1981/No. 11
Europe

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[DIR-1-'81]

THE CYPRUS DEADLOCK: FOREVER OR ANOTHER DAY?

The Cyprus problem has been around a long time, even discounting the preface provided by more than a century during which the evolution of first Greek and then Turkish national sentiments set the stage for its contemporary chapters. It is now 20 years since the frame of reference was changed by Cyprus' transformation from a British Crown Colony into a republic with a qualified and territorially incomplete sovereignty, a state that almost no Greek or Turkish Cypriot then wanted. It is 17 years since the constitutional order written and imposed on that republic by Britain, Greece, and Turkey was disrupted by intercommunal violence during the winter of 1963-64, leading to the physical and political segregation of a large part of the Turkish community into "enclaves," nearly causing a war between Greece and Turkey, initiating direct U.S. involvement, and bringing to Cyprus a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) that is still there. And it is more than six years since the structure of the problem was again violently altered by a coup d'état directed from Greece, followed by Turkish military intervention that divided the island and completed the segregation of the communities, displacing a third of the population in the process and leaving 38 percent of Cyprus under Turkish Cypriot administration and mainland Turkish military occupation.

Today, as the divided republic begins its third decade, the Cyprus problem is as far as ever from a solution that would provide political unity and peace and security for both communities. At the same time, however, it is also so close to such a solution that it could be had for the reaching out.

Such a solution is still unlikely for several reasons: because the costs of achieving it, in terms of unavoidable compromises, seem higher than the costs of the status quo to almost all concerned, both in Cyprus and abroad; because mutual distrust is unabated and misinformation is being enhanced by total separation of the communities; and because key individuals on each side appear to believe that developments on the other side or abroad will in time strengthen their own bargaining position. More energetic efforts are also impeded by a subtle form of abdication of responsibility by all the parties. Greek and Turkish Cypriots eagerly declare, and apparently believe, that it is not they who hold the key but outside powers—and the United States in particular. These outside powers, including the United States, take shelter in the principle that the problem is ultimately one for the Cypriots themselves to solve through intercommunal negotiations. They are therefore either inactive or else, for the sake of other interests that currently seem more important or urgent than Cyprus, appear to be supporting, rather than putting pressure on, those in Ankara or in north or south Nicosia who in someone's view are blocking a solution.

A solution is also, if paradoxically, close in the sense that its general outline is clear, and there is already agreement (albeit revocable and sometimes unrecognized or disbelieved) on broad principles and many details. What must and can be done to reach agreement on the remainder, including hotly disputed intermediate principles, is also generally clear. In addition, recent or anticipated changes in political line-ups or policies on both sides of the divided island, in Ankara, and perhaps elsewhere may indeed lead to increased willingness to compromise on one or both sides.

The restarting of intercommunal talks under UN auspices in September 1980 has to date (January 1981) only proved that the oldest

almost-continuous floating crap game in the eastern Mediterranean (or, in deference to the British English spoken in Cyprus, the longest permanent tea-dance) is still on. Meanwhile, however, those recent or anticipated changes *within* the contesting polities have the potential to break the impasse that even the Turkish intervention in 1974 did not break, although it altered and narrowed the range of possible solutions. Why this is so, why it may not happen, and some background to understanding why the problem has remained so intractable are the subject of this *Report.*

Basic Ingredients—Mix and Stir Well!

Cyprus, with 3,572 square miles, about twice the size of Long Island and the third largest and easternmost island in the Mediterranean, lies 40 miles south of Turkey, over 500 miles east of the Greek mainland (and 250 miles east of the nearest Greek-ruled Dodecanese Islands), 100 miles west of Syria and 230 miles north of the Suez Canal. Of a population of 633,000 in 1960, when the most recent census was taken, 80 percent were recorded as Greeks and 18 percent as Turks (compared to 73% and 25% early in this century), with minuscule minorities of Armenians, "Latins," expatriate Britons, and others comprising the remaining 2 percent. Until 1964, and in lesser measure until 1974, Greek and Turkish Cypriots cohabited in the four main towns and many villages, and the purely Greek or Turkish villages in which the rest of them lived were interspersed in random fashion across the island.

The Cyprus question has been compounded out of these primary geographic and demographic data by nationalism in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, a history of struggle between Greeks and Turks that is far older than modern nationalism and that profoundly affects the perceptions and fears of both, and the strategic interests of more distant Great Powers. The complexity of the interplay among all these factors, with a massive assist from multiple political miscalculations and other human failings in many places, has made the question so far unanswerable and has given substance to George Mikes' epigram, which Cypriots themselves are occasionally fond of quoting with rueful self-irony: "The Cypriots know that they cannot become a World Power; but they have succeeded in becoming a World Nuisance, which is almost as good."[1]

The Greek majority generally feel themselves to be part of the Greek nation and the heirs and custodians of more than three millennia of Greek culture on Cyprus, from Mycenean and Classical to Byzantine and five post-Byzantine centuries of survival under Lusignan (Crusader), Venetian, Ottoman, and British rule. These sentiments are nurtured by a consciousness of common or similar language, customs, and religion that is universal and profound, and by archeological monuments and excavations that are as ubiquitous, and as treasured by ordinary Greek Cypriots, as Cyprus' notoriously extensive pantheon of Christian saints and Greek gods and demigods. They are also more deliberately nurtured by school syllabuses and textbooks and by cultural and political propaganda of mainland Greek as well as Greek Cypriot provenance.

There is little doubt that in 1960 when the republic was created most Greek Cypriots, accepting the one-nation/one-state logic of the ideology of nationalism and the nation-state, desired union (*enosis*) with Greece. This emotional and political urge, which culminated in anticolonial demonstrations and violence from 1955 until independence in 1960, has been present among at least some Greek Cypriots since the Greek wars of independence in the 1820s—and even earlier, as a protonationalist self-identification within the religious one provided by common membership in the Greek Orthodox *millet* under Ottoman rule. The number affected, however, and the degrees of intensity and thoughtfulness, even the significance and implications of the desire, have varied over time and by social class and other divisions.

Since independence, evidence that is usually disregarded or disbelieved by Turkish Cypriots suggests that this "enosist" sentiment has been fading or at least changing, losing its political meaning for most Greek Cypriots. At the same time, however, the nature and content of their "national consciousness" and the history of their relations with Turkish Cypriots, reinforced by numerical preponderance and understanding of democracy as straightforward majority rule, continue to determine their attitude toward the Turkish Cypriots. These are regarded, at best, as a religious and ethnic minority with communal rights, deriving from their distinctiveness and minority status, that should be tolerated and even protected, as in other "civilized" democracies with similar minorities; but they should also remember that they are only 18 percent of the population and originally intruders in an ancient and profoundly Greek land.

The Turkish minority similarly feel themselves to be part of the Turkish nation, although Turkish Cypriot "national consciousness" developed later than that of the Greek Cypriots or that of the Turkish nationalism in Turkey itself, and in reaction to the former and response to the latter. Natural supporters of Ottoman rule as long as it lasted, the Turkish community afterward generally supported the continuation of British rule which provided a barrier to enosis and protected and in some ways even favored the Turkish minority as a counterweight to the Greek Cypriot majority. Then, as it became apparent that British rule would come to an end after all, the slogan of *taksim*—partition between Greece and Turkey—provided Turkish Cypriots with a precise and equally gripping counterpart to Greek Cypriot hankering for enosis. When it was created in 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was therefore not the preferred solution for either community; as truly as the Republic of Austria in 1918 (a suggestive analogy!), it was *der Staat den keiner wollte*, the state that no one wanted.

Since independence, and again with analogies to the way enosis sentiment has faded or altered its meaning for many Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot preferences have come to include a broader range of possible solutions, always with the proviso that they must include a maximum achievable degree of security against both enosis and Greek Cypriot domination. Varying with changing circumstances over time, this range has run from partition in its original or a modified version—i.e., with or without "double enosis" of the fragments to Turkey and Greece as a final goal—to some combination of constitutional and external guarantees of Turkish Cypriot security and equality as a "co-founder" community of a bi-communal state. The Turkish Cypriot leadership also argues that the prevalent Greek Cypriot version of the history of intercommunal relations on the island, as generally peaceful coexistence only recently and unnecessarily interrupted by British (and later Turkish) manipulation of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism in order to block enosis, is either a romantic or a calculated distortion. The facts, they say, chronicle incompatabilities and conflict so ancient and deep-seated—and so loaded against the minority once it was deprived of imperial protection—that geographic segregation and political autonomy have become prerequisites for co-citizenship in a common state that would otherwise be characterized by continuous strife, a constant risk of violence, and permanent economic and social subordination for the minority.

In these conflicting attitudes and aspirations, which have profound psychological as well as political and social dimensions, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have at different moments and sometimes simultaneously enjoyed, suffered, and resented the solicited and unsolicited support, intervention, control, and disengagement of their respective "mother countries," Greece and Turkey. Who (or what) has been the manipulator and who (or what) the manipulated—nationalism by politicians and other public figures; Nicosia by Athens and Ankara; or vice versa in each case—has at many points been disputed or unclear, even to the actors themselves. Either way, the consequences have made the Cyprus question a major aggravating issue in Greco-Turkish relations, already sufficiently burdened by the two nations' memories of ancient conflict, mutual historic grievances, and plenty of other contemporary bilateral problems and irritants. In the process the Cyprus problem has periodically disrupted "the southeastern flank of NATO" and on three occasions in a ten-year period has nearly led to war between the two protecting powers.

The even wider international importance of the island's strategic location also antedates by centuries and in various forms Cyprus' contemporary potential to be someone's mammoth aircraft carrier *cum* troopship, anchored beside sea routes to the Middle East that are vital to both West and East and within striking distance of everything from southern Russia and Turkey to Egypt and the oil fields of the Arab and Gulf states. Such importance guarantees the interest, and potentially the intervention, of Great Powers and their alliances, either to secure or to deny to others such use or potential use of the island. This, of course, is why the dangers inherent in the Cyprus question reach far beyond the shores of the island and those of Greece and Turkey, making it a "World Nuisance" with literally explosive potential. It also means that a solution has not been, and will not be, left to the Cypriots to work out for themselves alone, so there is some truth in handwashing Cypriot assertions that the key to unlock the problem is not in their possession.

Earlier chapters in the story of how this volatile and complex combination of domestic and external factors produced "the Cyprus question" are well documented, if usually with a partisan

bias, and so the details can for present purposes be omitted. The dramatic developments of summer 1974, although also frequently described elsewhere and fresher in memory, mark the beginning of the current chapter and change the rules of the game for subsequent and contemporary innings; on both counts a brief review of those developments and their impact is in order.

Changing the Framework: the "Events of 1974"

On July 15, 1974, a coup d'état executed by the Greek-officered Cypriot National Guard and planned by the military junta then ruling in Greece overthrew the government of Cyprus. The coup consummated five years of intrigues, attempted assassinations, and guerrilla operations directed against Archbishop Makarios III, the President of the Republic, by a "disloyal opposition" of pro-enosis Greek Cypriots, mainland Greek officers, and others, including the junta, who variously accused him of betraying enosis and Greece, flirting with the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) and the Soviet Union, and plotting against the junta. In the deep suspicions of most Cypriots, these efforts to overthrow, murder, or at least discipline Makarios also enjoyed the blessing, and perhaps more than that, of the American government or some of its agencies, including National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the CIA, who were widely regarded as beholden to the Athens junta for its staunch anticommunism and convinced that Makarios must be prevented from becoming a "Mediterranean Castro."[2]

Makarios himself made a dramatic escape from his presidential palace while it was under tank and artillery attack and fled to the British Sovereign Base Areas on the southern coast, whence he was flown to exile in Britain. In his place the "coupists" (as they are quaintly called in Cypriot English) installed Nicos Sampson, a veteran of the EOKA guerrilla movement that had fought the British in the name of enosis in the 1950s, when he had acquired an unsavory reputation as a ruthless killer of Britons and Turks.

The Turkish government and Army reacted as everyone, presumably excepting the Greek junta, had known they would react under such circumstances. On July 20 a Turkish expeditionary force landed near Kyrenia, on the north coast of the island. In the face of stubborn resistance and numerous casualties on both sides, they soon established a substantial bridgehead and a land corridor connecting it to the Turkish Cypriot quarter in Nicosia, beyond the Kyrenia Range. As tales of pillage, murder, and rape spread ahead of the Turkish advance—whether they were true, exaggerated, or invented is a separate subject on which Greek and Turkish opinions naturally differ—the Greek Cypriot population of threatened villages fled southward, the first of many who would still be refugees more than six years later. In the south Greek Cypriot forces occupied or besieged Turkish Cypriot villages and fortified "enclaves," generating a counterpart set of atrocity stories, and many Turkish Cypriots sought sanctuary, as Makarios had done, on the British Sovereign Bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.

The Turks claimed a legal justification for their intervention, in addition to a moral and strategic duty to protect their conationals on Cyprus from the Sampson regime and Turkey itself from Greek "encirclement" through enosis, by citing the Anglo-Greek-Turkish Treaty of Guarantee that had been part of the settlement creating the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The treaty granted the three guarantor powers "the right to take action," jointly or singly, to reestablish a status quo defined as including the republic's "independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution" (articles 1 and 4). Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit flew to London to consult the British as a coguarantor, as the treaty required, before unleashing the expeditionary force; the British declined his invitation to participate in a joint military operation, but do not appear to have challenged the legal and other justifications the Turks were citing. Ecevit also delayed the order to start the landing while Joseph Sisco, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs dispatched as Kissinger's special envoy, rushed from London to Athens, Ankara, and again Athens in a vain attempt to repeat Cyrus Vance's success in using such urgent "shuttle diplomacy" to defuse a similar Cyprus crisis in 1967. Whether the American failure to deter the Turks this time and in the following days signified a lack of skill, of will, or of means is much disputed.

By July 23 a provisional cease-fire had been arranged and both the military dictatorship in Athens and the "coupist" regime in Nicosia had collapsed. The former was replaced by a civilian regime headed by Constantine Karamanlis and pledged to restore parliamentary democracy, the

latter by the precoup government but with Glafcos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, as Acting President in the absence of Makarios—an order of succession prescribed by the 1960 Constitution.

Two days later the foreign ministers of Britain, Turkey, and Greece met in Geneva under the terms of the Treaty of Guaranty and in compliance with a United Nations Security Council resolution adopted in response to the Turkish intervention. In a declaration issued when they adjourned on July 30 the foreign ministers called for additional emergency measures to maintain the cease-fire, separate the combatants, and prevent further changes in the situation on the ground, and for the urgent commencement of negotiations to restore peace and constitutional government. They also "noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot Community and that of the Turkish Cypriot Community"—a sentence that alarmed the newly restored Greek Cypriot authorities in Nicosia, for whom any form of international recognition for their Turkish Cypriot rivals was then and still is considered a slippery slope to permanent partition.

Meanwhile and in defiance of both the cease-fire and the Geneva declaration, Turkish forces continued to widen their Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor through nibbling advances that sent more refugees streaming southward. In the south Greek Cypriot forces similarly defied orders from Geneva to withdraw from the Turkish Cypriot villages they had occupied.

The foreign ministers of the guarantor powers reassembled in Geneva on August 8 for the promised negotiations. On August 10 they were joined by Clerides and Rauf Denktaş, old dueling partners from the UN-sponsored intercommunal talks of 1968-1974 invited to Geneva as spokesman for their respective communities. That they were received in this capacity, at Turkish insistence, rather than in their official roles as the Cyprus Republic's Acting President and its elected but nonfunctioning Vice-President under the 1960 Constitution, was in order at this stage to evade the question of the present status of the 1960 Constitution and the legitimacy of Clerides' government. (The functions of Vice-President had been de facto suspended since Turkish Cypriots walked out of bi-communal central government organs during the crisis and violence of 1964 and set up their own separate administration in their enclaves.)

The second Geneva conference broke up in acrimony at 3 A.M. on August 14, after three days of intensive informal negotiations and only two plenary sessions. The end came when the Turkish Foreign Minister refused to agree to Clerides' request, supported by the British and Greek Foreign Ministers, for a 36-hour adjournment to allow him to consider and seek advice in Nicosia before responding to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot demands that the conference pronounce in favor of a federal solution based on geographic separation, which implied at least limited population exchanges. Within two hours the Turkish forces on Cyprus had recommenced military operations and were advancing rapidly southward. When they stopped again, and finally, 38 percent of the island was under their control, to a line running from the Bay of Morphou in the west to just south of Famagusta on the east coast, and including the UN Green Line that had divided the Turkish from the Greek parts of Nicosia since 1964. As the Greek Cypriots have tirelessly pointed out ever since, this line was nearly identical to those appearing in Turkish proposals for partition of the island dating back ten years and in Denktaş's proposals for a federal solution presented to the Geneva meeting on the day before the renewed Turkish advance began.

When it was all over some 170,000 Greek Cypriots (according to UN figures) were refugees south of that Turkish held territory, and only 20,000 had stayed behind. In the south a similar process of flight and expulsion from Turkish villages swelled the ranks of the Turkish Cypriots encamped under British protection on the Akrotiri and Dhekelia Sovereign Base Areas and subsequently resettled in the north. After others had followed the same route, on the basis of a Clerides-Denktaş agreement on further voluntary population exchanges concluded in summer 1975, the total of uprooted and resettled Turkish Cypriots stood (according to Turkish Cypriot figures) at 65,000, half the pre-1974 Turkish population of the island. By late 1979, according to a report by the UN Secretary General, only 1,482 Greek Cypriots remained in the north (in 11 villages on the Karpass peninsula) and 206 Turkish Cypriots in the south.*

The "events of 1974"—a noncommittal label currently favored by UN officials and others

*See map, p. 23.

wishing to avoid the appearance of bias associated with either "Turkish invasion" or "Turkish peacekeeping operation"—fundamentally altered the framework within which a solution to the Cyprus question must henceforth be sought and narrowed the range of possible solutions.

As the Turks quickly made clear, in the new situation shaped by their intervention it was too late to turn the clock back. The 1960 settlement had sought to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority, while establishing the republic as a basically unitary and centrally administered state, through the Treaty of Guarantee, which, in effect, legitimized Turkish interventions on their behalf, and through the traditional device of communal safeguards, rights, and privileges "entrenched" in the Constitution. The latter included language rights, communal autonomy in matters like religion and family law, a 30 percent quota of participants in central state organs, police, and civil service (for a minority comprising 18% of the population) and a right of veto, vested in the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the republic and members of the House of Representatives, in specified matters affecting their communal interests. It was the unacceptability to the Greek Cypriots of several of these provisions, which they considered unworkable or violations of majority rule and equality of citizenship, that led to the constitutional crisis and intercommunal violence of 1963-64 and the withdrawal of many Turkish Cypriots and their leadership—involuntarily according to them, voluntarily according to the Greeks—into self-administered, armed, and beleaguered enclaves. The central features of the proposed way out of this singularly unsatisfactory and violence-prone situation that gradually took shape in the Clerides-Denktaş negotiations of 1968-1974 were based on Turkish concessions in the area of central powers (for example, the veto was to go and the 30% quota reduced to 20%) in return for Greek concessions in the area of expanded autonomy for separate Greek and Turkish local governments as well as in communal matters.

Both the 1960 arrangement and the draft of revisions to it that was taking shape by the end of 1973 were based on the premise of a mixed population—Greek villages, Turkish villages, and mixed villages and towns scattered in random pattern across the island, as had been the case ever since the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571. Such a pattern, the Greek side argued, precluded the federal solution periodically proposed by the Turkish side. This and other Greek positions acquired additional negotiating strength from a second premise: that the Greek Cypriots were in a somewhat stronger bargaining position than the Turkish Cypriots, whose disadvantages of fewer numbers and forces and presumably more urgent need for a solution (to release them from the permanent physical insecurity and economic, social, and political disabilities deriving from semi-isolation in "enclaves") were only partly counterbalanced by mainland Turkish support, which was in turn supposedly inhibited by mainland Greek support for the majority community and American ability to restrain Turkey, as in 1967, from using force as an ultimate sanction.

These two premises had indeed been invalidated by "the events," as the Turkish side pointed out, and could be revalidated only by a change of heart or loss of will in Ankara. As a result of the violent redistribution of population during "the events" and its semivoluntary completing the following year, the two communities (except for a few stay-behinds on each side) now live totally separated in two distinct geographic regions, and the Turks and their Turkish Cypriot protégés have so far shown no sign of countenancing any solution that would bring about more than marginal changes in this new pattern. In addition, as a Greek Cypriot has put it, "The events of 1974 proved that in a crisis Turkey will come to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots, but Greece will not come to the aid of the Greek Cypriots," a lesson that may be one reason for the relative disengagement that has characterized Greece's Cyprus policy since 1974. Subsequent events have also produced little evidence of serious American or British interest in intervening against this reversal of Greek and Turkish negotiating strengths. These observations serve to heighten both Greek and Turkish Cypriot awareness that the geographic proximity of Turkey, whose coastal mountains are plainly visible from Kyrenia on a clear day, by itself reduces the Greek Cypriots from an overwhelming island majority to a minuscule regional minority. The consequences, for the Greek Cypriots, include a sense of powerlessness, isolation, frustration,... and further disillusionment with Mother Greece, and hence with enosis, which contributes another dimension discussed in more detail later.

In these circumstances, there would appear to be only two alternatives to a bicommunal and biregional federal solution with a distribution of powers (and territory) at least somewhat closer to

what the Turkish side has proposed than to what the Greek side has so far been willing to accept. The first is for the Greek Cypriots to persevere in unwillingness to agree to such a tilted compromise, which they purport to believe would be tantamount to "disguised partition." In this case the post-1974 status quo of a divided island with "two autonomous administrations" would presumably continue until it gradually acquired some form of international recognition and legality, leaving the world with two formally independent and ethnically homogeneous Cypriot ministates...or until the dependence of the smaller and weaker of these units on its "mother country" for economic aid and security leads to the formal annexation of northern Cyprus as the 68th province of Turkey. ("Actually the 69th," a Turkish Cypriot wryly corrected this scenario during a recent conversation, "since West Germany has so many Turkish migrant workers that Munich is already the 68th!") The second is for the Turks to decide—or for someone else, usually meaning the United States, to persuade them—to withdraw their military and political engagement before there is an agreed solution, thereby fulfilling a frequently heard Greek Cypriot hope that "they will go away and leave us and our Turkish Cypriot brothers to resolve things between us, in mutual good will, and all return to our lost homes and villages."

Many and perhaps most Greek Cypriots go on hoping that the second of these alternatives to the "disguised partition" of loose federation will somehow come to pass, and their hopes are reinforced before each American election by Presidential and other candidates wooing Greek-American voters with promises or what the Greek Cypriot press can construe as promises. Waiting for this particular Godot then becomes one reason why permanent and undisguised partition in one form or another, as the result of a failure to achieve a negotiated solution, continues to seem the most probable outcome. It is an outcome that almost all Greek *and* Turkish Cypriots fervently declare is as unwanted as the Republic of Cyprus was unwanted in 1960, but in summer 1980 almost all thought that it was indeed the most likely one.[3] In this potentially self-fulfilling prophecy there is disagreement only concerning ultimate responsibility for such a solution through nonsolution: one's own or the other Cypriots' political leaders; the other Cypriot community in general or in strategic parts; the Turkish government or Army; the American government or some agencies of it; or all of the above.

Back to the Drawing-Board and on with the Tea-Dance

In December 1974 Makarios returned from exile and reassumed his functions as Cyprus' President. His government's writ now ran to only 60 percent of the republic's territory. In the other 40 percent its legitimacy as well as authority was unrecognized. Power there was in the hands of the Turkish Army and Denktaş' "Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration," heretofore the de facto rulers of Turkish north Nicosia and the other Turkish enclaves that had comprised 5 percent of the island from their establishment in 1964 until the Turkish intervention. In these circumstances, the Greek Cypriot administration was already engaged in an agonizing reappraisal of its situation and how to save the savable.

Meetings between Clerides and Denktaş had been restarted that same month, in compliance with another UN resolution. In an initial agreement concluded by January 8, 1975, the Greek side conceded the principle of federation that Denktaş and the Turks had demanded at Geneva II. At this stage, however, the concession was qualified by insistence on a multiregional arrangement that would permit the return of all the refugees of both sides to their homes, which was then and later another Greek Cypriot demand. These qualifications, communicated to Denktaş in early February, were unacceptable to the Turkish side, for whom it would mean that their community would again be scattered, encircled, and cut off from the direct access to Turkey in all but one of the proposed regions (the exception being the Nicosia-Kyrenia triangle). The lesson of 1963-1974, the Turks argued then and continue to insist today, was that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together in peace and security, and that the geographic segregation into two viable and autonomous regions brought about by the Turkish intervention must therefore be maintained in any final solution, although the territorial and constitutional details are negotiable.

Denktaş' immediate response to Greek willingness to concede only a multiregional federation was to proclaim, on February 15, 1975, establishment of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC, later more commonly spelled Kibris, the Turkish name for the island, and also abbreviated TFSK in its English version). Its constitution, like its name, was written to anticipate

later incorporation in the bi-regional Federal Republic that the Turkish side was demanding. Denktaş himself was elected President of the TFSC/TFSK. The former residence of the island's British Governors-General, just inside the Venetian city wall of old Nicosia and residence of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the disunited republic during the decade of Turkish-Cypriot "enclavement," became his presidential palace... although some disrespectful Turkish Cypriots refer to the nearby Turkish Embassy—the only one in the north—as "our *real* presidential palace."

The Greek Cypriot government in south Nicosia in its turn responded to the proclamation of the TFSC/TFSK by again appealing to the UN. The result was another Security Council resolution that "regretted" the Turkish Cypriot move and once more called for implementation of earlier resolutions.

Nearly five years have passed since these inauspicious new beginnings. Intercommunal talks and other forms of negotiation under and outside UN auspices have continued spasmodically, with long interruptions, sequential deadlocks, some progress and some retreats to earlier positions... and no sign of an end. With official intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot "interlocutors" on again since September 1980, after a 15-month interruption, a brief review of the intervening phases—sparing the reader details and comment not essential to understanding the current situation—may be useful.

1. *The Vienna Waltz I.* Clerides and Denktaş came together to continue the revival of their 1968-1974 tea-dance on five occasions between April 1975 and February 1976—four times in Vienna and once at the UN in New York—with varying agendas including missing and displaced persons and other "humanitarian" issues, the territorial question, etc. Expert committees were formed and met; proposals, "observations" on proposals, and mutual accusations of bad faith were ground out. The mountain labored and gave birth, with the Special Representative of UN Secretary General Waldheim as indefatigable midwife, to a few mice: an agreement "in principle" to reopen Nicosia International Airport (never carried out); an agreement that Turkish Cypriots still in the south should be permitted to move north and Greek Cypriots still in the north should be permitted to move south on the basis of individual desires (implemented), and that Greek Cypriots remaining in enclaves in the north should "be given every help to lead a normal life..." (implementation disputed); and sometimes merely a blunt communique: "In the absence of concrete proposals, the talks were adjourned...."

Shortly after his fifth new round with Denktaş, in Vienna in February 1976, Clerides fell out of favor with Archbishop Makarios and was removed from the scene of action to a political limbo which he was later to turn into a mustering place for opposition to Makarios' successors.[4] He was succeeded as the Greek Cypriot "interlocutor" in the intercommunal talks by Tassos Papadopoulos and later George Ioannides; their Turkish Cypriot counterpart was to be Umit Suleyman Onan in place of Denktaş, a corresponding downgrading in rank consistent with Turkish insistence on the status equality of the two negotiating parties.

2. *The Makarios-Denktaş "Guidelines."* Early in January 1977 Denktaş wrote to Archbishop Makarios and proposed a personal meeting "to give you my views on... matters relating to the Cyprus problem in the hope that we may thus reach some understanding...." Makarios concurred, and the two men met on January 27 and again on February 12 at the Ledra Palace, once Nicosia's leading hotel and since summer 1974 a battle-scarred semi-ruin inside the neutral zone of the United Nations "Green Line" where Canadian soldiers with the UN Peacekeeping Force hang their washing from windows of once-luxurious bedrooms. At their second meeting Makarios and Denktaş agreed that the intercommunal talks should be reconvened in Vienna "at the end of March" and should be governed by four "guidelines" which have become the basis for all subsequent negotiations (and mutual accusations of reneging):

"1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bicommunal, Federal Republic.

"2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.

"3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.

"4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bicommunal character of the State."

3. *Vienna Waltz II.* The "interlocutors" and their teams duly began their new Vienna round, in the presence of Secretary-General Waldheim himself, on March 31, 1979. By prior agreement the Greek side presented a map showing its territorial proposals and the Turkish side submitted constitutional proposals, both supposedly as a basis for substantive negotiations. These did not take place. Perhaps one or both sides never meant that they should. It is equally possible, however, and the opinion of this observer of the 1977 Vienna round, that the talks were in any case doomed by the intense publicity, incarnate in the TV cameras and mob of journalists with cassette tape recorders jamming the corridors and staircases of the conference site in Vienna's Diplomatic Academy, and the premature statements forced out of Papadopolous and Onan at the end of each meeting. All of this precluded the flexibility and abandonment of initial positions that are essential to success in such negotiations, and provided another reminder that open covenants secretly arrived at are often better than open covenants openly arrived at.

The Greek map presented at Vienna conceded, for the first time, that the proposed bicommunal federation should also be biregional rather than multiregional, a concession that was to prove definitive although presented as conditional. On the other hand, the border between the regions proposed by the Greek side reduced the Turkish Cypriot area to 20 percent of the island and meandered across the map in such a fashion that the Turks called it "a snake." They also noted that it created semi-enclaves on both sides, barely connected to the main parts of the two regions, and was therefore really a disguised form of multiregionalism. If the border was a snake, the regions it defined were definitely relations of that remarkable cartographical beast, invented for party-political rather than ethnopolitical reasons in early nineteenth-century Massachusetts, that Americans call a "Gerrymander." The Greek map was summarily rejected by the Turkish negotiators, who argued that it violated point 2 of the Guidelines and the principle of "security" for the Turkish Cypriots that they claimed was implicit—although the term itself was not used—in point 3 and had been explicit in the Makarios-Denktas discussions that led to its adoption.

(Recalling those discussions during a conversation in July 1980, Denktaş told me that the wording of point 3 was a result of Makarios' "sympathetic and genuine understanding" of Denktaş' fears for the security of the Turkish community, and for peace between the communities, if a settlement should permit immediate and unfettered freedom of movement and settlement across regional boundaries.)

Turkish proposals on the constitutional aspect of the problem, based on a principle that Onan labeled "evolutionary federalism," were similarly rejected by the Greek side, which claimed that they were insufficiently specific, "federal" in name only, and in fact a transparent disguise for permanent partition into two loosely associated but essentially sovereign states. They were also unacceptable because they would in effect legitimize the fait accompli of the TFSC/TFSK, which was mentioned by name. This, for the Greek Cypriots, was another Turkish maneuver designed to elevate this illegal entity to equality of status with the regime in south Nicosia, thereby depriving the latter of its internationally recognized position as the legal government of the entire republic, which the Greek side considered their strongest remaining bargaining card.

In these circumstances the Vienna meeting could only produce grandstanding postures and a new impasse. It was ended on April 7, after eight futile days. The final communiqué noted that "It has not been possible to bridge the considerable gap between the views of the two sides," but promised that the talks would resume in Nicosia "about the middle of May 1977." This, too, did not happen, and the interlocutors were not in fact to meet again until June 1979, even more briefly and once more in vain.

4. *In the meantime...* Archbishop Makarios died in July 1977, a few days after addressing a mass rally commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Turkish intervention. One Greek Cypriot has suggested to me that he died of a broken heart, the result of the "great concessions of principle and national interest" (Greek or Cypriot?) and reversals of personal position that he had made in his last months—conceding first federalism and then biregionalism, still without achieving a solution. Others, told of this suggestion but sharing the widespread outside view of Makarios as "the master of Byzantine maneuvering," thought the image of a broken

heart was out of character but agreed that he, and perhaps only he, had had the political strength to hazard such concessions when they seemed to him necessary. His successor as President of the Republic of Cyprus was Spyros Kyprianou, Clerides' successor as President of the House of Representatives and a former Foreign Minister.[5] The new president's lack of Makarios' massive and loyal political following and "charisma"—enhanced, according to his political opponents, by his own indecisiveness and lack of leadership qualities generally—soon became important factors in the further development of both the Cyprus question and internal Greek Cypriot politics.

Further Turkish Cypriot "proposals" submitted to the UN Special Representative in April 1978 and Greek Cypriot "observations" on them brought no progress. In November 1978 the United States government sent the two parties a proposal, subsequently known as "the Western framework" or unofficially but more accurately as "the American framework," designed to serve as a basis for reconvening the intercommunal talks. After some internal and private debate that is now the subject of public dispute in Cyprus, Kyprianou rejected the "framework" on the grounds that it departed too far from the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines (in the direction of Turkish positions) and relegated UN resolutions on Cyprus to a secondary place as a basis for the negotiations. In all this period the only direct encounter recorded between Greek andTurkish Cypriots concerned with the Cyprus problem was an unofficial and informal academic seminar devoted to constitutional aspects and organized by the AUFS Center for Mediterranean Studies in Rome in November 1977.[6]

5. *The Kyprianou-Denktaş "Ten Points" and After.* Continuing efforts by UN Special Representatives Pérez de Cuéllar and later Galindo Pohl to break the renewed impasse and bring the parties back to the negotiating table finally bore momentarily promising fruit: a meeting between Kyprianou and Denktaş on May 19, 1979, resulting in a 10-point agreement that called for open-ended intercommunal negotiations dealing with "all territorial and constitutional aspects" to resume on June 15. The most important of the 10 points, in the light of later developments, were points 2 and 5. Point 2 declared that the renewed talks should be based on the Makarios-Denktaş "Guidelines" of February 1977 and UN resolutions on Cyprus (no mention of the "Western framework"); and point 5 stipulated that "priority" should be given to the resettlement of Varosha—the Greek Cypriot southern section of Famagusta and formerly the island's principal tourist resort, abandoned by its Greek Cypriot inhabitants and hoteliers during the fighting in August 1974 and since then a ghost town barricaded by the Turkish Army as a kind of hostage or bargaining chip to be played at the most propitious moment. (Hotels in Kyrenia and on the beaches north of Turkish-Cypriot-inhabited old Famagusta have, like Greek-owned homes and businesses elsewhere in the north, been turned over to Turkish Cypriots resettled from the south and Turkish settlers from Anatolia whose numbers and status are disputed.) The resettlement of Varosha, it was stated in point 5, should be carried out as soon as agreed and without waiting for agreement on other issues under negotiation. Both of these provisions were in effect concessions by the Turkish side.

The talks were resumed as scheduled at the Ledra Palace Hotel and in the presence of Pérez de Cuéllar, former UN Special Representative, now back in Cyprus in a more senior capacity as UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. They were "recessed" without results and with mutual accusations of bad faith after one week, on June 22. The problem this time, in the words of Secretary General Waldheim's subsequent report to the UN General Assembly:

The Greek Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. George Ioannides, took the position that in accordance with point 5 of the 19 May accord, the talks should give priority to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices. The Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, Mr. Umit Suleyman Onan, considered that before taking up point 5 the interlocutors should engage in a comprehensive discussion of point 2.... In this connection, the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor asked the Greek Cypriot interlocutor to acknowledge that the agreement on the 1977 guidelines, in addition to their published text, comprised also the concepts of "bi-zonality" and of the "security of the Turkish Cypriot community."

Both of these demands were unacceptable to the Greek side, for whom their a priori acceptance (as it was stated in a Greek Cypriot aide memoire handed to the UN Special Representative on August 2, 1979) "would nullify the Ten-Point Agreement of 19.5.1979 as a whole, including the Makarios-Denktash Guidelines." Moreover, it was claimed, the term "bi-zonal,"

although in the past also occasionally used by Greek Cypriot officials as a synonym for "biregional," now had unacceptable connotations in Turkish usage—where it was said to recall the evolution of postwar Germany's Western and Soviet occupation "zones" into two totally separate states—which would "destroy the basic notion of 'federation'...[and] enable the Turkish side to promote its avowed objective to create two separate states, legalizing the existing military occupation of Cyprus." If the Turkish side wished to raise the issues of "bi-zonality" and "security" during the negotiations, Greek Cypriot spokesmen said, they were free to do so, but they could not make their acceptance a precondition for resuming talks.

The Turkish side responded that "bi-zonal" had for them none of the connotations imputed by the Greek side, whose rejection of the term was instead an attempt to renege on *their* earlier agreement to a bi- rather than multi-whatever-you-want-to-call-them federation. They also argued that in refusing to accept the importance Turkish Cypriots ascribed to "security" for the minority community, the Greek Cypriot side had failed a litmus paper test of Greek sincerity in general, since this had always been the central issue for the Turkish community. Each side accused the other of merely indulging in a public relations trick by signing the 10 Points with no intention of engaging in good-faith negotiations.

This time and on these issues the suspension of direct intercommunal negotiations was to last 15 months, until September 1980. In a random opinion poll that summer most outside observers keeping scorecards for intransigence and stonewalling (a diplomatic and journalistic game to which Kyprianou, Denktaş, and governments in Ankara and Athens must pay concerned attention) awarded most of the blame for this latest renewal of the impasse to the Greek side, which seemed to be nitpicking about connotations of words and fine points of agendas, however good its formal case, and thus fiddling while the Cyprus question burned on endlessly. As described below, this judgment has generally been seconded by Kyprianou's political opponents and critics within the Greek Cypriot community, whose numbers and vociferousness grew as the stalemate dragged on, inserting a new factor into the equation.

Meanwhile, Denktaş raised his own score in the negative competition for the title of chief spoiler by appearing to be at fault, in June 1980, for the failure of another attempt by Pérez de Cuéllar to restart the stalled negotiations through personal "shuttle diplomacy" between north and south Nicosia. The details, although basically unimportant in view of the failure of the mission, preoccupied political Cypriots (meaning almost all Cypriots) and the Nicosia diplomatic and journalistic communities for several weeks and are illustrative of the day-to-day vicissitudes and "Byzantine" speculations that have beset the Cyprus question these many years. In brief, Denktaş was reported by UN and other sources to have said "yes" on Friday afternoon to a formula for reopening the talks presented to him by Pérez de Cuéllar and "no" on Saturday morning to the same formula, which had in the meanwhile been accepted by Kyprianou at a midnight meeting with the UN official following an emergency session of the Greek Cypriot government. Denktaş has a different version, in which he never said "yes" on Friday ("proved," he told a visitor in July, "by two independent sets of notes taken at the meeting and a subsequent apology from Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar"), but the first version was widely accepted south of the Green Line and gave rise to the usual kind of embassy, bar, and coffee house second-guessing.

Had Denktaş gambled on a "no" from Kyprianou that would have left Denktaş looking conciliatory and Kyprianou still and again a spoiler, or had his first "yes" been countermanded by Ankara or the Turkish Army? In any case, since general circumstances made the moment highly unpropitious for substantive negotiations, why had Pérez de Cuéllar, a skilled and respected diplomat with long Cyprus experience, come at this particular time? Was it because Hugo Gobbi, recently arrived to replace Galindo Pohl as UN Special Representative in Cyprus and eager to record an early success, had been overoptimistic in his reports to Secretary-General Waldheim? Because Waldheim himself had attributed too much significance, as an indication of greater Turkish flexibility, to a conversation he had had with Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in Belgrade at the beginning of May, when both were attending the funeral of Yugoslav President Tito? (As reported at the time in usually well-informed Belgrade circles, Demirel had replied affirmatively when Waldheim asked him whether a new UN initiative on the Cyprus question would be welcomed by Ankara.) Or merely because, with Cyprus likely to be on the agenda for the UN General Assembly meeting in the autumn (it was removed

at the last minute, in December 1980), the Secretariat wished to have more activity on its part to report? Everyone had an opinion, and the best-informed ones were contradictory.

Other initiatives and diplomatic games were not lacking in this period. There was a UN proposal to "internationalize" the question further, if intercommunal talks were not on again and making progress by March 1980, by appointing a multinational commission of mediators that none of the parties really wanted, which is why the deadline was quietly disregarded when it passed with the talks still suspended.There was also, to general embarrassment, an offer of personal mediation from Libya's Moamer Qadhafi.[7] Both Cypriot sides were constrained to give it official welcome, whatever their true feelings, because while Kyprianou was engaged in a campaign to muster more support for his cause from the non-aligned movement, Denktaş had discovered an exciting new source of potential support for his in the spirit of Islamic revival and militancy sweeping the Muslim world (therefore his now numerous forays out of Nicosia to attend Islamic conferences and to visit a series of Muslim states), and Qadhafi aspires to an active and pugnacious role in both. In these circumstances the principle that all mediation of the Cyprus question should take place under UN auspices provided a convenient diplomatic excuse for passing the Libyan buck to a presumably equally unenthusiastic Waldheim.

Meanwhile, Denktaş periodically repeated earlier threats to issue a Rhodesian-style unilateral declaration of independence for the TFSC/TFSK (" 'UDI' is the wrong term," he says, "because we are already independent, but the press is used to it"), accompanied by hints that only a Turkish veto had prevented him from already doing so. He also offered—under Turkish pressure, according to some sources—to permit immediate resettlement of 65,000 Greek Cypriots in Varosha, without waiting for agreement on jurisdiction in the area. The offer was rejected by the Kyprianou government on the grounds that the jurisdiction question must be decided first, and Varosha returned to southern control, in order to avoid making Turkish hostages of the 65,000 and their entrepreneurship. On the international scorecard this exchange was a draw, but the divided reactions it inspired among Famagusta-Varosha refugees in the south, many of them wealthy and influential persons, further complicated the political picture there and Kyprianou's position in it.

In the end, intercommunal talks under the chairmanship of UN Special Representative Gobbi were resumed at the Ledra Palace in September 1980...and are continuing on a (usually) weekly basis, accompanied by communiques reporting a "positive" and "friendly" atmosphere but no actual agreement on anything, as this *Report* goes to press. The formula, ironically, was originally proposed by Waldheim more than a year earlier, in August 1979, as a way of evading the issues that had brought about the immediate breakdown of the June 1979 talks. It was rejected by both sides when first proposed, then accepted by Denktaş but not by the Greek Cypriots in October 1979. Surfacing again during Pérez de Cuéllar's ill-fated shuttle diplomacy of June 1980, it was now rejected by Denktaş (as described above), but in September its time had come. As finally accepted and essentially as first proposed, Waldheim's formula provided that four basic topics distilled from the "Ten Points" of May 1979—"the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices," "initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence, and the return to normal conditions," "constitutional aspects," and "territorial aspects"—should be considered "concurrently," although for practical reasons they would be taken up sequentially, in the order stated, at successive meetings in a cycle to be repeated until agreement could be reached on all four. Thus the meeting that started the new year on January 7, 1981, after a one-month recess, began the fourth such cycle by considering—for the fourth time—the Varosha question.

"Where there's a will..."?

This chronicle of deadlock periodically interrupted by apparently half-hearted negotiations suggests two possibilities: lack of sufficient will for a solution, or a range and depth of conflict, suspicion and fear greater than or different from those formally recognized in the agendas and diplomacy of "the Cyprus question." In fact, it will be argued in this section, both are true and they are interconnected.

The suspicion that none of the parties, at least as presently represented, wants the kind of negotiated compromise solution that might be achieved at this time badly enough to pay the price of unavoidable concessions is reinforced by the observation, based on public positions assumed to date, that there are already broad areas of agreement or near-agreement (albeit conditional and revocable, as noted earlier in

this *Report*), and that what must and could be done to achieve agreement on most other subjects is also generally clear.

On constitutional and related issues, one survey of official and other nonbinding but public positions, compiled three years ago with the cooperation of unofficial but qualified Cypriots of both communities,[8] catalogued seven broad "areas of apparent agreement" concerning ultimate goals and matters of principle and a longer list of specific subjects, involving matters such as the division of powers within a federal structure, checks and balances, and guarantees, on which there seemed to be "agreement or similarity of views." The first category began with the "ultimate objective" that both communities have officially defined as an independent, sovereign, nonaligned, united, bicommunal, and bi-regional (or bi-zonal!) Federal Republic of Cyprus; its institutions and symbols should be conducive to gradual evolution toward a unified (or unitary?) Cyprus whose citizens will feel themselves to be Cypriots first and Greeks or Turks as a secondary cultural or ethnic self-identification. The second category recorded agreement, near-agreement, or differences that should be susceptible to negotiation on important subjects like the federal or regional attribution or division of power and responsibility for foreign policy, defense, money and banking, taxation and budgets, public health, education, commerce, industry, agriculture, natural resources, the courts, the police, and others. Closer analysis of these lists also suggested that an imaginative search for nonconventional solutions, perhaps drawing on precedents found in federations like Yugoslavia, Switzerland, West Germany, and even the Hapsburg Dual Monarchy, might reveal ways of making an end run around remaining differences.

In brief, these lists and subsequent developments suggest that on a broad range of constitutional and related issues a compromise solution—in which, as an example of major importance, the two regions would enjoy somewhat more competencies and autonomy than the Greek side has been willing to contemplate and somewhat less than the Turkish side has demanded—is within easy reach if the will for it exists and other issues in the total "package" can also be resolved.

Among these other issues the territorial question and the question of freedom of movement and settlement, which together include the question of whether, when, and how many refugees will be free to return to their homes and property, are the thorniest. It is here, and in the superficially symbolic question of sovereignty and legitimacy described below, that conflicting values, immediate and important conflicts of individual as well as communal economic and emotive interests, and (perhaps most intractable of all) deep-seated mutual distrust and fear are most "real" and hard to reconcile. Here too, however, the general outline of potentially endurable solutions based on difficult but not impossible mutual concessions and sacrifices is also clear to neutral observers, if not to those who must make them:

- As early as the first months after "the events" of 1974 the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side was signaling readiness to settle for "significantly" less than the 38 percent of the island currently under Turkish control, in return for commensurate concessions on other matters by the other side. What they would accept would presumably never be as little as the 20 percent offered by the Greek side at Vienna in 1977, but some northern sources have hinted that they might be induced to consider something around 25 percent. Greek Cypriot officials, noting that phrases like "significant geographical adjustments in favor of the Greek Cypriot side" (this one from the "Western framework" of 1978) are ominously vague, have been disbelieving or have argued that even 25 percent, if regarded as a minimum claim, is too much for 18 percent of the population. However, ultimate Turkish intentions and Greek expectations have never been put to the test of serious negotiations and quid pro quo bargaining (unless this is happening during the current round, which is happily being characterized by more secrecy than earlier ones.)

- On the question of freedom of movement and settlement across the future interregional boundary both sides have so far been publicly inflexible. The Greek side has argued that there is no precedent for a federation without such freedoms (which is not quite true for freedom of settlement, e.g., in Switzerland) and noted, as an instructive irony, that the European Community, which now includes Greece and in principle will some day include Turkey, has come to recognize them even across the frontiers of its sovereign member states. How, they ask, could a federal Cyprus be called a single and united country, and

how could economic and a degree of social integration benefiting both communities be achieved, if citizens of one region cannot settle or even travel freely in the other? What hope would exist for the refugees (one-third of their voters) deprived of their homes and property? For the Turkish Cypriots, however, some restriction of both freedoms, at least for a period of some years, is the sine qua non of their security, which is their primary concern. How, they ask, could they remain a majority in their own region—their principal ultimate guarantee against renewed Greek Cypriot economic, social, and political domination—if freedom of settlement were unfettered and most of the former Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the future Turkish Cypriot region were to choose to come home? And how, as long as there are even a few hotheads in both communities, could a return to intercommunal tensions and violence be prevented if (as Denktaş himself has put it) "Nicos Sampson and his friends were free to come to picnic and hunt in the Kyrenia Range, bringing their weapons"?

Freedom of movement and settlement is therefore likely to prove the most difficult of all issues, even with good will on both sides. Even here, however, there is a chink of light. As noted above, Denktaş claims that the wording of the third of the Makarios-Denktaş "Guidelines" of 1977—"Questions of *principle* like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, *are open for discussion* taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bicommunal federal system *and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community*" (emphasis added)—reflected Makarios' understanding and sympathy for real Turkish Cypriot concerns. Implicit in such understanding and sympathy is a willingness to be flexible about the limits and timing of freedom and movement and the principle of freedom of settlement.

Makarios is gone, which makes verification of his attitude and its endorsement by his successors more difficult, but there are other Greek Cypriots who share the views attributed to their great authority figure by Denktaş. It is also unclear, incidentally, how many of the Greek Cypriot refugees from northern districts to be included in a future Turkish Cypriot region would actually go back if they were free to do so—not counting those who could automatically return to districts like Varosha, part of Morphou, et al., that would either certainly or probably be "ceded" to the Greek Cypriot region in a final settlement. Greek Cypriots, including spokesmen for the refugees, usually claim that 90 percent would. Some Turkish Cypriot leaders (one of them even citing Makarios as the source of his estimate) put the figure as low as 10 percent, although if they really believed this they would presumably not be objecting so strongly to an unfettered right of return.

No one really knows. On the one hand, a great many of the refugees have in the past six years created satisfying new lives, often including local marriages and families, and successful businesses in the south; even most erstwhile refugee "camps," now outfitted with solid and decent houses and shops and lovingly tended gardens, have an appearance of prosperity and permanence that is only partly deceptive because it is or was subsidized. For such people, integrated into the southern Cypriot economy if not fully into its clannish society, a return would be a second uprooting. On the other hand, many have not made this adjustment, and most with new businesses and interests in the south would presumably not be averse to recovering old ones in the north as well, although they may now feel no urgency about it.

In addition, there is the painful, nostalgic longing that almost all former northerners display when they beg foreign friends, who can cross the "Green Line" they cannot cross, for news and impressions of their lost homes, villages, and familiar hills... leaving the foreign friends feeling vaguely guilty at being able, with less right, and an indecent detachment, to make such a visit. Thus the same passionate attachment to one's own people and physical environment that inhibits full social acceptance and integration in their new homes—the localism that the Italians, another Mediterranean people, aptly call *campanilismo* (from *campanile*, the parish church tower)—also draws refugees back to their old haunts. Still, some of them add that they merely want to be able to revisit the old homestead or village, and deeply resent being prohibited, but would not want to live there again; a sentiment echoed, by the way, by Turkish Cypriots transplanted to the north after 1974 and equally cut off from their birthplaces. To reiterate, no one knows how many Greek (or Turkish) Cypriots would go back if they could; or how many of the former would be prepared to understand and accept Turkish Cypriot reasons for insisting that the right to do so must at least be restricted and postponed.

- The last among those difficult issues is one that is at first glance highly abstract and therefore oddly important: the nature of sovereignty and legitimacy in the proposed Federal Republic. Would these derive from the (sovereign) peoples of two communities previously organized in political entities (states) of their own? Or would sovereignty and legitimacy derive from the united (sovereign) peoples of Cyprus, being directly vested in their common and federal state, from which they are again and in part devolved upon the two separate communities organized in regions? Capable of being phrased in a variety of ways, of which this is deliberately and provocatively the most abstract and philosophical, this question can give rise to more passionate disagreement between members of the two communities than any other constitutional issue before them. Such passion is in turn a signal that more is involved here than a modern Cypriot reversion to classic arguments, now generally regarded as sterile and unnecessary, over the concepts of sovereignty and statehood in federal states. That signal is worth pursuing, and at three levels.

The first of these is clearer in one alternative way of phrasing the question: will the government of a future Federal Republic of Cyprus be the successor of the two communal administrations that now exist de facto on the island, or of the regime that was created for a unitary, bicommunal Cyprus in 1960 and that still exists de jure in the treaties and Constitution of 1960 and as a member of the United Nations, where it is now represented by the government led by Spyros Kyprianou? For the Greek Cypriot side, accepting the first of these formulations, as their Turkish counterparts have insisted, would be to abandon the strongest bargaining card left in their hands since 1974, viz., international recognition of their government as the one and only legitimate government of all Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots maintain with equal fervor that there can be no genuine equality of status for the two communities in negotiating a settlement now, or as co-founders of a Federal Republic later, as long as this condition pertains. In other words, it has been essential to one side and anathema to the other that the exclusively Greek Cypriot administration in south Nicosia should regard itself and be regarded internationally as *the* government of Cyprus, engaged in negotiating with spokesmen for some of its citizens, who comprise a minority community with some legitimate rights and desires, about a devolution of its legitimate and heretofore unitary powers that will only *then* give that community a legal autonomous political status.

The second appears as a hidden premise in arguments used at the first level, but is also openly expressed on other occasions. Many Cypriots in each community profoundly suspect and therefore fear that the other side, through its attitude to the definition of sovereignty as in some other matters, is betraying an undiminished but now secret adherence to an ultimate goal that has been publicly renounced for temporary tactical reasons. These suspected secret goals are still partition (taksim) for the Turkish Cypriots, and for the Greek Cypriots a Greek island (and therefore, when possible, enosis?) with a Turkish minority as second-class citizens.

At a third and subtler level, Greek and Turkish Cypriots are actually arguing about what would become the "founding myth" of the federal state and regime they propose to create, and it is reasonable to assume that their passion on the subject derives at least in part from an awareness—conscious or otherwise—of the great symbolic and thereby political and psychological importance that tends to accrue to such myths in any human society. In accordance with one definition of its origins and sovereignty, the Federal Republic would be regarded as the creation of separate and equal Greek and Turkish communities, who had determined to come together in this way in order "to form a more perfect union" without sacrificing their separateness and much of their sovereignty. In accordance with the other it would be regarded as the creation of the once and still de jure united Cyprus, whose citizens had decided that their union could be sustained only through devolution of powers in a bicommunal federation. Which of these versions became established and accepted could be expected to have a significant impact on self-identity and sense of community (as Cypriots and/or as Greeks and Turks, and in what rank-order), on loyalties and attitudes toward the federation, its subunits, and the relative degrees of legitimacy to be accorded to their respective organs and leaders, and on other fundamental psychological states that affect political and social behavior, including interpersonal and intercommunal relations.

The same issue also surfaces in arguments concerning the office, function, and election of the Federal President. The Greek side wants a powerful President (and Vice-President) elected by communally undifferentiated universal suf-

frage (with the Vice-President to be a Turkish Cypriot if the President is a Greek Cypriot and vice versa). The Turkish side has called for a Federal Presidency with purely ceremonial functions, to be rotated annually between the presidents of the two regions, each elected by and from his own community. While questions of power are also obviously involved, the symbolic aspect of this issue, which once again concerns the relative primacy of pan-Cypriot or of Greek and Turkish communal symbols and allegiances has been described as equally important by several Cypriots from both communities.[9]

In negotiating a federal solution the superficially abstract question of the derivation and nature of the federation's sovereignty will for all these reasons be hard to evade, for example through a neutrally worded constitutional preamble that avoids specifying them (i.e., no "We the people of...?). However, evading it may also prove to be the only solution, at least for the time being.

The conclusion suggested by this incomplete and schematic analysis of negotiating issues and differences has already been stated at the beginning of this section and in the introduction to this *Report*. No solution to the Cyprus question in its post-1974 context has been found, although the outline of a potentially durable one can be defined, because the will to pay the price and to take the risks that are inherent in that outline has been lacking on all sides. This lack of will is in turn, but only partly, because these risks, as defined by each side's deep-seated mistrust and fear of the other, have seemed greater than the costs of muddling on with a divided island, a game of waiting (like Dickens' Mr. Macawber) "in case anything turns up."

Why Bother?

And why not the status quo as a (non-) solution that is at least more comfortable for most of those concerned than the circumstances they lived with at any time between 1963 and 1974? To general surprise, including their own, the Greek Cypriots on their 60 percent of the island have recovered and often surpassed the 1973 level of prosperity, the highest in the Eastern Mediterranean, that they once wailed was destroyed forever by the division of the island, the creation of 200,000 homeless and jobless refugees, and the alienation of their purportedly richest lands, resources, and capital investments in tourism and agriculture.

The Turkish Cypriots are poorer by more than half, and their economic prospects are blighted by semi-isolation from the world (through the Greek Cypriot "blockade" that is one of their major grievances—although only partly effective—and that the Greek Cypriots justify, inter alia, on the grounds that northern trade and tourism are based on "stolen" and illegally operated hotels, farms, and factories), by linkage with Turkey's chronic economic crisis, and by historic deficiencies in social structure. However, they are demonstrably better off, economically as well as in other respects, and less isolated ("at least our prison is now much larger," one remarked) than in their "enclaves" before 1974, and this comparison—according to their leaders—is the one they make and from which they draw conclusions. It is true that Greek Cypriots from the north have their largely legitimate grievances and longings, and that Turkish Cypriots generally resent their economic dependence and political subordination to crisis-ridden Turkey and have little love for the "primitive" Anatolian Turks who have come to live among them. But the former, with some exceptions, are not really suffering, the latter have more control over their individual and communal destinies than ever before, or at least since 1963, and (of special importance) all are relieved of the incubus of intercommunal strife, tension, terrorization, and occasional murder that burdened their lives before 1974.

As for governments in the outside world with an interest in the matter, Athens appears ready to be satisfied (and relieved) by anything the Greek Cypriots will accept, and Ankara has little reason (apart from the costs of occupying and subsidizing the north) to dislike a status quo that protects Turkey's southern flank and Turkish kinsmen on the island. Britain's sovereignty over the Akrotiri and Dhekelia Base Areas is not seriously challenged, nor are Washington's primary interests if these are defined as limited to peace today within and on NATO's southeastern flank, the security of British bases and communications centers that reinforce NATO capabilities although they are outside NATO, and anything that keeps the Turks happy and the Russians out. For their part, the Soviet government seems to be content with anything that keeps Cyprus nonaligned and friendly and NATO out.

It is surely legitimate to weigh these things, including the instinctive preference for the evil

one knows against the uncertainties inherent in the kind of compromise solution that could presently be achieved.

There are, of course, other risks of an individual and political nature for those currently in a position to move toward a negotiated solution: their political survival or at least the power and perquisites of present office are at stake. The first of these risks is equally incurred by Kyprianou and Denktaş and by their senior officials and advisers. Their repeated warning that any agreement they sign must be acceptable to their respective constituencies is true, and concerns their survival, as well as a canny negotiating ploy and an evasion of what they might do to prepare their peoples to accept unpopular concessions. The second applies to civil servants and elected officials of both communities in existing dual and often bloated bureaucracies, many of which ought to be combined and the rest slimmed down if Cyprus is reunited. (A Turkish Cypriot, pointing to the colonial-era building on Atatürk Square in north Nicosia that houses part of the government of the TFSC/TFSK, remarked: "Just imagine, in British times the whole island was governed from that one building, but now it houses only some of the offices to run 38 percent of it! What will happen to all this if we become a region and no longer have to fulfill all the functions of an independent state?") It also applies in a special way, or so it is frequently said, to Denktaş, who clearly enjoys the perquisites of being a head-of-state, even if the state is minuscule and unrecognized, and would have to exchange these for at best those of president of a federal region if the negotiations succeed. (On the other hand, would he not in fact enjoy more power and independence in that formally lesser status, if Turkish Cypriot demands for regional autonomy are even largely met, than he does now, when he cannot make any significant move without checking Turkish government or Army views on the matter?)

Finally there is the case to be made for avoiding agreement now in the hope of an improvement in one's own or a deterioration in the other side's bargaining position. Perhaps a new American President—expectations focused on campaign statements by Jimmy Carter and other Democrats in 1976 and by Ronald Reagan and other Republicans in 1980—will see that justice and American interests demand effective American pressure on Turkey to yield and withdraw. Perhaps the Greek Cypriots will finally understand that this will never happen, because Turkey is more important to the U.S. and NATO than Greece or Greek Cyprus, and will become more amenable. Perhaps economic hardship and bitter experience with Turkish overlordship, the Turkish economy, Turkish colonization, and political extremism imported from Turkey will finally soften Denktaş and his gang. Perhaps growing Greek Cypriot opposition to Kyprianou and his failure to produce results will force him to make concessions or to give way to those who will. Perhaps, in the minds of those many who are convinced that the United States and the United Kingdom also secretly prefer the status quo for reasons suggested above, these powers will finally realize that a united, peaceful, genuinely independent, prosperous, and nonaligned but fundamentally pro-Western Cyprus would serve their interest even better, and will act to achieve it. Perhaps....

Answers to many of these arguments for accepting the status quo as the least likely of all likely evils are provided, more in hope than in faith, by Cypriots of both communities who would prefer a reunited Cyprus, recognizing the need to make concessions and assume risks, and who would prefer it now. The present partition, they argue, is economically and politically irrational, fragmenting an already small and naturally complementary economy, leaving one part hopelessly nonviable and dependent on a foreign and crisis-ridden state and the other without essential resources, and producing two absurdly small and dangerously weak states (never mind that several UN members are still smaller) in places of one that was already small enough. It condemns the two to eternal enmity and a costly fortified frontier probably only temporarily reinforced by UNFICYP, and these are in the longer run more threatening to the peace and security of both communities and the wider region, beginning with Greece and Turkey, than the risk of intercommunal tensions in a biregional federal state. And for all these reasons and their destabilizing potential in an unstable part of the world it should also be less desirable to outside powers, primarily Western but also Eastern, than a reunited federal and nonaligned Cyprus.

As for the arguments in favor of a waiting game, the answer offered here is that each passing year further entrenches partition in its

present form, making its undoing and an enduring peaceful reunification more difficult. Each year more young Cypriots grow up with no personal acquaintance and knowledge of the other side as a counterbalance to nationalist propaganda and ethnic stereotypes portraying their own community as entirely virtuous, the other as entirely vicious. Each year brings further expansion and entrenchment of enterprises and economic sectors with a vested interest in the preservation of partition, such as those engaged in smuggling and "gray market" activities across the Green Line or otherwise profiting from the barriers to commerce and human contact it creates. Each year the fragile flower of "Cypriot consciousness," which advocates of a reunited Cyprus believe was beginning to take root and to cast a healthy shadow over centrifugal and mutually hostile Greek and Turkish nationalisms, withers more in this unhealthy climate. "It is already five minutes to twelve," they are fond of saying, "and soon it will be altogether too late."

Finally, and underlying all of the above, there is the conviction that such a "Cypriot consciousness"—capable of pacifying differences, generating loyalty to a common Cypriot homeland, and thereby of clear and universal benefit—is possible, as well as desirable, because it is based on a cultural fact. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the argument goes, actually have more in common with one another, as a result of a shared history and environment (in which the influence of British culture on both native cultures after 1878 is often cited as an important mediating factor) and despite religious and linguistic differences, than Greek Cypriots have with mainland Greeks or Turkish Cypriots with mainland Turks. It is further argued that this "fact," formerly obscured from view by the islanders' limited personal acquaintance with mainland Greeks and Turks and by rival nationalist sentiments feeding on intercommunal socioeconomic differences and conflicts of interest, is being perceived, and conclusions are being drawn, by a growing number of Cypriots that is proportionate to the growth of contacts and experience with the two "motherlands" since 1960 (for Greek Cypriots) and 1974 (for Turkish Cypriots). These experiences have generally been both culturally and politically disillusioning: "They are a different people" and "They have been pursuing their own interests in Cyprus, which are not ours" are said and in fact seem to be the usual conclusions.[10]

In political terms, the argument continues, the consequences have not yet included much perceptible further growth of nascent "Cypriot consciousness," which would be difficult under present circumstances, but they do include an increased sense of separate identity and interests and with these the demise, or near demise, of enosis sentiment among Greek Cypriots and of taksim-with-annexation sentiment among Turkish Cypriots. Unfortunately, total lack of communication between the two communities since 1974, and its almost total lack in the preceding decade, have prevented each from seeing and believing that this change has also taken place in the other's sense of identity and political aspirations. Most Turkish Cypriots (including their leaders) therefore go on believing that most Greek Cypriots secretly continue to hanker after enosis and will try for it again when there is an opportunity, and most Greek Cypriots (including their leaders) harbor corresponding beliefs about Turkish Cypriot aspirations and intentions. The vicious circle of mutual suspicion and fear is unbroken, and can be broken only by the restoration of communication and personal contact between the two communities—either through or in anticipation of a political settlement.

Eppur si muove

Arguments and counterarguments of all these kinds can affect the course and outcome of negotiations and the Cyprus question only indirectly, as they affect the negotiators and those who instruct them. It is precisely here, however, that some signs of a change in the weather have lately been appearing, like distant end-of-summer lightning over the Troodos or Kyrenia ranges, beyond the edges of the dull unending drama of the intercommunal 'tea-dance" and the feverish tactical maneuvers of Kyprianou and Denktaş. Fears for political survival if unpopular concessions were to be made and a settlement appeared to renege on proud promises or to compromise vital communal interests are giving way, or may soon do so, to fears for political survival (and hopes for political power in other quarters) if intransigence or lack of desire, imagination, or courage on one or both sides, seem to be the chief impediments to a solution that would be imperfect but widely regarded as better than none.

This phenomenon assumes different forms on the two sides of the Green Line.

In the south open political rebellion against Krypianou's alleged incompetence and manifest

immobility has been stalking the land since the early summer of 1980, ending the uneasy political truce that had encompassed all parties except Clerides' after Makarios' death. Clerides himself and his Democratic Rally—the only party formally in opposition but excluded from the House of Representatives by the workings of a post-Makarios electoral pact among the rest—have raised the volume on their long-standing demand that Kyprianou resign or at least call early new elections. On the left the Communist AKEL—the best organized and traditionally strongest Cypriot party, enjoying the largest share of popular support (around 35% in most current estimates) of any Communist party in a country with free contested elections, and heretofore backers of the government—publicly proclaimed its "distance" from Kyprianou in June, then "withdrew its support" without formally going into opposition, and is calling with increasing stridency for new initiatives and greater empathy in negotiating with the north. Kyprianou's own Democratic Party (Deko), never well organized or coherent, showed signs of shaking apart during the summer and in October, while Kyprianou was on an official visit to Yugoslavia. It began to suffer defections that quickly reduced its earlier 21 seats in the 35-member House to 12—still the largest contingent but only 3 more than AKEL's 9. Among the defectors were Alexis Michaelides, the party's co-founder and President of the House, former "interlocutor" Tassos Papadopolous, and other pretenders to future leadership. Then EDEK, the small but sometimes pivotal socialist party (4 seats in the House and support estimated between 5% and 8% of the voters) led by Vassos Lyssarides, once Makarios' personal physician, and taking the hardest line on negotiations (federation still revocable and no more concessions until someone makes Turkey bend), joined the call for early elections. That the crisis was not pushed to a conclusion before the end of 1980 was primarily because all the parties, except Clerides' Rally, would really prefer to wait for the center of the political spectrum to sort itself out and produce a new "third force" capable of repulsing the challenge from Clerides on the right, restoring Makarios' tacit alliance with AKEL on the left, and on this basis putting together a government that could take new initiatives on "the Cyprus question."

The political outcome cannot be predicted with any degree of confidence. This is partly because of the complex motives, goals, and possible new combinations of parties and individual politicians that characterize a singularly fluid situation. Furthermore, if and when elections are finally held (the mandate of the present House of Representatives expires in September 1981), past performance tells us little: the results last time were skewed by pre-electoral party deals; nearly a quarter of the electorate stayed away from the polls (in protest?) but will not be able to do so again, the electoral law having been changed to make voting compulsory, and no one knows how they will vote. It is also uncertain how Kyprianou, if still in office as he seems determined to be (*his* mandate runs until 1982), will respond if confronted by a hostile majority in a new House.

In these circumstances only one thing, but a vital one, does seem predictable: the political constellation that emerges from the present confusion and the House that will reflect it will be more interested in a bicommunally negotiated solution to the Cyprus question, and therefore more willing to do what seems necessary to achieve one, than has lately been the case. The reasoning here: AKEL and Clerides' Rally are the Greek Cypriot parties most committed, and perhaps the only ones genuinely committed, to such a solution (that they have nothing else in common is what prevents an AKEL-Clerides coalition forming on this issue: "We agree only on tactics and methods for solving the Cyprus question," an AKEL spokesman told me in June 1980, "but not on starting and finishing points.") They are also generally considered likely to come in first and second in a general election. The "third force" that may emerge from the shambles around Kyprianou has a less describable profile and prospects, but its likeliest protagonists tend at least to be more flexible, less bound by past stances, and less unsure of themselves than Kyprianou has been; moreover, they would need allies and early successes on *the* Cyprus question in order to hold the balance of power and political middle ground to which they would aspire, and this would make them attentive to terms for support from AKEL and the I-could-do-it-better challenge of Clerides. And Kyprianou himself, if he survives, is likely to do so only by paying the same attention.

In brief, the political scene in the south is in movement, and the omens for those who want a negotiated solution are on balance positive.

In the north there is also grumbling, the political scene is in motion, and elections that are likely to diminish Denktaş' National Unity

Party's control of the TFSC/TFSK legislature are due in 1981. Many, especially in educated and otherwise politicized social groups, are critical of at least some of his tactics in negotiating with the south and dealing with Turkey, and his social conservatism on domestic issues angers the political left while his secularism alienates the mullahs and lay religious conservatives on the Islamic right. Many more from all classes irritably hold him responsible for post-1974 immigration from Turkey, which he initially encouraged on the ground that the immigrants were needed to bolster the size of the island's Turkish community. Mostly peasants from backward southeastern Anatolia, they do not "fit in" among the far better educated and more "cultured" Turkish Cypriots and are almost universally unpopular—although, granted TFSC/TFSK citizenship, they also supply Denktaş' party with a solid bloc of beholden voters.

On the other hand, Denktaş' personal popularity is still great, his position almost unassailable. He is the so far indispensable symbol of his community, whose ordinary members regard him as a kind of *ghazi*, the warrior-hero of the Osmanlis, bearing sword and shield against his people's enemies. At a more mundane level he knows almost all of them by their first names, listens and caters to their personal problems, and kisses their babies—"like the perfect political boss of a south Chicago ward," an American observer remarked, "and that, remember, is the size of his constituency."

The formal political opposition is in any case fragmented and constantly subject to further fragmentation on the basis of individual followings, combinations and jealousies as well as some ideological differentiation. Five parties, three of them splinters from the National Unity Party, are represented in the present parliament of the TFSC/TFSK, and at least two more—one Muslim clericalist, the other primarily Anatolian—are expected to join them in contesting the next elections. The present line-up: 23 deputies from the NUP, 6 from the People's Salvation Party (also translated as Communal Salvation Party), 5 from the Democratic People's Party, 2 from the Turkish Republican Party, and one from the People's Party. The Turkish Republican Party is undeniably Marxist and generally regarded as also Leninist. The People's Salvation Party, created by Alpay Durduran and other defectors from Alper Orhon's People's Party, itself originally formed by defectors from the NUP, displayed growing popularity by taking 36 percent of the vote in the local elections of 1980 and therefore appears to pose the most serious threat to the NUP, but the situation is too fluid for confident predictions. In addition to this fragmentation, all the opposition parties claim that their opposition is confined to domestic issues and that Denktaş has their backing, at least as long as he informs and consults them as he apparently is careful to do, on the Cyprus question.

While a northern analogue to the internal political pressures favoring a more flexible negotiating stance in south Nicosia is therefore more potential than actual at this time, there is another place from which such pressures could in principle originate. The Turkish government and Army—since September at least temporarily synonymous—must approve and can veto Denktaş' initiatives in dealing with the south and in other matters. Here he now faces new uncertainties. He may know, although the rest of the world is still uninformed, whether the new rulers of Turkey want to clear the slate of the Cyprus question, and are eager enough to demand more Turkish Cypriot flexibility and concessions for the sake of a solution. It is at least clear that they are in a better position to do so, if this is their wish, than the civilian government of Suleyman Demirel that they replaced, a minority government dependent for its survival on the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan, who is generally viewed as intransigent on the Cyprus question as in other "Islamic" matters. Erbakan remained under arrest (along with Alparslan Türkeş, head of the National Action Party and even more chauvinist and unbending on the Cyprus question) when Demirel and Ecevit were released in October 1980.

The net result is that Denktaş, like Kyprianou or his successors but in lesser, different, and more speculative degrees, may find himself under new and additional pressure to be more forthcoming in the search for a negotiated solution to the Cyprus question. If so, and if other developments on both sides of the Green Line have the significance and direction described in these pages, the negotiating balance may be restructured at a lower threshhold of mutual resistance to concessions. And if and when that happens—which is not likely to be before scheduled

elections in the north and south have clarified the situation *or* Ankara has taken a strong stand—a Federal Republic of Cyprus that is not quite what either community wanted, but that both communities can live with, may yet come into existence.

This conclusion is full of "ifs." If these "ifs," or any key ones among them, are answered in the negative, the world and the Cypriots will presumably go on living with an inconclusively divided Cyprus for a long time to come. Which might or might not matter much, for the Cypriots or the world. This observer happens to think that it would be a pity for the Cypriots and, in the longer run, for regional stability and therefore the world.

(January 1981)

NOTES

1. George Mikes, *Eureka! Rummaging in Greece* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965), p. 107.

2. The studies by Theodore Coulombis (ed.), Laurence Stern, and Michael Attalides cited in the bibliographical note at the end of this *Report* provide critical and at times quasi-demoniacal interpretations of the American role (using many of the same sources and in fact building on one another) by, respectively, American scholars of Greek Cypriot origins (Van Coufoudakis of Indiana University et al.), an American investigative journalist, and a Greek Cypriot scholar-politician.

3. One should specify one's sample: "almost all" and "many" or "most" in the preceding sentences and elsewhere in this *Report* refer to a wide range but limited number of Cypriots of both communities interviewed or otherwise encountered by this observer and a research assistant in recent months, and with less certainty to a far larger number whose views these Cypriots and other outside observers of the Cypriot scene claimed to know.

4. Various motives for Makarios' dismissal of his longtime heir apparent have been cited by usually well-informed sources, including the victim himself. Makarios had convinced himself that Clerides was "pro-NATO" or a "NATO tool" and not merely "pro-Western"; insinuations that Clerides was moving, or being moved, to push him aside and take the presidency sooner rather than later; suspicions of Clerides' friendly personal relationship with Denktaş and readiness to compromise; or all of these and others.

5. Kyprianou ran unopposed after Clerides withdrew his candidacy in the emotional atmosphere created by the kidnapping, or purported kidnapping, of Kyprianou's son as the campaign was getting under way. The son later reappeared as mysteriously as he had disappeared.

6. See Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Institutional Framework of a Federally Structured Cyprus—An International Seminar Report* (published with restricted distribution by CMS/AUFS, Rome, 1978).

7. The Qadhafi offer, according to a senior, well-informed, but possibly self-serving Turkish Cypriot source, was not the result of a Denktaş initiative, as widely believed. It actually developed out of approaches made to the Libyans at and during preparations for the Havana nonaligned summit meeting in September 1979 by Kyprianou, who was trying to kill two birds with one Libyan stone: to flatter and thereby gain the support of a nonaligned but previously pro-Turkish influential leader and at the same time to undermine Denktaş's campaign for worldwide Muslim recognition of his as a Muslim cause. Reportedly ignoring (and resenting) Turkish Cypriot warnings about Kyprianou's motives, Qadhafi took the bit between his teeth. Perhaps he sensed an opportunity to compensate for his loss of Malta as a client state, which was then brewing but not yet common knowledge outside Tripoli and Valetta, by establishing influence over another, larger, and equally strategic Mediterranean island.

8. See note 6.

9. A similar recognition of the importance of symbols can also be discerned in the "regret," expressed to this observer by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot partisans of a united Cyprus, that the flag chosen for the Republic in 1960—a pale orange map of the island on a white background, deliberately eschewing Hellenic blue, Turkish red, and Muslim green for a color representing an important export commodity!—was so "insipid" it was incapable of inspiring the excitement and loyalty of either community. "The map is so pale," one of them said, "that the thing looks more like a white flag of surrender!"

10. More on this subject, including the present writer's own impressions of "Kebab-with-chips" Cypriotism, will be found in a later and more "personal" *Report.*

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CYPRUS



Source: Composite drawn from TFSC tourist map, and *An Appeal for Cyprus* (TFSC office, New York: December 1976).