
A Yugoslav Party Congress, although its focus is primarily domestic, provides an occasion for a quadrennial review of the state of the world, and of Yugoslavia's place in the world, as the Yugoslav leadership sees and wishes others to see it. The Eleventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (hereafter called the LCY), held in Belgrade from June 20 to 23, 1978, presented such a review and in its documents and discussions anticipated two events of the later summer that once again put 86-year-old President Josip Broz Tito's picture on the front pages of the world press. The first of these was the July meeting in Belgrade of foreign ministers or their deputies representing 117 members, "observers," and "guests" of the nonaligned movement, its task to prepare for the sixth summit conference of the nonaligned, in Havana in September 1979. The second, beginning with appropriate if accidental symbolism on the tenth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 21, 1968), was an official visit by Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Communist Party of China and archenemy of the rulers of Russia.

None of these happenings will have been pleasing to those in charge of Soviet foreign policy—the third merely because it happened, and the first two because of the balance of what was said and done. As a matter of courtesy and caution no literally anti-Soviet word was spoken, but the tenor of the Yugoslav position at all three meetings was clear: all great power corrupts into imperialism or hegemonism and all Great Powers therefore tend to be imperialist or hegemonist, but the most dangerous at the moment, at least for the nonaligned and the smaller Communist

countries and parties that are jealous of their independence, is the Soviet Union. Those who resist this danger are defenders of peace as well as their own independence and are in need of one another, in consultation and in action. Their representatives are therefore particularly welcome at Tito's Court in Belgrade, which was the first to cry a pox on both "Western" imperialism and "Eastern" hegemonism, and where the doyen of nonalignment and of independent Communism has experience and wisdom to offer and is still bold in his own defiance of Superpowers and the politics of blocs. Those who argue instead that the Soviet Union is the natural ally and protector of all "progressive and anti-imperialist forces" are the witting or unwitting lackeys of hegemonism. They must be isolated politically, and the falsity of their argument must be exposed.

The Party in Congress and Current World Affairs

The principal image the Eleventh Congress of the LCY sought to project, as described in a companion *AUFS Report* focusing on the domestic aspects of the message,¹ was of a stable Yugoslavia in an unstable world. This, the delegates heard and read and repeated, is a country with problems of its own, to be sure, but one whose regime's and peoples' self-satisfied self-confidence about the future is qualified primarily by concern over the potential effects of events beyond their borders and control. What is going on out there—retreat from détente, renewed Cold War, and consequently increased Superpower tensions and competition for enlarged spheres of influence—can at worst lead to more regional

wars or even a global one and must at least threaten the stability and independence of other countries, especially in the nonaligned Third World, and this includes Yugoslavia.

In Congress speeches and documents that discussed the affairs of this unstable world beyond Yugoslavia's frontiers² the sections that attracted most attention in the foreign press were those that attacked Soviet policies or those of its allies, particularly Cuba—although, as part of the courtesy and caution referred to above, it was an unwritten rule of the Congress that the targets of such criticism should never actually be named. While other and sometimes counterbalancing themes were thereby largely ignored (e.g., the "crisis of world capitalism," Yugoslav advocacy of a new international economic order, or the listing of [Western] imperialism and neocolonialism alongside [Soviet] hegemonism as forms of oppression and threats to peace), this emphasis accurately reflected the Congress's principal foreign policy message and what its organizers most wanted the world to hear—as evident in the way Yugoslav officials assigned to assist foreign correspondents drew their attention to passages that were most critical of Soviet policies. These were particularly to be found in speeches to the Congress commission on foreign affairs³ by senior officials, which by tradition function as an authoritative exegesis of selected passages from the Gospel of Tito's keynote speech. The conclusion of the Belgrade correspondent of *The Times*, Dessa Trevisan, in her report of June 25 was typical and justified at least for the 1970s: "Never before have the Yugoslavs made the message more blunt and never before have the differences with the Soviet Union, both ideological and practical, been greater."

Ordinary delegates meanwhile indicated their own sentiments, at the opening plenary session, by their usual method of apportioning their applause—one aspect of their behavior that cannot be disciplined, since it is collectively anonymous—as Edvard Kardelj, presiding, read the list of foreign guest delegations and their leaders. Enrico Berlinguer, head of the Italian Communist Party, a symbol of "Eurocommunism," and significantly the most senior foreign Communist at the Congress, received what was to

all ears clearly the warmest welcome. Others receiving identifiably above-average levels of applause—with observers inevitably disagreeing about the rank-order—included the Romanians, Hungarians, and Poles (but definitely not the staunchly pro-Soviet and "hard-line" East bloc parties: the Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and East German), the Spanish and other "Eurocommunist" delegations, and the Soviet delegation itself (led by Politburo member Fjodor D. Kulakov, who was considered a possible successor to Leonid Brezhnev until his sudden death the following month).⁴ When Kardelj went on to read the list of Parties that had sent greetings instead of delegations, he was interrupted by another round of demonstrative applause for the Chinese Party, which never sends guest delegations to foreign Party Congresses but whose letter of greetings was portentously warm and flattering.

Finally, the fact that the Yugoslav Congress was taking place on the eve of two important anniversaries—the thirtieth anniversary of Yugoslavia's expulsion from Stalin's Cominform on June 28, 1948, and the tenth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968—can reasonably be assumed to have been in the back of everyone's mind, although the 1948 one was mentioned only fleetingly and 1968 not at all.

In view of all this, the subjects on which Yugoslav views challenged those of the Soviet Union deserve pride of place in a summary of the principal foreign affairs topics discussed by the Congress.

The Current Deterioration in U.S.-Soviet Relations

In his keynote speech on the opening day Tito issued a solemn appeal to both superpowers:

The threat of an outbreak of war not only at a local level but even on a world scale cannot be excluded.... I am not saying that the situation is the same as in 1961, when the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Countries appealed to the two great powers to start a dialogue and negotiation. Yet it seems reasonable at the present moment to call on the two sides to make serious

efforts to transcend the present unsatisfactory situation. . . . This is their historical responsibility before the international community.

To these ends, Tito continued, a revival of détente as a bilateral arrangement based on existing blocs and largely limited to Europe (a limitation that was an important subtheme in Congress discussion of the subject) is not enough. Détente must be extended to the rest of the world and to other dimensions of multilateral international and interregional relations, including acceptance of the need for a new international economic order.⁵

This much, which did not apportion blame for “the present unsatisfactory situation,” was explicit. Implicit or deducible from various passages and speeches by others was the conclusion that, while the two Superpowers share responsibility for the deterioration in their bilateral relations and for nonacceptance of a new economic order (see below for this last), it is the Soviet Union and at least one of its allies that are chiefly to blame for the revival and extension of the Cold War in the Third World in general and in Africa in particular. The consequences, as described at the Congress, include the aggravation of local conflicts and the arms race, the destabilization of regimes, the undermining of recently achieved independence, and the risk of a wider war. Its most insidious aspect, treated next as a separate subject because of the importance the Congress attributed to it, lies in attempts to split the nonaligned movement, assigning those of its members selectively defined as “progressive” to a Soviet bloc tendentiously defined as their “natural” allies and protectors.

Attempts to Split the Nonaligned Movement

This theme, mentioned by Tito and in all Congress documents concerned with international affairs, received particular attention in what foreign ministry officials and other Yugoslav observers identified as the most important speech made to the Congress’s commission on international relations. By Miloš Minić, lately Secretary for Foreign Affairs and now apparently to be the Party Presidency’s principal spokesman in this area, it provided (in the tradition described above) an authoritative exegesis of briefer

and more circumspect references to the same subject found in Tito’s keynote speech.

An introductory section listed the virtues of nonalignment⁶ and meticulously used the plural “great powers” in referring to current efforts to split the movement and co-opt its members into spheres of influence—efforts also said to have contributed to the aggravation of existing conflicts among individual nonaligneds, sometimes leading to war. Then Minić came to his main point. “Of all the pressures from the outside and within the nonaligned movement,” he said, “I think that the most damaging are those aimed at imposing a so-called reorientation of the movement, that is, a change in the character of its role and purposes.” These pressures, “which generally come from the left,” seek to divide the nonaligned countries into “progressive” (or “radical”) and “conservative” (or “moderate”) categories, condemning the latter as having gone soft on imperialism and colonialism and arguing that “the socialist countries” (i.e., the Soviet bloc) are “the natural allies” of the “progressive” countries. “We,” said Minić, “cannot understand or accept the stubborn insistence of some that the character and role of the movement should be so altered that it limits itself only to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, but not against hegemonism and other forms of foreign domination. Even less can we understand views and efforts to reorient the movement so that one of the existing blocs is proclaimed a natural ally in the struggle against the other.”

Minić offered two arguments for this Yugoslav position. He admitted that in theory, given their Marxist principles, the “socialist countries” should support the goals of the nonaligned movement, but noted that in the real world of power politics and of different views and conflicts among Communist states and parties this is far from always the case. It is therefore wiser for the nonaligned to continue their traditional policy of supporting and accepting support from either of the blocs on an *ad hoc* basis, depending on whose policy on individual issues is consonant with the independence, nonalignment, and other interests of the nonaligned. His second and more revealing argument is the Yugoslav view of “hegemonism”

as a threat that is overlooked, either deliberately or out of ignorance, by the self-defined "radical" nonaligneds who see the Soviet Union as a natural ally. "According to our perceptions," Minić said, "hegemonism as a form of foreign domination is appearing ever more frequently in international relations." Even worse, and as a result of the crisis and declining of traditional [Western] imperialism, "it may happen, and is a likely prospect, that hegemonism in the historic sense will become a kind of successor to those forms of domination and exploitation that are gradually exiting from the historical stage—as colonialism is doing today, for example—under the pressure of the struggle of peoples for a democratic and progressive transformation of international and social relations and despite the powerful resistance of forces that support them." In these circumstances, Marxists and other progressives in the nonaligned countries must not be confused by the similarities between their goals and the systems ostensibly prevailing in one of the blocs, since hegemonism is "independent of the character of the social order and the ideological orientation of its carriers."

In all of this, Minić concluded pointedly, the Yugoslavs know what they are talking about: "Our position on the question of hegemonism derives from our experience that we have gained over the past three decades, a period in which we have at various times been exposed to acute pressures, both from imperialism and from hegemonism, that have threatened the independence of our country and our independent course of socialist development."

With "hegemonism" as a now universally recognized codeword for Soviet imperialism, with the Cuban regime (itself deeply involved in Africa) as the nonaligned movement's principal exponent of the views that Yugoslavia is opposing, and for those who remember that Yugoslavia's own struggle to remain independent of Soviet dictation is precisely Minić's "three decades" old this summer, the full meaning of his sermon is unambiguously clear. Minić himself said that the problems he was discussing must be on the agenda for the meeting of non-aligned foreign ministers that was to take place the following month in the same halls of Bel-

grade's Sava Center where the Congress was meeting. His and other Congress speeches repeating his thesis in fact anticipated the more dramatic and explicit Cuban-Yugoslav clash which was to take place at that meeting, as detailed below. Even more recently, Chinese Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng has endorsed the Yugoslav position on this question by repeating it as China's own during his August 1978 visit to Yugoslavia. Much more on the subject will undoubtedly be heard between now and the sixth meeting of nonaligned heads of state and government in Havana.

"Democratic Relations" among Communist Parties

Accentuating the positive here and leaving criticism of Soviet behavior to be sought largely "between the lines," Congress documents and speeches stressed the historical value of the 1976 East Berlin conference of European Communist Parties and praised the "Eurocommunist" and Japanese Parties for developing their own independent political and ideological lines (see below for more on this last). Aleksandar Grličkov, the chief Yugoslav negotiator at Berlin and in the long, difficult preparations for that meeting, doggedly kept to the same approach in a pre-Congress press conference at which Soviet correspondents persistently tried to corner him into a negative evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Party relations.⁷

The Berlin conference, it will be recalled, formally endorsed Yugoslav (and "Eurocommunist") positions concerning the independence and equality of each Communist Party, mutual non-interference and respect for different views, each Party's exclusive "responsibility to its own working class and nation," and "voluntary cooperation and internationalist solidarity" in place of the ill-famed phrase "proletarian internationalism" favored by the Soviet Party and its stauncher allies. In subsequent months authoritative Yugoslav spokesmen, including Grličkov, have on several occasions accused some unnamed but easily identified signers of the East Berlin

President Tito entertains Chinese Chairman Hua Kuo-feng with a ride in an electric cart, on a sightseeing tour of the island of Vangha, one of the Brionis, the President's summer residence, August 28, 1978.


meeting's concluding document of ignoring the pledges it contained by attempting to re-establish an international Communist organization or a "leading Party and state" with implicit authority over other parties. Ostensibly bland reaffirmations of the East Berlin meeting at the Party Congress will have been understood in the context of these complaints by all who listened, including Soviet bloc and West European guest delegations and Chinese embassy officials preparing briefing papers for their Chairman's visit to Belgrade.

"Eurocommunism"

The Yugoslav Party must tread warily here. Insofar as "Eurocommunism" stands for independence of Moscow, the right of each Party to "chart its own road to socialism," and its "re-

sponsibility only to its own working class," Tito was the first "Eurocommunist" (by 1948) and the Yugoslav Communists are all in favor and glad to have friends. For their own country, however, they must regard renunciation of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and acceptance of a multiparty system by some "Eurocommunist" Parties as potentially dangerous doctrines, quite possibly appropriate in Western Europe's "bourgeois democracies" but totally unacceptable in Yugoslavia.

Pronouncements on "Eurocommunism" by Tito and others at the Eleventh Congress were therefore carefully circumspect, and the term itself was seldom used. The resolution on international affairs adopted by the Congress, referring specifically to "some Communist Parties



in Western Europe and the Communist Party of Japan," put it this way: "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia supports positive trends in the workers' movement asserting the autonomy of parties and the diversity of roads and forms of the struggle for socialism and contributing to the consolidation of socialism as a worldwide process." Tito in his keynote speech called it a "positive tendency" that

many communist and workers' parties, for example in Western Europe, have emerged as important national political forces. They have autonomously and creatively elaborated their concept of the struggle for socialism in the concrete historical conditions of the contemporary crisis of capitalism. In doing so they have inaugurated an active dialogue on an equal footing with other democratic and progressive forces.... Taken as a whole, it is a progressive phenomenon of seeking new ways of struggle for socialism.

Then, however, he introduced a cautionary note that was probably addressed as much to Santiago Carillo, head of the Spanish Party and the most anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet of "Eurocommunism," as it was to Moscow:

This at the same time confirms that the struggle for socialism will continue evolving in different forms, that there are no universal "models" and that no concrete historical experience can have a universal significance. Any attempt at absolutization of one's experience and any tendency to impose it upon others hardly contributes to the success of the struggle....⁸

Speeches in the Congress commission on international affairs were as usual a degree more candid. Boško Šiljegović, who gave the introductory speech at the first session of the commission, noted that "an ever larger number of Communist Parties" are opting for "their own strategy and vision of socialist society, conforming to the specific conditions in their own countries," and added:

Understandably the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which already for decades has stubbornly fought for new relations in the workers' movement [among Communist Parties], salutes

this basic orientation by a number of Communist Parties in Western Europe and in some other parts of the world. That does not mean that between us and them, as between us and other Communist Parties, there are no differences of views on some questions. However, these differences, which we consider natural, cannot put in question our support for the independence of each Party in its choice of roads to socialism and the building of socialism, nor should it hinder the development of mutual cooperation, which today (in our view) can only develop on the basis of equality, voluntary choice, and mutual respect for different views and interests.

The Macedonian Question Again

Qualifying an otherwise generally positive evaluation of Yugoslav relations with six of the country's seven neighbors (always excepting Albania, although even here positive developments in trade and cultural relations were stressed), the *Basic Theses* for the Congress, commission speeches, and the Resolution on international affairs all noted sadly that three of them are in one way or another mistreating the Yugoslav minorities within their borders: Slovenes and Croats in Austria and Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece. The *Theses* were evenhanded in their criticism of the three countries, but the Resolution, drafted more recently and so presumably recording second thoughts, came down hard on Bulgaria. Cooperation between the two countries, the Resolution declared, is hampered by "the unchanged policy of Bulgaria towards the Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria and towards the Macedonian nation as a whole." The LCY and the Yugoslav state consider that Bulgarian treatment of their Macedonian minority "is in contradiction to the United Nations Charter and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe."

Bulgarian insistence that there is no such thing as a Macedonian nation, either in Yugoslav Macedonia or as a minority in Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, is an old story and a perennial reason for poor relations and periodic polemics between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The polemics invariably become serious on either of two occasions, which somehow usually coincide: whenever

Yugoslav-Soviet relations are on a downward curve and whenever the Bulgarians celebrate an anniversary of their liberation from Ottoman rule as a result of the 1878 Russo-Turkish War and Treaty of San Stefano.⁹ San Stefano created a "Greater Bulgaria" that included what is now Yugoslav Macedonia, largely populated by South Slavs whom Bulgarian nationalists have always claimed as a part of the Bulgarian nation. San Stefano's Greater Bulgaria was never actually established (the other Powers intervened to stop what they considered a dangerous expansion of Russian power and rewrote the Treaty at the Congress of Berlin that same summer), but it has never been forgotten in Bulgaria...or in Yugoslavia.

1978 is the centenary of the events of 1878 and is being appropriately commemorated throughout Bulgaria, complete with laudatory references to San Stefano as an act that momentarily united all Bulgarians in a single state and to a century of fraternal Russian support for Bulgarian national aspirations. Rightly or wrongly, the Yugoslavs have again interpreted this as irredentism and a latent Bulgarian territorial claim to Yugoslav Macedonia—which Bulgaria in fact occupied and annexed in both World Wars. The Yugoslavs also appear to believe, again as usual, that the latest Bulgarian "campaign" is sponsored by the Soviet Union as a form of pressure on Yugoslavia.

The Bulgarians reply that it is the Yugoslavs who are making a "campaign," and that its nature suggests it is the Yugoslavs who nurture territorial ambitions—against Pirin Macedonia. The Bulgarian regime also attempted to take preventive action in anticipation of what would be said at the Yugoslav Party Congress. In a speech delivered during a visit to Pirin Macedonia on June 15, one week before the Belgrade Congress opened, Bulgarian President and Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov offered to come to Belgrade "tomorrow" and join Tito in signing a joint declaration mutually renouncing territorial claims and reaffirming the inviolability of existing frontiers. Zhivkov's speech once again failed to mention the existence of a Macedonian minority among his Blagoevgrad audience or a Macedonian nation across the nearby Yugoslav border. For this reason, it was said later, the offer

was ostentatiously ignored by the Yugoslav regime and press (which reported other parts of Zhivkov's speech) until Bulgarian officials publicly complained about the allegations made at the Congress and the insult and purported Yugoslav territorial claims implicit in the silence that had greeted their leader's proposal. Their complaints included a statement by Dimiter Stanishev, a Central Committee Secretary who had led the Bulgarian guest delegation to the Yugoslav Congress, that "there has never been and there is not at present a Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria."

The Yugoslavs responded by recalling that in the Bulgarian census of 1956, taken during a brief period of official Bulgarian recognition that there was such a minority, 187,789 of Bulgaria's 8 million and 178,862 of Pirin Macedonia's 281,000 inhabitants were recorded as "Macedonian"—a figure reduced to 8,750 in Bulgaria and only 1,500 in the Pirin district in the census of 1965 and to none anywhere in that of 1975. As for Zhivkov's offer, the Yugoslav response here was to give the press copies of three documents drafted in preparation for a Tito-Zhivkov meeting in Sofia in September 1976: a joint declaration pledging all-around cooperation, including Party relations; a "solemn declaration" that neither country had "any territorial pretensions" against the other and reaffirming mutual respect for "territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing frontiers"; and another pair of "solemn declarations," one to be made by each government before its own national assembly, concerning the rights of the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia and those of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Because the three were a package, and Zhivkov would not agree to the third, none of them was signed or published. Zhivkov was now in effect proposing to revive the second, knowing that the third is the one that the Yugoslavs still consider important; his offer, the Yugoslav foreign ministry's press spokesman told a briefing, should therefore be considered merely an effort "to create an impression."

Since then, this latest round of Yugoslav-Bulgarian polemics over Macedonia has simmered on, with the Yugoslav press doing most of the shouting and the Bulgarians generally pre-

erving a dignified silence. Most outside observers have concluded that the Yugoslav authorities had over-reacted to Bulgarian centenary speeches and publications and were continuing to do so, at least in part to please their own Macedonians, but that Bulgaria's Soviet patrons would not be displeased by either Bulgarian sentiments or Yugoslav nervousness. Meanwhile, veteran Balkan correspondents like Viktor Meier of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and Paul Lendvai of the *Financial Times* and *Die Presse*, revisiting Pirin Macedonia for an "update" on local reactions, were again told that there ain't nobody here but us Bulgarians but got no reply at all to the question: what happened to the 179,000 Macedonians who were here in 1956?¹⁰

Two other foreign policy themes discussed by the Congress could not be interpreted as "anti-Soviet":

The Socialist International

Most criticism of alleged attempts to split the nonaligned movement and force its members to take sides in a revived Cold War was addressed to the Soviet Union and Cuba, as has been seen. Occasionally, however, another and at first glance curious agency was also accused of pursuing a similar policy, this time with anti-Communist rather than pro-Soviet motives.

The Socialist (or Second) International, a feared or revered political force until it fell apart over the question of its member parties' attitudes to their countries' declarations of war in 1914 and was eclipsed by the Communist Third International after 1919, has long been little more than a cozy, unnoticed club for occasional get-togethers by the leaders of Europe's socialist and social-democratic parties. The Yugoslavs themselves flirted with it in the early days of their lonely post-1948 isolation and attacks by "the world Communist movement," but soon found relations with individual members like the British Labour and Italian Socialist Parties more useful as tokens of their acceptability to at least the non-Communist European Left. Lately, however, the "SI" has been showing new signs of life and of a quest for a mission, a development usually associated with the person of Willy Brandt,

the former West German Chancellor and head of the West German Social-Democratic Party who is now chairman of both the Socialist International and a Western European agency concerned with ways to improve "North-South" relations—and who was an important friend of Yugoslavia in years past. Brandt's personal double engagement is generally considered one reason why the Socialist International has been showing increased interest in the Third World, its problems, and its non-Communist Parties of the Left. Somewhat ironically in view of the Yugoslav Party's concern over Soviet influence in the same region and its former attitude and political debts to the SI, to several of its members, and to Brandt personally, this interest and its possible consequences have now earned Yugoslav condemnation. Thus the Eleventh Congress's Draft Resolution on international affairs, after praising (alleged) increased emphasis on "socialist goals and values" by individual European socialist and social-democratic parties and "phenomena indicating a weakening of social-democratic dogmatism and of the crudest forms of anticommunism," continued:

*In recent years, however, activity has intensified in strengthening the Socialist International as the international center of socialist and social-democratic parties and in expanding its political and ideological influence, particularly among the parties and movements of the nonaligned and the developing countries. Such activity of the Socialist International is not conducive to the required faster liquidation of division and conflicts in the international workers' movement, and may even involve attempts to introduce ideological and bloc divisions among the nonaligned countries.*¹¹

A New International Economic Order

It was incidentally significant that this theme was almost totally ignored in Western and international news agency reports from the Congress. As one news agency correspondent said when I commented on his failure to mention Tito's own lengthy references to the need for a new international economic order as a major and pressing world problem: "Our subscribers aren't interested in that subject and wouldn't print it if I wrote it." What about subscribers in the Third

World itself? "They are relatively unimportant; most of our newspapers and income are in Europe and North America." Although in a way a separate subject, this silence and the reason offered for it are also a part of "North-South" relations in the light of (1) Third World complaints about dependence on culturocentric and allegedly prejudiced "Western" news agencies for news about and of interest to their own countries and consequent demands for some form of new international journalistic order, and (2) complaints everywhere about misinformation and lack of information in the media as a major problem for those who consider an informed and substantive "North-South dialogue" about the international economic order to be a matter of increasing urgency.

Nonacceptance of such a dialogue as a sub-theme in discussions of United States and Soviet delinquencies in foreign affairs has already been noted, but the subject received much additional emphasis in its own right. Views expressed at the Congress were standard and predictable, which is no doubt another reason they were not considered newsworthy. "Existing international economic relations," the Draft Resolution declared, "wherein the differences between the developed and the developing countries are being continuously reproduced and enhanced, constitute one of the most dangerous sources of international tensions and friction, as well as being one of the gravest problems confronting the international community." The answer to this and other "contradictions that have accumulated in the world economy" lies in "the concept of a new international economic order," particularly as articulated by the "Group of 77" in the United Nations and at the fifth conference of heads of state from the nonaligned countries in Colombo in 1976. The way to achieve it is "through international negotiation and accord, leading to comprehensive international economic cooperation on the basis of equal benefit and in accordance with the sovereign control of each country over its natural wealth, equality, and the consideration of the interests of all countries of the world." All, both developed and developing, would thereby benefit from "an appropriate structural transformation of the world economy, above all a new international division of labor, which would operate in

the interest of each individual country and bring about a juster distribution of world revenue. This would open up new avenues of development and progress in the world at large." So far, the principal impediments to such negotiation and agreement are "the lack of specific measures for the elimination of bloc groupings" (which means the East-West problem), "intensification of the contradictions imminent in international economic relations due to the activity of multinational companies," and short-sighted efforts by "the economically advanced countries...to preserve acquired advantages and dominant positions."¹²

Nothing new or specific here, and the emphasis and phrasing given the subject, in the presence of numerous guest delegations from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, was no doubt motivated in part by a desire to reaffirm Yugoslavia's solidarity with the Group of 77, the nonaligned countries, and "the South" in general. For Yugoslavia this may be an issue of greater sensitivity in the future. As a European country of white-skinned peoples, Yugoslavia has always been an odd and somewhat lonely member of the nonaligned and other primarily non-European groupings that constitute its primary international associations and a major base for a role on the world political stage that has been disproportionate to its size and military or economic strength. So far Yugoslavia's Europeaness and minor absolute and relative military-economic importance have been more than counterbalanced by Tito's enormous prestige as a founder and universally respected spokesman of the nonaligned. But after Tito? And in the context of the Cuban-led campaign for a "reorientation" of nonalignment that the Yugoslavs have so heavily committed themselves to opposing?

Meanwhile, however, nonspecificity, propagandistic phrases, and the "Yugocentricity" of Yugoslav reasons for speaking with a loud voice in conceiving and advocating a "new international economic order" need not (and should not?) detract from the strength of the case that they and others are presenting.


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Other topics in current world affairs were also discussed at the Eleventh Congress, including various "flashpoints of crisis" like the Middle East and Cyprus (well-known Yugoslav views were repeated here), an end to the arms race through negotiations "leading to general and total disarmament under strict and effective international supervision" (closer to Soviet than to Western phrasing on this subject), and the 1977-78 Belgrade conference to review implementation of the Helsinki "Final Act" of 1975 (it accomplished little but as much as could be expected in difficult circumstances, and at least it kept Helsinki alive). Such subjects rounded out the official Yugoslav view of the world in 1978, but the ones described in more detail in this Report were the priority themes. In addition and

as noted above, the Congress's discussion of topics such as nonalignment and such marginalia as particularly warm applause for the Chinese Party's letter of greeting anticipated more dramatic headlines produced by the Belgrade meeting of nonaligned foreign ministers in July and Chairman Hua's visit in August.

The Voices of Belgrade and Havana

At the July 25-30 meeting of nonalignment's foreign ministers the polemics and disagreements were so acute that the meeting itself had to be prolonged for a day to allow key delegations, meeting informally and privately, to draft a final document that all could accept with only a few formal reservations. During the public debate the



representatives of Somalia, Egypt, and several others among nonalignment's 86 full members were more openly anti-Cuban than the Yugoslavs, proposing either Cuba's expulsion from the movement (for which there is neither a precedent nor provision in nonalignment's largely unwritten rules) or at least that the 1979 nonaligned summit should be moved from Havana to somewhere else (which would be more than a gesture of pique and censure, since the host for a non-aligned meeting acts as its secretariat in the planning stage as well, an influential role). Although Yugoslavia joined the majority in opposing both these propositions and there were also other issues with other protagonists to dramatize the movement's present multifaceted disunity, the meeting as a whole was in essence a Yugoslav-Cuban duel for the soul of nonalignment.

The Yugoslav hosts, with Tito, Minić, Grličkov, and Foreign Secretary Josip Vrhovec all present at various stages to demonstrate the importance they were attributing to the gathering, repeated the views and arguments that Minić had presented to the Party Congress in the same building one month earlier. Although not physically present, Fidel Castro himself restated the Cuban position in a major speech delivered in Santiago de Cuba on July 27 and distributed in Belgrade the following morning. A large part of Castro's two-hour oration, in which he also attacked the United States and China and defended Cuba's military adventures in Africa, was devoted to the Belgrade meeting, then in its third day. The nonaligned, Castro said, have been infiltrated by "traitors, opportunists, waverers, and those who sell their principles." These people, in agreement with the United States, "are upset by the firm, combative, and unwavering role of Cuba," and some nonaligned countries (15 of them, Castro specified without naming names) have accepted U.S. inducement "to oppose the role of Cuba in the nonaligned movement" and at Belgrade. Apparently as a result, the movement itself has for the moment become "amorphous, opportunistic, and lamed rather than anti-imperialist, anticolonialist and

Presidents Tito and Hua Kuo-feng chat at Belgrade White Palace shortly after arrival of the Chinese Chairman in Belgrade, August 21, 1978.

progressive." For the nonaligned, Castro insisted, "there cannot be neutrality between progressive countries and reactionary countries," and if the obviously correct choice of support for and by the former leads to defections from the movement it does not matter, since nonalignment "should be characterized by its quality and not by the number of members." It also did not pass unnoticed in Belgrade that the Cuban leader listed himself among the founders of nonalignment, along with Nasser, Nehru, and Nkrumah (all dead), but ostentatiously did not mention Tito—although Castro was not in fact around during the movement's formative stage or present at the first (Belgrade) nonaligned summit in 1961.¹³

Perhaps the finest speech of the Belgrade meeting was by Singapore's foreign minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, who even-handedly damned both Superpowers for once again pressuring the nonaligned to take sides and manipulating them in proxy wars. Suggesting self-criticism by nonaligneds who go along with this game and also impoverish themselves with massive arms purchases, he warned that "the Third World War has already begun—in the Third World." Others, including ministers from some "radical" members like North Korea and Angola, apparently agreed with such firm restatements of nonalignment's nonalignment. With the Cubans and other pro-Soviet participants at last surrendering because they could apply the offensive terms to a different target, the meeting's final document listed "hegemonism" and "expansionism"—the latter an alternative pejorative for Moscow's behavior introduced at the meeting by the Cambodians when the Vietnamese and others started using "hegemonism" to describe China rather than the Soviet Union—among the evils that the nonaligned pledge themselves to oppose. (For the record, the full list now reads "imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism including Zionism, and all forms of expansionism, foreign domination, and hegemony." Most of the rest of the concluding document's 207 articles, incidentally, are a frequently repetitious potpourri of sometimes dated "positions on particular international issues" like the Middle East, southern Africa, Cyprus, Puerto Rico, Korean reunification, etc. These are generally written in the hyperbolic language of

radical movements, so that it is somewhat surprising that "moderate" members did not avail themselves of their right to submit "reservations" to more of such articles than they did.)¹⁴

In this round of the struggle for the soul of nonalignment, Yugoslavia thereby seems to have won on points and to have the support of a large majority of the movement. It is certain, however, that there will be a return and more decisive bout in Havana in 1979. The outcome there will undoubtedly be influenced by intervening developments in Africa and the way the respective African roles of the two Superpowers are regarded by key nonaligned heads of state—perhaps particularly those, like President Boumedienne of Algeria, who are at present more genuinely "nonaligned" between the blocs than Castro and the Vietnamese or (for example) the Saudis and Kuwaitis on the other side. The same is likely to be true of the way China "plays its nonaligned card" (mixing the metaphor for the sake of analogy with Washington's "playing the Chinese card") and China's own friends in the movement. These now include Yugoslavia, and during his visit to Belgrade the following month Chairman Hua pointedly repeated Yugoslav views of nonalignment as China's own.

Chairman Hua Comes Calling

On August 21, 1968, Soviet tanks rolled through Czechoslovakia to end "the Prague spring" and demonstrate the full meaning of Brezhnev's ex post facto (and never reiterated) doctrine that the sovereignty of "socialist" states must be subject to Soviet-defined limitations. Tito and his regime, who had applauded the Czechoslovak experiment with "socialism with a human face" and whose own more fulsome defiance of Soviet dictation and models was then precisely 20 years old, were outraged and alarmed. Tito sharply condemned an "aggression" which was "trampling Czechoslovak sovereignty" in order "to stop a progressive evolution" in that country, declared that if Yugoslavia's independence were also threatened "we shall know how to defend and protect it with all means," and redeployed and reorganized his armed forces to show that he meant it.¹⁵ President Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania, then as now the Soviet Union's circumspectly dissident ally and vul-

nerable neighbor, also nervously condemned the invasion in which Romania, alone among members of the Warsaw Pact, had avoided participation. In faraway Peking the Chinese joined the chorus of condemnation, but Premier Chou En-lai discounted in advance the possibility of help from China, if the Red Army were to roll on through Bucharest to Belgrade, by issuing a not-so-cryptic warning that "distant water cannot put out a fire." In any case, Chinese dislike of Yugoslavia's ideological heresies was still so intense that there had not even been a Chinese Ambassador in Belgrade since 1956, although Romania was highly regarded in Peking for its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet quarrel.

On August 21, 1978, precisely 10 years later, Chinese Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng arrived in Belgrade to begin a 9-day official visit to Yugoslavia, following 5 days in Romania and before a briefer stop in Iran on his way home. Hua was not exactly carrying a fire extinguisher, nor did he emulate Nikita Khrushchev's performance at Belgrade airport in 1955 by apologizing for the beastly things the Chinese had said about Yugoslavia in the past. The importance of his tour was at least for the moment primarily symbolic, and China is as far from the Balkans in 1978 as it was in 1968. However, Hua's mere presence and choice of hosts for his first trip to Europe, the warmth of his welcome in both Romania and Yugoslavia, and his repetition of Chinese warnings about "hegemony," pronounced in the Soviet Union's European front yard only days after the signing of a Sino-Japanese treaty that had defied explicit Soviet objections by using the same word, was quite enough for a Kremlin that is anxiously registering each step of China's dramatic post-Mao and anti-Soviet eruption on the world stage.

Hua and his hosts, concerned to give the Soviet Union as little pretext for reprisals as possible, did what they could to soften the blow. The Chinese leader tactfully refrained from attacking the Soviet Union by name or even inferentially, except for those passing references to "hegemo-

President Tito and Chinese Chairman Hua Kuo-feng during a sightseeing walk on the island of Vangha, one of the Brionis, the President's summer residence, August 29, 1978.

nism." Both the Romanians and the Yugoslavs repeatedly insisted that their relationship with China is directed against no one but is part of their policies of peace and friendship with all and especially with other socialist states. When the first public criticism appeared in the Soviet press, Ceaușescu even altered the program of the last days of the Romanian visit, cutting back his public appearances with Hua and the space devoted to Hua in the Romanian press.

Moscow was not to be appeased or deluded in this way. The Soviet press and that of its loyalist European allies sharply criticized the Yugoslavs and Romanians for merely listening to Hua with what was interpreted as approving silence. When the speeches of the three leaders and circumspect Romanian and Yugoslav media reporting of the

visits provided inadequate material for graver accusations, the Soviet media quoted instead from Western press reports and commentaries that did.

The Yugoslav and Romanian press and official spokesmen expressed astonishment at the intensity of this hostile reaction and wonder that their Soviet colleagues should quote "tendentious" reporting in the capitalist press rather than what was actually said and reported in the host countries. Both these points were repeated by Tito and Ceaușescu themselves, in speeches coincidentally(?) delivered on the same day. "As early as five years ago in Kiev," Tito told Slovene Party leaders calling on him at a castle near Ljubljana that is his second favorite vacation retreat. "I told Brezhnev that we were working on



improving relations between Yugoslavia and China....I also said that generally speaking one should make efforts to improve relations among various states, especially socialist ones, even where this seemed impossible." In view of this and because "we have done nothing that was directed against the Soviet Union or other countries," he was "indeed surprised" that Hua's visit "has evoked an unfavorable reaction in the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Press is attacking Yugoslavia and Romania," to this end "persistently quoting speculations published in various Western countries and designed to stir up a quarrel between us and the Soviet Union."

Elsewhere in his remarks, however, Tito himself indulged in some counterjabs at Moscow, explicitly recalling the events of 1948 (the thirtieth anniversary of which had heretofore passed tactfully unnoticed at high official level) and in the process implicitly admitting the obvious, namely that there is a connection between the present Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement and at least past Soviet threats to Yugoslavia. Referring to trade agreements signed with the Chinese during Hua's visit, for example, Tito said that "it is well known that we are interested in comprehensive development of economic cooperation with other countries. We don't want to depend on one side alone because in the time of Stalin, who annulled all agreements overnight, we have already burned our fingers once." Again, speaking of the background to Hua's visit and making the point that Mao Tse-tung himself had in October 1975 extended the invitation that took Tito to Peking in August 1977, he added: "Chairman Hua Kuo-feng also told me that Mao Tse-tung suggested five years ago [i.e., in 1973] that I should be invited for a visit, emphasizing that Yugoslavia was right in 1948. Mao said this at that time in the inner circle, [but] they did not state it publicly out of regard for the atmosphere prevailing between China and the Soviet Union."¹⁶

This last remark is interesting for another reason, as part of a minor but meaningful Sino-Yugoslav effort to re-edit history for contemporary political purposes. (Other Communist regimes notoriously *rewrite* history for such purposes, which has inspired the witticism that

under Communism the future is certain but the past is unpredictable. In recent times the Yugoslavs, in this once again more like "us" than like "them," merely *re-edit* it—e.g., selecting different sources or interpretations to support a changed evaluation of individuals or events rather than expunging them from the record and creating "nonpersons" and "nonevents.") Tito's references to 1948, to Mao's view of 1948, and to Mao's own and earlier than previously reported initiative in inviting Tito to China were clearly designed to impute more longevity and consistency to the Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement and to Chinese awareness of common Sino-Yugoslav interests than is generally recognized. Other references to the history of Sino-Yugoslav relations and the Chinese and Yugoslav revolutions in Tito's and Hua's speeches and Yugoslav commentaries emphasized the two regimes' similar origins in independent Communist-led national liberation struggles and the enduring nature of their common interests, particularly in "the struggle for socialism" (albeit in different forms) and against (Soviet) efforts to impose a single center and a single road on all those engaged in that struggle. In these selective readings from history both sides conveniently overlooked, without ever denying, two decades of almost unremitting Sino-Yugoslav polemics on almost every subject and Mao's continuing deep dislike of Yugoslav heresies even when ideological polemics tapered off and interstate relations began to improve after 1968.

Such selectivity was more than normal diplomatic and particular Oriental courtesy by Near Eastern hosts and Far Eastern guests, who at the same time and with deliberate ostentation made no secret of present disagreements on some issues, for example the inevitability of a major war in the future, which is proclaimed by Peking but denied by Belgrade. The other purposes of this strategy are easily inferred. First, and only for the Yugoslavs, joint affirmation of the basic similarities between the Chinese and Yugoslav revolutions and of common historic and current interests, both anti-"imperialist" and anti-"hegemonist" and deriving in large part from those similarities, brings to an end three decades of Yugoslav disappointment and perplexity because these commonalities were not recognized

in China. As a result of this blindness, for the Yugoslavs a consequence in turn of perverse Chinese ideological dogmatism, a country that should have been Yugoslavia's natural and desirable friend (doubly desirable because it is powerful and because it is Communist) instead chose to be an enemy and kept to this posture long after the great Sino-Soviet rift should have made its absurdity even more apparent. Now, at last, this has all been put right. Secondly and for both parties, Tito's and Hua's re-edited version of Sino-Yugoslav history carries a message to Moscow. The message is that the rapprochement between China and Yugoslavia is no momentary tactical maneuver in a Chinese diplomatic offensive and war of nerves with the Soviet Union. It is instead a belated recognition of common interests that were there all along and that endure, and for this reason the rapprochement will also endure and grow in strength and effect.

For the moment at least, Hua's visit to the Balkans is, to reiterate, a primarily symbolic event. Its concrete results, at least on the public record, were largely limited to the signing of some new technological cooperation and trade agreements of minor significance—although the Chairman was preceded in both Romania and Yugoslavia by Chinese military delegations having a good look at defense capabilities, needs, and potential suppliers, and in Yugoslavia by Chinese study groups interested in the system of workers' and social self-management that Mao so thoroughly hated. Neither the Romanians nor the Yugoslavs have much reason to go farther and faster in their relations with China at this stage and sound geopolitical and geostrategic reasons not to. The time has not yet come for the realization of a popular East European joke of recent years: offered the fulfillment of three wishes by a fairy, a citizen of any one of these countries (the choice depending on the nationality of the person telling the story) asks that China's armies should occupy his country and then go away again on three successive occasions. Asked why by the astonished fairy, our East European replies: "Because to do it they will have to march through the Soviet Union six times!"¹⁷

With fairies in short supply these days, the most that can be predicted with certainty is that Hua's calls will not have been a one-day sensation without consequences, that the Yugoslavs and Romanians will continue to reassure the Soviet Union that receiving him was not an anti-Soviet act, and that Moscow will not believe them and will attempt counteraction, probably including stepped up wooing of Albania, China's former but now estranged Balkan client.

One can also assume that Chairman Hua's planned visit to Western Europe in 1979, with the edge of total novelty taken off by this year's visit to Eastern Europe, and barring other surprises, will be unlikely to capture as large headlines as his Balkan calls or as many astonished descriptions of his amiability, energy, and world-statesmanlike sophistication. If you've seen one part of Europe you haven't seen it all, but Europe is Europe. Mao's successor in France or Britain is in a way less provocative and no more shocking than Mao's successor in Yugoslavia, a more sensitive area in Soviet eyes and a country that Mao also considered capitalist and an agent of Western imperialism. Columbus's second voyage was also not the sensation of his first, except perhaps for the peoples he did not discover the first time.

(September 1978)

NOTES

1. D.I. Rusinow, "Notes from a Yugoslav Party Congress" [DIR-4-'78], *AUFS Reports*, 1978/No. 41, Europe.

2. In addition to the mimeo. *Magnetofonske beleške* (stenographic reports) of speeches in the Congress commission concerned with international relations, see Tito's keynote speech, *The LCY in the Struggle for the Further Development of Socialist Self-Managing and Nonaligned Yugoslavia*, pp. 11-32, the Draft *THESES* for the Congress, pp. 263-289, and the draft resolution entitled *The LCY in the Struggle for Peace, Equitable International Co-operation and Socialism in the World*, passim (all published in English translation as brochures by *Socialist Thought and Practice*, June 1978). Except where otherwise noted, all quotations in this Report are my translations from the unedited *Magnetofonske beleške*.

3. Except for the opening and closing plenary sessions, the four-day Congress met in six commissions (political system, Party matters, economy, education and culture, foreign policy, and national defense), where both leaders and ordinary delegates discuss the appropriate sections of Tito's and other Congress reports and draft resolutions. For comments on the nature of these "debates," see the companion Report cited in Note 1.

4. I happened to be sitting among a group of domestic guests of the Congress whom I identified as elderly Bosnian veterans of the Partisan war and who atypically gave *their* warmest applause to the Soviet delegation.

5. Pp. 15-17 of Tito's keynote speech (see Note 2).

6. Minić's list is of some interest in view of the disputed importance as well as virtues of nonalignment. He named six ways in which he claimed that the nonaligned movement has been a powerful and positive influence: (1) as "an essential factor in the democratization of international relations" (meaning recognition of small powers as the equal of great ones in international political head-counting); (2) as "one of the most significant forces fighting imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, hegemonism, and other forms of foreign domination"; (3) as "the leading force" in advocating "active peaceful coexistence" between conflicting ideological and socio-political systems; (4) as "the force that unites the efforts of the nonaligned countries and developing countries as a whole in the struggle for a new international economic system and more rapid development of developing countries"; (5) as "an independent international force... that denies bloc divisions"; and (6) as "the initiator" in 1961 of the process that is now called *détente* and the chief contemporary proponent of its extension to the whole world as "universal active peaceful coexistence."

7. Typical of Grličkov's evasions and the Yugoslav strategy was his reply to a question by a Spanish corre-

spondent, who noted that "the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, together with the Communists of France, Italy, and Spain, also outlined a new line at the Berlin conference," and who asked for the Yugoslav view of the deletion of "Leninism" from the name of the Spanish Communist Party, Grličkov's answer, translated from an unofficial transcript of the Conference:

The Berlin conference and its document were accepted by consensus by all the attending parties.... The basic characteristic of the post-Berlin period is actually the continuation of the dialogue. And in this, understandably, consensus provides the basic principle. No one, no Communist Party, came to the Berlin conference with intention to change his policy and his conceptions. Or to deny his interests. Each Communist Party at the Berlin conference came with its own conceptions, its own interests, and accordingly the views that it was possible to endorse by consensus in a synthesis of the Berlin conference were those that were at that moment and on that principle acceptable to all the parties. We view positively the continuation of the dialogue both on the problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat and on the problems of the meaning and content of proletarian internationalism, and on all other problems concerning which it was known and is known that the Communist parties of Europe are divided in their doctrinal-ideological views.

As for the Spanish Party's deletion of the term "Marxist-Leninist Party" from its name, Grličkov said "that is the business of the Spanish Party," and he would give the same answer if he were asked instead why the Spanish or any other Communist Party does not adopt the Yugoslav principle of self-management.

8. Tito's speech, pp. 18ff; the citation from the Draft Resolution on international affairs is from pp. 16ff.

9. My 1968 survey of the history of the problem, "The Macedonian Question Never Dies" [DIR-3-'68], *AUFS Reports*, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1968, commemorates the last serious outbreak of such polemics, which took place on the occasion of Bulgarian celebrations of the ninetieth anniversary of the Treaty of San Stefano and while Soviet criticism of reforms in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was rattling nerves in Belgrade as well as Prague.

10. Zhivkov himself declined to answer the same question (merely saying "we have had other censuses") when it was asked, with specific reference to Lendvai's reports, during a press conference in Vienna on September 21, at the end of an official visit to Austria. Other post-Congress developments in the dispute are usefully summarized by Slobodan Stanković in *Radio Free Europe Background Reports* (Yugoslavia), nos. 148 (July 3), 155 (July 10), 165 (July 21), 174 (August 3), and 176 (August 8, 1978); also RFE's Bulgarian Situation Report No. 11, June 28, 1978.

Bulgarian census figures cited in this Report, based on a collation of sources, differ from those given by most authors, who frequently confuse all-Bulgarian and Blagoevgrad district figures.

11. The Draft Resolution (see Note 2), p. 18.

12. All quotes *ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

13. Addressing the meeting in Belgrade on the day after Castro's speech, the Cuban foreign minister tactfully corrected his chief on this point by naming Tito first among the movement's founders and reducing Cuba's role to a "participant at the first conference." (Quotations from Castro's speech and the Belgrade meeting in this Report are from press accounts, particularly the thorough and well-informed reports of *La Stampa* correspondent Frane Barbieri, a Yugoslav journalist and former editor of the Belgrade news magazine *NIN* who is incidentally the inventor of the term "Eurocommunism.")

14. The complete text, along with Tito's opening and Vrhovec's closing speeches can be found in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), double number 680-1 (August 5-20, 1978).

15. For reactions at the time, see Rusinow, "Yugoslavia and Stalin's Successors, 1968-69" [DIR-7-'69], *AUFS Reports*, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XVI, No. 7, 1969, and for a current reappraisal of this period and Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including reservations concerning the "Brezhnev Doctrines," see Fred Warner Neal, "Yugoslav Foreign Policy [FWN-1-'78], *AUFS Reports*, 1978/No. 24, Europe.

16. Talk with Slovene leaders at Brdo kod Kranja, September 7, published in the Yugoslav press on September 9. Cf. Slobodan Stankovic, "Tito Criticizes Moscow on Hua's Visit," and "Yugoslav-Soviet Polemics over Hua's Visit," RFE Background Reports (Yugoslavia), Nos. 199, 193 (September 4 and 12, 1978).

17. I recall, as a sign of changing times, another joke that was popular in these same places 15 years ago, when China stood for other things in East European eyes. Question: Why do we Poles (or Czechoslovaks or Romanians or...) love the Soviet Union so much? Answer: Because it's nice to have a buffer state between us and China.