

That no one really knows how many Slovenes there are in Carinthia, and that there is no way of finding out, is at first glance extremely odd. It would obviously be useful to know, since not knowing has been a primary source of both genuine difficulties and easy excuses for the law-makers and administrators who are supposed to design and execute measures to protect the existence of the minority and guarantee the equality and rights of its members. For more than a century, moreover, Austrian censuses have asked questions about language or other criteria of national (ethnic) identification, and the published results regularly include breakdowns of the Carinthian population into German-speaking, Slovenian-speaking, and other ostensibly national categories. On closer examination, however, these censuses contain so many anomalies and curious or apparently impossible fluctuations over time that they are in themselves conclusive evidence that the number of Slovenes on any given date is still unknown and in Carinthian circumstances apparently unknowable. The reasons for these anomalies and fluctuations are in turn useful clues to the complex of reasons, both nefarious and natural, why that number (whatever it may be) is dwindling and why the minority will someday almost certainly disappear...even if the nefarious reasons were to be eliminated, as they could be, through an act of political will.

In the century between 1869 and 1971 the population of Carinthia increased from about 315,000 to 526,728, a growth of 66.6 percent. During the same period the population of the southern Carinthian districts where most of the Slovenes live increased by 32.5 percent—from 90,655 to

120,121—a lower growth rate that reflects the south's relative lack of larger towns during a century of rapid urbanization in which the population of cities tended to grow by more and that of rural areas by less than natural increase as a whole.¹ Slovene estimates of their own share in the province's total population in these years—disregarding clearly extreme claims—present a picture of steady decline from between 96,000 and 116,000 (ca. 33%) in 1846 to 60-70,000 (between 11.4% and 13.3%) at the present time. On the other hand, official census results, while close to agreeing with these estimates for the beginning of this period, record a far more precipitous decline that is especially and suspiciously dramatic in recent decades. According to one version of these official figures, presented in Table 1 (the reasons why other versions also exist will be examined below), Slovenes now constitute only 3.4 percent of the Carinthian population.

Table 1	Year	No. of Slovenes in Carinthia
	1880	91,927
	1890	92,068
	1900	85,311
	1910	74,210
	1923	39,292
	1934	31,704
	1939	ca. 42,000
	1951	22,367
	1961	ca. 15,700
	1971	17,934

Either set of figures suggests a high rate of assimilation into the majority nationality, and at least in the official figures the rate is so high one is inclined to suspect that more than "natural" forces have been at work. More careful examination also reveals some astonishing fluctuations in individual townships (*Gemeinde*), and these raise even more questions concerning the validity of census results and what they are actually telling us about the political, socioeconomic, and other reasons for both real and apparent changes in Carinthia's national composition. These fluctuations are presented in graphic and dramatic form in Figure 1, which charts the ups and downs in the number of southern Carinthians recorded in censuses since 1910 as speaking Slovenian or "Windisch," singly or in combination with each other and German. One of the more extreme cases thus portrayed is the township of Mieger/Medgorje, where the language spoken by the majority of the population appears to have changed as follows:

1910	96 percent Slovenian-speaking
1923	51 percent Slovenian-speaking
1934	97 percent German-speaking
1939	81 percent Windisch-speaking*
1951	91 percent Slovenian-speaking*
1961	72 percent Windisch-speaking*.
1971	76 percent German-speaking

(*including combinations).

As Dr. Ernst Waldstein, who compiled much of the data on these censuses, comments: "An inhabitant of this township who is today over 50 years old must have changed his language of normal communication 5 times in the course of his life."³

Spokesmen for the minority and their Yugoslav friends call the generation and use of figures like these "statistical genocide." It is certainly demonstrable that the way the censuses have been designed, and even more the way they have been carried out, have tended to reduce the number of those registered as non-German-speakers as well as playing an important role in the strange fluctuations recorded in Figure 1. For example, the fact that successive censuses have posed the language question in different ways is both one reason for fluctuations in the results and a clue to the census-takers' intentions, since some ways of asking this question make it easier and others make it less easy for a bilingual person whose first or usual

language is a Slovene dialect to declare himself (or to be encouraged to declare himself) in some other category. It is thus instructive to compare the ups and downs recorded in Figure 1 with the ways that the language question has been posed in each of the censuses in question:⁴

1910 In this last Hapsburg census, as in earlier ones, people were asked to record their "language of communication" (*Umgangssprache*), defined as "the language used in normal communications."

1923 "Language of thought" (*Denksprache*), defined as "the language that one speaks best and in which one thinks." (This census also asked for "ethnic adherence" and "race," but these results were never published.)

1934 "The language of the cultural environment (*Kulturkreis*) to which one feels that he belongs" (only one could be listed).

1939 "Mothertongue" (*Muttersprache*) defined as "the language in which one thinks and that one prefers to use in the family because it is easiest." Bilingualism was recognized and "Windisch" was admitted as a language category. "Ethnic adherence" (*Volkszugehörigkeit*) was also asked in this census taken after the German annexation of Austria; only one Volk could be listed.

1951 "Language of Communication," defined as the language exclusively or primarily used in normal intercourse. Multilingualism was recognized (in a bewildering plethora of hyphenated forms as described below), and "Windisch" was an admitted category.

1961 "Language of communication," now defined as the language spoken in the family. Multilingualism and "Windisch" again admissible.

1971 "Language of communication," this

time without definition. Multilingualism and "Windisch" were still recognized, but only "German" was actually printed on census forms.

- 1976 The "census of a special kind" (boycotted by most of the minority as described in Part II of this series) asked for "mother tongue," defined as "the language in which one grew up." The forms (for use throughout Austria) provided for five possible answers: German, Slovenian, Croatian, Hungarian, or Other, with a space to write in which Other.

To understand the impact of such changing definitions on census results, take the example of a very common phenomenon I have frequently encountered on visits to the district: Carinthians whose first language was a local Slav dialect that some would call "Slovenian" and others "Windisch," conversing in their favorite café and unconsciously shifting back and forth between that dialect and the local German dialect, according to the changing subject of their discourse. Thus the talk will tend to be in a Slav dialect when it is about problems with the wife, the cow, or the crops, and in German when the subject is politics or sports or when the bill is being added up. What, then, is their "mothertongue," their "language of communication" (and by which definition), or their "language of thought," and is the answer to any one of these questions quite certain and invariable? Or will it depend instead on the *nationality* with which one wishes to identify *at the moment* the question is asked?

Postwar censuses added a further complication. Recognition of "Windisch" as a language and of multilingualism as a possibility—two innovations first introduced in the Nazi census of 1939—now meant that Carinthians were expected to choose among no less than ten linguistic categories, all of which were listed on their census forms until 1971: German, Slovenian, Windisch, Slovenian-German, German-Slovenian, German-Windisch, Windisch-German, Slovenian-Windisch, Windisch-Slovenian, and Other or Unknown. Whether such forms represented a deliberate "anti-minority" strategem on the part of those who

wrote and used them (as minority spokesmen and Yugoslav critics maintain), or are merely a typically Austrian amalgam of German thoroughness and Balkan sloppiness, the results have been the same: confusion, additional openings for suggestions or pressure by census-takers who have had to explain what all this means, and a consequent splintering and further reduction in size of the population recorded as non-German-speaking. It also means that politicians and propagandists (and even disinterested statisticians and observers) have been able to come up with wildly divergent figures for the size of the minority and therefore with divergent views about where enough of them live to justify or necessitate bilingual schools or topographical inscriptions and Slovenian as a second language in offices and courtrooms. For example, the postwar census results cited in Table 1, which were taken from a quasi-official brochure published by the Federal Chancellor's Office in 1977, appear to be based on the sums of all census categories in which the word "Slovenian" appears, but without those listed as "Windisch," "Windisch-German," or "German-Windisch." If the "Windisch" categories are also included—as in Table 2, from which one can also see how wildly the numbers in individual non-German categories have fluctuated from one census to the next—the apparent size of the minority becomes 42,095 rather than 22,367 in 1951, 25,300 rather than 15,700 in 1961, and 21,918 rather than 17,934 in 1971. On the other hand, eliminating the "German-Slovenian" as well as the "Windisch" categories in counting members of the minority eligible for protection, as the Heimatdienst and other German nationalist sources are wont to do, reduces the size of the residual minority even further—in 1971 to merely 6,991.⁵

Table 2

Census	1951	1961	1971
German-Slovenian	8,617	3,300	10,935
Slovenian-German	5,888	2,200	758
Slovenian	7,707	8,300	6,214
German-Windisch	10,944	7,400	3,394
Windisch-German	5,330	2,500	124
Windisch	3,454	1,600	454
Slovenian-Windisch	117	--	9
Windisch-Slovenian	38	--	--
Total in non-Germanic language categories	42,095	25,300	21,918

Of central importance for all these games with numbers, and for their broader significance and implications, has been the concept of a separate "Windisch" language and hence, by implication, a distinct "Windisch" ("Wend") ethnic group, formerly defined as the racially and now more gingerly as the culturally mixed product of early Carinthian Slav and German intermingling.⁶ Originally propagated by German nationalists early in this century, the concept's official acceptance as a linguistic category in censuses, first by the Nazi regime and then by the postwar democratic one, give it a legitimacy that few anthropologists and other experts outside (or today even inside) German nationalist ranks would accept. Indeed, the objections of such experts and recent doubts on the subject even in the German nationalist camp are probably the reason why only "German" was printed on census forms in 1971, leaving non-German-speakers to write in whichever of the nine other linguistic categories seemed appropriate. The effect of this change and of the declining fashionableness of the concept of "Windisch" in general are reflected in the census results: the number of Carinthians recorded as speaking "Windisch," alone or in combination with German or Slovene, declined from 19,883 in 1951 to 3,981 in 1971. As Table 2 reveals, almost all of these remaining "Wends" have put themselves in the "German-Windisch" category, which can probably be considered the final step short of a claim to or self-image of full Germanization. The "League of Carinthian Wends," a subsidiary of the German nationalist Heimatdienst under the



1972: German nationalist vigilantes demolish the first bilingual German-Slovene highway signs erected in a belated and abortive attempt to fulfill one clause of Article 7 of the State Treaty of 1955 (see Part II of this series).

leadership of Dr. Valentin Einspieler, who is also a deputy chief of the Heimatdienst, is dead in all but name. But the idea of a "Windisch" language and people, however much it is now generally discredited, has done its job for the cause of German nationalism and assimilation, a subject to which we shall return.

All of these games with numbers could be considered of marginal or esoteric importance were it not for the use they have been put to by the Austrian and Carinthian governments and because they function as both a cause and an index—manipulated and statistically dubious as they may be—of what is really happening to the minority.

First, census results have been used by Austrian lawmakers as a basis for delimiting the geographic area in which certain provisions of Article Seven of the State Treaty of 1955 are to be applied. For example, data from the census of 1951 provided the basis for the Federal legislature's decision to limit application of a Law on the Use of the Slovene Language in Courts, passed in 1959, to only three of nine judicial districts in southern Carinthia. The ill-fated Law on Bilingual Topographical Inscriptions of 1972, which was to have applied to 205 localities (one-quarter of the total) in the region defined as Slovene or mixed by the School Law of 1945, was similarly based on what a prominent Yugoslav expert calls a "statistically dubious processing of data on the number of the



1977: The bilingual signs go up again, but only a few at a time to test reactions; at latest report, this one is still in place.

THE BOYCOTTED 'CENSUS OF A SPECIAL KIND' (November 1976)



In Carinthia the Slovene minority organizations held public meetings, under bilingual posters, to rally support for a boycott of the "minority headcount."

Slovene population, collected during the census of 1961.⁷⁷ It was in fact because of minority and Yugoslav objections to the validity of such a data base⁸ that Austrian governments, while disagreeing with further Slovene objections to the need for or legitimacy of any ethnic census, made the application of later minority legislation dependent on the "census of a special kind" that was described earlier in this series. As we have seen, it, too, was denounced *ex ante* and boycotted by the Slovene minority organizations, who argued that the results would once again and inevitably be a lie.

Second, that census results have been and might again be used to limit the application of measures that are unpopular with the majority nationality and to counter past and possible future Yugoslav irredentist claims has provided German nationalists and other opponents of bilingualism in the zone with additional and specific incentives to do whatever they can to insure that each successive census will record ever fewer Slovenes living primarily in remote and disconnected parts of the province. This can mean pressures on individuals at census time and the kind of manipulation of census questions and results described here and in complaints by minority spokesmen. It can also mean general and deliberate intensification of the permanent social, economic, and psychological pressures to assimilate that are already and to some degree



In Vienna Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky casts his "vote" in the special census—presumably registering as a German-speaker?

"naturally" inherent in the minority's situation. And it is these permanent pressures, both deliberate and inherent, which are gradually but ineluctably bringing about the disappearance of the minority, so that the lowest estimate of its size that can be conjured out of each recent census becomes another in a sequence of partly self-fulfilling prophecies.

"Skimmed Milk" and other Socioeconomic Processes

There is nothing uncommon about the social and economic incentives to assimilate that are inherent in the situation of the Carinthian Slovenes, and that would still exist without deliberate intensification by their German neighbors and sins of omission by Austrian governments that have failed to do all they could or are legally bound to do to slow the process. These are pressures that are faced by members of any linguistic or similarly distinct cultural minority whose circumstances include most or all of the following: absolutely or relatively few in number; without economically and culturally significant urban centers of their own; economically subordinate to or poorer and less "developed" than their neighbors; and either fragile or frozen as a social community because their customs and social institutions or externally imposed restrictions inhibit change and occupational and social differentiation. All of these are true of the Carinthian Slovenes, including relative poverty and socioeconomic "underdevelopment"

by Austrian and Carinthian standards or those of their German-speaking neighbors, most of whom are also poorer than Austrian average levels but who still tend to control most of the region's comparatively few nonagricultural sources of wealth and employment.⁹ But the magnitude of such pressure is not necessarily and always as great as its *prima facie* potential, nor is the effect invariably direct or even one-directional. If they were, many minorities should have disappeared long ago.

When there is little deliberate external pressure to assimilate, and even (or, in perverse reality, especially) when the external pressure is blatant and unsubtle, such a minority may remain socially intact and resistant as long as none or only a few of its members aspire to be "upwardly mobile" beyond the limits that these circumstances impose. Thus, for example, a Carinthian Slovene can usually remain a Slovene with little economic or social difficulty—as distinct from the individual and social psychological kinds that are discussed below—as long as he is and wishes to remain a peasant or a farmer, or if he is or wishes to become a village shopkeeper, a small-scale rural entrepreneur in forestry, handicrafts, or tourism, a priest, or even (apart from certain pressures derived from the need to complete his training in an alien language and culture) a village schoolteacher, lawyer, or doctor. Or if he has had such difficulties, it is usually because of deliberate economic discrimination or political or physical intimidation by anti-Slovene German nationalists, which is not uncommon,¹⁰ but as a form of external and deliberate pressure is not the point at issue here. Even then, however, a modicum of "national consciousness" or an aroused affection for the language and customs of his forefathers, which he may actually acquire as an unintended effect of such pressure, can lead him to stiffen his ethnic backbone and so to resist assimilation more stubbornly and successfully than he otherwise might have done.¹¹

The story will have a different ending when the same Carinthian Slovene or his children wishes to enter a profession or rise to a professional or social level that is not represented in their native rural or village environment. The cities and larger towns and the universities and other postsecondary schools of Carinthia and Austria are German in

language and German-Austrian in culture, and non-German Austrians are too few in number to alter this. In these towns and schools one competes or prepares to compete with German-speakers, and one lives and communicates in a German-speaking world and a German-Austrian cultural environment. The surnames in the telephone books of the towns and cities of Carinthia and the Burgenland, and in Vienna itself, bear mute witness to the numbers who have indeed come this way. The given names that are attached to these surnames and the "native-speaking" Austro-German accents that answer the telephone tell us what has happened to them: urbanized and Germanized at the same time, or in successive generations, they or their children may even become fanatical German nationalists, in the atmosphere that prevails in Carinthia a frequent phenomenon for which the psychological explanations are too obvious to need elaboration. Back on the farm and in the village, their non-German grandparents and cousins constitute a kind of social "skimmed milk." With the minor exceptions of the rural intelligentsia and bourgeoisie noted above, the cream of each generation—the talented and the ambitious whom sociologists refer to as "upwardly mobile"—has been removed.

In Carinthia this process has been going on for a long time. More than a century ago Vinzenz Rizzi of Villach (1816-1856), a prominent early Carinthian German Liberal from the optimistic Mazzinian generation of European nationalists who tended to view other nations and their aspirations as equals in value, described with sympathy the plight of his Slovene countrymen. Their numbers and isolation between the Karawanken barrier and rapidly urbanizing and developing German-speaking valleys, he wrote, inevitably made Slovenian an unequal partner in the cohabitation of the two cultures:

And so the Slovenian culture in Carinthia must stagnate, and the Slovene is—Germanized... Let me be understood. It is not that the Slovenian race is being Germanized, no, it keeps its racial characteristics, its traditions and customs, stubborn as nature and peoples everywhere are; but the educated Slovene is Germanized. The people remain

raw and unenlightened, however much the individual who comes from the same origins may have acquired an outstanding erudition. But this education, because it was an alien one, does his people no good.¹²

The same phenomenon in its contemporary intensified form is described by another Carinthian German, this time a former Federal minister, and President of the Austrian Catholic Action:

... the change from an agricultural to an industrial society spells danger for all minorities. Then young people no longer stay in the village, they become rural-urban commuters or move to other places, where they earn their living. Slovenian boys and girls have found partners from the other language group and the mixing of the peoples, a Carinthian process for centuries, proceeds far more rapidly today. The state language is German. A person who wants to achieve something here must fully master this language and also accept the lifestyle of the people-of-state [*Staatsvolk*]. The language of the minority will still be spoken only at home in the farmhouse. So it comes about that even convinced Slovenes send their children to German schools, so that they will become something, so that they will at last do better. But that is only possible through the widest possible integration with the people-of-state. It would be otherwise if the Slovenes still as formerly lived in a compact, isolated homeland, but this is today no longer the case. Particularly decisive is the circumstance that there is no Slovenian city in Carinthia that could form a cultural or economic center.¹³


Weakened as a social community by such social decapitation, a minority subjected to this process may survive indefinitely, or as long as the rate of out-migration is low and the birthrate is high enough to compensate, but only as a politically and culturally unimportant and largely "non-modern" island in an alien sea. If, however, these last conditions are also altered—if the rate of out-migration goes up and the rate of natural increase goes down, creating a demographic equivalent to

the economist's "scissors effect"—then, with migration tantamount to assimilation, it is obvious that even the skimmed milk remnant of the minority will shrink over time. This, too, is part of the story of the Carinthian Slovenes. As we have seen, the population of southern Carinthia increased by 32.5 percent between 1869 and 1971 (and by 8.4 percent or 9,300 inhabitants between the censuses of 1961 and 1971). While this is in any case only half the rate of increase recorded in Carinthia as a whole or in the average for all of Austria, a look at more detailed figures reveals that population has actually declined, and by as much as 32 to 48 percent, in 14 out of 34 southern Carinthian townships over the past century (and in 11 out of the 34, by as much as 20 percent, between 1961 and 1971). Most of these are in the districts where the Slovene minority is most heavily concentrated. On the other hand, the largest increases have taken place in predominantly German-speaking towns and more recently in rural districts that are becoming suburbs or dormitory satellites of Klagenfurt and Villach or being developed as tourist and retirement centers. In all of these last, as the author of a study of population movements in southern Carinthia points out, "The grandchildren and great-grandchildren of Slovenes who once migrated to urban centers are thus coming back into the multilingual district, but now as German-speakers. This suburbanizing trend therefore also had undoubted Germanizing effects."¹⁴

Soft-sell Germanization, or the Psychological Angle

The sum total of all "natural" socioeconomic incentives to assimilate, accentuated by "the skimmed milk process," lower birthrates, and the impact of Austria's lately accelerated rate of socioeconomic development on local aspirations and migration patterns, would account for a considerable decline in the size of the Slovenian minority. Despite the reservations suggested above regarding its effectiveness in any and all circumstances, it is also reasonable to assume that common forms of deliberate economic, social, and political discrimination by anti-minority and economically or politically more powerful members of the majority nationality have increased the rate of decline. With all these

FIGURE 1




factors in play, the shrinkage that is admitted in the Slovenes' own most reasonable estimates—from 96-116,000 a century ago to 60-70,000 today—is quite credible, but in all probability the latter figure is still a considerable overestimation of present numbers. What, then, of the far more dramatic decline recorded in official census results? Or the fantastic fluctuations in individual townships described above and in Figure 1, which are even harder to explain? Even if we discount these figures by a healthy margin on grounds of confusion, ambiguity, and manipulation in census-taking and analysis, it will still be true that in a relatively free and democratic society, where the levels of intimidation and falsification of data that may explain similarly dramatic statistical declines and fluctuations in some other countries¹⁵ are simply not possible, a startlingly large number of Austrians have apparently and by their own declarations changed their nationality, many of them several times in their lives. Also worthy of notice is that these changes have also occurred in almost purely rural districts, where the skimmed milk residual minority is subjected to few of the economic and

social pressures to assimilate described above. Even here, according to census and school statistics and with the exception of a few sparsely inhabited townships in the mills and mountains immediately abutting on the Yugoslav frontier, many Slav peasants have apparently decided they are German or "Windisch" rather than Slovene and relatively few are registering their children for bilingual rather than exclusively German education.¹⁶

Whether such apparently fickle linguistic and hence national confessions are "real" or "a lie," a sincere aspiration or a matter of momentary expediency in the minds of those who change their declaration or declare what is really their second language, the number of such declarations and their occurrence in all social classes clearly require further, supplementary explanation. At least three additional factors seem to be involved. All of them concern cultural values and individual and social psychology. The first two are generalizable far beyond the Carinthian story, the third is specific if not peculiar to it.

SPRACHEN IN DEN WÄHLUNGSERGEBNISSEN

1910 - 1971



1. If a border community is not “nationally conscious,” if it betrays the influence of both neighboring cultures, and (or) especially the two cultures are similar in at least some of their fundamental or highly valued characteristics, then “nationality” may be a matter of relative indifference for most or all members of that community. Other considerations and values intervene, and nationality becomes an easily changeable personal attribute, a “dependent variable” in a very special and literal sense. Pre-1914 Austrian Silesia, partly German astride the ethnic frontier between Czechs and Poles, provides a case in point. The strategic Silesian town of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) and its

environs, generally agreed to have a Polish majority, passed to Czechoslovakia in the division of the Hapsburg Empire. Discussing the ensuing Czechoslovak-Polish dispute, Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Teleki is credited¹⁷ with the following anecdote:

I once asked a very prominent Czech politician how many Poles there were in the district of Teschen. He said, “Perhaps 40,000, perhaps 100,000.” I said “How does it happen that you give me such different figures just when the question seems to be of momentous importance?” He replied, “Well, the figures change. The peoples of

certain villages are changing their nationality every week, according to their economic interests and sometimes the economic interests of the mayor of the village."

The Slavs of Macedonia provide another example. Speaking a variety of dialects generally viewed as transitional between those of Serbia to the north and of Bulgaria to the east and claimed as co-nationals by both, during the past century they have identified themselves variously and often consecutively as nationally unspecified Orthodox Christians, as Bulgarians, as Serbs, and now as Macedonians, a separate South Slav nation with a lively "national consciousness" of its own.

German and Slovene, as members of two different Indo-European linguistic and cultural families, are of course not as similar as Czech and Polish (both Western Slav) or Serbian and Bulgarian (both South Slav). But cultures that cohabited in one physical space under one political roof for a millennium tend to exchange customs, legends, outlooks, and values even when they remain distinct. This is reflected, for example, in the great similarity between Slovenian and Alpine Austrian folk music. More suggestive is the remark, frequent among other Yugoslavs, that "the Slovenes are our Germans." If this is in some degree true of Yugoslav Slovenes, it is a more accurate description of the Slovenes of Carinthia, where the intermingling of cultures and blood has been more intimate at more levels. As Vizenz Rizzi pointed out more than a century ago, in a preface to his remarks on the assimilation process quoted earlier:

...the race of Slovenes [in Carinthia] ...is separated by natural frontiers from its racial fellows, it dwells on the banks of the Gail and the Drau and its closest contact is with the Germans. Specific characteristics must result from this isolation and this close contact with the German element...two small fragments of two larger nationalities live peacefully together in a small space, neither of them is capable of creating a specific and significant cultural lifestyle out of its own resources, the cultural impulses come to them from outside. Habit and natural frontiers direct them toward one another and mutual advantage strengthens the bonds.

A term for this relationship that is widely used in Carinthia—and much abused by the *Heimatsdienst*—is "a community of destiny" (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*) that has bound the Slovenes and Germans of the province for a thousand years. For the Slovenes in this *Gemeinschaft*, already in some ways culturally intermediate between South Slav and German worlds and speaking local dialects that also betray the influence of their German neighbors and overlords, becoming German can be done with comparatively little difficulty, abandoning comparatively little cultural baggage in the process. The emphasis here is on "comparatively," for it is still not all that easy or without psychological effort and potentially serious consequences. For this reason this is probably a relatively minor factor reinforcing the two that follow.

2. It is a commonly observed phenomenon (and common sense) that members of a linguistic, cultural, or ethnic minority who consider their language, culture, or ethnic characteristics inferior to those of the majority are more prone to assimilate because of this. Psychologists and social psychologists also tell us that such feelings of inferiority are always widespread, perhaps even ubiquitous, in a minority that has been historically subordinated to its majority, as Carinthian Slovenes have been to Carinthian Germans.¹⁸ In any case, all parties—Slovene nationalists, neutral observers, and German nationalists—agree that a sense of cultural inferiority exists and is indeed widespread among the Carinthian Slovenes. They also agree it is an important factor, for some the most important factor, in the readiness of so many of them to assimilate, to claim that they are German even without being assimilated, or, if their sense of logic rebels against such a claim when they know that they are not German, to opt for the label "Windisch."

3. More specific to the Carinthian story than either of the above, and in this writer's opinion of particular importance, is the minority's tendency to accept a particularly ingenious but in principle easily rejectable thesis propagated by their German nationalist opponents. Ever since 1918 and the creation of Yugoslavia, Slovene-speaking Carinthians have in effect been told that to be Slovene is to be Yugoslav, not only as an ethnic fact (Yugoslav means South Slav and the Slovenes are one of the South Slav peoples) but as a

political aspiration, meaning irredentism. Ever since 1945 they have in effect been told that, since Slovene equals Yugoslav (as a political aspiration) and Yugoslavia is now a Communist-ruled state, to be Slovene is to wish to be Yugoslav *and* under Communist rule. *Ergo*, if you do not wish to be counted as preferring Yugoslavia to Austria and Communist dictatorship to Western democracy, do not be counted as a Slovene. Since language is the defining criterion of nationality, you must also not be counted as a Slovene-speaker, which means declaring something else as your “mothertongue,” “language of communication,” or whatever the census requires, even if it is in fact Slovene.

Carinthia's Slovenes made their preference for Austria a matter of public record in the plebiscite of 1920, when 60 percent of southern Carinthians voted for the new republic with its capital in Vienna rather than for the new South Slav kingdom with its capital in Belgrade. The percentage of this largely conservative and devoutly Catholic community that preferred Austria was certainly not reduced when a Communist and avowedly atheist regime came to power in Belgrade, while a democracy that explicitly disavowed German nationalism and its crimes was established in Vienna and people dreamed “of a new Austria that would take Switzerland as its model.”¹⁹ Although it soon became clear that in the minds of most Carinthians this was not a non-national state like Switzerland, but one in which to be Carinthian and Austrian was to speak and be German, for most of the province's non-Germans and for a variety of reasons that included the unlikelihood of a real alternative, this was still better than Yugoslavia.²⁰ Carinthian German nationalists, on the other hand, refused to believe that this is what most Carinthian Slovenes feel and continues to treat Slovene as synonymous with irredentist. Some presumably do this because they believe their own thesis, others certainly because they see its usefulness as a weapon of assimilation. But this does not explain why it is so useful (i.e., why so many Slovenes have also at least subconsciously accepted the German nationalists' thesis, as their actions at census time and their attitudes at other times seem to indicate.)

First of all, German nationalists have made

intensive propaganda efforts to persuade Carinthians that every census and other moment when language or linguistic preference must be declared—for example the school strike of 1958 and the deregistration from bilingual classes that followed—is a vote for or against Austria, “a new plebiscite” at which the choice made in 1920 must be reaffirmed, even against yascillating and insufficiently German authorities.²¹

More important, the German nationalist thesis, despite its obvious logical flaws when presented as starkly as I have presented it, makes a kind of sense in terms of ordinary understandings of an ideology that so permeates the Carinthian atmosphere that it is wittingly or unwittingly absorbed by almost all who live there. This is the ideology of nationalism and the nation-state, which holds that mankind is naturally divided into units called nations, of which Germans and Slovenes are two, and that the nation constitutes the only legitimate basis for the division of mankind into states. It follows that every nation has a right to a state of its own, and that all members of a given nation have a right to be included in it. While difficult if not impossible to prove empirically, one suspects that in an atmosphere permeated by this belief, which both Slovene and German nationalists have been propagating in this borderland for more than a century and which has taken on new, worldwide vigor in our time, many Carinthian Slovenes feel in their bones (even then they have never thought about it) that in wishing to be Austrian they have somehow renounced a birthright, been untrue to the Sloveneness in their identity, committed an un-Slovene act, . . . in short, that they have already in a way renounced their nationality.

At this point, some of the other factors promoting assimilation that have been discussed in this Report come into play and make the next step easier. Those censuses with their nine linguistic variations and combinations, legitimizing a series of transitional linguistic and hence ethnic identities for people who are indeed in an intermediate position, are one of these. Here the concept of a “Windisch” language and nationality is once again of particular importance. It provided a plausible answer to the question: “If I am not a Slovene because that means wishing to be a Yugoslav and I do not, and if I am not a German

because that is not my native language or the culture of my forefathers, what am I?" The answer offered was that both Slovenian and "Windisch" are Slav languages or dialects and closely related ones, but that Slovenian is the language developed by Slovenian nationalists in the past century, taught in Slovenian schools, and spoken by "nationally conscious" (and by implication pro-Yugoslav) Carinthian Slavs, while "Windisch" is spoken by "homeland loving" (*heimatstreue*) ones—two labels that became a cliché in Carinthia.

By the time "Windisch" began to go out of fashion it had done its job, in part because it had been identified with Austrian patriotism and in part precisely because it had been defined as a Slovene-German mixed language and mixed people (*Mischsprache* and *Mischvolk*): the plausibility of a change of identity from "Windisch" to German is far greater than that of a change from Slovene to German. The "Windisch" became "German," as German nationalists had intended and as a careful analysis of statistical trends in the censuses of 1961 and 1971 confirms, and sometimes they have undoubtedly become Germans without the qualifying doubt symbolized by quotation marks.

It would be different if Austrian "state consciousness" (*Staatsbewusstsein*) had developed, as the creators of the Second Republic intended, into a viable, non-national substitute for German national consciousness as a principle of legitimacy (or illegitimacy!) for the Austrian state and an Austrian identity. There would then be no sense of a contradiction between being Slovene and being Austrian. But in the minds of most Austrians their country is at most what Schuschnigg vainly tried to make his countrymen believe it was in the last desperate years before the Anschluss: the "second" and "better" German state. In such a state one may on democratic and humanitarian grounds be prepared to offer national minorities what specialists call "tolerating protection," such as public as well as private language rights, minority schools where desired, and freedom to organize an autonomous cultural life, but one is disinclined to adopt measures that would actively rather than passively encourage their survival and development as "strangers in the homeland."

In Austria, as we have seen, not even the degree of largely "tolerating protection" required by the State Treaty has been consistently or conscientiously provided. The reasons, at least since the "storming of the town limits signs" in 1972 (see Part II), center on political calculations by the ruling Socialist Party and Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who have compromised their ideological and traditional sympathy for minorities out of fear they will otherwise lose their electoral majority in Carinthia, where Socialism is atypically German nationalist but which is the only province outside Vienna in which a Socialist majority is traditional, and that losing in Carinthia will mean losing in Austria. These are expedient and possibly miscalculated reasons, easily transcendable by an act of fairly minor political courage. Even then, however, it seems certain that "natural" socioeconomic incentives to assimilate, combined with the social psychological pressures just described, would lead to the disappearance of the Carinthian Slovenes within the next few generations. Those who recognize this and regret it, a group including many German Austrians as well as "nationally conscious" Carinthian Slovenes, advocate positive as well as passive measures to encourage the minority's survival and development.²² But would such additional measures do more than merely slow the process of assimilation?

It would at least mean that the virtues of cultural heterogeneity and majority generosity and the vices of exclusive, intolerant nationalism had been recognized and that political conclusions had been drawn. In these circumstances one is entitled to ask even those who believe that Austria should ideally become a consistently German nation-state: why not do all that the State Treaty requires and much more besides?

Present Austrian policy and practice, with the exception of some concessions and despite the goodwill and efforts of many Austrians, is not doing this. It seems to be based instead on the dictum recently pronounced to a visiting English scholar by a prominent Carinthian member of the minority Liberal Party: "Let the cat die quickly."²³ In my experience, cats prefer to die in their own time and way, and alone.

(May 1978)

[Photographs by Fototanjug, Belgrade]

NOTES

1. Over the same century the population of Klagenfurt grew by 290 percent, that of Villach by 473 percent, and that of Spittal/Drau by 423.1 percent. All are outside but draw population from the bilingual area, where the smaller towns grew much more slowly (e.g., Ferlach by 72.5 % and Völkermarkt by 75.2%). Cf. Ludwig Flaschberger, "Bevölkerungsentwicklung in Südkärnten," in Wolfgang Brunbauer (ed.), *Raumplanungsgespräch Südkärnten* (Vienna, September 1977), pp. 47ff. and see below, Note 9.
2. Figures for 1880-1910 and 1934 from the Austrian Statistical Office's published results of the 1951 census (p. 35), cited with the figures for 1923, 1939, and 1951 (given as 23,839) in Josef Tischler, *Die Sprachenfrage in Kärnten vor 100 Jahren und Heute* (Klagenfurt, n.d. [1957], p. 62. I have chosen the figures here for 1951, 1961, and 1971 as the variants apparently most acceptable to the present Austrian government, since they are reproduced in a quasi-official publication recently issued by the Federal Chancellor's Office (*Die rechtliche Stellung der Volksgruppen in Oesterreich—Eine Dokumentation* [Vienna, Bundeskanzleramt 1977], p. 9). The figure of 96-116,000 Slovenes in 1946 is from Fran Zwitter, "The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy," in the *Austrian History Yearbook*, III, 2 (1967), p. 159; 60-70,000 for the present Slovenian population in Carinthia can be found in many minority and pro-minority sources and was the figure most frequently cited by minority leaders in my interviews in Klagenfurt in 1960 and 1976.
3. "Wie viele Slowenen gibt es in Kärnten wirklich?" in *Das gemeinsame Kärnten/Skupna Koroška*, nr. 3 (Klagenfurt, 1975), pp. 50ff. Fig. 2 in this Report originally appeared as an appendix to Waldstein's article. The apparently changeable linguistic (and hence ethnic?) preferences of the people of Mieger/Medgorje and other southern Carinthian townships are also described in Bogdan Osolnik (ed.), *Minority Problems in Yugoslav Austrian Relations* (Belgrade, 1977), pp. 134ff, based in turn on the Klemenčič studies cited in Note 5 below.
4. Cf. Waldstein's article, cited above, p. 54.
5. For an extremely detailed analysis of the 1951 census results by a prominent Slovenian (Yugoslav) geographer, see Vladimir Klemenčič, "Kritični pretres avstrijskega popisa 1951 z ozirom na jezikovno strukturo na Koroskem," in *Rasprave in gradivo* (Ljubljana), 1960, n. 2, pp. 101-182, recapitulated with briefer critical remarks on the 1961 and 1971 censuses by the same author, "Kritika uradnih avstrijskih popisov prebivalstva v letih 1951, 1961, in 1971 glede na slovensko manjšino in slovenščino kot občevalni jezik," *ibid.*, 1976, combined nos. 7-8, pp. 101-124, and more briefly in Osolnik (1977), pp. 123-140.
6. The origins of the term and its evolution into a pseudo-ethnic category are described in Part I of this series.
7. Klemenčič, in Osolnik (1977), p. 127. For the legislation referred to here, see Part II of this series.
8. e.g., in a memorandum of complaint submitted by the two Carinthian Slovene organizations after the 1961 census ("Denkschrift des Rates der Kärntner Slowenen und des Zentralverbandes slowenischer Organisationen in Kärnten").
9. Several contributions to Brunbauer (ed.), *Raumplanungsgespräch Südkärnten* (see Note 1), document both the relative social and economic backwardness of southern Carinthia as a whole and the additional comparative socioeconomic disadvantages suffered by southern Carinthian Slovenes vis-à-vis their German neighbors. Although the 14 authors of this volume are all German-Austrian scholars, their sympathies are intensely pro-minority. So much so that this is less a case study in spatial planning, which it pretends to be, than another if different and unusually useful contribution to the polemical literature concerned with Austria's minority problem.
10. Many examples, ranging from "suggestions" made by employers, schoolteachers and administrators, and officials, on the firing or nonemployability of those known to have Slovenian nationalist (or sometimes merely Slovenian) sympathies, to actual physical intimidation, can be found throughout both the polemical and scholarly literature on the minority problem. Specific incidents and the general atmosphere were dramatized for a broader Austrian public in a controversial television special produced by Trautl Brandstaller, entitled *Fremde in der Heimat* (Strangers in the Homeland), and broadcast on September 18, 1975. Several prominent Carinthian politicians as well as most viewers who phoned the station condemned the production as an anti-Austrian and scandalous misrepresentation; the producer was castigated by the Carinthian media, but she was also awarded the prestigious Karl Renner Prize of 1976 for outstanding investigative journalism, "especially about right extremist tendencies and the Slovene question."
11. This apparently accounts for the survival of the Croats of the Burgenland, who seem to have remained virtually constant in numbers, despite isolation from their motherland and intense Hungarian efforts to Magyarize them after 1867, from the sixteenth century until after World War II, when the "skimmed milk process" defined in the following paragraph began to accelerate.
12. As quoted by Erich Nussbaumer, "Das gemeinsame Kärnten," (Dokumente aus der Kärntner Geistesgeschichte) in *Das gemeinsame Kärnten/Skupna Koroška*, no. 2 (1975), p. 7ff.
13. Ludwig Weiss, "Betrachtungen zur Situation der Kärntner Slowenen," *ibid.*, p. 19.

14. Flaschberger, in Brunbauer et al. (1977), p. 51, from which the demographic statistics cited in this paragraph are taken (see also Note 1 above).

15. One contemporary European example is provided by the "Macedonian" minority in Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, whose numbers as recorded in Bulgarian censuses have gone up and down with the vicissitudes of postwar Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations. Officially declared to comprise 70 percent of the district's population in 1946 and to be nonexistent in 1949, Pirin "Macedonians" numbered 178,862, or 63.6 percent of the district total in the census of 1956 but only 8,750 in that of 1965.

16. In the 1970s the number of primary school children registered for bilingual instruction throughout the region in which schools are legally obliged to offer it (see Part II of this series) had stabilized at around 14 percent of all those enrolled. In 1972-73 more than 50 percent were registered for bilingual instruction in only 13 out of then 42 such school districts in the region, and all of these 13 are so sparsely inhabited that only one of them was scheduled to retain its own primary school after a consolidation designed to eliminate small rural schools (with less than 100 pupils). See *Die Slovenen in Kärnten/Slovenvi na Koroškem* (Klagenfurt, a publication of the two minority organizations, n.d.), pp. 17ff and map 8.

17. By W. Kolarz in his *Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe*.

18. A point made with specific reference to Carinthia by Austrian social psychologist Wilfried Daim, "Die Problematik der Versöhnung der Volksgruppen in Kärnten," in *Das gemeinsame Kärnten/Skupna Koroška*, no. 4 (Klagenfurt, 1976), pp. 37-52.

19. Andreas Moritsch (A Carinthian Slovene, born 1936, and now Assistant Professor of history at Vienna University), "Gedanken eines zweisprachigen Südkärntner zum Österreichischen Staatsbewusstsein," in *Das gemeinsame Karnten/Skupna Koroška*, no. 3 (1975), p. 68.

20. One possibly misleading indication of the strength of pro-Yugoslav sentiment among Carinthian Slovenes in the first years of the Communist regime there is in the 2,077 votes cast in provincial elections in 1949 for a party called the Democratic Front of the Working People, the political successor of the pro-Communist wing of the Carinthian Slovene Partisan movement of World War II. In the same elections the political party formed out of the Catholic wing of the Slovene Partisans received 4,617 votes, a total poll by the two Slovene parties of 6,694.

21. Thus Viktor Miltshinsky, grand old man and ideologue of the Heimatdienst, described the school campaign of 1958:

The high number of deregistrations was...interpreted and celebrated as a new plebiscite, except that...the people's leadership (that is, the government, the national assembly, the provincial government, the provincial assembly) took no part in it and the deregistration had to be fought through against their inclinations (*Kärnten wehrt sich* [Klagenfurt, 1962], p. 51).

22. One of the conclusions implicit in Hanns Haas and Karl Stuhlpfarrer, *Österreich und seine Slowenen* (Vienna, 1977), the latest and one of the most balanced of the sympathetic pro-minority studies by (German) Austrians that have appeared in recent years.

23. As told to me by the visitor, Malcolm Anderson of Warwick University.

[This Report concludes the three-part series begun in 1977].