

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

GCD-4

South Korea's Relations with
China: the Wise Ostrich?

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November 10, 1962

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Dear Dick:

In Japan I found many different views on China policy, and I had a wealth of written and oral information from which to distill a summary. Among many other contrasts between Japan and South Korea are the unanimity of opinions in South Korea regarding the two Chinas and the nearly complete absence of discussion of the subject as a problem, either in the press or among citizens. The lack of mention of the subject is likely due to the tight military dictatorship under which South Koreans now live. Pak Chung Hee and Kim Chong Pil aim at nothing less than a reformation of the national character which, of course, requires some thought reform. The Central Intelligence Agency, under Kim, has arrested a farmer for writing a letter to an editor and complaining about delay in deliveries of fertilizer, and has arrested a professor for an article saying that since South Korea was not a member of the United Nations it was not fully a sovereign nation. The Korean Republic (government newspaper) carried the following story on November 8, 1962:

A Military Court-Martial upheld the death sentence yesterday for Keumam Chung, 27, a graduate of Korea University, and sentenced Rakjoong Kim, 27, a graduate school student of the university, to life imprisonment for playing leading roles in a group they organized in connection with unification issue of Korea. . . .

In passing the sentences, presiding judge Col. Munhwan Cho accused the defendants that they longed for communism and denied the authority of the Republic of Korea by organizing an underground student group to discuss the Communist way of reunifying Korea. . . .

According to Col. Cho, the students have met frequently to spread the Communist advocacy that Korea be reunified into a neutral nation through peaceful means.

It is not amazing, therefore, that under military rule there has been a dampening - no, drenching - of interest in debate on what would normally be considered public issues, controversial or not.

Even in the climate of relatively free speech which prevailed during the Chang Myon Administration (August 19, 1960 to May 16, 1961), however, the most significant variation from current thinking relating to China policy was the espousal, mainly by students, of the view that a neutralized Korea would be a possible way to unify the country, but this position was not, apparently, shared by a large segment of the South Korea citizenry. The attitudes and policies set forth below, then, unless otherwise noted, can be taken as representative of the views of South Korean governments and the great majority of the people from the time of Syngman Rhee, through Chang to Pak Chung Hee.

A. Summary of Relations and Forecast

1. South Korea-Communist China relations - When is it not foolish for an ostrich to hide its head from an approaching enemy? One answer, which fits South Korea's refusal to have anything to do with Communist China, is: this is not foolish (1) when the ostrich has a friend (the United States) standing by with a club and (2) when talk with the enemy might divert the ostrich from digging his defenses.

South Korea adheres to every detail of United States policy toward Communist China and goes beyond it in zealous anti-Communism. There are no official or unofficial relations between the two countries: no diplomatic relations, no trade, no travel, no conversation and no letters. Likewise, contact between South Korea and North Korea is virtually nil. Until quite recently the South Korean Government did not permit any private studies of contemporary China or of developments in North Korea and the newspapers still carry little such news. Most South Koreans have fragmentary information about what is going on in either place, have a strong distrust of Communist propaganda and have a general idea that life in both places must be terrible.

Summaries of most of the known contacts with Communist China will indicate how nearly zero they have been. In the Asian atmosphere radio waves, from South Korea in Chinese and from Peking in Korean, pass each other for an hour or two each day without, of course, any interaction, with no discernible effect in South Korea and with unknown effect in Communist China.

South Korea from time to time has caught Chinese fishermen in its waters and has returned them through Panmunjom. 59 Fishermen who have landed on South Korean shores asking asylum have been allowed to go to Formosa. In 1953 four South Korean Coast Guard officers who had boarded Communist fishing vessels were captured by a surprise superior force of Chinese craft. The South Korean Government has taken their case up with the International Committee of the Red Cross and has received word merely that the four men are alive in Communist China. There are perhaps 1,150,000 Koreans, who fled to Manchuria when the Japanese occupied Korea, living in Kirin Province of China across the Yalu and incommunicado with any relatives who may be in South Korea. There are about 24,000 Chinese living in South Korea, but most of them have been there for 30-50 years running stores, restaurants and farms and

having three high schools and 44 primary schools of their own. The government says they are non-Communist and no problem.

Chairman Pak said on the first anniversary of the May 1961 military revolution that he "would uphold anti-Communism as our foremost national policy." Behind these words is the nation's deep hatred of Communism coming from the unprovoked attack on June 25, 1950 and the anguish of partial occupation by North Korean and Chinese Communists. South Korea makes no important distinction among Communists; it tends to lump Communist China, North Korea and the Soviet Union together because in any change in South Korea's future those three would be on one side and the United States and the other nations which came to the rescue in 1950 would be on South Korea's side.

South Korea owes its existence since the 1950 aggression to help from the United States in arms, food, supplies and blood. For some years to come this deep dependence will continue. South Korea has therefore, with only occasional friction, followed United States policy. It realizes that its future and the question of unification are in the hands of the United States. It appreciates that the opposing Communist triumvirate will not agree to settlement of the outstanding questions except on their own terms for the time being. It sees no advantage, therefore, in any bilateral relations with any of the three. On the contrary, it sees dangers in such relations. South Korean leaders have lacked confidence in the strength of their society and its people's will. They have feared that premature contact with Communist powers would lead to subversion. They have wished to avoid such exposure until their arms, economy, democracy and people's anti-Communist education are unquestionably superior to anything North Korea may have to offer. If there is a change for the better in the international situation; if the Communists weaken or fall out; then unification on the United Nations' terms might have a chance; and meanwhile South Korea can wait and ignore Communist China and the rest. It knows Korea may be divided for a long time, but it abhors resignation to a permanent division. Talk of a permanent line is as bad to the South Koreans as talk of two Chinas is to Chiang. There is some fear that Communist China is more keen on having a Communist unified Korea than the United States is on having a non-Communist unified Korea.

One can see little sign of change in this impasse. It will be a long time until South Korea gains that adequate measure of superiority over North Korea which would make unification conceivable. Even if the United States should come to a two-Chinas policy in this interval, South Korea will probably not follow. It will see little advantage in doing so. In trade, for instance, Japan will have much more to offer South Korea than Communist China, and with few of the risks.

At the end of the other reasons why there is likely to be no change in South Korea's relations with the Communists one should add the amiable perversity of the Korean people. Much as they would like unification, the present situation is not too bad. The United States is a good patron; a soft touch and not aggressive. They would hate to

give up United States aid. Their aversion to Communism is based more on personal experience with its inhumanity than on its undemocratic qualities. Their frustrated nationalism often tends to make them shut their eyes against the centuries of Chinese influence which have gone before. The Koreans have not had much chance to practice nationhood on their own. Perhaps the want of such an opportunity is at the root of their lack of confidence, inner discipline, drive and an individual sense of public responsibility.

2. South Korea-Nationalist China relations - No ostrich here; rather we find heads-up, cordial, formal relations through ambassadors and occasional ceremonial visits. South Korea has ten officers in Taipei and the Nationalist Government has twenty officers in its mission in Seoul. There are only 550 South Korean residents in Formosa and, as mentioned earlier, only 24,000 Chinese in South Korea and these are sympathetic to Formosa or keep quiet.

Certain parallels are worth noting. Both South Korea and the Nationalist Government have suffered at the hands of the Communists. Both governments would like to unify their countries. Both have received massive military and economic aid from the United States. Both have United Nations problems; for South Korea, how to get in and for Nationalist China, how to stay in; and both get their votes from about the same group of countries. Both have big anti-Communist armed forces which cannot be spared for use outside the country, which the United States thinks are too large for the jobs to be done and which unduly burden their economies; but both have been able to retain the excess forces and have the United States pay the bill. Both are over-populated and growing fast, both (according to a South Korean Government spokesman) are pushing birth control programs and each resists giving immigration visas to nationals of the other. Both are controlled by military dictators, and each resists in his own way United States suggestions for broadening the political base. Both are completely subservient to the United States in their main policy lines. Both would like to claim the title of most fanatical anti-Communist government in the world, and this rivalry has led to some irritants between them.

There are no important economic or cultural interests linking South Korea and Formosa. The slight cultural interchange is not being facilitated by a mutual waiver of import duties on books, exhibits, art and the like. There is a Sino-Korean Cultural Association which was formed during World War II and reactivated in Taipei in 1953. Trade is not important. In 1961 South Korea exported to Formosa \$483,000 worth of apples, fish, fluorspar and ginseng (a medicinal root). Coming in the other direction were \$6,345,000 worth of Formosan fertilizer, machinery, wire and rayon yarn. There have been no changes in this pattern for several years. So little travel is done between the two countries that no airline has been able to establish a direct connection; so one must go from Seoul to Taipei via Tokyo or Hong Kong. There is some exchange of intelligence products between government intelligence agencies.

In 1943 at the Cairo Conference Chiang K'ai-shek was instrumental in having the independence of Korea made one of the Allies' war aims, for which South Korea has since been grateful to him. South Korea became independent in August 1948 and established diplomatic relations with Nationalist China in early 1949. In that year Syngman Rhee and Chiang discussed the possibility of establishing an anti-Communist union in the Far East. Nothing came of this, but the idea has similarities to those which led to the formation of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, which held its first meeting in Chinhae, Korea in June 1954. Rhee and Chiang had much in common, especially their desires to renew their wars of reunification against the Chinese Communists, but there was some rivalry between them for pre-eminence. During the Korean War the Nationalist Government offered to send troops to assist South Korea, but the offer was declined. There has not been coordinated military planning between the two governments. The Koreans have not wanted to tie themselves to the fortunes of Nationalist China nor to have Korea used as a springboard to the mainland.

After the overthrow of Rhee there was a cooling of relations. The Chang Government, which came to power after the most orderly and free elections ever held in Korea, regarded the Chiang regime as retrogressive and had its reservations about some of the policies of Chiang. Since the military coup of May 1961 sentiment has warmed again. There appears to be no fundamental trend or circumstance, however, which will draw South Korea and Nationalist China any closer together than they are now.

B. China and the Unification of Korea

1. The connection - Will South Korea have diplomatic relations with Communist China prior to the unification of Korea? "Not necessarily," is the South Korean answer. There is no causal relationship either way between the two events and yet there is a connection. It is a lesson learned from the Korean War that Korea will not be unified without the agreement of Communist China, but it does not follow necessarily that South Korea must talk to Communist China.

In speculating on the circumstances in which Korea might be unified, several sets of variables must be considered. First is the strength of the Chinese-Soviet-North Korean side relative to the U.S.-U.N.-South Korea side. If, for example, the Communist Government in China should be replaced by a government friendly to the United States, unification on terms favorable to South Korea might not be long delayed. The military leaders of South Korea (along with those in South Vietnam and Formosa) do not see much chance of the global power balance being altered except as a consequence of a large-scale conflict. So long, however, as the present power relationships prevail (with North Korea continuing to demonstrate that it is economically viable trading with its big Communist neighbors and with economic weakness continuing in South Korea), then North Korea makes a good buffer state for the Communist side and they have no need to agree to unification on terms reasonable to the West.

The second variable is the relative strength of, and the attraction between, South Korea and North Korea. Free world strategy has counted on misery north of the De-militarized Zone and prosperity below it, but achievement of that contrast seems indefinitely postponed. Even if such a favorable ratio were reached, however, the history of Germany reminds us that unification does not automatically follow (although Korea does not have the historical handicap of having started two world wars). A third variable is the attachment between South Korea and the United States. Korea has almost always had a patron or an overlord or an occupier. Maybe a stronger South Korea could have a mutually beneficial partnership with Japan someday, but until that time the United States must continue as the benefactor of South Korea unless it ceases to care whether Korea is unified on Communist terms.

Finally for examination comes the variable of affinity and power as between South Korea and Communist China. Enough has been said previously to show that this is the tail of the dog. In previous moves toward unification it has not counted. In 1946-47, of course, when the Soviet Union and the United States were negotiating about reunification the Chinese civil war was well started. When, following the recommendation of the 1953 Korean armistice agreement, a conference on Korean unification convened in Geneva in April 1954, there were delegates from South Korea and the 15 countries that had contributed military forces to the U.N. Command and representatives from Communist China, North Korea and the Soviet Union but bilateral talks between South Korea and Communist China were of no significance.

Having in mind the foregoing history and strategic factors, the South Koreans have considered the question of unification to be an international problem, not a bilateral matter for settlement with Communist China. It might well be that the balances of forces which would result in reunification would also make diplomatic relations between South Korea and Communist China feasible, but such a tie would be incidental.

2. South Korean policies - In order to safeguard South Korea's independence and promote its welfare its governments have followed these precepts: (1) be stronger than, and avoid contact with, North Korea; (2) stay close to the United States; (3) make as many friends in the United Nations as possible; and (4) shun Communist China. There has been a high degree of agreement on the last point. Even the historical cultural links with China now seem to work toward separation. South Koreans no longer like to think of their culture as having been derived from China. They want to have their own culture but they are not sure what are its ingredients. The trade potential is low. South Korean exports tend to be competitive with those from the mainland. Government officials say they believe Communist China to be growing weaker, they expect the chances for revolt to be better next year, and they estimate the 1962 harvest to be worse than in 1961. Such officials are confident that if the Communists were overthrown in China the mass of people would feel a common bond with Koreans

(both having fought the Japanese and suffered under Communism) and that food shortages in China would be quickly solved by the donation of United States surpluses and the higher rate of agricultural production under free enterprise.

The policy of keeping a tight seal on the door to North Korea has been followed consistently. In the airwaves overhead, however, there is a din. Many hours a day the North Korean radio scolds the United States for staying in Korea, viciously attacks the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and purrs that unification could readily be achieved if the true representatives of the people were allowed to meet and work things out. The South Korean radio replies with newscasts, commentary on world developments, criticism of events in the Communist world and polemics against principles of Communism. After the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces in 1958 the Communists stepped up their demands for the withdrawal of United Nations forces. With the downfall of Rhee North Korea called for gradual unification through a confederation of North and South, economic cooperation, free travel and exchange of correspondents. Some students and the small socialist parties in South Korea (agitated by a disputed number of Communists) were sympathetic to these feelers and to the concept of a neutral Korea. One slogan of the military coup in May 1961 was that these tendencies and the activities of North Korean spies and agents had to be curbed. Except for an unexplained period in the summer of 1962, when the North Korean radio suggested that contacts could be opened with the Supreme Council, it has called for subversion and overthrow of the military dictatorship.

How many people continue to feel, as they said when they were free to during the Chang Administration, that there ought to be some dealings with North Korea it is hard to say. I met no one who spoke in this vein, but this may not be significant because I found it difficult to meet persons interested in discussing any political subjects. I would guess that Communist sympathy is narrowly confined, because the memory of the killing of all opposed to Communism during the brief occupation of South Korea by the invaders is still fresh in the minds of persons of voting age.

If logic and facts are persuasive to South Koreans, the government has a good case for not dealing with North Korea on its own. Forcible unification is out of the question because of North Korea's backers and because the United States holds South Korean supply lines in such a way that its forces cannot move without American consent. Likewise, there is no use thinking of negotiating directly with North Koreans because neither negotiator would be his own master. Economic and cultural ties would be too risky. Conditions up north have improved too fast. The northern industrial base was much bigger than that in the south to start with, and North Korea, with help from China and Russia, has rebuilt it since the war and added to it. North Korean leaders have worked the people hard and have planned well so that the north is making faster progress toward self-sufficiency than the south. The north has of course the advantage of less than half as many people.

in an equal area. Consumption per capita in South Korea may be twice that in the north but it ought to be better distributed and it would be impossible at the current rate without United States aid. South Korea's new leaders say they are dedicated to ending loafing and profiteering at United States expense, but they have a fundamental education task on their hands. Koreans traditionally are interested in themselves and their families, and have regarded private charity and keeping the office-holder's hand out of the public till as strange ideas. The democratic tradition is rudimentary.

South Korea continues to favor unification under the principles repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations: (1) the United Nations is responsible for securing a peaceful settlement in Korea; and (2) in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision to select representatives to the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous populations of the two parts. It has resisted proposals of China, Russia and North Korea which call for: (1) withdrawal of U.N. forces; (2) holding of elections without outside supervision and representation of the north and south equally in the Assembly; (3) commercial, cultural and other exchanges; and (4) joint organs of a coalition government.

Since the United Nations has had jurisdiction over Korea's fate since 1950, it is important that the history of U.N. actions and South Korea's case be known to and be supported by as many United Nations members as possible. Rhee kept aloof, but the military government has doubled the number of countries with which it has diplomatic relations and these include neutral countries for the first time. The Pak regime, for instance, has been glad to respond favorably to Nehru's request for sympathy in India's border conflict with China because North Korea, which has a consulate general in India, has been attacking India in support of Communist China.

No other unification solutions would come close to giving South Korea the advantages of the United Nations formula. A neutralized Korea would be opposed out of a well-justified fear that it would not stick. Only a year elapsed between the withdrawal of United States forces in 1949 and the invasion of 10 North Korean divisions headed by Russian tanks. A narrow neutralized zone along the Yalu, manned by token U.N. soldiers of the small powers, separating China and Russia from a Korea unified according to U.N. principles but containing no United States forces, would be considered by the South Korean Government as worth exploring at a time in the future when South Korea is strong enough relative to North Korea. There is also the jocular solution according to which South Korea would trade Formosa to Communist China in return for North Korea, but the narrators always repeat at the end that it is only a joke.

C. China and the Normalization of Relations Between South Korea and Japan

South Korea and Japan have been periodically negotiating, and

then breaking off negotiations, on the "normalization" of relations between them since an independent South Korea was first established. If they could settle their differences and establish diplomatic, trade and other ties the blessings for the two countries and the free world generally would be many. Fourteen years of wrangling and bitterness would be ended. To the extent of South Korea's ability to export products needed by Japan, trade between two complementary economies would grow. Japan would make several hundred million dollars worth of payments and loans to South Korea as recompense for harm done during Japan's occupation, 1910-45. South Korea would give up its prohibition (enforced by its navy) of Japanese fishing in a large area of the high seas delimited by the Peace Line (as they call it; the Rhee Line as others call it) around the Korean peninsula. Depending upon the Korean foreign investment law, and an appropriate discounting by the Japanese of the South Korean propensity for ex post facto legislation, the Japanese may invest in Korea. Permanent rights for several hundred thousand Koreans who may choose to remain in Japan would be fixed. Japan would accept another strand binding itself to the free world. South Korea would gain another claim to legitimacy and permanence.

There is ample evidence of the proper spirit on both sides so the chances for settlement now appear bright, and the battle for ratification by the Japanese Diet might begin in the spring of 1963. The foregoing description of course prejudices some of the issues but gives the order of magnitude of the advantages of normalization and a fair anticipation of the likely bargain. It is a sufficient catalog at any rate to explain the propaganda effort by Communist China and North Korea to quash the deal. Fully conscious that any strengthening of South Korea hurts them, the Communists have been holding mass meetings of protest and keeping their radios and other voices in full outcry. Chinese messages to students and journalists in South Korea and to the socialist parties in Japan have been regular. The Communist's main argument has been that normalization will bring a Japanese commitment right up to the Armistice Line and will therefore promote a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.

North Korea feels especially wounded by Japan's discrimination and slur against its legitimacy. It worries about missing out on "reparations" due it. Its propaganda is poured upon Korean residents in Japan and it has spent money in their organizations and in leftist groups to harass the normalization progress. Japan has softened the blow somewhat, and gratified its own commercial acquisitiveness, by increasing trade with North Korea, unofficially of course. South Korea does not like this, and protests, but is resigned to it.

Why does not Communist China do something to stop Japan and South Korea from getting together? Mere verbal protests will clearly not be enough. The Chinese have enlisted the support of the Japan Socialist Party, the Japanese Communist Party and SOHYO, one of the big labor federations, but they have not warmed up to riot tactics yet. The JSP platform has a plank opposing relations with Korea until Korea is united. The Democratic Socialist Party is not opposed in

principle to normalization but is pressing the government to add safeguards for Japan.

Communist China has one practical lever, its trade with Japan. A ban on normalization is not, however, included in the three political principles and three economic principles which Chou En-lai has said must govern that trade. China did not make normalization an obstacle to the successful Matsumura-Chou negotiations. The Takasaki mission is still in China as of this writing but, so far as I can learn from the Japanese newspapers in Korea, the Chinese have not pressed their objections in that negotiation either. The answer must be that Communist China judges that the advantage to it of a five-year barter agreement with Japan, and the political advance which that represents, outweigh the harm done, from the Communist point of view, by the beginning of Japanese-South Korean cooperation and the injury to the prestige of North Korea. On the Japanese side China's forbearance is fortunate because the Ikeda Government has skillfully juxtaposed in the news in Japan the headlines on the Matsumura and Takasaki missions (which the socialists can only applaud) with the headlines on the Kim-Ohira meetings in October and November on normalization.

D. NEATO, APACL and Nationalist China

1. NEATO - Now and then there has been informal discussion by representatives of South Korea and Nationalist China about forming a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization. NATO, CENTO, SEATO; why not NEATO? Nothing has ever come of this talk because the cherished advantages of bilateral security treaties with the United States might be diluted in such a multilateral frame and, especially, because neither the United States nor Japan, the other two essential participants, has shown the slightest interest. Mere talk, however, has alerted the East Asian Communist countries and anti-NEATO positions are part of the boilerplate in the Communist propaganda engine. Any well-indoctrinated Japanese socialist will tell you at once, upon being given the initials, that NEATO is bad. South Korea maintains a distant interest. Yes, if the United States would push it, and if Japan were willing, NEATO might be helpful to South Korea's security.

2. APACL - The formation in South Korea in 1954 of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League was mentioned earlier. This was a Rhee initiative enthusiastically supported by Chiang. The name still has a bad connotation for some people in South Korea because Rhee used the organization locally for his own political purposes. APACL has now been adopted by the Supreme Council. Chairman Pak in his first anniversary speech mentioned APACL accomplishments as demonstrating the government's desire to be an international leader of anti-Communism:

Especially, the recent extraordinary conference of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, held in Seoul at the initiative of Korea, heightened the prestige of anti-Communist Korea. The anti-Communist attitude of the Korean people exhibited during the conference must have prompted the free Asians to practice anti-Communism

in their daily life. The fact that the conference resolved to establish a Freedom Center, which Korea had proposed as a Mecca for the anti-Communist movement of free Asians, proves the firm anti-Communist stand of Korea and displays the determination of the Koreans to the whole world.

The Supreme Council is underwriting the financing of the Freedom Center. It has forced businessmen and government employees to make contributions and has imposed an extra tax on movies shown in Korea, the proceeds of which will go to the Center. South Korea's overseas missions have been instructed to try to drum up foreign contributions. The government will make up the difference. Ground has been broken for the construction of the Center which has elaborate plans estimated to cost \$2.5 million to complete.

What will be done at the Freedom Center? Plans are vague but the thinking is big. Research will be done on Communist China, North Korea and the Soviet Union. Scholarly works on Communist tactics and strategy will be published. Leaders of non-Communist organizations from all over the world will be brought to Seoul for training on Marxism and its methods, some for two-week intensive sessions so as not to interrupt regular jobs. Youth leaders, propaganda experts and perhaps guerilla tacticians will be turned out. A Youth Corps may be organized. The Center may serve as a collection agency for information about the Communist threat.

Two governments are active in APACL, South Korea being much more heavily committed financially than Nationalist China. South Korea as host for the extraordinary May 1962 session paid the bills for hotels, meals and publicity. Government employees, including some from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked in the secretariat for that conference and some are detailed full time to the organization. The Nationalist Government operates similarly. Other delegates from Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, France, the United States and other countries represent themselves or, at most, some non-governmental anti-Communist organization at home.

The future of APACL is speculative. The central organization and the Freedom Center are being professionally run and paid for largely by the Governments of South Korea and Nationalist China. APACL is in no way a popular movement as yet, although its backers would no doubt be glad if it developed into one. The eighth annual meeting was held in Tokyo in October 1962. Some right-wing Japanese political leaders like Kishi participated. The Japanese managers tried to have the name of the organization changed to Asian League for the Defense of Freedom and to broaden the aims a bit, but they did not succeed. The Japanese language press mostly ignored the meeting. American delegates representing the "Committee of One Million" and the National Review attended. Former Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy made one of the principal addresses. The United States Government has not opposed APACL but has not contributed to it nor provided any assistance. It has not objected to South Korea or Formosa budgeting for their contributions.

3. Problems in South Korea-Nationalist China relations - Reference has been made to certain irritations. The APACL history reflects one problem. Pak and Kim want to share Chiang's Asian anti-Communist leadership. They feel that Korea is entitled to such a position by virtue of having been the most recent victim of Communist aggression and of suffering under a continuous massive confrontation of hostile force. At the extraordinary May 1962 APACL conference, the Nationalists tried to make the Freedom Center a local activity instead of the training center for all of Asia. The question was left fuzzy in the final resolution.

In July 1962 South Korea made another bid. Central Intelligence Agency Director Kim Chong Pil called a five-day conference of government representatives from Nationalist China, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam to discuss means of checking Communist infiltration and to formulate efficient anti-Communist intelligence tactics. They agreed to exchange data and to hold other conferences. Observers from the United States and Turkey attended.

South Korea's drive to increase its diplomatic relations has annoyed Nationalist China when the effort has included countries which recognize Communist China. The Nationalists refuse to have relations with such countries.

The Nationalists would like South Korea to admit some Chinese for permanent residence. The response is that South Korea is already crowded. A former official of the Rhee Government explained that South Korea does not have and does not want an overseas Chinese problem such as that experienced by the Philippines and Thailand. Besides, the argument went, the Chinese now in Korea came there before and during the Japanese occupation and were given such favored treatment by the Japanese that they still have something of a head start on the Koreans. The Koreans get along well with the Chinese in their midst but feel distaste for the Chinese stingy, solemn, saving, self-sufficient ways.

Athletics politics caused another pinprick. Indonesia would not let Nationalist athletes participate in the 1962 Asian Games in Djakarta - no visas. The Chinese Embassy in Seoul asked the South Korean Government to boycott the Games but it refused for two reasons. It has been trying to establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia. Secondly, it has the problem of complying with the decision of the International Olympic Committee that it must form a "joint team" with North Korea for the 1964 Olympics, and it does not want to jeopardize the outcome of that issue by taking political stands with respect to other athletic contests.

None of these differences has led to serious friction or bad feeling between South Korea and Nationalist China. In view of their many common interests already discussed it would take more than these disagreed items to upset the smooth course of dealings between these two victims and targets of Communism.

E. South Korea and Chinese Representation in the United Nations

The problem of Chinese representation is of great concern to South Korea even though Soviet vetoes have kept it out of the United Nations. Seating of Communist China and ousting of Nationalist China would be regarded in South Korea as a great defeat for the free world. South Korea knows Communist China has hostile aims and remembers that China has always wanted to expand and to control the Korean peninsula. How can Communist China be said to be peace-loving when it argues even with the Soviet Union that world war is inevitable? This is a typical South Korean way of expressing the country's adamant position.

Seating of both Communist China and Nationalist China would be looked upon as a dangerous precedent which might be used to argue in favor of seating representatives of both North Korea and South Korea. The vote on Chinese representation each year has given South Korea a good clue as to how the vote would go on the Korea question in the United Nations. When the result of the 1962 debate was known the government newspaper said editorially of the 42-56-12 vote rejecting the Soviet proposal to substitute the Communists for the Nationalists:

The United Nations vote against the proposal to seat Red China undoubtedly constitutes a substantial victory for the free world. It may reasonably be equal to the recent victory of the United States in the Cuban crisis.

I regret that treatment of North Korea's internal trends and its relations with Communist China in this report has had to be so thin. Washington, Tokyo or Hong Kong are better places to study these subjects than Seoul, I am advised. As has been said above, South Korea has done - indeed, permitted - very little study on such topics. The Ford Foundation has, however, just made a grant to a new Asiatic Research Center of Korea University for studies on Asian Communist countries. It will be a three-year project and those in charge of it have been promised access to Korean Central Intelligence Agency files and a guarantee that the fact of use of such files will not be the basis for a charge of Communist sympathy. So much of the better information on North Korea is in the files of intelligence agencies of the United States Government and is much more easily available to government employees, and others with special security clearances, in Washington than to the wandering private scholar who happens to be in Seoul.

Cordially,

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