



# The Price Of Pluralism

by Dennison I. Rusinow



## YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavian socialism and multinational federalism approaches another "moment of truth." The most dramatic aspect of present political and economic trends is the search for ethnic scapegoats. This revived nationalism may be a particularly illuminating crisis of modernization.

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## THE PRICE OF PLURALISM

by Dennison I. Rusinow

July 1971

To say that the moment of truth has come for Yugoslavia's unique and eternally experimental brand of socialism and multinational federalism is to risk the accusation that one is crying wolf. It has been said so often, the moment has passed, and the system and its leading personnel—altered a little bit in the process—have still been there, still fundamentally the same. The values and goals they proclaim remain constant, but after each “moment of truth” they have seemed little closer than the day before to either definitive success or definitive failure in realizing them, in building a “direct socialist democracy” based on “economic and social self-management” in a multinational community whose ethnic units enjoy full equality and a large degree of individual sovereignty in an increasingly decentralized federalism.

Despite the risk, it must nevertheless be said again, and by this observer for the first time: it is as certain as such things can be that the coming months will be of decisive importance for the Titoist experiment. There will be either a new consolidation of the system at a significantly more sophisticated level of polycentric, multinational, and participatory decision-making or an almost certainly irreversible and possibly even dramatic retreat from the pursuit of these declared values. If the former, then this will be one of the great economic and political success stories of the century, whether or not there is a later failure to meet other, subsequent challenges. If the latter, then Yugoslavia will become just another quasi-traditional, quasi-modern semiautocracy, or worse, or no Yugoslavia at all.

Such an apocalyptic forecast requires serious supporting evidence. One might begin by noting that the Yugoslavs themselves see their present situation in similarly dramatic terms. Leading politicians and newspapers, reflecting Yugoslav communism's ever more liberal norms of public expression and discussion, speak openly of a “crisis” confronting the country's political and economic systems. One's ordinary friends, more specifically alarmist, talk nervously of the danger that the multinational state may disintegrate, that the army may be contemplating a coup, that the Russians may come, and that either of these last two potential disasters might be preferable to the first or to a continuation of present political and economic trends.

“Sono nervosissimi, e non sanno proprio perche” (they are terribly nervous and don't really know why) was the succinct summary of the prevailing atmosphere in both official and unofficial circles offered by an Italian Communist observer of the Belgrade scene as early as last October (1970). By the spring of 1971, when President Tito himself intervened forcefully to calm the atmosphere, the tension was ubiquitous and palpable. It manifested itself in many ways, including a growing distrust of foreigners and of one another. There has been an instinctive search for both micro- and macroscape-goats: another enterprise or branch of foreign competition; big banks or export-import companies or “megalomaniacal” investments; the consequences of free enterprise or the consequences of state interference in the economy; the Party or youth or intellectuals; “Cominformists” or “unitarists” or

ethnic "chauvinists;" Soviet agents and/or Western anti-Communists in league with Yugoslav political émigrées; and always and especially some other ethnic group or groups within the Yugoslav community.

This last is by far the most dramatic aspect of the present situation and the chief source of widespread alarm and pessimism about the future of state and system. Five years ago Vladimir Bakarić, the astute President of the League of Communists of Croatia, warned his countrymen:

Today nationalism is at least question number two . . . If we do not win the battle for the Reform, then it may indeed become question number one.<sup>1</sup>

The prophecy has been fulfilled. The "national question" is again Yugoslavia's first question, as it was before the war, although this time—so far—its attributes and even its rhetoric more closely resemble forms and language that are familiar to any student of the Hapsburg monarchy after 1867. There is even, for real connoisseurs of *déjà vu*, a familiar tendency in multinational Croatia for the battle to be joined between rival (ethnic) cultural organizations, founding branches in culturally mixed areas to an accompaniment of flags, processions, bands, and occasional exchanges of verbal or physical fisticuffs. Of more practical and ominous importance, there is also a familiar tendency to subsume all other questions and conflicts to the national one, to interpret (and simplify) every issue in national terms, and thus to recreate the atmosphere and intensity of emotion that comes to surround the question of nationality when all discontent and every grievance, every perception of injustice, oppression, or relative deprivation is projected as a national issue.

On the other hand, it seems in some ways a curious time for such a crisis. Constitutional amendments in process of adoption at the present moment will effectively (and *pace* frequent denials of the fact by official spokesmen) convert the Yugoslav federation into a confederation. But this will only institutionalize and further a trend that has been apparent for six years. The amendments and attendant discussion of them are both a result and an additional cause of tensions and disputes among the country's nationalities. But these ethnic ten-

sions are not new or recently recreated (*pace* perennial optimists among foreign commentators and official propaganda), and the extent to which current "excesses" represent a genuine worsening of relations or merely greater freedom to express differences openly is still a matter of fair debate. Disputes attending the transition to confederation have paralyzed the Federal administration for nearly a year, preventing implementation of measures designed to relieve an increasingly critical economic situation. But Yugoslav governments have muddled through serious economic crises in the past without major disturbances and could be expected to do so again, once the political situation has been clarified.

While it is true that the economy is in dangerously bad shape, its problems, with the admittedly major exception of inflation, are not those that immediately and directly affect ordinary citizens and cause unrest and political crises. On the contrary, more Yugoslavs are living better than ever before, more goods are available to more people, the unemployment rate is down for the first time in several years, and the visible improvement in the living standards of many people in most parts of the country amazes (as ever!) the observer who has been away for a couple of years. So does the press, whose ever wider freedom to print almost anything, from political criticism and satire, to blatant special-interest pleading, to some extraordinarily shabby and tasteless pornography, is an accurate reflection of a remarkably high level of intellectual and artistic liberty and personal freedom from fear of political sanctions. In politics and in the economy the special Yugoslav promotional logjam—access to most middle and senior executive positions blocked for over 20 years by the Partisan veterans who occupied them at very tender ages just after the war and who are still too young to retire—has come unstuck, so that new, under-50 faces are appearing in leading roles everywhere, relieving the pent-up career frustrations of those born after 1927.

In such circumstances one might reasonably expect a passive or at most a critical contentment with the existing system on the part of the many (including most politically mobilized strata) who have "never had it so good" and who at most should merely want to have it better for themselves or for others still excluded from relative prosperity, participation, or freedom. There is therefore

some temptation to agree with those numerous non-Party or nonpolitical Yugoslavs who argue that the present crisis atmosphere is largely artificial, deliberately concocted by otherwise incompetent politicians who see in such an atmosphere the only way of maintaining their power and positions, and of avoiding personal political and social redundancy.

What justification is there, then, for viewing the present moment as of particularly decisive, long-term importance for the future of the system and the society itself? It will be argued in this Report that the answer lies in a particular conjunction in time of a complex series of factors, and that the decisive long-term importance of the present moment emerges when that conjunction is examined in terms of three analytical dimensions. The first is the personal succession question, posed at an especially awkward moment of acute domestic problems and speculative foreign pressures. The second is a more generalized power vacuum: the old system of power relationships has largely dissolved, it is unclear what will replace it, and the scramble is taking place at that same awkward moment.

Finally, and fascinatingly, what is happening here can be interpreted as a particularly illuminating crisis of modernization. A transitional society has achieved a level of institutional, economic, and social development - albeit still dangerously uneven or asymmetrical - which opens the doors to that quality of freedom and responsibility that readers of Fieldstaff Reports have learned to call "modern." The possibility is perceived and accepted by key elements of the political leadership, but is in serious danger of being rejected by society as a whole (abetted by other leadership elements) through the operation of that process of social psychology that Erich Fromm has described as "escape from freedom." Given the recent history of the Yugoslav peoples, it is inevitable that the strong irrational factor in such a rejection should assume the form of nationalism.

It is this third dimension that makes the "crisis" especially exciting and open-ended, a cliffhanger that could develop in any of several directions. If the recent ubiquitous atmosphere of personal and national insecurity and the "objective" reasons for it were the whole story, and they are the aspects of the current Yugoslav scene that strike the returning observer first and forcefully, one could join the

chorus of deep pessimism over the future of the state or at least of the liberal course of the past seven years as a number of foreign commentators in fact have done, some with sadness and others with satisfaction. But they are not the whole story. This is a complex crisis of transition in a changing and modernizing society whose institutions and systems (and the individuals who run them) are as likely to succeed as they are to fail in adapting themselves to new conditions. The risks are extraordinarily high, but the outcome is absolutely unpredictable, which is why the present is a moment of frightening as well as breathtaking suspense in the ever-exciting odyssey of postwar Yugoslavia.

### After Tito, What?

The succession question was specifically posed by Tito himself, in a calculatedly offhand manner, during a talk with Party activists in Zagreb on September 21, 1970. Speculation at home and (especially) abroad about what would happen to the multinational federation when he was no longer there to symbolize and guarantee unity was unhealthy and dangerous, Tito said. To stop this speculation and initiate a gradual transition now, he was therefore suggesting the adoption of a constitutional amendment creating a collegial presidency to replace him as President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It should consist of an equal number of "outstanding personalities" from each of the country's six republics and appropriate representation from the two autonomous provinces within the Serbian Republic.

The proposal was in one sense a logical extension to the state apparatus of an earlier reorganization of the League of Communists (the Party). At the Ninth Congress in April 1969, again at Tito's personal suggestion, a 15-member Executive Bureau consisting of Tito himself, two Party leaders from each republic, and one from each autonomous province was established above the federal Party Presidium. Its declared function, like that of the collective state presidency now being introduced, was to insure that accepted policies represented a consensus of the views of all the federal (ethnic) units and that such a consensus should be uniformly implemented.

In another sense, however, the new proposal was more than that. It openly put the succession question "on the agenda" and made it the ultimate

lynchpin to which all the other variables in the present, tense Yugoslav equation would be related. It gave primacy among these other variables to the increasingly sensitive question of inter-republican relations, i.e., to the "national question." And through the modality of a proposed amendment of the constitution it opened the door to other, related institutional changes and thus to broad public discussion of the nature of the federation itself.

Tito, who was 79 in May, continues to enjoy the physical and mental health of a far younger man, as his interventions in the crisis in recent weeks have again forcefully and dramatically demonstrated. His departure from the scene through death or incapacity does not appear imminent. If he had not raised the succession question himself, therefore, the leadership might have been able to continue to evade or suppress it for some time to come, as they have consciously or subconsciously done for years.

In terms of its timing, therefore, the "succession crisis" could perhaps be described as a manufactured—or better, a pre-emptive—crisis. It was deliberately provoked by a leader whose advancing years have apparently not dulled his acute political and gambler's instincts, and who has boldly elected to meet the future at a time and on terms of his own choosing, while the ominous elements of that future are still manageable and while he is still there to manage them. The storm clouds have been building up for some time, and Tito has chosen to act like the peasants of his native Zagorje, who fire specialized rockets at real, hail-bearing thunderheads in order to precipitate the tempest before the hailstones have grown big enough to destroy their vineyards.

### Paralysis in a Vacuum

The gathering storm consisted of that unlucky conjunction in time of accumulated and now inter-related domestic and foreign problems and pressures referred to above and in earlier Fieldstaff Reports:<sup>2</sup> serious trouble in the economy, ethnic tensions openly expressed, and foreign (i.e., Soviet) speculation with the after-Tito-what question in the form of flirtations with all kinds of dissident elements inside Yugoslavia and among Yugoslav émigré groups. To these factors there has now been added another, which may have been one reason

for Tito's timing: a paralysis of the Federal government and of the League of Communists at the Federal level, making any effective country-wide action to deal with accumulated problems impossible and fueling the general public's growing conviction that either the system or the politicians and technicians who run it are incapable of vitally necessary action.

For many years the power of central state and Party authorities to make and implement decisions has been evaporating, at first gradually and almost unnoticed and then (after 1966) dramatically and rapidly. Enough of this formerly centralized power had come to lodge in republican and provincial state and Party apparatuses so that it became necessary to secure the agreement of most or all of them before measures affecting general interests could be adopted or enforced. At the same time, however, the republican and provincial apparatuses, with all their new political weight, lacked commensurate economic power. Monetary and fiscal instruments and most tax powers remained in the hands of the federal government, while an important fraction of total investment funds remained at the disposal of three former federal banks, located in the federal capital. Thus the power of the regional authorities remained almost entirely negative: they could veto but they could not implement policies of their own.

For a time this did not seem to matter. The operative slogan after 1965 was "de-étatization:" the state was supposed to be withdrawing from intervention in the economy. Mika Spiljak, Federal Prime Minister from 1967 to 1969 and a Croat, deliberately ran a do-nothing government. He was often criticized for this (and made the object of many unfair jokes impugning his intelligence and ability), but he was really fulfilling his mandate, which was to be the Calvin Coolidge of a Yugoslav laissez-faire epoch. In the Party the decline in effective central control—a function of allowing the sanctions enforcing "democratic centralism" to fall into disuse, in its turn simultaneously a result and a reinforcement of growing regional Party autonomy—was a deliberate policy welcomed as "democratization."

After 1969, however, the kind of increasingly serious problems that plagued the economy called with growing urgency for remedies that must have

an all-Yugoslav character and stern enforcement. The inflation rate and the balance of payments deficit reached alarming proportions, as did enterprise illiquidity. The social consequences of growing inequalities in personal and regional incomes and standards of social services, like the economic consequences of imperfect competition, led to increasingly loud demands for new forms of planning, control, and secondary redistribution of national income. Growing concentration of capital in the hands of certain banks and other financial and commercial organizations, no longer controlled by the state but under existing laws not yet effectively responsible to anyone else, became a matter of increasing public concern. But these were precisely the kinds of issues on which the agreement of the necessary republican power centers could not be obtained, because their respective interests required contradictory solutions.

For example, the Croatian leadership in the course of 1970 proposed reforms of the banking, foreign trade, and foreign currency systems which were unacceptable to the leaderships of at least four other federal units. The federal government proposed a package of stabilization measures to deal with inflation which was unacceptable to the Croatian leaders. The federal administration was paralyzed and no problems were solved. The only important measure actually carried through was an unavoidable devaluation of the dinar (in January 1971), which miserably failed to accomplish any of the positive things a devaluation should accomplish because it was unsupported by any other effective measures. Exports stagnated, and imports increased at an accelerating rate; so did inflation, in defiance of a formal price freeze the ineffectiveness of which was final proof of the federal administration's almost total impotence.

In the League of Communists, meanwhile, officials of the now virtually autonomous regional and local Party organizations, no longer fearing reprimand or dismissal from above (the federal center), were still subject to sanctions or pressures from their peers. In the increasingly public political marketplace where federal policy was made and still important federal funds were collected and disbursed, it was therefore more important than of old that they faithfully represent and be seen to represent the interests of these constituents. At the same time their leverage in negotiations over these

matters would be increased if they could point convincingly to mass support in their home constituencies. In mobilizing such support and in using it there was a frequently overwhelming temptation to play the nationalist card, historically the easiest and surest way of arousing mass enthusiasm while simultaneously frightening one's negotiating partners with the (implicit) threat that nationalist forces may get out of hand if one's demands are not met. Thus regional leaders tended with increasing urgency and recklessness to pose as national leaders, defending the interests of "their" nation against attempted exploitation or domination by another nation or nations.

This is a strategy that could not fail to refuel the ever-smouldering fires of ethnic distrust, rivalry, and hatred that had destroyed prewar Yugoslavia. The kind of Communist nationalists who had been drummed out of office or the Party as recently as 1967 for displaying their nationalism too openly took heart and returned to the fray, freely stating, publishing, and winning applause for sometimes fair but often irresponsible accusations of discrimination against their nation's language, its share in the distribution of national income, or its representation in Party, state, or army cadres, or in employment.

In such an atmosphere of growing mutual suspicion and intolerance epithets with startlingly ominous historical connotations were exchanged with growing frequency and aimed even at regional Party leaderships. The Croats, in particular, were accused of being "chauvinists," "separatists," and, most deadly of all, Ustasa. The Serbs, in particular, were charged with "unitarist centralism," "great nation chauvinism," and even "Cominformism" and "neo-Stalinism." Elements on each side were suspected by the others of flirting with Soviet support.

### The Locus of Power

While there was general agreement that the situation was intolerable, there was no agreement as to what should be done about it. The dispute, as noted, was essentially about the future locus of power—the power to make and implement effective public choices. There was nothing new in this, or even in the basic line-up of individuals and regional-ethnic groups behind alternative solutions.



What was new was the *present* locus of decision-making power. It used to be in a definable place, in the federal Party and state apparatuses, and the argument was about whether it should stay there or be decentralized. The partial victories, over the years, of the "decentralizers" (or "liberals") have largely destroyed those centers but without—in fact, as opposed to theory—defining the legacies. As a result power is nowhere and everywhere, in greater and smaller accumulations; a quasi-anarchy of diffused decision-making with reduced responsibility (for anonymous power is irresponsible power), together with a free-for-all scramble to collect the pieces. The principal parties to the scramble, the would-be legacies of former central power, can for analytical purposes and with oversimplification be divided into three groups.

There are those who feel that decentralization has already gone too far. These are no longer only the "conservatives" of traditional analyses of the Yugoslav scene—the Serbian "unitarists," including the State Security Service (UDBa) and other followers of former Vice-President Aleksandar Ranković, their allies in the state and Party bureaucracies, et al. Although it is still generally accepted that more Serbs hold some kind of "centralist" views than members of any other nationality, many other people in all the republics are now disturbed by the trend toward complete emasculation of central authority. These people include some of the political leaders as well as the managers and "self-managers" of economic enterprises who favored or fought for the decentralizing reforms of 1965-66. They are reacting to the paralysis of government, to apparent anarchy in the market, or to fear that the present course could lead to the disintegration of the state or subjugation to a foreign Great Power by asking (usually obliquely, since centralism is officially anathema) for some degree or kind of central regulation or control.<sup>3</sup> Sensible and traditional "liberal" Yugoslavs are wondering anxiously whether it would not have been better to democratize control over the central administration rather than abolish it. Such a course would have required a thorough reform of the Party, including abolition of any monolithic, centralized Party bureaucracy and the rule of "democratic centralism," but little or no substantive diminution of the competence and power of the federal legislative and administrative apparatuses.

The second group favors devolution of former federal powers to the republics and provinces. The most important of the constitutional amendments presently being adopted represent their views, which would carry this devolution so far that the formerly highly centralized federation would become, in effect, a confederation (Switzerland is not infrequently cited as a precedent). Their principal argument is that only in this way can the equality and the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nationalities, among the cardinal official values of the regime, be really assured and the hegemony of the largest nation or nations avoided. They also argue, as a corollary of this first proposition, that only in this way can a revival of dangerously violent nationalisms, with separatist connotations, be definitively prevented. The principal and most articulate spokesmen of this view have been Croats, but they are not without allies in all other republics, including Serbia. Their motives, it is evident from careful examination, are somewhat mixed. Some really see such devolution as a necessary intermediate step toward genuine "democratization" of decision-making; for others it is an end in itself, taking power away from former holders (at the federal center) in order that it should come fully into their own hands, in republican or provincial Party committees and government offices as inaccessible to popular control as their federal equivalents used to be. For some "republican sovereignty" really is necessary to protect one's own nation from domination by or assimilation to another; for others this claim is made in order to legitimize and win popular acquiescence for their usurpation and unfettered exercise of a former central power.

Finally, there are those who take the official ideology of Titoist "self-managing, direct socialist democracy" seriously, whether out of ideological conviction or out of personal or class interest. For these people "de-étatization" does not mean replacing one (federal) center of state authority with eight (republican and provincial) centers. It means instead some form of realization of the proclaimed goal of Yugoslav socialism, which has long been "direct decision-making by working men in their place of work," a formulation which may mean many things but which does not mean decision-making by politicians or bureaucrats in Party or state apparatuses at any level. Those who sincerely



support one form or another of this solution tend to be the ideologically devout (some intellectuals and some politicians), and, more important, those individuals and groups in whose interest it is that the primary locus of decision-making should not be in any existing political body or system. Such people include many managers, engineers, economists, bankers, etc., in "self-managing" enterprises (who interpret the goal to mean decision-making by managerial and/or technocratic elites), or trade union leaders and those with important roles in elected self-management organs (who interpret the goal more literally, but also out of self-interest).

The newest slogans to this end are *samoupravni sporazum* and *društveno dogovoranje*, which are difficult to translate (literally, "self-managing agreement" and "social consultation"). A leading Party official and economic expert defined the difference for me in these terms: the first is an agreement, usually of a contractual nature, among enterprises or other self-managed institutions; the second is a process which occurs when the first is impossible, either because agreement cannot be reached or because the nature of the subject exceeds the framework in which such agreement is appropriate. It therefore involves consultations among all interested parties, including political and social organizations and communities, in order to reach agreements which will be binding on all signatories. Stripped of terminological and procedural obscurity, what is envisaged is that decision-making in matters which are normally part of the competence of a traditional state will be done by ad hoc agreements negotiated and signed by delegates of the groups or institutions directly concerned, for whom such agreements will then have the force of law. Although obviously complex, perhaps impossibly so in a modern society, the Yugoslavs already have considerable experience of such procedures at the communal level or among economic enterprises.<sup>4</sup> When such a system is fully matured, its advocates argue, the residual functions of the state will have "withered away" to an absolute minimum, including little more than defense, foreign affairs, and minimal powers necessary to guarantee a "unified market"—and even these will be subject to some "self-management" controls.

Put in these terms, the issues involved may seem to be obscure, singularly theoretical, and unreal. The situation is further complicated by the fact

that the line-up in terms of individual players and of role or class interest as determinants of one's choice of solution is not as clear as it has been made to seem in this analysis. For example, and as already suggested, many "self-managers" are torn between a desire to enjoy the benefits of a laissez-faire economy, escaping the annoyances of political supervision, and a desire to enjoy the benefits of state assistance and regulation: and when they look for the latter, some prefer to look to republican and some to federal centers.

Whatever the complexities, however, the prize is very real power and very real and conflicting interests are involved.

### From Corporativism to Confederation?

A centralist solution, or at least a partial reconstitution of central administration and control, has many advocates—perhaps, in this spring of near panic a temporary majority of politicized Yugoslavs. In fact, anticentralism has been made into an official fetish of such magnitude, supported by the powerful interests of power-holders in the newly autonomous regions, that no one can openly advocate a strengthening of the federal apparatuses at this time. It can only be talked about as an undesirable alternative that might well be imposed by events if no other solution is made to work. (It is in this context that one hears talk about a possible military *coup d'état*, or one variant of a scenario for Soviet intervention, à la Czechoslovakia, to "save socialism" in Yugoslavia.)

While a centralist solution is thus officially *hors de combat*, the "self-management" solution is equally officially the only acceptable one. One of the consequences is that partisans of confederation, as well as partisans of some more or less disguised reconstitution of central authority, are obliged to argue that what they want is really only a necessary complement or guarantor of the "self-management" solution. This necessity has helped to obscure the shifting nature of partnerships and purposes on the political battlefield and the deeper significance for "self-management" of the recent victories of confederate forces. It is to penetrate this obscurity that one must look more closely at some of the side effects of "self-management" and "market socialism" and at constitutional revisions since 1963.

As an aspiration and ideal type, the "self-management" solution has long been a handsome and Utopian vision of the future that lent respectability to a centralistic Party dictatorship. As an applied process of decision-making it was realized in small doses, under the paternalistic sponsorship of the dictatorship, in the economy and in local "socio-political" communities, where it produced encouraging results in the fields of production, participation, and the responsiveness of economy and polity to the demands of citizen-consumers. Only since 1965 have serious efforts been made to extend its application from the micro- to the macro-level in economics (from decision-making within the enterprise to decision-making about gross national savings and investment and secondary redistribution of national income) and from the local to the regional and federal level in politics.

The result, the stalemate and quasi-anarchy partly described above, must in many ways resemble economic and political life in the United States ca. 1880: vigorous, exciting, individualistic, chaotically productive, and full of a primitive, rough-and-tumble democracy characterized, *inter alia*, by self-serving local political "bossism" and "machines," cut-throat competition, and ubiquitous political and economic corruption, sometimes crude and sometimes sophisticated.

The negative aspects of this kind of transitional condition have made even official spokesmen of the regime unprecedentedly defensive about the twin theoretical pillars of their system, a "socialist market economy" and "social self-management." In a single recent conversation, for example, one of them (a member of the Party's supreme Executive Bureau) argued vehemently and without provocation (1) that self-management in theory and practice is not to be blamed for present weaknesses and distortions, which are rather the consequences of incomplete and inconsistent implementation of self-management and vestiges of the old, "administrative" system, and (2) that we are not at all disappointed with the market economy, but merely see the need for the kinds of correctives and controls to which the market mechanism is subject in all developed Western societies." He went on to repeat the present line of the "liberal" establishment, which holds that the only appropriate way of forestalling the growth of demands for recentralization as an answer to political and economic instability and social injustice is rapidly to perfect

and extend the competence of the "self-management" system of decision-making, which will then prove capable of solving other outstanding problems through "self-managing agreements" and "social consultations."

Easier said than done, or even seriously intended. Meanwhile, in a situation that Tito and other leaders have become fond of describing as "a stagnation in the development of self-management" and in the power vacuum resulting from the disintegration of central authority, what has here been called the confederate solution has been gaining ground. Its vicissitudes as an alternative to the self-management solution—a description that is vociferously denied by its partisans—can be traced in the evolution of the formal Yugoslav constitution during the past ten years.

The five chamber federal, republican, and provincial parliaments created by the Constitution adopted in 1963 represented and legal apogée of the concept of self-management as a normative principle. Four of the five chambers represented citizens in their functional roles—in the economy, in education and culture, in health and social welfare, and in political bureaucracies—and were conceived as "supreme workers' councils" in their respective spheres. Decision-making was to be the product of public negotiation and compromise among elected delegates of all relevant economic and social interest groups. The former Chamber of Nationalities, which had offered equal representation to ethnic groups institutionalized as republics and provinces, disappeared inside the Federal Parliament's general political chamber, the Federal Chamber, in which it was incorporated as a quasi-distinct part which in fact never met separately.

Within four years, however, the tide of change was running in a different direction. In a package of constitutional amendments promulgated in 1967 the Federal Chamber was abolished and the Chamber of Nationalities was not only revived as a separate entity but became the most powerful chamber in the Federal Parliament.

In the present round of further constitutional amendments, being adopted this summer, this tendency to move from the principle of parliamentary decision-making by "supreme workers' councils" to decision-making by negotiation among

delegates of republics and provinces (i.e., of the nationalities whose ostensible ministates are the republics and provinces) has been carried much further. The collective state presidency proposed by Tito will be constituted on the basis of republican and provincial parity: the Federal Executive Council (the cabinet) will be similarly constituted, as is the Chamber of Nationalities, which will continue to be the most powerful house in the Federal Parliament. Moreover, the amendments contain complicated provisions requiring unanimity of all republics and provinces in many spheres and elaborate consultation procedures to this end.<sup>5</sup> Finally a third round of amendments, scheduled for adoption before the next general election in 1973, will almost certainly either combine the four "functional" chambers of the Federal Parliament into one or eliminate them altogether, leaving a unicameral legislature consisting of the Chamber of Nationalities.

Involved in these shifts of emphasis have been two fundamentally different concepts of decentralization. The first aspires to pluralistic decision-making through essentially syndicalist or corporatist (or "anarcho-syndicalist") mechanisms, by delegates of "working people" aggregated according to economic and social functions. The second aspires to pluralistic decision-making on the basis of territorial-ethnic aggregations. The distinction was for some time obscured by the alliance of advocates of both concepts in the struggle against "centralist unitarism" which characterized the 1960s, and also by the fact that the choice was as unclear in the minds of individual players as their motives were mixed. Many of them did and do really see republican and provincial "sovereignty" as a prerequisite and guarantor of "self-management" and not as an alternative to it and an end in itself. These people are again subdivided into those who understand "self-management" as management by managerial-technocratic elites and those who understand it as genuine participation by "all workingmen in their place of work." An additional role was also played by an incidental consequence of the equal importance of both ideology and ethnic nationalism in Titoist Yugoslavia. While it has been ideologically imperative that any political proposal be argued in terms of its contribution to the development of "self-managing socialism," it was also imperative in the political context of the

past decade, when the struggle between "centralists" and "decentralists" was played and decided primarily as a national question (as the struggle of Croats, Slovenes, and other smaller nationalities to escape domination by the numerically preponderant, politically powerful, and "centralist" Serbs), that decision-making by functionally aggregated "self-managers" be described as the ultimate and only sure guarantor of national equality.

The dynamics of this dual nature of the political struggle contain an important clue to one otherwise curious aspect of its evolution. The struggle was allegedly for "democratization" in the form of real implementation of the "self-management" concepts embodied in the 1963 Constitution, but the retreat of the "bureaucratic centralist" enemy has been marked by institutional changes that dilute that concept and move in the direction of a confederation which is declared to be only a necessary complement to self-management but which manifests itself as an alternative. (In other words, if the goal were really a full and uncompromising realization of the ideal type of direct democracy through all-encompassing social self-management, then the struggle to create six or eight confederated state systems in place of a single centralized one should in theory be considered at best a costly and unnecessary diversion of reformist energy.)

The answer is to be sought in an analysis of the forces that made the emasculation of centralist state and Party apparatuses possible. The decisive factor here, as we have seen, was not the strength of the ideologues and interest groups of "self-management" but the growing ability of increasingly autonomous national leaderships to frustrate action at the center.<sup>6</sup> The constitutional amendments now being adopted are in this sense only a legal recognition of the real de facto heirs of formal central power and an unspoken recognition of the fact that, for the moment at least, the autonomous power and mutual jealousies of the national leaderships provide the firmest guarantee of no return to the quasi-centralism of a few years ago.

### Alarums and Excursions

The storm precipitated by Tito's proposed answer to the succession question broke with what must have been a wilder display of thunder and lightning than even he could have anticipated. For

seven months the tensions and "speculations" that he hoped to dispel grew more rather than less intense. Paralysis of the federal administration continued unabated and was excused (by members of the government, but not by parliamentary deputies who attacked them for inaction) on the ground that with far-reaching constitutional changes under discussion this was now a lame duck administration which should not undertake initiatives that would bind the protagonists of next year's new power structure. The interregnum was repeatedly extended by the expanding scope of the changes under discussion and by the failure of the regional chieftains to reach agreement on almost all key issues, including the remaining powers of the Federation, regional-federal relationships, and the distribution of powers within the new federal structure (State Presidency, Parliament, and Federal Executive Council).

Tensions among the nationalities were aggravated by a by-product of the level of "democratization" already achieved. For the first time in postwar Yugoslavia important institutional changes were not being imposed from above, with only formal public discussion of a *fait accompli*, but were being argued in public and in print. Neither the audience nor the participants were psychologically prepared for such a procedure. Political leaders offered their views, opening negotiating positions in speeches and articles in the same vehement style they had been wont to use behind the closed doors of higher Party meetings. Partisan regional newspapers and journals simplified issues and quoted "opposition" statements out of context with a lively journalistic irresponsibility unknown on this side of the Adriatic since the war. Unused to a spectacle they had long demanded, the general public reacted with alarm and with displays of partisanship (read rival nationalisms). Some of their leaders, excited by a new kind of political game and either unskilled or willing to play dangerously, responded with an escalating demagoguery that others saw as nationalist rabble-rousing. Seen from the outside, both words and actions still seemed extraordinarily inoffensive in comparison with those that a people like the Belgians, for example, have long learned to live with. In the Yugoslav historical and political context—a state that did once collapse, that was then the scene of vicious attempts at mutual genocide, and that today is the object of unwelcome attention by a

Great Power interested in exploiting its internal dissensions—they were enough to turn alarm into near panic.

For some months the embattled national leaderships, preoccupied with tough negotiations, remained curiously deaf to the rising clamor of alarm and blind to the dangerous potential of license for "chauvinist excesses." Once again it was Tito who proved more responsive to the mood of his peoples than their more direct representatives seemed willing or able to be. In April he went on one of his periodic and tireless visits to the countryside for talks with local leaderships and ordinary citizens, this time to Bosnia, South Serbia, and Kosovo, the first and third ethnically mixed regions where the national question is hypersensitive. As the royal progress went on, he became visibly and perhaps calculatedly angrier with what he was seeing and hearing. Finally, after nationalist arguments had been aired in front of him at a Party meeting in Pristina, capital of the Kosovo Autonomous Province where tensions between Serbs and Albanians are particularly acute, he exploded.

"We are a socialist community," Tito said, "in which the League of Communists is the ideological-political principal of the entire development. But the behavior in the League of Communists is not good and I am not satisfied. I must say this hurts me terribly. You know that I have long been at the head of the Communist Party and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. But I think that so far we have not had such a situation as we have today in the League of Communists. But as long as I am in this office, as long as the rank and file uphold me, I shall endeavor to make order in the League of Communists."

To this end he named two specific sanctions. If the situation did not improve, he said, "it will be necessary to have recourse to administrative measures [a Marxist euphemism for arbitrary dismissal, purge, or arrest] so as to prevent these trends... I know, there will be cries against undemocratic procedures and the like, but is it possible to act otherwise when such behavior is in question, especially when Communists behave like this?" Meanwhile, and more immediately to the point, he said that he was going to summon a special meeting of the Party Presidium "and the

most responsible figures in all the Yugoslav republics and provinces," and that "we will not go our ways until we come to an agreement."<sup>7</sup>

At the end of April the threatened meeting was duly convened. It met at Tito's Adriatic retreat on the Brioni islands, lasted three days, and issued a communiqué of startling blandness. Speeches made at the meeting were not published. This is unusual in recent Yugoslav Party practice, but was afterwards justified by Tito on the ground that there had been sharp disagreements at the beginning of the session and that publishing what was said there would only aggravate tensions. What was important, he said in a May Day speech, was that complete agreement had been reached before they adjourned. (A senior Party official and national leader who had been at Brioni put the same point to this observer a few days later. "I think we had gone a bit too far with 'democratization' in this sense," he said. "Everything was published. In any political party in any country there must be a place where leaders can argue differences bluntly and sharply when it is healthy to have such arguments but not healthy that what they say should become public knowledge, for then they appear exaggerated and create alarm. No political party can or should wash all its linen in public.")

The communiqué, bland and undramatic, included an announcement that the constitutional amendments should be adopted and implemented quickly, that nationalism and divided leaderships are bad things, and that the participants had agreed that all matters of disagreement were negotiable. In the week following the Brioni plenum Tito delivered himself of two important speeches, one at a May Day mass meeting in Istria and the second at the closing session of the Second Congress of Self-Managers in Sarajevo on May 8. Like the Brioni communiqué, both were important not for what was said, but for the style and the impact.

Especially at Sarajevo Tito was in top form. He spoke scathingly about domestic critics, who were not those workers and pensioners without enough to live on who have a right to criticize, but pensioners (including "retired generals") with large incomes, who sit in cafes complaining and plotting because they did not realize "megalomaniac ambitions to become President of the Republic or

at least ministers." He said a unity had been achieved at Brioni which included a guarantee of action against "enemies of our socialism: We spoke also of democracy. I think that there, we all together arrived for the first time at a common view that democracy can be—and how—harmful to the development of socialism if it is not in its interest, that is, if it is abused by the opponents of socialism." After his Istrian speech, he said, he had read a commentary in a Western newspaper saying that all this had been heard before, "that Tito had threatened many times and that he threatens also now, but it is all an empty gun and everything will be the same as it was. But now, this will not be an empty gun—we have plenty of ammunition."<sup>8</sup> There was much more of the same, little that was specific and little that is impressive on the printed page, but a popular (even demagogic) rhetoric and show of vigor that had an immense impact on the audience, including the hardened foreign journalists of the popular cliché, and on those who watched it on television.

These details are important in attempting to understand what happened after Brioni and Sarajevo. "The old magician has pulled another one out of the hat," was the comment of one foreign observer after Tito's speech at Sarajevo. The change in the atmosphere in Yugoslavia was indeed magical. Newspapers and politicians spoke with a new tone and the public mood in Belgrade passed from darkest, alarmist pessimism to an equally exaggerated optimism. Agreements among regional delegations were announced in several long-disputed sectors.

There are several, complementary explanations of this curiously abrupt change in atmosphere, possibly including the suggestion of one Belgrade editor who submits that it is either part of the Yugoslavs' "mentality" or because they have not yet "become used to an open dialectic" that "our political mood so frequently swings between extreme optimism and pessimism."<sup>9</sup> One of the most obvious answers is that the regional leaders have taken fright from the implications of the course they were pursuing and are both ready for compromises and eager to join their President in seeking to calm public opinion; Tito's intervention, backed by his prestige, provided the timing and the impetus for a retreat that they were finding it increasingly difficult, politically, to initiate on

their own. A second explanation lies in the one specific, important decision that the Brioni meeting did adopt: discussion of the present round of constitutional amendments is over and they will be promulgated and implemented before the autumn. The immediate political issue is thus resolved and those who hoped or feared that the Brioni meeting would mark a retreat from recent policies and concessions to "centralists" and other opponents of extreme decentralization—an expectation that added considerably to the tenseness of the late winter and spring—have been disappointed.

But nothing else of substance has really changed. All the factors that made recent months so tense are still there except the psychological one, plus (as a result of the changed atmosphere) a certain alleviation of the paralysis of the federal apparatuses, and these two ingredients could reappear as abruptly as they vanished. As a once powerful participant, now a disgraced "mere observer" of the Yugoslav political scene, told a recent visitor: "Despite the positive things that are in them, the amendments have not resolved a crisis, they have opened a way to its continuation."

#### From Quantitative to Qualitative Modernization?

A long-time and notoriously well-disposed foreign observer of the changing Yugoslav scene returned to the country this spring after an absence of nearly two years. Listening to stories of incidents between ethnic groups and observing the political paralysis and economic confusion described in these pages, he found himself saying to various Yugoslav friends: "For heaven's sake, don't blow it! You've almost got a tremendous economic and political success story here. Don't blow it at the last minute!"

His reaction, however full of implicit and arguable value judgments and preconceptions about what constitutes a "success story," was essentially concerned with a point made in the introduction to this Report. It was suggested there that the drama of recent months in Yugoslavia—while adequately explainable in terms of a (pre-emptive) succession crisis added to a special kind of power vacuum aggravated by foreign speculations and serious economic problems—can also be interpreted as a particular and crucial crisis of transition in a changing and modernizing

society. Existing systems, it was further suggested, are as likely to succeed as they are to fail in adapting themselves to change in ways that further open the door to pluralism, participation, and a growing range of free personal and public choices, but if they do fail the determining factor will probably turn out to have been a metaphorical failure of nerve on the part of leaders and followers, and especially the latter.

Postwar Yugoslavia has come far along the road of "modernization," whether the concept is measured in terms of per capita or gross national product, industrialization and urbanization, changing "life styles," occupational and social differentiation and specialization, or pluralism of autonomous but integrated and participant social institutions. The process has been supervised by a Communist Party whose leaders did not always anticipate the consequences of what they were doing (except in self-justifying hindsight) and was illuminated by an official vision of the good society based on an eclectic, adaptable, but still sometimes restrictive Marxism, the self-preserving pragmatism of the leadership, and considerable self-deception as well as deliberate myth-building. At the very least these leaders were relatively good at practicing economic and social development and very good at preaching participation through decentralization and self-management.

Whatever they originally intended, this particular combination of deeds and words produced particular results, as Paul Lendvai has perceptively noted:

When the Yugoslav leaders decided to find an ideological alternative [to Soviet Marxism] and felt compelled to bridge, partially at least, the gulf between the rulers and the ruled, they offered the people working in the economy the illusion of power. The irresistible logic of the economic and social forces, however, transformed the illusion of power into a power of illusion that gradually became a prime mover of developments, animating them from below.<sup>10</sup>

Meanwhile, the shape of the political stalemate that followed the subsequent and not unrelated disintegration of the monopoly of political power held by the federal Party and state apparatuses, a

development guaranteed by triumphant regionalism founded on ethnic jealousies, meant that no person or group was in a position to say an effective no to an increasingly pluralistic reconstitution of decision-making power (except, hypothetically, through a *coup d'état* or other violent alternation of the balance of forces). Instead, such a reconstitution in one form or another was genuinely supported by regional political leaderships and by powerful economic interests, jealous of their growing effective autonomy and able to defend it. It was also encouraged by still influential individuals at the federal level who had played a leading role in dispersing their own power, whether out of genuine "socialist democratic" convictions, because they were really the agents of the regional or sectional interests that provided their real power bases, or because they were reluctantly hoist by their own rhetorical petards after years of lip service to the Party's liberal ideological line.

It can therefore be argued that the congruence of these interrelated but distinct economic, social, and political developments has generated a moment of unique opportunity, a tide to be taken at the flood lest the future of the great experiment should be bound in shallows if not in miseries. When the disintegration of the former monopolistic center of political power reopened the question of the future locus of public decision-making, the minimum ideological, institutional, and economic prerequisites of greater collective and individual freedom to make and to participate in making a wider range of effective public (and personal) choices had been created. The political environment at the highest levels of leadership, however unstable, was momentarily favorable for such a mobilization and expansion of participation.

The first reaction of both public and polity, however, has been an apparent recrudescence of defensive and exclusive ethnic nationalism, a search for scapegoats for both real and imaginary problems and persecutions, usually among other ethnic groups, and attempts to reconstruct traditional states at republican and provincial levels, with traditional functions and controlled, limited participation, to replace the centralized apparatuses that have been destroyed.

This is a reaction that includes elements of irrationality, elements of rational skepticism, and

elements of a preference for the evil one knows. As such it reflects the strength of history (as reality and as myth, both equally unhappy, violent, and full of deeply-felt mutual ethnic and political suspicions and rivalries) and of traditional social structures and attitudes. The lesson of history is that the evil one knows is indeed preferable to evils one has known (fratricide, disintegration of the state, foreign domination, attempted mutual genocide), which could conceivably come again if the inhibitions built into the postwar system are dismantled with the system. The wisdom of traditional attitudes is that the known is always bad but the unknown is almost certainly worse; among more sophisticated, less traditional elements this is transformed into a sly awareness that one has learned to operate and do relatively well out of the present system, whatever its defects, and might well lose one's way and do worse in an unknown, if "objectively" preferable one.

It can also be argued, however, that the present reaction reflects something else as well: a reflexive, almost subconscious rejection of the burden, the responsibility, and the bewildering complexity of the kind of participation implicit in the Yugoslav concept of "social self-management." Developments of recent years have for the first time endowed the regime's repeated declarations of intent in this area with a degree of credibility, in the sense described above: because the minimum prerequisites are there and because the political barriers are down or in disarray, it could be done. The possibility, long demanded in theory, has become frightening as it becomes realizable.

This is a hard thesis to document, even with the help of attitudinal studies that have not been done or that are not available. One must be impressionistic, interpreting the motives behind the attitudes and actions of an inadequate sample. If such an undertaking is legitimate the most convincing evidence is probably to be found in the style and focus of the particularist nationalisms that have again become the central feature of Yugoslav political life.

The conviction that national freedom, as expressed in "national sovereignty" and a nation-state of one's own, must precede and is a precondition for individual freedom is certainly not new or recent in this part of the world; nor is



the tendency to slide from that conviction into an absolute identification of national with individual freedom or into an identification of the nation with the personas of its leaders, whether elected or self-proclaimed. This is also a region with particularly intense experience of the nation elevated to a superordinate and even exclusive value and point of reference, so that every issue is interpreted in national terms.

These attitudes and attendant emotions did not disappear "under socialism" in postwar Yugoslavia. They were, however, suppressed and for some time they were also reduced to a secondary level of importance in the consciousness of most people, preoccupied with more pressing problems and grievances of a manifestly nonnational character related to the nature and actions of the Communist autocracy. The regime, meanwhile, did what it could, with honest intent, to remove the "objective conditions" which Marxist theory believed to be the sources of nationalism and without which nationalism should disappear.

The theory was wrong, and in any case the "objective conditions" of ethnically differentiated levels of exploitation, oppression, and relative deprivation were not consistently or entirely removed. That divisive nationalisms therefore survived and manifested themselves again when the opportunity arose should not have surprised anyone, nor does the phenomenon really need allegations about irrationality or elaborate theories about the social psychology of an alleged "escape from freedom" to explain it.

Necessary or not and however tentatively and impressionistically, it is possible to make such a case, and to present it both as a *partial* explanation of the style of contemporary ethnic particularism in Yugoslavia and as evidence in support of the view that Titoism's present crisis is indeed a crucial one—a "moment of truth"—which will determine either the maximum or the minimum limits of the quantity and quality of freedom that will characterize the post-Tito era.

The tendency of regional Communist leaders to present themselves and to be accepted as national leaders has been noted. In some isolated cases their claim to speak for their nation has already come close to sounding like a claim that they incorporate

the will of the nation. In the public discussion of the present round of constitutional amendments great attention has been paid to the concepts of national and republic "sovereignty" and the republic as the "national state of the Croatian (or Slovene or Macedonian or Montenegrin) nation." This has led in turn to sometimes acrimonious debate about the status of citizens of a multinational republic who are not members of the nation whose state it is and about their relationship to another republic in which their co-nationals are of "nation-of-state" (e.g., and of particular sensitivity, the status of the numerous Serbs of the Republic of Croatia and their relationship to the Republic of Serbia).

Except for constant lip service to the principle that each republic is to be a "self-managing socialist community" in which the "class content" is equal to or takes precedence over the "national content" of citizenship, all of this is highly reminiscent of debates in the Austrian half of the Hapsburg Empire in its last decades concerning the meaning and status of Bohemia as the sub-nation-state of the Czech nation (and the consequent status of its large German minority) or Styria as a sub-nation-state of the German nation (and the status of its large Slovene minority). Now as then, it would seem, a man's national particularity takes precedence over his universality, and what is revealed is a renewed tendency to think of his relationship to society in organic terms: if his identity can be fully realized and his interests protected only as a member of a nation, then the nation takes precedence over the individual and the "general will" as articulated by national leaders has greater value than an individual will or a collectivity of wills.

Such a concept of man in society does not belong to the main stream of either Western liberal or Marxian socialist views of the nature of human freedom and the kind of social order needed to guarantee its existence and growth. It belongs instead to a vision of the world in which society is hierarchical, roles and status are prescriptive, and individual salvation is to be sought through identification with the community and submission to its prescripts, known to and enforced by an enlightened or chosen few.

If this is what is happening in Yugoslavia, and it seems to be, and if such a phenomenon can

represent a classic form of flight from and surrender of individual freedom and its attendant burdens and responsibilities, as some social scientists and philosophers claim, then history may record that the Yugoslavs were once offered an opportunity to take a giant step toward a society characterized by wide and effective popular participation in the making of an ever wider range of rational public and private choices, and that they rejected it.

That verdict is not yet in order because the story is still unfolding and the "moment of truth" is an extended one. Other endings are still very possible. There is, for example, an official scenario advertised by the ideologists of the present establishment: the "nationalist excesses" of the moment are only a temporary blowing off of a steam generated by a long history of oppression and hate and forced to accumulate dangerously during two decades of autocracy; the "national sovereignty" of the republics is the only safe way of bleeding off that steam and of eliminating the disputes and suspicions that would generate more; the "étatisme" of republics and provinces will prove weak and will only provide an historically necessary transition from the greater "étatisme" of a centralized state toward that "self-managing socialist democracy" in which all but the ultimately indispensable attributes of a traditional state will have withered away.

If this last seems unlikely and utopian, the reader can write his own, intermediate scenarios. One is suggested by a collection of statements made recently by several highly placed officials at meetings or interviews at which this observer was present:

"We have decentralized about as far as we can go," a member-designate of the first federal government of the confederation created by the

amendments told a group of foreign visitors, "and as one of the authors of the amendments I am in favor of maximum decentralization. Now we shall have to see what is the minimum of central government possible in a modern state. This will mean a slight tendency back toward centralization, but with my colleagues I see it as my job to keep that movement as slight as possible."

"All this alarming talk about 'closed, autocratic republican markets' as an economic consequence of republican sovereignty is nonsense," said a member of the federal Party Presidium. "The economy itself, which means the modern sector of the economy, will not permit that to happen. They need a market bigger than Yugoslavia, certainly not smaller. We have recognized the laws of a market economy and those laws will not permit a closing of republican frontiers."

"Although we are known in the socialist world as protagonists of a market economy," a member of the Party's supreme Executive Bureau told me, "this does not mean we do not see the problems inherent in a market economy, such as assuring apartments to low-income workers or seeing that the cost of health services is a burden that cannot be equally distributed without reference to income. Similar problems are involved in education, social infrastructure in general, culture in underdeveloped areas, etc. Science and research, for example, will also certainly still need to enjoy federal funding."

Pragmatism, illuminated by the demands of a semimobilized citizenry for the kinds of services that it is currently fashionable to expect of a modern state, may triumph over both irrational extremes in ethnic nationalism and the idealism of "direct self-managing socialist democracy." And such an outcome might still qualify for labeling as a modernization "success story."

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## NOTES

1. *Borba* (Belgrade/Zagreb), March 6, 1966. Bakarić's title at the time was Political Secretary of the Central Committee of the L.C.C.
2. See Dennison I. Rusinow, *Yugoslavia and Stalin's Successors, 1968-69* [DIR-7-'69], and *Yugoslavia: 1969* [DIR-8-'69], Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XVI, Nos. 7 and 8, 1969.
3. Despite ritual lip-service to the need to widen the powers of "self-managers" in the economy at the expense of state powers, demands for a more active role by the state (implying more state controls and interventions) were legion among speakers representing enterprises at the Second Congress of Self-Managers in Sarajevo in May 1971. (The Congress will be analyzed in a later Fieldstaff Report.)
4. For example, *društveno dogovoranje* between a consumers' association and commercial enterprises, or between citizens and enterprises on the one hand and suppliers of social services (teachers, medical workers, etc.) on the other to reach agreement on the financing, standards, or administration of these services.
5. The amendments, which almost amount to a new constitution, will be analyzed in detail in a later Fieldstaff Report.
6. A detailed and admirably clear analysis of this process is in Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs* (New York, Doubleday, 1969), Chapter III.
7. Quotes from Tanjug report of the meeting, Priština, April 15, 1971.
8. Tanjug, May 8, 1971, and personal notes taken at Sarajevo.
9. Frane Barbieri in *NIN*, June 6, 1971, p. 7.
10. Lendvai, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

