

SLOVENIA: MODERNIZATION WITHOUT URBANIZATION?

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Rapid urbanization is in modern history one of the normal concomitants of economic development and associated social changes. The growth of cities has usually, at least initially, outstripped other growth rates, generating serious urban economic and social disequilibria: high unemployment, deteriorating standards of housing and services, new quantities and qualities of crime, political instability. Even in more mature, "modernized," urban industrial societies the negative aspects of the large concentrations of people are attracting increasing criticism in the context of contemporary concern with the total human environment and "quality of life."

Any society which appears to be successfully industrializing and modernizing with an urbanization rate significantly lower than the expected norm therefore merits attention. One such society is the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, the most developed but one of the least urbanized of Yugoslavia's eight federal units.

Slovenia Today: Selected Indicators

The other Yugoslavs call the 1.7 million Slovenes who live in the northwest corner of their multinational and geographically and culturally variegated federation "our Swiss." The stereotype conjured up by this half-admiring and half-condescending label is of a people who are very clean and tidy, very hard-working, very thrifty, very businesslike and rich . . . and very dull. Alpine that is, and not Balkan. Even the casual tourist, coming from other parts of the country, gets the same impression. The landscape, both physical and cultural, is if not Swiss at least Austrian: the wide green valleys and lakes of glacially overdeepened tectonic troughs run straight and true between towering Alpine ranges and down

to intermontane basins and wooded Prealpi, the high alps and hanging valleys are festooned with the kind of houses Americans call chalets and grazed by the brown cows my visiting relatives call furry-footed friends, and the valleys are studded with farmsteads, villages, and onion-domed churches virtually indistinguishable from those of Carinthia or Styria in neighboring Austria.

If lifestyles are virtually Austrian, so are standards of living. The last, however, was not true until recently. The Slovenia that in 1919 found itself the richest province of the desperately underdeveloped new state of Yugoslavia had the day before been the poorest of the *Alpenländer* of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Since 1950 they have dramatically widened the per capita national income gap between their region and the rest of the country while narrowing the one between themselves and their foreign but noncommunist Alpine neighbors in Austria and northeastern Italy.

Selected statistical indicators, as set forth in Table I, confirm these tourist's impressions of Yugoslavia's most developed and dynamic region. With 8.6 per cent of the population of the country, Slovenia produces 16 per cent of Yugoslavia's Social Product.¹ With a far higher ratio of employment outside peasant farming—77 per cent of the economically active population compared with 58 per cent in Yugoslavia as a whole—the average monthly income per employed person in 1970 was 1357 dinars (then \$108), compared to 1233 in Croatia, 1071 in Serbia, 934 in Kosovo, and a Yugoslav average of 1146 dinars. It has the highest literacy rate, by far the highest percentage of those who have completed vocational schools, and by far the lowest number with no schooling, although two other




TABLE I

Slovenia in Yugoslavia: Selected Indices of Development
(1971 unless otherwise indicated)

	Population %	(vs)	Social Product %	Net Personal Income per Employed (monthly dinars)	Urban Pop. (% of total)
Slovenia	8.4		16.0	1357	34.3
Yugoslavia	100		100	1146	35.3

	Literacy	Univ. grads.	Gymnasium	Schools for highly qualified workers	No school, or less than 3 yrs.
Slovenia	97.49	3.15	2.16	16.20	7.42
Yugoslavia	84.75	2.87	2.00	8.99	24.30

(per cent of population)

	Nat. Increase (per thous.)	Age Structure %		Mobility (% who changed place of residence)	Active Pop.	Women as % of Active Pop.
		0-14	50+			
Slovenia	6.3	24.09	22.98	46	48	41
Yugoslavia	9.5	26.72	19.84	40.6	50	32

Employment by Economic Sector (per cent of total employed)

	Agriculture	Industry & rel.	Commerce	Services	Health	Admin. & Leaders	Specialist & Artists
Slovenia*	23.41	42	3.85	5.95	1.67	9.59	7.96
Yugoslavia	42.81	24.88	3.04	4.07	1.57	7.08	7.37

(*next lowest % in agriculture; Croatia, 35.55; next highest in industry Vojvodina, 27.1; Croatia, 26).

Sources: *Prethodni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 31 marta 1971 godine* (Savezni Zavod za statistiku Bilten 700), and *Statistički godišnjak 1972*.

regions (Croatia and Serbia proper) have proportionately more university graduates. Slovenes are the most residentially mobile of Yugoslavs and their occupational structure, although far from what their economists and planners consider optimal, is the most developed: proportionately the fewest in agriculture, the most in industry and related occupations and in most tertiary sectors. Key demographic indicators reveal a similar picture: birth and natural increase rates (the latter 5.7/1,000 in 1969) well below the all-Yugoslav level and, in consequence, more older people (23 per cent age 50

or above) and fewer children (24.1 per cent aged 0-14) than in other regions except demographically similar Croatia and the Vojvodina.

In only one significant sector do standard indicators reveal an anomaly. Slovenia, economically and culturally the most developed of the eight federal units, ranks fifth in level of urbanization. According to the latest census (1971), 34.3 per cent of all Slovenes lived in urban communities so classified at the time of the 1961 census, when the urban population was 27.4 per cent of the total. For

Yugoslavia as a whole, in 1971, the equivalent figure was 35.3 per cent (in 1961, 28.3 per cent), but for Macedonia in the underdeveloped south it was 46.1 per cent. The Vojvodina recorded 44.1 per cent, Croatia 38.6 per cent, and Serbia proper 36.8 per cent. Only the three least developed regions ranked below Slovenia—Kosovo with 24.7 per cent, Bosnia-Herzegovina with 24.9 per cent, and Montenegro with 29.5 per cent.

Urbanization rates of the past decade seem unlikely to alter these rankings. Between 1961 and 1971 the total Slovene population grew by 87,000 persons, the urban population by 99,000, an index of 113.6. The equivalent index for Macedonia was 148.2, for Croatia 147.4, for the Vojvodina 137.1, and for Serbia proper 120.8. Since 1953 the urban population of Slovenia has grown by 63 per cent while that of Yugoslavia has grown by 81.5 per cent. Ljubljana, the Slovene capital, is the slowest growing of all Yugoslavia's regional capitals: from 98,000 inhabitants in 1948 to 174,000 in 1971, a growth rate of 25.2/1,000 per annum.²

Slovenia therefore remains a predominantly village society, despite rapid industrialization: only two towns, Ljubljana and Maribor, have more than 50,000 inhabitants, and there is one town each in the 30-50,000 and 20-30,000 categories, and five others with 10-20,000. No less than 61 per cent of the population lives in places with less than 2,000 inhabitants.

Most of them show every intention of staying there if they can, despite an equally strong determination to enjoy the values and the social mobility of the modern world that in other societies usually draw such people to the city. The reasons why they feel this way and the reasons that have enabled so many of them so far to combine rural or semirural domicile with modernization are partly geographic and historic, partly the sometimes purposeful and sometimes accidental consequences of postwar development policies, and partly the pure bloodymindedness of mountaineers.

Geographic and Historic Factors

Slovenia, with 20,251 square kilometers, is the second smallest of the six Republics. It is situated in the groin of southeastern Europe, where the Balkan and Italian peninsulas are attached to the continent,

and was a Hapsburg possession from 1335 to 1918. It is also the unique point of juncture for Europe's three main ethnic constellations, the place where Latin, Slav, and Germanic worlds meet. Predominantly mountainous, it is nevertheless easy to transit, especially by two transverse routes of major European importance that form a St. Andrews cross on the map of the Republic, northeast to southwest and northwest to southeast, intersecting in the Ljubljana Basin. The former of these includes the lowest pass to the Mediterranean in all the Alps, making Slovenia "the shortest and lowest transit route to the European interior in the whole 1,300-mile stretch of mountains between the Bosphorus and the Rhone Valley Break."³ It is the homeland of one of the smallest Slavic nations, a people whose fierce pride in their national heritage and its preservation against the logic of history during a full millenium under ethnically alien (German) rule is fortified by the cultural exclusivism and suspicion of outsiders, close to tribalism and easily translated into xenophobia, that often characterize mountain peoples.

The syndrome of these geographic and historic factors is the most important determinant of contemporary population distribution and the pattern of urbanization.

Some of the historic factors apply to a larger area than Slovenia. One is the tradition of local autonomy in the Hapsburg Monarchy. This tradition, which survived the centralizing efforts of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, provided a counterbalance for the capital concentrating and thus centralizing influence of nineteenth century Imperial-Royal sponsorship of industrial and general economic development through "state capitalism." The consequences of such dispersed decision-making and economic power are visible today in all the successor states of these Imperial Länder: from Bohemia to Slovenia more of the urban population is to be found in smaller towns than is true elsewhere in Central and East-central Europe.⁴

The distribution and physical plan of these towns, like those of most of pre-industrial Central Europe, were established during the great medieval period of urban revival; new towns were seldom added and existing towns grew little between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁵ If functionally these towns were little more than villages until the

TABLE II

Growth of Total and Urban Population in the Period 1953-1961.
(Urban Settlements so classified in 1961)

In thousands			
	Growth of Total population	Growth of Urban population	Index of growth of urban pop. (total growth = 100)
Yugoslavia	1,558	1,553	99.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	430	213	49.5
Croatia	224	330	147.4
Macedonia	101	150	148.2
Montenegro	52	40	76.1
Serbia Serbia proper	360	434	120.8
Kosovo	148	74	50.0
Vojvodina	155	213	137.1
SLOVENIA	87	99	113.6

B Growth of Urban Population of Yugoslavia 1953-1971.

i n d e x						
	1953	1961	1971	<u>1961</u> 1953	<u>1971</u> 1961	<u>1971</u> 1953
Total	3,992,051	5,266,080	7,245,268	131.9	137.6	181.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	466,901	640,081	933,006	137.1	145.8	199.8
Croatia	1,007,936	1,282,490	1,705,555	127.2	133.0	169.2
Macedonia	367,110	490,159	759,696	133.5	155.0	206.9
Montenegro	64,900	101,517	156,698	156.4	154.4	241.4
Serbia Serbia proper	976,478	1,382,683	1,928,538	141.6	139.5	197.5
Kosovo	138,790	192,430	308,365	138.6	160.2	222.2
Vojvodina	606,781	718,611	861,304	118.4	119.9	141.9
SLOVENIA	363,155	458,109	592,106	126.1	129.2	163.0

Source: Ginić, art. cit. in *Stanovništvo*, January-June 1971.

renewed urban growth of the nineteenth century—few seem to have had more than 2,500 inhabitants—they were nevertheless very pretentious villages. If rural in function, they were urban in form and therefore endowed with a potential for modernization without major physical or social disruption. In Slovenia their distribution also reflects the historic commercial importance of the two great European highways that intersect at Ljubljana and

that open all four corners of this otherwise mountainous country to one another and to the outside world. Along these roads towns are evenly spaced at distances appropriate to horse-drawn commerce: from Vienna to Trieste there is a city every two hundred kilometers, while the one hundred, the fifty, and the twenty-five kilometer points between them are occupied, respectively, by small cities, by larger market towns and by small market towns. With easy

and good communications, especially after the building of railroads, which the Imperial importance of the Vienna-Trieste road brought to Slovenia earlier than a backward province could otherwise have expected, this was a distribution that in conjunction with other historic factors and national preferences would make dispersed development and urbanization an easy and natural option.

Another specific aspect of Slovene history strengthened a collective national preference for this option. The Slovenes were one of the so-called "unhistoric" or "peasant" nations of the Hapsburg Monarchy. This meant that the rulers, the rudimentary middle classes, and the towns of the Slovene provinces were culturally (which does not necessarily mean ethnically) non-Slovene. Upward social mobility for a Slovene peasant was rare and entailed either a village-bound role, before 1850 almost exclusively through the priesthood, or a rural-urban move that also meant ceasing to be Slovene. Since Ljubljana, then better known by its German name Laibach, was as culturally alien to a Slovene as Trieste, Zagreb, Graz, Vienna, or Cleveland, he was at least as likely to try his fortunes at one of these more distant, but larger places.

This is precisely what happened. As late as 1910 most Slovenes urbanized, when they did, outside the boundaries of predominantly Slovene territory. The Slovene intelligentsia and the most mobile, vital part of the Slovenian nation left home and made their contributions to Italian Trieste, whose Slovene population grew by 130 per cent in the decade 1900-1910, to Austro-German Klagenfurt, Graz, and Vienna, to Croatian Zagreb, or to the United States. The effects are felt even today: If Ljubljana and Maribor (the latter, incidentally still a predominantly German town in 1918) are now but only recently the two largest Slovene cities in the world, the third largest is still Cleveland, Ohio.

Three developments in the nineteenth century affected this pattern without, for the time being, seriously altering it. The first was the "Slav awakening," including a "Slovene renaissance," that marked the spread of modern nationalism to eastern Europe. The second was the building of the *Südbahn*, the Austrian Southern Railroad from Vienna to Trieste and the first true mountain rail line in the world, which crossed Slovenia along that northeast-southwest axis from Maribor through

Ljubljana to the sea and which was completed in 1857 to become a major factor in the rapid growth and the prosperity of the two terminal cities during the last sixty years of the Empire. The third, the first steps toward modern capitalism in the form of artisanate small industry and supportive credit and commercial organization, took its spirit and its geographic distribution from the combined influence of the first two.

The beginnings of economic development, illuminated by nationalist ideology, were marked by a modestly growing number of upwardly mobile Slovenes no longer willing to cease being Slovene as they climbed, inspired to do their climbing at home, and able to call on the financial backing of wealthier fellow-Slavs (primarily Czech bankers and industrialists) in their efforts to do so. They were also characterized, in the context of the increasingly bitter national rivalry of the Monarchy's last years, by an ideologically motivated effort to meet the cultural competition of the "historic" nations, in the Slovene lands Germans and Italians, through rapid extension of primary education in the Slovene language and of Slovene cultural and social associations and services. Alien political control was challenged through demands for the enfranchisement and then by the political organization of the peasantry.

The net result was the creation by the turn of the century of a rare phenomenon (known also, for example, in Wales), a 90 per cent literate peasant nation with a developed cultural infrastructure of schools, reading rooms, and voluntary social organizations as well as a widespread network of peasant cooperatives, artisan workshops, and attendant institutions like savings banks (*Raffekasse*). The emergence of this society was accompanied by and was presumably related to a declining rural birth-rate that began at least as early as the 1880s.

Most of this infrastructure of modernization was located in small towns or villages, for the larger towns remained fortresses of German culture to be conquered by demographic pressure one by one. Even then they were regarded as somehow alien to the essential Slovene life style, an attitude reflected in the policy of the dominant Slovene political organization, the peasant and clericalist People's Party, whose leaders sought to keep the Slovene people on the farm, were anti-industrialist, and even opposed the founding of a Slovene university in

Ljubljana, all at least partly because cities were associated with Germanization.⁶ With declining birthrates and continuing emigration also contributing by keeping demographic pressures on the land from increasing as disastrously as in other East European peasant nations, the larger towns therefore grew relatively slowly. Economic initiative and development, exploiting the tradition of local autonomy and the advantages of geography, remained dispersed.

The Slovenes thus confronted the challenges of twentieth century industrialization and associated social change with specific sets of potentials and preferences. Similar peoples in similar situations but with some of these factors missing—for example other “unhistoric” nations of the Monarchy like the Slovaks and Romanians, who lived under unitary and ethnically intolerant Hungarian rule instead of in the quasi-federal Austrian Länder with their open and institutionalized ethnic rivalries—followed a different path of development, including different patterns of urbanization.

Finally, illuminating and pervading all these determinants is an attitudinal one as difficult to quantify or weigh as it is important: the particularly local and peculiarly physiographic form that self-definition and patriotism assume in a mountain people, who tend to identify themselves and their relationship to the world in terms of their own valley, its shape and feel and boundaries defined by familiar peaks as unique and intimate as the personality of each of them.

Socialist Strategies and Praxis

The Marxists who came to rule Yugoslavia and Slovenia after the Second World War carried in their ideological baggage commitments to extensive and rapid industrialization, to the equal and even development of all parts of a country and all ethnic communities, and to the importance of “social costs” in any development strategy. The great industrial cities of the developed capitalist countries, with all the misery accompanying such concentrations of people, had happened because capitalism required them; socialism did not.

Elaboration of these principles by Soviet regional planners and their followers in other ruling communist parties had already reached a level of considerable sophistication when Boris Kidrič, a Slovene,

became the first tsar of socialist construction in post-war Yugoslavia. As described by Ian Hamilton, whose studies have focused on the principles, processes, and purposes of communist spatial planning, especially in Yugoslavia, there are nine principles of industrial location that these planners try to keep in mind:

(1) Industries should be located near the natural resources they use.

(2) Industries, particularly the higher stages of manufacturing, should be located near the markets where their products are consumed.

(3) Industries should be allocated interregionally in such a manner as to develop regional specialization.

(4) Industries should be allocated interregionally to achieve greater regional self-sufficiency.

(5) There should be an even distribution of industry throughout the country.

(6) Industry should be located so as to advance the economic and cultural development of all regions inhabited by national minorities.

(7) Industrial location policy should eliminate economic and social differences between town and country.

(8) Industrial location planning must take heed of defense needs.

(9) Industrial location choices should facilitate international division of labor.⁷

Such ideological commitments and planning principles are clearly of a kind to encourage the sort of dispersed economic and therefore also urban development for which Slovenia was structurally and psychologically prepared. So, too, are communist disdain for orthodox capitalist cost accountancy and the higher value they place, at least in theory, on the social costs of development. On the other hand, all of these principles have frequently been honored more in the breach than in the observance in all socialist states, as huge cities, overindustrialized regions and underdeveloped ones, and growing rather than decreasing regional disparities in income bear

witness. Additionally, Yugoslavia abandoned orthodox Soviet economic doctrine at an early stage, when postwar economic development had barely begun—turning from a centrally planned command economy which can ignore “capitalist” cost considerations to a quasi-market one which cannot or at least should not.

Nevertheless, several specific aspects of these principles combined to continue and even reinforce Slovenia's preference for polycentric development and a dispersed population. Some reflected Marxist theory and were supposed to have this effect, others did so accidentally.

One that falls curiously into both categories was the strategy of industrial location pursued in the early postwar years. The commitment to bring the least developed regions of the Yugoslav South up to the level of the most developed was combined with defense needs, which suggested the advisability of putting large factories producing strategic goods in the mountainous regions far from frontiers and exposed northern valleys facing a possible Soviet bloc invasion. While the principle of a little development for everyone was implicit in this strategy, it also meant that investment in the poorer regions would have to be financed by the richer ones. The latter therefore saw most of their meager savings siphoned off by the central government for a redistribution from which, for the time being, they got little and sometimes nothing.

As a result, large factories requiring a concentrated labor force and appropriate population movements were built elsewhere. The Slovenes were forced to build on the basis of what they had with the limited investment resources that federal redistribution left to them. With a few exceptions like the already antiquated iron and steel works at Jesenice, inherited from the Hapsburg era and Slovenia's notorious combination of a white elephant and principal environmental spoiler, what they had was a widely dispersed proto-industrial network of handicraft shops and producers for local markets. As a matter of necessity rather than preference, these shops provided the basis for the industrialization of Slovenia that took place at a time when Yugoslav economic theory had become dogmatically in favor of competition but was still dogmatically opposed to economic integration of enterprises. Concentration

of capital in the economy was also important in inhibiting a consolidation, locational as well as organizational, that might otherwise have taken place spontaneously under true market conditions. When economic integration became fashionable in the following decade it therefore took geographic dispersal of existing plant as a given that it was too late to alter. Integration could and did take place organizationally and financially, but not locationally. Thus a strategy that was intended to disperse industrialization in the rest of the country accidentally encouraged its dispersion within Slovenia as well.

(One example of Slovenia's imposed do-it-yourself development and its consequences for regional development and population distribution is provided by Novo Mesto, a small town in the relatively backward and deprived Dolenjska region of eastern Slovenia. The workers of a Novo Mesto pharmacy, frustrated by lack of needed drugs and medicines, exploited the autonomy of enterprise decision-making brought by the first Titoist economic reforms of the 1950s to begin production of their own, at first with no additional employees. They prospered, entirely on communal resources, and are today one of the largest drug manufacturers in the country. With other small enterprises they have made Novo Mesto an attractive town in every sense of the term. Its 1971 population of 9,664 accounted for most of the modest 17 per cent of the 91,332 inhabitants of Dolenjsko classified as urban—the region has only two other towns with over 2,000 inhabitants—and employment there and its multiplier effects have stabilized the population of what remains a region of strong out-migration. Novo Mesto figures in all Slovene planning variants as one of eight or more centers of polycentric regional development.)

Reinforcement came from the combined effect of the deliberate political decentralization of the early 1950s, which favored the basic political unit, the commune (*občina* in Slovenian), more than it did the Republics and of one of the peculiarities of the Yugoslav economic system in the following decade. Investment decision-making had been effectively decentralized, with a major role for individual enterprises and communal governments, but investment funds were still largely supplied by or through government organs at higher levels. The uneconomic investments that resulted from this system, the “polit-

ical factories" of the 1950s and early 1960s, soon became a prime target of criticism by economists and politicians, leading to major reforms after 1965, but meanwhile it became fashionable for every commune to aspire to and usually to get its "own" industrial plant. In such a system the Slovenes continued to do what they had already been doing, but because they started with more appropriate economic and social foundations they did it a little better.

Perceptions and Policies

In a quarter-century of economic development under socialism the number of Slovenes dependent on agriculture for their livelihood has dropped from about 50 per cent to just over 20 per cent of a population that has grown from 1.4 million to 1.7 million. The number employed in the secondary sector (industry and related occupations) has in recent years stabilized at around 42 per cent of a work force which totaled 815,000 persons or 48 per cent of the total population in 1971. The share of the tertiary sector continues to grow slowly, presently employs 26-28 per cent of the work force, and is projected to reach 31 per cent by 1975.

Most of those employed in the secondary sector work in over 2,000 industrial and semi-industrial enterprises or their subsidiaries, with average plant size between five and six hundred workers. These are as widely distributed as the prewar handicraft shops out of which many of them grew, although they show a noticeable concentration along the axes of the St. Andrew's cross of historic commercial routes that Slovene planners call "the Slovene skeleton." The tertiary sector is not only less well developed generally but less widely distributed.

At the same time, over half of the nonagricultural population—59 per cent in 1961—lives outside urban communities. With only three cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants, as noted, most of the rest live in small towns. This distribution of a stubbornly immobile population and of employment, plus a domestic work force growing less rapidly than projected labor demand, constitute the fundamental demographic parameters of Slovenia's short-term development and of the Republic's first experiment in comprehensive long-term regional spatial planning. The spatial plan, ordered by the Republican Assembly in 1967 with what was the first legislation of its kind in Yugoslavia, and the six months

of public debate to which the first draft was subjected in 1971, are themselves indicative of widespread official and public interest in the future of the land-man relationship in Slovenia.⁸

Spatial distribution of population and employment make daily commuting to work an ubiquitous feature of Slovenian life. In 1961, for example, a total of 39 per cent of the work force commuted an average of 20 kilometers by public transport, company bus, bicycle, motorbike, or private car. The company bus dominates but the private car, with automobile ownership growing by 30 per cent per annum during the 1960s, is a new challenger whose impact on the highway system should have been predictable but was not predicted.

While the level of daily migration is nearly as high in some other regions—33 per cent in Bosnia 30 per cent in Montenegro and Kosovo—and is a common feature of life in all of Eastern Europe with its chronic urban housing crisis, the Slovene commuters are qualitatively different. Fewer of them are true "half-peasants," the people a Hungarian rural sociologist describes as "post-peasant and pre-citizen." The majority are really weekend farmers who continue to till the family plot, with mini-tractors and other modern machines purchased with earnings from nonagriculture, for primarily recreational rather than economic reasons. One such man, the brother of a Ljubljana sociologist, is a worker who is employed in a factory in the capital but who lives in Vrhnika, a village 20 kilometers away, where he finds time in the evenings and on weekends to farm the legal household maximum of ten hectares (24 acres). He does it as a hobby, ploughing back in the form of new machines and other farming toys all the earnings from this agricultural moonlighting. The average holding in Slovenia is just over three hectares, but the man is otherwise typical of thousands who work in a town but prefer not to live there and whose sentimental link to the soil from which they sprang is manifested in dual life styles and economic roles. Their determination (and in other Republics the economic need) to continue having it both ways is one primary reason for the Yugoslav worker's stubborn defense of Yugoslavia's economically inefficient working hours from 6:00 or 7:00 A.M. to 2:00 or 3:00 P.M.

A combination of relatively low population with high economic growth rates has also made Slovenia

a net importer of labor. Twenty per cent of the work force is already composed of non-Slovene immigrants from other Republics, more than compensating in quantity but not in quality for the 2.7 per cent of the Slovene population that has emigrated to find work in Western Europe or beyond. The demographic impact of this influx, in recent years comprised primarily of Kosovar Albanian, Bosnian, and other miners and unskilled workers, is not negligible. In the 1959-1963 period, for which detailed data are available, the number who immigrated from other parts of Yugoslavia was equal to 24 per cent of those born in the Republic. In subsequent years, while the rate of natural increase fluctuated between 7.7 and 5.7/1,000, the growth rate from net migration is estimated at around 3.5/1,000. The need for more will in all likelihood continue, since most variants in a matrix of labor supply and demand projections to 1975 show a domestic labor deficit running as high as 38,000.⁹ A demographic forecast prepared for the regional spatial plan therefore concludes "that by the end of the century every ninth inhabitant of Slovenia will be recruited out of net migrations occurring *after* 1961."¹⁰

As for population redistribution through internal migration, 22 of Slovenia's 62 communes (roughly equivalent to large New England townships) recorded net positive migration balances in a detailed study of all population movements during the years 1959-1963.¹¹ Except for three coastal towns and one new frontier town in territories acquired from Italy after the Second World War, which are special cases, all of these communes lie on the historical commercial axes, either along the Südbahn from Maribor through Celje to Ljubljana or along the Tauernbahn from Ljubljana northwest through Kranj to the juncture of Yugoslavia, Austria, and Italy. The highest coefficients were found, unsurprisingly, in the communes comprising the greater Maribor and greater Ljubljana urban areas; in the latter they ranged from 120 to 159/1,000 inhabitants. On the other hand, the old centers of both cities already had more out- than in-migrants in the early 1960s. The highest negative coefficients were recorded primarily in mountainous or upland districts remote from the axes and therefore especially in some border communes along the Italian, Hungarian, and Croatian frontiers.

(Local differences in birthrates have relatively little influence on redistribution. Only six com-

munes with a total of 6 per cent of Slovenia's population had natural growth rates—represented by gross reproduction rates of 1.40 to 1.49—that were significantly higher than the Slovenian average in 1960. At that time rates well below the Republican average—gross reproduction rates of 0.60 to 0.99—were found in two contrasting environments: in the greater Ljubljana area and the coastal communes that are growing rapidly through in-migration and in the Karst districts along the Italian frontier that are also centers of strong out-migration. Moreover, rates at both these extremes have moved toward the Republican average in the past decade.)

Elite attitudes to immigration from other Republics are perhaps simplest and easiest to summarize. If economic growth is to continue at what Slovene political and public opinion considers an acceptable rate, so must immigration, but with it come two problems, one current and one imminent. The first concerns the quality of the labor force. As a leading demographer, Dr. Dolfe Vogelnik, summarizes it in material prepared for the regional spatial plan:

Since the structure of net migration is such that it is numerically the positive function of comparatively weak emigration from Slovenia and of stronger in-migration from other Republics, and because out-migration includes mostly skilled and highly skilled labor while in-migration is primarily limited to unskilled persons, *the positive permanent migration growth means consequently a permanent pressure on the qualification structure of the Slovenian labor force.* The resulting tendency toward a deterioration of the qualification structure of the Slovenian labor force will have to be overcome only by a systematic endeavor to improve the qualification structure of the immigrants. The alternative, to check in-migration from other Republics, is considered unrealistic both because of the great pressure of the unemployed labor force in those Republics and because the Slovene economy is comparatively well developed.¹²

Less openly discussed because of its obvious sensitivity is the second problem: the reaction of the heretofore ethnically homogenous and notoriously clanish Slovenes to growing numbers of foreigners,

especially non-Slavic and Muslim Albanians (just above Gypsies at the bottom of Yugoslavia's ethnic pecking order) or Slavic but usually Muslim or Orthodox and distinctly "Balkan" Bosnians, Macedonians, and other southerners. Slovene officials and scholars with whom I have spoken were aware of the risks, admitted that their countrymen were already reacting in some districts, and were cognizant of recent Swiss experience with an analogous problem, but they did not appear to have given the matter the serious thought that it will undoubtedly demand.

On the implications of a dispersed population and industry, with a low level of urbanization, two schools of thought emerge. All of those I interviewed agreed that most Slovenes want it this way. Most agreed with this public preference that the present situation represents a Good Thing, and that public policy should be designed to perpetuate it, although some worried about the international competitiveness of a dispersed, small-scale industrial establishment. A few, usually in government offices concerned with planning or the economy, complained about the "conservative immobility" of their people and wanted policies that would encourage the concentrations of industry, population, and talent characteristic of most developed societies.

One of the most interesting exponents of what seems to be the majority view is Dr. Erman Kržišnik, the influential former director of the Slovenian Institute of Economic Research, who enthusiastically sees the future in terms of "all of Slovenia as one garden city." "Slovenian policy," he says, "proclaims a polycentric concept: let the people live where they are, but organize services to them. We must coordinate these services and eliminate *some* duplication. The same is true of the economy."

As an economist, Dr. Kržišnik sees the principal risk in terms of the external competitiveness of a fragmented industry with average enterprise size less than 600 workers. The solution must be sought in organizational integration into large industrial combines, with concentration of capital and an efficient division of labor among branches but without geographic concentration, thus eliminating most of the economic disadvantages of dispersal except transport costs. (This, it should be noted, is already taking place, the result both of the pressure of competition and of official policy.)

On the other hand, Kržišnik argues that Slovenian industry has already produced better results than that of the rest of the country, despite older, often obsolete plants, precisely because it is dispersed. "Urban infrastructure," he says, "is really the most expensive part of total economic development and social modernization." Because they have not taken on the burden of large urban agglomerations with higher per capita costs for construction and communal services, the argument goes, the Slovenes have been lower cost producers than the diseconomies of small-scale production would suggest. If such considerations do not eliminate the need to worry about the future competitiveness of a dispersed economy, they may reduce the risks to manageable proportions.

In the Republican Institute for Republican Planning, a government office more directly concerned with medium-term economic development than with long-term spatial planning, a discussion of the same demographic parameters of modernization produced a lively disagreement between two women functionaries. Describing the planned development of Eastern Slovenia and adjacent Dolenjsko and Slovenian Styria through "the infiltration of industry and the tertiary sector," the first saw the primary problem in terms of a quantitatively inadequate labor force and the primary solution in taking jobs to potential recruits. The second, however, thought the primary problem was qualitative and a function of the existing "underdeveloped" labor force's lack of geographic mobility.

"We are ruining the quality of our work force because of polycentrism," she said. "A modern economy requires concentrations of talent as well as of capital and technology." As an example of the violation of this principle because of the ill-advised commitment to polycentric development she cited the proposed second Slovenian university at Maribor. It would be better for quality to enlarge and improve the existing University of Ljubljana (present enrollment 15,000). When, as in Slovenia, comparative cost advantages are being sought in technologically sophisticated industrial sectors like chemicals and electronic equipment, one cannot afford to produce second-rate technicians at second-rate universities and research centers simply because people do not want to move to the place where the first-class action is. A nation the size of Slovenia can afford only one such center.

The same problem of quality, she continued, applied to primary education. It is particularly alarming that in a country like Slovenia, with its long tradition of popular culture, a full 35 per cent of children do not finish the eight-year compulsory primary school. The reason is in the curriculum, designed for offspring of a developed, urban environment and too tough for peasant children in the mountains. The proof: in Ljubljana 99 per cent of all children complete the eight-year school, while in rural Bela Krajina in southeastern Slovenia only 60 per cent do, despite the fact that in I.Q. tests the children of Bela Krajina scored higher on the average than Ljubljana children. "It follows, therefore, that after 25 years of effort the qualification structure of our people is absolutely unsuitable to our level of [economic] development. To lower the standards of school curricula for the sake of rural children may be necessary with present population distribution, but it is hardly designed to improve that qualification structure."

The Slovenian spatial plan and its supporting documentation tend to support the apparent majority view and its implicit value preferences, making modern virtues out of the traditional immobility and anti-urban predilections of the nation. Moreover, when the first draft of the plan placed three possible variants before the 1971 public debate, a majority of communal assemblies and a plurality of public meetings opted for Variant B, the one that the planners consider the most favorable of all to extensive, "polycentric" development. One of the rejected variants would have concentrated future industrial development along the crescent formed by the Tauernbahn and Südbahn, centered on and running northwest and northeast from Ljubljana, a zone where some spontaneous concentration of industry and population has taken place throughout this century. Effective implementation of the plan will thus tend to dry up or redirect the most important stream of a migratory flow that some consider already too "undeveloped."

The premises on which the plan is based, significantly entitled "Socioeconomic points of departure for spatial economies and for protection of the environment," begin with the following:

-- The territory of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia must be treated as an entirety; [the purpose of] regional spatial and sectoral coordination is to strive toward a linking of

economic-social and regional-territorial structures based on the principles of social equality, economic efficiency, and superior environmental quality.

-- The advantages of contemporary urban civilization are to be guaranteed to the entire population. The guaranteeing of equal rights and access to social services and goods, appropriate employment, housing for every citizen of SR Slovenia, means that it is necessary to organize space so that the inhabitants of Slovenia will have—in accordance with regional conditions—as little distance in time as possible from place of residence to place of work or services, a maximum of 90 minutes there and back.¹³

What is foreseen is the creation of a Republic-wide "urban system" in which virtually the entire population will be legitimately classified as urbanized but without a megalopolis or even (by contemporary standards) large urban agglomerations. The principle on which the whole plan is based is that "polycentric social development will receive a more realistic foundation with the urban system." The vision of Slovenia in the year 2000 that is projected is similar to what Kržišnik calls a "garden city" embracing the whole of Slovenia's 20,000 square kilometers.

After surveying present population and economic distribution and trends and outlining the instruments to be used to influence the latter, the plan specifies "the anticipated effects on the regional development of Slovenia":

-- On the basis of the urban system there would be formed in all regions of Slovenia more significant urban centers or subcenters to carry the major weight of a more symmetrical and rapid regional socioeconomic development. Development in this sense also means approximating the developmental aspirations that have manifested themselves in the past and particularly in the most recent past. [The reference here is to the expectation, raised by communist planning principles and institutionalized in the precedence and autonomy granted the commune in Yugoslav law, that each locality will be equally developed.]

-- By ca. the year 2000 there would be achieved a more symmetrical urbanization of all regions of Slovenia, *along with the least displacement of the work force from its native regions*; differences between better and less developed regions would be minimized more rapidly and frontier regions would be more strongly developed.

-- Considering demographic trends, the urban system provides the best way of immediately and gradually including in the urbanization process the potential population, both those who originate in the separate communes and regions on the basis of natural growth and those who would leave agriculture.

-- All regions of Slovenia or gravitation hinterlands of leading development centers, with the exception of the northwestern Primorje and part of Kočevje district, would be less than 30 minutes, i.e., 50 kilometers by highway or railroad, away from such centers, which is significant from the point of view of inclusion of the entire territory in contemporary economic-social development.

-- From the point of view of time consumed in work and shopping, the proposed design of an urban system, accompanied by the construction of an appropriate infrastructure of communications, will make possible a more rational use of time; only 10 per cent of the entire Slovene population would remain outside the half-hour distance from place of residence to place of employment, shopping, or availability of higher-level service institutions.

-- The urban system would offer possibilities for accelerated economic and social development to southeastern and eastern Slovenia, which are thickly settled and at the same time less developed regions. The creation of several stronger centers of nonagrarian employment in these regions would in addition influence an accelerated development of peasant agriculture.

-- The urban network of SR Slovenia would acquire greater internal coherency; gaps in

the existing urban network would thereby be filled.

-- The development of urbanization in the sense of an urban system would influence the development of the communal system, its territorial divisions and the creation of intercommunal cooperation in separate functional areas. Through the cooperation of existing territorial divisions in the urbanization process itself, a process of spatial integration on a wider plane than the present communes would take place gradually, in the direction of various forms of territorial collaboration (political-administrative, self-administrative, and sectoral).¹⁴

The 1971 public debate of the plan, in addition to criticizing inadequate attention to the key problems of better communications and housing construction, emphasized the need to accelerate both daily migration and the mobility of the labor force. It also added two areas to the eastern Slovenian ones mentioned as needing special attention. Both reflect Slovenian pride in and sensitivity about the new territories acquired from Italy after 1945: the Slovenian coast with its new seaport at Koper and resorts at Piran and Portorož, only ten miles long but Slovenia's very own, and the thinly populated and still emptying Karst and Soča valley to the northwest.¹⁵ Attention to the former represents national pride, to the latter national defense and lingering fears that the Italians might once again claim those territories if Yugoslavia's title, based on the ethnicity of the inhabitants, were to be weakened by depopulation. If the motives in both these additions reflect the historic emotions and sensitivities of Slovene nationalism more than developmental or environmental concerns per se, the effect is nevertheless to serve notice that no presently populated corner of the country is to be left out of the plan, undeveloped or subject to depopulation.

In elaborating a pan-Slovenian "urban system," Variant B of the spatial plan specifies 13 centers or clustered sub-centers of regional urbanization. The forecast urban and hinterland populations ascribed to these centers at the end of the century (Table III), based on demographic projections that may put the growth rate too high in anticipating a total population of more than 2.4 million by the year 2000,¹⁶ reveal the following pattern:

- a Republican capital with ca. 400,000 inhabitants and with 700,000 in its wider gravitational zone: Ljubljana.

- one "significant regional center" with 200-300,000 inhabitants and 400,000 in its wider gravitational zone: Maribor.

- three other "significant regional centers" with ca. 100,000 inhabitants each and 200,000 in their respective gravitational zones: Celje, Koper-Piran, Novo Mesto.

- three "regional centers" with ca. 50,000 inhabitants and 100,000 in their respective zones: Nova Gorica, Murska Sobota, Kranj.

- and five "regional centers or sub-centers" with 20-50,000 inhabitants and from 60-100,000 in their hinterlands: Jesenice-Bled-Radovljica, Brežice-Krško, Slovenjgradec-Ravne-Dravograd, Trbovlje-Hrastnik-Zagorje, Ptuj.¹⁷

Particularly instructive are the differences between the end-of-century populations of these urban centers anticipated by the spatial plan, therefore representing desired distribution, and their populations on the same date as forecast in the demographic projections prepared for the planners on the basis of actual present trends (see Table III). While the figures are not strictly comparable, since the plan's forecasts include "urbanized suburbs" but the projection's do not, variations in the direction and magnitude of the differences are revealing. Only for Ljubljana and nearby Kranj are the desired populations less than the projected. For Murska Sobota, Brežice-Krško, and Novo Mesto, on the other hand, the plan's projected populations are up to three times larger than the demographers' forecasts; these are the three regional centers nominated in the plan for heretofore relatively underdeveloped and least urbanized eastern Slovenia. Celje and Maribor (but not its satellite town of Ptuj) in Slovenian Styria and the ex-Italian towns of Nova Gorica and the Slovene coast should also grow significantly more rapidly than projected.

Conclusions

If the planners have their way, deliberate policies will intervene to redress the balance of the population-concentrating forces of industrialization

and modernization, which favor the crescent-shaped "Slovene skeleton" centered on Ljubljana but which have already been remarkably weak in their effect, and so to influence a population distribution closer to a mountain people's tradition and desire but with at least most of the economic and cultural "advantages of contemporary urban civilization."

In most societies, including many that have in fact tried hard to keep people out of the city, such a plan might be dismissed as a pious wish unlikely to have much effect. In Slovenia, where most people have consistently demonstrated that they do not want to live in big cities, and with a low birthrate and moderate population density, at least the distribution goals of the dream are eminently realistic.

Their realism is rooted in equal measure in tradition and economic structure, in official values and policies, and in popular perceptions. The first category is comprised of what Ljubljana sociologist Andrej Caserman calls the "non-deliberate processes," both historic and contemporary, which were described in the early sections of this Report—a list significantly recited in whole or in part by every social scientist and several government officials interviewed in its preparation. The second category is comprised of Caserman's "deliberate processes," both present and planned, in which he sees three primary considerations: a "disinterest in megalopolis" that is uncommon among the megalomaniacal planners and politicians of developing countries but that is rooted in Slovene history; the fear of leaving an empty countryside, especially along contested frontiers with Italy and Austria, also a function of Slovenian nationalism's particular history; and a concern for environmental quality that antedates its contemporary fashionableness and has its source in an Alpine people's special love of their particular valleys and a romantic attitude to natural landscapes.

This last consideration straddles the borderline and provides an important link between official values and policies and popular perceptions. A small country in which nearly every factory director and engineer, most workers, and many leading politicians are mountain climbers or skiers or both is like having a Sierra Club comprised of key members of all elites, including most of those whose

TABLE III

(Population in thousands)

Urban Center	Inhabitants 1971			Demographic Forecast Forecast Pop. of cities ca. 2000	Desired Pop. ca. 2000		
	I City	II City + other towns in region	III Total in towns + hinterland		I Urban agglomera- tion	II Urban agglomera- tion + other towns	III Total in region
Murska Sobota	9.5	17.7	147.6	19.8	40.0	65.7	133.0
Maribor	115.1	131.8	285.4	215.1	270.0	295.4	415.9
(Ptuj)	(9.5)			(21.4)	(19.0)		
Slovenjgradec-	13.5	13.5	65.9	30.0	50.0	56.2	86.8
Ravne-Dravograd							
Celje	34.4	60.1	220.6	66.7	120.0	168.9	254.3
Trbovlje-Hrastnik-	29.4	29.4	45.3	39.1	50.0	50.0	62.2
Zagorje							
Brežice-Krško	7.6	11.3	69.7	14.5	50.0	54.9	93.5
Novo Mesto	12.1	18.1	91.3	25.8	90.0	102.6	142.6
Ljubljana	212.2	256.6	533.2	493.8	380.0	606.0	742.2
(Kranj)	(27.2)			(53.6)	(50.0)		
Jesenice-Radovljica-							
Bled	27.8	27.8	56.2	46.1	50.0	50.0	68.8
Nova Gorica	14.8	20.4	94.9	27.6	50.0	61.9	110.0
Koper-Izola-Piran	29.6	42.1	115.0	69.3	100.0	124.5	163.1

Source: Splošne Zasnovе . . . (*op. cit.*), p. 12 and Vogelnik, "Projekcija prebivalstva . . ." *op. cit.* (for "Demographic forecast population ca. 2000,").

professional roles usually make them pollution's best friends. The Slovene Mountaineering Society has 100,000 active members, 10 per cent of the total adult population, and in August the best place to track down almost any leading government functionary or enterprise director is on a trail somewhere above the thousand meter line.

The linkages and the role conflicts they sometimes involve are typified by the story of a court case involving the Jesenice steelworks and the Mountaineering Society. The steelworks, as noted earlier, were inherited from the Hapsburg Monarchy and are an antiquated, money-losing, but indispensable major employer and polluter near the headwaters of the Sava river, in a narrow valley between the Julian and Karawanken Alps and close

to internationally known mountain resorts like Bled and Kranjska Gora. In 1957 the steelworks were taken to court by the Society, acting as a citizens' "interest association," for polluting the upper reaches of the Sava Dolinka and destroying its famous trout fishing. The steelworks undertook to control its effluents and paid the local fish hatchery 40 million dinars—a considerable sum in those days—for restocking. What makes the story interesting, aside from the early date for such an action, is that both plaintiff and defender represented the same people. The plant's management and many of the workers are avid fishermen, mountaineers, and members of the Society, and the local volunteer Alpine rescue service is organized in and made up of workers from the steelworks.¹⁸

As Kržišnik puts it: "Every Slovene is in some way, in his heart, conscious of what is at stake, of the connection between environmental protection, population distribution, and employment."

The problem, therefore, is not whether the regional spatial plan and other policies can keep the population dispersed, but whether such a dispersed population really can be as economically efficient and culturally "modern" as they also aspire to be.

"The question," Kržišnik concludes, "is whether we can support dispersion, with all its advantages, *economically*. How to concentrate labor without concentrating people is difficult. . . . Psychologically the present situation—a relatively immobile population—has the great advantage of giving to a Slovene an easy and sure sense of personal identity, which is rare in the modern world, but on the other hand it limits his choice of profession or specialization, which is personally, economically, and socially undesirable."



NOTES

1. "Social Product" as measured in Yugoslav omits some categories like administrative expenditures that are included in Western calculations of Gross National Product, therefore underestimating GNP by about 10 per cent.

2. Dr. Ivanka Ginić, "Dinamika gradskog stanovništva Jugoslavije prema prvim rezultatima popisa od 1971. godina," in *Stanovništvo* (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, Centar za demografska istraživanja, January-June 1971). See Table II to this Report, based on Ginić.

3. A.E. Moodie, *The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary* (London: George Philip & Son, 1945), p. 21.

4. In Czechoslovakia, for example, 32 per cent of the urban population lived in towns of under 10,000 inhabitants and 15 per cent in towns of 10-20,000 inhabitants in 1961, a significantly higher proportion than in any other East European socialist state, including "rural" Bulgaria. These figures, for which I am indebted to Professor Leslie Dienes of Kansas University, would be even more striking if the ex-Austrian Czech lands (Bohemia-Moravia) were disaggregated from ex-Hungarian Slovakia. Professor Dienes' tables also reveal that Marxist principles of dispersed economic development, reinforcing historic tradition in Czechoslovakia as in Slovenia, are maintaining or even strengthening this pattern. Between 1950 and 1960, while the urban population of Czechoslovakia increased from 51 to 57 per cent of the total, small- and medium-sized urban settlements more than maintained their share (here again the more significant data for Bohemia-Moravia are not disaggregated):

Size of Town (in thousands)	Percentage of Total Population	
	1950	1960
2- 5	14.2	16.3
5-10	7.4	8.6
10-20	6.1	7.2
20-50	6.7	7.2
50-100	2.9	4.0
100+	13.9	14.1

5. Norman J.G. Pounds, "The Urbanization of East-Central and Southeast Europe," in George W. Hoffman (ed.), *Eastern Europe; Essays in Geographical Problems* (London: Methuen, 1971), is an urbane and extremely useful history of urbanization in the area from the Greeks to the Marxists.

6. This is the view of contemporary Slovene scholars, although it could also be argued that the People's Party was anti-urban and anti-industrial because towns and capitalism tended in the Monarchy to be liberal and anti-clerical.

7. These "principles" are defined and qualified in F.E. Ian Hamilton, "The Location of Industry," pp. 185-93, in Hoffman (ed.) *op. cit.* Cf. Hamilton's major work, *Yugoslavia: Patterns of Economic Activity* (New York: Praeger, 1968), *passim*.

8. Documentation prepared for the plan by the Biro za regionalno protorsko planiranje (Bureau for Regional Spatial Planning) of the Republican Secretariat for Urbanism, with

interviews the primary source for this section of the present Report, is impressive in volume and research methodology. Of particular use are the Bureau's serially numbered occasional papers, including a detailed nine-part study of migration by Dr. Dolfe Vogelnik, (cited below as "Vogelnik Study," published as occasional paper no. 15, "chapters" 1-7, 1969-71). See also the Bureau's Informational Bulletin, published monthly, its periodic progress reports entitled "Pregled poteka dela na izdelavi regionalnega prostorskega plana za območje SR Slovenije," and especially "Splošne zasnove regionalnega prostorskega razvoja-osnutek" ("General Principles of Regional Spatial Development—First Draft"), published in March 1972. For a brief history of Slovene spatial planning see Jack C. Fisher, "The Emergence of Regional Spatial Planning in Yugoslavia: the Slovene Experience," in Hoffman, *op. cit.*

9. "Osnutek družbenega plana razvoja SR Slovenije v letih 1971-1975, Tabelarni pregled" (Ljubljana: Zavod SRS za planiranje, June 1972, mimeo.), Table 21. Inputs for the matrix include new job rates ranging from 1.6 to 2.5 per cent per annum and varying assumptions about new emigration abroad (from 25 to 37 thousand minus repatriations (from 16.8 to 25 thousand).

10. Dr. Dolfe Vogelnik, "Projekcija previvalstva, delovne sile in mest SR Slovenije" (Ljubljana: Biro za regionalno protorsko planiranje, 1971, no. 25). Other statistics concerning immigration 1959-1963 and later estimates are by the same author in the Vogelnik Study, chapters 6-7 ("Selitveni tokovi: Medrepubliške selitve in meddržavne selitve," 1970).

11. Vogelnik Study, chapter 4 (1970).

12. Vogelnik, "Projekcija prebivalstva . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 39. Emphasis in original.

13. "Splošne zasnove regionalnega prostorskega razvoja," *op. cit.*, p. 6.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 22f. (Emphasis added)

15. *Ibid.*, Appendix summarizing the results of the debate.

16. The projections, including a positive balance from external migration, are those of Dr. Vogelnik, "Projekcija prebivalstva . . .," *op. cit.* Taking the 1961 census (Slovenian population 1,591,523) as a base, Vogelnik anticipated a population of 2,440,787 in 2001 along a curve that forecast 1,807,000 in 1971. In 1971, however, the new census found only 1,725,088 inhabitants, which means that the forecast growth in the past decade exceeded achieved growth by fully 38 per cent. Vogelnik's principal error, puzzling in a study only published in 1971, was in forecasting a natural growth rate of 8.7 per thousand in 1966, declining to 8.0 per thousand in 1971; the actual growth rate averaged 7.7 per thousand from 1965 to 1969 and was 6.3 per thousand in 1971, a rate that Vogelnik did not anticipate until the 1980s. A later version of the forecast, which replaces the projected 1971 population with census date, curiously fails to revise later forecast figures downward.

17. "Splošne zasnove . . .," *op. cit.*, pp. 9f, 12f.

18. Sociologist Caserman, who used to be the Jesenice steelwork's industrial psychologist, is the source of this anecdote.

