

SOME ASPECTS OF MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION  
IN YUGOSLAVIA

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Yugoslavia, although undoubtedly not in Africa either geographically or demographically, is only partly in the Europe of developed economies, advanced urbanization, and completed "demographic transition." Like general demographic indicators, which vary regionally from extremely low fertility with gross reproduction rates of less than unity to the highest rates of natural increase in Europe,<sup>1</sup> patterns of urbanization and migration reflect regional differences in history, culture, ethnicity, and social structures and values that range from Central European to Western Asian. If the Yugoslav case is of general interest, it is primarily because these regional variations in one small and rapidly developing country with relatively comprehensive and reliable statistics make it a compact laboratory in which to study the relationship between differing rates of economic development and regionally distinct sets of other variables as factors in migration, urbanization, and their demographic effects.

What emerges is a set of seldom surprising conclusions:

— The rate and structure of rural-urban migration are functions of multivariant correlations among quantifiable economic and demographic-social factors and political and psychological factors which are difficult or impossible to quantify,

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but to which an experienced observer can ascribe approximate values with acceptable accuracy.

— The distinction between urban and rural can be uninformative and misleading when treated as a dichotomy if, as in Yugoslavia, over two-fifths of the nonagricultural population is nonurban and up to one-third of the urban population in some districts is agricultural.

— Whether urbanization as a complement of rapid industrialization proceeds more rapidly or more slowly than "de-agrarianization" depends primarily, especially in the first generation or two, on the historical structure and role of the city in a given society; and this is so because history is a major determinant not only of the attitude of potential rural-urban migrants toward the urban world but also of the physical and psychological capacity of the city to adapt and diversify its functions—i. e., to employ, house, and satisfy other physical and cultural demands of a rapidly expanding population.

— Whether a combination of rapid urbanization (in the narrow sense of the growth of towns) with increased rapid de-agrarianization is more likely to lead to the urbanization of rural areas (in the wider sense of the diffusion of "urban life styles") or to the "peasantization" of the city is also likely to depend on historically derived attitudes and other psychological factors that are difficult to quantify.

— The combination of an economically and socially undigestible volume of rural-urban migrants with jeopardized agricultural production and productivity as a result of such migration may lead planners and politicians to seek policies that will slow the flood.

– If these policies take the form of attempted industrial decentralization they raise questions of cost efficiency and infrastructure that a developing and still poor economy may not be able to afford to answer. While if they take the form of schemes to keep people on the farm, they solve few of the problems of rural overpopulation and in any case are usually romantically unrealistic in terms of social psychology; but a judicious combination of both forms, with careful attention to varying regional potentials for development, may alleviate if not solve both urban and rural problems.

– Whatever the form, the need to stem the flow indicates that social mobility is already *de facto* or is now *de jure* to be subject to new kinds of restrictions, a development with far-reaching political as well as social implications, especially for a “socialist” society whose official values place great emphasis on extensive modernization and full equality of opportunity.

– Finally, and of most interest in the context of the present project, the Yugoslav case shows only a weak correlation between levels of fertility and urbanization, while regional variations suggest that urbanization has little influence on fertility in either low or high natality areas, but significantly more in areas where fertility is falling from high to low levels, i. e., during “demographic transition.”

### Patterns of Urbanization

Despite rapid industrialization since the Second World War, accompanied by a rate of deagrarianization which reduced the number of people dependent on agriculture for their livelihood from about 75 to 49 per cent by 1961, Yugoslavia was then still the least urbanized country in Europe except for Albania. At the time of the 1961 census only 5.2 million persons, 28 per cent of a total population of 18.5 million, lived in the 348 communities defined by Yugoslav criteria as urban. Regional levels ranged from 38.7 per cent in the Vojvodina to 19.5 per cent in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While equivalent data are not yet available from the April 1971 census, my own rough calculations based on provisional data published by two of the six republics suggest that the present country-wide figure will be about 34-35 per cent of today's 20.5 million Yugoslavs. Most of even these urban settlements, moreover, are small

towns, since the Yugoslav definition, which relates total population to the percentage of nonagricultural population, includes 53 places with only 2,000-3,000 inhabitants.<sup>2</sup> Thus 69 per cent of all “urban” communities in 1961 had less than 10,000 inhabitants, while only 14 had populations of 50,000 or more (see Tables I and II).

On the other hand, the urban population has traditionally been concentrated in medium-sized and large towns. Only one million or 20 per cent of the 1961 total urban population lived in the 240 communities with 2,000 to 10,000 inhabitants classified as urban, while 108 towns with 10,000 or more inhabitants accounted for the remaining 80 per cent. The 14 communities with 50,000 or more inhabitants contained 42 per cent of the urban and 11 per cent of the total population.

Regional differences in the number and density of towns, their growth rates, and rates of addition of new towns are primarily attributable to different levels and intensity of economic development, but also to historical conditions. Professor Jack Fisher points out that cities in the north and along the coast, areas of former Hapsburg and Venetian domination, tend to be “rank-size” in distribution, while cities of the south, which was part of the Ottoman Empire until the mid-nineteenth or early twentieth century, reveal a “primate” distribution.<sup>3</sup> A parallel distinction exists between the historic origins and functions of cities in these two zones. In Catholic Slovenia and Croatia, as in Central and Western Europe, castles, other feudal administrative centers, and the traditional marketplaces associated with them provided the core of medieval towns which grew into typical “precapitalist” and then “capitalist” cities with diversified functions and values that prepared them for a relatively easy expansion and transition to industrialism. In Dalmatia, as in other Mediterranean lands, towns originated as commercial seaports, often in the form of Greek or Roman colonies, and then followed a similar evolution, albeit stunted by the secular decline in Adriatic commerce since the seventeenth century. After the Ottoman conquest of the Orthodox south, however, such towns as existed in Serbia, Macedonia, and (with some exceptions) Bosnia-Herzegovina, were Turkish garrison and administrative centers, ethnically and functionally alien enclaves until the progressive withdrawal of the Turks from 1817 to 1912.

The results of these differences have been as Joel Halpern describes them:

In the Orthodox areas urban culture has emerged out of the peasant society during the past century, while in other parts of Yugoslavia the urban sub-culture has been constantly present although changing in composition and organization. This is clearly revealed in the nature of Yugoslav cities. The type epitomized by Belgrade and clearly seen in many smaller Serbian towns such as Niš has what might be called a disappearing past and a vital present. The Turks left few enduring architectural monuments or viable administrative traditions. The preserved wood and plaster houses, mosques and even the bridges provide no basis for the foundation of a modern city. Another type of city is caught in the embrace of its past and is seeking to harmonize with the present. The crowded central bazaar of Sarajevo is an obstacle to city planners, but parts of it have been left untouched, at best as a reminder of the past and as a tourist attraction. In Zagreb and Ljubljana by contrast the town squares and public buildings of the Austrian period are a reproach to modern developments and a challenge to planners, while the town walls serve as points of departure for expansion. . . .

Not only is the industrial tradition older in the western area, and the cities themselves more adaptable to the needs of an expanding technology without being completely redesigned, but also the existing types of social systems in rural areas have facilitated urbanization. Peasantization of the towns is not so clearly noticeable in Croatia and Slovenia because there has been more continuity and interdependence in rural-urban relationships.<sup>4</sup>

The separate histories and cultures of Yugoslavia's regions have affected the pattern of urbanization in yet another way. Like Italy or Germany, but unlike France and England, there is no single historic metropolis, while unlike any of these ethnically homogenous states there is also no single

city which all Yugoslavs regard as their national, "spiritual" capital.<sup>5</sup> In contemporary, Titoist Yugoslavia these historic and ethnic factors favoring a polycentric pattern of urbanization have been powerfully reinforced by the postwar federal structure based on ethnic and historic divisions; by the Communist regime's early ideological and political commitment to extensive economic potentials; and more recently by the increasing real autonomy of the six republics, two provinces, and the 500 communes, all with their own development plans and widening tax powers.

The legacy of history, as important a determinant of regional differences in urban patterns as differing rates of economic development, is therefore the source of several apparent anomalies. Slovenia, economically and culturally the most developed of the eight federal units, ranks fifth in level of urbanization (24.7 per cent in 1961), just above least developed Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and well below the Yugoslav average. In 1971 only 21 Slovene towns had more than 5,000 inhabitants and only nine had more than 10,000. They contained 23 per cent of the Republic's population, but 43 per cent of these were concentrated in Ljubljana, the capital (population 173,000), and even today only one other town has more than 50,000 inhabitants. As in neighboring Austria, with which it is historically linked, small communities predominate, many non-agricultural in function, so that fully 96 per cent of all settlements with over 2,000 inhabitants are classified as urban.

At the other extreme, underdeveloped Macedonia is considered "hyperurbanized," with 35 per cent of the population designated as urban in 1961—the second highest level in the country—despite a low level of de-agrarianization. A high proportion of these, moreover, are concentrated in the capital, Skopje, whose 1971 population of 312,000 includes 19 per cent of all Macedonians and represents a growth of 88.5 per cent since 1961—especially remarkable if one recalls that 80 per cent of the city was destroyed in the disastrous earthquake of 1963!

The rich agricultural province of the Vojvodina offers yet another kind of urban anomaly with an historical explanation. The average size of Vojvodina communities is larger than anywhere

else in the country, but so is the percentage of agricultural population in even the largest of these communities. Both are consequences of eighteenth-century resettlement of a new Hapsburg frontier province which took the form of what now might be called large agrocommunes, designed simultaneously for self-defense against the nearby Turks and for optimal exploitation of the richest soil in the Empire. As a result, the province today ranks first in level of urbanization in Yugoslavia (38.7 per cent in 1961), but a record 34 per cent of this urban population is agricultural. Moreover a number of large communities, including three with over 10,000 inhabitants, are disqualified from classification as "urban" because the percentage of agricultural population exceeds the limits set by the Yugoslav definition. In consequence only 13 per cent of all Vojvodina communities with 2,000 or more inhabitants are classed as urban, a striking contrast with the equivalent figure for Slovenia of 96 per cent.

**The Growth of Towns**

Even if the rate of urbanization in postwar Yugoslavia is unimpressive in comparison with that experienced by many other developing (and some developed) countries, it has impressed the Yugoslavs, who are bewildered by the growth of their cities, unaccustomed to knowing so few of the people they pass on the street, made continually aware of the peasantization brought to old urban centers by the flood of rural-urban migrants who now often comprise an absolute majority, and

struggling with the familiar problems of undigested growth.

The total urban population increased by two million persons between 1948 (3.1 million urbanized) and 1961 (5.2 million). Between 1953 and 1961 the population of the 241 towns classified as urban in 1953 grew by 29 per cent, while if the 107 towns reclassified as urban between those two censuses are included the total urban population grew by 44.3 per cent, or from 21.7 to 28.3 per cent of all Yugoslavs.

These growth rates have meant that between 1953 and 1961 the absolute increase in the urban population (by 1,553,000 persons, an average annual increase of 43.5 per thousand) precisely absorbed the total increase in Yugoslavia's population (1,558,000, an average annual increase of 10.9 per thousand). In several regions, moreover, urban growth exceeded the region's natural increase by nearly 50 per cent, with the ratio of urban to total population growth ranging from 49.5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 50 in Kosovo to 113.6 in Slovenia, 120.8 in Serbia proper, 137 in Vojvodina, 147.4 in Croatia and 148.2 in Macedonia.

In the last ten years, according to provisional data from the 1971 census, the nine cities with over 100,000 inhabitants (there were seven in 1961) and the two regional capitals with less than 100,000 inhabitants have recorded the following percentage increases in population:

*go to orig ms.*

	1971 pop. (in thousands)		Increase 1961-71 city	1971/1961 indices Republic*
*** Belgrade	742	156	126.7	108.9
** Zagreb	566	135	131.4	106.6
** Skopje	312	147	188.5	117.2
** Sarajevo	244	32	137.1	114.3
** Ljubljana	174	39	129.3	108.9
** Novi Sad	142	39	138.3	105.3
Rijeka			106.6	
Split	157	58	158	106.6
Niš	127	46	156	108.9
** Pristina	70	31	180.1	129.2
** Titograd	55	25	186.6	112.5

\*Province in which located  
 \*\*Republican/provincial capital  
 \*\*\*Federal and Republic of Serbia capital

Details of the 1961-1971 growth of all towns are presently available for only two of the federal units, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. For what they are worth—they cannot be taken as typical

since there is no such thing—these partial results illustrate the following development of towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants:

	size of town (in thousands)	no. of towns in category		growth indices 1971/61
Bosnia-Herzegovina (total pop. growth index 114.2%)	10 - 20	6	4	136; 120; 135; 111
	20 - 30	-	4	152; 142; 142; 155
	30 - 50	3	1	135
	50	2	4	147; 141; 140; 149
Slovenia (total pop growth index 108.9%)	10 - 20	3	5	111; 169; 104; 179; 195
	20 - 30	2	1	127
	30 - 50	-	1	134
	50	2	2	130; 118

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the least urbanized of all the federal units in 1961 (19.5 per cent urban, as noted above), the percentage of the population living in towns of 10,000 or more inhabitants increased from 11.8 per cent in 1961 to 17 per cent (635,896 persons) in 1971. Of these 38 per cent live in Sarajevo, the capital, and 69 per cent in the four towns (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Zenica) with more than 50,000 inhabitants. It is worth noting that ten years ago the equivalent figures were 49 per cent in Sarajevo and 80 per cent in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Zenica. If the distribution is still "primate," it is less so than it was. This seems to confirm a trend that was already indicated throughout the country when the 1961 census revealed that the highest growth rates were in towns with 20,000-50,000 inhabitants. In the past decade the relationship between high growth rates and community size—at least in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia—presents a more random pattern, but it is interesting that smaller urban communities with high growth rates in these republics are almost always communal (equivalent to county) capitals, while urban communities with declining or below average growth rates are usually either not communal capitals or are in communes with high emigration rates. This suggests that the further decentralization of political and fiscal power which took place during the 1960s is having a significant impact on migration and urbanization. If data from Serbia show a similar trend, one will be able to conclude that the locus of political

power is as important as the locus of economic development in determining the emerging pattern of the "primate" form of urbanization described by Fisher as characteristic of southern Yugoslavia is being gradually replaced (except in Macedonia?) by a "rank-size" distribution.

#### Patterns of Rural-Urban Migration<sup>6</sup>

Urban growth rates indicate that immigration plays a more important role than natural increase in the rapid expansion of the urban sector since the war. Although direct data are not available, Yugoslav demographers estimate that the share of natural increase in the growth by 1,071,000 persons recorded between 1953 and 1961 by the 241 communities classified as urban in 1953 was somewhere between 338,000 and 405,000, and the remainder was due to increased immigration. Of the total urban population in 1961, 58.4 per cent were born elsewhere. (Among the population as a whole—rural and urban—only 37.5 per cent were not born where they lived in 1961.) As a result of this influx only 7 per cent of Yugoslav urban communities were considered autochthonous (two-thirds or more native inhabitants), 60 per cent were classed as mixed (between one-third and two-thirds native-born), and 33 per cent were defined as migratory (less than one-third native-born). Towns with 30,000-50,000 inhabitants were usually regarded as mixed and cities with over 50,000 were migratory. Only 30 per cent of the

inhabitants of Belgrade, the federal capital, were native Beogradjani. Other republican capitals recorded similar levels of native born inhabitants: Zagreb 36 per cent, Titograd 38 per cent, Ljubljana and Skopje 41 per cent, and Sarajevo 44 per cent.

In terms of origin (place from which they emigrated), 32 per cent of the total urban population—i.e., 56 per cent of the immigrant population—had come from rural, 5.7 per cent from semirural, and 19.5 per cent from other urban communities (see Table III). It can be assumed that many of the last group were villagers by birth, since the census recorded only the last migration. Between 1953 and 1961 an estimated 90,000 persons moved from rural to urban communities each year.

With one major and some minor exceptions, the direction of this migratory movement follows traditional lines: from the mountains of the south and west to the plains and valleys of the north and east. Out of a total of 20 demographic regions in Yugoslavia, seven appeared as immigrant regions: Šumadija with Belgrade in northern Serbia proper; the Banat and Sylvania-Bačka (the whole Vojvodina); Slavonia and Central Croatia (the Sava and Drava valley regions of Croatia); central Bosnia; and western Slovenia. All the rest show a net emigration balance, but chief among them are all but one of the regions that constitute the great highland belt that stretches southeast from the Rijeka-Zagreb line and that includes the Lika and Croatian Littoral, Bosanska Krajina, Herzegovina, Eastern Bosnia, Montenegro, and Southern Morava in Serbia. The major deviation from tradition on these lists is central Bosnia where massive industrialization along the Sarajevo-Zenica axis during the early years of the Communist regime has converted one portion of the fecund Dinaric highlands into an important immigrant region. Bosnia was partly intended as an example of development of an underdeveloped area by state socialism but its growth was primarily motivated by a desire to put the country's heavy industrial base in an inaccessible area (this was at the height of the quarrel with Stalin's Cominform and traditional industrial centers in the northern valleys were particularly vulnerable to attack from the East).

More specific directions of movement are to a large degree determined and limited by ethnicity. Thus, Serbia, even more than the federal and

republican capital of Belgrade, has received the lion's share of interrepublican migrants. Although less developed and economically dynamic than Slovenia or the Croato-Slavonian valleys, Serbian cities are not only the natural primary pole of attraction for rural-urban migrants from within the republic, but also for Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia. Emigrant regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a nationally mixed republic of Serbs, Croats, and Yugoslav Muslims, send their surplus population in three directions, to their own Central Bosnian industrial region, to Serbia (including the Vojvodina), and to Croatia. Yet, developed Slovenia, with the highest rate of *intrarepublican* migration of any federal unit and potentially attractive to economically motivated migrants, is protected against the outside by its distinct language and culture (and notorious clan-nishness) and so receives very few immigrants from the rest of the country. It thus remains, except for miniscule Italian and Magyar minorities along the frontiers, the only ethnically homogenous republic in Yugoslavia.

Analysis by Yugoslav demographers of the factors involved in rural-urban migration have presented a set of familiar conclusions. As Dr. Ginić summarizes them:

The most frequent reasons given for leaving the village, or agriculture, have been difficult conditions of existence in agriculture—as a consequence of inherited agrarian overpopulation or of modernization or mechanization of agricultural production—as well as differences between the level of personal income from agriculture and the possibility of higher earnings in a city in some non-agricultural activity . . . . On the other hand, the prospect of higher incomes in many cases is not of primary importance; often it is the attractiveness of life in a larger city . . . . The development of urban economies especially the growth of tertiary activities, has worked positively on the volume of village-city migration and on the growth of urban population. Big cities have been attractive especially for the work force from those districts in which the "tertiary attraction" has been inadequate and which therefore have been unable to hold the "best" segment of their populations.<sup>7</sup>

The Center for Demographic Research has done a statistical analysis of correlations, employing as independent variables eight "demographic-social characteristics" and seven "economic characteristics" and relating them to average annual migration rates. The results, which evaluate the determinants of migrations among demographic regions and not of rural-urban migration as a specific category, include the following:<sup>8</sup>

- The rate of natural increase of the population has an influence on migration. The coefficient of correlation is negative and equals -0.47916, and the coefficient of determination suggests that 22.9 per cent of variations in migratory rates can be attributed to this factor. Almost all demographic regions with very high rates of natural increase have more emigrants than immigrants, the only significant exception is Central Bosnia, as noted.

- The economic structure of the population is also important, as is seen in statistically significant positive correlation coefficients between migration balances and the percentage of the total nonagricultural population (0.53668, coefficient of determination .288), or the percentage of economically active nonagricultural population (0.65748, coefficient of determination .432). Multiple correlation tables associating these three factors with the rate of natural increase explain the apparent anomaly of Central Bosnia, where 72 per cent of the total labor force in 1961 had nonagricultural jobs, so that the region, despite a very high rate of natural increase, had a high positive migration balance. In Eastern Serbia, on the other hand, although a very low percentage of the working population was engaged in nonagricultural jobs (24 per cent), the migration balance was even because the region (a special case of extraordinarily depressed rural fertility, as noted in last year's Yugoslav population survey) has the lowest rate of natural increase (2.8 per thousand) in the country. Regions with the highest rate of emigration are those in which these three factors all operate in the same direction.

- The correlation coefficient between per capita national income and the migration balance is also high (0.62437), making it the most significant of the economic factors tested in the study. (Others included income from industry and crafts per person over ten years of age [0.55222], gross personal income per employed person [0.45881], value of

capital equipment per person over ten years of age [0.50605], et al.)

- Other significant factors included population density (0.58242), the percentage of population of working age (0.58793), and the percentage of urban population (0.89405).

Of the factors tested, the statistically *least* significant included the percentage of active population (0.26980), the percentage of women in the total active agricultural population (0.19780)—(but the analyst had some doubts about the method of inquiry on this point)—and the number of dwellings constructed per 1,000 persons over ten years of age (0.19265). This last is statistical proof of the commonly observed phenomenon that a large city in which one has no hope of finding an apartment for many years is still more attractive to migrants than a provincial town with an ambitious program of housing construction; but it also reflects the objectively curious if politically explainable fact that rates of housing construction have in recent years been higher in rural and mixed settlements than in urban communities in most parts of the country.

#### Urbanization and De-agrarianization

One of the most interesting aspects of the demographic scene in Yugoslavia is that the rate of urbanization, while too fast in terms of the ability of the cities to absorb it, has not kept up with an even faster rate of economic development in many parts of the country. This phenomenon has meant the very rapid growth of a population sector with increasing economic, demographic, and even political importance: nonagrarian but nonurban Yugoslavs who work in a town but do not live there (or whose place of work does not become a town because they do not live there), and who may serve as a vehicle for the urbanization of the countryside—in the wider sense of the term—in the same way that their ex-country cousins who did migrate contribute to the increased peasant class within the city.

A few relevant statistics should be noted here:

- Between 1953 and 1961 nearly 2,000,000 Yugoslavs transferred from agricultural to nonagricultural sources of livelihood, but only about

480,000 of these also moved (at a rate of 60,000 each year) to urban communities.<sup>9</sup> From this it appears that each year about 180,000 Yugoslavs moved from the classification of agrarian to non-agrarian without moving to a town, representing three times the rate of transfer from rural domicile and agriculture to nonagriculture with an urban domicile.

- As of 1961 over 42 per cent of Yugoslavia's nonagricultural population did not live in urban communities. In Slovenia, with its peculiar aversion to urban life, the figure was 59 per cent; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with rapid recent industrialization in a region almost without cities and under a system that gave low priority to housing and urban development, it was 58 per cent; and in Croatia and Kosovo it was 48 per cent. The economic importance of the sector is reflected by the fact that nonagricultural activities represented 48 per cent of rural income in Yugoslavia. While over half of the 2.5 million "active males" listed as residing on agricultural holdings (total population so listed 12.5 million) were employed outside of farming. One-third of all agricultural holdings had someone employed full time off the land. Nor were these all small land-holders: 25 per cent of them lived on farms with four hectares or more of land, well above the Yugoslav median of about 2.5 hectares, and the households of these peasant-workers owned collectively one-third of all agricultural land.

One consequence of the large size of the non-urban, nonagricultural sector is that daily or weekend migrations are a widespread necessity in many areas, but are particularly common in Slovenia, Bosnia, and in some parts of Croatia. In Slovenia, for example, the number of workers and employees who are employed outside their community of residence in 1961 was 39 per cent of the total number of workers and employees in that republic; in Bosnia-Herzegovina the equivalent figure was 33 per cent, and in Kosovo and Montenegro 30 per cent. In a 1957 survey it was found that over 100,000 of those employed in the Zagreb economy were daily migrants from surrounding communities. The 1961 census recorded one million such migrants in the country as a whole.

This form of intensive daily urban-rural contact ought and often does have a major impact on rural

values and life styles in the districts from which the migrants come. Moreover, this influence is once again a field in which the quality of the impact varies as a function of differing historical roles of the city (and consequently of rural attitudes toward the city) in various parts of the country, a factor capable of raising or lowering the threshold of rural resistance to this form of urbanization. The outstanding example is Belgrade itself, where the effect of the city on even the nearest villages and suburbs was until recently conspicuous by its absence, despite a large volume of daily migrations. A study by Yugoslav demographers in 1957 found that 86 per cent of the 57 communities in the Belgrade area had a "distinctly rural character" when measured in terms of architecture, organization, "cultural level," literacy rates, etc.<sup>10</sup> Such resistance, however, appears in the longer run to be ephemeral. While the peasant character of the Belgrade area (and indeed of the city itself!) was still very marked as late as 1964, great changes are now noticeable. New houses are being built in the villages of nearby Sumadija, nearly identical to single-family dwellings going up within the city limits not only in construction materials but in the arrangement of rooms and in the conveniences they contain.<sup>11</sup>

From the picture as a whole Dr. Ginić, the Belgrade demographer who has made a special study of urbanization, concludes that:

... the fact that the transfer of agricultural population to non-agricultural activities did not force the population from the village suggests two things. First that changes in the economic structure of the population also took place in the village, i. e., outside cities, because there, too, new possibilities are created for employment. Second, the existence of a relatively large section of non-agricultural, non-urban population can mean that the urbanization process here in Yugoslavia has a tendency toward decentralized urbanization, i. e., urbanization of suburban and village settlements (especially in Slovenia). On the other hand, the fact that there exists a significant section of the non-agricultural population who work in the city but do not live there bears witness to the insufficiency of housing construction in the cities.<sup>12</sup>



## Urbanization and Fertility

Urbanization has not had an important effect on fertility in Yugoslavia. In 1959, for example, the birthrate of the urban population was 18.9 per thousand and that of the nonurban population was 24.7 per thousand. Because of lower death rates in urban environments, there was even less difference between the rates of natural increase in the two sectors: 11.6 per thousand for urban and 13.9 for nonurban. Since that year the birthrate in all regions except Kosovo has continued to decline, until it was 17.6 per thousand (natural increase 8.7 per thousand) in the country as a whole in 1970, but according to Yugoslav demographers it has declined more slowly in urban than in rural areas, so that the gap has grown even narrower.<sup>1 3</sup>

Regional variations in these figures reveal two significantly deviant republics. Only in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the urban-rural birthrate disparity (35.9 vs. 24.5 per thousand) larger than the all-Yugoslav figure. At the other extreme is Montenegro, where the urban birthrate (31.7) is higher than the nonurban (26.4). In Serbia and the Vojvodina there is virtually no incongruity. In the other federal units the differences between the two rates show only a small range, from 4.6 per thousand in Kosovo through 4.8 per thousand in Slovenia and Macedonia to 5.1 per thousand in Croatia. What is striking, and evident if the data are presented in tabular form (see Table IV for crude birth, death, and natural increase rates), is that the differences among the republics and provinces are far greater than the differences between urban and rural rates in any republic or province.

The reasons for the small overall difference certainly include the fact that some fertility-determining factors work in opposite directions in the two environments. Rural-urban migration, for example, produces a younger, more fecund urban population and an older, less fecund rural one, thus favoring higher urban birthrates, but this effect is counterbalanced by later marriage and higher levels of education (especially of women) in the city. Also depressing urban fertility should be the higher percentage of working women and the high number of working people, including women, who are employed outside their town of residence. Similarly, infant mortality rates, statistically proven to be an important factor in fertility, are significantly

higher in nonurban settlements and raise the relative birthrate there. On the other hand, rural fertility should be depressed and urban encouraged by another aspect of rural-urban migration: the number of female graduates of rural elementary schools who migrate to town is considerably larger than the number of male graduates who do so (a primary education having a greater tendency to alienate girls from village life than boys). While peasant girls can and do marry urban men, peasant boys only marry peasant girls; all of which adds up to more men than women of active age in nonurban regions (1,020 men for every 1,000 women in the age group 20-29 in 1961; cf. 1,039 women for every 1,000 men in the same urban group), and a significant number of unmarried male peasants, in happier days a very rare thing.

A more detailed examination of the data by demographic regions reveals further clues that point to a more particular explanation of somewhat greater general interest. Among regions with high rates of rural-urban migration there are some (chiefly in Serbia proper, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Vojvodina) in which the migrants are drawn from rural areas where fertility was already low or at an advanced stage of decline. Others with still high rural fertility are regions in which de-agrarianization lags considerably behind urbanization (Macedonia) or in which both are still at a very low level (Kosovo). In all these cases—both where “demographic transition” has reached or is nearing completion and where it has hardly begun—the move to a city has made little difference to fertility. The Bosnian exception proves the rule: there rapid urbanization *and* rapid de-agrarianization have occurred together in high fertility regions forcing a “demographic transition,” which has consequently begun in the new urban sector by creating the only significant (but presumably transient) gap between urban and rural fertility rates.

Yugoslav demographers have come to much the same conclusion after more thorough statistical analysis. Dr. Miroslav Rašević found in his detailed study of Yugoslav fertility determinants “that the coefficient of simple correlation [between fertility and level of urbanization] is negative and equals -0.255, while its value is illustrated by the coefficient of determination, which shows that to this factor can be ascribed only about 6 per cent of the

variations in the general fertility rate.” (Compare this with -0.465 and 21 per cent for level of economic development as measured by per capita national income, -0.426 and 18 per cent of working women 20-34 years of age, 0.701 and 49 per cent of the population with three years of school or less, 0.754 and 56 per cent for the infant death rate, etc.) He explains this phenomenon as follows:

The reason for the weak relationship between fertility and level of urbanization is probably to be sought in the small differences that exist in fertility between the populations of urban and rural settlements. This is confirmed by the evidence of Dr. Ginić for Serbia and of Dr. Rendulić for Croatia. According to them, in many urban settlements of Serbia proper, the Vojvodina, and Croatia the general level of natality is in fact somewhat higher than in village settlements, while only in Kosovo-Metohija as a whole does the peasant population have a rather higher natality. Generally speaking the situation is similar in other republics. In Slovenia, for example, the general fertility level is much the same in most regions (in five regions 71-77 per thousand, lowest in Ljubljana with 60 per thousand, and highest in Dolenjsko, 81 per thousand), although the percentage of urban population is very different (Ljubljana 67 per cent, Dolenjsko 10 per cent, and in the rest 7, 20, 21, 29, and 43 per cent). In Bosnia and Herzegovina however there is a higher correlation between urbanization and fertility: It [fertility] is highest in Grmeč, Kozara, Ukrina, Ozrenski district, Visočki district, Trebinje [all among the least urbanized]. But in this republic, too, there are exceptions. For example, Zenički and Birčanski districts have the same fertility level (176 and 174) but very different percentages of urban population (28.2 and 4.3 per cent). The level of urbanization is the same in Birčanski and Livanjski districts (4.3 and 4.0 per cent) but the level of fertility is different (174 and 110). Taking all this into consideration, it would appear that urbanization has little influence on fertility of the population in

low natality and high natality areas, but significantly more in areas where fertility is falling from high to low levels. Its role is important at the time of demographic transition, when together with other social factors (economic development, spread of education) it contributes to the diffusion of birth control and family planning, while later it has an increasing influence on the remaining settlements as well.<sup>14</sup>

### Of Consequences, Problems, and Solutions

The rate of rural-urban migration in recent years has confronted Yugoslav politicians and planners with a dilemma that is familiar in many developing countries. A social revolution led by Communists crying “electrification and industrialization” and manned by peasants with high expectations, followed by a period of rapid, extensive industrialization with jobs for all comers and special social status to “workers,” contributed to a widespread acceptance of industrial and urban values as aspirations toward which all ambitious men should strive. The migration influx came faster than industry and town could absorb. While back on the farm, neglected by the regime, agriculture suffered because departing manpower, however underemployed it had been, was not replaced rapidly enough by mechanization and improved land use. Then an economic reform, rational in turning to intensive development and in accepting lower growth rates now that a medium stage of development had been achieved, brought a drastic cut in the number of new jobs, affecting primarily unskilled and semiskilled categories.

The country’s politicians, with the characteristic sociological irresponsibility of their profession, talked blithely of sending surplus labor back to the farms. Instead, as in many other Mediterranean countries, the surplus labor migrated to northern and Western Europe—where 682,262 Yugoslavs, 3.3 per cent of the total population, were working when the census was taken in April 1971. This measure merely relieved the pressure at the critical moment, without solving the problem.

The dilemma remains: if the rural-urban migration flood cannot be absorbed, it must be slowed or stopped. If it is, the problem of rural overpopulation will not be solved. A new class division, politically important to the legitimacy of a socialist

system, with impermeable boundaries is created between a closed proletarian aristocracy of those who made it into city and factory while the doors were open and a residual peasantry still too large to get rich and condemned to stay where they are. Nor is it at all clear how one can persuade people to stay down on the farm, much less go back there, once urban and industrial values have been widely accepted.

The debate has been intensive and the literature extensive. Here, by way of conclusion to this Report, and without further comment, are the conclusions and recommendations of some of the most expert of the participants, the group of Belgrade demographers whose detailed study of migration has just been published:

The reduction of the rural to the advantage of the urban population is developing with varying intensity and is basically altering the characteristics of both villages and cities. The rural population ages, the urban becomes younger. The cities receive a work force in its best years, but unfortunately largely unskilled, which only now is becoming accustomed to industrial work. From this comes a relatively low industrial productivity. The new work force which arrives from villages gives rise to numerous problems in cities and industrial communities (in connection with housing, transport, supplies, communal services, etc.). It has not proved possible to solve these problems as quickly as the migratory movement has taken place, so that they have often been aggravated, although not with the same intensity in all republics. A special problem arising from this spontaneous abandonment of the village has been the employment of unskilled labor in the cities. This problem has been particularly serious in recent years. It is today partly ameliorated by the temporary employment of surplus labor abroad . . . On the other hand, problems appear in the village: agriculture is left to the older generations . . . to aging households no longer able to cultivate their land . . .

The transfer of a large number of farmers to work in industry has generated

a labor surplus in industry, which has often led to a fall in labor productivity. Especially excessive has been the unskilled labor force, which in reality is only apparently employed. According to some surveys, there have even been large industrial enterprises which could have performed the same operations with half as many workers, a fact clearly indicative of their productivity. Therefore it is not surprising that after the economic reform a number of enterprises gave "rewards" to unskilled, usually ex-agricultural workers to leave industry and return to the village . . .

Rural-urban migration, although justified in postwar conditions if in our opinion excessive, is difficult to stop or adjust to the appropriate level. . . . The question is therefore posed whether departures from the village are always justified and always ought to be supported. In our opinion, the situation in this regard varies by districts. In those districts where the demographic pressure of the agricultural population is great, and where the quality of the land is such that successful crops are those which do not demand a larger engagement of labor, this departure from agriculture certainly must be accelerated. On the other hand, if the areas in question are those in which entire agricultural complexes are left uncultivated because the phenomenon of "flight from the village" has been set in motion, this phenomenon should be stopped. Because migration from agriculture, to a large degree favored during the first postwar years, has not always been justified by economic reasons. The attractiveness of the city, greater income possibilities than in agriculture, etc., have often been the motivation. Although there has always been serious agrarian overpopulation in our country, one must consider whether it is not better in present circumstances to maintain even under-employment in agriculture rather than have it burden industry, which in a period of adopting modern technology has an ever smaller need for unskilled labor. For this reason it seems to us that it is essential that rural-urban migration

develop in a planned way, that is, that it is necessary to take a close look at all the consequences of excessive migration. In our opinion there are two ways to resolve this: either create wider possibilities for the employment of unskilled labor coming from agriculture, or, on the contrary, consider the possibility of somehow tying youth to the village, that is to agriculture. At a conference on problems of employment [held at Vrnjacka Banja in March 1968] several proposals were made in connection with this second possibility. These are the ones which seemed to us most acceptable: One group of economists proposed that labor engaged in the private agricultural sector [which owns and works 84 per cent of agricultural land in Yugoslavia] be enlarged by forcing those kinds of production which are in deficit on the market but which generally require a relatively large quantity of live labor [vegetables, fruit, tobacco, and other industrial crops, etc.]. At the same time they considered it particularly necessary to resolve the question of the use of several hundred thousand hectares of abandoned arable agricultural land, therewith ensuring work for a larger number of individual [i. e., private] farmers.

A second group of experts discussed the present maximum land holding of 10 hectares per agricultural household. It was suggested that since individual producers can [now] own all kinds of equipment, even large agricultural machines, there is no reason to hold to the present land maximum. Raising the maximum to 20-30

hectares, it was felt, would enable the owner better to employ his energy and to achieve an income equal to that of an industrial worker, thus widening possibilities for employing and keeping labor in the village. [Thus Dr. Sveta Popović, in his paper, suggested that the 1953 law on landholding maximums had a primarily political significance. At the time it was adopted, and also later it had little economic effect. . .]

Earlier in this section we posed the question of how one can tie youth to the village, that is to agriculture. Let us advance our own view on this question. The obligatory eight-year school does not prepare young people for work on individual [private] agricultural properties. In school the village child becomes acquainted with the advantages of life in the city [shorter working day, obligatory weekly holiday, greater possibilities for personal upward mobility and leisure, greater personal independence, etc.]. All of this influences young people, so that after eight years of schooling they eagerly leave for the city, without considering whether they will be able to find employment there. It is consequently necessary to consider whether obligatory schooling should be maintained for this long and in this form. This is one important question. And finally, if one wishes to check the transfer of population from villages to cities one must also revise the existing policy of taxing private agricultural producers.<sup>15</sup>

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## NOTES

1. See Dennison I. Rusinow, *Population Review 1970: Yugoslavia* [DIR-1-'70], Fieldstaff Reports, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1970.

2. The Yugoslav definition considers as urban all communities which have:

| Total no.<br>of inhabitants | % of nonfarm<br>population |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| a) 2,000 - 2,999            | 90 and more                |
| b) 3,000 - 9,999            | 70 and more                |
| c) 10,000 - 14,999          | 40 and more                |
| d) 15,000 and more          | 30 and more                |

Again, it is regional differences that make such a definition seem appropriate. In some areas like the Vojvodina, as will be seen, very large communities are almost entirely agrarian, while in others what should by size be a village performs the functions of a town and has almost no inhabitants employed in agriculture.

3. Jack C. Fisher, *Yugoslavia - A Multinational State* (San Francisco, 1966), pp. 43-8. The former, said to be characteristic of "a more advanced stage of development," is defined as "a distribution of cities in terms of their size that is log-normal in form, that is, the progression of city sizes from smallest to largest is systematic and exponential." The latter, found "in some less advanced cultures . . . represents a situation where a stratum of small towns and cities is dominated by one or a few very large cities without intermediate size groups."

4. Joel Halpern, "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia," in *Human Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1965), pp. 172f. (The second paragraph quoted is in the original mss. version but not in the published article.)

5. The interwar and immediate postwar periods of highly centralized government were too brief to alter this situation, although a trend toward bipolarism, centering on Belgrade as the political and Zagreb as the financial capital of the interwar Yugoslav Kingdom, was briefly observable.

6. This and subsequent sections are based primarily on a collective study by associates of the Center for Demographic Research of the Institute of Social Science in Belgrade, published in November 1971 as *Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije* (389 pp.), supplemented by Dr. Ivanka Ginić's earlier study, *Dinamika i struktura gradskog stanovništva Jugoslavije* (1967). Until these studies, which are based on indirect methods (chiefly analysis of census data), there was little reliable material on the subject, since

only Slovenia and Belgrade keep a population register and a current statistical coverage of migrations based on it. For the same reason little can be said about migratory movements since 1961 until the 1971 census is similarly analyzed.

7. Ivanka Ginić in *Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije*, p. 73, and *Dinamika i struktura gradskog stanovništva Jugoslavije*, p. 84.

8. Dušan Breznik in *Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije*, Ch. VI, passim.

9. This is not, of course, the total volume of rural-urban migration (roughly 90,000 per annum), since not all rural-urban migrants were agricultural workers or their dependants before migration. The figure of 60,000 is based on the assumption that the ratio of agricultural to nonagricultural among the migrants is the same as among the rural population as a whole, where it was 7:3 in 1961 (total rural population 13.3 million, of whom 9.4 million agricultural and 3.9 million nonagricultural). For the complex calculations on which all these figures are based, since direct data do not exist, see Ginić, *op. cit.*, pp. 84ff (but cf. the table on p. 124, which shows the total nonagricultural, nonurban population in 1961 to be 937,000 persons or 31.5 per cent larger than in 1953).

10. M. Macura and I. Ginić, "Struktura naselja beogradske okoline" (paper read at a 1958 symposium and quoted in Ginić, *op. cit.*, p. 7n).

11. See also Joel Halpern, *op. cit.* and "Yugoslavia: Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State," in Wayne Vucinich (ed.), *Contemporary Yugoslavia* (Berkeley, 1969).

12. Ginić, *op. cit.*, p. 75 (cf. the same author's more detailed analysis by regions in *Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije*, pp. 120ff.).

13. It is somewhat larger if fertility rates (number of live-born per thousand women aged 15 to 49) are used instead of crude birthrates. On this calculation the urban fertility rate was 73.32 and the nonurban was 98.05 in 1961; that is, one baby was born to each 10 fertile rural women and to each 14 fertile urban ones (Ginić, *op. cit.*, p. 68, with a table showing regional variations).

14. Miroslav Rašević, *Determinante fertiliteta stanovništva u Jugoslaviji* (Beograd, 1971), pp. 150f.

15. *Migracije stanovništva Jugoslavije, op. cit.*, pp. 331-5. On the point about village schooling in the final paragraph, Joel Halpern in his excellent chapter in Vucinich, *op. cit.*, has a description of changes in Yugoslav elementary school textbooks in recent years reflecting the shift from rural to

urban values that the Belgrade demographers deplore. It is also worth noting that the campaign to enlarge the maximum permitted private farmstead continues in some republics, despite the defeat this year of efforts to write an increase into a federal constitutional amendment.

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There is no lack of Yugoslav data and studies in the field of rural-urban migration and its effects. The problem is rather one of selection, especially when both data and studies contain contradictions and inconsistencies. This is not because the censuses and other basic statistics are faulty, but because little of this material is directly relevant to the subject, which must therefore be studied through statistical and other "indirect methods." In this Report only direct quotations have, as a rule, been footnoted. The statistics cited, and many of the conclusions, have been drawn from the sources listed below, but the number of collations and recalculations that have been necessary has made it impractical as well as unfair to the sources to make specific attributions. The writer is indebted to the Center for Demographic Research in Belgrade, and in particular to its director, Dr. Dušan Breznik, for their cooperation, but all errors of fact and interpretation are my own responsibility.

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**TABLE I**  
**TOWNS AND URBAN POPULATION**  
**ACCORDING TO 1953 and 1961 CENSUSES**

| Communities<br>according to<br>the number of<br>inhabitants<br>(in thousands) | Towns  |      |      |      | Urban population |       |      |      | Index<br>1961 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|------|------|------|------------------|-------|------|------|---------------|
|                                                                               | Number |      | %    |      | In thousands     |       | %    |      |               |
|                                                                               | 1953   | 1961 | 1953 | 1961 | 1953             | 1961  | 1953 | 1961 |               |
| Total                                                                         | 241    | 348  | 100. | 100. | 3,688            | 5,242 | 100. | 100. | 142.1         |
| 2-3                                                                           | 21     | 53   | 8.7  | 15.2 | 47               | 126   | 1.3  | 2.4  | 268.1         |
| 3-5                                                                           | 58     | 94   | 24.1 | 27.3 | 176              | 356   | 4.8  | 6.8  | 203.4         |
| 5-10                                                                          | 61     | 93   | 25.4 | 26.7 | 312              | 604   | 8.5  | 11.5 | 193.6         |
| 10-20                                                                         | 43     | 50   | 17.8 | 14.3 | 494              | 707   | 13.3 | 13.5 | 143.1         |
| 20-30                                                                         | 28     | 28   | 11.6 | 8.0  | 507              | 686   | 13.7 | 13.1 | 135.3         |
| 30-50                                                                         | 16     | 16   | 6.6  | 4.5  | 457              | 595   | 12.4 | 11.3 | 130.2         |
| 50 and more                                                                   | 14     | 14   | 5.8  | 4.0  | 1,695            | 2,168 | 46.0 | 41.4 | 127.9         |

**TABLE II**  
**TOTAL AND URBAN POPULATION**  
**BY REPUBLICS, 1953 and 1961**

| Republic                  | (In thousands)           |       |                      |                          |       |                      |        | Index<br>(1953 = 100) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------|----------------------|--------------------------|-------|----------------------|--------|-----------------------|
|                           | Total<br>popu-<br>lation | 1953  |                      | Total<br>popu-<br>lation | 1961  |                      |        |                       |
|                           |                          | Urban | %<br>of the<br>total |                          | Urban | %<br>of the<br>total |        |                       |
|                           |                          |       |                      |                          |       |                      | Number |                       |
| Yugoslavia                | 16,991                   | 3,688 | 21.7                 | 18,549                   | 5,242 | 28.3                 | 142.1  |                       |
| Bosnia and<br>Herzegovina | 2,847                    | 427   | 15.0                 | 3,278                    | 640   | 19.5                 | 150.0  |                       |
| Croatia                   | 3,936                    | 953   | 24.2                 | 4,160                    | 1,282 | 30.8                 | 134.6  |                       |
| Macedonia                 | 1,305                    | 340   | 26.0                 | 1,406                    | 490   | 34.9                 | 144.3  |                       |
| Montenegro                | 420                      | 62    | 14.7                 | 472                      | 102   | 21.5                 | 164.0  |                       |
| Serbia                    | 6,979                    | 1,570 | 22.5                 | 7,642                    | 2,292 | 30.0                 | 145.9  |                       |
| Serbia proper             | 4,464                    | 947   | 21.2                 | 4,823                    | 1,381 | 28.6                 | 145.9  |                       |
| Kosovo and<br>Metohija    | 816                      | 118   | 14.5                 | 964                      | 192   | 20.0                 | 162.6  |                       |
| Vojvodina                 | 1,670                    | 506   | 29.8                 | 1,855                    | 719   | 38.7                 | 142.1  |                       |
| Slovenia                  | 1,504                    | 337   | 22.4                 | 1,592                    | 436   | 27.4                 | 129.4  |                       |

Source: Ginić, *art. cit.*, *Yugoslav Survey*, No. 18, pp. 256lf.

**TABLE III**  
**URBAN POPULATION IN 1961**  
**BY ORIGIN, BY CONSTITUENT REPUBLIC\***

| Constituent<br>republic              | Natives | Total | From                      |                           |                           |      |         | Unknown<br>abroad |
|--------------------------------------|---------|-------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|------|---------|-------------------|
|                                      |         |       | rural<br>commu-<br>nities | mixed<br>commu-<br>nities | urban<br>commu-<br>nities | From | Unknown |                   |
| Number of Inhabitants (in thousands) |         |       |                           |                           |                           |      |         |                   |
| Yugoslavia                           | 2,156   | 3,063 | 1,679                     | 297.0                     | 1,024                     | 64.0 | 28.0    |                   |
| Bosnia and Herz.                     | 306     | 320   | 137                       | 50.0                      | 141                       | 1.8  | 4.3     |                   |
| Croatia                              | 480     | 791   | 429                       | 88.0                      | 260                       | 14.0 | 10.0    |                   |
| Macedonia                            | 242     | 247   | 151                       | 16.0                      | 63                        | 17.0 | 1.2     |                   |
| Montenegro                           | 43      | 58    | 31                        | 7.3                       | 19                        | 0.5  | 0.5     |                   |
| Serbia                               | 907     | 1,364 | 794                       | 87.0                      | 463                       | 21.0 | 8.8     |                   |
| Slovenia                             | 179     | 273   | 138                       | 48.0                      | 76                        | 11.0 | 3.3     |                   |
| Percentage Composition               |         |       |                           |                           |                           |      |         |                   |
| Yugoslavia                           | 41.3    | 58.4  | 32.0                      | 5.7                       | 19.5                      | 1.2  | 0.5     |                   |
| Bosnia and Herz.                     | 47.7    | 51.6  | 21.4                      | 7.8                       | 22.1                      | 0.3  | 0.7     |                   |
| Croatia                              | 37.5    | 61.8  | 33.5                      | 6.9                       | 20.3                      | 1.1  | 0.7     |                   |
| Macedonia                            | 49.3    | 50.4  | 30.8                      | 3.3                       | 12.9                      | 3.4  | 0.3     |                   |
| Montenegro                           | 42.2    | 57.3  | 30.5                      | 7.2                       | 19.1                      | 0.5  | 0.5     |                   |
| Serbia                               | 39.8    | 59.8  | 34.8                      | 3.8                       | 20.3                      | 0.9  | 0.4     |                   |
| Slovenia                             | 39.4    | 59.5  | 30.2                      | 10.6                      | 16.7                      | 2.4  | 0.7     |                   |

\*Data in absolute figures given in thousands. For figures under 10,000 data are given in hundreds

Source: Breznik, *art. cit.* in *Yugoslav Survey*, Volume IX, No. 2

**TABLE IV**  
**MORTALITY AND NATURAL INCREASE**  
**OF URBAN AND NON-URBAN POPULATION OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1959**

|                    | Urban Population* |        |                     | Non-Urban Population* |        |                     |
|--------------------|-------------------|--------|---------------------|-----------------------|--------|---------------------|
|                    | Live<br>Births    | Deaths | Natural<br>Increase | Live<br>Births        | Deaths | Natural<br>Increase |
| Yugoslavia         | 18.9              | 7.3    | 11.6                | 24.7                  | 10.8   | 13.9                |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 24.5              | 6.4    | 18.1                | 35.9                  | 11.0   | 24.9                |
| Croatia            | 15.3              | 7.4    | 7.9                 | 20.4                  | 10.8   | 9.6                 |
| Macedonia          | 29.1              | 9.3    | 19.8                | 33.9                  | 11.6   | 22.3                |
| Montenegro         | 31.7              | 6.8    | 24.9                | 26.4                  | 7.7    | 18.7                |
| Serbia             |                   |        |                     |                       |        |                     |
| proper             | 16.3              | 6.6    | 9.7                 | 18.4                  | 9.7    | 8.7                 |
| Kosovo             | 36.8              | 9.3    | 27.5                | 41.4                  | 15.0   | 26.4                |
| Vojvodina          | 15.2              | 8.1    | 7.0                 | 16.9                  | 11.0   | 5.9                 |
| Slovenia           | 14.5              | 6.5    | 8.0                 | 19.3                  | 10.8   | 8.4                 |

\*Per 1,000 inhabitants

Source: Ginić, *op. cit.*, p. 66