

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

EPW-5
The Formation of Parties

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& New Guinea
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Dear Mr. Nolte:

The first few months of 1967 have marked the emergence of the Territory's first two indigenous-led political parties with any real hope of survival. Political parties have been established before in Papua and New Guinea, but they have always lacked the membership size and quality, the organization and the potentially wide appeal of these two parties. The aim of this Newsletter, then, is to analyse the background and nature of the PANGU Pati and the Christian Democrats in order to appreciate their significance in the Territory's longterm political development.

The Institutional Background

Until 1951 Papuans and New Guineans were entirely excluded from all of the central institutions of legislative, executive and judicial power in the Territory. A few village councils had existed before the War, and some others were in the process of establishment. Some indigenes, not necessarily the holders of any traditional authority, exercised a measure of strictly controlled executive and judicial power on behalf of the central government. Politics at the centre was a wholly European affair. Indigenous politics existed beside, despite, or in isolation from, the central government. Indigenous opinion existed and mattered only insofar as the central government could, or chose to, interpret it. Even European politics was of only peripheral concern to the Territory's administrators.

The first post-War Legislative Council was established in 1951. For the first time, it included 3 indigenous members - all non-official, yet nominated by the Administration, and all unwilling or unable to confront Administration policy on major issues. They were, anyway, selected primarily on the basis of their previous record of cooperation with the Administration, and effectively outnumbered by 26 European members. Of the European members, the Administrator and 16 others were Official Members and therefore pledged to the support of government policy. 6 of the remaining members were appointed by the Administrator, and the 3 missionaries among them were intended as paternalistic spokesmen on the indigenes' behalf. 3 members were elected to the Council by the Territory's European population. In 1960, as a bold experiment, Dr. Reuben Taureka was nominated to sit for a year as the Territory's first and only indigenous Official Member.

Primarily as a result of pressure for a greater non-official, but still predominantly European, say in policy-making, the Australian Government reconstituted the Council after 1960. The increase in non-official European representation, however, was complemented by an increase in indigenous representation. For the first time, the Administrator and 14 other Official Members were outnumbered by 22 non-official members. 12 of the new Council's members were indigenes, of whom 6 were elected on a restricted franchise by local government councillors and other relatively sophisticated local leaders. The 6 indigenous nominees were again non-official members, i.e. they were not bound to support Administration policy in the Council. Of the indigenous members, only John Guise (elected for Eastern Papua), Vin Tobainig (the United Progress Party's candidate for New Britain) and Nicholas Brokam (elected for the New Guinea Islands) merit further mention, as does Dr. Reuben Taureka, who came back this time as a non-official nominee. Simogen Pita, the only indigenous member to have survived the first four Councils, was finally dropped. The most remarkable feature of this Council was the failure still of its indigenous members either to oppose the Administration on any major issue, or to organise themselves.

Following the visit of the 1962 United Nations Visiting Mission led by Sir Hugh Foot, and the reports of the Legislative Council's own Select Committee on Constitutional Development, the Council was abolished at the end of 1963, and replaced in 1964 by the House of Assembly.

The present House of Assembly was elected early in 1964. It is the first legislature in the Territory's history to have an elected majority. It consists of 10 nominated Official Members, 10 Members for Special Electorates and 44 for Open Electorates.

Candidature for the Special Electorates was restricted to Europeans, though the election was held on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Of the 10 Special Electorate members, 4 have previous legislative experience: J.R.Stuntz (East Papua Special, elected M.L.C. for Eastern Papua, 1961-3), Ian F.G.Downs (Highlands Special, elected M.L.C. for the New Guinea Mainland in 1957 and 1961), Donald Barrett (West Gazelle Special, elected M.L.C. in 1951-7, and 1960), and H.L.R. Niall (North Markham Special, and an Official Member, 1951-63, now Speaker of the House).

The rights of candidature and suffrage for the 44 Open Electorates applied to adults of all races. The 6 Europeans elected for Open Electorates showed that the widespread fears that the indigenes would not vote for Europeans unless the Special Electorates were set up were misplaced. 4 of the 6 were former Administration officials, though one of them had not worked for the Administration in the electorate for which he stood. Of the 38 indigenous members, only John Guise, Nicholas Brokam and Simogen Pita have had previous legislative experience.

The 1968 elections will be contested in 15 Regional Electorates, with an educational qualification for candidature, to replace the Special Electorates, and in 69 Open Electorates. There will still be 10 Official Members, but greater executive responsibility will

devolve upon the 16 new ministers and under-secretaries.

At least formally, then, effective political power at the centre has, subject to the infrequently used power of disallowance vested in the Governor-General, been within the grasp of indigenous Papuans and New Guineans since 1964.

Why No Parties?

There have been several attempts at setting up political parties in the Territory, but they have all so far failed for quite similar reasons.

In 1961, Don Barrett, a former M.L.C., ex-President of the New Guinea Planters' Association, and now a member of the House of Assembly, founded the United Progress Party. The party lasted a little more than a year, during which time it endorsed Barrett and Vin Tobaining for the European and indigenous ~~New Britain~~ seats respectively in the 1961 election. Only Tobaining was successful, and the party collapsed because of its lack of any effective legislative outlet for its aspirations.

The party's policy was moderate and oriented towards development. It sought eventual nationhood, but stressed the need for the Territory to retain its strong ties with Australia. The indigenous candidates for the party did not stress their connection with it, and seemed vague about its policy. The European members were attacked for attempting to use Papuans and New Guineans. "So far as can be ascertained," wrote Colin Hughes, "the U.P.P. label helped no one in the (1961) elections; it may have handicapped indigenous candidates with some representatives (at the 6 electoral conferences)."

In 1963, a group of professionals, businessmen and planters in the Territory and in Australia formed the New Guinea Party. The party's prime concerns were with the protection of Australian investments in the Territory, and with the Territory's defence. Its policy was, if anything, relatively right-wing. Its immediate aim was to contest the 1963 Australian Federal election, for which it put up 4 candidates, with the object of securing a Territory representative in the Commonwealth Parliament. In the longterm, it seems to have sought the Territory's eventual inclusion as the seventh state of the Australian Federation. Its leader was Bruce Miles, a Sydney solicitor, and it included a number of New Guinea "old hands" in its ranks.

The nomination of Union Begi, from the Finschhafen area of New Guinea, for the Wentworth electorate in Sydney was rejected by the local returning officer, and all of its final candidates lost their nomination deposits. One of them, Charles Kilduff, later contested and lost the Central Special seat at the 1964 House of Assembly election, while the party claimed another 6 or 7 undisclosed candidates of both races at the same election. The New Guinea Party's defeat at both elections showed simply that the Territory's politics scarcely concerned the vast majority of Australians in any way at all, and that its policies were too narrowly conceived for even widespread European support within the Territory.

Since 1963, a number of attempts have been made to set up Territory branches of the Australian Labor Party, the present Australian Federal Opposition. A fullblown branch existed in New Guinea before the Second World War, but all of the various attempts at its resuscitation have been abortive. Despite the offer of financial assistance from Australia, and the party's appeal in the eyes of a few oldtime radicals of the immediate post-War period in the Territory, the A.L.P.'s main concerns are simply too remote for Territorians to hope for any real voice in policy-making. Anyway, why should indigenous Papuans and New Guineans seek to join an Australian political party if they are denied, and probably do not seek, a voice in Federal politics?

The reasons for the failure of these 3 parties seem quite clear:

(i) Until 1964, they lacked any focus within the Territory about which they might politicise with any real hope of success. There was certainly no institution through which they might exercise direct and effective legislative power. The Administration had the numbers to do what it wanted in the Legislative Council. Particular interest groups would do better to politicise directly at Konedobu, or even in Canberra, than to engage in the difficult task of mass organisation, even assuming that they sought widespread local support for their causes.

(ii) They were European-led, and Europocentric in structure and policy. Their appeals were primarily to European economic interests or to homesick expatriates anxious for signs of support from home. Their very organisation usually precluded effective indigenous participation, and the interests they represented rarely would have welcomed any encouragement of the indigenous participation in central politics. Partly, there simply were very few sophisticated indigenes likely to be of real use in such organisations, and partly, the parties' leaders conceived of the indigenous interest in ethnocentric and paternalistic terms that would have precluded the support of any real indigenous sophisticates. All of these parties were concerned to promote the indigenes' supposed or desired interests. None of them foresaw the need to come to terms with the indigenes' felt needs for quite some time, much less the desirability of attempting to do so then.

There were also a number of more general factors that inhibited the emergence of political parties. The lack of an effective central legislature rendered electoral victory worthless, and, given the small size of the Territory's European, especially non-public service, community, unnecessary. The Chinese population (about 2,300) of New Guinea had its own politics, and local branches of the Kuo Min Tang were set up from time to time. Their interest, however, was primarily in domestic Chinese politics, especially after the New Guinea Chinese were granted the right to apply for Australian citizenship in the mid-1950s.

Not only was there no objective need, or real opportunity, for parties within the Territory, but the major Australian parties were able to clothe their lack of interest in, and concern for, Territory affairs in the guise of a bipartisan Territorial policy that lasted until about 1962-3. Thus there was no conflict over Territory policy in Australia, and little desire even to establish local branches of Australian parties for fear of disturbing the equilibrium of one of Australia's "settled policies". Even now, little newspaper interest, and even less political interest in the Territory is evident in Australia, though, in

both cases, there is now considerably more interest displayed than was the case even three years ago.

The ideology of development, with its stress that all differences should be cast aside in favour of getting on with the job of, especially economic, development was abroad. Parties were wrong, unnecessarily divisive and likely to arouse the indigenes. These widespread expatriate attitudes were reinforced by the Australian Government's conviction that there were, and should be, economic and social prerequisites for political development. Politics could await the attainment of more general development. Only in 1964 did Mr. P.M.C. Hasluck, the former Minister for Territories (1951-64) admit that this version of colonial preparation theory had failed, and that the rate of political change would, in fact, outstrip the other aspects of change.

Even now, quite apart from the belief that politics should follow, not dictate the pace and direction of, development, there persists a widespread official belief that colonial development is, and should be, a cooperative undertaking. The aims of officialdom and of the ruled are the same. Even further, the aims of the Administration, the European and indigenous ruled, are identical, and not only in official eyes. Indeed, one of the more prominent leaders in the Legislative Council, and later in the House of Assembly, Ian Downs, went so far as to declare in 1963:

"I have always regarded this (Legislative) Council as a single legislature and not one with one side in opposition to the other. In a country as small as this and at this stage of development, I think it is important for the country and not the party or the individual, nor any section of the party, to be put first...I hope that the new House of Assembly will continue along similar lines and be a single legislature and not be immediately divided into parties. At this particular stage, I think that one has to think very carefully as to how such parties will develop and I feel that if the new House of Assembly can sit in the beginning as a single house it will not be separated into racial divisions..."

Politics is so much less predictable when no longer under European control.

In many more tangible ways than mere belief or utterance, Australian policy has been in no way helpful in fostering political organisation. The United Nations Trusteeship Council has urged Australia repeatedly to encourage the formation of political parties. Although motivated by considerations that Australia is scarcely likely to share with the U.N., the U.N.'s urging has very real point for Australia. In the long run, a colonial government, especially one territorially contiguous to its principal charge, may be sensible to encourage a responsible political opposition, however much it may be able to strengthen its hand in the short run through perpetuating the colony's political fragmentation. In the end, indigenous frustration at such continued fragmentation and the consequent hindrance to political organisation, may only lead to the expression of demands even more inimical to the ruling government's policies than those it originally sought to repress. Unfortunately, few governments deliberately set about digging their own graves. Even in the age of decolonisation few governments begin to prepare for the inevitable until obliged by events to do so. Their lack of any serious

preparation may merely hasten, and certainly worsen, their end.

The Australian Government's belief in the longrun compatibility of Australia's and the Territory's interests, and the repeated stress on the need to prepare for national politics, blinded it to the need to assist in overcoming the Territory's political fragmentation. Indeed, the very failure to develop the Territory politically until very recently may explain the Territory's backwardness in other spheres, particularly in relation to public service localisation. Governments, including colonial governments, are most surely stirred to action by a concerned and politically sophisticated public.

The low level of indigenous political awareness until quite recently can largely be explained in terms of the Administration's failure to develop an educational or a political elite. The policy of uniform development which persisted throughout the 1950s was interpreted so as to delay the introduction of secondary education until the late 1950s, and of a university until 1966. Statutory village councils were not set up until 1950, and their rapid expansion beyond a few long-contacted areas not begun till 1960. The early councils, anyway, tended only to rigidify old village loyalties rather than to force erstwhile enemies to live together. Only in the last few years have these councils been made multiracial, and, even now, very few of them embrace people from more than one large language-group.

It is no new criticism to point out that many councils are still used as arms of the local administration, at best for consultation, and only occasionally, though increasingly, for genuine decision-making. Even now that about three-quarters of the Territory's population is under local government, few councils are able to meet without their official advisers. To date, the only relevant training available to these advisers has been that given to them when they were appointed as patrol officers. Indigenous politics for most of the Territory's population still centres around social units very little larger than those of the pre-contact era, and European politics still takes place in institutions such as the Highlands Farmers' and Settlers' Association which tend to be multiracial in membership rather than in policy-orientation or control.

The failure of any indigenous political or educational elites to emerge until very recently was not just the effect, but the aim, of Australian policy. Australian egalitarianism was transformed in the colonial context from an ideology of aid to the underdog to a belief in the need to keep everyone down to the same size. In consequence, few non-traditional organizations apart from a number of millenarian cargo cults were set up by Papuans and New Guineans themselves. The Methodist Welfare Society was begun in Port Moresby, mainly at the instigation of Lepani Watson (now M.H.A. for Esa'ala-Losuia), in 1955, and the Kerema (from 1961, Western) Welfare Association, led by Albert Mauri Kiki, in 1958. Albert Mauri Kiki, Dr. Reuben Taureka and a similar group of young urban leaders set up the Territory's first trade union, the Papua and New Guinea (later, the Port Moresby) Workers' Association as late as 1960. Apart from Dr. Taureka, now the Territory's most senior indigenous public servant, most of these leaders of these organisations had only a rather inadequate post-primary education. Few urban leaders even now have a proper tertiary education. The contemporary notion of a Territory

sophisticate has a rather modest connotation.

Until recently, many Papuans and New Guineans have, in consequence of the foregoing, subscribed to what I have called "the myth of organisational betrayal". Much of the myth's currency rests upon a misapprehension of the possible benefits of a Western type of education. The most widespread demand among the new university students is for a department of political science. Their expectations from it, however, are not only vague, but positively frightening, unless the incoming professor should happen to be an extremely confident psephologist with a decided bent for the applied.

Objectively, many Papuans and New Guineans do still rely upon European advice and guidance to an enormous extent. Their objective dependance upon European technical and managerial know-how has, however, been reinforced by a psychological dependance upon Europeans generally that implies much of what Mannoni pointed to in Prospero and Caliban. The Highlanders' psychological dependance upon Europeans owes a great deal to their objective situation, while that of many of the coastal people owes more to the white man's historical assertion of his superiority and his neglect of their educational advancement. Having been told for nearly 60 years that they were inferior, and refused the opportunity to learn self-reliance, many coastal people seem to accept their position of dependance, but with rather more bitterness than their Highland compatriots. As late as 1965, when I first came to the Territory, I found, in discussion, that many of the Territory's so-called elite blamed their political quiescence upon the myth's reality. They claimed to know what they wanted, but to be unsure of how to gain their ends. They had now been told to participate in politics, but were unsure of how to organise. They shammed politeness and agreement, but resented very bitterly their organisational shortcomings, which they blamed, almost to a man, upon the inadequacies of their education. The Australian Administration had, they felt, failed to teach them what they most wanted to know, i.e. how to organise politically, most likely against it.

Even these relatively Westernised indigenes regarded modern forms of organisation as alien, and could not see how to work them properly - a type of criticism voiced also of the House of Assembly by some of its literate, but only semi-sophisticated, members. The sorry failure of the Western Welfare Association, the contemporary inaction of many Workers' Associations, and the troubles experienced in applying Australian accounting procedures to the Territory's cooperatives, gave meaning to their point. Even in the public service, few of them were used as anything other than "professional tea-boys". Western forms of organisation may or may not work abroad, but few Papuans and New Guineans had ever had the chance of testing this for themselves. Thus, there were no indigenous political organisations able to contest the 1964 House of Assembly elections other than some mission groups and cult organisations. A few candidates campaigned on similar platforms, but the House of Assembly consisted of 54 independent members, and an official "party" of 10.

The House of Assembly

The 1964 elections for the House of Assembly theoretically provided a remarkable opportunity for wouldbe political organisers to emerge and test their abilities at the polls. In fact, the elections only reflected, in part reinforced, the parochialism of the Territory's politics. Although a very few candidates assisted each other across electoral boundaries, their actions never resulted in any permanent organisation. Only one electorate returned an indigenous Territorian not born in his electorate. The 6 Europeans returned for Open Electorates may have won precisely because they alone were able to transcend the local rivalries in their areas.

Many sophisticated Papuans and New Guineans may not have stood for election simply because they were uncertain of how to campaign, and what the implications of the elections really were. Few of them were old enough anyway to be able to impress their local villagers with their wisdom and experience, and may have feared a rebuff. Most of them were automatically posted away from their home Districts if they were public servants - to avoid the corrupting influence of family ties - and felt themselves to be out of touch with their people. The public service is by far the largest employer of educated indigenes, and, although their rights in the public service were secure in the event of defeat, it was and still is rather difficult for an officer in a neutral, career public service to organise politically much before an election. Public servants who wish to preserve their rights if defeated can resign only one month before the close of nominations. The major part of the indigenous educational elite is, therefore, at something of a political disadvantage when compared with its less sophisticated rivals.

Gaudi Mirau, a Papuan from the Gulf District, was elected for the Markham Open Electorate in New Guinea. He was, as were a number of successful candidates, a former Administration official in his electorate. His victory was unique in that he was the sole Papuan or New Guinean to gain electoral acceptance away from home. It was all the more difficult to emulate because of the legal requirement that all candidates must previously have resided in the area of their electorate for 12 months prior to the election. In this way, true local representation was ensured, but the emergence of Territory-wide political organisations inhibited. A political party that sought or seeks representation in some of the more backward Highlands electorates would have had either to find a local personality with whom it could come to terms, or a "foreigner" resident in the area. Thus the parochialism already inherent in Territory politics received a measure of legislative reinforcement. Nevertheless, the first House of Assembly has undergone at least two abortive attempts at what was in the first case proto- or para- party formation, and, in the second case, party formation pure and simple.

During the second meeting of the House, in September 1964, John Guise was elected Leader, and Matthias To Liman Deputy Leader, of the Elected Members. Curiously, the move to establish these two positions was initiated by Ian Downs, who had earlier been so vocal in the hope that the House would not be split by parties. The provision of whips implied an intention beyond the mere provision of a gathering-place for 54 independent members.

Despite the appointment of Barry Holloway (European M.H.A. for the Kainantu Open Electorate) and Zure Zurecnuoc (M.H.A. for Finschhafen, and the Under-Secretary for the Treasury) as the whips for the elected members, and W.F. Carter (the Director of Posts and Telegraphs) as whip for the Administration, the elected members' caucus never functioned as anything more than a study-group for the discussion of forthcoming legislation. Its whips were unable to ensure that their listing of speakers for each debate would be adhered to, much less that members would vote in a particular way. The Leaders of the Official Members, Dr. J.T. Gunther, certainly did not see the caucus as constituting a restriction upon an individual member's freedom in the House, nor even as the forerunner of a one-party state. Indeed, he welcomed it as a possible brake on the disorder of a House of 54 independent members. The caucus might be able to provide some indication of the number of members likely to want to speak on a particular measure. It might even bring a measure of coherence and predictability to the House's voting-patterns if Members were able to discuss legislation before it was formally presented in the House. Thus, Dr. Gunther praised the elected members' organisation:

"What had worried many people (before the new House of Assembly was set up) was that ... groups on geographical lines would prevent any unity of outlook, and unity is needed irrespective of whether it means a later demand for self-government or not. There can be no future for this country without unity. It is therefore a very welcome decision to find that the diverse peoples of this House were able to see the need to unify under the leadership of one man. The decision to choose a leader is a part of the tumbling speed that is about us today - speed in all things, not just political."

The elected members' caucus failed to function properly as either an educative or as a policy-formulating body. Not once did all of its members vote together in a division, nor was there any consistent effort on the part of its leaders to attempt to employ it as a cohesive force against the Administration. Its membership was simply too varied. Few of its members had been elected upon a platform to which they might be held. When it was able to exact certain duty and excise concessions from the Administration, it was unable fully to enforce the compromise reached between its leaders and the Official Members. 16 of its members voted for one amendment, and 19 for another, after the initial concessions had been granted only on condition that all of the elected members would abide by the compromise reached.

In part, the elected members' caucus failed because of the dual roles played by 10 of its indigenous members. John Guise resigned as Under-Secretary for the Department of Information and Extension Services immediately upon his election as Leader of the Elected Members, though his Deputy did not follow suit. Though not pledged to uphold official policy, the 10 Under-Secretaries, who are roughly equivalent to ministers-in-training tend on the whole to back Administration policy rather more than the average of other members (see Appendix C). They do so partly because they may feel some attachment to their own departments' policies. Perhaps too, they confuse the explanation of official policy with its justification, and are simply unable to formulate alternatives to it, which they must find more necessary than does the average member who is less intimately involved with officialdom.

The appointment of the District Commissioner for the Western Highlands, Mr. T.W.Ellis, as an Official Member has further strengthened the Administration's influence in the House, and further frustrated its more sophisticated opponents. The kiap is still the sole experience of government in the lives of most Western Highlanders, and certainly the most important power-wielder in his area. The nambawan kiap, then, is held in considerable awe by his conservative "constituents", and his control over them, as well as the manner in which he may speak even to this M.H.A's, must be the envy of many other district commissioners. The 5 Western Highlands members, who include one European in their number, have shown the greatest consistency of any regional group in the House in supporting Administration policy. Their rate of support for the Administration in the 44 divisions to date has run at 71% of their recorded votes, while that of their 4 neighbouring Southern Highlanders, who must pass through Mt. Hagen on their way to and from the House, has run at 56%. The votes of these two groups before Ellis's appointment in May 1965 are not appreciably different from those since, but Ellis's presence has at least ensured the continuance of their support. The conservative dependance upon Europeans of the members from the more backward areas of the Territory has only served to bolster the Administration's numbers in the House.

On the whole, the organisation of the Official Members has enabled them to modify opposition to Administration policy simply because of the statistically random (but not necessarily irrational) allocation of so many of the other members' votes. The most effective counter-leadership has come from Ian Downs and Paul Lapun, the Under-Secretary for Forests, but on certain types of economic issues the majority of the members for Special Electorates can be expected to side with the Administration. Skilled oratory and leadership of a special, and relatively aggressive, kind are necessary to goad the conservative majority of private members to concerted action against official policy.

The illiteracy of 19 of the indigenous members renders their pre-meeting briefing rather complex. The relatively short duration never more than two weeks - of most meetings of the House, and their packed schedule, with meetings both by day and night, makes their organisation when in Port Moresby just as difficult. The parochialism of most members' demands, in meaning if not in precise expression, has so far made cooperation pointless on all but a very few issues.

The personal rivalry and jockeying for position that has preceded independence in many other colonies added to the uncertainty that derived from the House's diversity so as to cripple the elected members' caucus to the point where some of its members even attacked its leaders on the floor of the House. By June 1966, the leaders' positions were not only superfluous, but irritating to some of the more ambitious led. John Guise especially had become too closely identified with a number of more radical causes that were unacceptable to the majority. In order to allow them not to lose face, Guise and To Liman were not dismissed, but, with their own votes included, a majority of the members voted for the abolition of their positions. Few members had been elected on the basis of even a simple policy-platform, and very few needed to account to their constituents in a meaningful way. Their demands were too parochial for cooperation to be fruitful, and there were no apparent electoral benefits to be derived from organisation.

A somewhat similar group of about 27 members was started by Barry Holloway and Toni Voutas in March 1967, with the express intention of educating, rather than organising, its 25 indigenous members. They hoped to gather a few days before each meeting to prepare for the forthcoming debates, and to provide themselves with a useful summary to take home to their electorates afterwards to tell their people of the House. It met a few times during the March meeting, under the chairmanship of Zure Zurecnuoc, and seemed to be of some use in guiding some of the less confident members. Its function was to educate its members and to clarify the issues at stake, not to marshal votes. During the June meeting, the members' study group, as it became known, collapsed, and some of its leading members found a replacement for it in the PANGU Pati.

The New Guinea United National Party

The second major attempt at group formation within the House of Assembly took place during August and September, 1965.

Following discussions with a number of the more prominent indigenous M.H.A's, including some Under-Secretaries, Oala Oala-Rarua, the president of the Port Moresby Workers' Association, announced the formation of the New Guinea United National Party. Some student leaders at least were involved in these discussions too. There had been much talk of the need for, and the imminence of, party organisation in Port Moresby. There was considerable speculation as to who would proclaim himself first in public, but Oala's fate probably served as an effective warning to his wouldbe emulators.

The party's first public meeting was called in Port Moresby for September 1. It required a special act of will, however, to discover where or when it would take place.

The meeting resulted in the selection of an interim executive for the party, and the adoption of the platform which Oala read to the gathering of about 150 people.

Rather cruelly, one commentator referred to the new party as "a party for all seasons", though presumably he was referring to the nature of its policy rather than its ability to survive.

The party's most controversial aim was for "the rapid development of New Guinea to internal Ministerial Government by December 31, 1968." The widespread fear, or hope, as the case may be, that so many Europeans held at the prospect of a radical party was probably misplaced, for the platform also stated that the party "unreservedly supports New Guinea's continuing close, friendly relation with Australia..." Within a few days, the earlier date had been modified to read "19-". The party's genuine nationalism was nonetheless manifest, however, in that, despite his own background as a Papuan, Oala remained loyal to the suggestion that inter-Territorial differences be sunk, and that the entire country should be known as New Guinea.

Some of the party's critics were most fearful of its socialism. The party advocated, for example, that "New Guinean employees in private enterprise ... be rapidly and progressively trained in all the

technical, managerial and professional skills of the enterprise concerned, with the definite objective of giving New Guineans an ever-increasing share of managerial functions at all, and especially, top levels." An independent standing commission would carry out this programme; it would assess claims and award compensation where necessary. Profit sharing in private enterprise was to be encouraged, with greater government intervention in the economy to follow.

A Lands Commission would be set up, but its purpose remained as obscure as its very suggestion aroused, especially European, fear. A National Planning Commission was promised too. Its aims would be to compile information on the economy, coordinate existing plans, and to investigate the possibility of the Territory being able to industrialize rapidly through public and private investment. The latter commission was also to recommend measures to implement the World Bank's 1964 report on the Territory's economic development. In sum, the economic bias of the party's platform and its stress on the need for a strong trade union movement reflected only too clearly the interests of its president, Oala.

Oala had already acquired some prominence before the party's formation as a workers' association leader, a failed candidate at the 1964 elections, and an assistant to the Currie Commission which had recommended the establishment of the University of Papua and New Guinea. He had also been abroad to a number of courses and conferences sponsored by the International Labour Organisation, and had visited Kenya at the invitation of Tom Mboya. He certainly demonstrated his own serious commitment to the party by resigning very soon after its formation from his (quite senior) position in the public service as a special assistant to the Assistant Administrator (Services), Dr. Gunther.

The New Guinea United National Party failed for a number of important reasons:

(i) its platform was too programmatic and too specific about dates and individual items of policy to acquire a mass following in the Territory. The platform's stress on the need for national unity and for the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination together indicated the major springs from which an indigenous political party would draw sustenance. Unfortunately, it attempted to present an electoral policy about which a few sophisticates might argue, but which the masses would not understand. Its platform was that of a party immediately concerned with the use of power, not that of a movement in active process of formation. In part, these faults resulted from the unfortunate circumstance that much of the party's platform was drafted in Australia, rather than mulled over, perhaps less coherently, by the party's immediate progenitors. The party attracted a number of indigenous, but mainly European, sympathisers with its policies, but failed to draw upon the sources of dissatisfaction and frustration common to the mass. Better perhaps to lack a policy in the conventional sense, but to capitalise upon emotion as most colonial nationalists had done elsewhere? Its policies were those of the second stage of colonial evolution, when such parties are really concerned with power, not so much with its pursuit.

(ii) its organisation was jeopardised from the start by the loving care bestowed upon the party by a press corps over-eager to discover significance in what it sought rather than able to record what it saw. Perhaps too, many of its European wellwishers attempted to nurture

the party at a stage when its success depended less on their willingness to help than upon the indigenous public's ~~response~~ to Oala's original appeal. In consequence, the party's organisation crumbled as the surrounding publicity frightened some of its more cautious supporters and forced the hand of its leaders.

The party's first meeting was announced by the press before a place or time had been decided upon, or the leaders consulted. The few members of the House of Assembly (mainly the 10 Under-Secretaries) who had been consulted beforehand therefore paled before the prospect of lending their names to an organisation that offered them no widespread following, but that could imperil their political careers unless and until they could be sure of the party's true nature and the extent of its support. The M.H.A.'s failure to join, coupled with the intimidatory ~~interest~~ of the Territory's Police Special Branch, ensured the party's effective demise. So ill-prepared and nervous was the party's indigenous leadership, that much of their platform seemed incomprehensible to it, if not simply unfaithful to its wishes. Their organisational talents were stretched to their limits, and failed them completely when the interim executive was recruited from the floor of the first meeting by asking people to volunteer. Natural selection failed as a number of Europeans volunteered, and the party foundered upon their detailed arguments over policy and their failure to comprehend the problems involved in mobilising indigenous support.

Although the two Special Branch men who attended and took notes at the party's first meeting were there only as private citizens according to the Police Commissioner, their interest restrained that of the major part of the Territory's indigenous elite, the public servants. Curiously, the wild claim of Frank Martin (M.H.A., Madang-Sepik Special) that "Two members of the working committee are active communists, two of them are people with whom a man would not normally like to associate if he is a normal male, and another is a drunk" only intimidated its leaders even more. The party, therefore, went underground to await signs of wide indigenous support, but, in fact, merely withered, minus funds and organisation, until June 1967. Oala then announced that the party of which he was still titular head, despite its failure to hold any meetings during the preceding 18 months, had ceased to exist. Its remaining funds and alleged membership would be passed over to the new PANGU Pati, of whose executive he was by then a member.

The most explicit attempt to form an indigenous-led political party had failed. European interference, the failure to include leaders from outside Port Moresby by consulting them from the start rather than presenting them with a fait accompli of whose purposes and success they could only be unsure, had led to disaster. The widespread theory, held mainly by academics and Labor Party sympathisers, that the Territory's first - perhaps its only - political party would be founded upon a trade union base had come unstuck. In part, of course, the workers' associations were too small, ill-managed and conservative to be of use politically anyway.

The two succeeding parties were to manage to get off the ground for quite the opposite reasons to those generally supposed to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for success by the United National Party's supporters. Their policies might be vague, their bases of support

unclear, the common purpose of their members uncertain, but both their structure and aims were at least an accurate reflection of the, only imprecisely formulated, ambitions and organisational compromises of their leaders.

The Christian Democratic Party

It has long been expected that the Territory's Christian missions would enter the political arena. Several candidates at the 1964 elections were clearly sponsored by a number of smaller missions, and several others used their mission affiliations to boost their chances. Only one of the indigenous members of the House of Assembly does not claim some Christian religious affiliation, while John Guise, for example, made much play during his campaign of his work for the Anglican Church. 5 indigenous members are former mission-workers, and one European an ex-missionary. The Territory's pagan majority is virtually unrepresented politically.

The Christian Committee on National Development was the missions' first public venture into politics. This organisation was set up in 1963, and claimed Anglican, Lutheran, Methodist and Roman Catholic support. It failed, however, to arouse much interest outside Rabaul.

The Committee did not seek to influence voters towards or against any particular candidates, but to educate the electorate in politics generally, and specifically in the need for the members of the new House of Assembly to be Christians. Its aims, according to a student of the Committee's activities, were:

- "a. To provide a sound knowledge of issues relating to national development.
- b. To provide a common meeting ground for the foundation of a healthy Christian nation.
- c. To create a sense of personal involvement in the development of Papua-New Guinea."

Prior to 1964, the Legislative Council had always included 3 missionaries among the nominated non-official members on the grounds of their peculiar ability to represent the indigenous interest. The missions were allegedly closer to the indigenes than were other Europeans. By 1964, their paternalistic role seemed ripe for replacement by active intervention in the elections. As yet, however, most of them confined themselves to a primarily educative role.

The origins of the Christian Democratic Party remain obscure. As the New Guinea United National Party had claimed to be doing, the Christian Democrats underwent a long period of more or less semi-private gestation before emerging to full public view. Indeed, rumours of a seventh state, Roman Catholic-backed party in the Sepik were current in Port Moresby at the time of the United National Party's formation. Pita Simogen, a member of the first Legislative Council, and now M.H.A. for Wewak-Aitape and Under-Secretary for Police, was thought to be one of its leaders. The party was expected to emerge formally only if and when the United National Party appeared to be succeeding. It seemed likely to constitute a reaction to a party favouring independence, an organised expression of the Sepik's fear of

desertion, rather than a positive political force in its own right. Despite these rumours, no such party emerged at the time, and when it did finally appear, there was as yet no party in existence with an opposing set of policies.

During 1966, the Roman Catholic missions in the Sepik and New Guinea islands held a number of lay leadership courses, both in the Territory and in Australia. Their aims were not overtly political, though scholarships to these courses were offered to a number of politically ambitious New Guineans, including some who were offered assistance to attend a six months' long course in Melbourne. Although the party's leaders have been vehement in their denials of church influence and assistance they have admitted that the possibility of the party's public formation was canvassed at a Catholic leadership course in Wewak in late 1966, although the discussions there resulted in no immediate action.

In March 1966, the party began privately as the result of an agreement between Simogen, Otto Kovingre, manager of the Catholic mission's plantation at Boiken, and Peter Maut, a former president of the Wewak-But Local Government Council, and now one of its two vice-presidents. The party's first public meeting was held in Wewak on May 11, 1967, and the party's name was changed from that of the United Democratic Party to that of the Christian Democratic Party.

The party's first public meeting was called after a letter announcing its formation had been circulated by its three founders. The basic principles of the party as they envisaged them were :

1. That Papua and New Guinea should unite as one strong country.
2. To gather all Christians into the party.
3. That people of all colours should remain friends of the country.
4. To encourage the people to obey the law of the government provided that it does not conflict with God's law.
5. To prevent fighting and killing, so that all of the people should be friends and law-abiding, like brothers and sisters in the family of the party.

(For the original letter, see Appendix A)

The first meeting opened and closed with the Lord's Prayer and Ave Maria. Kovingre was elected president of the party, though immediately afterwards his position was qualified so as to apply to the Wewak Sub-District alone. It was clear, and the party later admitted so, that Maut was the party's real leader.

The party's early membership included only two Europeans, the Administrator of the Wewak Diocese, and Graham Gilmore (M.H.A., South Markham Special), who had attended a Catholic high school in Australia. Apart from Maut, the party's principal organiser, Kovingre and Simogen, other officials included the organising secretary, ~~Elabua Weramo~~, and the recording secretary, Henry Kabai, both of whom were teachers at a Catholic school in the Sepik. Maut has already been announced as the party's first candidate, and Simogen's replacement at the 1968 elections.

The party's platform was enunciated in more specific terms after the first meeting. Its principal points were that the party sought the Territory's incorporation within the Federation as Australia's seventh state, the encouragement of Pidgin as a national language (presumably for Australians too?), the encouragement of primary education, and the sponsoring of candidates for the House of Assembly and in local government elections. A little later, it added the proposals that Lae become the capital of the Territory, and that the present Administrator be replaced by a High Commissioner to its platform. The last suggestion seems to have been taken directly from the submission put to the Select Committee on Constitutional Development by the "Committee of 13", one of the progenitors of PANGU. The party's principles, then, reflected its social origins among the Pidgin-speaking, development-oriented elite of local, non-traditional politics. It was left to PANGU to link other segments of this same elite with the urban sophisticates inside the public service.

The party has organised quickly. It has sent recruiting agents to establish branches in many parts of the Sepik, Rabaul, Lae and Kavieng, in all of which centres it now claims to have branches. Its attempts in Port Moresby and the Highlands have so far met with little success. Its emissaries have been at great pains to emphasise the party's Christian bias, but even more concerned to stress the ecumenical nature of its religious commitment. As was the case with candidates who wanted to campaign in the more inaccessible parts of their electorates in 1964, the Administration has provided the party with local transport where possible. Administration assistance has always been supplied in a strictly non-partisan manner. The party's total membership is now claimed to be something in excess of 4,000.

The Christian Democrats have now ~~fr~~ encountered two serious setbacks. Its message has so far failed to come across in the Highlands. Though the majority possibly agree with its policies, few Highlanders at the meetings I have attended even know what a party is, much less what it might achieve. In a spirit of strict impartiality, the councils that have been addressed have tended to follow the Christian Democrats' lectures with the request that a PANGU representative be invited to address them too. Political education here involves organisational as well as ideological elements.

Despite the party's conservatism, which led the Minister for Territories, Mr. Barnes, to lament the undue publicity accorded its opponents, Mr. Barnes has himself been responsible for the party's principal dilemma. On June 23, in Lae, Mr. Barnes, for the first time, sought to place a limitation upon the range of constitutional structures from among which the Territory's leaders might eventually choose. Seventh statehood, he felt, was out for the present, though he qualified his statement by refusing to predict what government policy might be in the future. Perhaps seventh statehood would still be negotiable after independence.

Mr. Barnes's sudden move had long been urged upon him by a number of "realists," especially in Australia, who had always felt that seventh statehood would be unworkable, and certainly unacceptable to the Australian taxpayer whatever the feelings of the Territory's wouldbe nationalists. With amazing alacrity, the Christian Democrats simply accepted Mr. Barnes's statement at face value, and removed the seventh state clause from the party's platform. It may be that both

the Minister and the Christian Democrats' leaders simply recognised the inevitability of failure, but perhaps too, both have realised that seventh statehood would reek too much of neo-colonialism to be acceptable to the U.N. They may indeed recognise the need for the Territory to attain independence before being able to negotiate seventh statehood after New Guinea's trusteeship agreement has been terminated. The Western Samoan solution of independence followed by a voluntary treaty under which some of the new state's powers were handed back to New Zealand was easier to negotiate internationally than was the Cook Islands' solution of only internal self-government. The results are similar, but the political problems at the U.N. were rather different. The Christian Democrats' current willingness to come to terms with PANGU may vindicate the first, i.e. the "realists'", interpretation of Mr. Barnes's remarks as a recognition that seventh statehood would be unworkable, although, to turn the tables, perhaps the Christian Democrats are now the realists in searching for a roundabout means to their original end.

PANGU Pati



The Party Emblem

The PANGU (Papua and New Guinea Union) Pati has sprung from two principal sources : a relatively widespread interest in parties as such, and the need for an organisation to articulate certain sorts of demands that are becoming increasingly important in Territory politics.

There was a strangely deterministic air to much of the public discussion of parties before PANGU's formation. Some of it was obviously politically motivated, as when Thomas Tobunbun, now a member of PANGU's executive, and Michael Bui of the Christian Democrats argued whether parties should be formed before or after independence. Tobunbun's opposition to the pre-independence formation of parties was probably designed as an attack on the Christian Democrats as such. He was as much motivated by annoyance that they had beaten PANGU, or at least a non-seventh state party like it,

in proclaiming its public formation as by any principled conviction on his part. Much of the early discussion of parties, however, was motivated by quite different considerations.

Early in April, James Meanggarum, M.H.A. for Ramu Open, circulated a letter in Pidgin to the local government councillors and people in his electorate. In his letter, he pointed out that the 10 Government members in the House of Assembly "have one thought and one belief, and when the time for voting comes after the debate, the 10 of them are strong together. Naturally they influence us, the elected members,

to follow them in the votes." In his view, however, "The time for 'yes sir, yes sir' is now finished and ... it is time for 'no sir'." What was needed, then, to express such a view effectively was a political party, for "Apolitical party is a good thing which will help us stand on our own feet." Thus, he concluded, "if you wish later on to attempt to stand on your own feet, now is the time to attempt to stand on our own feet," and so the people should send him suggestions of points that might be added to the party's platform. At this point, he suggested the party's platform might include at least the following four planks:

- * "The building of roads and bridges for the economic development of the country.
- * Improved wages for workers employed by big companies and factories.
- * Improved wages for ~~qualified mission~~ teachers.
- * Improved rice, copra, cocoa and coffee prices for co-operatives.

As the editor of the South Pacific Post observed, Meanggarum's proposed party platform was "hardly an ideological one".

It was noticeable that Meanggarum was more concerned to inform his electorate of what a party was, and to suggest its possible nature, than to start one himself. His behaviour, however, was not unique. During the hearings conducted by the House of Assembly's Select Committee on Constitutional Development, it became common for speakers to discuss the need for, or the desirability of, political parties at the Territory's present stage of development, and even to suggest their total number. Not a few M.H.A.'s made it their business at this time to inform meetings of their constituents, or local government councils, what political parties were, but none of them was as yet prepared to attempt their formation. Partly, no one was prepared to make the first move and then to be cut down as Oala Oala-Rarua had been. Partly, they naively believed that parties must come from the people, and were awaiting someone else's initiative. They felt unable to organise such an alien institution themselves, and were awaiting an outside initiative - an example of the organisational dependance mentioned earlier.

Much of the abstract discussion of the need for, and the nature of, parties was motivated by a genuine desire to educate the indigenous public in modern politics. Often, these explanations fell on deaf or uncomprehending ears, however, as when - perhaps apocryphically - one M.H.A. was told that politicians did little enough work as it was without having parties all the time too. Confusion, and a nervous waiting for someone else to take the plunge were the dominant themes of most of these talks. At the same time, many of the present M.H.A.'s wanted a party system to emerge just to increase their personal effectiveness in the House rather than to press an ideological point. Others feared it because political parties usually need to press quite special organisational demands which could well precipitate the Territory's early independence.

Toni Voutas, European M.H.A. for the Kaindi Open Electorate, went so far as to circularise most of the Territory's local government councils on the need for a council party to be established, but declined to take the initiative himself. In the end, this idea was dropped because of the illegality of using council funds for political purposes, and because of the inherent unworkability of a party in which the sole point of common interest was membership of a local government council. Indeed its opponents

might well have been obliged to attack local government as an institution if the party had got off the ground. True, Voutas himself had managed to gain council endorsement for his nomination, and other candidates had been elected with council support, but there was a great difference between that sort of manoeuvre and the establishment of a local government party.

Most of the foregoing problems were, however, solved with the formation of the Christian Democratic Party and PANGU. Now, there was less need to know what a political party might be, or to discuss how many should be formed, for it was simply necessary to decide whether to join one of the existing parties, and, if so, which one, or whether to set up a party of one's own. The philosophical discussion of political abstractions was over.

While the abstract discussion of parties proceeded on one front, several issues of another kind were being debated elsewhere. It was from the simultaneous search for organisation without any necessary policy, and from the advocacy of certain unorganised causes that PANGU would emerge.

The extra-parliamentary leadership of PANGU has a common social background. Most of it comes from within the public service, and consists of men in their mid-20s to mid-30s with considerable urban experience. They include some of the Territory's top indigenous public servants. They have been to the same schools and colleges, and have experienced the identical frustration of repeated re-training as new jobs have been opened to indigenes. Thus, one of the party's leaders began life as a schoolteacher before becoming a journalist. He has, therefore, been educated successively at high school, teachers' college, and later the Administrative College. Another party official received as good a high school education as the Territory was then able to provide, was sent to the Suva Medical College to train as a pathology assistant, became a welfare assistant in the Department of District Administration, and later a patrol officer, in which position he also furthered his education at the Administrative College. He is now the party's fulltime secretary. Their story is not unique. It is that of a whole generation of Papuans and New Guineans, the Territory's present educated elite.

Albert Mauri Kiki has had organisational experience in a host of urban associations, including the Western Welfare Association. Joseph K. Nombri is the president of the Tertiary Students' Federation. Both Oala Oala-Rarua and Thomas Tobunbun are presidents of workers' associations, respectively in Port Moresby and Rabaul. Vin To Tobaining is a former member of the Legislative Council, and is presently the president of the Gazelle Peninsula Local Government Council near Rabaul. John Guise, a member of the party, has managed to complement Tobaining's persuasion of his council with his own work, which has resulted in 3 councils in the Milne Bay District of Papua, and the Milne Bay Workers' Association, of which he is vice-president, joining the party.

PANGU shares the frustrations of, and has links with, a whole political generation in the Territory. Perhaps only the present university students and the few recently-appointed army officers are too sophisticated for PANGU. The difference that Thomas Hodgkin observed between African and European parties, that there was no "distinction between party members and sympathisers" in the African case, seems to

apply equally well to PANGU. Many of its most ardent supporters simply have not bothered as yet to join formally, while its meetings tend to consist of ad hoc gatherings of whoever happens to be there. It is from such meetings that decisions are often issued in the party's name. To criticise this procedure on the grounds of its failure to adhere to the formal rules of meeting procedure would be to ignore the specifically non-Western quality of the meetings, and the fact that their decisions are accepted as being completely legitimate even by those members of the party who did not attend. The Christian Democrats' decision-making process is not dissimilar.

The extra-parliamentary leadership of PANGU seems to stem from one principal source - the public service, and the issues that motivated these men to membership of the party are a direct reflection of the shortcomings of Australian policy since 1950. While they may all be politically ambitious, and generally resentful of racial discrimination and the Territory's colonial status, two specific issues brought them together into the party; the question of public service salary rates, and doubts about the Territory's political future.

Australian policy in Papua and New Guinea in the past five years has tended to follow two contradictory themes. On the one hand, the Government has insisted that it is preparing the Territory for self-determination, and on the other hand, while refusing to predict what form the Territory's constitution might eventually take, it has tended to prepare it administratively in a direction directly contrary to that which the Minister seems personally to prefer. Thus, in 1964, the Administration reduced the salaries of indigenous public servants to approximately 40% of those paid to expatriate officers in identical positions. The new salary rates and increased housing rentals were claimed at the time to be adjusted now according to the Territory's "capacity to pay". The consequent feelings of racial discrimination, and widespread dissatisfaction within the public service, were in no way alleviated by the paltry pay increases granted in May of this year after a public service arbitration that had lasted 15 months. The march through the streets of Port Moresby on June 3 to protest against the new wage determination was the Territory's biggest political demonstration to date. The leaders of the march included a number of the extra-parliamentary leaders of PANGU.

While apparently preparing the Territory administratively for at least internal self-government, if not independence, the Australian Government has ~~been~~ loth to commit the Territory to any particular constitutional path. Mr. Barnes, however, has often warned the Territory of the perils of premature independence, and has even expressed his doubt that the Territory could ever be fully independent. In consequence, the Select Committee on Constitutional Development has had no firm guidelines in its work, and, given the Territory's political backwardness outside the urban areas, it has received but little encouragement from most of those who have addressed it. Thus, in March of this year, the third of a series of submissions made by varying combinations of a group labelled by its enemies the "12 Apostles" was presented to the Committee.

The sources of their thinking were revealed in the opening clauses of their submission in which they spoke of the Federal Government's "temporizing and foot-dragging" and of the Territorial Administration as "out of date, autocratic, unrealistic and inflexible". They felt that

"not one single Papuan or New Guinean is in a position to make a decision that cannot be vetoed or countermanded by an Australian or by Australians. This domination and exclusion is already resulting in disillusionment, friction and steadily deteriorating race relations. We cannot visualise a change over to self-government at any time in the future except under greatly worsened conditions and with the strong possibility of a complete and irreparable breakdown of unity and goodwill. This alone is sufficient reason for a complete reappraisal and review of the present system without any further delay."

In their detailed submission, probably the most radical presented to the committee, they called for immediate limited responsible government, or "home rule", with a cabinet of at least 8 ministers elected by the House of Assembly but not removable by it. There should also be an elected Chief Minister, and a House Steering Committee consisting of 7 members. Together, the Steering Committee and Cabinet should form the Parliamentary Executive which would be "the policy making body for the House of Assembly during the transition period to self-government." In pursuit of more rapid localisation of the public service, they wanted a Board to replace the present Public Service Commissioner. The entire framework of the Territory's government after 1968 should be that of a "caretaker administration", with a High Commissioner to replace the present Administrator, and with the Department of External Affairs as the Territory's new Australian overseer. The Deputy High Commissioner should be a Papuan or a New Guinean.

Needless to say, the Select Committee did not recommend in accord with this submission.

The signatories included Dr. Reuben Taureka, the Territory's senior indigenous public servant, Albert Mauri Kiki, now the secretary of PANGU, J.K.Nombri and Michael Somare of PANGU's bung, Oala Oala-Rarua, also of the bung, and Cecil Abel, a European lecturer at the Territory's Administrative College, and Ebia Olewale, both later on PANGU's interim central executive. The South Pacific Post predicted that "As a result of these talks (before the submission's formal presentation) a political party made up of an elite of educated natives, largely from the Public Service, is expected by some political observers to be formed before the end of the year." Thus, there was little public surprise when the formation of PANGU was announced on June 13.

The Interim Central Executive of PANGU includes a Bung (Pidgin for "gathering") of 4 Rotating Chairmen, J.K.Nombri, Vin Tobaining, Oala Oala-Rarua and M.Somare, Albert Mauri Kiki as the Secretary-Treasurer, and Epel Tito, Gavera Rea, Cromwell Burau, Cecil Abel, Ebia Olewale and Thomas Tobunbun as Members.

The Parliamentary Wing of the party comprised Paul Lapun, Under-Secretary for Forests and author of some of the Administration's most crushing defeats in the House of Assembly, Nicholas Brokam, Under-Secretary for Information and Extension Services, Pita Lus, James Meangarum Paliau Maloat, Wegra Kenu, and Siwi Kurondo. Two European members for Open Electorates, Barry Holloway and Toni Voutas also joined the party. John Guise and Eriko Rarupu, the party's only Papuan M.H.A's joined a few days after the party's formation was announced.

When divided into their respective regional, racial and electoral-type groupings, the parliamentary members of PANGU have a more consistently anti-Administration record in the House of Assembly than do the comparable groupings, including themselves, in the House as a whole. PANGU's 2 Under-Secretaries tend to oppose the Administration more consistently than do their confreres. A number of other members do have individually more anti-Administration records, though these include some alleged cargo cult leaders and some supporters of a Rhodesia-type solution for the Territory. Only in one region, the New Guinea coast, does a PANGU member not conform to the general pattern (see Appendix C).

While the 2 Christian Democratic M.H.A's display no discernible pattern, a majority of PANGU has always sided with a majority of the House when the Administration has been defeated, although a majority of PANGU's members have also been anti-Administration on occasions when the Administration has been victorious. It must be remembered, however, that the calling of divisions (roughly equivalent to an American rollcall vote) is entirely random, and does not always occur on major issues, nor are divisions called on all major issues. It must also be borne in mind, of course, that PANGU did not yet exist when these votes were recorded. The proposal that the PANGU members sit together henceforth in the House of Assembly should, if successful, provide a much sounder guide as to the likelihood of the party's success within the present legislature.

PANGU's motto is certainly praiseworthy: "humility, honesty na hatwok" (Pidgin for "and hard work"). The party supports the home rule demands of its progenitors, and is cautiously in favour of the Territory's eventual independence. Its policy stresses the need for "One name - one country - one people", with Pidgin as the common language beside English as the country's official language. Its platform places considerable stress on the need to localise the public service rapidly and effectively, and the need for overseas investment to encourage the Territory's economic development. It stresses the need for land reform, the establishment of a new department of local government, and the importance of improving the Territory's educational, housing and communications facilities. It stands behind the workers' associations in their efforts to raise the Territory's wages levels. The party's platform, then, is still as moderate as one might expect of a party still in the early stages of formation, though the details of many of its policies have still to be worked out.

PANGU's major problem now is to reconcile its beliefs, which, in the present Territory context, are of a relatively radical kind, with the need to woo the support of the Territory's less sophisticated, and more conservative, non-traditional local leaders. To this end, therefore, it has tried to dissociate itself from Oala Oala-Rarua's prediction that independence could come by 1970 by explaining that independence does not, and should not, involve desertion by, or the expelling of, the European experts so necessary to the country's development. The reservations felt about PANGU by the president of the Huon Local Government Council, Lae, are probably indicative of those felt by many Papuans and New Guineans. Certainly, PANGU appealed rather more than did the Christian Democrats with their seventh statist bias, and Sepik regional background, but he would not join PANGU unless assured that the party would not press for independence too soon. PANGU's major problem, then, would seem to be the need to avoid frightening away some of its more conservative potential supporters, just as the Christian Democrats must now find an acceptable alternative to seventh statehood.

The Future

If one may hazard a guess, then, it does not seem unlikely that the Territory will soon have three political parties. The All Peoples' Progress Party will be formed in Wewak on July 26. Its policy seems likely to be of a type similar to that of the Rhodesian Front. Symbolically, some of its likely members are already quite outspoken advocates of a "Recognise Rhodesia" policy for Australia.

Thanks to Mr. Barnes, the policies of PANGU and the Christian Democrats now bear a remarkable resemblance to one another, and their eventual union does not seem improbable. The cost of such a union may well be the departure of the advocates of immediate independence from PANGU. Like most nationalists before independence, the leaders of PANGU are sincere and cautious men. They advocate swift and steady progress towards, not immediate, independence.

Although all three of the parties as presently constituted will probably contest the 1968 elections, it seems reasonable to assume that their impact as parties will be minimal. It would not be surprising if many of their candidates are defeated, but if men of the same general background and character as those currently in them join up after they are elected. Both PANGU and the Christian Democratic Party, then, will tend to be caucus parties, at least at first, and will probably develop into branch parties, and perhaps even mass movements, at a later date. Their continuity will be assured through their recruitment at the national legislative level, at least for the time being, rather than at the mass level, though the support of such key local figures as local government councillors will be crucial to the parties' eventual success. They will probably tend to bring together two types of leader - the secondary educated radical, and the local modernising big men, whatever the reasons for their election to the House. Their true viability as political forces will only be fully tested after the 1968 elections.

Yours sincerely,

Edward Wolfers.

Received in New York July 31, 1967.

APPENDIX A : Text of the original letter sent out by the founders
of the Christian Democratic Party - original in Pidgin.

Territory of Papua and New Guinea

Otto Kovingre
c/- Council Chambers
Free Bag, Wewak.

Dear Friends,

I am Otto Kovingre from Boikin. I would like you to know why we have started the "Kristin Demokratik Pati" (Christian Democratic Party). There are five reasons:

1. To unite the small country of Papua and New Guinea so that it can develop into one big country. We would like that good time to come when everyone can live as one family.
2. To unite all Christians of all churches as members of the one Christian Democratic Party.
3. To ensure that people of all skins remain the friends of our country.
4. To help everyone obey the laws that our government has made, provided that these laws are good and don't contravene God's own law.
5. To prevent the causes of trouble, such as stealing, fighting, and killing, etc. ... We would like, eventually, when all of us are already members of the party, that we all remain true to our fellow man, that there is no trouble and no one is afraid. Then we can look at one another as brothers and sisters, all members of one family inside the Christian Democratic Party.

We hope that you are all relatively clear about the principles of this new party.

We will be pleased if you are all happy with our party's good work.

That is all.

Otto Kovingre.
Peter Simogun. M.H.A.
Peter Maut. W.B.C.

APPENDIX B : Text of the first newspaper advertisement published by PANGU on June 16, 1967. (South Pacific Post, Page 3)

Support ...

P A N G U P A T I

— The Party of Modernisation

"Humility Honesty na Hatwok"

Papua New Guinea's own Political Party founded on the principle of EVOLUTION, NOT REVOLUTION

Believing in:

- # Home Rule leading to Ultimate Independence
- # One Name, One Country, One People
- # Pidgin the principal common language of communication
- # Localisation of the Public Service and creation of Public Service Board
- # Security of Overseas Investment
- # Doubling National Income within ten years
- # National Adult Literacy Programme
- # Adequate Housing all workers urban and rural
- # Joining Papua and New Guinea by Road
- # Land Reform through Land Conversion Ordinance
- # Improved conditions rural and urban workers
- # Greater subsidies to Missions for Education and Health
- # Papuan and New Guinean participation in all Economic Development Schemes
- # The Strengthening of Local Government Councils
- # The Support of the Volunteer Service

HOW CAN YOU SUPPORT PANGU?

By becoming:

- (a) An Ordinary Member - by subscribing 20 cents
- (b) A Donor Member - by subscribing 20 cents plus donation
- (c) A Promisor Member - by subscribing 20 cents plus a fixed amount paid monthly.


Subscription fees should be forwarded by Postal Order or cheque and made out to PANGU PATI.

Further details also available on request. All correspondence should be addressed to:

Secretary,
PANGU PATI,
P.O. Box 623,
PORT MORESBY


APPENDIX C : The parties and the House of Assembly.

Composition of the House
By Party




- 1 square : 1 elected Member
- 'x' : PANGU Pati member
- : Christian Democratic Party member

Percentage of Total Votes Cast
By Party




1 square : 2% total votes cast in House


Formal Composition of House



Percentage of Votes Cast by



Percentages of Total Votes Cast Against
the Administration by Particular Classes
of Members.



Voting Patterns of all Party Members

PANGU Pati

(Included in
Tables - Below)
(2,3,5f) Brokam

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44

(2,4,5a) Guise

(1) Holloway

(2,4,5c+e) Kenu

(2,4,5b) Kurondo

(2,3,5f) Lapun


(2,4,5c+e) Lus

(2,4,5f) Maloat


(2,4,5d+e) Meangarum

(2,4,5a) Rarupu

(1) Voutas




Majority of (actual voters in)



- 1 : Took his seat on 30/8/1966, after a by-election.
- 2 : Decided on the casting vote of the Speaker.
- 3 : Unanimous vote of the whole House.
- 4 : PANGU members evenly split - 5 for and 5 against with Guise not voting.

Christian Democratic Party




key


- : pro-Admin.
- x: anti-Admin.
- : No vote recorded

Percentages of PANGU's Total Votes
Cast Against the Administration in
Comparison with Similar Classes of Other Members.


1. European M.H.A's




2. Indigenous M.H.A's









3. Under-Secretaries




4. Indigenous Back benchers



5. Indigenous M.H.A's by Region



PANGU Pati Percentages Shown: 

1. Excluding Gaudi Mirau as non-indigenous to the area, and therefore, for the purposes of this comparison, more likely to behave as a European Member, because an 'outsider' to his electorate. Where region is irrelevant, then counted as an indigene. Has an 81% anti-Admin. record (the highest of any Member).