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China-Pakistan Relations; the By-Product of Other Processes

Metropole Hotel  
Karachi, Pakistan

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Mr. Richard H. Nolte  
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Dear Dick:


I think it was in plane geometry where I learned the rule: "Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other." I am doubtful that this principle is often useful in analysis of foreign relations, but I was reminded of it after being told several times in Pakistan that Pakistan's friendly relationship with Communist China is easily explained by the hostility which characterizes the association of both countries with India. In both cases the fight is over territory, Kashmir between Pakistan and India and the border between Communist China and India. The Kashmir struggle goes back to the 1947 partition of British India into Pakistan and India whereas major armed clashes along the Sino-Indian border erupted only in 1962.

The trouble with applying plane geometry to foreign relations, however, is that "things" are seldom simple and they won't stand still. In the enclosed essay on relations between Pakistan and Communist China I should like to leave you with the idea that enmity between India and China and Pakistan does not explain enough and that one must also examine Pakistan's relations with the United States, its internal problems, and its conflicts with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, as well as the direct ties between Pakistan and China.

I was fortunate to arrive in Karachi three days following the March 2, 1963 signing of the Sino-Pakistan border agreement and seven days ahead of the opening of the Calcutta round of the India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir. It was hardly necessary to ask questions; theories, justifications and implications helpful to my study were in the very air.

Cordially,

*George C. Denney, Jr.*  
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CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS:  
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By

GEORGE C. DENNEY, JR.

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### A. Introduction

Pakistan, which will be only 16 years old in August 1963, started its national life in exceedingly unfavorable circumstances and has not yet reached the point where it can be sure of its continued existence. Overwhelmed by its internal problems, faced with constant hostility by its much-larger, better-endowed sibling, India, wary of the claims of Afghanistan and the unfriendly position of the Soviet Union and unable to make progress without massive aid from the United States, Pakistan understandably notes with relief and appreciation the absence of threatening gestures from its neighbor, Communist China.

The main fact of life for Pakistan is its weakness relative to India and its assumption that India desires to undo the partition of 1947 by which two Muslim portions of British India were created as Pakistan but separated by a thousand miles of India. Pakistan is poor in resources and skills and backward in agriculture. The annual per capita income is \$53. It once exported food grains, but unchanged yields per acre coupled with a population increase of 23 percent from 1951 to 1961 have made it a net importer of food grains for its 94 million people. The infant industries of Pakistan are growing quickly but underemployment still is the rule. India has enormous problems but their solution is more easily foreseen than those of Pakistan, whose East Wing contains 53 million people (as many as in all the Atlantic seaboard states of the United States) jammed into a river delta the size of Louisiana.

Maybe partition was a mistake, but the clock is unlikely to be turned back if Pakistan's leaders have their way. After the bloody scramble in which Muslims fled to Pakistan and Hindus left it, the reciprocal crimes in the name of religion, the war over Kashmir still unresolved, years of mutual uncooperation with India and years of freedom from Hindu domination, Pakistani nationalism and hatred of India have steadily grown. India's more rapid economic progress and unwillingness to carry out the plebiscite which it promised in Kashmir have increased Pakistani bitterness and frustration. They will seek help from any quarter, preferably from the free, but also from Communist, countries if necessary, to stay independent of India. Pakistan is grateful for \$2 billion worth of American economic and military assistance but it has had to enter the uncomfortable association of SEATO and accept other cold war risks of alliance with the United States. In the subconscious of many Pakistanis, America has replaced the former master, Britain.

Among the weaknesses of Pakistan which no amount of foreign aid can cure is the failure of any political party, or group of parties, to organize the development of the country. Disillusionment with selfish personal politics and habits of corruption in

public office, nineteen percent literacy, and the large economic and social gap between peasants and workers and previous ruling elites (whether landlords, businessmen, army or career bureaucrats) must be listed among the explanations for the degree of acceptance of the virtual dictatorship of Mohammed Ayub Khan since October 1958. The China policy of Pakistan is that of President Ayub made after consultation with a small group of military and professional advisers and with some of the politicians eligible to function under the constitution of 1962. Interviews with opposition political leaders and with non-governmental persons in both East and West Pakistan give one the impression that there is general agreement, among the minority of Pakistanis who care about such things, with the policies toward Communist China which Ayub is pursuing.

#### B. Summary of Relations and Forecast

Compared with other countries bordering on China or having an important connection, Pakistan has little knowledge of, or interest in, internal developments in China, its people have slight racial or cultural affinity for the Chinese, there are practically no Chinese living in Pakistan and the commercial and social intercourse between the two countries has been meager in recent years. It has perhaps the least reason of any of China's neighbors to expect military attack. In these circumstances, Pakistan's policies toward China, more than those of most countries in this part of the world, are predicated upon a rational calculation of Pakistan's best interest in confronting the four largest nations of the world.

The only compelling reason for Pakistan to have relations with China is their common border,<sup>1/</sup> but this 25,000 foot boundary is not the usual kind where rivers and roads cross and adjoining farms, cities and people from different countries meet. It is understandable then that the association which has continued peacefully since 1950 is secondary for both parties to more important matters, arising out of the relations of each with other countries, for Pakistan in the free world and for China in the Communist group.

Pakistan's independence and its claim to Kashmir have been preserved by Pakistan's own efforts, including armed struggle with India, and by assistance from the United States and other countries in the West. Pakistan has taken its stand with the West on most of the issues of the cold war. Beyond its formal diplomatic intercourse, the occasional exchange of delegations and a little trade, Pakistan's relations with China have reflected some incident or issue involving India or the overshadowing East-West struggle.

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<sup>1/</sup>with India claiming that this border belongs to it.

Keeping its primary allegiance to the United States, Pakistan has nevertheless made counter-balancing gestures toward the Communist side: as examples, support for Communist China's representation in the United Nations, breaching the UN embargo on trade with China during the Korean War and signing a border agreement with China on March 2, 1963 while still disputing with India over its right to make such an agreement.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet, the U-2 incident which imperiled Pakistan because the United States revealed Peshawar as the takeoff point, and the Sino-Indian border clashes brought the cold war closer to Pakistan. During the same period Pakistan's hopes for a favorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute grew dimmer and its rate of economic development was slower than that of India. Pakistan began to feel neglected by the United States relative to the attention which India seemed to be getting. These processes came to a head in the question of American military aid to India and the intimately related question of a Kashmir settlement. The answers which the United States and India give will largely determine the degree to which Pakistan will hedge its commitment to the United States by undertaking balancing moves in the direction of Communist China and Russia.

#### C. Pakistan's Relations with the Republic of China

Communist China in its propaganda and messages of friendship to Pakistan likes to refer to ancient and continuous ties between the two regions. It is true that there are Muslims in Pakistan and Muslims scattered over China with a heavy concentration in Sinkiang, but the total evidence of contact over the Himalayas during history is slight. The peoples and cultures of the Indian sub-continent differ greatly from those of China. Buddhism, which spread from India out into China, Japan and Southeast Asia, has died out in Pakistan. The emperors of China did not think of Lahore and Dacca as falling under their sway.

In the early 1900's nationalists in India and China were aware of and sympathetic with, each other's struggles. Nehru visited China in 1939 and Chiang Kai-shek came to India in 1942 in an unsuccessful effort to have the British give independence to India so that its peoples would be interested in supporting the war against Japan. When Pakistan was gasping at birth China was engaged in its Civil War and no diplomatic relations were established with Chiang's regime. The Communist Government was recognized on January 4, 1950, three months after the defeat of the Nationalists.

Pakistan has had no intercourse of consequence with Formosa. A small amount of sugar is privately purchased from the island from time to time, but separate figures on trade with Formosa are not kept by Pakistan. Formosa reports that imports from Pakistan in 1961 were valued at \$380,000 and that exports to Pakistan were \$37,500. There are no cultural exchanges. The Government of

Pakistan has not been hostile to the Government of the Republic of China; has simply ignored it, not wishing to be embarrassed in its friendly relations with Peking.

In the United Nations Pakistan voted for the Indian resolution of September 1950 which would have substituted representatives of Peking for those of Formosa. For several years thereafter, however, it voted with the United States to postpone resolution of the issue, but in 1961 reverted to its support for Communist China's representation in the United Nations. In 1959 during a low point in their association Pakistan needled Communist China by having the Foreign Minister receive a delegation of Chinese Muslims on their way from Formosa to Mecca. In early 1963, however, relations with Peking were never warmer and Pakistan turned down an opportunity to play host to a trade gathering of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) so as to avoid having to invite Nationalist China. Pakistan has taken no position inconsistent with representation of both Formosa and Communist China in the United Nations, and if such a deal could be worked out Pakistan would probably support it.

#### D. Pakistan's Relations with Communist China

1. Political Relations - Pakistan was impressed by the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. In a nation which had only recently won independence there was sympathy for the success of the "people's revolution" in China. On October 17, 1949 the most important newspaper in Pakistan, Dawn, urged recognition of the Communist regime and added: "China with its large Muslim population and territorial contiguity with Pakistan, has a special appeal to our people." On January 4, 1950 Pakistan accorded such recognition. The Pakistani press welcomed the move and criticized the United States for withholding its recognition.

Pakistan began promoting good relations with Communist China when it voted for the September 1950 resolution in United Nations challenging the credentials of the Nationalist delegation. Zafrulla Khan (President of the 1962-63 session of the General Assembly) speaking for Pakistan in 1950 in support of the representation of Communist China said: "The General Assembly is unwilling to concede the existence of a fact, not because the fact has not been established, but because the majority regard it as unpleasant." Pakistan voted in the U.N. to brand North Korea as an aggressor, but it abstained on the resolution branding Communist China an aggressor. It also abstained on the resolution to impose an embargo on Communist China. Pakistan profited handsomely by selling cotton to Communist China during the Korean War. In 1952 these sales amounted to 31% of Pakistan's total cotton exports and 16% of all Pakistan's exports. In these early years of association several Muslim friendship organizations were established in the two countries.

In 1954-55 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States and joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Peking called the SEATO alliance "hostile" to the people of China and denounced Pakistan's decision, but liaison between the two countries was not much affected. Pakistan was not worrying about Communist China; it was thinking of threats from India and the Soviet Union. Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammed Ali gave Chou En-lai assurances at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and made public statements later, to the effect that Pakistan's participation in these security arrangements with the United States was not directed against China and that Pakistan would not be a party to any aggressive action by the United States.

Low-level delegations of women's organizations, artists, editors and the like were exchanged and high-level Pakistan-China contacts increased in 1956. In January Madame Sun Yat-sen visited Pakistan and in March Marshal Ho Long, Vice Premier of Communist China came. In October Pakistan Prime Minister Suhrawardy held extensive talks in Peking and a joint communique hailed the friendly association and urged expansion of commercial and cultural connections. Suhrawardy's visit was returned by Chou En-lai in December 1956 after he visited India. Chou received a warm welcome in spite of the fact that he had blamed the Kashmir dispute on "imperialism" instead of on India. Communist China was glad to use its affiliation with Pakistan as a symbol of its professed willingness to get along even with anti-Communist countries in Asia.

These state visits were not enough, however, to prevent Sino-Pakistani relations from deteriorating due to the fact that China's ties with India were cordial and the Chinese were unwilling to support Pakistan against India on the Kashmir issue. In February 1957 Prime Minister Suhrawardy wrote to Chou En-lai criticizing his public statement in Ceylon that India and Pakistan should seek a settlement of the Kashmir dispute through direct negotiations. In 1958 Pakistan Prime Minister Noon criticized both the Soviet Union and China for doing nothing to bring about a solution of the Kashmir problem. The Chinese press responded with attacks on Pakistan's dependence on the United States.

When Ayub took over Pakistan in 1958 he charged that the previous governments had let relations with Communist China go sour, but when fighting broke out in March 1959 in Tibet between Chinese forces and the Tibetan people President Ayub reacted strongly with a declaration emphasizing the need to improve relations between India and Pakistan and a direct offer to Nehru of "joint defense" of the subcontinent. These moves irritated China and received no encouragement from Nehru. Ayub went further, however, and Pakistan voted for the U.N. resolution condemning Communist China's actions in Tibet. China protested that Pakistan's actions and statements on Tibet were "unfriendly" and "interfered in China's domestic affairs."



In September 1959 the Pakistan Government announced incursions of Chinese planes in the Hunza area in the extreme northern tip of Pakistan. In October Dawn reported that a Chinese map showed a large area in the north of Pakistan as Chinese territory. On October 21, 1959 Foreign Minister Qadir stated that maps alone did not constitute violation of territory but added that India had informed him that Chinese infiltration did take place in Ladakh. On October 23, 1959 President Ayub disclosed that Pakistan would approach China in an effort to delimit the border. In May 1961 Qadir said that after long consultations with the Chinese Ambassador in Karachi Pakistan had made proposals to Peking on the demarcation of the Pakistan-China border. At the U.N. in the fall of 1961 Pakistan returned to its former position of support for Communist China's representation in the United Nations.

On May 3, 1962 a simultaneous announcement was made in Karachi and Peking that the two countries would start boundary negotiations. It avoided prejudicing the Kashmir issue by referring to territories "the defense of which is under the actual control of Pakistan" and termed any agreement which might be reached as provisional, to be renegotiated by the agreed sovereign once the Kashmir dispute was settled. India protested to both China and Pakistan, claiming the sole right to negotiate with China the boundary of any part of Kashmir. The protests were rejected by both, China having refused since 1960 to negotiate with India alone the boundary west of the Karakorum Pass (the portion controlled by Pakistan).

The Pakistan-China border talks proceeded in 1962 during the period of sharp deterioration of India-China relations, the border clashes and the Chinese heavy blow in the fall. In January 1963 it was announced that a one-year trade agreement between Pakistan and Communist China had been signed, the first ever between two countries which had hitherto relied on a series of individual commodity barter agreements. Further evidence that the trade agreement was designed for its political impact was that it was never published and that, reportedly, it specified no items or quantities, only general principles for settling accounts. On March 2, 1963 an agreement fixing the boundary between Pakistan and Communist China, on the principles which had been agreed upon the previous year, was signed in Peking by Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Thus in the early months of 1963 Sino-Pakistani relations reached their highest point to date.

There are now no matters in dispute between Pakistan and Communist China. Pakistan's objective is to maintain correct friendly relations. The Communist Party is still outlawed in Pakistan. Communist China has not offered any economic aid. Pakistan would not accept any military aid or advice if offered. Pakistani officials deny that in the border agreement negotiations China proposed the signing of a non-aggression pact or that Pakistan

proposed that China back its stand on Kashmir, but it seems likely that some such exchange took place. Pakistan has given no indication that it intends to open up any new subject with Peking.

2. Economic Relations with Communist China - The split with India meant that Pakistan's natural trading partner was lost. Some of this trade went to the Communist bloc and especially to China (purchases of coal and sales of cotton) during the Korean War when the United Nations embargo made it harder for China to obtain materials. As mentioned earlier Pakistan's exports to China reached a peak of 16% of total exports in 1952 but have fallen off rapidly since. During the periods July-June ending in 1959 (2.7), 1960 (2.3), 1961 (4.2) and 1962 (.6) the figures in parentheses are the percentages of Pakistan's total exports which went to Communist China. For the same periods the percentages for imports from China were: 1959 (3.6), 1960 (.8), 1961 (.5) and 1962 (.5). The value of exports to China from July 1961 to June 1962 was about \$2.1 million, largely in raw cotton grown in West Pakistan and jute and its products from East Pakistan. The value of imports from China from July 1961 to June 1962 was about \$3.4 million in the form of coal, cement, hardware, sheet plate glass, earthenware, medicinal products and paper. Pakistan has no strategic items for export. The trade balance has usually been in Pakistan's favor and China tried to get Pakistan to agree in the January 1963 trade agreement that exchanges would be balanced, but Pakistan agreed merely to do its best toward that end. In this connection it is possible that United Nations economic sanctions against South Africa will mean that Pakistan will shift normal purchases of coal from there to Communist China.

Trade with the Communist bloc is a popular idea in Pakistan partly in reaction against the fear of being hurt by the European Common Market. There is no injury yet but Pakistan was a late comer to the European market with its textiles, an export which has become quite important, and worries about being kept out. The potential of Pakistani trade with the Communist bloc is questionable -- the West generally pays better and the earnings are convertible -- and trade with China, except for cotton, has nothing but wishful thinking behind rosy estimates. Pakistanis are inclined to forecast that Communist China will succeed in its development plans, but this is a guess and an instinctive discounting of Western press stories about the failure of the "great leap forward" in China. Pakistan's trade with the Communist bloc is also a corollary of the policy of the last few years of "balancing" the influence of the United States and its friends. It is only about five percent of Pakistan's total trade now and would not be worrisome to the West unless it reached ten percent. A settlement of the Kashmir dispute and resumption of normal beneficial economic relations with India would radically reduce Pakistan's temptation or necessity to trade with China and other Communist countries. Otherwise such trade will probably slowly increase.

3. Cultural Relations with Communist China - Pakistan is a very backward country in which only one person out of five can read and write. Many in East Pakistan do not know that there is a West Pakistan, and vice versa. In the absence of Chinese residents, and in such a state of ignorance, consciousness of China, let alone China policy, is confined to a small minority. Even educated people in Pakistan know little about China. They find it easier to communicate with Europeans than Chinese. China presents no model for emulation except in the writings of a few left-leaning Pakistanis.

There is little scholarly research on Communist China being done in Pakistan. The University of Peshawar has a division of studies on Central Asia which plans to start the teaching of Russian and Chinese. Pakistanis are dependent upon a few books written by their countrymen who have traveled in China and upon foreign sources, mainly press wire services. Written materials coming from Communist China are strictly controlled; for example, a book on Muslim life in China may not be allowed in bookstores. The Chinese Embassy puts out an information bulletin which has a small mailing list. The Pakistan Government has complete power to control the press but uses it sparingly and usually indirectly through economic pressure. Communist propaganda in the press was rare until 1962. No articles attacking Communist China appear, but occasionally an obliquely critical piece will creep in. Information about the Sino-Soviet dispute is printed. Beginning in the spring of 1962 some news stories favorable to Communist China appeared but, having signed the trade and border agreements with China, the Government may feel that this thaw has served its purpose.

Exchanges of persons between Pakistan and China have been confined to formal delegations and selected persons. There is no tourism and no exchange of students. Pakistan has been accepting about one out of ten cultural attractions or delegations offered to it. Except for an occasional "fellow traveler," Pakistanis going to China are carefully selected for maturity, appropriateness and advantage to Pakistan, for instance, some flood engineers departed recently to study that subject in China.

Radio Peking broadcasts to Pakistan for four hours each evening, as does the Voice of America, but the Peking signal is strong and clear (better in Dacca than the Dacca radio station) while the VOA signal is only fair. As usual, the Peking content is a mixture of propaganda, news and entertainment.

Considering the patent reasons for discontent in Pakistan, it is amazing that Communism has not had more appeal. Religion and nationalism are probably antidotes. The Communist Party in India was guided from Moscow and shortly after partition the Party in Pakistan was suppressed following a series of violent strikes. Considerable Chinese Communist literature came into East Pakistan

in the mails from Hong Kong but this flow was halted about 1950. Whatever the extent of opposition in Pakistan now to the status quo, it does not appear to be Chinese-oriented.

4. Processes Determining Pakistan's Relations with China - Most of the countries in Asia should worry about China first thing in the morning. Pakistan can put off such concern until later in the day. It is far from being a tempting prize. It offers no competition or threat to China. The China border in the West Wing is a wall which needs little mending. China must deal with India before reaching East Pakistan. Pakistan has several other problems which in fact have claimed its attention ahead of China.

a. India - Pakistan's concern about India is of a higher order of magnitude than its concern about any other problem. What India does will determine Pakistan's existence, not merely its condition. India can cut off Pakistan's water. East Pakistan is an island in India.

Will India come to accept Pakistan as permanent? Will India let go of Muslim Kashmir, or share it, or let it be independent? Will India treat Pakistan as an outcast or agree to share the wealth of the subcontinent? Will India make its remaining 40 million Muslims stay at home or will it cause them to look outward to those who have gone to Pakistan? These are burning questions for Pakistanis. They do not trust the Indians to give answers favorable to Pakistan unless the Indians are pushed. Because Pakistan is getting weaker relative to India, any push must come from outside. Pakistan has long hoped that the help and pushing of the United States would be enough but it is now beginning to feel increasingly frustrated. This is where China comes in. The thought that China might actually be helpful to Pakistan vis-a-vis India did not occur to Pakistan apparently until China and India began to clash. India had formerly made it clear that it would bend over backward to have China's friendship. Now, however, on nearly all the big questions with India leverage through China may seem worthy of experiment by Pakistan.

The permanence of Pakistan depends in part on how permanent India feels. If India were impregnable in the shelter of the Himalayas it could be more arrogant toward Pakistan. If India needs Pakistan to help defend the subcontinent Pakistan must be given reason to cooperate. Only two of Pakistan's seven divisions are not now disposed to fight against India and none is ranged toward China. Pakistan contemplates no substantial change in this order of battle until the danger which it sees in India passes.

Pakistan is of two minds on the question of Chinese aggression against the subcontinent. Suppose China really intends to continue military pressure. Pakistan appreciates that its fate is tied to India's. It is obvious that East Pakistan lies less than 100 miles across a bit of India from Tibet. Ayub has seemingly been more worried than Nehru but the latter either mistook this concern for an opportunist gambit to win Kashmir when Ayub made his

"joint defense" offer in 1959 or differed with Ayub on the likelihood of Chinese military action.

Suppose China is not interested in conquering India but aims to get the border settled on China's terms and to show up India's military weakness relative to China. This is the predominant conclusion drawn by Pakistan. It explains Pakistan's insistence that major new arms to India are unnecessary or, if they must be delivered, can be delayed until India does its duty in Kashmir. Such reasoning also accounts for the fact that people even in East Pakistan were rather glad of India's discomfiture until Chinese troops neared the plains of Assam which are separated only by low hills from East Pakistan. To the idea that China could not or would not seriously hurt India and Pakistan can be traced to the visit by extremist religious leaders of Pakistan to Peking in 1957 to encourage Communist China to wrest the leadership of Asia from India. The appraisal by India and Pakistan of China's threat as lying more in its attraction to Asians as a way to pull out of ancient misery rather than in its military belligerency also is at the bottom of the fundamental difference which these nations have with the United States over how to deal with China. It goes a long way to justify India's neutralism and Pakistan's mere lip service to SEATO. Pakistan is inclined to guess that only some years from now when China may have solved its internal economic and social problems will China feel strong enough to push out in military aggression. Meanwhile, Pakistan feels the threat of Indian aggression to be far more immediate and is beginning to ask whether China may not in some safe ways undermine India's obstinacy, or, in the last extreme, come to Pakistan's aid.

The issue of Kashmir is the key to peace between Pakistan and India, and it is the subject on which China can be most helpful to Pakistan. It is the key to peace because Pakistan regards a settlement of Kashmir as the prime test of India's willingness to let Pakistan live. Pakistanis feel absolutely certain -- and they believe their opinion to be backed by most of the world -- that India is wrong on Kashmir. If India is not willing to do what is right in this contest it means to Pakistanis that India is planning to wait until the other contestant gives up or ceases to exist separately.

As Pakistan sees the issue, the terms of partition in 1947 left Kashmir free to join either India or Pakistan. Kashmir's Hindu ruler defied the wishes of the predominantly Muslim population and chose India. The people rebelled, Indian forces intervened and then Pakistani forces responded until the U.N. arranged a ceasefire, leaving India in possession of the best part of Kashmir. At that time fifteen years ago both India and Pakistan agreed that the question of accession of Kashmir shall be decided by its people through a free plebiscite. But India has since refused to allow the plebiscite. Pakistan knows that India has

some reasons for not allowing the plebiscite (aside from the Kashmiri preference for Pakistan): (1) possible demands by parts of India, such as pro-Communist Kerala, for separation plebiscites, (2) possible Hindu riots against Muslims in India and (3) elimination of a rallying point for Indian unity. Pakistan would seriously consider a partition of Kashmir favorable to Pakistan or guaranteed independence for Kashmir and it has agreed to a number of solutions for the debacle recommended by the United Nations all of which India has rejected.

China figures in the Kashmir tangle in several ways. It is a party to the dispute in the sense that the Kashmir boundary cannot be settled by either or both of the other two parties without China's consent. China has refused to deal with India alone on the question and has agreed to demarcate the part which Pakistan controls on the condition that this line is final only if Pakistan succeeds in keeping control. Pakistan would like to have China's support instead of neutrality on the merits of the Kashmir debate. This would be a partial counterweight to the backing of the Soviet Union for India but only partial because even if Communist China were in the U.N. Security Council it could not offset Russia's vetoes of Council action which would put pressure on India. A third China angle in the Kashmir question is the fact that India and China have come to blows over their common border, one end of which, and the portion China appears to care most about, Aksai Chin, is claimed by India to be part of Kashmir.

Perhaps these crosscurrents in Kashmir can be separated and China's part isolated by examining the interests of the three countries seriatim. How much could Pakistan afford to pay for China's support? A non-aggression pact with China, or siding with China on the India boundary, or withdrawal from SEATO or CENTO or both? Pakistan would have to weigh against such moves a possible reduction or loss of United States aid, which so far has been essential to the preservation of Pakistan. It would also have to bear in mind that a shift by China might have little effect on India. China's choice is not self-evident either. Its aim must be to keep India and Pakistan from cooperating and the unsettled Kashmir controversy is the automatic separator. Would Pakistan be any easier to deal with than India on Aksai Chin? Pakistan has taken no position on China's claim there. A logical solution for the Sino-Indian border dispute is for China to keep Aksai Chin and let India have the Northeast Frontier Area (NEFA). This logic would vanish if Pakistan came into control of all of Kashmir. On the other hand, if India could persuade Pakistan to partition Kashmir in such a way that Aksai Chin went to India then India could go to the bargaining table with China possessed of a clear title to the western end of the disputed line. India fussed with Pakistan at the March 12 Kashmir talks about Pakistan's provisional border agreement with China, but India was not so upset as to refuse to enter the next round of discussions on April 21.

This agreement served China's purpose by once again (after Burma, Mongolia and Nepal) suggesting that India is being unreasonable, but it also served Pakistan's (and incidentally India's) purpose by taking a long stretch of border out of contention.

In the aftermath of the Chinese push into India, and then withdrawal, Pakistan sees the matter of United States arms aid to India in the light of Kashmir. It hopes that India will seize the opportunity of the emergency situation to make a deal on Kashmir which might cause internal political upheavals in calmer times. Pakistan doubts, however, that India has sufficiently altered its views on the Chinese threat to cause it for that reason alone to settle the Kashmir issue. Pakistan figures that India will try to keep its armies in Kashmir and persuade the United States to re-equip the NEFA forces on the other end of the line and add more units to them. It fears that the best leverage which has come along in years to push India to keep its Kashmir promises may be thus thrown away and the balance of power between Pakistan and India may be further deranged. It further fears that India may continue to delude itself into relying upon Soviet protection against China. With the likelihood of hostilities between China and India having receded at least temporarily, Pakistan hopes that any additional military strength for India can be timed so that Kashmir can be settled first.

Even aside from the Kashmir implications, Pakistan lacks sympathy for India in regard to its border dispute with China because it believes India stupidly and arrogantly brought about its own defeat. Pakistanis point out that there was little publicity in the West about the sequence of events: that Nehru announced to the world that Chinese units would be thrown out, that Indian troops started to try it and that only after this challenge did Chinese forces launch their attack. Pakistanis also argue that India's neighbors share this opinion and hence did not rush to India's aid when it got into trouble. Besides, Pakistan had disagreed all along with India's judgment that real friendship with China was possible and Pakistan had to suffer the taunts of India to the effect that Pakistan had mortgaged its soul by allying itself with the United States. Nevertheless, Pakistan has not flopped over to China's side on the boundary dispute with India and has done nothing else to hurt India vis-a-vis China, unless the border agreement is considered as a hostile action.

After Kashmir, China has much less ability to affect the outcome of the many other controversies between India and Pakistan: (1) boundary disputes, (2) cooperative use of rivers, railroads and roads which cross borders, (3) religious persecution and discrimination, (4) refugee property claims dating back to 1947 and (5) new claims by Pakistan of expulsion by India of Muslims from Assam and Tripura. After Kashmir is settled it may be that these lesser problems can be worked out. There is undoubtedly a considerable reservoir of good will on both sides between individuals and nostalgia for happier days between the two religious communities. In view of the amount of bloodshed which has already occurred, however, and the depth of bitterness and religious fervor

which exists, optimism about a rapid increase in cooperation would seem unwarranted. China could do little to help Pakistan on these disputes even if it wanted to, but it can do more to keep the two countries apart by overtly and covertly fanning the fires of distrust and recrimination.

b. Pakistan and the United States - There is no question in Pakistan about the need for United States assistance, past, present and future. There is a growing question about how closely Pakistan needs to tie itself to the United States in order to merit and to obtain American aid. Pakistan has not changed its aspirations or its basic anti-Communist predisposition. It has been the impact of China and the Soviet Union on the subcontinent, especially since the 1959 invasion of Tibet and the U-2 incident, which has caused this reexamination. Pakistan weighs: (1) how much help from the United States, (2) how much help from the United States to India, (3) how much service Pakistan rendered to the United States, (4) the liabilities of being allied with the United States and (5) alternative sources of aid and backing for Pakistan's interests, especially with respect to India. While it is not feasible here to run a complete balance sheet, it may be shown by the following illustrations that Communist China enters into this calculation in a number of ways.

Pakistan knows of, and reluctantly admits the truth of, the premise of the United States that India is more important than Pakistan. Pakistanis often start policy discussions by referring to this premise. Still, Pakistan is grateful that the United States kept Pakistan going when India would have reabsorbed it and knows that the United States is its number one friend. The United States hopes to persuade Pakistan and India to settle their differences, develop the subcontinent cooperatively, and jointly defend themselves against the Communist bloc. Communist China hopes to downgrade India as a leader and model in Asia, to forestall India-Pakistan cooperation and to remove United States influence from Asia. Against this background of major priorities, the United States wants Pakistan to emulate its policies toward Communist China while the latter wants to turn Pakistan neutral or against the United States. Pakistan has a spotty record when measured against the China policy of the United States.

The United States wants no country to deal with Communist China. Pakistan was one of the first to recognize the Communist regime and there have been only a few hostile words between the two. Pakistan will go right on dealing discreetly and at arms length with Peking. It argues that if Britain does why can't Pakistan. The United States wants no country to trade with Communist China, but Pakistan has always done such trading, made quite a profit out of it during the Korean War, and will continue to carry on such trade. The United States want to keep Communist China out of the United Nations. Pakistan disagrees, both on the principle that the Communists are entitled to China's seat under the Charter because they alone have political power in China and



on the tactical ground that Communist China will be less troublesome in the U.N. than out. As a further tactical consideration Pakistan will vote on Chinese representation in such a way as to garner the most Afro-Asian votes on Kashmir in the event that issue comes to the Assembly rather than the Security Council. It has no emotional cause to keep Formosa from representation and probably would not stand in the way of that unless it feared some backfire from Peking. Pakistan strongly disagrees that the way to weaken China is to ostracize it. Pakistan argues that such tactics merely make China more stubborn and self-righteous and are not succeeding in weakening China anyhow.

The United States wants Pakistan to continue its membership in CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan took the Russian military threat seriously and has disposed two divisions on its western frontier for such a contingency but it went into SEATO primarily to strengthen itself against India through additional American aid. No Pakistani forces are deployed against China. The United States did not consider Pakistan's capability against China very seriously either since the single division in East Pakistan (deployed to meet Indian trouble) has not been made eligible for United States military assistance. The lightness of Pakistani forces in the East Wing is also attributable to: (1) Pakistani judgment that the East Wing could not be defended against India, (2) reluctance of the central government in West Pakistan, which is controlled by Punjabis from West Pakistan, to increase the temptation toward East Wing secession through the arming of Bengalis from East Pakistan and (3) United States reluctance to upset India. Pakistan could make some gains by bargaining with China and Russia on leaving SEATO and CENTO: (1) reduce the feeling of being an American puppet, (2) perhaps get large-scale Soviet aid or even win Soviet neutrality on Kashmir, (3) perhaps win Chinese backing on Kashmir, (4) regain support among Afro-Asian countries. It could also lose a lot too: (1) cause the collapse of the two defense organizations and with them some valuable planning and cooperation helpful to Pakistan, (2) hurt the leadership capability of the United States, Pakistan's protector and (3) risk the loss or diminution of American aid, through Executive or Congressional action. Pakistan will probably stay in CENTO and also in SEATO unless the balance of American and Chinese favors on Kashmir makes tenure in SEATO a net disadvantage.

The United States wants to be able to use Pakistan's airfields and other facilities for intelligence purposes against the Communist bloc and for military operations if defensive anti-Communist action needs to be taken some day. Pakistan has been helpful. The reaction of the Soviet Union to failure of the U-2 flight from Peshawar in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier and President Eisenhower's admission that it was an American intelligence effort and that the plane came from Peshawar shocked, dismayed and scared the Pakistanis. There has been no public evidence, however, that other forms of cooperation in this sphere are not still available.

Pakistan acted immediately to placate the Russians by accepting their technical aid to explore for oil.

The United States wants to strengthen India's defenses against China, to keep India and Pakistan from fighting each other and to settle the Kashmir dispute so as to advance toward the other two objectives. A typical discussion with a Pakistani about these interlocked matters goes like this:

P: What do you mean by giving arms to India? Are you not our friend anymore?

U.S.: Calm down. We have sold, not given, only \$60 million worth of emergency equipment and we are still talking about how much more may be needed. Are you not worried about military aggression by Communist China?

P: No, China was only teaching India not to be so haughty and hypocritical; it doesn't intend to invade India and start World War III. Yes, China may come down again but your aid will not help India enough, so you might as well save your money and be prepared with your atom bombs. No, China won't invade and your weapons will only make India more stubborn on Kashmir and more tempted to fight Pakistan.

U.S.: Make up your mind. One problem at a time. Now we have told you time and time again that we wouldn't stand for India using our weapons against you and we have told India the same thing about the arms we have furnished to you.

P: Who ever heard of that!

U.S.: Really, if you will look at Eisenhower's letter to Nehru and State Department Press Release...I forget the number...

P: Don't be technical. Not one Pakistani in a hundred has ever heard of that and besides India doesn't need to use your guns; the Indian troops up in Kashmir have their own guns. What about the Kashmir plebiscite? For once you have some real leverage to use on Nehru -- the Indians got badly mauled in NEFA -- and now Rusk has thrown it all away by coming out and saying that you would put no conditions on the arms. It doesn't make sense.

U.S.: Of course it makes sense. If we put Nehru over a barrel now what will the rest of our friends in Asia think? It would look as if we are saying, "Sure you can count on our help when you are in trouble but you may have to come crawling to get it."

P: What do you mean "crawling"? Nehru promised that plebiscite fifteen years ago. It might be wrong to announce you are attaching conditions but it is foolish to say publicly that you

you are not attaching conditions. Why not leave it ambiguous; there is no hurry about delivering the guns. How about keeping the arms under U.S. control, like the nuclear weapons in Europe?

U.S.: You know as well as anybody that Nehru has his internal problems on Kashmir and if the word gets around that we are twisting his arm that will only make it worse. You certainly didn't help much by signing a border agreement with Communist China.

P: It is a good agreement; we gave up nothing we had in hand and we gained a little.

U.S.: Sure, but the Chinese would have waited a while. You might have caused the Indians to break off the Kashmir talks.

P: Well, they didn't break off the talks and the Chinese were in no mood to wait. Why are you always so worried about the sensibilities of the Indians? Why don't you get on our side once in a while: What has Nehru ever done for you except sneer! How do you think we feel; like a puppet on a string or something!

The foregoing illustrative conversation attempts to indicate what is bothering the Pakistanis. Their differences with the United States are mostly about India. Their leaning toward neutrality -- without taking any irrevocable steps yet -- does not arise from a change to thinking that Communist China can be trusted or that China is too powerful to annoy; it is a combination of several of the disappointments with the United States which have been mentioned above plus some others. From the outset of the Kennedy Administration the Pakistanis feared they might be in for a bad time. The Kennedy speeches as a Senator on aid to India, the appointment of former Ambassador to India, Bowles, and former India scholar, Talbot, to high places in the Department of State and the loss of people from the previous administration who never forgot Dulles's pronouncement that neutralism was immoral -- these gloomy indicators have not been erased from the Pakistani mind by the high social tone of Ayub's visits to the United States and Vice President Johnson's and Mrs. Kennedy's visit to Pakistan. The Pakistanis are hypersensitive: Ambassador McConaughy made a harmless remark at a supposedly off-the-record press conference in Dacca about United States willingness to aid East Pakistan which was twisted by the press into comfort for East Pakistan separatists. Pakistanis say with justification that the Government of Pakistan was not consulted in advance about arms aid to India but neglect to mention that President Ayub went up into the mountains where he knew he would be hard to reach.

Pakistan knows that it has no good alternative to dependence on American help but it may move several steps more toward neutrality, unless the United States puts a lot more pressure on India regarding Kashmir, and some of these steps may please -- but probably not strengthen -- Communist China.

c. Pakistan's Internal Stresses and Chinese Subversion -

Many of Pakistan's social and economic difficulties have already been alluded to. Other things being equal, the more success Pakistan has in solving these problems, the less likely it will be that it will turn toward the Communist bloc as a reaction against the Western states which have been helping it. Similarly, improvement in living standards will allay the discontent on which Communism feeds.

Communist activities in Pakistan are outlawed but of course the Communists have not given up. One can only speculate on how well they are doing. Outwardly in March 1963 Ayub's regime appeared to have the country in complete control, but his popularity has declined, especially in East Pakistan. Apart from the abundant possibilities of agitation about poverty, unfair distribution of wealth as between Pakistan's capitalists and the workers and peasants, lack of democracy and infringement of human rights and toadying to the United States, the Communists also have a ready wedge for the cleft between East and West Pakistan. Ayub and his central government are in West Pakistan and Punjabis predominate in that government, including the armed forces. The West has 85 percent of Pakistan's land but only 46 percent of its people. The Bengalis in the East are poorer on the average than the people of West Pakistan and they have a long list of grievances centering on disparity as between East and West on public investment, government services, distribution of foreign aid, discrimination in government employment, including military service, and so on. Without going into the merits of these controversies it may be observed that they are natural openings for Communist trouble-making.

Is there anything in the foregoing situation of special advantage to the Chinese Communists? Evidence of Chinese activity in Pakistan is not noticeable but details are in government police files. Whether the Chinese or the Russians predominate in influence over the local Communists is also a matter for guessing. One may guess that the Chinese would have some advantage over the Russians in Pakistan because of the Sino-Indian conflict. One may also guess that Chinese proximity to East Pakistan and their ability to put pressure on the Indians at the east end of the sub-continent may offer special subversive possibilities for the future. Take the eviction of Muslims from Assam into East Pakistan; it is not unthinkable that Communist China might make known to India the concern of Muslims in China for the fate of their brothers in Assam who are being ousted for alleged political unreliability in the emergency in Assam created by Chinese military action.

d. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union - In the Pakistan scheme of priorities bilateral relations with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union deserve more attention than bilateral relations with Communist China. Afghanistan has a long border with Pakistan which has been the scene of skirmishing because of Afghanistan's vigorous claim that Pushtun tribes who straddle the border ought to be given

the right of self-determination. The Soviet Union has traditionally been considered a threat to Pakistan and Pakistan's membership in CENTO is not just a token affiliation. The Soviet Union has retaliated by backing India on the Kashmir question. It has held out to Pakistan the bait of large-scale economic aid if Pakistan will withdraw from CENTO. The Pakistan-Soviet confrontation over the Peshawar U-2 base has already been mentioned together with Pakistan appeasement in the form of acquiescence in Soviet oil exploration aid valued at \$30 million. Communist China has played no role in these matters. Pakistanis sometimes point out that bilateral conflict with Pakistan's big neighbors is absent in the case of Communist China alone.

5. The China-Pakistan Border Agreement of March 2, 1963 -  
When this agreement was announced during the interval between two sessions of the India-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir the United States expressed concern, India protested and a wave of speculation was set off concerning the firmness of Pakistan's anti-Communist position. The following motivations and reasons should be adduced to explain Pakistan's action:

a. It wanted to remove a possible source of friction with, or excuse for aggression by, Communist China and clarify its rights and its defense responsibilities. Support for this rationale is found in the facts that Pakistan took the initiative in the negotiations in the fall of 1959 and steadily pressed the Chinese to settle the question. Pakistan, not having any intention of being an aggressor over the border toward China, had reason, in view of its skepticism as to the peaceful nature of China's ultimate aims, to desire the line to be drawn so that aggression, if such was to come, could be readily ascertained. In this regard there was already the precedent of the Sino-Indian border clashes.

b. It wanted a settlement with China while the Sino-Indian dispute was still going on so as to get extra concessions likely to result from China's probable desire not to have two disputes going at the same time as well as China's undoubted desire to put pressure on India by successfully settling borders with everybody else.

c. It wanted to push India toward a Kashmir settlement by demonstrating that China was not unfriendly and that a stabilization of part of the Kashmir border did not depend on India's agreement. India argued that Pakistan was dealing with what was not its own, but Pakistan had two ready answers: (1) India was begging the question involved in the Kashmir talks and (2) the agreement with China was provisional and did not purport to finally fix the sovereignty of any portion of Kashmir.

d. It wanted to demonstrate to itself, to the United States and to other nations that Pakistan was still an independent country and could make important decisions without consulting anybody (especially the United States which had not adequately consulted Pakistan on giving arms to India). It wanted to cause unease and extra attention by the United States.

e. It wanted to do something helpful for China -- but not seriously hurting Pakistan's allies -- in the hope that China might move toward an endorsement of Pakistan's position on Kashmir. Pakistan was disappointed that China did not do so, but the price which China probably asked, a non-aggression pact, was too much for Pakistan to pay.

f. Ayub wanted to have a foreign policy success to shape the thinking of the Pakistan National Assembly which opened on March 8.

None of these points conflicts with any other and they probably all played a part. Achievement of both China's and Pakistan's objectives necessitated that the agreement be announced before the end of the Kashmir negotiations and before the start of Sino-Indian border negotiations. A month or so earlier or later would not have made any difference in this respect. Pakistan's main risk was that India would use the agreement as an excuse for breaking off the Kashmir talks but, as indicated in point c. earlier, this risk was not large. The line drawn was a good "deal", from Pakistan's point of view, and it did not prejudice India's legal rights. Pakistan gave up no territory of which it had been in possession since the Kashmir ceasefire. It gave up some which it had claimed at one time or another but of course so did China. By adopting the watershed principle for drawing the line the parties gave some support for India's contentions in the Northeast Frontier Area, but contradicted India's claim to Aksai Chin, which is north of the Karakorum watershed. Pakistan got some grazing lands and salt sources of importance traditionally to the few tribesmen in the Hunza area. The Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission agreed upon was scheduled to start work in May 1963 and to take about 16 months to do the job from the Afghanistan border to the Karakorum Pass. The prestige item of lofty K-2 mountain was settled by having the boundary run through the peak. This leaves the only accessible route for climbers on the Pakistan side.

The March 2, 1963 border settlement with China may be a forerunner of other moves by Pakistan designed to strike that delicate balance between calling the attention of Pakistan's western friends to its needs and avoiding any great favor to a Communist country, while at the same time serving Pakistan's basic interests in regard to India or otherwise. The border agreement may be said to epitomize Pakistan's China policy.