

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

GCD-5

A China Away From Home?

Friends of China Club
Taipei, Taiwan

December 1, 1962

Mr. Richard H. Nolte
Institute of Current World Affairs
366 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Dick:

I am enclosing three Formosa^{1/} essays on subjects which seem to me to be related and on which I have collected bits of evidence: A. The Sensitivity of the Government of the Republic of China; B. Some Comparisons Between the Two Chinese Governments; and C. The China Policy of the Formosans.

I should also like to give you my mood as I depart from Taiwan; it is one of disappointment and depression. The disappointment is based on hindsight and may be somewhat unfair, but I cannot help regretting what might have been done on the island if policies had been based on more than one goal during the last 17 years. If there had been two goals, (1) counter-attack and (2) build the island into the best country that can be, Formosa would be a far different place today. I realize that the second goal would have subtracted resources from the first, and vice versa, but my judgment is that the result today in free world security and in harmony on the island would be better if attention had been paid to both aims. My depression comes because devotion to the single goal has created some problems to which I see no easy or quick solution and because the Government of the Republic of China has not yet given sufficient importance to developing Taiwan as one desirable end in itself

While in Formosa I have devoted most of my attention to an assessment of some of the policies of the Government of the Republic of China against the background of Communist China's aims and actions and to an exploration of relationships between the Formosans and the two Chinese governments. There was not time to study many other important ques-

^{1/}By the way, should one say "Formosa" or "Taiwan", "The Government of the Republic of China" (GRC) or "Nationalist China" (NC), "The Government of the People's Republic of China" (PRC) or "Communist China (CC)? I have decided that world-wide diversity of usage makes it appropriate to use "Formosa" and "Taiwan" interchangeably, except that I always use "Taiwanese" when referring to the language. I have decided rather arbitrarily to use "GRC" and "CC" when referring to the two governments and to throw in "Nationalist" now and then when the other term seems too tiresome.

tions.^{2/} I found in my inquiries that the extent of Chiang's efforts to return to the mainland is central to an appreciation of the present and to forecasting. In GCD-1, p. 4, I pointed out the fundamental divergence between Chiang's objectives and the willingness of the United States to help him. Chiang's sole interest is in returning to the mainland and governing China; he opposes making an independent country out of Taiwan; and every program on the island is subordinated to the counter-attack. Chiang believes that the only way to avoid world nuclear war is to substitute a local war in the Far East with conventional weapons. The United States has not been willing to support the Generalissimo in his plans for invasion or provocative actions against the mainland. Chiang's Quemoy buildup is seen as unnecessarily provocative, but he is being given time to change his mind.

The United States-GRC disagreement over the priority which should be given to the economic and political development of Formosa is paralleled by similar differences of opinion between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese.

In order to judge the opinion of a person on Taiwan one has to first establish whether the speaker is a mainlander or a Formosan. The people who live on the island do this automatically, and sometimes unconsciously, by noting language (Taiwanese or some mainland dialect) dress, occupation and manner. The English-speaking visitor must ask. It may serve as an introduction to contemporary thinking on Taiwan to describe four main types of attitudes. There are more, of course.

Pure mainlander - There are no security restrictions on opinions of this type. The holder can state them anywhere without fear because Chiang has views of this sort. Others come from the KMT, higher Government officials, military officers and noncoms and monopoly or large business. Naturally, not everyone in such classes holds such beliefs.

The pure mainlander is genuinely homesick. He has a deep longing for his real land, for his wife and children perhaps, for property, for the remembered landscape and different weather, for a more varied scene and challenging job. The Nationalist Government and armed forces are vital units in the crusade against the bandit Communists who hold the motherland. Right, duty and wise strategy demand return to the mainland. The right time could come at any moment. The failure of the "great leap forward", the Communist China-USSR split and the Chinese march into India are taken as good omens of trouble back home. The long years of sacrifice, discipline, exhortation and waiting will surely not be in vain. Taiwan is a temporary base and that is hard on the Taiwanese but there was no other choice. The Taiwanese are Chinese too and they should be understanding (just as Texans would be if the Executive and the Congress retreated there for a last ditch fight).

^{2/}Chapter 13 of A. Doak Barnett's book, Communist China and Asia, continues to be the best statement of the situation on Formosa and its prospects, the objectives and programs of the GRC and the implications of these ingredients for the China policy of the U.S. A visitor to the island for only three weeks can merely embroider upon the comprehensive analysis in these 45 pages published in 1960. I was therefore amazed to learn that a copy of this book is not to be found in any of the six reading rooms maintained by the U.S. Information Service in Taiwan for the purpose of "bolstering confidence in and understanding of U.S. policies and programs".

It is a wartime situation: the Taiwanese, being only one province, cannot determine national policy; naturally security must be tight; of course KMT control in all important matters must be complete. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that three political parties operate without hindrance. Democracy on the provincial and local levels is being strengthened every year by greater participation of Taiwanese. The Minister of Interior is Taiwanese and others are coming into the national government. In the new generation it will be possible to have leaders from the Taiwanese; the Japanese never educated nor allowed any to rise. Considering the model land reform and the rapid growth in the island economy, it is understandable that the Taiwanese are not dissatisfied. They share in the prosperity of the island more than they ever did under the Japanese. The language differences are becoming less significant through compulsory and exclusive study of Mandarin in all schools and, after all, dialect differences among provinces of China is something to which Chinese have been accustomed for thousands of years. Sure there is grumbling; that is also traditional away from the seat of power, but there is only minor disaffection among the Taiwanese and it is a disservice to the free world cause to look for such communal dissent.

Lukewarm mainlander - Opinion in this category will be heard only when the speaker has adequate privacy and has reason to think his audience will not give him away. He will probably be a low-paid civil servant, shopkeeper or teacher. He will share most of the opinions of the pure mainlander with some of the following important exceptions. Return to the mainland is only a dream now but until the President passes away there can be no change in Government policies. After Chiang goes no one can be sure what will happen. Meanwhile the Government could at least eliminate corruption and raise the salaries of government workers.

It is true that many Taiwanese are dissatisfied, and they lack proper respect toward mainlanders, but education and prosperity are gradually making a homogeneous population. There is no real democracy - maybe there cannot be while the Communists are so near - but one would think an opposition party would be healthy and a cure for some of the money passing and favoritism which goes on. Until there is some such liberalization, and more outward-looking tax laws, it can hardly be expected that overseas Chinese investment will be attracted to Taiwan. There could be an end to the spoon-feeding of the public from controlled newspapers.

Collaborating Formosans - All Formosans talk like pure mainlanders or lukewarm mainlanders when in the presence of a mainlander or someone they don't know. In addition, there is a group of Formosans who have adopted one or the other of the mainlander views. These accept the system as it is and participate in it, even joining the KMT. Motivations are varied. Some few do feel that they are part of the mainland group, especially if they went from Formosa to the mainland to fight against the Japanese and then returned to Formosa with the retreating GRC. Other motivations are: greed, realism, "can't-fight-City Hall", vested interests in property or position and, in a few, more patriotic (from the point of view of Formosans) notions of infiltrating the enemy's ranks.

Pure Formosan - These beliefs will be heard only in secure conditions; when the hearer is known and can be trusted not to report to the KMT. The speakers in such conditions will be Formosans drawn from all levels, ages and conditions of life, rich and poor. Since their 1947 rebellion they feel themselves to be "Formosans", not "Chinese". Their ancestors having arrived 2-300 years ago from the mainland, the present Formosans - after being ignored by the Chinese for most of the intervening period, and having revolted from time to time against both the Chinese and Japanese - feel (and this is the illustration they use) as much Chinese as Americans feel British. Formosa is home; there is no desire to go to the continent or to be like the Nationalist Chinese.

Return to the mainland is a foreign concept. It would be nice if the Nationalists could go home (Formosans are anti-Communist), but there seems to be little likelihood of it and Formosans are not interested in fighting across the Straits. Meanwhile Chiang's monomania is the root of most trouble: the excuse for dictatorship, conscription, military taxes, government controls, secret police and all the rest. The Formosans are merely fodder, used in the interest of the KMT. They didn't like it at the time, but Japanese rule is thought of nostalgically now.

What to do about it? The typical Formosan in his frustration is likely to hold several contradictory opinions. There should be full democracy in Taiwan (then the Formosans would have control); but Formosans who run for office now on the sure-to-win KMT ticket are usually branded as puppets. Participation in political life is hopeless now. Revolt seems hopeless too since it was only 15 years ago that 10-20,000 of the cream of Formosan leadership were killed by the Nationalists after a spontaneous uprising. The Americans are the only practical source of help (the Japanese probably being out of the question) but they are giving full support to Chiang.

How many people are there in each of the foregoing categories? There is not much good quantitative evidence. As a guess, the first and third categories are probably small. The second and fourth categories are probably large and are in the same ratio as the two groups in the population, one mainlander to five Formosans.

How many other significant categories are there (in addition to the apathetic mass which never has a political thought)? Soldiers on active duty? Retired mainlander servicemen? Former big Formosan landlords? Children of mainlander-Formosan marriages? There was not sufficient time to investigate these important groups.

Cordially,

George C. Denney, Jr.

George C. Denney, Jr.

I. SENSITIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

My experiences during the past two months in Japan and Korea had led me to conclude that foreign governments are not much interested in exerting themselves to influence the opinions of an individual visiting scholar asking questions about their China policies. Officials (all of whom ranked below an Assistant Secretary of State) had been courteous, answered my questions to the extent that it was in their government's interest to do so, volunteered little material or extra time and extended no social invitations.

I was alert to the possibility of some increase in interest by the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) owing to the complete dependence of that government on United States support. I was not prepared for the extraordinary display of defensiveness and sensitivity to questions which I experienced in unusual efforts by Government and Kuomintang Party (KMT) officials to occupy my time during business hours and socially, in shadowing by the police and in a high-level attempt to use pressure to influence my writing.

My first interview in Taipei was at the Foreign Ministry with the Director of a department (Assistant Secretary level). It lasted a little more than an hour and was useful to me. I gave him a copy of my project outline telling my status, scope of inquiry and travel schedule. At his suggestion I submitted to him the following morning some questions which he said he would refer to appropriate persons for discussion with me. A week later he phoned at my hotel to say that he had arranged for an interview with a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Before escorting me to that interview the Director told me that the interview would concern my submitted questions and that it would last long enough to cover them to my satisfaction.

The Vice Minister opened our private session by saying that he knew of my interest in Washington in the Liao visa case.^{1/} I explained that this had been Senator Fulbright's interest but said that since he had mentioned the matter I would like to hear the Government's views. He said that this involved a matter of great principle for the GRC and then launched into a diatribe against scholars who wanted to call atten-

^{1/}Thomas W. I. Liao, a Formosan exile in Japan, calls himself "The President of the Provisional Government of Formosa". He has sought permission to come to the United States to visit Ohio State University, where he got his Ph.D. years ago, and to make speeches against Chiang. The Eisenhower Administration repeatedly refused. The Kennedy Administration decided to give Liao a visa but reversed itself during the crisis in U.S.-Nationalist relations over the admission of Mongolia to the U.N. Denial of Liao's visa was one of several concessions to the GRC in return for withholding its veto of Mongolia's admission.

tion to the differences between Nationalist Chinese and Formosans. He said that a whole generation had grown up in Taiwan since the Nationalists had taken over from the Japanese, that the Japanese-made differences were being erased and that I should concentrate on what the Nationalists had done to solve the problem and not on the remaining differences. He said heatedly that I had come to Taiwan with a closed and prejudiced mind. Too surprised to be angry, I asked what evidence he had of my prejudice. He replied that two things proved it: my work on the Liao visa case in Washington and the list of questions I had submitted to the Director. I asked what he found objectionable in the questions. He said that they were too general and could not be satisfactorily discussed. He said that he would be happy to answer other questions provided it were understood that his answers were not for attribution. I agreed and asked a few to which he gave short answers. On my departure the Vice Minister again brought up the subject of mainlander-Taiwanese relations. He said that I must realize that the GRC was carrying out a vital mission not just for itself but for the whole free world. It was therefore important to emphasize the Government's will and policy to solve these problems rather than to emphasize the differences which may remain.

There follows the list of questions which so upset the Vice Minister:

"November 14, 1962

"Mr. _____
Director, _____ Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Taipei, Taiwan

Dear Mr. _____:

Following your suggestion of yesterday, I am submitting to you some questions in which I am interested so that you can refer them to appropriate persons in the Government who may be able to discuss them with me.

1. On what subjects or questions in the field of foreign policy is the position or attitude of the Communist regime similar to that of the Government of the Republic of China (GRC)? (Please give a brief summary of the position of each party).
2. On what subjects or questions in the field of foreign policy is the position or attitude of the Communist regime different from or opposed to that of the GRC? (Please give a brief summary of the position of each party).
3. What is the probable origin, motivation and basis for each of the reports which have appeared from time to time since 1949 to the effect that a political deal of some sort has been made between the Communists and the GRC?

"4. For each of the last 5 years, what is the nature and value of goods which have moved directly, or indirectly through Hong Kong or otherwise, between Taiwan and the mainland?

5. To what extent and in what manner have persons on Taiwan kept in touch with relatives and friends on the mainland and kept themselves informed of political, economic and cultural developments on the mainland?

6. What are the methods used, and the political and ideological content of, efforts by the GRC to influence the thinking of the population on the mainland? Also, same question as to efforts by the Communist regime toward the population on Taiwan.

7. What are the methods used, and the political and ideological content of, efforts by the GRC to influence the thinking of the overseas Chinese in Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, etc.? Also, same question as to efforts by the Communist regime toward such overseas Chinese.

8. To what extent and for what reasons do Formosans (persons who were already on the island before 1949, and their children) feel separate from, or alien toward, those who came from the mainland? Also, same question regarding the feeling of Formosans toward those remaining on the mainland.

9. What are the principal appeals and promises which the Communist regime has made to the Formosans since 1949 and what have been the responses of the Formosans to them?

10. What are the principal domestic policies and programs which the GRC has made applicable to the Formosans since 1949, and what have been the responses of the Formosans to them?

I shall be in Taipei, at the Friends of China Club until December 1, except for the period November 17-22, but I should like to finish my discussion on the foregoing topics prior to November 26 if possible.

You were most generous with your time and patience yesterday and thoughtful to allow me to pursue my research in this way.

Sincerely yours,

George C. Denney, Jr.
Fellow, Institute of Current World Affairs
New York, New York."

Shadowing by the secret police adds a certain zest to scholarly research in Formosa. Only twice before have I been followed so closely by government agents: in Czechoslovakia in 1956 when traveling in and near Prague with Senator Long, and again in Cuba in 1957 when Senator Aiken and I visited Santiago and called upon some opponents of Batista.

An incident near the southern end of the island will illustrate the atmosphere (I shall change the names and some of the situation). I went to visit an American friend, Cranmer, for an evening of talk of local politics and mutual acquaintances. His servant ushered me in and gave me a note from Mr. Cranmer saying that he would be late. Then Mr. Tseng arrived. He spoke very little English but wrote his name on a card for me. He asked me whether I had met Mr. Chow. I said yes, period (not knowing Mr. Tseng, and being mindful of Mr. Chow's dissatisfaction, as a Formosan, with Kuomintang rule). Mr. Cranmer arrived and interpreted Mr. Tseng's recital of personal history: a Formosan, he had been successively an officer in the Japanese air force, an officer in the Nationalist Chinese air force, a member of the KMT and now a member of the Young China Party (a so-called political party in Formosa kept by the KMT for public relations purposes). He added that, owing to his military record, he could speak more freely than the average Formosan without worrying about the authorities.

Mr. Fu arrived, took a look at Mr. Tseng, and excused himself saying that he would go see Mr. Yang for a minute. Mr. Yang arrived, greatly agitated, and asked me whether I had met with Mr. Tseng previously. I said no. Mr. Yang said that the atmosphere was bad, suggested taking Mr. Tseng's words with "a pinch of salt," and left, regretting that he had a conflicting meeting. Mr. Tseng then asked to tell me about the opinion of Formosans on the general situation in the Far East. He said that Formosans were eager for the liberation of the mainland. The island was too crowded. If the mainlanders could go back and rescue China from the mess which the Communists have made, then Formosa could be integrated with the mainland and have a prosperous happy future.

Much later in the evening, after Mr. Tseng's departure, Mr. Yang came by and apologized for his stupidity in inviting Mr. Tseng. Earlier in the day Mr. Tseng, known previously to Mr. Yang only as a fellow church member, had amazed him by calling upon him and telling him of his intervention on behalf of the church with the KMT powers regarding a threatened confiscation of church property used for school purposes. Mr. Tseng showed Mr. Yang a copy of a letter which Mr. Yang had received from KMT authorities saying that confiscation would not be carried out. His bona fides apparently established, Mr. Tseng then told Mr. Yang that he had talked to Mr. Denney, and wondered whether Mr. Yang was going to talk to him also (I had talked to Yang on the previous day). Mr. Yang said that he expected Mr. Denney to come to Mr. Cranmer's that evening and he invited Mr. Tseng to come also.

Mr. Fu, coming near Mr. Cranmer's house, had encountered two strangers inside the walled church compound, speaking Mandarin and

not Taiwanese, and had become suspicious. Being surprised to find Mr. Tseng, a stranger, in the room, he decided to leave at once and to warn Mr. Yang. Accordingly, the non-KMT Formosans withdrew from the planned conversation.

The last of these related intrigues came the following day. Mr. Chow, referred to by the KMT agent Tseng, did not show up at a second meeting with me which I had agreed to at his request. As I was leaving the United States Information Service library, where he had asked that we meet, the taxi with three men in it which had been waiting outside started up and followed me back to the hotel. I should add that Yang and Fu were respected and senior citizens in the community, were not members of a revolutionary group, and held quite moderate opinions in the spectrum of Formosan attitudes.

* * * * *

II. SOME COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TWO CHINESE GOVERNMENTS

1. Differences and similarities in policies - Communist China (CC) and the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) are, of course, on opposite sides in international affairs. CC is a rival with the Soviet Union for leadership of the group of Communist nations which seek to dominate the whole world. The GRC is an ally of the United States, which is regarded by CC as its number one enemy. Both CC and the GRC claim to be the only legitimate government of all of China and compete for international recognition. Each claims China's seat in the United Nations, but the GRC has so far been able to hold it against annual attempts to substitute CC for the GRC representatives. On international issues the GRC has almost always shared the view of the United States and has so voted in the United Nations, while CC has almost always expressed positions violently hostile to those of the U.S. and the rest of the free world.

a. The struggle for China - The top GRC and CC leaders know each other well, having "gone to school together" in China and the Soviet Union, having fought cooperatively against the warlords and sometimes against the Japanese and having fought against each other and double-crossed each other for 40 years. The GRC fled to Formosa in 1949 thoroughly beaten by CC and unwanted by the Chinese people. In the 12 years since, CC has carried out a complete Communist transformation of the social, economic and political institutions of the mainland without serious challenge. In the same period the GRC has modernized its forces on Formosa and continued its dictatorship over agriculture and industry, still largely privately owned. There has been practically no contact between GRC and CC forces for the past 12 years; the two sides have been kept apart by United States forces in the Taiwan Straits.

b. Rivalry for international recognition - Each government has sought world acceptance of its claims. The GRC has guarded its status as a national government by adhering as closely as circumstances permit to the Constitution of 1946, by maintaining and expanding diplomatic relations with established and newly independent nations, and by protecting its right to sit in the United Nations and other international organizations. The GRC has diplomatic relations with 56 U.N. member states plus three outside of the U.N. CC has such relations with 39 U.N. members plus four others. To the extent of their limited abilities both the GRC and CC have undertaken foreign aid programs, the GRC concentrating on African countries whose votes it badly needs to stay in the United Nations.

Generally speaking CC and the GRC have followed "all or nothing" policies. Both reject the concepts of two Chinas and of one China - one Formosa. Each states that it will not sit in the U.N. with the other. The same principle is extended to other organizations and to participation in international athletic events. They have rarely had diplomatic relations with nations which do so with the other side. The GRC has criticized the United States for meeting with CC in Geneva and Warsaw. The GRC, however, permits the United Kingdom to keep a consulate in Formosa on the rationalization that it was the only consulate in Formosa before the CC took over the mainland and because

it is accredited to the Province of Taiwan and not to the GRC. Senegal recognized both CC and the GRC but the CC representative has not appeared there, so the GRC representative has stayed. This is the formal side; the GRC does not, however, break off relations with countries which have economic or cultural ties with CC so long as some kind of fig leaf covers any government-to-government dealings. A salient example is GRC relations with Japan, which used a semi-private trade mission in October-November 1962 to negotiate a 5-year trade agreement with CC.

c. The continuing Straits crisis - The GRC never claimed Formosa until 1943, China having ceded it to Japan in 1895. Mao during the 1930's took the line that Formosa should be "liberated" from "colonial" status and restored to independence, and this position was not wholly disavowed until 1949 when CC set the goal of "liberating" Formosa from Chiang. Both the GRC and CC now claim Formosa, however, as being unquestionably part of China. They agree that the battle is an internal matter and that the use of force across the Straits is legitimate. The United States and CC have had many discussions at Geneva and Warsaw about the mutual renunciation of force in the settlement of the Taiwan question. CC would be happy to renounce use of force against the United States if the United States would get out of the way so that CC could invade Formosa. The United States has said it would be willing to renounce the use of force against CC in the Straits provided it could still defend the GRC if CC attacked Formosa. Neither the GRC nor CC desires any relaxation of tension over the issue of Formosa.

The use by the GRC of force offensively against CC depends, by agreement and by military necessity, on the will of the United States. The GRC might be able to land a division or two on the mainland even without United States permission, but this would be suicidal unless the United States decided to help. In the Yeh-Dulles agreement of December 10, 1954 the GRC promised that use of force from areas under its control "will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense". On October 23, 1958 when the Quemoy crisis was beginning to die down Secretary Dulles insisted that Chiang agree to a joint communique in which the GRC belief was stated to be "that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People Principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force". This document caused heartbreak in the GRC at the time. It has been reported in the American press and not officially denied that the United States in July 1962 privately assured CC that the United States would not approve and would not support an invasion of the continent by Chiang.

The GRC still speaks in warlike tones, however. On November 12, 1962 "the national leader" spoke to 400 members of the KMT at the opening session of a big Party meeting and urged them to prepare themselves for the counter-attack on Communist China. The Vice President-Premier and Deputy Director-General of the KMT, Ch'en Ch'eng, gave the political report to the session from which the following excerpts give the flavor:

"Today the Communist bloc nations are using the threat of nuclear war to nibble away at the Free World by means of conventional war. The democratic countries should also use conventional war as a substitute for nuclear war to stem aggression of the Communist bloc. . .

Judging by conditions on the mainland, the internal crisis of the Chinese Communists, instead of being alleviated, is actually becoming more serious. . .

The Republic of China has never pinned her hope of solving the problem of the Chinese Communists on a global nuclear war. On the contrary, we are of the firm belief that only by removing the source of aggression and war on the Chinese mainland by our own efforts can world peace be safeguarded and a worldwide conflict avoided. . .

Secondly, military strength is indispensable for mainland recovery. . . We believe that, once the bugle sounds, our armed forces will be able to accomplish this all-important task. We are also aware that the fight against communism means a total war. Military effort cannot be independent from political, economic and cultural endeavors. . .

Our nation now stands at the crucial juncture. Before us is either survival or extinction. This is the time for the Party and our comrades to redeem our past mistakes. No matter how the international situation may turn, we should be self-reliant, and exert the utmost by ourselves. We should neither complain to Heaven nor blame anything amiss on others. We know that whatever changes may take place within the Communist regime, our only and final solution lies in mainland recovery. Thus we must step up our preparations, especially those needed to support the military. We must fortify our strength, especially the spiritual power necessary in the course of national recovery and reconstruction. We should also carry out the Director-General's teachings of 'reform, mobilization and combat', improve ourselves, overcome dangers and difficulties, and exert maximum efforts toward the goals of anti-Communism, national recovery, deliverance of our people, and salvation of mankind. . .

Comrades! The torch of our anti-Communist revolution is already burning on the mainland. As soon as the bugle sounds for our national recovery, we should march together under the leadership of our Director-General, claim no success for ourselves but be second to none in exertion, and follow in the footsteps of our revolutionary martyrs, until victory is ours."

The Generalissimo was more specific about the occasion for blowing the bugle in his message of October 10, 1962 to the Chinese Communist armed forces:

"I have given special orders to the Ministry of National Defense and other government agencies concerned to set up radio stations and organize task forces to keep in constant touch with Communist officers and men on the mainland rising against the Communists. Any substantive anti-Communist step taken by any organization in any area will be given immediate assistance by our air force. The leaders of such actions will be appointed political and military chiefs of their areas. The government will never leave the anti-Communist revolutionaries to fight alone without aid."

What would the GRC do if the bugle were blown? Something like this: small-scale paratroop drops would be made on the mainland to create bases to which defecting CC units could go and join their comrades from Formosa. These bases would be supplied by air until the United States was convinced (by rapidly increasing numbers of defectors) that a larger attack, say ten divisions ferried in United States vessels, was feasible. What would the CC air force and the Soviet Union be doing while this was going on? The interviewer is stopped by the plea that such questions are getting too much into the details of strategy.

d. Chinese principles - There is much common ground between the GRC and CC when it comes to the Chinese nation and territory. "Born Chinese, always Chinese", is a principle supported in both GRC and CC negotiations with countries where overseas Chinese have settled, and they vie with each other in seeking protection and cultural autonomy for, and in promoting each's patronage of, such Chinese. The borders of China are also commonly defended. Ambassador Galbraith caused a storm in Formosa when he said in New Delhi that the MacMahon Line is "the accepted international border and is sanctioned by modern usage". Tibet is likewise viewed as being part of China, although the GRC said in 1958 (when it no longer had any power over Tibet) that Tibetans should have the right to choose their relationship with China. CC has had to acquiesce in the Soviet Union-sponsored independence of Mongolia, but the GRC position is that Mongolia should be autonomous within China.

I have learned second-hand while here that there has been a certain elation expressed among mainlanders in Formosa over the CC military successes against India. Similar stories were told in connection with CC prowess against the United States in Korea. Examples of this kind, and the ancient and continuing superiority feelings of the Chinese toward all foreigners, provide a basis for cynics in Formosa to say that the mainlanders would rather have Formosa fall to CC than to have it be independent.

e. Plans for administering the mainland - If CC conquered Formosa it would presumably make the island over in the image of the other provinces of CC, but in its propaganda to Formosa these details are not given. Likewise, Chiang called on KMT members in November 1962 to build the whole of China into a "new San-Min-Chu-I /nationalism, democracy and social well-being/ China" by using the "new San-Min-Chu-I Model Province" of Taiwan as the blueprint. There is a Mainland Recovery Planning and Research Commission, headed by Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng, which draws up standby plans, but they are all secret. "Land to the tiller" and free enterprise are the slogans, but if one talks to five KMT members one will get as many different ideas on how this transformation on the mainland will be accomplished. This uncertainty and vagueness is inevitable; no one can tell what conditions on the mainland will be like when the time comes and it would be foolish for the GRC to make public guesses now. GRC propaganda to the mainland, some main principles of which are given below, is necessarily general concerning the transition from Chinese Communism to San-Min-Chu-I.

2. Relationships

a. Trade - Nationalist China forbids direct trade with Communist China. The GRC has reported that an average of \$1.5 million worth of goods of China mainland origin have been imported into Formosa from Hong Kong each year for the last six years. This trade has constituted a little less than one-third of Formosan imports from Hong Kong and the trend is downward. The main items have been metallic ores, peculiarly Chinese foods and herbs, "vegetable, animal and mineral medicinal substances, crude", and rhinoceros and antelope horns for making so-called virility potions. Exports from Formosa through Hong Kong to the mainland have been reported as negligible. There is some smuggling but naturally no figures are available.

b. Personal and cultural ties - The million and a half mainland refugees to Formosa of course left many friends and relatives behind. The GRC discourages any sort of contact with, and even research in colleges and universities concerning, the mainland. It controls immigration and emigration tightly, partly to prevent fraternizing. It permits no cultural exchange, and Communist-published materials are strictly forbidden on Taiwan. Some flow of letters and news does take place, however, through Hong Kong. Mainland broadcasts come in loud and clear on Formosa at certain times in spite of GRC efforts to keep local stations on the air at the same times and on the same frequencies. Some of these Communist broadcasts include personal messages. One can only guess that the interchange with the mainland which does go on in these ways increases the homesickness of the refugees but also adds to their resentment against the Communists.

Both the GRC and CC claim to be the true guardians and perpetrators of Chinese culture. They put forth much effort and spend what they can afford to so persuade the world and especially the overseas Chinese. The Communists have been innovators and revolutionary in the mainland society. The GRC has been conservative. I do not have

the facts or the experience to sort out the conflicting claims. What is a good reform and what is a bad undermining of ancient values? Take the question of the written Chinese language. The Communists are simplifying, standardizing and working toward a Roman alphabet. They say this is necessary for a modern industrial society and that it brings Chinese culture to the masses for the first time. The Nationalists reply that much of Chinese culture is in the written language and they propose to abolish the Communist changes when they get the chance.

c. Political contacts - From time to time there have been reports of secret discussions between representatives of CC and those of the GRC about some kind of political settlement. CC in its propaganda has encouraged belief in such reports, which are consistent with CC's open propaganda line that annexation of Taiwan to CC is inevitable, that withdrawal of American support from the GRC is bound to happen and that a negotiated settlement now, with fair treatment of GRC leaders being assured, would be more advantageous to the GRC than conquest or subversion of the GRC in the future.

The GRC position on these reports of secret talks and on CC peace feelers is that they are CC propaganda plots, not serious attempts at negotiations, and that the GRC would never consider making a deal with CC.

The latest report, on August 11, 1962 by Dennis Bloodworth, a seasoned Singapore reporter for the London Observer, was that "The Chiang Kai-shek family, which controls Nationalist Formosa, has reached a secret agreement with China's Communist leaders in Peking. This provides for a truce in the Straits of Formosa, and for the future autonomy of the island itself under the continued rule of the Generalissimo and his Kuomintang successors for at least 10 years." A key point in the detailed provisions of the reported agreement was the provision that the Nationalists would reduce to nominal proportions their garrisons on the offshore islands, which would be integrated with Amoy into a buffer administrative district in which free movement would take place. Since Chiang's heavy buildup on Quemoy is central to his stated objectives, it would seem possible over a relatively short period to check the authenticity of Bloodworth's report; that is, if Chiang substantially reduces his Quemoy forces without the prodding of a United States ultimatum, there may be something to the Bloodworth story. In any case, the Bloodworth article was strongly denounced and ridiculed by the GRC.

One can speculate endlessly about these rumors. The standard theories: (1) pure Communist fabrication; (2) reporter's imagination; (3) Chiang is putting pressure on the United States; (4) Ch'en Ch'eng is trying to get a leg up on the succession by discrediting Chiang and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo; (5) overseas Chinese, hating to see their brothers at odds, indulge in wishful scheming; and (6) Bloodworth is correct.

Laying aside such speculation until there are more facts to go on, the following points might be kept in mind. There would be mutual advantages for the GRC and CC in a negotiated settlement and they have the power^{1/} to make one, so a deal is not impossible, although unlikely. Any possible advantages to the United States would seem to be even smaller than those meagre advantages for Chiang, especially if Chiang made a deal behind the back of the United States. The extent of autonomy for Formosa agreed upon would determine the reaction of the Formosans. They might feel that they had moved from the frying pan into the fire; hence this contingency is one of several mentioned by Formosans as possible triggers for an uprising against the KMT.

3. Propaganda

a. From Communist China to Formosa - CC does not attempt to drop leaflets on, or float balloons to, Formosa; it relies on very powerful radio transmitters occupying the usual listening hours. The CC transmitter at Foochow alone is twice as powerful as the Nationalist's biggest transmitter. Jamming would be ineffective, I was told, so the GRC has spotted 20 radio stations around the island to fill the same hours with easier-to-hear local programs.

To the mainlanders on Formosa CC makes appeals aimed to drive a wedge between the GRC and the United States. The call is for patriotism, for getting rid of American control so that Formosa can be an autonomous part of China. CC represents the wave of the future. Under CC the Nationalists could run Taiwan as they saw fit and Chiang could be the Governor. If the GRC notion of counter-attack is given up CC assures that it will not invade Formosa. Incidents like the 1957 riot against the American Embassy in Taipei, which was sparked by the acquittal by a U.S. Army court-martial of an American soldier who had shot and killed a Chinese and which was permitted by the GRC authorities, are played up and celebrated annually. It is alleged that the United States is undermining the Generalissimo and is going to put in Thomas Liao or someone else who "will be America's stooge". Personal messages to important KMT officials are sent on the air from their relatives still on the mainland pleading for reunion. The CC radio comments unfavorably on United States actions of every kind, branding the U.S. as an aggressor, jeering at visits to Formosa of American generals and other officials and even blaming a cholera outbreak on the Americans. There is little comment on GRC programs in Taiwan; the big pitch is to the Chinese instincts: "Come back to the fold and all will be forgiven."

CC broadcasts in Taiwanese play up Formosan unrest and shortcomings in living conditions, which are alleged to be no better than

^{1/}Some observers say this is the one order of Chiang's which might be disobeyed since he has built up such strong conditioned reflexes to the contrary.

under the Japanese. Formosans are reminded constantly that they live under the thumb of the KMT, which is said to be operating as an organ of United States regulation. The Formosans are urged to overthrow the GRC so that they can enjoy the fruits of life under Communism. There is no advocacy of an independent Formosa or of a two-Chinas policy.

How much do people on the island listen and how much do they believe and respond as CC would like? I have no idea. No one admitted to me that he listened, but of course listening is forbidden. GRC officials say no one does. There is no definite legal penalty prescribed, and I was told that no one has been tried for such an offense. It is clear that many Taiwanese have the same anti-KMT thoughts as are to be heard on the CC radio, but there are plenty of other better explanations for the Taiwanese state of mind.

b. From the GRC to the mainland - Nationalist broadcasts are made for 14 hours and 15 minutes each day on medium wave frequencies in Mandarin, Cantonese, Hakka and Amoy dialects from the single large transmitter of the Central Broadcasting Station. In addition, during the "mainland hour" from 8 to 8:30 each evening all 20 of the local broadcasting stations on Formosa have programs for mainland consumption. The GRC tries to cover all parts of the mainland.

A variety of content and themes is sent: comment on Communist difficulties; description of progress on Formosa in land reform, agricultural production and industry; international news and editorials from the Formosan press; music and drama (Chinese opera); songs and dialect jokes; words of comfort to the oppressed and news of GRC parachute drops of food and clothing.

Nationalist broadcasts contain detailed commentary on major Communist pronouncements. For example, the communique of the Tenth Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which lasted from September 24 to September 27, was deemed noteworthy. The GRC broadcasts facts to refute the CCP claim that the economic crisis was passed, asked questions about the ration content and pointed out that the communique had no figures, not even percentages, on food production. KMT analysts had picked out what they considered to be significant changes from the previous CCP lines: (1) Mao used to say that the imperialist world was united against the socialist countries, but the communique gave the idea that the whole world was against CC; (2) subversion inside CC was mentioned for the first time; (3) in May 1962 and in this communique were the first mentions that the GRC was preparing an invasion; and (4) there was open admission of maladministration and abuse of power by lower echelons. The significance of points like these is discussed in GRC transmissions to the mainland.

GRC broadcasts were coordinated with the autumn 1962 bombings on the Hong Kong and Macao borders. CC said there would be no more bombings. The GRC challenged this on the air. The bombings continued and of course the GRC radio paid tribute to the bravery and disaffection in Communist ranks.

The balloons which the GRC launches from the ground when the wind is right go mostly into Fukien province. They carry propaganda leaflets, safe-conduct passes for soldiers who may wish to defect and heart-shaped badges for the secret society which the GRC is trying to establish. Aircraft drops of propagandic rice, clothing and weapons are also made occasionally at night.

As was stated earlier, the GRC does not believe that it is wise to be too specific about what it will do to change the Communist system when the mainland is recovered. The most common themes used in propaganda are that the land will not be returned to the pre-CC landlords but will go to the tillers, that the breakdown of the institution of the family will be reversed and that private ownership will be restored. The "Six Freedoms" outlined by President Chiang in his Chinese National Day message on October 10, 1957 are frequently re-broadcast:

- "1. To free the workers from slavery and persecution and to restore to them the freedom of employment.
2. To free the farmers from fear of deprivation and starvation and to restore to them the freedom to enjoy prosperity.
3. To restore to the people the freedom of thought and the freedom of study and to free them from fear of 'ideological reformation'.
4. To restore to the people the freedom of economic enterprise and to free them from fear of confiscation and requisition.
5. To restore to the people their security of life and to consolidate the foundation of society.
6. To restore to the people the free way of life and to ensure the continuity of Chinese cultural heritage."

What response is there on the mainland to the GRC broadcasts? Perhaps American and other intelligence agencies have an answer. I am merely able to pass along the GRC report of the response to President Chiang's 1962 "Double Ten" message to the Communist armed forces quoted above. Chiang pledged that he would support by his air force any uprisings against the Peking regime. This message was broadcast 15 times a day in Mandarin at one-hour intervals, plus several times in other dialects, for five days and 10 times a day for a subsequent 10 days. On November 21, 1962, forty days later, The China Post reported that the Government had received over 3,000 letters from all parts of the mainland in response to Chiang's pledge. The Post quoted "a highly placed intelligence official and expert on Communist affairs" as saying that "the message has in fact exploded like a megaton bomb in the hearts of the Chinese Communists, setting the already shaky regime on the brink of collapse". No uprisings big enough to support have been reported by the Government.

III. THE CHINA POLICY OF THE FORMOSANS

Technically speaking, there is no such thing. There is no foreign minister to represent Formosan attitudes toward Nationalist China and Communist China and no agreed policy to present. Nevertheless, submerged and subdued as the Formosans are under the complete domination of the mainlanders, each has his opinions about those two governments. There is no sizeable overt organization of Formosans to crystallize or even coordinate individual views, but by talking to a number of individuals variously occupied in different parts of the island (Taipei, Taichung, Tainan and Kaohsiung) one begins to isolate certain viewpoints and find common threads.

1. Why do Formosan views matter? - The ruling mainlanders constitute only one-fifth of the population of Formosa. The other four-fifths, Formosans, are an intelligent, industrious cohesive people. Fifty years of Japanese rule and 17 years of KMT rule have left the politically-minded among them leaderless and the mass apathetic. There is, however, a deep cleavage and estrangement between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders. The Taiwanese do not share the fundamental objectives of the Kuomintang; they neither participate significantly in national policy making nor consent to programs of the KMT designed to recover the mainland. This is an inherently unstable situation on the island the dynamics of which are strongly affected by two outside powers, the United States and Communist China.

2. Attitudes of Formosans toward Nationalist policies - Four introductory comments: (a) Discovery that a situation is unstable does not necessarily reveal the direction of future change. (b) On paper a Formosan has the same rights and duties as a mainlanders; there is no legal discrimination. (c) Formosans are frequently wrong on their facts and unreasonable in their complaints when they discuss their situation under the GRC, but of course unfounded beliefs can still be politically significant. (d) There is no conscious policy of the KMT to exploit, or be mean to, the Taiwanese; on the contrary, the KMT thinks it is doing what it must do and thinks it is being reasonable under the circumstances. Still, the normal desire to protect what one has, coupled with absolute power and the corruption which goes with it, tends to leave the Formosans on the short end of the stick.

It is hard to say what is the direction of change in the balance of opinion and action between the islanders and mainlanders. Some general pressures can be isolated, summarized here, and described more fully later.

a. Divisive and unifying forces - Drawing the Taiwanese and Chinese together are many circumstances and trends. They shared a common culture (albeit without much communication between Formosa and the mainland) between, say, 1680 and 1895, when the Japanese intervened. Chinese customs, family life, food habits, etc. are still the rule in Taiwan. Economic conditions have improved since 1950 and the standard of living is second best to Japan in Asia. Personal relations between

individuals in the two groups are not hostile. There is some inter-marriage, though I was not able to learn how much. On sober thought and with prodding, both groups admit that their fortunes are probably inextricably linked. The educational system, which teaches only the Mandarin dialect, drills in the catechism of San-Min-Chu-I and integrates islanders and mainlanders throughout, is a strong unifying condition. The loss of hope and disillusionment among increasing numbers of mainlanders finds common ground with most Formosans who have not been interested in working for mainland recovery.

Separating Taiwanese and the KMT ruling group is their disagreement on the share of the national income, including U.S. aid, which should be devoted to building up the island economy as compared with the share which should go to defense and preparations for counter-attack. The bitterness of Formosans over their 1947 betrayal and slaughter by Nationalist authorities seems permanent. The good things about Japanese overlordship are recalled among adults and the bad forgotten. Population increase may be catching up with the growth of the economy. The superiority feelings of the Chinese are apparently irrepressible and exceedingly divisive.

Some factors I must leave with question marks. Does compulsory military service tend to indoctrinate the Formosan young man for or against the KMT regime? Is participation in local government for a Taiwanese conducive to a sense of sharing responsibility or merely stultifying? Does the forcible holding of monopoly political power by the KMT allow time for education to make the two groups into one, or does it keep the lid on while the steam pressure inside the kettle builds up?

b. Return to the mainland - The Formosans would not of course object if the Chinese were able to go home. They do object to paying for, and serving in, a huge military force alert for a counter-attack bugle call which the Formosans doubt will ever be blown. They object to the reduction in economic development, government controls, delayed democracy and martial law which stem from this offensive combat posture. The more cynical Formosans go so far as to assert that Chiang himself no longer believes in return but is keeping up "face" and salting away cash in foreign banks. They expect no change in KMT policy on this subject until Chiang is gone and maybe not then. Meanwhile their main hope is that the United States will do something.

Thoughtful Taiwanese appreciate the difficult task which the Nationalists would have even if they paid only lip service to the goal of returning. A defensive force even two-thirds reduced from present numbers would still be expensive. The consequences of further reduction in mainlander morale would be uncertain. There would be the aggravation of the problem of the retired soldiers, already serious. Retired soldiers have meagre pensions and few civilian skills. They are found everywhere in Taiwan now eking out a living with a pedicab, an unfamiliar government-granted homestead or a janitor's broom. Some are reduced to begging.

The negative attitude of the Taiwanese on the counter-attack policy has some military repercussions. It is often said that since one-third, or so, of the GRC military establishment is composed of Formosans, the control of the KMT is threatened. This danger is far over-stated because the Formosans who rise above the grade of private are exceptional. Perhaps 20 percent of non-commissioned officers and only five percent of cadets in officer's training are Taiwanese. There are not too many historical instances of military revolts led by privates.

c. Making Chinese out of Formosans - A typical KMT statement of the cultural retreading of the Taiwanese appeared in the November 1962 issue of "Free China Review" which on page 8 recorded some of the KMT achievements since "Taiwan Retrocession Day" 17 years earlier:

"Despite the long period of Japanese tutelage and attempts to rob the Taiwanese of their heritage, the native-born of the island returned to Chinese loyalty and cultural allegiance quickly and with few exceptions."

The GRC has used gradual, educational methods, relying heavily on Mandarin teaching and required use as a unifying binder. Use of Japanese and Taiwanese in schools was forbidden. There were no textbooks written in Taiwanese anyway. A Formosan student today will use Mandarin in school but Taiwanese at home. If he is fortunate enough to be able to go on to high school after grade school he will get additional training in Mandarin. If he is an ordinary worker or peasant he will probably speak Taiwanese most of the time except for encounters with officialdom. The proportion of Mandarin use is slowly growing. I should interject here that generalizations about language use are hard to prove. Political standardization is probably not proceeding as fast as language standardization; that is, the use of Mandarin does not necessarily reduce the old feeling of being a Formosan rather than a Chinese from the mainland.

The Japanese veneer has still not worn off. A foreigner speaking Japanese can do business nicely most anywhere on the island. Many Formosans use Japanese among themselves, mixed in with Taiwanese. It has been reported that even some of the young Formosans are learning Japanese outside of school as a kind of safe protest. Japanese movies are very popular, so the GRC restricts their showing.

The GRC educational system does not discriminate much against Formosans as such up through high school. Those who pass the courses given in Mandarin can move upward. Competition is stiff to get into the inadequate number of high schools and fierce to get into colleges. At the college entrance state and beyond discrimination enters in some well-known and some subtle ways. For overseas Chinese^{1/}, say from Thailand, and for a child of a man who has "contributed much to his country" 20 percent is added to the college entrance examination

^{1/}Many mainlanders resent this too.

grade. Obviously it is hard to find out how much discrimination against Formosans occurs at these higher stages. There is additional resentment over what is widely considered to be discrimination in the issuance of exit permits for graduate study. 7300 Chinese students, more than any other country, are now studying in American universities. If past performance holds, less than 10 percent will return to Formosa. The small return may be due to the existence of better paying and more challenging jobs outside the island more than to political reasons. Among the Formosans I interviewed there was less complaining about educational opportunities than about any other subject.

The GRC drive to build Chinese loyalty among Formosans has an uphill struggle against the Nationalists's own mistakes and the political facts of life. In 1945 the Formosans were prepared to become Chinese. When the Taiwanese rebels in 1947 laid down their arms in return for the Government's promise of autonomy and then were decimated by reinforcements from the mainland, an unforgettable grievance was created. When the GRC lost the mainland many Formosans concluded that that there was no point in casting their lot with this group of Chinese even if they had still wanted, as late as 1950, to become Chinese. Lack of real concern for, or else amazing insensitivity to, Formosan feelings is often displayed by the KMT. An example is Chiang's appointment on November 22, 1962 as Governor of Taiwan of General Huang, who had until then been Commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command whose feared and hated internal security forces, overt and secret, intrude thoroughly into the life of the Taiwanese. The making of Formosans into Chinese, far from being completed, as was indicated in the GRC claim quoted above, is just beginning.

d. Control of the economy - The Nationalist Government succeeded to the dominant position of the Japanese Government in the economy of Formosa. It has proceeded to extend this power until the Government now controls directly or indirectly everything of major importance in the economy. The GRC owns many large enterprises and it has a direct monopoly of, or fixes the prices of, key consumer goods such as rice, salt, tobacco and liquor. It controls the banks, licenses new investment and regulates the degree of prosperity in the agriculture sector by fixing the prices of both fertilizer and rice. Twenty-five percent of the gross national product of \$1.6 billion is spent by the Government. The economy bears one of the world's heaviest per capita military burdens.

There is nevertheless much private ownership of land and business. Most of the agricultural land is owned by Taiwanese and they have much of the small and medium-sized business. It is difficult to generalize about Formosan ownership of large enterprise and key industries, but the KMT has complete control in one way or another. The economy has grown at the rate of 7 or 8 percent per year lately, but the population growth has been 3.5 percent per year. The agricultural production index per capita has not grown for the last three years. The Government does not have its own birth control education program but it no longer puts obstacles in the way of private organizations which promote family planning. It is difficult to get infor-

mation on income distribution among various segments of the population; mainlander versus islander, KMT compared with non-KMT, and so on. It is pretty clear that the extremes of poverty lie both in the mainlander group (civil servants, teachers and retired military personnel) and among the Taiwanese (in several occupations). There are rich Taiwanese and rich KMT members, and it would be a fascinating project to try to learn who makes the big money and how much of it stays in the country.

The Formosans have many complaints about mainlander domination of the economy and about KMT economic policies. Their resentment over the military share of the GNP and their lack of voice in any national economic policy has already been referred to. In 1962 the GRC increased the military preparedness budget by 17 percent mainly for the purpose of stocking military and civilian items for emergency military needs, and regressive taxes were increased accordingly. Other major charges are that the Chinese are slowly squeezing the Formosans out of attractive businesses and that the economy is not growing fast enough. There appears to be solid support for both assertions. Significant mergers of profitable Taiwanese enterprises with new KMT companies in the same fields have been brought about by "persuasion", discriminatory taxation, threatened strict inspections and the like. A black market rate of 47 New Taiwan dollars for each U.S. dollar, instead of the official rate of 40 NT to \$1, was reported in the November 17, 1962 China Post. Unemployment is rising alarmingly. There were 800 applications for 40 telephone switchboard jobs in Taipei in October. Some 30 percent of college graduates are unable to find jobs.

The Formosans also have some generalized gripes which are plausible but impossible to be sure about. They say that the mainlanders, who figuratively "have their bags packed ready to go home", are more interested in dividing up the existing pie than in making a bigger pie to cut. The Taiwanese assert that nobody can get work done expeditiously, or obtain a necessary permit or start a new venture without passing money under the table to somebody. They also argue that many government health and safety restrictions are unnecessary, but the government rejoinder to that is that without such laws being enforced the Taiwanese employers would lapse into permitting primitive work conditions. How much these kinds of dissatisfaction are voiced for political reasons is a question which cannot be answered with confidence.

e. KMT political monopoly - The similarities of form and organizational practice between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, and Chiang's years of cooperative association with Communists, have often been pointed out. One man-one party dominance is the fact in both Chinas, but in Formosa the KMT has made few changes in social and economic life and many non-political activities go on with little or no supervision by the Party. Youth, students and labor organizations are said to be the main targets for KMT control. The Party enlists (conscripts, in some cases) enough Formosans to give the appearance of lack of discrimination against islanders.

The Taiwanese are right, Formosa is run like Burma or South Korea, but when the Taiwanese say they want democracy they mean (having in mind the 5 to 1 ratio of the two population groups) control by their own kind. They have had no experience with Western democracy and, judging from the way they fail to cooperate among themselves and the way they think about the responsibilities of office and of opposition, they would have to be classed as politically backward. All the same, several attempts by Formosans, and Formosans and mainlanders jointly, to form an opposition party have been frustrated by the KMT in various subtle as well as reprehensible ways. Even single independent candidates for local office do not often succeed. My interview notes are full of tales of rigged elections, bought candidates, police intimidation, timely exiling and political arrests, but these can be used sparingly now that the KMT political bosses throughout the island have effectively discouraged competition.

One example of Chiang's suppression of opposition political activity should be mentioned because of United States involvement, the Lei Chen case. Lei Chen is a mainlanders who falls into the "lukewarm" category described earlier. He started a fortnightly magazine, "Free China", and was helped by a heavy subsidy from the Asia Foundation (American money) and several thousand subscriptions purchased by the United States Embassy. The idea, not rejected at the outset by the KMT, was to give a harmless outlet for opposition emotions and opinions. In the judgment of the KMT, Lei Chen went too far in 1960 when his magazine touched two taboos, (1) non-return to the mainland and (2) existence of a Taiwanese problem, and when he participated in discussions looking toward the formation of a mainlanders-Formosan opposition party. The Embassy withdrew its subscriptions and Lei Chen was arrested, tried for subversion and imprisoned. Perhaps he would have been arrested even if the Embassy had not indicated its lack of support. The new party was crushed before it could become active.

The reaction of most Formosans to KMT's successful insistence on having a monopoly of political power has been to shun political activity altogether. This majority condemns Formosans who join the KMT, or who allow the KMT to elect them, for being traitors and puppets; and it condemns Formosans who think of violent revolutionary activity as foolhardy men who may involuntarily inflict a bloodbath upon all Formosans. The majority prefers not to think about political questions at all or to dream of some miraculous intervention by the United States.

3. Attitudes of Formosans toward Communist policies - One Formosan summed up his feeling this way: "After 50 years under the Japanese and 17 years under the Nationalist Chinese, why would we welcome the Communist Chinese?" This attitude is typical; the Formosans complain about the GRC but they know that their life is far better than life on the mainland.

GRC education programs, the controlled press and radio and public utterances of the regime drive this point home. The October 10 parade in Taipei had floats depicting Communist slaves in chains.

School children begin their anti-Communist indoctrination early. An American anthropologist working in a Taiwanese peasant village found hysteria in pre-school children at the very mention of "Communist bandits", a term akin to the "Boogie Man" of an older generation in the United States.

Formosans give no sign of paying attention to radio propaganda from Communist China. As mentioned earlier, the Communists do not promise independence anyway, only a better life under Communism. When the mainland radio tells the Taiwanese that they are hungry because the KMT is the puppet of the Americans the message falls flat. The Taiwanese are not hungry and, in their eyes, the puppet strings have run in the other direction.

4. A Formosan 20-year plan - Talking with Formosans about their complaints, desires and plans can be quite discouraging. Often one finds that complaints are ill-founded, desires are unreasonable and plans do not exist. Reactions to the question, "What are you going to do about these troubles?", usually come in three states: (a) the situation is hopeless, (b) violent overthrow of the GRC is the only answer, and (c) the Americans are our only hope.

If the conversation lasts long enough to permit serious discussion in detail about the implications of Formosan desires and the limitations imposed by the international situation, their own leaderless, phlegmatic political state, and Chiang's absolute control, a sketchy concept of salvation, from the Formosan point of view, begins to emerge. I shall attempt to organize such ideas into a Taiwanese vision of an ideal, but not impossible, future for the island. It represents the best that the Formosans have serious reason to hope for.

Even in this practical ideal certain assumptions must be made. Chiang's rule, and that of his successor, will not be violently overthrown by the Taiwanese. Any changes in the island's political structure will be gradual. The Chinese Communists will not be able to gain control of Taiwan and their regime will be no more threatening than at present. The GRC will not be able to return to the mainland. United States aid to the island will continue. Taiwan will continue to be anti-Communist, not neutral, and under the protection of the United States.

Several long-term trends are basic to this Taiwanese dream. The main goal of the island government will shift from counterattack to the economic development of Taiwan. The divergence of views between the mainlanders and Formosans will gradually change to parallelism and then convergence. The Taiwanese share of political power will slowly rise. United States policy will be consistent with these long-term trends.

The hopeful possibilities in the political realm would include the following. The Constitution of the GRC will be preserved but the national (multi-province) aspects will slowly become inactive. The present provincial government will take more and more responsibility,

gradually superseding the national government. The KMT will include increasing numbers of Taiwanese and will be responsive to the views of an opposition party of mainlanders and Taiwanese. Eventually, Formosans will predominate in both parties. Formosa will continue to be represented in the United Nations but Communist China will eventually take China's seat.

On the military side in this realizable fantasy martial law will end, Quemoy and Matsu will be evacuated and the island's military forces will be reduced over a period of years to the size needed for defense and internal security. Economic measures will be coordinated with the phasing of the military contraction: a public works program will employ retired soldiers; industry and foreign trade will expand rapidly; and Japanese and overseas Chinese investment in Taiwan will be effectively encouraged. The foregoing kind of thinking is no doubt wishful on the part of Formosans but it is not outlandish. Such thinking is, however, rare at present.

5. The Formosan independence movement - While in Taiwan I have made no attempt to get in touch with sympathizers or participants in the Formosan independence movement; considering the sensitivity of the GRC, that would have been unduly provocative. I have, however, asked questions about the movement and I brought with me from Japan my notes on conversations with exiled Formosans there.

My impression is that the several Formosan independence groups are not presently a substantial threat to the GRC. They are undoubtedly an annoyance and they are pursued diligently by the Taiwan Garrison Command and the other five Nationalist internal security organs. Thomas Liao, in Japan, may be the best-known rebel name to Formosans but he represents the older, former-landlord, class and would appear to have little chance to fire zeal on the island.

The Formosan Association, also in Japan, is a younger group which, although not hostile to him, is not associated with Liao. It publishes "The Young Formosan", a monthly magazine in Japanese whose circulation is in the low thousands (there are about 25,000 Formosans in Japan); the "Formosan Quarterly", of which the July and October 1962 issues, in 2000 copies of about 30 pages each in English, have appeared; and "Independence Correspondence" news bulletins in Taiwanese for clandestine circulation on Taiwan. The tone of the "Quarterly" is rather mild for revolutionaries, and its editors do not make big claims. They state privately that the independence movement is scattered, uncoordinated, fearful and discouraged about the support given to it by Formosans at home and abroad. Nevertheless, these men are not giving up; they will continue to try to get their message across; that Formosa belongs to its indigenous people, that Formosans desire independence from both Communist China and the GRC, and that the United States, in its own interest, should help the Formosan people achieve independence. As the editorial in the October "Quarterly" indicates, these Formosan rebels are growing impatient with the United States for its support of Chiang K'ai-shek. They are beginning to wonder whether their appeal should not be broadened by their willingness

to consider a neutral Formosa, on the theory that the island's future may be settled in the United Nations where a guaranteed neutral status might be a fair compromise between an anti-Communist regime and the claims of Communist China.

On Formosa itself I have the impression that the independence activists have been immobilized underground. In talking with Taiwanese who would have every reason to exaggerate the extent of agitation, these "hotheads" are often referred to deprecatingly. There is none of the atmosphere of furtive excitement which usually accompanies clandestine political action. There is some discussion among Taiwanese of the hypothetical conditions which could conceivably spark rebellion, such as a deep economic depression or a fight in the KMT to be Chiang's successor or an unsuccessful counter-attack, but these are musings, not movements.

6. Outlook - How much chance do the Formosans have of realizing their ambitions, not of quickly substituting Formosan independence for mainlander rule - that seems extremely remote - but something like the future outlined in section 4 above, harmony between Formosans and mainlanders in the development of the island under the protection of the United States?

There are five main variables: (a) the power and policies of Communist China; (b) the same for the United States; (c) the same for the GRC; (d) the extent to which the Formosans remain separate and dissatisfied under the GRC; and (e) the attitudes, and votes in the United Nations, of other nations. Obviously, with a minimum of five variables there are many possible combinations.

As was indicated at the beginning of this essay, perhaps the central question is how hard the KMT pushes the counter-attack. It is only one question, however, because even if Chiang put his invasion plans on the shelf Communist China would not abandon its efforts to subdue Taiwan. Assuming the continuation of American protection and aid for Taiwan, however, the tacit abandonment of the return-to-the-mainland preoccupation (with the natural corollary policies on the island which that would permit) would go a long way toward generating effective cooperation between the Formosans and the mainlander Chinese.

The existing impasse composed of Communist China's hostility, Chiang's zeal for return, America's reluctant support and Taiwanese unenthusiastic acquiescence has continued for several years. Some say, "Something's got to give!", but a good case can be made for forecasting indefinite continuation of the present predicament.

It is not surprising that the Formosans have been looking for a change in United States policy. There are fewer conflicts between American goals and Formosan desires than between American goals and Chiang K'ai-shek's objectives. The Taiwanese were jubilant when Kennedy was elected because they had heard about the TV debate on Quemoy and because the island press had openly favored Nixon during most of the campaign. When Vice President Johnson came to Taiwan soon after the new Administration took office the Taiwanese were eager

to hear him and the GRC was full of foreboding. Still no change. Then Ambassador Drumright was replaced by Ambassador Kirk and now the Formosans are puzzled. It seemed that Drumright used to help cut every opening ribbon and was lavishly treated in the island press. Kirk has been quiet and the press has been noncommittal. Formosans ask American visitors what is going to happen.

Let us suppose, from the point of view of the Taiwanese, that the United States decided that instead of waiting for Chiang to change his mind about the counter-attack it would try to persuade him to relax. American leverage is formidable but not omnipotent. If the persuasion were too forceful or too public, some countervailing dangers would come into play in the Far East, not to speak of the domestic political hazards: (a) emboldening of the Chinese Communists; (b) another sacking of the U.S. Embassy in Taipei; (c) outbreak of disorders on Taiwan from which the Chinese Communists might benefit; (d) unauthorized attacks on the mainland by Chiang; (e) uncertainty and dismay in the governments of Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and the Philippines; and (f) a deal between the GRC and CC. Formosans do not sufficiently appreciate the weight of these counterproducts.

Let us suppose, from the point of view of the Kuomintang, that the United States makes no change in its policy of waiting. Events might favor Chiang's policy: (a) further deterioration of morale on the mainland; (b) deeper involvement of Communist China in its war with India (and the West); and (c) additional bitterness in Communist China's disputes with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if these possible trends do not grow in importance, there are risks in the indefinite continuation of the Eisenhower policy of waiting for the GRC to turn its attention to nation-building on the island. Formosa may become a still larger recipient of American aid (U.S. domestic political implications must again be laid aside). The economy of Taiwan may slow down. Unrest from economic and political causes, both among mainlanders and Taiwanese, may increase on the island. Resentment of Formosans against the United States may become deep-seated. The chances for continued representation of the GRC in the United Nations may diminish. The GRC may too readily discount these prospects.

Unless the Communist Chinese decide to precipitate another crisis over Quemoy, which they have the capability to do at any time, the United States will be free to exert its large influence in the direction favored by the Taiwanese or to continue along the traditional path. It is likely that American actions will have more to do with the future of Formosa than any of the many other variables.
