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*"Comrade Tito has died.*

*"On May 4th at 3:05 P.M. in Ljubljana the great heart of the President of our Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and President of the Presidency of the SFRY, the President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Marshal of Yugoslavia and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, stopped beating...."*

With this proclamation, issued three hours after the event by a joint meeting of Yugoslavia's State and Party Presidencies, the world learned that Tito's four-month death agony had finally ended. And with the death of Tito, three days before his 88th birthday, an era not only in Yugoslav history, but in world history, ended. "A legend in his own lifetime," as his fellow-Croat Vladimir Bakarić called him in an eulogy the following day, Tito was the last survivor of those who led their peoples in and after World War II and whose names are worldwide symbols of their generation and the mid-century drama of conflict, triumph and tragedy, heroism and infamy in which they were the most prominent actors. Roosevelt, Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, De Gaulle, Gandhi, Chiang, Mao, many lesser heroes and villains, and finally Tito...now all gone.<sup>1</sup> Radio and television stations around the world interrupted their programs when the news came at 6:46 P.M. West European time, and in Norway Prime Minister Odvar Nordli came in person to the television studio to make the announcement to his countrymen.

Perhaps Tito was indeed, as some obituaries claimed, the last titan of the twentieth century. The clichés that describe his life and accomplish-

ments are no less true for excessive repetition: Josip Broz, called Tito, peasant of Kumrovec and migrant metalworker, veteran of the October Revolution and maker of his own, organizer and hero of Yugoslavia's epic Partisan struggle, father of his reborn country and its ruler and symbol for 35 years. He successfully defied Hitler's legions, the living Stalin, and the logic of Yugoslavia's smallness, backwardness, and place on the map, so that under him it became the most genuinely independent state the Balkan peninsula has known since the fourteenth century and enjoyed a global prominence and influence vastly disproportionate to its size. He was the patron of his country's ingenious political and social experiments and "the last of the Habsburgs" (using A.J.P. Taylor's frequently quoted label) for his success in ruling the most multinational and unruly of the Habsburg Empire's successor states, and for a style and purpose of rule that had more in common with Joseph II and Leopold II, the Habsburg "enlightened despots" of the eighteenth century, than with modern forms of despotism. Triumphant heretic and ultimate doyen of world communism, he was also the last surviving founder of nonalignment and latterly elder statesman to the world, listened to with respect and as an equal by the rulers of Super, Great, and ordinary Powers on all the continents and of every ideological persuasion.

His state funeral in Belgrade on May 8, 1980, was attended by the most impressive panoply of world leaders ever assembled for such an occasion—including 4 kings, 31 presidents, 6 princes from reigning families, 10 vice presidents, 22 prime ministers, 11 presiding officers of national parliaments, 12 deputy heads of government, and 47 foreign ministers. Their presence and the attention lavished on his dying and funeral by the

world press were a testimonial to Tito's multiple significance, to his stature and importance in history and as a national and world leader, and to his passing as a symbol of end-of-era.

They also bore witness to concern about the future. The end of one era logically implies the beginning of another. The moment of transition for which Tito's death is a worldwide symbol and a Yugoslav reality is accompanied by grim omens—the gathering storm of Cold War II, serious economic troubles almost everywhere, and multiple domestic and international crises and confrontations dangerously concentrated along the arc of the Near and Middle East, a region of enduring and once again crucial geopolitical importance and fragility in which the lands of today's Yugoslavia and those of Iran and Afghanistan are traditionally regarded as the western and eastern anchors. These considerations, coupled with widespread uncertainty and speculation concerning the role and even the viability of post-Tito Yugoslavia, were also reflected in the "world summit" at the funeral and among the horde of foreign journalists encamped in Belgrade and Ljubljana, virtually without a break, since Tito's final illness began four months earlier.

The myriad bilateral "mini-summits" that the attending presidents and prime ministers engaged in before and after the funeral, sometimes formally at embassies or hotel suites and sometimes catch-as-catch-can in hotel lobbies and even elevators, were a further testimony to concern as well as products of opportunity. Taken all together the agendas of these meetings comprised a catalogue of most of the world's current international crises and problems, from Afghanistan, Iran, the demise of détente and East-West relations in general to partly subsidiary regional issues like inter-German and Indo-Chinese relations, the Cyprus and Palestinian problems, and those of the European Community.

As for the place and role of the host country in this troubled new era, the public record contained only generalized promises of support for and noninterference in post-Tito Yugoslavia found (respectively) in Western and in Soviet official and quasi-official statements issued for the occasion. Discussion of the circumstances that might require such support or tempt someone to a violation of noninterference was left to the Western, the Third World, and (by inference only) the Yugoslav press—and presumably to

confidential briefing papers in the pockets of some of the visiting heads of state and government.

"Future histories" for a Yugoslavia without Tito are almost as numerous as the scholars, journalists, and embassies or intelligence services who have composed them, and as a consequence of Tito's unanticipated longevity, many are nearly as old. At one extreme, discounted by all responsible observers, is a forcible and virtually immediate reincorporation of communist but independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia into the Soviet bloc, with all that implies. A Belgrade black-humor reference to this scenario made the rounds after Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav regime's number two political personality and chief ideologist, died in February 1979. The Soviet leaders, who had always disliked him, ostentatiously failed to send anyone to his funeral. According to the joke, unfortunately repeated as fact rather than fiction by one Western columnist when Tito lay dying a year later, the Yugoslavs complained to the Russians about this slight and were told: "Kardelj really wasn't very important, you know, but please don't worry: when Tito dies, we'll *all* be there!"

The Red Army did not come to the funeral, although Brezhnev did. This scenario, however, does have more sophisticated and longer-range versions which must be taken more seriously. One of the most popular begins with the proposition that Tito was the only and indispensable linchpin that held Yugoslavia's traditionally quarrelsome nationalities together and gave his country's independence and "self-management" system a legitimacy peculiarly linked to his person. With his departure quarrels among the nationalities will become increasingly unmanageable, a political system based on an unstable mix of Party control and a "pluralism of self-management interests," and on "collective leadership" by national-regional representatives of inferior quality and no pan-Yugoslav legitimacy, will break down. Civil war will threaten or ensue. At that point, or even earlier, someone will appeal to the Soviet Union for "fraternal aid" to "save Yugoslav socialism" (and unity). The Russians will feel obliged to respond, their intervention will encounter widespread and effective armed resistance, the resisters will in turn appeal for outside help...and we are all on our merry way to World War III.

At the other extreme there are those who confidently predict a tranquil transition and a stable

post-Tito Yugoslavia in which there will also be rapid progress toward more participation by more people and "plural interests" in more and higher levels of public decision-making—i.e., more democracy and "social self-management" as posited in Yugoslav theories of socialist democracy. This will be accompanied by more "withering away of the [Communist] Party" as an ultimately centralized and authoritarian political agency, by an international nonalignment that becomes increasingly Eurocentric, and by increasing economic interdependence with Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Third World. In other words, a Yugoslavia still intact, independent, nonaligned, communist-with-a-difference that tilts further toward pluralism and "democracy," and in all these qualities a Yugoslavia still useful to the wider world as both an East-West buffer and a multipurpose triborough bridge connecting the First, Second, and Third Worlds.

These and a variety of intermediate "scenarios" constitute what David Binder, an old Belgrade hand himself, calls "a rusty minefield" in which "one should tread warily."<sup>2</sup> Picking one is nearly as risky, despite the availability of far more solid information, as predicting the direction and timing of post-Mao developments in China turned out to be. As the post-Tito era begins, the most the wise should therefore dare is a description and preliminary evaluation of the moment of transition, the institutions of succession, and the elements of the political, economic, and social environment in which explanations of what did happen will be found after it happens.

### The Passing of Tito

On January 21, 1980, Tito underwent the amputation of his left leg, an effort to save his life after medical and then surgical interventions had failed to alleviate circulatory problems that were leading to gangrene. The increasingly gloomy medical bulletins issued during the days preceding the amputation loosed a wave of dismay and anxiety that observers agree was often tinged with surprise, at first glance curious, considering the patient's age. It was as though people had begun to take seriously all those jokes they had been telling for years, to the effect that "Tito may indeed be mortal, but there is yet no evidence to support such a hypothesis." He had, after all, been seen on television, celebrating New Year's Eve at his castle near Ljubljana in his usual fashion and apparently in good form, only four days before he first entered the Ljubljana hos-

pital for medical treatment. It was only later that some viewers remembered noticing that he seemed to be walking with more difficulty than he had at the nonaligned summit meeting in Havana the preceding September or during subsequent autumn trips to Kosovo and the Middle East.

The shock of realization that Tito not only could die but was doing so came at a moment when the Yugoslavs, like the rest of the world, were still absorbing and weighing the implications of another surprise, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also a Communist-ruled but non-aligned country whose buffer-state function in a strategically sensitive area had seemed to endow it with a degree of at least military untouchability.

Initial reactions to this combination of shocks in those dark January days included some panic buying (ingenuously explained away by a semi-official source as "belatedly following standing orders that everyone involved in 'all-people's defense' [which means most Yugoslavs] should always have a two-week supply of essential food-stuffs at home") and some withdrawals from foreign currency savings accounts. (Official figures later revealed an overall drawdown of 5 percent from these accounts during January, which is significant but hardly "the massive run on the banks" reported by some foreign media.) The armed forces were put on a low state of alert, meaning cancellation of leaves, and weekend warriors in some reserve and territorial defense units were called out early for training periods that were routinely scheduled for spring or early summer.

More important, the institutions of "collective leadership" in state and Party that Tito had created during the 1970s for his succession swung into action in what was later and only half-facetiously called "a dress rehearsal for the real event."

For a time at the end of January and beginning of February it seemed as though the "real event" might be postponed again after all and indefinitely, with a one-legged Tito still in charge for months or even years. He made an excellent early recovery from his series of operations and was photographed sitting up in a chair joking with his sons Zarko and Aleksandar-Mišo and talking animatedly with Lazar Koliševski and Stevan Doronjski, his deputies in the State and Party Presidencies. He was reported to be reassuming

some of his duties, received a series of other visitors, and on January 29 was moved out of the intensive care unit.

People began recalling that one of his brothers had survived, by several years, the amputation of first one and then the other leg under similar circumstances. At Brdo kod Kranja, the castle near Ljubljana where he had spent New Year's Eve and a brief period between hospitalizations in January, there were signs that he was expected home again in the near future, an event that was reportedly to have been marked by the sending of letters to five other heads of state, including Presidents Carter and Brezhnev, that he had drafted or personally revised in the hospital and that appealed urgently for peace and détente despite Afghanistan and other blows.

The letters were finally sent on February 21, with Tito's approval but over Kolisevski's signature, a sign that Tito was now too ill to sign his name. They constituted Tito's last testament to the wider world.

On February 10 and 13 medical bulletins, which had ceased after he left intensive care at the end of January, revealed that postoperative complications of a kind common to elderly patients after such serious surgery had set in after all. On February 14 his condition was described as "critical" for the first time. A breakdown of kidney function, a weakening of the heart, pneumonia, internal bleeding, and liver failure were successively reported in the now daily medical bulletins. The end was near, although not as near as was repeatedly expected.

The hordes of journalists who had besieged the country in January, and who had left when Tito seemed to be recovering, returned to jam the International Press Center in Belgrade and an *ad hoc* one in Ljubljana. In the absence of enough hard or dramatic news to enable them to compete with Afghanistan, Iran, and an endless American presidential campaign for a place on the air or in print, many resorted to the ever lively Belgrade rumor mill...and repeatedly had Tito dead or in a coma (and the Red Army massing on the Hungarian and Bulgarian borders!) while his sturdy Croatian peasant's heart was still fighting its last fight with medically remarkable, but characteristic stamina and will. By April some were even writing that he had in fact died in February, and that this was still being concealed so that his successors could prove themselves and gain legitimacy before announcing what would otherwise cause panic and invite Soviet intervention.

For Tito's sake it would almost certainly have been better if he had died sooner instead of lingering, reportedly with periods of consciousness and lucidity, at least until sometime in April, that must have made him aware of the hopelessness, helplessness, and indignity of his situation. Moreover, and important because of theories and speculations to the contrary, there was no political reason why his successors should have welcomed or prolonged such a passing, much less concealed the event when it came.

By mid-February, at latest, the slowness of his dying had given his people enough time to get used to an inevitability they had subconsciously come to believe would never really happen and to observe and take comfort from the smooth functioning of the "dress rehearsal" for the transition. In the process they had convinced themselves that their lives and Yugoslavia might be less different without him than they had feared.

For about six weeks, therefore, his fight for life was indeed his last service to his country, as many described it. From then on his lingering in such a state was an unnecessary and increasing agony, touched with pride at the fight he was making, for his people and for his successors, who even had reason for some impatience to get on with the business of transition that was now so well prepared and rehearsed. Most or all—including or excepting Tito?—had come to agree with the old peasant in the Lika district of Tito's native Croatia, where many of the battles that forged the new Yugoslavia were fought, who summarized his feelings for a February visitor by saying simply: "A man must die."

### The Funeral

They buried Tito with a pomp and an assembly of the world's leaders that he would have appreciated, for he was a notoriously vain man and one who took special pride in playing a role on the world stage so disproportionate to the size of his country. It all went off with only one minor hitch, an efficiency that might have surprised him, since he was very aware that his Yugoslavs are usually brilliant at improvisation but bad at organization. In this case, however, they had had plenty of time to prepare and had reportedly taken the wise precaution of engaging a leading film director to help supervise the arrangements.

Tito died on a Sunday afternoon. On Monday his body was taken to Belgrade in the Blue Train, the presidential train in which he had so often made his "royal progresses" around his dominions. In the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana

when the coffin was put on board in pouring rain, at the Croatian capital of Zagreb where the train made its only stop, once again in rain, and at the Serbian and Yugoslav capital of Belgrade where he arrived, the crowds were in the hundreds of thousands, and in hundreds or thousands beside the tracks in smaller places along the way. Always they were quite clearly deeply and genuinely moved, with many in tears. Everywhere there was singing of a wartime Partisan ode to their leader that begins: "Comrade Tito, we swear to you that we shall never stray from your road...." And in Catholic Ljubljana and Zagreb church bells joined factory sirens in a penultimate salute that was repeated by churches throughout the country at the hour of his burial three days later.

In Belgrade the body lay in state in the rotunda of the Škupština (the Federal Parliament), a prewar building in the traditional domed neo-classical style of the world's parliaments, until the funeral ceremonies began at noon on Thursday. The closed coffin of pale wood, covered with the Yugoslav flag and surrounded by a display of his medals and decorations, stood on a bier in the middle of the room. It was flanked day and night by first six and later eight persons, standing silently at attention on the steps of the bier and changed every three minutes in a solemn little ritual that began and ended with the regime's senior officials. In the intervening hours and days their places were taken by delegations from federal, regional, municipal, and finally local government and Party organs and other institutions—all together a guard of honor representing all Yugoslavs and all their estates in hierarchical order. Outside the double path of carpeting along which a continuous line of mourners passed down both sides of the bier, a second double row of honor guards was posted by the Presidential Guard, whose dress uniforms with royal blue jackets and red trouser piping gave them the appearance of a royal guard. Solemn music played softly from loudspeakers around the rotunda and on the Boulevard of the Revolution in front of the Škupština, where the lines of waiting mourners converged from two and further back four directions.

They came by the hundreds of thousands and from all over the country, waiting up to six hours by day and night for their turn to walk slowly but without stopping through the rotunda. Some were in jeans or working clothes, but a surprising number including young people were in black or dark suits and black dresses and stockings. For

most the coming was organized, with time and rendezvous set at factory, office, shop, or school, and was therefore not strictly voluntary, but watchful foreign journalists never detected reluctance or annoyance at being there, and many who had spent the waiting hours chatting quietly but almost festively were seen to cry as they passed the bier. (Many others, although also clearly moved and even crying, curiously kept their eyes straight ahead as they passed, not even glancing at the coffin.) In general they also waited patiently, these Yugoslavs who are normally impatient when they have to stand in line; the only reported exception was at 3 A.M. the final morning, near the end of the line on Terazije, when realization that those this far away might not make it into the Škupština before the lying-in-state ended led to some scuffling and a brief intervention by the police.

Others came too, alternating with Tito's Yugoslavs on Tuesday and Wednesday and with the last two hours on Thursday reserved for them. These were the foreign delegations: 208 of them from 126 countries by official count. There were 121 state delegations led by 38 heads of state, 5 princes and 7 vice presidents standing in for heads of state, 6 heads of parliaments, 10 prime ministers, 11 foreign ministers, and 41 other ministers or state functionaries. The remaining 87 delegations represented political parties (chiefly Communist, Socialist, and Social-Democratic), liberation movements, and other entities like the United Nations, whose delegation was led by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

It was the countries of Western Europe, not those of the Communist and Third Worlds, that most consistently sent their top dignitaries *en masse*. Six of them—Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, plus Romania from Eastern Europe—supplied not only their heads of state (or, in the case of the Netherlands and Britain, Princes Consort Claus and Philip to represent reigning queens who only attend state weddings, not state funerals), but also both their prime ministers and their foreign ministers; Norway and Portugal sent heads of state and prime ministers. The delegations of Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland, and Sweden were led by heads of state (or for Denmark again a Prince Consort) plus foreign ministers, as were those of the Soviet Union (Brezhnev and Gromyko), most Eastern European states, and ten from the Third World. The Yugoslavs appeared to be particularly pleased that the British, in addition to Prince Philip,

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, and leaders of the opposition Labour and Liberal Parties, also brought the successive heads of wartime British missions to Tito's headquarters, Sir William Deakin and Sir Fitzroy Maclean, postwar personal friends of the Marshal whose missions in 1943 had played a major role in bringing about Churchill's and thereby the Western Allies' recognition of Tito as a major Resistance leader who should be supported.

Of those who did not come, three were particularly conspicuous by their absence: Presidents Carter of the United States, Giscard d'Estaing of France, and Castro of Cuba. The absence of Giscard, ostensibly because of a summit meeting of Francophone African states in Nice, left France with the lowest-ranking delegation from any Western European state except Switzerland. Castro as present titular leader of the nonaligned movement missed an opportunity of some symbolic importance to claim the mantle of true and apostolic leadership from the bier of its last surviving founder (who was also the most authoritative challenger of the pro-Soviet tilt Castro favors for the movement). The absences of Giscard and Castro received less comment than they deserved. That of Carter received far more than pleased the Yugoslavs, not to mention official Americans.

A European journalist described Carter as "*in absentia* the most talked about person at the funeral, apart from the deceased." *The Times* of London, in an editorial only slightly sharper than media comment elsewhere and particularly throughout Western Europe, described his failure to make the trip as

*unwise for reasons which are so clear that the failure of the White House to see them must deepen the conviction that the United States is being led by a man who is not just muddled, but is in some ways blind to whole areas of reality. In this case he shows himself blind to the stature of President Tito, to the importance of Yugoslavia, to the mood of the Yugoslav people, to the interests of the United States, and once again, to the sound views of his own Department of State.*

Purportedly informed leaks about State Department unhappiness and desperate efforts by the U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade, Lawrence Eagleburger, to get Carter to change his mind were inevitable. So was speculation that Brezhnev, whose unexpected attendance was announced at the last minute, had deliberately outmaneuvered Carter by delaying his own

announcement until the composition of the U.S. delegation had been made public—although it is equally possible the news that Chinese Premier and Party leader Hua Quo-feng would attend had more to do with Brezhnev's change of mind and its timing than confirmation that Carter would not. Finally, it was also inevitable that the later announcement of a state visit to Belgrade by the American President, to take place on June 24-25, should be construed as an embarrassingly tardy recognition of error and an effort to make amends—although American diplomatic sources insist that Carter personally informed Yugoslavia's Washington Ambassador of his June plans when expressing his condolences and explaining why he could not go to the funeral, i.e., before Brezhnev's coming was announced and the Americans were accused of making a major error.

Meanwhile, the American delegation that did attend was led by Vice President Mondale. With him were presidential mother Lillian Carter (whose appearance before Tito's bier and at the funeral in a white or beige outfit, rather than black or dark mourning, upset more of my own Yugoslav friends than her son's absence did), Ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman (an old friend and frequent visitor to Tito and a thoughtful inclusion), and a curiously motley and awkwardly large collection of minor Minnesota and Yugoslav-American politicians and businessmen whose Yugoslav connections were not always apparent. All in all impolitic and embarrassing but really little more than a tempest in a journalistic teapot, of more concern to news-hungry correspondents bored by "commemorative journalism" than to most Yugoslavs who noticed and commented. As for Yugoslavia, the official view was expressed by a functionary who remarked that his country knew better than to measure another country's friendship by the makeup of the delegation it sends to a funeral.

One Yugoslav who was there also attracted particular attention. When the Blue Train carrying Tito's body arrived at Belgrade's grubby main railroad station on Monday afternoon, there was a surprise for correspondents and photographers: aboard was Tito's wife, Jovanka, for 25 years his constant and affectionately attentive companion on most public occasions, whose estrangement from her husband in summer 1977 and virtual disappearance since then had given rise to much political and personal speculation around the world. Now for a few days she was to appear once again, always flanked by Tito's sons

(by earlier wives) and other members of his family in a place of honor—a lonely figure, still handsome and a little less stout, dressed in black and bowed with grief, crying frequently.

Whether Tito himself or others had decided that Jovanka should be there was never said, nor were rumors that she had visited Tito on his deathbed ever confirmed. The personal significance of her reappearance at this time and place was clear and touching, and was gratifying to ordinary Yugoslavs who commented on it. Its political significance, if any, was almost certainly purely symbolic, one of several gestures designed to signal unity in grief and forgiveness; there is no convincing evidence that she ever aspired to any political role, possibly excepting occasional efforts to influence Tito on behalf of the careers of wartime comrades or clansmen from her home district.

If there was potential political significance in public reappearances and places of honor during the funeral, it applies to others—like Koča Popović (wartime hero, later Foreign Minister and Vice President, and personally close to Tito) or Mijalko Todorović (long-time minister, President of Parliament, and one of the architects of Yugoslavia's liberalizing reforms of the late 1960s)—who either withdrew from public life or were gently forced aside because of association with policies or people that encountered Tito's disfavor after 1971. It should also be noted that former high officials who had erred more grievously than these and been put aside more dramatically—like Milovan Djilas in 1954, Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 and the Croatian, Serbian, and other leaders who were actually purged rather than sidelined in 1971-72—did not similarly reappear in the guard of honor at the lying-in-state or among the "members of earlier Politbureaus and Executive Committees of the Communist Party and later League of Communists of Yugoslavia" who marched in a place of honor in the funeral procession.

At noon on Thursday the last guard of honor, consisting of the eight surviving members of the country's collective State Presidency escorted by eight generals of the Yugoslav People's Army, carried the coffin from the rotunda and placed it on a gun carriage, drawn by a military jeep, on the ramp in front of the Škupština. A 48-gun salute of 21 salvos echoed and re-echoed over the city, while 12-gun salutes were fired in 10 salvos in each capital city of the other republics and provinces. There was a brief address by Stevan

Doronjski as presiding officer of the Presidency of the League of Communists. The funeral procession formed and began the four-mile walk to Tito's villa on Dedinje hill, where he was to be buried after a second, graveside funeral oration by Lazar Kolisevski as president of the State Presidency and a second round of 48-gun and 12-gun salutes around the country, this time to the accompaniment of all Yugoslavia's factory sirens and church bells.

The procession was led by massed flags (of Yugoslavia, of the 6 constituent republics, and of 365 wartime units of the National Liberation Army), about 100 surviving National Heroes (the highest Yugoslav military decoration), and units from the 3 armed forces, and the Presidential Guard with a military band. Then came the gun carriage, preceded by officers carrying Tito's many Yugoslav and foreign decorations displayed on cushions. Behind the coffin came the official mourners, led by Tito's aide-de-camp, his family, and members of the State and Party Presidencies, followed by thousands of functionaries and delegations selected from all levels and walks of life. Only the foreign delegations, who had observed the Škupština ceremonies from special stands, were spared the long walk. They were transported to the burial site in buses, herded on and off rather like schoolchildren on an excursion, which must have been a disturbing if democratic experience for the massed ranks of presidents, kings, princes, and prime ministers heading the delegations. The route was covered by nearly three dozen television cameras, mustered from all over the country to broadcast the proceedings throughout Yugoslavia... and to the world, where some national networks like Britain's BBC and Austria's ORF carried the entire four hours live.

The boulevard and square in front of the Škupština were jammed with people, as were the sidewalks along the route to Dedinje, with each ward of the city assigned its own area. Otherwise, and perhaps the funeral's most remarkable feature, the streets of Belgrade—and of every other city in the country, as aerial photographs in Friday's newspapers demonstrated—were totally and eerily empty. No vehicles moved, no one was abroad. At noon on May 8 Yugoslavia stopped and did not really and fully start again until the following morning. For the four hours until the grave on Dedinje hill was sealed the only sounds to be heard away from the route of the procession were the startled twittering of birds, reacting to



the unusual silence and empty streets as to a solar eclipse, and the muffled sounds of the funeral proceedings coming from television sets behind curtained windows.

Tito was buried in the garden of the upper middle class suburban villa that had been his Belgrade residence ever since the war, among roses he had personally planted and tended. This was his own wish, officials said. The grave is in the atrium of a summerhouse where he liked to work or take coffee with personal lunchtime guests, and is covered with a large plain white marble slab bearing the simple inscription in gold: Josip Broz Tito 1892-1980. The contrast to the elaborate mausoleums of people like Lenin, Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria, or Mao is striking and no doubt deliberate. Adjoining the back of the grounds of the Dedinje villa is a museum, called the 25th of May (Tito's official birthday, also celebrated as Youth Day), which houses his personal memorabilia. From here there is a new access to the burial site and villa grounds, which converts the entire complex into a memorial to the fallen leader.

On the Sunday after the funeral special masses were said in Catholic churches around the country. They were not actually requiem masses, which would have been awkward both for the church and for the formally atheist state, but their intent was clear to all. Zagreb television unprecedentedly carried the services from Zagreb and Šibenik cathedrals and the church of St. Theresa in Zagreb, where a portion of the homily was also broadcast. The presence in the funeral procession of the heads of the main religious communities—Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim—was a further symbolic gesture by both sides.<sup>3</sup>

### The Succession...

*The outside world, and many Yugoslavs as well, will be surprised by how smoothly and well our "collective leadership" is going to function. The institutions are appropriate, and everyone is going to be on his best behaviour...at least for the first two years.*

This prophecy, by a leading Yugoslav social scientist and Party official during a Belgrade conversation at the end of February 1980, was to be heard often again in May. It was supported, moreover, by arguments designed to prove that it was more than wishful thinking, from unofficial and non-Party as well as official and other Communist Yugoslavs.

The two years of "best behaviour" was not just a rough estimate: a Party Congress should take place in 1982 and must endorse new leaderships and potentially controversial political and especially economic reforms. The institutions referred to include multimember State and Party "Presidencies" constituted on the basis of regional parity and therefore, with some exceptions deriving from the multinational character of several regions, on parity among the principal Yugoslav nations. Both presidencies were created in the early 1970s, in response to Tito's own suggestion (in September 1970) that such bodies, so constituted, would be his most or only appropriate successors in a multinational federation—an unspoken recognition of the fact that no other public figure in the country was generally recognized as being "Yugoslav" rather than a Serb, Croat, Slovene, or whatever. In the state hierarchy the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S.F.R.Y.) consists since 1974 of nine persons: one elected by the Assembly (parliament) of each of the six republics and two autonomous provinces plus the President of the Party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). In the Party the Presidency of the 165-member Central Committee, itself also based on modified inter-regional parity, currently consists of 3 representatives from each republic, 2 from each province, and one from the Party organization in the Yugoslav People's Army, for a total of 23 members elected by their respective Republican, Provincial or Army LC Congresses and confirmed by the Federal Congress.

To these political summits as "appropriate institutions" should be added others, at federal, regional, and local levels, similarly balanced among the nationalities but also among occupational and functional interests—a bewildering and pluralistic complex of "sociopolitical" (state, Party, and mass political) organizations, autonomous economic organizations, and "self-management communities of interest." Together with the two presidencies these are Tito's successors, existing while he was there but now deprived of their mediating and authoritarian father-figure, who could be counted on to impose peace on his own terms whenever their disputes threatened to get out of hand.

By mid-June, some 40 days into "the real event" of a Yugoslavia without Tito, other Yugoslavs were repeating the prophecy in the present rather than the future tense. The evidence cited



now included several tough and potentially controversial decisions taken quickly and apparently easily by the new leadership. Among these was a 30 percent devaluation of the dinar, long overdue but reportedly opposed by Tito, who never understood economics but considered devaluation a loss of prestige. It also included, at first glance paradoxically, a frank airing in the mass media of differences within the leadership over draft constitutional amendments to implement Tito's proposal that "collective leadership" should also mean rotating chairmanships and other officers, limited to one or two years throughout the system. Was this really necessary and wise in executive as well as policy-making positions? Openly discussing such disagreements on such an issue at this early stage, one official suggested privately, was a sign of self-confidence and commitment to collective decisions debated and made under public scrutiny. Meanwhile, the press and Yugoslav observers were also reporting that decision-making within and among economic enterprises and sectors was also frequently being done with greater alacrity and ease than usual.

The after-Tito era, based as he had planned on institutions rather than individuals, was alive and well, at least for the moment. And many were ready to agree with the prophet quoted above; despite their cumbersomeness and complexity, the institutions and instruments of "collective leadership" and decision-making by "a pluralism of socialist self-management interests" are in fact capable—perhaps, in a multinational society with such diverse interests and cultures, uniquely capable—of functioning and accommodating further orderly and self-sustaining change without institutional breakdown or major crises. But most also agreed that this capability-in-principle will be severely tested, in the medium if not the short term, and will be subject to two conditions. The first is that the Yugoslavs "are ready for routinized bureaucratic rather than individualized charismatic leadership," as a Yugoslav fond of Weberian terminology aptly characterized Tito's intention and the practice of faceless "collective leadership" in multiple loci of decision-making. The second is that an already serious economic situation does not become much worse, and that measures to cope with it do not bring a distribution of sacrifices so uneven (in reality or in perceptions) that Yugoslavia's multiple regional nationalisms are again and fatally roused from the watchful half slumber that was imposed on them in the 1970s.

### ... at the Party and State Summits

In the last years of his long reign Tito's unique and extraordinary (but not unlimited) power within and over the Yugoslav political system was based, apart from his personality and status as "living legend," on a combination of top Party, state, and military offices, all in later years held "without limitation of mandate," a euphemism meaning that they were his until death should part him from them. He was head of state as President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (sometimes more simply "President of the Republic") and in that capacity permanent President of the 9-member collective State Presidency and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, presiding over the Council for National Defense. He was also President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and in that capacity empowered to convene and preside over the 165-member Central Committee and its 23-member Presidency... as well as the *ex officio* 9th member of the State Presidency.

Although in terms of formal mandate and political realities Tito was unremovable from any of these offices as long as he lived and chose to serve, his chief posts, at first glance paradoxically, were uniquely removable institutions:

- The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution explicitly provided for the disappearance of the office of President of the Republic whenever Tito should cease to be it. The constitutional Chapter that describes this office and its powers (Articles 333-345) specifies that the position is being created for Tito and Tito alone ("In view of the historic role of Josip Broz Tito..."). Article 328 in the preceding Chapter, concerned with the 9-member state Presidency, stipulated that "With the termination of the office of President of the Republic, the S.F.R.Y. Presidency shall exercise all rights and duties vested in it under the present Constitution, and the Vice-President of the S.F.R.Y. Presidency shall become President of the S.F.R.Y. Presidency [n.b., *not* "President of the Republic"] until the expiry of the term for which he was elected Vice-President." This last is on a one-year basis rotating by republic and autonomous province among the members of the Presidency. In this capacity but only "on behalf of the Presidency," its President also assumes Tito's functions as commander-in-chief and chairman of the Council for National Defense.

When Tito died Lazar Koliševski of Macedonia was therefore duly declared President of the Presidency and so Yugoslavia's first post-

Tito head of state—but only for the ten days that remained of his one-year term as Vice-President. On May 15 he was succeeded, according to the annual rotational order of republics and provinces set forth in the Presidency's Rules of Procedures, by Cvijetin Mijatović of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In May 1981 Mijatović should be succeeded in turn by Sergej Kraigher of Slovenia.<sup>4</sup>

- In the Party matters were not quite so clear. Because the Party Statutes specify that the President of the LCY (Tito's title) must be elected by the Party Congress, however, this office was also "vacated" (the term used by the Belgrade weekly newsmagazine *NIN* when Tito died, at least until the next Party Congress, either after the next quadrennial one in 1982 or an extraordinary one summoned for this purpose. Recognizing this state of affairs but unwilling to convene an extraordinary Congress, the Central Committee at its first meeting after Tito's death, on June 12, adopted a "provisional" solution. In a 7-point resolution the CC merely changed Doronjski's title from "Presiding Officer" (*Preds[j]edavajući*) of the CC's Presidency—another annual office, created on Tito's initiative in October 1978, to be rotated through the list of republics and provinces—to "President of the CC Presidency" (not "President of the LCY"), with October 1980 still to be the end of Doronjski's one year term and time for "rotation." The resolution also "provisionally" redistributed the powers of the vacated office of President of the LCY to itself, to a "special commission" that is bound to "consult" the republican, provincial, and Army Central Committees about nominations to the CC Presidency, and to a five-member "working presidency" for CC meetings. "This means," the Committee was told, "that the CC Presidency will retain its present role: it is not a collective president of the Central Committee, nor is it going to manage its work." Finally, the resolution provided that the 9th seat of the *state* Presidency that the Constitution reserves for "the President of the LCY *ex officio*" should provisionally be filled by the President of the CC Presidency—and therefore, until October, by Doronjski, who already has a seat there as the representative of the Vojvodina Autonomous Province.

Whether the next Party Congress will decide to discontinue or re-establish the office of President of the LCY, and on what basis, is for the moment still an open question.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the Central Committee's "provisional solution" has dis-

persed Tito's powers as Party President even more widely than the Constitution disperses his powers as President of the Republic.

This complex play with titles, offices, and organizational charts is of more than esoteric interest. Its importance as a symbol of intent and of institutional arrangements elsewhere throughout the system is also broader than the undeniably important question of whether it would be possible for a single person again to accumulate anything like Tito's power at the top of the political pyramid without far-reaching constitutional changes or some form of coup. The deliberate oddity and "dispensability" manifest in the way Tito's offices are tacked on to the political system described in the 1974 Constitution and current Party Statutes bear documentary witness to the frequently overlooked fact that Tito and his offices—however indispensable because Tito—were in his later years increasingly an anachronism in that system.<sup>6</sup>

In Tito's last years Yugoslavia was a country in which long years of lipservice to "socialist democracy" based on "self-management" and what Kardelj in his last formulations called "a pluralism of self-management socialist interests" had gradually grown a corresponding infrastructure of autonomous and semiautonomous institutions, expectations, constitutional and statutory checks and balances, and decision-making procedures. These together have genuinely "pluralized" decision-making about public policies and (of equal importance!) public appointments in all sectors and at all levels except the very top, which was Tito. For more than a decade now, despite a partial turning back of the clock (on Tito's initiative) between 1972 and 1976, Yugoslavia has been in effect a confederation. The powers of the Federal state and Party centers, with the former constitutionally limited in scope, depend on inter-regional consensus about their use, and those who occupy central state and Party offices depend on the approval of the regional or local authorities who send and can remove them. Except when Tito intervened in the decision-making process (either to resolve an impasse or because he did not like the results) or in the making of appointments (because he liked some people, disliked others, or granted or denied his special protection to someone who lacked an adequate regional political base), and except for foreign affairs, to the end largely a jealously guarded private sphere, for more than a decade macro-economic and regional or local political

and social policies have been the product of frequently tortuous and sometimes stormy public or private negotiations within and among economic enterprises and sectors, institutionalized interest groups, state organs, and a variety of "socio-political organizations" (always including but not always dominated by the chief of these at every level, the relevant Party organization). Of course Tito could intervene but he did so less often on these matters and at these levels.

It is in this context that Tito and his offices can be called an anachronism in a system otherwise consistently based on diffused power and decision-making. It is in this sense that Tito's offices without Tito are functionally as well as formally "removable" without requiring serious changes in the form or functioning of the system. And it is also in this sense that his removal *could* prove to be a minor plus for continuity and stability of the system generally and of its "pluralistic" and participatory features in particular. But only if the two preconditions cited above—public readiness for faceless leadership and some success in coping with already serious and potentially worse economic problems—are also fulfilled.

#### Faceless Leadership: the Millard Fillmore Era?

In his own "After Tito" ruminations,<sup>7</sup> former Belgrade correspondent David Binder devoted considerable space to a comparison between American and Yugoslav postrevolutionary experience with generational continuity in leadership. Both revolutions, as the present writer has noted on other occasions, produced and were guided by an inner core of leaders with remarkably impressive talents, especially considering the small population bases from which they were recruited—more talented leadership, some would argue, than either of these countries seems able to recruit from larger population bases today. Be that as it may, what interests Binder is a suggestive difference between the postrevolutionary fates of the two groups and its implications for post-Tito Yugoslavia:

George Washington was 57 when he became president of the United States. He retired after eight years in office, when younger leaders who had made the revolution with him and shared the aura of legitimacy that comes from being co-founders of the state had many active years ahead of them. And so Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe provided a 28-year transition to a new generation of leaders who lacked the authority that derived from these

advantages as well as commensurate talent. Tito was 52 in 1944, and he ruled Yugoslavia until retired by death at nearly 88, a total of more than 35 years—an equivalent to a Washington presidency lasting until 1825—during which he outlived or politically outlasted all but one fringe figure (Bakarić) of the inner leadership who had called him *Stari* ("The Old Man") during the war. Although most of the other members of the collective presidencies that are Tito's successors participated in the revolution, all played purely local and (except for Koliševski in Macedonia) relatively minor roles. Most are almost unknown and/or unrespected outside and sometimes even inside their home fiefs. Nor can they lay claim to the aura of revolutionary and I-was-with-Tito legitimacy that could have been asserted by many waylaid by death or disgrace in the intervening 36 years, such as Kardelj, Djilas, Ranković, Koča Popović, and several more. In an extension of his analogy for which Binder cites this observer as his source, it is as though the United States had passed from the presidency of George Washington to that of Millard Fillmore without benefit of a transitional leadership with 1776 qualities and legitimacy.

Considerations of this kind lend importance to speculations and rumors that at least some currently disgraced or sidelined wartime and postwar leaders of the middle generation might be rehabilitated or recalled. (Postwar counts, too: Andrew Jackson came between the presidencies of the heroes of the Revolution and that of Fillmore, but was not lacking in political qualities like his successors.) For the merely sidelined people like Koča Popović, Mijalko Todorović, and Kiro Gligorov (the reasons for their sidelining differ importantly, but they are still formally Party members in good standing), this would be relatively easy if they were wanted and willing. For others like Djilas, Ranković, and those who led Croatia into crisis in 1971 it is virtually unthinkable. A third group, including frequently able Serb, Slovene, and Macedonian politicians and administrators tarred with the brush of "technocratic anarcho-liberalism" or one of its variants in the early 1970s, is in an intermediate position in terms of the degrees of difficulty and possibility that a return to active politics would entail. Some academic and other intellectuals who also fell into disgrace in the early 1970s are in this last category as well.

Meanwhile, as with everything in Yugoslavia, the weaknesses and strengths—and the "conser-

vatism" or "liberalism"—of present political leaderships are unevenly distributed among the republics and provinces. For whatever general popular "images" are worth, Macedonia's team is usually given high marks for competence and pragmatic flexibility (in the positive sense of that term!). Bosnia-Herzegovina's is generally rated the most "conservative," which a Serb politician of a different persuasion defined as "readiest to use 'administrative measures,'" which in turn translates as arbitrary official and coercive measures, with connotations of Stalinism. Croatia disposes of considerable talent, but the precise quality and political-ideological predisposition of leading figures are matters of dispute. And so it goes, with the general view of Serbia's leadership typified by the blank or sad silence that tends to greet the question: "And who speaks for Serbia?"

It can of course be argued that if institutions and routinized procedures of conflict-resolution and decision-making are really going to count more than individuals, whether "charismatic" or "faceless," in making or breaking continuity and stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia, these personnel weaknesses as well as speculations about personnel changes and reserves do not matter very much. There is, after all, sufficient and often impressive talent of a nonheroic and noncharismatic kind scattered among these institutions at all levels for a nonheroic postrevolutionary period of continuity, consolidation, and development.

The answer will probably depend on whether the times and popular expectations permit such a period to ensue. The omens at the moment are mixed. They are generally good in terms of political structures and apparent determination to make them work, if only because the likely alternatives, which are domestic dictatorship or foreign domination in some degree, are less palatable. They are less good to poor in terms of domestic and world economic prognosis, the international political climate, and the effect that negative developments in these fields can be expected to have on popular attitudes in general, the attitude of the various nationalities in particular, and regime reactions to both.

For the moment at least, no one wants to be accused of challenging the present rules of the game. The press and politicians, adopting a term reportedly coined by Kardelj shortly before his death in a warning to his countrymen, are on the lookout for would-be "*Titići*" (little Titos). Another pejorative term is *liderstvo* ("leader-

ism"), and everyone is being careful to do nothing that would bring the anathema of these labels down on his or her head. All members of collective leaderships are formally equal, although everyone admits that some must by personal qualities or reputation be more equal than others, and that this particularly applies to Bakarić, as the last politically active member of Tito's wartime inner circle.

The populace, as far as one can tell, likes it this way, again at least for the moment, and as the least of all likely evils. Will this last? There is surely a cautionary tale in the way other theoretically more "mature" and "democratic" societies and polities, in principle long since adapted and accustomed to "routinized bureaucratic" rather than "charismatic" rule, have reacted to the impossibility of easy solutions to complex and urgent economic, social, and international problems by seeking a Someone whose genius might justify their trust and great power.

The conclusion is a commonplace. Yugoslavia's after-Tito political and economic systems, like other "pluralistic" ones, are characterized by diffused decision-making power lodged in many centers with different and sometimes conflicting interests and many participants. Such systems, including Yugoslavia's, tend to be responsive and even broadly representative except for groups or individuals excluded or self-excluding because of basic ideological or cultural alienation or marginality). By the same token, however, they decide slowly, with compromises that often make the decision inappropriate or ineffective, or cannot decide. These are systems that function admirably in calm seas, but ones whose navigators should take pains to anticipate and avoid major storms, in which such unwieldy if otherwise useful craft are inclined to wallow and may even capsize. Some storms are unavoidable, however, while an additional disadvantage of the many navigators that such systems presuppose is that they may disagree until too late about the location and intensity of storms that could be avoided.

### Of Dark Clouds and Silver Linings

Pessimists who expect post-Tito Yugoslavia to go wrong in terms of Western liberal or official Yugoslav socialist-democratic values and interests would do well to look to the economy, and only then to inordinate personal or institutional ambitions and intrigues, for first indicators that pessimism is justified. It is here, as already suggested, that an aggravation of existing problems

and inadequate or inappropriate responses are most likely to undermine the stability of the post-Tito regime, leading to a retreat from achieved levels of pluralism, participation, and tolerance, and perchance to the destruction of the unity of diverse nationalities and genuine nonaligned independence of the state that were Tito's great but always incomplete or challenged accomplishments.

As the 1970s ended, the performance of the Yugoslav economy as measured by several standard indicators continued to be generally impressive, which means that it had so far weathered the blows that have lately befallen most national economies with less slowdown than most and less current disruption than many. In 1979 Social Product (the nearest Yugoslav equivalent of Gross National Product) grew by just over 7 percent, industrial output by 8 percent, private consumption by 5.5 percent, and employment by 4.5 percent—all particularly admirable in comparison with average and most country rates in either the (Western) OECD or the (Eastern) COMECON economic groups, with both of which Yugoslavia is associated.<sup>8</sup> However, even these accomplishments, because under present circumstances they were also indicators of a dangerously “overheated economy,” were as much grounds for gloom as for self-congratulation. The Yugoslav economy, like many others (if that is any comfort) and with especially close parallels in other southern European countries, is in deep trouble.

The most acute problems are a familiar triad:

- Inflation as measured by the cost-of-living index was officially at an annual rate of 23 percent at the end of 1979, with unofficial estimates closer to 30 percent. The regime's goal for 1980 was a reduction to 20 percent, but as of March 1980 the official figure had instead risen to 25.8 percent, with some effects of 1979 energy price increases still to “work through” and with the June 1980 devaluation of the dinar, effectively increasing import costs by 30 percent, bound to add several points.
- The balance of trade and balance of payments deficits have reached unmanageable levels as imports have increased in volume and cost (especially for oil) while the volume of exports and earnings from invisibles (workers' remittances, tourism, transport, etc.) have stagnated or risen only slightly. In 1979 the trade deficit was up from about \$4.3 billion in 1977 and 1978 to \$6.4 billion (with one-third of the increase blamed on

rising oil prices). The payments deficit on current account more than doubled from \$1.3 billion to \$3.4 billion.

- Unemployment, despite 1979's remarkable 4.5 percent increase in employment, was also up. It was boosted on the one hand by workers returning home from Western Europe (at a net annual rate of return down from about 80,000 during Western Europe's 1973-1976 recession to about 15,000 in 1978-79, leaving about 800,000 still abroad and vulnerable to another recession) and on the other by the arrival on the job market of the products of the last years of relatively high Yugoslav birthrates. Although the number of registered jobseekers increased by less than 4 percent, the lowest rate since 1972, the total at year's end stood at 750,000, about 8 percent of total active population. Such figures, it should be added, are usually considered an underestimation of real unemployment and underemployment; although up to one-third of registered jobseekers are actually employed but seeking to change jobs, there is almost certainly a larger reserve of unregistered unemployed comprised of those who consider the quest hopeless and “worker-peasants” who return to “underemployment” on family smallholdings when they lose a job.

In this triad of problems Yugoslavia is again better or at least no worse off than, for example, most of its Mediterranean neighbors. They often have equal or higher inflation rates, balance of payments deficits and foreign indebtedness, and unemployment. They share Yugoslavia's excessive vulnerability to recessions in Western and northern Europe, which cut into their exports and earnings from tourism and send emigrant workers (*Gastarbeiter*) home, eliminating their remittances and adding to domestic unemployment. (This vulnerability, added to others of domestic origin, is why another major recession in the West that is any worse than the last one would seriously or fatally challenge whatever passes for political stability in a string of northern Mediterranean countries that extends from Portugal to Turkey.) All of them, along with many other countries in which the triad has lately tended to appear together, seem equally baffled by the special intractability of the combination, because austerity as the standard method of coping with the first two is bound to aggravate the third and tends to depress growth rates and living standards, which is harder to accept in poor than in richer countries. (But even here

Yugoslavia has in the past had one advantage—no contested elections to threaten the political survival of governments that impose unpopular “belt-tightening” measures.) And many of them have similar problems of “intermediate development” to bedevil strategies for coping, such as industries excessively dependent on imported raw and other materials and technology, a legacy of injudicious past investments and “political factories,” and in general an industrial base that is in crying need of a costly and long-term restructuring for which there is neither money nor time.

Two things complicate matters for the Yugoslavs and make them in some degree different and at least slightly less likely to solve their problems without Tito there to enforce tough measures with his authority.

One is the special nature of the “self-management” system, which diffuses economic (even more than political) responses and decision-making in such a way that macro-economic policies are hard to devise and harder to implement. Because the economic powers of central or any governmental authorities are limited, it is hard to know who is responsible and therefore answerable for choices, and the alternative Yugoslav devices for macro-economic decision-making, known as “self-management agreements” and “social contracts,” involve many actors with diverse and local interests, are slow if sometimes sure, and further distort an otherwise already imperfect market. Despite enormous frustrations, the Yugoslavs live with this system, and even give it their support, because on balance it still works better, in the sense of satisfying their wants and giving them freedom of personal choice, than the alternatives, especially of an “Eastern” socialist variety. That, however, is a qualified kind of allegiance.

The second and potentially more dangerous complication derives from Yugoslavia’s national heterogeneity, its history of mutual suspicions and conflicts among the nationalities, and differences in their economic interests. This last was hard enough to control when the pie was growing rapidly and conflicts were primarily about equitable shares of larger slices. Now, however, in the present economic circumstances the post-Tito leadership agrees (and agreed and began to act before Tito’s death) that the watchword must be “stabilization”—meaning austerity in investments, in personal incomes and consumption, in imports, etc. In a scramble for pieces of a shrinking pie, hard enough in any society, conflicts and

mutual accusations of unfairness among nationalities with already radically different levels of wealth and development and different priorities can easily become acute.

Less developed regions like Kosovo and Montenegro, for example, have ambitious development plans that are generally more sensible than they used to be, but that must depend on richer regions for their financing. Richer regions (and hence nations) have their own problems with “stabilization,” and their own prejudices as well as priorities. It will be hard to avoid the appearance, if not the reality, of an inequitable distribution of hardships. If “collective leaderships” do not cope and tensions as well as problems mount, the road will lead through “destabilization,” political as well as economic, toward either collapse or an imposed solution.

As long as the Party, with the Army and the Security Service as its extensions, continues to have the latent powers of coercion and susceptibility to recentralization that it clearly still possesses, an imposed solution is the more likely of these outcomes. Most would then agree that it was also the lesser of two evils, both undesired. It would probably come about, not through one of the dramatic coups anticipated in most “scenarios,” but through small and gradual steps, each designed to cope with a particular economic or political problem or sector of social unrest that seemed to be reaching threatening proportions.

There is much in both recent and more remote historical traditions and in the traditional political ethos of the Yugoslav peoples that can generate receptivity to such a process and many in or on the margins of political life who in their hearts would welcome it. It is only a little less true than it was 11 years ago, when a then leading Serbian political figure made the point in a not-for-attribution interview, that “We cannot say that we do not have the preconditions for a Stalinism in this society...we could still go backward. This in turn could happen with or without the ‘fraternal assistance’ from the Soviet Union that is part of so many after-Tito ‘scenarios,’ which would come through subtle economic and political pressures rather than the military intervention these scenarios usually anticipate.”

There is also, however, much and perhaps more that would resist such a trend. Primary among these factors are the large numbers of individuals, social strata, and institutionalized interests with a stake in Yugoslavia more or less

as it is—genuinely independent and nonaligned, united, with open frontiers and an odd system in which an uneasy mix of authoritarian and “pluralistic” elements is on balance more open to participation and representation, and more tolerant of dissent and individualism, than most in the contemporary world, especially to the east and south of their country.

\* \* \* \* \*

On March 1, 1980, President Tito lay dying in a Ljubljana hospital. The “business lunch” restaurant in central Belgrade was as usual, even on a Saturday, full. A woman of uncertain age, by her appearance clearly a middle-class professional, asked permission to share my table, as is customary in Central Europe. Something in my dress, appearance, or mannerisms gave me away:

“You are not Yugoslav?”

“No, I am an American.”

“Ah, a wonderful and beautiful country. I have visited it. New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Florida, Chicago, California, Hawaii... I didn't like New York, it is too big, dirty, full of tension, but California...!”

“You were there on business?”

“Oh no, I was a tourist. It's not so very expensive, you know, with group fares, only about \$1,000 for the trip.”

“Which state,” intending to mean which of the U.S. states, “did you like best?”

“Actually,” interpreting the question to mean which country, “Indonesia and especially Bali. The Bahamas are also beautiful, but there is not much culture.”

“You travel a lot then?”

“Oh yes, I love to travel and make such a trip every year.”

She is, it transpired, a middle-rank economist with a middle-rank professional income working for Jugopetrol, Yugoslavia's second largest petroleum company, in the division concerned with internal distribution of revenues. These have not suffered noticeably from increasing oil costs, she said.

Before she left to take two daffodils carefully wrapped in tissue paper to a sick friend she gave me her office telephone number:

“I should like to talk some more about America and your impressions of Yugoslavia. But next time we should speak in English, because I should like to keep in practice for my next trip.”

We did not speak of politics or the “after Tito” question. It was clear, however, that she, like most in the restaurant and indeed most other Yugoslavs, had good reason to wish that Yugoslavia will not become too different a place and system after Tito.

In official circles that feeling, the reasons for it, and a number of other factors are called “stability.”

(July 1980)



## NOTES

1. Hirohito of Japan and Enver Hoxha of Albania are both still alive and active, but it would be hard to argue that their roles and "place in history" earn them a spot on this particular list.

2. "After Tito," in *Europe*, May-June 1980.

3. An expert on state-church relations in Yugoslavia who analyzed the telegrams of condolence sent by religious leaders when Tito died described them in a letter to this observer as "fulsome from the Moslems, enthusiastic from the Bosnian Franciscans, cool but courteous from the Archbishop of Zagreb, somewhat epic from Patriarch German [of the Serbian Orthodox Church], while the head of the Macedonian Orthodox Church naturally gives thanks for the existence of his church."

4. The order of rotation for Vice-President as set forth in Article 66 of the Presidency's Rules of Procedure (published in the *Službeni list/Official Gazette/SFRJ* of March 7, 1975), which is now to apply to the President as well, is as follows (with present incumbents in parentheses): Macedonia (Koliševski, born 1914), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mijatović, b. 1913), Slovenia (Kraigher, b. 1914), Serbia (Petar Stambolić, b. 1912), Croatia (Bakarić, b. 1912), Montenegro (Vidoje Žarković, b. 1927), AP Vojvodina (Doronjski, b. 1919), and AP Kosovo (Fadil Hoxha, b. 1916). The 1979-80 incumbency of Koliševski represented the beginning of the second round since this order was established (Krstić Crvenkovski of Macedonia was the first Vice-President of the then 23-member State Presidency, in 1971-72). If it is maintained, Kraigher will be succeeded by Stambolić of Serbia in May 1982 and by Bakarić of Croatia in May 1983. Then the current 5-year term of the present Presidency expires and new members should be elected; of the present incumbents only Kraigher (who replaced Kardelj as Slo-

venia's representative when Kardelj died in February 1979) will be eligible for re-election then, since all the rest are in the second of their permitted two terms.

5. This was confirmed by a Tanjug (official news agency) dispatch of June 3 that objected to *NIN's* use of the term "vacated" as implying that a new President definitely would be elected at the next Congress (cf. Slobodan Stanković's analysis of the *NIN-Tanjug* exchange and the June 12 meeting in Radio Free Europe's RAD Background Reports nos. 137 and 148, June 10 and 18, 1980). It is also worth noting that under the current statute the LCE President is not actually one of the specified 23 members of the Party Presidency or 165 members of the Central Committee. The Statutes merely provide that, separately elected at a Federal Party Congress, he may convene and preside over meetings of either of these bodies. This somewhat curious arrangement suggests that the Statutes' authors may have intended that the office of President of the Party should be almost as easily and almost as automatically dispensable as that of the President of the Republic.

6. A point also made, and probably somewhat exaggerated, in a recent article by Bogdan Denitch, "Succession and Stability in Yugoslavia," in the *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1978), pp. 223-238, 1978. Cf. also A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslavia: the Non-Leninist Succession" (Rand Paper Series, P-6442, January 1980).

7. Cited in note 2 above.

8. For a more complete survey (in places excessively optimistic?), see the OECD's annual *Survey of Yugoslavia*, published in May 1980, from which these and the following statistics are taken.