
A stable Yugoslavia in an unstable world, in general self-confident even in self-criticism at home but worried about the potential consequences of revived Superpower confrontation for the security and independence of smaller countries and for world peace—this is the message that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and its amazingly unflagging President Josip Broz Tito were projecting from the Party's Eleventh Congress, which met in Belgrade from June 20 to 23, 1978.

Yugoslav Party Congresses, as pointed out in *AUFS Reports* from earlier ones, do not actually make policy decisions or choose the Party's leaders, although theory and the Party Statutes say they do. These things are done elsewhere and beforehand. Party Congresses are important, however, in providing a deadline for the conclusion of these other more or less private debates, since a Congress must endorse a platform and a roster of top officials and these, although not unchangeable, will be influential in subsequent months or years.

In addition, although there is little of the "open dialogue" claimed by official handouts, a Congress provides a setting for a series of monologues, actually listened to by others, that are not always the uninteresting, monotonous repetition of successes and exegesis of "the Party line" that inexperienced observers expect and that seems to be confirmed by a casual reading of first paragraphs in the hundreds of speeches delivered in plenary sessions and in "working" commissions (663 delegates asked to speak in the Eleventh

Congress's 6 commissions, of whom 412 did and the remainder submitted their remarks in writing for inclusion in the record.) The reality, as this observer has experienced it in the four Congresses held in the 1960s and 1970s, was more aptly described at a pre-Congress press conference by Aleksandar Grlićkov, the able Macedonian who is the Party's principal spokesman on international Communist affairs. Answering a skeptical resident journalist who asked how "various views" within the Party ever really become public knowledge, Grlićkov said: "You yourself know how every Yugoslav, when he makes a speech and from whatever position he makes it, devotes one-third of it to reporting positive developments, then he puts in a 'however,' and then in two-thirds he makes his criticism. That Yugoslav 'however' is universal, as you'll see at the Congress.... Everyone will say something about what he thinks is really successful, then he'll use two-thirds of this time for that 'however.'" With some important qualifications—some never get that far; Tito, the principles of self-management and nonalignment, Yugoslav foreign policy in general, the Army, and a select number of basic Marxian tenets head a list of uncriticizable subjects; and one is not supposed to attack individuals by name who have not been officially damned (embarrassing exception: in 1958 one senior Party functionary used the Congress podium to attack an even more senior and distinguished colleague for allegedly seducing his wife)—this is a fair description.

Party Congresses therefore deserve at least somewhat detailed analysis. This, it should be

said hastily, is not the purpose of this Report. Too much time would be needed, and in two senses: time to read *all* the verbiage and sort out the wheat from the chaff—of which, *pace* the above, there is a great deal!—and time for subsequent events to grant some wisdom of hindsight in order to know what was really important. (A recent series of articles in a Yugoslav periodical by Dušan Bilandžić, a political scientist and Party official whose writing always merits attention, reanalyzes speeches made at the Eighth Congress in 1964, picking out passages that were usually overlooked at the time by those who reported a basically no-change Congress, but that in retrospect clearly anticipated the dramatic policy changes that occurred during the following two years.)¹ With this in part cowardly excuse, what follows is at best a preliminary to such analysis: random notes, with emphasis on atmosphere and “color,” by an eyewitness who was experiencing his fourth such event.

Setting and Themes

For this year's Congress the 2,291 delegates, several hundred domestic guests, guest delegations from 120 Communist, Socialist, Social-Democratic, and other “progressive” parties around the world, and over 240 foreign plus about 1,200 domestic journalists had a new site for their deliberations and observations. This was the ultra-modern Sava Center, an enormous, attractive, and generally efficient conference complex on the banks of the Sava River in Novi Beograd, built in two frenetic stages, between February and June of 1977 and 1978. Stage one was completed just in time to house the preparatory and then the main sessions of the Belgrade “follow-up” Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that met here from June 1977 to February 1978 to review implementation of the Helsinki CSCE agreements of 1975. Stage two, a separate building containing additional auditoriums, the largest seating 4,000 persons, was similarly completed only days before the Congress opened and despite a fire that destroyed much of the new roof only two weeks earlier. Of the three Congress locales I have known in my years in Yugoslavia—the early postwar Trade Union Hall in downtown old Belgrade, site of the Eighth and Ninth Congresses (1964 and 1969),

the then brand new Sports Center near the Pančevo bridge for the Tenth Congress (1974), and now Sava Center—this was undoubtedly the most elegant, attractive, and practical, including a large and well-equipped press center and despite a size and complexity that sometimes made it difficult to track down the people one wanted to talk to. Signs of the times on both scores?

The Congress's dominant theme was provided by a recently published book by Edvard Kardelj, the regime's perennial chief ideologist who is generally considered its number two person and Tito's likely successor as Party President unless Tito outlives him (Kardelj is known to have had two operations for cancer and was clearly in poor health at the Congress). Entitled *Directions in the Development of the Socialist Self-Management Political System* and officially declared “an integral part of the Platform for the preparation of the Eleventh Congress” by the Party Presidency, Kardelj's study offers a more complete and mature version of his vision of Yugoslav socialist democracy than any of its prolific author's earlier works and was clearly intended to be more than a political pamphlet for a Congress year. The basic argument, described in more detail in a previous *AUFS Report*,² is that the organization and behavior of the Party and the political system as a whole must be more consistently and conscientiously adapted to a democratically organized “pluralism of self-management interests” that are legitimately socialist and must be the primary participants in all public decision-making. For this to happen, there must be more intra-Party democracy and a more open “dialogue with non-Communist Yugoslavs” who accept the basic principles of Yugoslav socialism. Grličkov, using what he apologetically called a “journalistic phrase” in his pre-Congress press conference, described Kardelj's and the Congress's thesis as “a general political philosophy of searching for democracy in socialism and socialism in democracy.” The Eleventh Congress, Grličkov said, would draw its agenda of unfinished business from this philosophy:

In this task the last four years have been devoted, above all, to the economic system. The economic

system has been adapted to this political philosophy...[but] there was not enough time and probably not enough intellectual energy for a simultaneous, parallel, and consistent adaptation of the other sphere of public life, and that is the political system. So this Eleventh Congress, following the recommendations of the Tenth Congress, will have to elaborate a vision of the political system that will eliminate possible contradictions between the economic and political systems, which normally and by their nature can lead to political, economic and social tensions in any society, including our own.

In international affairs the dominant theme, influenced by recent developments, was a pox-on-both-your-houses criticism of the Soviet Union and the United States—with the Soviet Union implicitly accused of greater responsibility—for a retreat from détente that can lead to a new world war, as Tito warned in a solemn appeal to both Superpowers to think again. More specifically, there was repeated sharp criticism of the Soviet Union (under the code word “hegemonism” and never by name) for destabilizing and anti-“nonalignment” adventurism and sphere-of-influence politics in the Third World and particularly in Africa—an anticipation of the Yugoslav-Cuban duel for the soul of the nonaligned movement that took place at the nonaligned foreign ministers conference in the same Sava Center the following month.³

As in party congresses everywhere and especially in one-party states, there was an element of unreality, or at least of one-dimensional, abstract, and therefore highly conditional reality, in the way the Congress’s domestic theme was handled. It is worth recalling, in particular, that every postwar Yugoslav Party Congress except two—the Fifth in 1948 and the Tenth in 1974—has been more “liberal” in its pronouncements (meaning more talk of intra-Party democracy, freedom for criticism and participation by non-Party Yugoslavs, and “withering away” of state and Party roles in public affairs) than current or subsequent developments have warranted. Presumably conscious of this, many observers and even participants at the Eleventh Congress concentrated their attention on a second dimension

of “reality”: changes in Party structure and “leading cadres,” or who’s where in this year’s round of Yugoslavia’s perennial political game of musical chairs. This, too, led to no very definitive conclusions, although more will be said about it later.

Perhaps more significant, therefore, than minor changes of proclaimed policy and rotations of personnel was the relaxed and self-confident atmosphere that pervaded the Eleventh Congress and what it indicated. Like the focus on “dialogue” within the Party and with the country and on the need to “tolerate disagreements,” this atmosphere and associated emphasis on the country’s political and social stability (if others will leave Yugoslavia alone) and on the appropriateness of current institutional arrangements (except the role of the Party) were in marked contrast to the themes and atmosphere prevailing at the last Congress, in 1974. Then, recently emerged from a series of crises that had shaken the regime and with many familiar faces missing, the delegates were nervous and more cautious in their speeches. The basic theme then was that a recentralized and redisciplined Party must reassert its direct control over all aspects of Yugoslav life, and Soviet journalists were the happiest and in their evaluations the most positive of all foreign observers. This time, despite constant repetition that the Party’s “leading role” is and will remain essential, there was more talk of too much than of too little direct Party control. This time it was the turn of resident Soviet correspondents to ask provocative questions and shake their heads in sadness or disbelief at the answers.

In this atmosphere there was also more pointed criticism of the economic situation, which is not rosy if better than that of many southern European countries, and of the functioning (but not the principle) of “self-management,” the regime’s ultimate sacred cow. These and the Party’s continuing inability to find a viable formula for running the country without ruling it will undoubtedly prove more troublesome in the future. For the moment, however, a quiet Congress, boasting of stability and preaching the message of more “democracy in social-

ism," seemed an accurate reflection of a quiet Yugoslavia, at least temporarily stable and ready for another swing of the pendulum in the direction of more freedom and participation.

Tito...

Presiding over it all, still and perhaps ominously the principal symbol and guarantor of the stability and self-confidence that he and the Congress were proclaiming, was Josip Broz of Kumrovec, called Tito—veteran of the October Revolution, maker of his own, father of his recreated country and its regime, triumphant heretic and doyen of international Communism, last survivor of those who led their peoples in the Second World War, last of the founders of non-alignment, elder statesman of the world. In honor of the past and in apprehension of the future, all eyes turned to him whenever and wherever he was present.

Despite his 86 years, occasional use of a cane, and the recent estrangement from his wife that leaves him more alone in the isolation of power and high office than ever before, Tito looked healthier and more likely to be around for the next Congress, presumably in 1982, than many of his senior associates who are in fact 20 years his juniors. His appearance and his emotional statement at the very end, when he said that the ovation he had received was "such a recognition that one would be happy to work another 50 years," were reminders of a popular Belgrade joke: Tito may indeed be mortal, but there is so far no evidence to support such a hypothesis.

At the plenary session on the first day, fresh from a long stay at his favorite retreat on the Brioni Islands, and again as at the last Congress the only delegate to defy the No Smoking signs in the auditorium, he read the traditional hour-long set of excerpts from his 86-page Presidential Report in a strong voice and with a chair placed before the massed microphones as his only concession to advancing age. After the session he received and talked at length with the heads of the most important foreign guest delegations, beginning with Fjodor D. Kulakov, a member of the Politburo of the Soviet Party who was considered a possible successor to Leonid Brezhnev until his sudden death the following month, and

Enrico Berlinguer, head of the Italian Communist Party and leading "Eurocommunist," who had received conspicuously more applause than any other visiting delegation chief when Kardelj read the list at the plenary session. On the third day Tito was back in public, briefly listening to the debates going on in three of the six commissions into which the Congress had divided for its working sessions. The same evening he presided over a gala reception for foreign guest delegations and journalists, and stayed so long that a subsequent reception for the same foreign journalists, with Executive Committee Secretary Stane Dolanc as host, started late and was a curtailed anticlimax. The following morning he was again present at the final plenary sessions, where he received repeated standing ovations and made his traditional closing remarks. In these he several times departed from his prepared text to make ad lib additions—typically syntax-murdering Titoesque admonitions and parenthetical observations punctuated by his characteristic "ovaj, kako da kazem..." and "i tako dalje" ("that what-do-you-call-it..." and "etc."). It was as though he were deliberately demonstrating to watchful foreigners that he is still mentally "with it" and not, like Mao Tse-tung and Franco in their last years, a senile automaton capable at best of reading a speech prepared by others—which, incidentally, he has always done badly.

A word of caution after such a description is obviously in order. It and others like it by other observers, both foreign and domestic, are inspired by justifiable astonishment in view of his years—and justifiable caution in memory of rash colleagues who were already describing the Eighth Congress, in 1964, as a then septuagenarian Tito's "last Congress." He is noticeably and hardly surprisingly older than in 1964 or even in 1974, his previously most recent "last Congress." At his age, after all, any day now may render the above description "inoperative"... but not, as an observation in June 1978, inaccurate.

President Josip Broz Tito signs the party-membership cards of some young delegates, as he attended the session of one of the XI Congress Commissions.

...and Tito's Lieutenants

The gala reception on the third evening, held in the vast public rooms of the Federal Executive Council building, was one of those increasingly rare occasions when almost the entire Yugoslav leadership is collectively and quasi-informally "on view," gathered around Tito in a ritualized and calculatedly semiprivate atmosphere that is reminiscent of a royal levee in times past. As the ritual prescribes, Tito and his entourage (but now without wives, since Tito's Jovanka no longer appears with him) make their entrance promptly at the moment the reception is scheduled to begin and pass through the applauding throng of guests to seats arranged around a table in a corner of one of the rooms. Access to them is restricted, very politely, by men whose dress, sturdy build, and watchful eyes identify them as members of

that multinational fraternity whose American chapter is confusingly called the Secret Police. Thus protected from unwanted approaches but not from observation, the leadership sits, chatting and joking and pretending to ignore the rest of the company until Tito leads them out again, signaling the end of the reception. Frequently, if he is in a convivial mood as he seemed to be this time, he will stay longer than scheduled or than more easily wearied colleagues apparently would have preferred. Sometimes, when "royal" favor is to be demonstrated, outsiders to the leadership will also be at the table. (I recall one such occasion, several years ago, when the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church was seated next to Tito and his wife and was the object of their special and friendly attention, signaling an improvement in church-regime relations). The



experienced ordinary guest, by standing in the right places, can discreetly enjoy a prolonged close-up examination of these proceedings and of the interplay of personalities, in which rank and standing are defined by postures that reveal individually graduated mixes of intimacy and obsequiousness.

Much "Belgradology" results from such observations. Most of it is as dubious as most "Kremlinology." On this occasion, however, two more general and "atmospheric" aspects of the scene made an identical impression on both foreign and middle-rank Yugoslav fellow-guests with whom I compared notes. The first, already described in more general terms, was that Tito's energy and apparently robust health (enhanced, to be sure, by dyed hair, Brioni tan, and heaven knows what medical assistance) made him seem more endurable, and sometimes even younger, than the survivors in his inner circle of those who had called him "the Old Man" (Stari) in the intimacy of the Partisan army's Supreme Headquarters some 35 years ago—when he was in his 50s and they in their 20s. This was true not only of Kardelj, whose drawn face and trembling hand shocked his Yugoslav and foreign admirers and indicated an at least temporary recurrence of the illnesses that had seemed stabilized at the time of his American visit last year. Others like Vladimir Bakarić and Petar Stambolić, still or again the leading figures of the Croatian and Serbian regimes, also bore the visible marks of age and apparent poor health. The second general impression, more striking because of the first, was the conspicuous age gap separating this inner circle, with the sole exception of Stane Dolanc (who is only 53, but whose shocking overweight and chain-smoking may counterbalance his youth), from the regime's second rank as it was represented at the reception and at the Congress. Most of the latter are under 45 and many are in their 30s. The middle generation, once the youngest Partisans, now age 45-59 and in normal circumstances the present leadership's immediate successors, was conspicuous by its absence—or, more accurately, by its presence almost entirely in the form of colorless non-entities. Decimated by the crises of the early 1970s, in which most of its leading figures were on the losing sides, this missing generation may

be sorely missed when the time comes for a post-Tito transition that men and women of their age and experience could smooth.

Musical Chairs 1978

Changes in the organization of the Party summit endorsed by the Eleventh Congress were not as extensive or significant as those carried out at the last two Congresses,⁴ but as usual constituted an implicit critique of recent performance.

The Central Committee remains as it was, with 165 members: 20 from each of the 6 republics and 15 from each of the 2 autonomous provinces—including the presidents of the republican central committees and provincial committees as *ex officio* members—and 15 from the Party organization in the Yugoslav People's Army. On the other hand, the Presidency of the Central Committee, which is more powerful in fact although not in theory, has been cut from 38 to 23 members: 3 from each republic, 2 from each province, and one from the army, again including the presidents of the republican and provincial parties *ex officio*. (Tito is not elected to or formally listed as a member of either of these bodies, but as President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia he convenes and presides over both and in the words of the Party Statute "supervises their work." For this reason both bodies are frequently referred to, even in Yugoslav sources, as having one more member than stated here.)

The Executive Committee of the Presidency—emasculated in 1967, eliminated by the "decentralizing" Ninth Congress in 1969, and restored by the "recentralizing" Tenth Congress in 1974—has again been abolished. Stane Dolanc, whose powerful position formerly carried the cumbersome title of Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidency of the CC of the LCY. It should be noted that he has *not* been given the title of "General Secretary" and the implied increase in rank and power that would go with it, as erroneously reported in the *New York Times* and several other newspapers.⁵ Dolanc's formal status is unchanged, except that in place of an "Executive Committee" of largely first-rank politicians he is now to be assisted by nine

"Executive Secretaries" drawn from the broader CC and delegated by the republican, provincial, and army Party organizations—new and formally less authoritative functionaries whose importance and powers are not yet clear. (Those named to these posts range in age from 41 to 55 and include former federal ministers and top-of-second-rank republican or provincial functionaries.)

One declared purpose of these changes, which are ostensibly designed to make the Party center more efficient rather than either more or less powerful, is to encourage a re-activation of the Central Committee. In theory the Party's supreme policy-making organ between Congresses, the outgoing CC had been singularly inactive, sometimes meeting only once in a year, as its functions shifted to a combination of the large Presidency created in 1969 plus the 12-member Executive Committee created in 1974. The only other feature of this reorganization worth noting is that the principle of republican parity—equal representation regardless of population or Party membership, on the Central Committee and its Presidency and among the new Executive Secretaries—has been reconfirmed as an enduring legacy of the Party's "federalization" in the late 1960s. While this means that the smallest republican Party (the Montenegrin, with about 60,000 Party members out of a population of about 560,000) has the same representation at the federal Party summit as the largest (Serbia with more than 700,000 and Croatia with nearly 300,000 Party members),⁶ it is based on the overriding principle of national (and therefore republican) equality, also respected in the composition of state organs, that is the regime's answer to Yugoslavia's eternal central problem, the "national question."

There were no startling changes in the roster of those named to federal Party organs at the 1978 Congress to compare with those confirmed at the Tenth Congress in 1974, when leaderships from four out of the six republics and from the Vojvodina Autonomous Province were almost entirely manned by new people as a result of the purges of 1971-1973. (The composition of the new Presidency and Central Committee was in any case not news when announced at the closing

session. Since 1969, when republican, provincial, and army Congresses preceded rather than followed the federal one, the all-Yugoslav Congress has merely "confirmed" the members of its Presidency and other organs, who had already been elected at these regional meetings.⁷) There were, however, some changes of personnel or of balance of some interest beyond the narrow circle of connoisseurs of Yugoslav politics.

One that attracted the attention of old hands among foreign observers was the unexpected underrepresentation of Bosnia's Muslims in the new federal Party leadership and even, to a lesser extent, in that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, their own republic. Now officially counted as a separate South Slav nationality, equal in status with Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins, these Serbo-Croatian-speaking descendants of Bosnians who converted to Islam under Ottoman rule number more than 1.7 million, 1.5 million of whom live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This makes them the largest national community in their own multinational republic (just ahead of 1.4 million Orthodox Christian Serbs in a total population of 4 million also including 800,000 Catholic Croats) and the third largest in Yugoslavia as a whole (where 8 million Serbs and 4.5 million Croats are in first and second place). Of these, 105,569 are members of the League of Communists, in which they constitute 6.51 percent of total, Yugoslav-wide membership, again more than any other nationality except the Serbs (46.68 percent) and the Croats (15.04 percent). In addition to such numerical significance, they have lately seemed to be gaining in political importance both within their republic and at the federal level, where one of them, Džemal Bijedić, served as Yugoslavia's first Muslim prime minister from July 1971 until his death in an airplane crash in January 1977. This increase in apparent political weight has generally been interpreted as a consequence of their "ethnically neutral" position between Bosnia's and Yugoslavia's rival Serbs and Croats (who both claimed them, as Islamicized Serbs or Islamicized Croats, until they were proclaimed a separate "nation" and began to take the proclamation seriously), enhanced by Bosnia-Herzegovina's analogous status as the only officially multinational and hence "ethnically

neutral" republic in the federation. Their and Bosnia-Herzegovina's political strength have also been viewed with mixed feelings elsewhere in the country, in part because of ethnic prejudices—Muslims of all kinds are fairly low in Yugoslavia's ethnic pecking order—and in part because of the Bosnian Party's reputation as a bastion of "hardline" conservative communism, which is often linked to the Muslims' importance there. This last, it should be added, is unjustified. Leading Bosnian officials usually identified as "hardliners" are mostly Croats or Serbs, and several leading Bosnian Muslim functionaries have been among Yugoslavia's most prominent "liberals."

President of the Yugoslav League of Communists Josip Broz Tito (seen in left center) while attending a session of one of the XI Congress Commissions.

Now, however, none of Bosnia-Herzegovina's three positions on the Yugoslav Party Presidency will be held by a Muslim. The republic will instead be represented by two Serbs—Cvijetin Mijatović, 65 and a veteran of the old Partisan generation, and Nikola Stojanović, 45 and the new President of the Republican CC—and by one Croat, Branko Mikulić, 50, the leading Bosnian political figure of recent years and generally considered a leading Yugoslav "hardliner." Even in the Bosnian Party Presidency there will now be 8 Serbs, 7 Muslims, and 4 Croats. No explanation for this apparent downgrading of the Muslims has been offered, and it is interesting that Yugoslav Party officials and senior journalists attending the Congress seemed genuinely surprised, claiming they had not noticed that it had



happened, when the absence of a Muslim on the Party Presidency was pointed out to them.

Another apparent downgrading, this time individual, was not overlooked by these same Yugoslavs, who invariably regretted it in private conversation. Kiro Gligorov, a 61-year-old Macedonian, has been one of the architects of Yugoslav economic policies for more than 10 years, is widely known and respected in both Yugoslav and international commercial and banking circles, and from 1974 to 1978 was both President of the Assembly of Yugoslavia (the federal parliament) and a prominent member of the Party Presidency. In this writer's opinion he is one of the ablest political figures in Yugoslavia today. Now, however, at almost the same moment that his term as Assembly President ended with the election of a new Assembly this spring, he has also been excluded from the more important Party Presidency, where Macedonia will be represented by Lazar Koliševski (64 and an old Party warhorse who made a comeback over the political corpses of Macedonian "liberals" after 1972), Aleksandar Grlićkov (55, the Yugoslav Party's chief spokesman in international Party affairs, as noted, and incidentally Gligorov's close personal friend and political associate), and Angel Čemerski (55 and President of the Macedonian CC).

Gligorov's at least temporary demotion is regrettable not only because his talents and pragmatism are otherwise in short supply at the Party and state summits, but also because it is the result of a rule of contemporary Yugoslav political life that has almost invariably had similarly deplorable consequences. One of the effects of the new degree of genuine decentralization of governmental and to a considerable extent even Party authority that has taken place since the later 1960s—creating what is almost a confederation—is that senior and even middle-rank federal functionaries really are sent to Belgrade (and recalled from Belgrade) by the political apparatuses of the republics and provinces. This means, among other things, that no one who does not have a political base or powerful patrons in his own republic enjoys security of tenure at the federal center, no matter how well he functions or how highly he is regarded there. The only exceptions are those for whom Tito himself, the most

powerful patron of all, is willing to intervene: then all other rules, including Constitutional or statutory limitations on tenure (which should have but did not affect Secretary of Defense General Nikola Ljubičić this year) are in abeyance. Gligorov's "sin" is that almost his entire career has been as a federal official. He has no base or leverage in Skopje, the Macedonian capital. Nor does he enjoy Tito's particular favor or Grlićkov's special untouchability because of his brilliant performance on the international Communist scene before, during, and since the East Berlin conference of European Communist Parties in 1975. So, for the moment at least, Gligorov is reduced to the second rank, not even a member of his republican Party Presidency although still on the 165-member Yugoslav Central Committee.

At least many delegates to the Party Congress apparently disapproved and would like to see Gligorov back in an important role. There is one aspect of a Yugoslav Party Congress that is genuinely spontaneous and that permits ordinary delegates to do a kind of "voting" in the security of collective anonymity: no one can control the way they apportion or withhold the applause they give to speakers in debates, guest delegations when they are introduced, or members of their new Party leaderships when the lists are read. In one such demonstration of sentiment, when Gligorov went to the podium to address the Congress commission concerned with economic problems, he was the only speaker in that session to receive a round of applause, distinctly warm, before as well as after he spoke.

Several other individual "demotions" that attracted the attention of some foreign observers were not in fact that, although the changes in function that led to this conclusion were in most cases also consequences of the rule of political life that sidetracked Gligorov and others before him. The lesson of the rule is that an ambitious politician should limit his time at the federal center, periodically abandoning even the highest offices there to return to his own republic and cultivate his political base. Those who have now done this should usually be described as smart rather than demoted. A conspicuous example—supposing that his move is voluntary, as it seems

to have been—is Jure Bilić, the leading figure of the post-1971 leadership in Croatia and a member of the outgoing Yugoslav Central Committee Presidency and Executive Committee; now he is not even in the new Yugoslav Central Committee but is quite definitely a member of his Republic's Party Presidency—unlike Gligorov in both cases and as an indicator of which post matters.

One other aspect of the personnel changes in Party and state organs following the Congress and this spring's general elections deserves mention. The *Theses* for the Congress and Kardelj's study, like Yugoslav theory since as early as 1951, emphasized the importance of a separation between Party and government—specifically meaning that no one (except, of course, Tito) should hold both high Party and high state functions—if the “deformations” of “Stalinism” are to be avoided and a genuine “socialist democracy” based on a “pluralism of self-management interests” is to be achieved. As Kardelj puts it, “the personal union of Party and state executive apparatuses” in Yugoslavia's past and in other Communist-ruled states has been “the real cause of the bureaucratization of society and of the Communist Party itself.”⁸ To this end, for example, it was explicitly decreed in the early 1970s that no one (except Tito) should simultaneously be a member of the collective State Presidency (created in 1971 in premature preparation for Tito's departure) and the Party Presidency or its Executive Bureau (the latter eliminated in 1974). Later, to enhance the prestige and power of the State Presidency, it was reduced in size from 23 to 9 members, who were Tito and each republic's or province's most senior and usually leading political personality: Kardelj for Slovenia, Bakarić for Croatia, Stambolić for Serbia, Mijatović for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Koliševski for Macedonia, Vidoje Žarković for Montenegro, Stefan Doronjski for the Vojvodina, and Fadil Hoxha for Kosovo.

Now, in unacknowledged defiance of these rules, the trend is in the direction of either renewed union of Party and state functions or a downgrading of the state ones. All 9 members of the outgoing State Presidency are members of the new, 23-member-plus-Tito Party Presidency, as

are the federal Prime Minister (Veselin Djuranović) and the federal Secretary of Defense (General Ljubičić). At the same time, names mentioned in the press before the Party Congress as candidates for membership in the next incarnation of the State Presidency (to be named by the new Federal Assembly elected this spring) are generally those of second rank and frequently almost unknown people. Since then, some people have apparently been having second thoughts about the implications of a State Presidency comprised, except for Tito, of nonentities. Its election has not yet taken place, and several republics are reported to be reconsidering their nominations. This, however, could lead to further violations of the rule concerning the separation of Party and state functions, since virtually all those who could give the new State Presidency the prestige of the old one are now already members of the Party Presidency.

Either outcome—union of functions or a state leadership conspicuously less distinguished than the Party's—will also run counter to the more general principle, endorsed by the Congress, of a Party operating “within self-management” rather than a separate institution “outside and above self-management,” a Party that has adapted itself to the search for “democracy in socialism and socialism in democracy.”

Since General Ljubičić's name has been mentioned twice in this section, it is also appropriate to note that the army's role inside the Party and Ljubičić's role in both and in the government, all of them unchanged, are still important and worth watching. With 77,791 members, probably including all career officers, the Party organization in the armed forces accounts for 4.8 percent of total Party membership. Since 1969, when it was first separately represented at the federal Party summit alongside the eight republics and provinces, it has been in effect a ninth and almost coequal member of the federally organized LCY—and by its membership and definition the only explicitly all-Yugoslav one. Ljubicić, as General of the Army the second-ranking officer in Yugoslavia after Marshal Tito, as Secretary for Defense in the federal Executive Council (the cabinet) since 1967, and as the army's representative on the Party Presidency since that

organ was created in 1969, is also personally in an interesting position. He is in addition a Serb, which is also true of a preponderance of the generals and officer corps as a whole, but not of the High Command, where Croats unexpectedly outnumber Serbs.⁹ Interpretations vary, with some observers seeing this situation as a good point of departure for army (and Serb?) supremacy in state and Party after Tito's departure and others seeing it as part of a strategy of integration and "cooptation" that will successfully maintain civilian Party control over the armed forces. History, beginning with the effective fusion of the two institutions under the Party Politburo as the military's Supreme Command in Tito's revolution and lack of evidence of any subsequent army pretensions to an independent role in policy-making or politics, favors the latter of these. The question is nevertheless open as well as important.

Making a Party Safe for Democracy?

Membership in the LCY on the eve of the Eleventh Congress stood at 1,623,612, an increase of some 547,000 or 50 percent since just before the preceding Congress in 1974, more than ever before in the Party's history, and nearly 7.5 percent of the total population. Of the 681,679 new members admitted in the 1974-1977 period, youth (defined as up to 27 years of age) accounted for 72 percent, women for 29 percent, and those classified as workers for 31.2 percent. These three categories (and, rather hopelessly, private peasants) had been given priority in recruitment criteria set by the Tenth Congress and designed to improve "the social structure" of an embarrassingly old, male, and nonworking-class organization. The results: those classified as workers, up 160,000, are now 29.2 percent of total membership and the largest occupational category; 23 percent of Party members are women, and 35 percent are less than 27 years old. All of this was praised at the Congress as splendid progress, but not yet enough. With "administrative personnel" the second most numerous occupational category (11.4 percent) and "leaders and officials" tied with "engineers and technical personnel" and pensioners for third place (6.7 percent each), the LCY is not only far from the "workers' majority" idealistically proclaimed as a goal in 1974 but still has more

"apparatchiks" and "technocrats" (when other relevant but smaller categories are added in) than "proletarians." Private farmers, the other priority target and in 1945 the largest group in the Party, still account for only 4.8 percent of membership.¹⁰

In addition to at least lip service to continued efforts to improve this "social structure," the revised Party Statute that the Congress approved took two other concrete steps designed to democratize the organization and adapt it to life in a pluralism of self-management interests. Both of them were more discussed and opposed in pre-Congress discussion than their effects will probably warrant.

The first, fulfilling a demand voiced in the later 1960s but silenced in the earlier 1970s, liberalized the Yugoslav interpretation of the Marxist concept of "democratic centralism" (in theory the fullest democracy in adopting policies and the most rigidly enforced unity in carrying them out; in practice, by Communist Parties almost everywhere, only the latter and with many examples of severely punishable insubordination even here). Now it is official in the LCY's Statute: a Party member who finds himself in the minority on a specific issue when it comes to the vote is entitled to keep his opinion, and by implication to argue for a subsequent reversal of the decision he opposed, although he is still obligated to do his part, loyally and energetically, in implementing it as long as it stands.

The second, in the form of a largely *déjà vu* series of minor organizational and procedural changes and exhortations intended to strengthen the autonomy of the Party's local and lowest-ranking "basic organizations" and their relationships with "self-managing" economic and social institutions, was more important for what was rejected than for what was accepted. "You all know," Kardelj himself told the Congress commission debating these issues, "that during the discussion concerning amendments and additions to the Statute of the LCY there was a whole series of proposals, and from all over Yugoslavia, that basic organizations of the League should be linked vertically, from League organizations in work organizations [presumably meaning 'BOALs,' the basic work units that comprise

Yugoslav enterprises, etc.] through complex organizations [enterprises, conglomerates, etc.] and so on." These proposals had been rejected as totally contrary to current objectives, which seek a Janus-like basic Party organization, inward looking and fully integrated (and influential) in the "self-managed" institutions whose Communists comprise it and simultaneously outward looking toward the rest of the League and its mission, which means a detached attitude to local and sectional interests in order to speak for "higher" social and socialist ones. Or, as Kardelj put it in speaking of the rejected proposals,

if I wanted to be malicious, I would say that following such logic would lead to an organizational structure built up to the very largest producing entities and to the banks, so that in the end the Party [pyramid] would "end" in the banks. Thus the LCY would be transformed from an ideological and political organization into a kind of federation of business organizations. This or a similar organizational structure would mean losing not only the links between the basic organizations and the communal and republican organizations of the League of Communists and with the central organs of the LCY in general, but also with what is happening in society as a whole. The LCY would not be the ideological engine of the revolution but rather an adjunct of technocracy.

Earlier in the same speech, in a passage quoted by the leading Yugoslav daily, *Politika*, as its front page lead for its report on that day at the Congress, Kardelj had again restated his and the LCY's official view of how and how not to be an "engine" at this stage of the revolution (emphasis in the original):

The League of Communists will not be the leading force by monopolistically ruling over society through its own or the state's bureaucracy. It can be that only if it is capable of seeing furthest, if it is capable of indicating paths of development that are objectively, historically imminent, that is, if it is the most progressive and most dynamic creative force in the society.

At his pre-Congress press conference, Grlićkov had addressed the same questions in more ex-

tended and commonplace language:

What we are really looking for is the answer [to the question of] how, with existing various interests and in the context of a one-party system, to prevent any possibility of stifling pluralism of interests by a ruling party on the one hand, and on the other hand to make it impossible for it to turn itself into a marginal appendage to social and political processes in the country.

As you see, this problem is very important for us, although as such it is not unknown to the world.... In seeking an answer, the conviction with which we are going into the Congress—generalizing and simplifying and to be clear and convincing for you—is that we shall not renounce the leading role of the League of Communists. Every political party in the world, in power or seeking power, wishes to be the leading force in order to realize its mission of changing things.

We do not want the LCY to stifle the pluralism of socialist self-management interests by its method of operating.... What the Eleventh Congress hopes to do in this area is to redescribe [osmisli] democratic centralism, to give it a democratic content through readiness of the League of Communists on two fronts—[first] that it tolerates a democratic dialogue within itself, that in the process of policy-making it tolerates majority and minority. And second, readiness of the League of Communists to retreat in a dialogue with non-Communists from what it has offered as a proposal or a concrete solution whenever a better solution is found in the course of such a dialogue.

The intention and the values on which it is based are indeed clear. Although they are not new, their restatement at this time is significant, since the "democratic" thread in the dialectic of Yugoslav "socialist democracy" had been less visible than more orthodox views of the leading role of the Party since before and at the Tenth Congress in 1974. On the other hand, phrases like Grlićkov's "we are looking for the answer" (how reminiscent of the phrase that the first

Member of the Praesidium of the CC of Yugoslav League of Communists, Edvard Kardelj presides over one of the plenary sessions of the XI Congress, President Josip Broz Tito attending (left), at right, Stane Dolanc, secretary of the Praesidium.

AUFS observer of the Yugoslav scene, Fred Warner Neal, heard so often when these same intentions were first proclaimed ca. 1953: "We are searching for our way!") are revealing as well as endearingly self-critical. Like Kardelj's vague if sublime definition of how to be a "leading force" without "ruling over society," most of the rest of what was said at the Congress on this subject was singularly unhelpful to real life and mostly quite ordinary Communists who might be willing to try if they knew how, but whose careers and other personal and collective goals can more safely be furthered by more traditional means.

With great sympathy for the difficulty of the question and the intractability of society and human nature, one must say that it was all very familiar.

Debate in Commissions, and an Atypical "However"

Perhaps to spare Tito or because such an extension of ritual finally seemed unnecessary, there was not even the traditional symbolic minimum of "discussion" at the plenary sessions with which the Eleventh Congress opened on Tuesday and closed on Friday morning. The first of these began with a panegyric by Kardelj in honor of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Filip Filipović, a founder in 1919 and first head of the Yugoslav Communist Party who was killed in the Soviet Union in 1938, a victim of Stalin's purges—as Kardelj noted. The further agenda of the two plenaries was then limited to Tito's opening report and closing speech, formal statements and greetings, and the business of the Congress required by the Statute: various votes



and "confirmations" of elections and the brief presentation and acceptance of reports.

All "debate" was therefore carried on in six "working commissions" that met Tuesday afternoon and both mornings and afternoons on Wednesday and Thursday: one to consider economic matters, the second concerned with the political system in general, the third for Party matters (including organization, membership, and revision of the Statute), the fourth for culture and education, the fifth for foreign affairs and foreign policy, and the sixth for national defense. All were open to the domestic and foreign press and guests of the Congress—unlike equivalent sessions of the Congresses of some Communist Parties or the first postwar Yugoslav ones. The mimeographed stenographic reports of the 663 speeches made in these commissions—transcribed from tapes and usually available within an hour of each speech's delivery, no mean accomplishment with 6 simultaneous meetings in which speakers often depart from their texts or fail to deliver a copy on their way to the podium as requested—make a pile over 3 feet high.

Some start their "however's" earlier, some later, and some not at all. Speeches by delegates who are all-Yugoslav or regional senior functionaries tend to be global or topical—e.g., inflation or investment problems, the functioning or malfunctioning of the new parliamentary "system of delegations and delegates," school reform in general, etc. Speeches by delegates from Party organizations in enterprises, communes, schools, hospitals, youth or women's organizations and the like tend to focus on local or special interest issues and generally fall into two categories: self-advertising by the speaker or those who sent him in the form of a fulsome report, with minimal or no "however's"; or, after either a perfunctory or lengthy introduction of that kind, a series of complaints, criticism, and/or appeals for change that may concern behavior, policy (but not principle!), the functioning of some aspects of the system, or even the way some parts (but not the whole!) of it are made. The latter may be interesting for some piquant aspect—for example, a delegate from the state security service (the political police, commonly called UDB), where there has lately been a heavy turnover of personnel, concerned

about re-employment opportunities for youthful "retirees"—or for valuable insights into the functioning and malfunctioning of the system at the local level.

Once the real garbage in the fulsome report category has been put aside, this observer's principal complaint concerns style and delivery more than uniformity of opinion or lack of content. As in one-party Communist states farther east and despite Yugoslavia's more open politics and many politicians' interest in inspiring mass support and enthusiasm, it is still generally the rule that even public political speeches before mass audiences should be dull, full of popularly incomprehensible jargon ("Western" social science as well as Marxist), and read in a monotone, often stumbingly as though the speaker does not understand it either, and with minimum gestures. Is it petty and irrelevant—or merely an impermissible subjective reaction to an alien political culture—to note this and to wish that unnecessarily gray functionaries, especially when they have something interesting to say, could also be lively and interesting in the way they say it? Or is dullness of phrasing and delivery an important indicator, a rational style for politicians in a system in which position in the hierarchy is more important than persuasiveness as a source of power and influence, and not giving offense to superiors through untoward statements or flamboyance is more important than the response of mere peers and electors in the maintenance of that position? And what does this tell us about the Party's formal (and in some of its leaders undoubtedly sincere) aspiration to operate "within self-management" and through "democratic persuasion" rather than as an institution of power "outside and above self-management"?

On the other hand, it must be admitted that the Yugoslav style has one advantage. It is easier for a political speaker to be substantive and as intelligent as he can be when he does not have to entertain and popularize to the point of oversimplification and distortion. Even as it is easier for him to say hard and unpopular things, or, with due caution, to criticize his own Party's policies or performance if there is no organized opposition with an institutional interest in using what he has said against him and his Party.

There are some exceptions to this rule of dullness. Tito, when he departs from his text, can be lively in style and delivery, a slogan-coining popularizer and oversimplifier, and a great crowd-pleaser—like Krushchev, of blessed memory in this respect, in another country of even duller and more dishonest political speeches. Another is the irrepressible Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, a former senior Party warhorse and sometime Politburo member, once the incompetent tsar of the economy and then energetic head of the trade union federation, a bear of very little brain but considerable integrity sidelined from any position of authority since the late 1960s.

At the Eleventh Congress as at the Tenth Vukmanović predictably spoke (in the commission for economic questions) and predictably said what he hoped were provocative things in what was undeniably a lively style—colloquially, with gestures rather than jargon, and without a text or even notes, another great rarity. He woke the audience up and enlivened a dull session, even in anticipation, when the chair recognized him and he came to the podium, since everyone knew what to expect. What he said, however, seemed to inspire more amusement or embarrassment than nods of agreement. In a way the audience was right, and only partly because of the pretentiousness of the “study” he said he was making. The two more pedestrian speeches that happened to follow, by Kiro Gligorov on problems of technological dependence, productivity, and political sources of economic inefficiency, and by Jakov Sirotković on imperfections of the system as a reason for inefficient investment, undoubtedly contained more specific, substantive, and useful “howevers.” With and despite this caveat, I have elected to quote Vukmanović’s speech as a conclusion to these notes—not because it was typical, profound, or original, for it was none of these things, but because the man who was nicknamed Tempo for his Partisan haste had once again and in ordinary language covered at least the economic waterfront in voicing the gripes of the man-in-the-street (or the Communist-in-the-street). In so doing he momentarily shattered the glass wall of the one-dimensional reality that was said in the introduction to this Report to characterize this and any other Congress of any Party anywhere.

Although he soon rambled, Tempo began with his own perennially favorite theme, which happens to be a question of central political and economic importance in any system. Who decides about the distribution of income—national, sectoral, enterprise, and personal—and by what criteria and rules? For personal income the Yugoslav translation of the Marxist principle “to each according to his work” has long been (in effect) “to each according to the results of his work as measured by an imperfect market economy and qualified to compensate for unequal conditions,” but how can this be done, especially for units and individuals in jobs where the contribution to final market value is hard or impossible to measure?

This is what Tempo had to say:

Again at the Tenth Congress Comrade Tito said that income distribution, the material receipts of workers, must be made dependent on the real results of their work. This thought, especially the key phrase “real results of work,” impelled me to speak at the Tenth Congress and to set down a whole list of questions that must be answered if this is to be realized in practice. I submitted that list of questions, composed in haste and taking over 30 pages, to the Congress. But when I look to see if any questions have been answered? No. And still we tend to maintain that the measurement of the work of a worker be found in the working place. To be sure, it is said that this is linked to the income of the enterprise, but in essence it consists of measuring work, even now in this campaign that is being carried out in the country, it still comes back to measuring work in the working place. So when I looked at how that is going in practice, I looked at and began to follow how preparations for the Eleventh Congress were being carried out. It was being said that everything was clear, that answers have been given to all questions, but there it is, some things aren't functioning right. But they aren't functioning right because people don't want to work, to fulfill norms, etc. And so we kind of come around in a circle. Because, if all questions have been given a clear answer, but still something doesn't work in practice, if practice still doesn't give results, then we cannot and must not look for solutions in things like mobilizing

Communists to push it through, etc. First we must start from the beginning, from the real sources of the state of relations in production and distribution, relations in planning and coordination, in order to get the answer to the question—why don't workers behave the way we think they ought to behave?

Look, we can follow—here now in the discussion I've seen—how consumption repeatedly goes above production, above our possibilities. Who spends it all? Who? Who takes the decisions and who spends? Are those Communists? Are those workers, or are those someone else? There is no answer to that question. I looked at this, and it drove me, just to explain, drove me to get to the bottom of these questions, and for a year and three months now I have been writing an analysis of every single problem in relations among people, and I'm submitting that to the Central Committee. I've already been writing a year and three months and already have 600 pages of analysis in typescript.... That's probably not relevant, but it does seem to me that we must get into that analysis, that we must even accept that not all will agree with what comes out now, that we will be, or some will be, in the minority. Let us be in the minority. But, if practice shows this was right, it will have to become a majority... and go before the leadership. As I see it, there's no way to get away from a situation by being reluctant to look into the relations, real relations in production and in society, that are happening and that are the basic reasons why the situation is not what it should be.

As you see, I will not and have not started my remarks with successes. Our successes are great. I remember when we began building the economy in those hard years of the [Soviet] blockade, when we built Zvornik [an early major industrial project] we began with one technician and two trucks. Today our engineers and technicians are building all over the world. At Trepca, our largest mine, we had one engineer. Today our engineers include unemployed ones, to our shame, and a serious indictment... [but they also] work all over the world. From a small undeveloped country we have risen to the ranks of the developed. And in agriculture we have also made a great advance, practically a revolution. I

remember when we were barely able to manage 10 metric cents per hectare, or 11 at best, and were satisfied. Today we get 50-60 and even 70. Today we have practical examples of our whole agriculture of how to get bigger results. We didn't know, then, we only knew that we had to try.

This means, Comrades, that our potentialities are enormous. Let me take one official statistic—we utilize [only] 70 percent of capacity. We go on building—judging by the press—hundreds and hundreds of factories precisely in those branches where utilization of capacity is around 50 percent. That means we still follow the line that some of our needs are unsatisfied, a line that [means] we do business nonrationally. Who makes those decisions? Who is in charge of investment? Let's analyze that a little, let's talk openly about it. Are those workers? No, nobody asks them about it. Were they asked, if they are unemployed, then they are ready even to go along with minimum utilization of capacity just to have some earnings. This means that someone else is in charge of investment, despite the fact that we here and in all our documents proclaim that the workers are in charge. Yes, we have proclaimed that, but do we realize it in practice? And how many funds are committed in advance? What funds, what is there to decide, who decides, etc. etc. Come on, let's talk about it openly, honestly, let's look at the sources, because otherwise we'll never get to the bottom, we'll always have the same things happening again and again.

So our capacities are poorly utilized. Personally I reckon 70 percent. But in the press I read that utilization of working time is 50 percent. So if you put it all together, both poorly utilized capacity and poorly used working time, etc., we are losing the use of a third of 40 percent of our potential. What are the results? Low personal incomes. And what do low personal incomes lead to, they lead to moonlighting. People have to moonlight. That works for those who have land in the village. They will work in the village but will also take a job in a factory and not show up regularly, not make an effort because they are guaranteed the [legal] minimum monthly personal income, social security, health insurance, and additional income in the village. There are

about 40-50 percent of these from the village. And then those in the city who have a skilled craft, they will work privately on the side, etc., etc. There are no statistics for this, but social property gets eaten up this way. And the worker, what situation is he in now, what are "production relations" like now? He looks at his pay, his earnings, the minimum personal income. He looks at that. He practically cannot decide, cannot influence general economic policy. We say that he has an influence in matters of income. What influence? Who decides about customs duties, administration... no longer the federation like we once did it, but now the republics together at the level of organs of administration. But a customs duty lowers income for some raises income for others, like frozen prices. I notice that when prices are frozen, some places they are unfrozen, some places they are allowed 15 percent, and all that through some agreements, etc., etc. Everyone makes these agreements, but who decides them, are those workers, do they have influence in creating the conditions for their business operations? They don't....

That social relations are not brought in line is seen in the fact that credits dominate in all our investments. Here they say 50 percent, as far as I am informed 50 percent by banks. But the second source, from working collectives who work under more advantageous business conditions, who have high profit rates, and who also give to others in the form of credits, that is little, apparently 3 percent.... It is insignificant, that is true, but the principle is the same if only [financial] means are pooled. The question is how pooling is done, is it pooled as capital or not, etc.

Therefore we arrived at the following situation, that credit relations dominate. But what do credit relations mean? Credit relations mean the following: there is the one who gives credits and who gets because he gives, he gets in terms of the distribution of income, or better said profits, since there's nothing else to get except profit, guaranteed earnings of workers, etc., etc.

This means that the distribution of profit margins is such that those who have, who are in more advantageous positions, they always have and even have the possibility to appear as creditors.

But those who don't have, whose conditions of business operation are poorer, we help with credits, but credits have to be paid back. Thus they are in a worse situation, a continually worsening situation. Think about these relations, how they happen in our reality. Some in difficult conditions and others in easier positions, whole branches, groups, not to mention individual enterprises. Fine, that's o.k., one enterprise works better, the other works poorer, that's another question. Great, equal opportunity for everyone, and if you want to work, please do and [have] the largest income and larger personal incomes. But if there is unequal opportunity, if conditions vary, some can in some branches be sure of three times, four times larger average personal incomes, larger profits, those profits can on the principle of "past work" be placed wherever, etc., while others can't but have to wait for someone to offer credits that have to be paid back, etc. Differences in average profit rates by branches are very great, and I don't see how to determine whether that is because of the results of work or because of conditions for business operations that we have created. For in the last analysis it is we who create the conditions for business operations....

That is, Comrades, it seems to me that it would be very important for us to see the question and not just mobilize Communists. [We shall mobilize Communists, and easily when they are placed in a position in production relations that are such that they have to go for increased production and productivity. That will be a completely different situation.] And instead of singing hymns, better that we get on with an analysis of the sources in society that lead to all this. Because, look, it is commonly said—fine, we have achieved great results. Indeed, an industrial production [growth rate] of 7.5 percent, that's no small thing, that's a big thing. But, Comrades, let's look at whether that is enough now and how that rate of growth was achieved. That rate of growth was achieved at the cost of [international] indebtedness of a billion to \$2 billion a year, two billion dollars have to be paid back. If you don't insure greater production, then the living standards of future generations will have to go down, there is no alternative. That means it would be better to analyze how those billions that we get in

credits can go for the more rapid development of the economy. That's one thing.

Second, what kind is that level of industrial production? We are stagnating for years now.... The question is why? If there are such unutilized possibilities in production, unutilized in the work force, in an unemployed work force abroad? You know what it is. Our unemployment has gone up, despite the fact that we have employed so many workers in this period. I look at Montenegro [his native region], according to some information—it may be off 2 percent or 5 percent more or less—it is 27 percent for little Montenegro.... Measure however you like, but of these 27,000 people who are without work, who come out of school and are without work and must wait for 7, 8 years to get it, imagine, they finish their studies at 25 or 26 and have to wait another 7, 8 years, so what will happen to their pensions, their working period, etc. Not to speak about the present situation, how they keep themselves, etc., etc. Obviously those rates are undesirable. Both economic rates and relations to the schools are inappropriate. Why do the schools deliver people we don't need, how long will we repeat that?... And so it goes on, I see no end if we do not look into the whole problem area of planning.

I have enough to say, but I know that hundreds of others must speak, that each has something to say. I would only like to say the following.

I quote Comrade Tito, already 15, 20 years ago he said it to us in the trade unions, there is no greater task for Communists in building a socialist society than to resolve relations in society, contradictory relations in society and whether they are in harmony with socialist principles of distribution according to work, according to the real results of work. And I look around now, at least... according to what the press says and the television, etc., there is nothing about these relations, about the real reasons why these relations are the way they are, etc. Nothing. The only thing is: a meeting was held, it was attended by so and so, pictures were taken, etc., etc., and nothing more. And I turn off the television I tell

you the truth, I turn it off. But there is something to be said. For years you have to wait to get an apartment, and one gets an apartment and another does not, but why does one get it and the other does not? This means, this system that we have proclaimed, something is not right with it. Let us discuss basic things. This means there is no other task before Communists other than relations in society, and contradictions in our society are big, beginning with that between those who work and those who decide—and that is the situation today—those who work in difficult conditions and others in easier conditions, those who have a right to work and others who don't, etc., etc.

Communists must be there. We do not need Communists who know from memory five phrases from the classic of Marxism or know the stages of a capitalist economy. No, relations in a capitalist economy do not suit our relations. All of what we would adapt here, all that is false, because there is no decision that you make, that doesn't touch on relations among people. In capitalism that is easy, there it is a matter of relations among capitalists. Or capitalists negotiate there with their state, government, etc., etc. That is their task, but our task must be such that we harmonize our relations so that decisions that are taken for the sake of harmonization in the economy, that there the workers participate and with regard for the relations that are realized among the workers. Then we can expect both an increase in production and an increase of productivity and socialist relations, etc., etc.

Yes, Tempo, etc., etc., etc.

(September 1978)

[Photos by Fototanjung, Belgrade]

NOTES

1. The same hindsight also informs this reporter's similar but briefer re-examination of that Congress in my recently published study, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (London and Berkeley, 1977), pp. 163-72. I did not report it that way in 1964, nor did any colleagues whose accounts I read at the time.
2. D.I. Rusinow, "Yugoslav Domestic Developments" [DIR-2-'78], *AUFS Reports*, 1978/No. 25, Europe.
3. A companion Report, "Yugoslavia and the World, 1978" [DIR-5-'78], *AUFS Reports*, 1978/No. 42, Europe, describes the foreign affairs issues discussed at the Congress, the nonaligned meeting in July and Hua Kuo-feng's visit in August.
4. Subheadings under "League of Communists" in the Index to *The Yugoslav Experiment* provide thumbnail chronologies of the ups and downs (including disappearances and reinstatements) of LCY organs like the Central Committee, Executive Committee, Executive Bureau, and Presidency.
5. Including a report under my by-line, in which an editor, presumably thinking I had missed an important point carried in other papers, inserted a paragraph repeating this error.
6. This is not strictly accurate for Serbia, because that republic includes the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, whose parties elect their own representatives to the federal organs at their own congresses (called conferences) and then participate in electing Serbia's representatives at the all-Serbian Congress. Figures for the republican Party membership cited here are from the Yugoslav press at the time of the republican congresses and do not tally with other Party membership figures cited in this Report, which are from a mimeographed handout, entitled "LCY Membership Statistical Overview," available at the Eleventh Congress. The handout includes breakdown of membership by nationality (and by occupation and the age and sex of recent new members), but not by republic and province.
7. At the Ninth Congress in 1969 there was, however, one surprise: the previously unannounced creation of a new body, an Executive Bureau of 15 members, above the Central Committee and Presidency. Again eliminated at the following Congress, the Executive Bureau was one of Tito's first efforts to recentralize authority and stop the "federalization" of the Party into rival republican-ethnic units that was one of the sources of the crises of 1971-72. My version of this story is found in *AUFS Reports* at the time and in *The Yugoslav Experiment*, ch. IX.
8. On this much disputed factual question, see Bogdan Denitch's convincingly documented analysis of the national composition of the YPA in *The Legitimation of a Revolution* (New Haven and London, 1976), pp. 113-20.
9. *Directions in the Development of the Socialist Self-Management Political System* (second edition), p. 179.
10. The remaining categories: educationists and cultural workers, 6.3%; economists, lawyers, scientists, artists and other professionals, 5.9%; doctors and other medical personnel, 1.9%; security services personnel, 2.3%; private craftsmen, 0.3%; unemployed, 2.3%; housewives, 1.3%; students, 5.9%; secondary and vocational school pupils, 2.9%; Army members, 4.8%; working abroad, 0.5%. (See note 6 for source.)