add one caveat to this present speculation: if the Yugoslavs want to show off the progress they have been making in recent years, and this was the avowed purpose of the tour, then it is difficult not to show their guests factories operating with western licenses or built with western aid and resorts brimming with western tourists. Such is the structure of the Yugoslav economy today. The choice may therefore not have been as calculated as we all tended to think.

Nevertheless, it is worth asking what Krushchev made of all this, if indeed he took it in.

This raises a second and more general point, which probably occurs to me for the ingenuous reason that this was the first time I have ever followed such an expedition. How much does a man like Krushchev see and register when he is hustled through one factory after another, his view physically obstructed by a phalanx of security guards and by photographers and reporters tumbling ahead like an anxious bevy of court clowns, his mind preoccupied by the speech he is to make or the negotiations he is to conduct? For much of this tour he certainly gave the impression that he was thinking of other things, or was bored or tired or both - in contrast, it is worth adding, to the ever-smiling and ever-interested Nina Petrovna, who struck me as an excellent Royal ambassadress, in the same league with the British Queen Mother. On the other hand, one reporter, an old Krushchev hand, assures me that there is evidence that the Soviet Premier takes in quite a lot on these visits.

If he did, one also wonders if his reaction in any way resembled that of Moscow's western press corps, who followed him here and saw the same things. Most of them had never been to Yugoslavia before, and as visitors from one socialist country to another they expressed continuous astonishment both at the Yugoslav standard of living and at this country's socialist unorthodoxy - or downright un-socialism - as they saw it with Muscovite eyes.

When Krushchev and Tito met the press at Brioni, on the ninth day of the "holiday", one of these Western Muscovites asked the Soviet Premier directly:



"How do you compare the standards of living in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union?" Krushchev's answer was translated to read, "Why do you always sniff around the part of the body that smells," but we were told that the Russian words were blunter still, and the informal press conference ended forthwith. This reply, if technically irrelevant, revealed a degree of pique that seemed greater than the admittedly tactless question warranted.

With Vice President Alexandar Ranković at Split

What they said

During the fortnight Krushchev delivered three prepared speeches - each of them with an ad lib insert - and Tito delivered one. In addition, lengthy toasts were exchanged at three formal dinners (twice by Tito and Krushchev, once by Krushchev and the Croatian boss Vladimir Bakarić), there were brief speeches at the airport, and Krushchev's "conversation" with the Rakovica workers' council in fact amounted to a significant informal speech, with the advantage that statements made there did not need to be reported in the Soviet press.*

Public utterances on these occasions are of course only the visible part of an iceberg whose far larger underwater sections may have quite a different shape and quality. And when it is a case of speeches exchanged by Communist leaders it is no doubt true, even if Kremlinologists overdo the point, that one must be wary of phrases that have different meanings for the layman and for the initiated.

* For reference purposes, the speechmaking program looked like this:

- 20 August. Belgrade airport: Brief speeches by Tito and Krushchev.
- do. Belgrade: Tito gives a dinner party, he and Krushchev exchange toasts.
- 21 August Rakovica: Krushchev talks to the workers' council at IMT and delivers a speech.
- do. Belgrade: Krushchev gives a dinner party, he and Tito exchange toasts.
- 24 August Split: Krushchev speaks at the shipyard.
(from 25 to 29 August Tito and Krushchev were closeted at Brioni for talks, apparently continued at Brdo Castle, Slovenia, on the 31st)
- 30 August Velenje: Tito and Krushchev speak in a model coal-mining town.
- 1 Sept. Zagreb: Bakarić and Krushchev exchange toasts at dinner.
- 2 Sept. Belgrade airport: Brief speeches by Tito and Krushchev.

Ernst Halperin has told us (in The Triumphant Heretic) that we all completely misunderstood the background and significance of the 1955 Krushchev visit to Belgrade. Perhaps what follows will suffer from all these same errors. It is based on the assumption - which is only an assumption - that the public debate which Tito and Krushchev have been conducting on two subjects of importance to Yugoslavia and world Communism bears some resemblance to their private talks. And even to see it as a "debate" requires a careful reading of the texts. With these warnings and reservations:

1. Different roads to socialism revisited. This concept first assumed importance in 1955-56, at the time of the first Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. After the alarms sounded by the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, the Soviets watered it down by attaching two corollaries: a different road could be an acceptable road only if the dictatorship of the Party is preserved, and if the principle of "proletarian internationalism" is accepted - meaning support for Soviet foreign policy and recognition of the "leading role" of the Soviet Communist Party in the world movement. Subsequent difficulties in Soviet-Yugoslav relations grew out of the application of this second corollary, and the latest rapprochement between the two countries (and their Parties) has required a further re-definition of the original concept.

Tito struck the keynote in his toast offered the evening Krushchev arrived. In effect he returned to the principles of the 1956 Moscow Declaration on Relations between the Yugoslav League of Communists and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The field of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation could now be extended, he said, "as it has become obvious that certain differences in views on various things and problems are no hindrance to the development of our relations." Yugoslavia, he added later, looks forward to constructive cooperation among all countries and peoples, "and above all among socialist ones, because we considered and still do that nothing is more natural."

At Rakovica the next day Krushchev took one giant step toward the Yugoslavs. He spent an hour with the workers' council of the tractor factory, before the eyes of Yugoslav and foreign journalists, displaying great interest in the operation of the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management - not long ago the cardinal heresy of Titoism in Moscow's eyes. When the system had been explained to him, he commented: "We have had different positions on this and have discussed them in the open. I like the form of workers' councils, they are a progressive form." Then he added a qualifier of great importance: "But if the director and the council agree you have double management, while if they do not there can be a violation of the Leninist principle of unity of leadership." And later, for emphasis: "In cases of differences of opinion, I would let the director decide."

Nevertheless, he said, referring to his own interest as chairman of a constitutional drafting commission in the Soviet Union, "we are examining this question now, and are looking for a favorable organizational form to make possible a still greater democratization of management in enterprises and greater participation of the public in this management....If public opinion is not mobilized, management may become an autocrat. This is why we are interested in the Yugoslav experience." But once again the qualifier: "We are looking for forms that would not violate the Leninist principle of unity of leadership." He was therefore planning to send a delegation of Soviet Party, trade union and economic officials to examine the Yugoslav system in detail. (I am quoting from the notes taken by the three Russian-speaking Western journalists admitted to the session with the workers' council. The version printed by the Yugoslav press was slightly but not essentially bowdlerized, and according to the Times of London the meeting

was not reported at all in the Soviet press.)

That evening Tito, answering a toast by Krushchev, added another gloss to the expanding re-definition of their attitudes: "Now we have on both sides arrived at the conclusion that many things which had separated us in the past were only trifles as we have before us great common interests and tasks." Tito's definition of these "common tasks", as it emerged in the course of the tour, was conveniently general and widely acceptable: the maintenance of world peace, assistance to emerging nations and the building of socialism. Krushchev spoke in addition of the struggle against imperialism.

The public discussion was continued at Split and at Velenje (the latter after the conclusion of four days of private talks at Brioni), and certain differences in phraseology seem to justify the use of the word "debate". At Split Krushchev again pointed out that many aspects of the Yugoslav system differed from "our Soviet reality," but that this was "quite comprehensible" because Yugoslav conditions differ from Soviet. The implication was that Yugoslav solutions are for Yugoslavia...only: "As for the approach to the solving of concrete problems in the development of economy and culture, there each people introduces its special, specific conditions. Perhaps even some things that could not be applied under different conditions."

At Velenje, Tito agreed that "The path which we have been following has been dictated by our conditions." He referred specifically to the 1956 Moscow Declaration affirming the "Leninist view that the paths of socialist development in different countries and under different conditions are different and that the rich treasury of forms of development of socialism contributes to its strengthening," and to Krushchev's re-emphasis of this point at Split. But when he went on to talk about the Yugoslav system, he suggested that it does, in fact, have broader applications, and he pointedly reminded Krushchev that the Soviet leader had recognized that fact at Rakovica.

In Yugoslavia, Tito said, we have been developing, "on the ideas of Marxism," workers' and social self-management. "What is most important is that life has confirmed in practice [a favorite Krushchevite phrase thrown back at him] the system of social self-management, because on the basis of it we have achieved undeniable results in the industrialization of our country, in the construction of socialism and of a better life for our workingmen and in the developing of socialist relations." However," he went on, "when workers' self-management is spoken of, it is not only a question of the problems and needs of one, specially selected, country. Social management lies at the basis of the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Comrade Nikita Sergejevich Krushchev is rightly devoting great attention to this question."

In the prepared text of his speech, which followed Tito's, Krushchev made no mention of these matters. His answer came in his ad lib remarks at the end. "With us, Soviet Communists," he repeated, "there can be no substantial contradictions with Yugoslav Communists because both our countries are socialist." Then a new note: The principal tasks traditionally facing the working class and Communist Parties everywhere are the winning of power, consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the development of socialism; "we, in the Soviet Union, have accomplished these tasks. Yugoslavia's working class has also accomplished the task of winning power and is successfully building a socialism." Was this a reminder to the Yugoslavs to know their place?

A more interesting passage is somewhat obscured by a subsequent disagreement (among journalists) as to whether the Soviet Premier was referring to China

and Albania, or to Yugoslavia. Can there be, Krushchev asked, "various conceptions and different approaches..., sometimes even on a matter of principle? Yes, there can....What should be done in such cases? One must fight to achieve unanimity in what is essential, decisive, in that which unites us. At the same time, one must have patience when differences arise in one or another concrete question, and not start accusations which boil down to the following: if you do not agree with me, this means that you are against the revolution." Restraint and patience are necessary; the child, who likes to pull father's moustache, must be allowed to burn itself in order to learn the difference between hot and cold. "We are not at all against each party learning on its own experience. Let it try. We are convinced that the time will come when life will correct those who are making mistakes."

It seems to ^{me} quite clear that parts at least of this somewhat rambling lecture were meant for the Yugoslavs, too. Two days later, still in the same mood, Krushchev visited a workers' university in Zagreb, where he and the director discussed comparative education systems. "There can be many ways," Krushchev said. "I am not going to speak about our advantages, because in our country socialism is 'older'. Youth has its qualities, but old age has its own, too." But he went on to say that he had criticized Stalin's education policy for resurrecting classic secondary schools (gymnasias) in the Soviet Union, which produced only "young misses prepared for marriage and young masters for the promenade." Yugoslavia, too, retains its classical gymnasias.

Tito had the last word, and it was diplomatic and conciliatory. At the airport at his guests' departure he again referred to "divergent views on individual questions," which are necessary and healthy as the building of socialism "because more and more diverse and comprehensive." This only makes "frank and comradely exchanges of views and experiences" more imperative and helpful, and existing differences should not be dramatized.

2. The "socialist division of labor." For months now speculation concerning Yugoslavia's future economic relations with the countries of the Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) has been rife. Belgrade once applied for observer status in this grouping, which includes all the East European satellites and Mongolia, but was refused. Several recent developments have made the need for some kind of link seem more imperative: Yugoslavia's high-cost, medium-quality industrial products in search of export outlets, fear of exclusion from a Western European Common Market that shows signs of becoming increasingly protectionist, American threats to cut trade as well as aid by withdrawing most-favored-nation treatment. At the same time COMECON has been evolving, at Soviet insistence, into a supra-national planning organization which will tell its members what and how much to produce, an arrangement that offers only economic and political disadvantages to the Yugoslavs.

On the day that Krushchev left for Moscow, a Yugoslav Foreign Office spokesman told a group of us that Yugoslavia would now get observer status in COMECON. He added, however, that this had been decided before the Krushchev visit, and that the Soviet leaders had known "at least since December" (when Tito was in Moscow) that Yugoslavia had no intention or desire to go farther than that. (David Binder said: "Congratulations! And when are you getting observer status in the Common Market?" The reply was a reminder that Yugoslavia had applied for just that a year ago, and is still awaiting a decision in Brussels. This is true. The bid was made by President Tito himself to Italian Minister for Foreign Trade Preti at the opening of the Zagreb Fair on 19 September 1962.

This is for the Yugoslavs the ideal solution, a characteristically successful Yugoslav effort to have the best of both worlds. Observer status means that Belgrade will know about long-term plans being made by COMECON, and can make its own plans accordingly. As the Foreign Office spokesman put it: if COMECON decides that in the next seven years Hungary will build so many of such and such a machine, we will now be able to know of this and can go to them, bi-laterally, and say, "we make so many or can expand our production to make so many of such parts for this machine, how about it?" at the same time, the Yugoslavs will not be bound by COMECON's rules or plans, to the detriment of their own industrial ambitions and trading arrangements with the rest of the world.

The question raised by the Krushchev visit, therefore, is whether the Soviet Premier hoped for anything more than this when he came. From what we have been told, and from what we know of the normal workings of Soviet-Yugoslav diplomacy, it seems extremely unlikely. But in the public exchanges which took place Krushchev managed to create the impression that he did want something more, and that he was disappointed. If this was a deliberate masquerade, the reasons for it remain obscure.

The first hint came at that Rakovica meeting with the workers' council. "Some people affirm," Krushchev said, "that in socialist development one should rely exclusively on one's own strength - incorrect!" This reduces possibilities by creating isolated small markets and units of production. "We can organize everything on an assembly-line basis. You cannot do it, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia cannot do it, only the Soviet Union and China can do it." Western accusations that the Soviet Union is seeking through COMECON to subordinate the economies of other socialist countries to Soviet requirements are unjustified; "we look upon each other as partners, not competitors," and are "merely seeking a division of labor."

At Split he returned to the theme in public. Communists cannot yet claim that they are fully utilizing the advantages of the existence of a world socialist system to organize the broadest possible cooperation among all socialist countries. Some results have been achieved, he said, tendentiously citing planned cooperation in building hydro-electric stations on the Danube by Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania (the Iron Gates project), and Rumania and Bulgaria.

Then came the sentence that set press agency teleprinter bells jangling: "I am glad to say that the Yugoslav government, too, is prepared to participate in the socialist division of labor which is now being organized in the countries of the socialist community. This will enable Yugoslavia considerably to expand foreign trade with socialist countries..." The headlines this evoked in the West brought a prompt denial from the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade: Yugoslavia was not going to join COMECON.

Tito's own answer came in his Velenje speech, immediately after his defense of workers' self-management as a Marxist-Leninist principle worthy of emulation. "A further standing task," he said, "is a general joining in the international division of labor. In connection with this we are envisaging a very broad developing of economic relations with the socialist countries, with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and with other countries

as well" (italics added). This was clearly not quite the same thing as Krushchev's "socialist division of labor."

In the toast he offered to Bakarić, Tito, and company at a dinner in Zagreb on 1 September, Krushchev returned once more (apparently) to the attack. "Some say," he repeated, "that socialism should be constructed by relying on one's own forces." This the Soviet Union had had to do, because in those days it stood alone in the world. (These remarks were almost defensive in tone; was this another answer to that indiscreet question about comparative standards of living in Belgrade and Moscow?) "But all the same, my comrades, it is better and easier to construct socialism in company with other fraternal countries. It is even merrier to sing a song in a chorus, and still easier to build in a harmonious collective. Well, then, why should not we unite our forces and exchange experiences if that is useful for the people of these socialist countries? Why should not we extend fraternal, mutual aid to each other?" And again he denied "foreign" reports that this was a Russian device to hold smaller socialist countries in economic thrall to Moscow.

There was no Yugoslav reply. One Yugoslav official in Belgrade voiced the (official?) opinion that these remarks were in fact directed, not at the Yugoslavs, but at the Rumanians and other reluctant members of COMECON itself.

The protagonists

By trailing the Tito-Krushchev road show across the countryside one inevitably forms an impression of the relationship between the two men. Again, a warning comes to mind. Both of them are actors, as every major public figure in our day must be; does one therefore see only what he was supposed to see, the characters the script called for? This, too, is part of Ernst Halperin's theory of the "dumb show" enacted by Tito and Krushchev for the benefit of Western journalists and diplomats in 1955. I can only say that this hypothesis is too sophisticated for me, and report what I thought I saw.

I saw a Tito who was browner and healthier and taller ("he's got his elevators on," someone remarked unkindly) than Krushchev, and who looked younger although he is in fact two years older. A Tito who managed to be one-up on his guest at every turn, a feat achieved primarily by means of the essentially irrelevant qualities of greater urbanity and multi-lingual ability.

That this was deliberate was particularly evident at the beginning of that meet-the-press session at Tito's White Villa on Brioni. They had just returned by motor-launch from the nearby island of Vanga, where Tito gives al fresco picnics to honored guests. As they came on to the terrace where we were waiting, both smiling, Tito said "Good afternoon" and then, still in English, "Are you satisfied?" (This was a reference to journalists' complaints that they had not had a chance to talk to the great men.) For about two minutes the dialogue continued exclusively in English. Krushchev speaks only Russian and Ukrainian. It is a commonly observed phenomenon, noticed also in the case of early meetings between Hitler and Mussolini, that the multi-lingual man is psychologically one-up on a mono-lingual rival - although the case of Hitler and Mussolini also suggests that the significance of this kind of one-upmanship should not be over-stressed.

Later in the session Tito had relatively little to say. But when he did, it was usually in the form of a qualifier, an expanded definition, or even an explanation of something Krushchev had said in his well-known blunt fashion. And the Yugoslav president managed to appear embarrassed at the "why do you sniff" vulgarity with which the meeting ended.

As a result of such tactics, by the time of the Velenje appearance of both men on the same platform foreign observers were using the adjective "condescending" to describe Tito's attitude to his guest. Dumb-show or not, this reminded us of several important matters of fact about them; that Tito fought in the ranks of an underground Party and went to prison for it, made his own successful revolution, and defied the living Stalin, that Krushchev as a second generation Russian Bolshevik has done none of these things, and that no other surviving Communist outside of Peking has done even the second of them. When one also recalls that Krushchev has for over eight years worked with stubborn persistency for a reconciliation with Tito, despite repeated irritations and embarrassments for his Government traceable to Belgrade, then these observations suggest several interesting speculations concerning Krushchev's personal relationship with and attitude toward the Yugoslav President.

I don't want to belabor the point, and in any case I am not qualified to do so. I merely report a first-hand impression, for what it is worth.

What did it mean?

This was Nikita Krushchev's third visit to Yugoslavia. The first two - in May 1955 and September 1956 - heralded events of great importance for the participants and for Eastern Europe, where they were connected with the developments which led to the successful Polish October of 1956 and the unsuccessful Hungarian attempt to secede from the Soviet bloc. What about the third one?

This is not the place to repeat again the complicated history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations since 1955 or the theories advanced to explain the three rapprochements and two quarrels that have marked these last eight years. In any case, they have recently enjoyed one ICWA re-analysis, by Tony Shub in the pages of The Reporter (January 31st).

One observation which I first heard from Oxford East European specialist Harry Willetts, is nevertheless worth repeating for its present relevance. As he sees it, the Yugoslavs have entered each rapprochement with the Russians by accepting a myth concerning the preceding quarrel which only partly corresponds to reality. In 1955-56 it was Krushchev's explanation that only Stalin, Beria and company were responsible for the otherwise avoidable quarrel of 1948. In 1957 it was a Yugoslav myth that Soviet policy toward Belgrade was a key issue in the struggle for power being waged inside the Kremlin between Krushchevites and neo-Stalinists, and that by supporting the Krushchevite faction through meeting its demands Titoism could again play a major role in the liberalization of Soviet internal and bloc policy. Since 1961 it has been a Sino-Yugoslav myth that holds the Chinese alone responsible for the dispute of 1957-60, thereby excusing Krushchev for the unpleasant things he said and did under Chinese pressure and seeing the now irreconcilable Sino-Soviet conflict as a guarantee that a new Soviet-Yugoslav accommodation will prove more durable than earlier ones.

These myths enabled the Yugoslav Government to overlook the fact that maintenance of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe remained a cardinal principle of Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, both the later quarrels resulted essentially from the Kremlin's awareness that un-reconstructed Titoism still presented an implicit challenge to that hegemony, just as Tito's mere independent existence had done in 1948. This was the lesson of the events of October 1956. It seems fair to infer that what Krushchev really offered Tito at the time of the 1957 rapprochement was the application of Gomulka's "Polish solution" to Yugoslavia: in return for Yugoslav "solidarity" with the Soviet Union in foreign policy - implying a formal return to the Soviet bloc - and an end to Yugoslav meddling through criticism in other people's socialisms, the Titoist domestic program would be treated as a purely Yugoslav matter and Tito would have his longed-for re-acceptance. Krushchev seems to have thought that Tito had agreed to this compromise. Tito, with little to gain and everything to lose by such a course, had not agreed. The misunderstanding emerged when Tito was asked to sign a resolution on international communist unity which declared that "revisionism" was a worse heresy than "dogmatism" and referred repeatedly to "proletarian internationalism" and the "leading role" of the Soviet Union.

And now? With the help of their acceptance of Chinese responsibility for the 1957-60 rift, the Yugoslav leaders appear to have persuaded themselves that the circumstances which led to that quarrel cannot be repeated. This conclusion also involves some more realistic calculations: that the Sino-Soviet split is permanent, and that the Soviets will avoid a two-front war against Chinese "dogmatism" and Yugoslav "revisionism", especially when the vitally important Italian and French Party leaders have learned to look with favor on the Yugoslav experiment.

The importance of the Krushchev visit, in this context, was to give the Yugoslavs an opportunity to make their view of the present situation clear to the Russians. If I am correct in my reading of the statements and the innuendoes of the past fortnight, this Yugoslav construction has something like the following shape:

1. The Yugoslavs have made their own position clearer than ever, so that the Russians cannot fail to understand it. Yugoslavia remains an independent, socialist state, and everything else follows logically from equal emphasis on each of those adjectives. Titoism remains un-reconstructed. Its basic tenets were re-affirmed in the new constitution adopted this spring, and Tito has told Krushchev that he still considers the central feature of his system, workers' and social self-management, a model that may usefully be copied elsewhere. That is, he has not renounced his claim that Belgrade, as well as Moscow, can pronounce on matters of dogma. In foreign policy, the Russians can expect the Yugoslav Government to agree with them on most issues because of their identical ideological bias, but even more because the Soviet position on many problems - especially on the priority of peace and co-existence - has moved toward the Yugoslav position, not the other way around. The Yugoslavs will remain "non-aligned" and advocates of "positive co-existence" between states with different social systems; they will be especially happy to cooperate with other socialist countries because of ideological affinity and will tend to be more critical of Western than of Eastern misdemeanors because of ideological bias, but neither will be allowed to prejudice their good relations with non-socialist states, whether Western or non-aligned. The same criterion will

govern the orientation of their foreign trade and their industrial cooperation with foreign enterprises.

(Several other events, unconnected but contemporaneous with the Krushchev visit, served in these weeks to underscore the continuing independence of Yugoslav foreign policy. While Tito and his guest were emphasizing the issues on which the two governments are in agreement, an article appeared in the Belgrade Party newspaper Borba about Yugoslavia's continued support for an enlargement of the United Nations Security Council and Economic and Social Council to make room for representatives of newly-independent African and Asian countries - a reform which the Soviet Union opposes. This was a reminder that Yugoslavia's UN policy has consistently differed from the Soviet Union's. On September 2nd Belgrade's popular evening newspaper, Večernje Novosti, devoted its front page to two stories: the return of Krushchev and Tito to the capital after their tour of the country, and a report from its own correspondent in the United States quoting an editorial in the New York Times which suggested that a meeting between Presidents Tito and Kennedy in the immediate future would be "useful for both." And four days after Krushchev's departure Tito announced that he would, in fact, be making his first state visit to the United States next month, at the end of his forthcoming Latin American tour. Non-alignment, it seemed, was being re-emphasized.)

2. The Russians, for their part, have made clear their willingness to overlook major points of friction. The legitimacy of "different roads" has been reaffirmed, specific Yugoslav modes have been recognized as "progressive", and Krushchev has even spoken, like a good Yugoslav, of the "transient nature" of blocs (a phrase he used when talking with journalists at Tito's Brioni villa). The area encompassed by the Soviet-Yugoslav agreement to disagree has been more precisely defined - the failure to do this was a prime source of trouble in 1957 - and any renewed Soviet attack on the fallacies of "revisionism" adjourned for the duration of the war with Chinese "dogmatism".

(The protagonists said as much when they spoke of "not dramatizing" differences. Experienced Western Kremlinologists pointed out that it was highly significant that speeches and statements spoke of "fraternal Soviet and Yugoslav peoples" but never of "fraternal Parties"; in Kremlin jargon this meant that the Yugoslav League of Communists is still not accorded the status of an ideologically accepted Party, and the right to reopen the question of Titoist heresies at a more opportune moment was thereby implicitly reserved.)

3. At a time of tentative but worldwide East-West rapprochement, the West is less likely to be alarmed by a parallel Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement than it once was. This will be especially true if President Tito is conspicuously careful not to use some of Premier Krushchev's more belligerent phrases, so that Western journalists will notice the difference.


4. Perhaps most important of all, Krushchev is in the process of dismantling the Soviet Empire in Europe and converting it into a Communist Commonwealth,* a process which makes the continued independence of Yugoslavia and of Titoism no longer a blemish and a threat to Soviet hegemony within the bloc. In any case, the Chinese challenge has altered the context of "proletarian internationalism" and made it easier for the Soviets to accept Togliatti's Tito-like concept of "polycentrism".

*This happy coinage is David Binder's, who agrees with the Yugoslavs on this one.

Whether the Yugoslavs will be disillusioned again as a result of mistakes in this latest appraisal of their position vis à vis the fatherland of the Revolution remains to be seen. Their fourth postulate is especially vulnerable, and either they or the Russians may once more be in for some unpleasant surprises in Eastern Europe.

Soviet-Yugoslav relations continue to be a function of three complex factors: the internal policies of each country, relations among communist parties in the world, and the general foreign policy position of each country. The present configuration of all these factors is such that political meteorologists may reasonably predict a goodly spell of fair weather. Theirs is, however, an inexact science.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dennis Rusinow".

Dennison Rusinow

Received in New York September 16, 1963.