

The Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo—population 1.5 million, of whom about 80 percent are Muslim Albanians—is the poorest of Yugoslavia's 8 federal units. It is also a bundle of economic and social problems whose continued nonsolution could threaten international as well as Yugoslav stability and peace. Its problems, in origin the legacy of Kosovo's particular history within the Ottoman Empire and then pre- and early postwar Yugoslavia, have been uniquely aggravated by rates of economic growth and social change that are considerable but inadequate to satisfy aroused expectations, less than the rest of the country's, ill-digested, and along with political power unevenly and changeably distributed among nationalities divided by religion and ancient antagonisms as well as language and culture. The potential threat to Yugoslav and thereby to international stability is more acute and directly international because Kosovo's Albanian majority, a large but poor, widely despised, and until recently oppressed non-Slavic minority in Yugoslavia, lives next door to an independent Albanian nation-state—a classic setting for irredentism.

The people of Kosovo are poor, but Kosovo is rich in partly or largely unexploited natural resources, particularly of minerals and labor. The reasons for the failure to exploit these resources and raise standards more quickly are partly historical and cultural, partly contemporary and political, and largely disputed between Kosovo and the rest of the country, which also aggravates the

national question. The province now has a political status, a leadership, a more adequate infrastructure, and plans that all augur well, but what happens will also depend on economic conditions in the rest of Yugoslavia and beyond, where present short-term forecasts are in general extraordinarily gloomy.


This two-part exploration of these issues and questions—in Part I through summaries of some problems and prospects and in Part II with vignettes of village, factory, and city streets—is based on visits to Kosovo in October and November 1979 and conversations with numerous local officials, including a three and one-half hour survey of the state of the nation and the world by Provincial Communist Party President Mahmut Bakalli. The timing of these visits was fortuitously well chosen: Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito began an abruptly scheduled and intensive four-day tour of the Province on October 15, reportedly doling out criticism but also approving ambitious local plans at closed-door sessions; Albanian foreign policy, nervously watched from Kosovo, seemed to be in motion toward some degree of opening to the world; and a combination of these events with a deadline for a new Five-Year Social Plan made the autumn of 1979 a season for evaluation and decision-making by Kosovo politicians and planners.

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At first glance, through the gate in the high wall that surrounds the Hadri family compound, nothing seemed to have changed since 1965,

when David Binder of *The New York Times* and this reporter were first in Skivjani. Just to the left of the entrance loomed the familiar bulk of the house in which 26 Hadris, including 11 children, had lived—a high, fortress-like "Metohija tower" of smooth-cut stone and narrow windows, built more for defense than for comfort and characteristic of western Kosovo, where such dwellings are lived-in monuments to the province's violent history. Straight ahead in the walled, defensible farmyard the haystack and mud were still in place, and an old man was shucking and chopping corn for winter fodder for the cattle. Outside the compound the little mill that had been a principal source of the Hadris' relative prosperity still straddled a branch of the rivulet, now swollen with autumn rains, that is the village's main street, wandering among other Metohija towers and more modest dwellings of sunbaked brick on its way from the Hadri homestead to the asphalted Prizren-Peć highroad, where the mosque stands. Except for a few new houses glimpsed through poplars dressed in bright autumn yellow or over high walls "the (almost) unchanging village," as Skivjani was described in a 1965 *AUFS Report* about Yugoslavia's Albanian minority,¹ still seemed to deserve that title in 1979.

1. See D.I. Rusinow, "The Other Albanians" [DIR-2-'65], *AUFS Reports*, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1965, for the village, the Hadris, and a general view of conditions in Kosovo (then officially Kosovo and Metohija, or Kosmet) at that time.



That this is not quite so became apparent one step inside the Hadri gate. Near the old man, where a steaming dungheap had perfumed the farmyard air 14 years ago, a black Mercedes came into view — not new and one of the smaller models, but undeniably a Mercedes and only part of a family horsepower pool (in 1965 consisting of two live horses) which now also includes a

second “limousine,” a small Yugoslav-built Fiat, and three trucks. Beyond the Mercedes, clustered around the end of the compound opposite the Metohija tower, three large new two-story houses of commercial red brick were under construction, one of them nearly finished and the others well on the way. “There will be nothing better or more modern in

Prizren or Priština!” the old man said proudly. More housing and more horsepower, he also explained, reflected another form of growth in his extended family since my previous visit: from 26 members to 60, including 32 children and a dozen or so teen-agers and unmarried young adults.

Kosovo is still the poorest and most traditional corner of Yugoslavia. Indeed, and despite assistance from the rest of the country that has lately and belatedly been almost as generous as 30 years of unfulfilled promises, Kosovo is year by year *relatively* poorer in terms of Yugoslav per capita averages: growth rates in almost all sectors (except population growth!) are almost always lower than those of already far richer regions. But the external symbols of increased absolute and even per capita wealth and "modernizing" social change in the Hadri farmyard are not an isolated phenomenon and constitute an appropriate introduction to other and related transformations, outside and inside the homes and minds of the Hadris and many other Kosovars, altering cultural values, ethnic pecking orders, and politics as well as living standards and styles.

The quality and quantity of these changes, and of what has not changed or is changing too slowly for peace of mind and polity, are of more than local and sociological interest. During an official visit to the province in October 1979, Tito himself repeated that an unhappy and unstable Kosovo, which could result from a perpetuation of the growing gap between Kosovar and Yugoslav standards, would inevitably destabilize the rest of Yugoslavia and thereby, given Yugoslavia's pivotal geographic and political position, the wider world. What Tito did not describe in detail, presumably out of respect for the sensitivity of Yugoslav-Albanian relations and the question of Albanian irredentism inside Yugoslavia, was the rationale for such a Balkan domino theory and the likely role, direct or indirect, of the Albanian connection.

Albanian irredentism is as old as the twentieth-century Albanian state and older than Yugoslavia. In an age of nationalism it was an inevitable consequence of the way the Ottoman Empire's last European possessions were divided up after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which

led to the creation of an independent Albania but left one-third of the Albanians outside its borders, in neighboring parts of the Slavic Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro and thereby in Yugoslavia after 1918. Now, according to estimates of Albania's population made by officials in Kosovo, these Yugoslav citizens of Albanian nationality, whose birthrate of 32/1,000 is the highest in Europe, have increased from one-third to nearly one-half of the Albanian nation. This makes them proportionately the world's largest *irredente*. Most of them, moreover, still live adjacent to the borders of the Albanian state, in southern Montenegro, in western Macedonia, and especially in Kosovo, home to 916,168 of the 1,309,523 Albanians counted by the 1971 Yugoslav census. Until very recently they were also a persecuted minority, discriminated against in education and employment, harassed by police largely recruited from among their principal ethnic rivals, and generally regarded as just above gypsies at the bottom end of Yugoslavia's ethnic pecking order.

Except for the unusual and aggravating circumstance that the "unredeemed" Albanians are nearly as numerous as the "redeemed" ones, this so far sounds—and historically has been—a classic case of the consequences of incongruence between ethnic and state boundaries in the contemporary, nationalistic world. Two developments of the 1970s, however, are giving the tale a new and somewhat different twist. The first, a result of constitutional changes adopted in 1971 and 1974, is that Kosovo, while still formally a Socialist Autonomous Province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, has come to enjoy most of the attributes and powers of a separate republic in the Yugoslav federation, where the autonomy of the republics has also increased so much that many observers are these days describing the system as a confederation. The second, which began after Serb nationalism and the Serb-dominated political police

were humbled in 1966, is that the local Albanian majority is now in charge of the province. These developments have revolutionized the ethnic pecking order there. They also have the potential to revolutionize international relations in a region in which there are now, in effect, two neighboring and competing Albanian states—one of them autonomous within nonaligned "Titoist" Yugoslavia and the other a sovereign and "Stalinist" Albania whose xenophobic rulers in Tirana claim that theirs is the motherland of all Albanians... and also the world's first totally atheistic and only truly Marxist-Leninist state.

The Albanians' numerical preponderance in Kosovo is unchallenged and growing. In the 1971 census they constituted 73.6 percent of the province's 1,243,963 inhabitants; with their birthrate and intervening migrations, they must now be about 80 percent of its present estimated population of 1,540,000. The most important minorities are Serbs and Montenegrins—18.3 and 2.5 percent in 1971 and somewhat less today—and their kinsmen of Muslim faith who are now counted as a separate nationality in Yugoslav censuses, and who were 2.1 percent of Kosovo's 1971 population. Some of these are descendants of the South Slavs who stayed behind during the exodus, from what had been the heartland of medieval Serbia, that took place in the 1690s and 1730s and that left the land empty and open to Albanian migration and settlement. The rest are newcomers, either since Kosovo's annexation to Serbia in 1913 or since its reannexation to Yugoslavia in 1945, after four years of inclusion in a wartime, Axis-ruled "Greater Albania." From 1918 to 1941 and again from 1945 to 1966 these Serbs and Montenegrins ruled the region and (along with a Turkish minority of about 12,000) dominated its economy. Since 1966, and at an accelerating rate since the constitutional reforms of 1971 and 1974, they have watched these roles and corresponding ones in culture

and education being taken over by the Albanian majority.

These changes in relative numbers and in rank order of status or power shape the contemporary chapter of the Kosovo question. The equation includes a locally overwhelming and still growing Albanian majority that has been a restive, discontented and at times ruthlessly suppressed non-Slavic minority in larger Yugoslavia, now increasingly in charge of their own affairs but grimly aware that these affairs, and their poverty, are not independent of the will, abilities, and charity of the kinsmen of their former oppressors. It also includes local South Slav minorities whose members have lately lost their positions of dominance and sometimes even jobs for which they are better qualified than their Albanian replacements, and who can call on the sympathies of their co-nationals in Serbia, Montenegro, and elsewhere in the country whose name—now an irony for many of them—means Land of the South Slavs.

What is new in all this is the potential—and in some circles, as certain as it is hard to verify, the actuality—of a *double* irredentism: of Albanians longing for union with Albania, either as it is or *as it might be* as a result of such a union of now nearly equal partners; and of Serbs and Montenegrins longing for reunion with Serbia, which can be achieved either by restoring Serbo-Montenegrin dominance in the Kosovo . . . or individually, by emigration out of the province. And as final spice to this brew come two other potentially complicating considerations. First, there are signs of movement and opening, still unclear as to direction, on the part of Albanian foreign policy in the wake of Tirana's quarrel with China and consequent isolation in the world. Second, most Kosovar Albanians are (Sunni) Muslims, and a visitor to the province in 1979 quickly comes to feel a kind of electric charge of interest and excitement (by October sometimes mixed with apprehension and

dismay) over current developments in Iran and elsewhere in Islam.

These wider issues and associated dangers were inevitably in the back of an observer's mind—and in the forefront of some conversations—during visits to villages, factories, schools, and government offices. Irredentisms *per se* were like icebergs in a fog—fleeting glimpsed intimations of sentiments whose full extent can only be inferred and whose existence, according to my official pilots, is in any case an optical illusion, the product of expectations based on Belgrade and foreign prejudices and misinformation concerning the Kosovo climate. On the other hand, ethnic prejudices and economic and social problems (and, of course, accomplishments) were more frankly or unavoidably displayed. These, it is reasonable to assume, are actually better navigational aids in anticipating irredentism and other political and social hazards than either official pilots or isolated instances of openly expressed disaffection or sedition, which tend to prove seriously mischievous only when they encounter widespread popular sympathy (or lead to terrorism, a possibility discussed below).

Therefore, as well as for their intrinsic interest, it seems meet and proper to survey some of the major problems and accomplishments in education and economic development before returning to political attitudes and prospects.

Population and Education

In the course of a meeting with senior Kosovo Party officials at the end of my November visit, I quoted, with deliberate imprudence, a Yugoslav friend in Belgrade who had suggested that Kosovo's economic problems could best be solved by sending a few thousand Slovene managers and technicians to run the province for a while. (Slovenia is Yugoslavia's richest region and the Slovenes are known to the other Yugoslavs as "our Swiss," with all that label implies.)

The reaction was predictable, but the force with which it was expressed was significant. The attitude that Albanians are stupid and lazy people who do not know how and will not work is "racism" and therefore intolerable, although this does not mean that Belgrade officials, or the Party, or even many Yugoslavs are racist, a characteristic most commonly found outside Yugoslavia or at worst in the Belgrade *čarsija* (the rumor mill, with petit bourgeois connotations).

But is there not a subtler, nonracist version of the "send the Slovenes" thesis, one that recognizes the undeniable fact of historically derived cultural backwardness in Kosovo and argues that the time and costs of social modernization in this poorest province are too great for the rest of a still poor and semideveloped country to subsidize without intervening to speed the process? This version was also totally unacceptable: for all kinds of reasons the only solution is to develop one's own cadres, not import them. The factory that I had visited in Suva Reka (described in Part II of this *Report*) was proof, I was reminded, that this was possible and under the right circumstances could happen quickly. The main task, I was told, "is to see to it that every day a few fewer stupidities are committed." And here lay one of the principal virtues of Yugoslavia's concept of self-management socialism: unlike certain other concepts of socialism propagated farther to the east, it recognizes the existence and even inevitability of stupidities and mistakes, and that the task is therefore to correct these rather than justify and thereby perpetuate them.

However this may be, there is one Kosovo "stupidity" that everyone agrees is still being committed with unremitting frequency and that complicates all efforts at "cadre development" and every other form of social and economic development. Despite some hopeful signs that "demographic transition" may have begun in the past 10 years

(see Table I), the crude birthrate still stands at 32 per 1,000 inhabitants and population is increasing at 2.6 percent per year. These are Latin American and African rates, higher than Asian averages and far higher than those recorded in Yugoslavia as a whole, where the crude birthrate is 17.7/1,000 and natural increase is down to .86 percent per year, with lows of 14/1,000 and .3 percent in the Vojvodina (cf. European averages—excluding the Soviet Union—of 15/1,000 and .5 percent per year for natural increase). Among the more obvious consequences: more than 53 percent of all Kosovars are under 19 years of age; the number of subsistence peasants is larger every year, despite a massive flight from the land and a consequent *relative* decline in the agricultural population from over 80 percent at the end of World War II to about 48 percent; the number of unemployed and of emigrants grows rapidly from year to year, despite some 60,000 new nonagricultural jobs created since

1971; and the school system, despite genuinely heroic efforts and impressive quantitative expansion, is still woefully overcrowded and in many sectors qualitatively unimpressive or inappropriate to Kosovo's needs.

Table II portrays the quantitative development of the school system during the 15 years since my first visit to the Province. These figures are even more impressive if postwar starting points, virtually ground zero, are also considered: in 1939-40, the last prewar school year, total enrollment in Kosovo's elementary schools, then conducted only in Serbian, was 32,790 (cf. 321,162 this year), of whom 36 percent were Albanians (cf. today's 81.4 percent, roughly the percentage of Albanians in the total population); in 1939-40 there were 3,306 pupils in Kosovo secondary schools (cf. 87,133 this year), and none of them was Albanian (cf. ca. 75 percent today). The more than 37,000 students enrolled this year at

Pristina University, 73 percent of whom are Albanians, more than equal the total population of Pristina in the first postwar years.

The elementary school attendance rate, at 93.1 percent (98 percent in the first four grades, 89.2 in the last four), equals the Yugoslav average and is now better than in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, although in the early 1970s (the latest figures available here) Kosovo still trailed in the percentage that completed the eight years of elementary schooling required by Yugoslav law. Female education, a particularly sensitive issue in a predominantly Muslim and traditional society where many peasants only a decade ago refused to send their daughters to school at all, is more impressive in primary than in secondary or university education, but has advanced across the board—to 45 percent of all primary pupils, about 30 percent of all secondary pupils (but about 25.5 percent of those of Albanian

TABLE I

Kosovo: Selected Demographic Indicators

	1953	1971	%	1978/79 (est.)	cf. YU 78/79 (est.)
Total population	815,908	1,243,963	100.0	1,550,000 (1979)	22,107,000 (1979)
by nationality					
Albanian		916,168	73.6		
Serb		228,264	18.3		
Montenegrin		31,555	2.5		
Muslim		26,357	2.1		
Turk		12,244	1.0		
Others and undeclared		29,105	2.3		
crude birthrate	44.7/1,000	35.9/1,000 (1973)		32/1,000 (1978)	17.7/1,000 (1978)
crude death rate	17.4/1,000	7.8/1,000 (1973)		6.2/1,000 (1978)	8.7/1,000 (1978)
natural increase	27.3/1,000	28.1/1,000 (1973)		25.8/1,000 (1978)	8.6/1,000 (1978)
agric. pop.	72.4%	51.5%		ca. 48% (1978)	30.3% (1978)
urban pop.	14.6%	26.9%		32.1% (1978)	45.6% (1978)
active pop.	33.2%	26.0%		25% (1978)	42.3% (1978)
employed*		107,000		165,000 (1979)	
of whom, women				32,600 = 19.8%	35%

*in socialist and private sectors, excluding private peasants.

Source: *Statistički Godišnjak, SFRJ*, 1979: additional date provided in Priština, October-November 1979.

nationality) and about 23 percent of university students.

The net result of this effort and of Kosovo's bottom-heavy demographic profile: one-third of the province's total population is in school or university!

School construction and teaching staff have not kept pace. Pajazit Nuši, the Vice-President of the Kosovo government responsible for cultural and educational questions, told me that the province's first priorities in the school sector in the next years must be the elimination

of the third shift, which still keeps many schools operating from 6 A.M. to 10 P.M. Imer Jaka, the Kosovo Secretary for Education, spoke of class size, in some cases still 40-50 pupils, as an equally pressing problem and a flagrant violation of Yugoslav school laws, which have recently lowered the allowable maximum from 36 to 30-32. Nuši is also concerned with the lack of pre-school facilities (kindergartens and crèches), a sector in which most of Yugoslavia has done well but in which Kosovo's high birthrate and limited means have meant a

deteriorating situation: only 1.8 percent of the province's preschoolers in only 5 towns (Priština, Prizren, Kosovska Mitrovica, Djakovica, and Peć) can be accommodated at a time when female employment is growing and increasing the demand for such facilities.

The financial burden of keeping ahead of population growth and at the same time improving the coverage and quality of Kosovo's school system, with one-third of the population in school and most of the

TABLE II

Education in Kosovo

	1963-64	%	1978-79	%	1979-80
Primary					
Total pupils	189,649		311,542		321,162
of whom, female	ca. 82,000	ca. 43	140,000	45.	n.a.
of whom, Albanian	119,310	62.7	253,636	81.4	n.a.
of whom, Serb/Montenegrin	n.a.		56,456	18.12	n.a.
of whom, Turks	n.a.		1,450	.46	n.a.
		('72-'73)			
% of age cohorts in grades 1 - 4		93.8		98.5	98
% of age cohorts in grades 5 - 8		72.1		87.1	89.2
Secondary					
Total pupils	20,130*		77,521		87,133
of whom, female	n.a.		23,095	29.8	n.a.
of whom, Albanian	9,701	48	57,473	74.1	n.a.
of whom, Serb/Montenegrin	9,981	49.6	19,527	25.2	n.a.
of whom, Turk	446	2.2	501	.6	n.a.
of Albanians - female	n.a.		14,645	25.5	
% of age cohort	n.a.			or 48	
	(1965-66)			59.3**	
University					
No. of faculties	3		10		10
Total students	3,292		34,702		37,379
of total, full time	662		24,124		23,903
of total, females	2,269		7,769	22.6	n.a.
Other postsecondary schools	6		6		6
students (full and part-time)	3,738		13,045		16,605

* includes *all* types of secondary schooling, including 6,067 in gymnasium (classical secondary schools); 1978-79 and 1979-80 figures include only general education secondary schools, a combination of gymnasiums and *some* other types.

**48 percent is the figure supplied by Vice-President Nuši, 59.3 percent by Secretary of Education Imer Jaka.

Sources: for 1963-64, data collected in Priština in 1965; for later years data collected in Priština in 1979. (n.b. not all correspond to data in the *Statisticki Godisnjak SFRJ*, but discrepancies are minor and these are probably more accurate).

rest under- or unemployed, is enormous. The percentage share of educational costs in national income has been more than double the Yugoslav average of about 5.5 percent since the mid-1960s. Inevitably, a large part of this burden must be carried by "the wider community," meaning the rest of Yugoslavia, through various forms of grants-in-aid and subsidies. Equally inevitably, the rest of the Yugoslavs tend to resent this, seeing it as another aggravating dimension of the problem of a religiously and ethnically different people whose one successful vocation is in breeding children that others must work to support.

Meanwhile, the task of qualitative improvement has been further complicated by the extension to Kosovo of Yugoslavia's current educational reforms, which are eliminating the traditional *gimnazije* (classical general education secondary schools, equivalent to the German *Gymnasien*, French *lycées*, or English grammar schools) and consolidating secondary education in a "single ladder" of "schooling centers" with complex diversified career-oriented curricula and much emphasis on on-the-job vocational training. These reforms have led to considerable disruption—and opposition—in other regions, but Kosovo as usual has extra problems of its own.

First of all, changes of curriculum, pedagogical methods, teaching plans, etc., which are taxing the abilities and patience of most teachers everywhere, are likely to prove the straw that breaks the camel's back for Kosovo teachers, the majority of whom are more recently and barely qualified and had only just begun to cope with the requirements of the old system. The Provincial Secretary of Education called this "our poor base for teacher development." Secondly, and itself significant as an indicator of cultural expectations in a less "modern" cultural environment, secondary school demand and development in Kosovo had led to a relatively far greater emphasis on

the traditional, classical, general-education *gimnazije*, the principal target of the reforms, than in Yugoslavia's more developed regions. As a result, 62 percent of Kosovo's pre-reform secondary schools were *gimnazije*. In 1977, when 24.6 percent of secondary school graduates in Yugoslavia as a whole were *gimnazije* students, and in Slovenia, the most developed republic, only 18.4 percent, the Kosovo figure was 36.8 percent. Conversely, only 24.6 percent of Kosovo secondary school graduates that year were produced by schools for skilled workers, compared to a Yugoslav average of 45.3 and a Slovene one of 55.4 percent. Thirdly, the new system's emphasis on extramural training in economic enterprises is proving hard to put into practice in a region where there are so many pupils and so few economic enterprises, mostly small and unwilling to be overwhelmed by torrents of unskilled, short-term apprentices.

On the other hand, I was told at the Secretariat of Education, the reforms, with their emphasis on career training, are particularly needed in Kosovo, which must prepare its enormous surplus of locally unemployable youth to go elsewhere and compete successfully when they got there. "For example," it was said, "we must be asking Croatia, 'What professional skills do you need?' and then supplying them."

Similar problems exist in higher education, although here most of them are in essence simply a more serious version of problems that plague most Yugoslav universities as a result of rapid expansion and new creations during and since the 1960s. Priština's university began with a Faculty (college) of Philosophy, as a branch campus of Belgrade University, in 1960. Faculties of Law and Economics were added in 1961-62, and a Technical Faculty (its offerings initially limited to construction engineering) in 1965; the Faculty of Medicine was celebrating its tenth anniversary in fall 1979. These

together became a fully independent university in February 1970. Now there are ten faculties, including agriculture, electrotechnical, mining and metals (in Kosovska Mitrovica), physical education, natural science and mathematics, and an Academy of Art, in addition to those created in the 1960s. At the beginning of the present school year, 37,379 students were enrolled, so that Priština is tied with Sarajevo as Yugoslavia's third largest university (after Belgrade and Zagreb). An additional 16,605 are enrolled in other postsecondary "higher schools," for a total of 53,986 students, which is nearly one-third of the total number of people employed outside peasant agriculture in the province. The faculty of 1,000 is largely Albanian-speaking, like the student body, and three classes are taught in Albanian for every one in Serbo-Croatian.

A senior Party official spoke of "the stupidity that we have so many students"—40,000, he said, would be more than enough—and described the large number who are studying things like philosophy and philology as "a luxury" that a poor society at Kosovo's stage of development can ill afford. At the provincial government, Vice-President Nuši also addressed both of these questions and offered his own explanations. Lack of employment opportunities must be a primary reason, he thought, why so many enroll at the university—for example, more than 9,000 of the 13,645 pupils who completed secondary school in Kosovo last summer. As for overenrollment in arts and humanities and underenrollment in technical faculties, he blamed this primarily on past overemphasis on the *gimnazije*, the traditional road to a university education and a type of school that encourages the humanities and discourages science and technology. Others are more inclined to blame popular attitudes, typical of many underdeveloped societies, that view office jobs as more prestigious than technical ones.

TABLE III

Kosovo: Selected Economic Indicators

Social Product—index of growth at constant prices

	1952 to 1978		1952 to 1958		1958 to 1968		1968 to 1978	
Yugoslavia	100	581	100	158	100	199	100	185
Kosovo	100	566	100	148	100	203	100	187

Social Product per capita

	1953 INDEX	1977 INDEX	1978 mill. dinars	INDEX
Yugoslavia	100.	100.	41,143	100.
Kosovo	46.	30.	11,735	28.5
Slovenia	165.	200.		

Rate of Growth of Social Product (percentages)

	1976	1977	1978	1979 (est.)
Total economy	2.1	5.1	4.2	7.2
Socialist sector	1.9	8.1	6.4	5.3
Private sector	2.7	-5.1	-3.3	14.3

Planned average annual rate of growth, 1976-1980 9.5 percent

Actual average annual rate of growth, 1976-1978 3.8 percent

Estimated average annual rate of growth for Plan period 1976-1980 5.4 percent

Comparative Economic Development, selected Indices

	YU	Kosovo	Slovenia
Population 1953	100%	4.8%	8.8%
1978	100%	6.9%	8.2%
Active pop. 1953	100%	3.4%	9.0%
1978	100%	4.1%	9.3%
Agric. pop. 1953	100%	5.7%	5.9%
1978	100%	9.8%	3.7%
Workers 1953	100%	2.1%	15.3%
1978	100%	3.0%	14.0%
Basic capital 1953	100%	1.7%	20.1%
1976	100%	2.7%	16.5%
Investment 1953	100%	1.2%	16.0%
1977	100%	3.1%	14.7%

Source: Data supplied in Kosovo, 1979, supplemented from *Statistički Godišnjak SFRJ*, 1979.

In a separate conversation Zeqë Shehu, as the University's Secretary, roughly equivalent to an American university's Provost, agreed but argued that the imbalance is correcting itself, since 40 percent of students are now enrolled in "technical faculties." However, other sources and statistics on recent graduating classes contradicted this assertion. Of 1,231 students who got their diplomas in 1979, nearly 68 percent were in undeniably nontechnical faculties: there were 324 graduates in law, apparently the most popular of all, 278 in philosophy or philology (faculties that include history, the social sciences, and languages), 188 in economics, and 44 in art. An additional 120 graduated in natural science and mathematics and 81 in medicine, leaving 196—16 percent of the total—from all 6 strictly technical faculties together. Elsewhere I was told that student quality and level of preparation is conspicuously lower in these technical faculties, since they are hard-pressed to fill their quotas and will take anyone, whereas philosophy, philology, and economics are oversubscribed and overcrowded. This source had found many engineering students, for example, whose basic mathematics were so deficient that he wondered how they coped with university-level work at all.

The quality of a Priština University education is not a subject that university or provincial officials are eager to discuss, but one figure that suggests relatively low standards (and plentiful scholarships) is the 20 percent of the students who come from outside the province, although Priština is not normally considered one of Yugoslavia's more desirable cities and student living conditions are among the poorest in the country. Some of these non-Kosovo students are Albanians from Montenegro and Macedonia who have come here because the language of instruction and of Priština's streets is primarily Albanian, but others come from as far away as Kragujevac in Serbia,

where a branch campus of the University of Belgrade has a sound reputation. (There are also 180 non-Yugoslav students, including at least one Albanian-speaking American in the medical school). The further fact that the 1,231 students who received diplomas this year was equivalent to only 5 percent of those enrolled as full-time students and 3.5 of all PU students is also indicative, although not all that unusual in other Third World or even several European countries where life-long education seems to be taking on a very literal meaning.

On the other hand, and in apparent contradiction of their contention that Kosovo has too many students for its needs or funding capabilities, and too many studying the wrong subjects, both senior Party and government officials insisted that their society still needs all the university-educated people it can get. In evidence it was pointed out that only 130 of the more than 8,500 who have graduated from Priština's university so far—and, according to these sources, only 10,000 of Kosovo's secondary school graduates—are listed as unemployed in this province of awesome unemployment. The senior Party official who made these points also vehemently denied a specific suggestion, often heard in other parts of Yugoslavia as well, that Priština and other purportedly overlarge universities may be manufacturing a social and political time bomb by turning out graduates whose numbers or choice of academic discipline can make them unemployable, either totally or in accordance with their training and expectations. Perhaps, however, he was so vehement because the subject came up just after he had been discussing alleged efforts by "external enemies" to foment Albanian nationalism and irredentism in Kosovo.

Economic Development: Running Faster to Fall Further Behind

That Kosovo has lately enjoyed significant economic development is manifest in the statistics (see Table III) as it is in visual evidence for a

visitor returning to the province after several years' absence. Social Product at constant prices—roughly equivalent to Gross National Product (GNP) as measured in the West—has grown by 581 percent between 1952 and 1978 and by 187 percent in the decade 1968-1978. Even when discounted for a 95 percent population growth since 1952, this is impressive. Per capita national income, only 15 years ago about \$200, is now about \$550. The factories (mostly small and mostly inefficient, but never mind) and the improved agriculture that have contributed to these and other indices of growth dot the countryside and are reflected in the improved living standards of the Hadris of Skivjani and many other Kosovars, particularly from the Albanian majority, in both rural and urban environments. The town-dwellers of the province, another normal index of development, now account for nearly one-third of the population, compared to a quarter in 1970 and under 15 percent in 1953. The 165,000 who are now employed, although still far from adequate, are some 55 percent more than at the beginning of the 1970s. All this reflects an impressive amount of investment, far exceeding the province's own capabilities: 21,941 million dinars (18.50 dinars = US\$1) in the 3-year period 1976-1978 alone, about 80 percent of it in economic activities.

If Kosovo's once empty cup is thereby approaching half full, it is still more than half empty. Of greater psychological and political importance, it is filling less quickly than those of other Yugoslavs in other republics and provinces, both developed and underdeveloped. The growing gap in development and affluence is not only per capita, where it is made worse by the Kosovar Albanians' birthrate, but in many sectors the gap is growing in absolute values as well.

Figures again speak more eloquently than words or random impressions. In 1953, when Yugoslavia's postwar economic development really began and the whole country could be

classified as "underdeveloped," Kosovo's per capita Social Product was a lowly 46 percent of the Yugoslav average; Slovenia's, at the other end of the spectrum, was 165 percent. By 1977—despite the enormous effort and all-Yugoslav support, at least since 1957, that are reflected in the impressive gains noted above—Kosovo's per capita Social Product was down to 30 percent of the Yugoslav average, while that of do-it-yourself Slovenia was up to 200 percent. In 1978 the Kosovo index slumped another notch, to 28.5 percent of the Yugoslav average. With about 7 percent of Yugoslavia's population, Kosovo still has only 4.1 percent of the country's economically active population and 3 percent of its workers, but 9.8 percent of its peasants; its economy disposes of only 2.7 percent of Yugoslavia's total stock of invested capital (plant, equipment, etc.) and produces 2.2 percent of both Yugoslav industrial output and the country's exports. An estimated 100,000 Kosovar Albanians have emigrated temporarily or permanently in search of work, perhaps 40,000 of them to other parts of Yugoslavia and 60,000 to Western Europe.

The industrial sector, in particular, suffers from chronic problems and underutilization, lately severely aggravated—as is true in many underdeveloped countries—by fall-out from the problems besetting the older industrialized societies, here including the north of Yugoslavia. As Ismet Gusija, Director of the Provincial Institute for Social Planning, told the Belgrade daily *Politika* (October 12, 1979) and repeated to this reporter: "The rate of growth of Social Product is about 60 percent below plan, profitability is constantly falling, production is stagnating, employment has slowed, enterprise indebtedness is growing. The complex economic conditions in the country as a whole have hit this region hardest, especially because of the unsatisfactory structure of the economy." It is well known, *Politika's* correspondent added, that utilization of capacity is

TABLE IV
Investments in the Socialist Sector

		Value in Mill. dinars 1976-1978	Structure (%)
Total Investments	100%	21,940.7	
1. Investments in the Economy	79.3%	17,390	100.0
- Industry		10,538	60.0
- Agriculture		807	4.6
- Forestry		94	.5
- Hydrosystems		1,095	6.3
- Construction		1,338	7.7
- Transport		1,861	10.8
- Commerce		913	5.3
- Hotels and tourism		563	3.2
- Crafts		150	.9
- Communal sector		13	.1
- Other		18	.1
2. Investments in noneconomic sectors	20.7%	4,551	100.0
- Communal housing		1,874	41.2
- Financial services		360	7.9
- Education and culture		832	18.3
- Education and health protection		610	13.4
- State organs and other		875	19.2
Actual Investment (Socialist Sector), Percentage Shares by Source of Funding		1976-1978 (current prices)	
		Total Investments 100.0%	Investments in the Economy 100.0%
Total			
- Self-funded by economic enterprises ("organizations of associated labor")		7.9	9.6
- Self-funded by noneconomic institutions ("organizations of associated labor outside the economy)		4.2	
- Self-managed Interest Communities, Noneconomy (education, health, social welfare, etc.)		2.3	
- Banks (largely from resources of the Fund of the Federation)		68.4	88.1
Other bank credits		12.2	.5
Communal budgets		1.0	.2
Republic and Province budgets		4.0	1.6

Actual Investment in Fixed Capital (Socialist Sector)	Per Capita, 1976-77	
	Yugoslavia	Kosovo
Actual investment per capita, million dinars	18,392	8,619
As percentage of Yugoslav per capita level	100.0	46.9
Of which, investment per capita in the economy in million dinars	14,096	6,722
As percentage of Yugoslav per capita level	100.0	47.7
Investments in the Kosovo Economy as Percentage of Investments in the Yugoslav Economy		
1966 - 1970	4.0	
1971 - 1975	3.6	
1976 - 1977	3.0	

Source: Provided by the Provincial Secretariat for Information,
Pristina, November 1979.

unsatisfactory in many enterprises, that there are many organizational and technological "misfortunes," that working hours are not properly used, and that there are inadequacies in specialization and division of labor.

The most notorious consequence is the number of Kosovo's industrial enterprises—unusually high even by Yugoslav standards, which are not good—that chronically lose money. In the aggregate, again according to *Politika* (October 31), 17 of 31 industrial branches are currently operating in the red. According to a report in *Rilindja*, Priština's Albanian-language daily (May 21, 1979), total losses amounted to 1,640 million dinars in 1978 and 1,080 million in the first three months of 1979.

How to apportion the blame for this dismal picture and for the failure to close the Kosovo gap or even prevent its widening is a major political issue—as it has been the centerpiece of interregional and hence interethnic disputes between more developed donors and less developed recipients of aid throughout Yugoslavia for over 20 years. That the focus is now on Kosovo is largely because some other underdeveloped regions have made it and the rest are either doing well enough at closing the gap to

divert criticism or are politically or ethnically less sensitive at the present time.

The arguments used in the dispute are a kind of microcosmic echo of the wider world's "North-South dialogue" about development, with the difference that Yugoslavia's "developed" north is itself at the lower margin of that category. The donors emphasize the magnitude of the aid they have provided and the inefficiency with which it has been used. The recipients focus instead on the inadequacy of that same assistance and argue that it is because its use has been dictated by the donors' interests, not theirs, that it is often inappropriate to local development needs and for that reason proves "inefficient." The two sides only agree that part of the problem arises from the "cultural milieu," "nonmodern value orientations," and similar phrases that the charitable layman translates as "the heritage of the past" and the uncharitable as plain backwardness—but here, too, they draw different conclusions.

Thus participants in the debate from Yugoslavia's donor republics point to the share of the rest of the community in investments in Kosovo—as measured by externally funded bank credits (see Table IV), currently 68 percent of total investments and 88 percent of

investments in the province's economy—as evidence of their generosity, which they argue is all the more impressive and unsustainable because they, too, are still relatively underdeveloped and short of capital. They emphasize investment as a percentage of total domestic Social Product—in Kosovo lately a phenomenal 45 percent, compared to a Yugoslav average of about 30 percent—as evidence that Kosovo is doing very well indeed as a result of others' self-sacrifices. And they point to investment-output and capital-output ratios—the precise figures are in dispute but are undeniably much worse in Kosovo than in the rest of the country, where they are bad enough—as evidence that the core problem is inefficient if not criminally incompetent use of capital, not lack of it. In addition, of course, they always return to Kosovo's birthrate as the ultimate reason why running harder, even if it were done more efficiently and with more means, can still mean falling further behind.

Kosovo officials and economists have no answer to this last accusation—apart, that is, from embarrassed references to vestiges of five centuries of externally imposed cultural backwardness, optimistic references to the theory of "demographic transition" ("please note hopeful recent trends, with predictable lags, in our birth, death, and natural increase rates"), and defensive counteraccusations that the way the subject is raised smacked of racism and deeply resented myths of Muslim sexual machismo.

They, do, however, have answers for the other accusations:

Investment aid has not, they point out, been as generous as alleged. If one looks at per capita investments, a better indicator than investment as a percentage of domestic Social Product, Kosovo has always done poorly and is lately doing worse. In 1976-77, as indicated in Table IV, per capita total and economic investments in Kosovo were 46.9 and 47.7 percent of respective

Yugoslav levels. This is not only too low for catching up, or even running in place, but is less than in the later 1960s or in 1957-1963, the province's first investment boom, when the figure was a still inadequate 59 percent. Looked at another way, Kosovo's share in all-Yugoslav economic investments has declined from 4 percent in 1966-1970 to 3.6 percent in 1971-1975 and merely 3.0 percent in 1976-1978.

As for sources of investment funds, it is true that most comes from the rest of Yugoslavia, primarily through the Fund of the Federation, a development aid scheme similar to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in neighboring Italy. Given the limited local base provided by Kosovo's own existing small and seldom profitable enterprises, the only alternative is virtually no investment and therefore no growth, which is obviously unacceptable to the whole of Yugoslavia and for many reasons, some selfish and some dictated by partly altruistic "solidarity."

Third, it is argued, the purported inefficiency of investment in Kosovo is partly an unfair accusation and for the rest only partly to be blamed on the deficiencies of the "cultural milieu" and Kosovar work ethic that Kosovar officials are so disarmingly willing to admit. Time and effort can in any case remedy these deficiencies, as that frequently cited success story in Suva Reka and a few other happy exceptions prove. More important, therefore, as an unfortunate legacy that will be harder to eliminate and as a lesson for the future, have been the consequences of a basic investment strategy that was imposed on Kosovo by the outsiders who have provided the funds, who were pursuing their own rather than Kosovo's economic interests, and who have pursued a different strategy for themselves, at least since the early 1960s.

This strategy, which Kosovo officials and planners are determined to change, has concentrated on extensive

investment in extractive industries. The goal has been the exploitation of Kosovo's extraordinary mineral wealth—especially lignite (52 percent of known Yugoslav lignite reserves, 46 percent of total known coal reserves, and 27 percent of all primary energy sources), lead and zinc (52 percent of Yugoslav reserves and already an important export representing 25 and 13 percent of European production of these metals), nickel (only in Kosovo), and magnetite, but also bauxite, chrome, quartz, kaolin, asbestos, marble, and cement marl.

Although no one argues that these resources should not be exploited—especially, today, lignite as a cheap, plentiful domestic substitute for oil in generating thermo-electricity—directing the lion's share of limited investment funds to these sectors, largely ignoring processing industries, is said to have had two extremely unfortunate consequences (to which a small but growing number of Kosovars would add a third, which is environmental). The first is that, like a parallel but unavoidable emphasis on investment in infrastructure like roads, transport, and electrification, it distorts the image and also the short- and medium-term reality of the "efficiency" of investment as measured by capital—output and profitability ratios. This is because investment costs in these sectors are relatively high, it generally takes far longer to complete construction and begin realizing a return, and much of the real economic and social return (especially in the case of energy) is not or cannot be monetarily credited to the initial producers. The second, and more important in the eyes of the Kosovo planners, is that the primary beneficiaries of such investment in and exploitation of Kosovo's natural wealth are not the Kosovars but producers and consumers in the richer republics. Their processing industries are fueled with Kosovo energy and raw materials and their peoples, with employment and higher incomes provided by these Kosovo resources, can afford to buy

and consume the output, again including made-in-Kosovo energy, as most Kosovars cannot. A particular complaint is that most of Kosovo's extractive industries—and especially the highly mechanized open-pit lignite mining and associated thermo-electric plants that have been particularly favored in this increasingly energy-conscious decade and that scar the Kosovo countryside and foul its air—employ very few people, either in total numbers or per unit of investment. And these are precisely the province's principal "objective" economic problems.

Kosovo's Plans

It is at this point in the argument that Yugoslavia's long-standing problems and disputes concerning interregional capital mobility and optimal investment strategies take on, in their Kosovo variant, a new focus for the 1980s. On the day I interviewed him, Planning Director Ismet Gusija was on his way to a meeting of the provincial government at which the draft of a new five-year plan, for 1981-1985, was to be presented. President Tito had just toured Kosovo, his first visit since 1975 and only his fifth since 1945, and according to senior officials had given his blessing to the development strategy that had been laid before him—clearly to their great relief, since they freely admitted that Tito's backing will be necessary if the rest of the country is to be persuaded to go along.

A central feature of this strategy was expressed in its bluntest form by middle-ranking officials as follows: No more investment in lignite mining and electric power (with nonferrous metals also sometimes listed) from the Fund of the Federation and other sources of credits intended for the development of underdeveloped regions. If "they" want more Kosovo electricity (or metals), let them pay for expanding capacities in this sector separately with direct investments. From now on we shall use development funds in accordance with our own development interests, and this

means primarily in processing industries that employ more people per investment dinar, quickly and in more places, and that have better profit margins.

One scheme of this kind goes well beyond Yugoslavia's borders and was the subject of much enthusiastic talk in Kosovo in autumn 1979. Negotiations with Swiss, West German, and French interests, who some sources claim are already close to signing, have as their goal an additional 75 megawatts to be generated in Kosovo from Kosovo lignite for direct export to these countries. The importers would pay for the expanded capacity as part of the deal. I had first heard of this scheme in Zagreb and Belgrade, where it was treated as a Kosovar pipe dream, unrealizable because of technological problems and costs—the inadequacy and inappropriateness of existing transmission lines and the power losses incurred when electricity is transported over great distances. These objections were discounted in Priština, where recent technological advances were said to have reduced losses in transmission to tolerable levels and where the alleged seriousness of Swiss, West German, and French interest was cited as evidence that other costs were considered reasonable.

As for the Fund of the Federation and other sources of development aid from the rest of Yugoslavia, the draft 1981-1985 Social Plan reportedly anticipates increased amounts (one high-level source specified 25,000 million dinars from the Fund and 12,000 million from budgetary sources), despite northern impatience with Kosovo inefficiency and countrywide economic problems to which the orthodox answer is austerity. The solution, according to a senior official who said it has Tito's approval, is to maintain what he called "the burden on the rest of the country" at its present level but effect a redistribution of credits from that burden in favor of Kosovo. This would mean less for

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, the other regions that are designated as "underdeveloped" and therefore eligible for credits from the Fund and the budget.

The same senior official cited three other devices for increasing investment from other sources that were also said to have Tito's approval or to be his proposals during his October visit. The first would be an all-Yugoslav "social compact"² under which all the republics and provinces would agree that new industries, producing things that Yugoslavia needs but does not yet produce, would be located in Kosovo. (What might these be? The source said he did not know, since the idea was a new one, but that he was sure an appropriate list could be devised.) The second would be an agreement by large enterprises to locate new branch plants in Kosovo—on the model of the factory for automobile parts established at Peć by Yugoslavia's principal car manufacturer, Crvena Zastava of Kragujevac (Serbia), but usually on a smaller scale. The third was the one I had already heard so much about: all new investment in energy and raw materials to be funded separately and by their consumers, so that credits from the Fund, other than those for infrastructure, can be focused on processing industries. But here, I was also told, the opposition is now

2 "Social Compacts" (*društveni dogovori*) . . . are self-management enactments adopted, on equal terms, by organizations of associated labor and their associations, self-managing communities of interest and other self-managing organizations and communities, agencies of sociopolitical communities, trade unions and other sociopolitical and social organizations, by which the parties thereto regulate socioeconomic and other relations of general concern to the community . . . Social compacts are binding upon the parties which have concluded or acceded to them . . . (from the Glossary appended to the English translation of *The Associated Labor Act* (Belgrade, 1977) to explain such Yugoslav concepts in simple and clear (!) language).

as much domestic as external, in the form of "'or-else' type psychological pressure" from Trepča and other Kosovo producers of raw materials and energy, all at present deeply in the red.

How realistic is this list, especially when those who must take the burden have increasingly urgent and similar economic problems of their own, including unemployment and capital starvation, at a time when austerity should be the watchword? Tito's support, if it was as strong as reported and if it is maintained by his successors, is undoubtedly important, perhaps even capable of turning what a Priština official called "a dream list" into reality. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's complex and genuinely pluralistic system of political decision-making in matters of this kind, which gives each republic and province a near-veto that can be overruled only in exceptional circumstances and at some risk, limits even the President's awesome power when many regional or corporate interests may be injured, or think they may be. "Believe me," said a senior Party official in Priština who has done a study of the American political system, "getting something like this through our parliamentary [*delegatski*] system can be harder than it is for President Carter's programs in the U.S. Congress. The difference is that our press doesn't write about it—and shouldn't, since it only upsets the public [*da narod ne boli glava*]."

Who's In Charge?

In 1965, when David Binder and this reporter first visited Priština and its region, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo-Metohija was, if readers in and outside Yugoslavia will permit the expression, a colonial dependency ruled, neglected, and exploited by Serbian and local Serbs. In addition to suffering economic and social discrimination, the Albanian majority was firmly and when necessary ruthlessly oppressed by UDBa, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav State Security Service—so effectively that, although this and the restiveness of

the Albanians were common knowledge and Binder and I were watchful with what we thought were well-trained reporters' eyes and ears, no firm publishable evidence of restiveness or oppression came to our attention. Instead, we were served with a rich menu of Kosovar Albanians in ostensibly leading positions and ready to tell us that now, albeit only recently, Albanians were getting a fair deal and were loyal to Yugoslavia. Interestingly, some of the "token Albanians" and Albanian "Uncle Toms" of 1965 have almost miraculously survived intervening political events to serve today as Grand Old Men of the Revolution, in sometimes titular and sometimes real positions of authority.

Any suspicion that tales of discrimination and oppression of Yugoslav Albanians were being exaggerated by anti-Serb Albanian, Croatian, or Slovene nationalists was dispelled by the detailed (if possibly still understated) documentation that appeared in the Yugoslav media a year later. This was after a smoldering all-Yugoslav political crisis was resolved through the purge in July 1966 of Yugoslav Vice-President Aleksandar Ranković, founder and still informal boss of UDBa, along with his chief lieutenants in the Party and UDBa. The immediate consequences of the easing of police supervision and UDBa's demoralization included sometimes violent Albanian nationalist demonstrations in the streets of Priština and elsewhere, in November 1968 and during the following year.

These were followed and in part preceded by some additional economic aid, genuine equalization of the Albanian and Serbo-Croatian languages in administration and in topographical and personal nomenclature, and parallel symbolic changes of psychological importance (e.g., "Kosovo-Metohija" or "Kosmet" became simply "Kosovo," dropping the Serbian term for the western part of the province, and the Albanian national flag was adopted

as the provincial flag). The province's political autonomy was expanded, in stages, through constitutional amendments, and there was to be no more discrimination against the Albanian majority in employment and for public office. That this last was really happening soon became evident from complaints, first in the "political underground" and then publicly, of reverse discrimination against local Serbs and Montenegrins. In this as in the banning from official and polite usage of the term "*Šiptari*" (Shiptars) because it was often used with pejorative connotations—it is actually an initially innocent Serbo-Croatian rendering of *Shqiptarë*, which means "sons of the eagle" and is what Albanians call themselves, and was used to distinguish Yugoslav from Albanian Albanians (now all are to be called *Albanci*)—an American does not have to look far to discover instructive analogies.

The first important public reference to the other side of the new Kosovo coin was by two distinguished members of the Serbian Party's Central Committee, the writer Dobrica Ćosić and the historian Jovan Marjanović, at a Central Committee meeting in May 1968. Albanian "nationalism and irredentism" were being openly promoted in Kosovo, they warned, and Serbs were suffering systematic discrimination in employment. As evidence they cited the emigration from Kosovo of an increasing number of Serbs and Montenegrins, "especially the intelligentsia." Although both also criticized several specific manifestations of Serbian nationalism and are well known as more Yugoslav than Serb in their patriotism, they were condemned by the Central Committee for being "nationalistic" and "opposed to self-management," and were probably spared expulsion because a Party Congress a few months later provided a less dramatic way to drop them, which it did.

In 1979 the ethnic composition of the Kosovo Secretariat for

Information—the able, amiable, and cooperative organizers of my second visit of the autumn—was a kind of prototype for what is encountered in other offices and in enterprises and the university. Nehat Isljami, the Secretary for Information and until lately a journalist and foreign correspondent—in Beirut during the civil war—for Priština's Albanian-language daily, is an Albanian of Muslim origins. His deputy, Mark Nikaj, is an Albanian of Catholic origins, an extra twist of "the ethnic key" to recognize the non-Muslim minority among the Province's Albanians. Two Assistant Secretaries are also Albanian. Then comes Tihomir Saljić, the Secretariat's man-of-all-work, from scheduling and shepherding my visit to sending for coffee and slivovitz or settling the bill when the Secretary or his assistants took me to lunch. He is Montenegrin but bilingual and virtually bicultural, from a mixed community near Peć where mutual favors and mutual defense bred good feeling and sympathy between Albanians and Slavs. This visitor would give all of them roughly equal (and high) marks for intelligence, helpfulness, and openness. Fifteen years ago it would have been clear that the Slav in such a group was actually but not formally in charge. Today it is equally clear that this is not the case.

A similar mix and rank-order is found at the province's political summit, where Party President Bakalli, Fadil Hoxha as Kosovo's representative on the all-Yugoslav State and Party Presidencies, and Xhavid Nimani as President of the Presidency of the Province are all Albanians. One must work well down the list of the top dozen, by protocol or by power, to find Slavs as Secretary to the Provincial Party Committee, President of the Provincial Parliament, and President of the Provincial Socialist Alliance.

While many of these top offices were also occupied by "token" Albanians before 1966, atmosphere as well as experienced observers

make it apparent here, too, that the present occupants, and other Albanians in far more numerous middle-ranking positions that were once held by Slavs, really are in charge now.

Emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins apparently continues, especially of the traditionally Serbo-Montenegrin "intelligentsia." But so does that of Albanians of the nonintelligentsia, who cannot find work in Kosovo. Albanian officials in the province try to put this into a "socioeconomic" perspective stripped of ethnic categories. "With development below plan, limited opportunities, and limited income made worse for the upwardly mobile because personal income differentials are less in Kosovo than elsewhere," I was told, "it is no luxury, especially for intellectuals, to live here rather than in Ljubljana or even Kragujevac." This is why they go, and it is because Serbs and Montenegrins were traditionally preponderant in the social strata that are most affected, and not because of ethnic pressures and discrimination, that proportionately more Serb and Montenegrin professionals and skilled workers are leaving. Their places are taken by newly educated and professionally trained Kosovar Albanians, reinforced by an influx from the Albanian minorities in Macedonia and Montenegro. Here again, it was said, the reasons are socioeconomic, since the Albanian minorities live in the poorest parts of those republics. In the next breath, however, it was admitted that there are "cultural" reasons as well: after all, Kosovo is predominantly Albanian in culture, and Macedonia and Montenegro are not.

This admission led to others, qualifying the contention that Slav emigration has little or nothing to do with nationality. The predominance of Albanian culture, which is visibly increasing as a result of growing self-confidence as well as policy, must also have a reverse effect on Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins. "They share the fate of Kosovo, [which is] underdevelopment," a

senior Party official explained, "but it is easier for them to escape because, however natural [*prirodno*] the environment is for them here, how much more natural in Kragujevac or Niš," which are in Serbia. The problem, he continued, "is complicated by our peculiar social structure, in which the most numerous nationality always lived worst. It has a lot to do with who is traditionally urban. For example, the Turks, historically urban, still live best — better in fact than the Serbs — although they are only one percent of the population." So the Serbs and Montenegrins, deprived of political positions that guaranteed them a privileged social and economic status, go elsewhere "to share at least in the *average* standards there, which are higher than here." Sometimes, he added, Party members among them have been given Party orders not to go, but they do so anyway.

Another official present at the same meeting noted that most of the Serbs and Montenegrins who emigrate are the offspring of or are themselves post-1912 immigrants to Kosovo, not members of families that had always lived there, which he thought significant. This recalled an earlier conversation with one of the latter, a university-educated professional, who had said that "psychological pressure" to emigrate was intense, no matter what officials might say, but that Kosovo was his ancestral home and that he would be "a coward to the air I breathe" if he succumbed and went.

The Albanians, apart from the estimated 100,000 who have also emigrated, remain. Whatever the reason — luck in the employment lottery, love of homeland or family, lack of initiative, or hopelessness — they are apparently willing to live in Kosovo. But what country would they like Kosovo to be a part of, if they had a choice?

Kosovo, Yugoslavia, and Albania

The Albanian state that is ruled by Enver Hoxha from Tirana is, by all reports, both literally and figuratively a forbidding sort of

country. Economically and socially it is Europe's most backward corner. Its regime is unregenerately and by self-definition Stalinist, with all that label implies for the oppression of the individual and the suppression of "individualistic" values and aspirations. Its boasts include the achievement of universal literacy and electrification, the world's allegedly most egalitarian communism . . . and the creation of the world's first truly atheistic society, accomplished by locking or transforming all mosques and churches and through firm suppression of religious practices. It is also xenophobically isolationist, traditionally maintaining few links with the outside world apart from the ideological leadership of a scattering of anti-Soviet *and* anti-Chinese but "true Marxist-Leninist" splinter parties and far-reaching propaganda, from Radio Tirana's powerful transmitters, characterized by a crudeness and extreme Manicheism that have not been heard from Radio Moscow since the high noon of the Cold War.

The Albanian state within the Yugoslav (con-)federation that is ruled by Mahmut Bakalli and others from Priština is economically and socially the most backward unit in that federation, but by almost all indices of modernization, prosperity, and culture it is well ahead of Tirana's Albania. The principal exceptions, if limited information from beyond the mountains is accurate, are rural electrification (but there is less to plug in over there), literacy (shamefacedly admitted in Priština), atheism (if that counts), and the cleanliness of city streets (because it is said in Kosovo, the Albanians of Albania have nothing to throw away). An Albanian of Kosovo can normally be a practicing Muslim (or Catholic), except in political and a few other professions. He is also usually free to leave Kosovo or Yugoslavia and seek his fortune or happiness elsewhere if he wishes. In Tirana's Albania this is seldom possible.

If a Kosovar Albanian is therefore freer and wealthier and has better

prospects on both counts in Yugoslavia, and in addition has a (sub-)state of his own to run and in which to preserve and cultivate his national heritage, would he not have to be an idiot or a nationalist fanatic to wish to see Kosovo become a part of a "greater Albania" ruled from Tirana? This is, indeed, the common wisdom.

There is, however, another way of looking at the matter. The Albanians of Yugoslavia are now nearly as numerous as the Albanians of Albania. More of them are better educated and trained for "modern" life and are culturally more sophisticated. They possess far more social and economic "infrastructure." Who, in these circumstances, would run a Greater Albania if it came into existence? Would the Kosovars not quickly become the big fish in a little pond filled with their own kind, instead of being small fish in a bigger pond largely populated by alien species who generally despise them? And is this not an enticing prospect, especially for young, nationally conscious intellectuals embittered by low status in Yugoslavia's ethnic pecking order and frustrated by lack of opportunity in Kosovo and by cultural and linguistic barriers to opportunity elsewhere in the country of their present citizenship?

Kosovo's Albanian officials unsurprisingly and vehemently denied that many of their people are thinking in these terms. What Yugoslav Albanians want, they said, is to be part of a Yugoslavia in which all nationalities enjoy equality of respect, opportunity, and participation. What they want is a next-door Albanian state that is independent, open to the world (including Yugoslavia), and more democratic than it is. "Then the question of frontiers will be 'relativized'." What they do not want is an Enver Hoxha who addresses them condescendingly as "our brothers" and "paternalistically manipulates the Albanians of Kosovo," as it was phrased at high political level in Priština. "He should remember that he is a head of state and head of a

Party, but not the head of a nation." The viciousness of Albania's anti-Yugoslav propaganda and its "slandering of Tito and the Yugoslav system" are resented but answered only in extreme cases ("we try to ignore it, but we cannot be indifferent!").

Apart from Albanian failure to tone down this propaganda, Kosovo-Albanian and Yugoslav-Albanian relations are said to be developing "positively." Cultural exchanges, including textbooks, films, television programs, and the performing arts, have been increasing quietly and on an *ad hoc* basis for more than a decade. Relations between the universities of Tirana and Priština began in 1968, now include faculty exchanges, mutual access to archives, and joint research projects (particularly by Albanologists), and are regulated by annual cooperation agreements signed by the two Rectors. A joint Kosovo-Albanian scholarly symposium and festivities to celebrate the centenary of the League of Prizren of 1878 (the first organized movement for Albanian independence from the Ottoman Empire in modern times, with its base in Kosovo rather than present-day Albania) is cited as a high point and precedent. Trade between the two countries has risen to \$800 million in value, and Kosovo Chamber of Commerce President Nazmi Mustafa was in Tirana with a delegation, discussing higher levels for Kosovo-Albanian local trade, in November 1979.

It is only recently, however, that the Albanian government has shown willingness, which is enthusiastically welcomed in Priština, to put these and other relations on a more regular, government-to-government basis and to do so at a Tirana-Belgrade level in addition to a Tirana-Priština one. In autumn 1979 Kosovo Secretary for Culture Imer Jaka became the first minister of provincial or Yugoslav cabinet rank to be invited to an official visit in Tirana. Officials in Priština view all these developments in the context of the Albanian regime's apparent interest in compensating for the loss of Chinese patronage and aid by

establishing diplomatic and commercial links with the rest of the world—so far explicitly excepting the Superpowers and Great Britain (the last because of unresolved mutual claims arising out of the Corfu Channel incident in 1946). Such a general opening by Europe's most closed society is also welcomed with apparent enthusiasm.

Currently more ominous than Tirana's propaganda and "manipulations," a senior official in Priština suggested, is the purported new line of the anti-Communist Albanian emigration in the West. It is considered highly significant that attacks from this quarter—representing, the official added, a small minority of Albanian-Americans, "most of whom are either just good Americans or sympathetic to present-day Yugoslavia"—have become conspicuously softer in their view of the regime in Tirana and tougher about Tito, the Yugoslav system, and especially the alleged abuse of Albanians in Kosovo, where conditions in general are described as though they were worse than in Albania. More immediately worrying, however, is evidence that extremist and terrorist organizations in the Croatian nationalist emigration are seeking and may have succeeded in establishing relations with this anti-Communist Albanian emigration. The reason why this is worrying is that the Albanian emigrées have never attempted, or at least never succeeded, in promoting terrorism inside Yugoslavia, unlike the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood and its ilk. And political terrorism, as much of the world now knows from painful experience, is today a contagious disease transmitted by links among such bands of "anti-social" elements ("as a Marxist," the source said, "I won't accept that some of these should call themselves 'leftist'"). He did not add, although it would have been appropriate, that the assassination of Yugoslav King Alexander Karadjordjević in Marseilles in 1934 was the product of analogous

cooperation between the Croatian separatist Ustaša and the partly separatist, partly irredentist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).

Another and quite separate outside influence on the Muslim Albanians of Kosovo—and the Slav Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina—comes from the ferment sweeping the Islamic world. Because it is at this stage both intangible and subterranean it is impossible to pin down in terms of extent, quality, and significance. One is forced to retreat to that most unreliable form of evidence, which is vibrations in the antennae of “experienced observers.” In this instance this means their interpretations of nuances of change in their friends’ and contacts’ focus of interest and reactions to sometimes superficially irrelevant things. So far their report, at least from Kosovo, is so limited and primitive that it could be confirmed even on the antennae of an occasional visitor like this correspondent: yes, there is a reaction—a stirring of special interest and excitement and an unexpected knowledge of details about events in the Muslim world whenever the subject comes up. Beyond this, as of October 1979, there was at most an occasional cautious word of enthusiasm for Iran’s Islamic Revolution, and by November some worried or disapproving headshaking about the latest news from Tehran. Afghanistan, of course, came later.

The potential effect on Kosovar Albanian attitudes toward Albania and toward irredentism is a matter of speculation and in theory could be either positive or negative. It is

often said that one reason why Yugoslav authorities have lately encouraged more visits by ordinary Kosovar Albanians to Enver Hoxha’s Albania is so they will see the locked and boarded mosques of that “atheist” country and make appropriate comparisons with the functioning and sometimes newly built mosques in Kosovo. On the other hand, it is in principle equally possible that a new sense of pride in Islam could lead to an increased sense of solidarity with simultaneously religious and ethnic brothers across the frontier beyond which religion is being suppressed.

In Belgrade I was to hear rumors, circulating in diplomatic quarters, that Albanian nationalists had succeeded in staging several unpleasant incidents during President Tito’s October visit to Kosovo. These allegedly included an anti-Tito, pro-Hoxha slogan spray painted inside the Grand Hotel in Priština when Tito arrived to stay there (“but *which* Hoxha,” Belgrade wits were asking, “Enver or Fadil?”—the latter, as noted above, being Kosovo’s representative on Yugoslavia’s collective State Presidency and no relation of the Tirana one). The intensity of security precautions that I observed before the visit and my failure to hear any rumor or mention of the purported incidents when I returned shortly afterward tempted me to regard these stories with skepticism, which was shared by usually well-informed journalists in Belgrade.

Whatever the truth may be, the prompt surfacing of such rumors and the possibility that they just might be true are reminders of irredentism has lived and thrived in Kosovo’s past, that official protestations are no reason for believing that it has evaporated merely because life in Yugoslavia is undeniably better and freer than in Albania, and that the subject is a matter of interest and concern both for Yugoslavs and the international community.

“An Albanian nationalist who works for a Greater Albania,” said a senior and Albanian official in Priština, “is guilty of madness, because the process of achieving that goal would lead to a Third World War.” And that, he added, is why such people, when they occasionally surface, are rightly put into prison to join equally occasional pro-Soviet “Cominformists” and Serbian nationalists, no matter what Amnesty International may think about it. It was a dramatic and possibly exaggerated remark, but one capable of making an impression at a moment when developments in other small (and Muslim!) countries and provinces, no more sensitively located along the great earthquake-prone political and geological fault-zone that divides the contemporary world, are setting world peace at hazard.

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