

# ICWA LETTERS

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EUROPE/RUSSIA

*Gregory Feifer is an Institute Donors' Fellow studying the current political and cultural reshaping of Russia.*

## Moscow's New Bolshevism

By Gregory Feifer

March 2000

**MOSCOW** – An unusually warm March night promised spring was soon to bloom. The memory of the day's petty problems faded into oblivion and a blissful abandon took over.

Just after the Soviet Union's collapse, similar Moscow nights went a long way toward making up for the well-known difficulties and deprivations of daily life. The proletariat went to bed, leaving the streets empty for the first generation coming of age in what promised to become a boldly free new society.

Those nights had a certain naïvete about them. Giddy young Russians were able for the first time to discover the city's nascent nighttime bars and discotheques. Many of the revelers wore another symbol of their newfound liberty: *jeansy* (jeans, of course) freely available for the first time. Foreigners were welcomed like royalty, and almost felt entitled to it, for their spare change could buy them almost anything they could want of the state's meager consumer offerings.

It was the memory of such bygone nights that I remembered while driving home from a bar in a gypsy cab through the empty boulevards of Moscow's center with a couple of friends. We were nearing my apartment when we happened to pass three intensely bored Interior Ministry policemen lounging in the back seat of their Lada car.

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"Pulling us over, they demanded to see our passports, which we were required to carry at all times by Russian law."

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I absently stared into the face of one of them as we passed. When I looked away, it was already too late.

The cops jumped into the front seats of their aged, diminutive vehicle, screeched forward, and raced to catch up. Pulling us over, they demanded to see our passports, which we were required to carry at all times by Russian law. I'd forgotten mine as usual, which was enough for one of the policemen, an automatic-rifle-wielding 18-year-old hulk, to demand that I get out of the car.


"You've broken the law," he said, smirking and fingering his firearm as I stepped onto the pavement. "You'll have to come down to the station."

Although one knows always to be prepared for the vagaries of all kinds of state employees in Moscow, falling victim to their petty authority, however familiar, is never pleasant. I decided not to budge.

The smile faded. "Why don't you have your documents?" the cop tried again in a tone bordering on annoyance and boredom.

"I don't carry my passport at night because it's dangerous," I lied. "If I'm

*A common sight in Moscow. Traffic police frequently walk along lines of cars waiting at red lights to pick the most expensive-looking vehicle promising the best bribe.*



robbed, it's safer to have it lying at home."

"What!?" my interlocutor barked suddenly. I started. "Are you calling Russians thieves?!"

"No, I'm not."

"Then where's your goddamn passport?"

"It's at home."

"Get in our car. We're going to the station."

"I'm not going anywhere until I call my embassy first," I bluffed, knowing full well that Interior Ministry goons have the full right to lock unlucky wretches without their documents in jail for up to eight hours.

That is, they have the right according to municipal law. The Russian Constitution bans any such thing. But I didn't feel mentioning that at the time would bring any benefit.

"Who are you to tell us what to do?" The cop howled, his temper rising. "Who do you think you are?"

The exchange continued along the same pointless lines for 15 minutes, ending when the policeman, prodded by his colleagues, told us to drive off immediately before he arrested us all.

This kind of story is all too common in Moscow — I was lucky my policy of making it too bothersome for someone in uniform to either exact a bribe or make himself understood paid off.

Tim McCarthy, an American fund manager at Moscow's Troika Dialog bank, told me he'd recently been forced to stand against his car while a policeman rammed

his back repeatedly with the muzzle of a cocked AK-47 with its safety switch off. And he had had all his documents with him.

"The slightest mistake, and my back would have been shredded by bullets," he said. "I was screaming for help."

In another episode, Yuri Riabchikov, an easy-going Russian friend visiting from St. Petersburg who had been stopped walking down Moscow's main shopping street, Tverskaya, in midday, was brusquely told he had to register with the police or pay a fine. (No such requirement for Russians exists even in the city's draconian laws.)


In my case, there was something in the policeman's manner I hadn't seen before: a new level of trigger-happy, power-wielding aggressiveness. The cop was only doing his job, he informed me, but the kick he got out of harassing a hapless foreigner was clear.

That incident helped me realize the final passing of the heady days in which police were dismissed by many as the guardians of a bankrupt regime those days, in which the country's first democratically elected president had come to power flouting Soviet authority by standing on a tank during the country's infamous 1991 coup attempt.

The ever-growing thousands of uniformed men patrolling Moscow's streets today in the service of a myriad of state agencies are no longer relics of an outmoded way of life. They are the enforcers of a new regime, one clearly reverting to the old ways of doing things.

### **Official and Illegal: Mutual Reinforcement**

It might seem paradoxical that a state with a crumbled economy, scandal-ridden politics and an



*The infamous Petrovka 38, a wing of the Interior Ministry police headquarters on downtown Petrovka street. The building was a feared symbol of Soviet repression.*

overwhelmingly poverty-stricken population spends funds on Interior Ministry foot soldiers to arbitrarily hassle people on city streets.

But the coinciding trends are actually logical. It is precisely the state's burgeoning and oppressive bureaucracy that creates the conditions necessary for crime and corruption to thrive. Without Russia's Byzantine state structure,

which makes it difficult to carry out even the simplest of paperwork, there would be little reason to resort to corruption to get around it.

Bribes go not only to state officials, but also to Russia's burgeoning "shadow" economy, in the form of payments for services officially illegal or semi-legal. That part of Russia's commercial activity now accounts for 50 percent





*Muscovites from the Caucasus are the most-targeted for document checks. After a series of apartment building explosions rocked Russia last summer, the Moscow city police rounded up hundreds of dark-skinned "suspects" and deported them, claiming they were possible terrorists.*

of the country's economy, by most estimates.

In turn, the state cannot function without the illegal commerce that greases the system. Without the trails blazed by the black and grey markets in actually getting things done, it would be difficult to funnel cash in the form of bribes and kickbacks to the cadres of bureaucrats and police. That's why "law-enforcers" are not really interested in enforcing the law. They are an essential part of the system, feeding on society by the thousands.

The aggregate system would not work without the real enforcer: fear. Certainly not the Stalinist system's fear, needless to say, but something related.

"The worst thing," says Jamie Dettmer, the *Washington Times's* Moscow correspondent, whose passport is frequently checked by the same police near his apartment, "is that Russians don't stand up against it. They accept having their rights violated because they're used to accepting it. And that's only going to make it worse."

### A Stronger State

What to do? Foreigners and Russians alike agree with newly elected President Vladimir Putin when he says the country needs a stronger state to enforce laws that would ensure a continued transition to democracy and a competitive market economy. Such laws would also presumably protect the individual from illegal hassling by those supposedly protecting his rights.

Even the most optimistic, however, agree that Putin's words can have wildly differing ramifications. A stronger state to most in Russia, whether they admit it or not, really

means more power for the thugs to enforce the status quo. Political will is simply too weak, and corruption too endemic, to enact real reform.

One of the key factors in society's support for a return to a "stronger state" is a memory-clouding nostalgia. Many Russians now fondly remember the Soviet Union as a state that guaranteed social services, however lousy. They forget they couldn't travel to the West, couldn't say what they wanted and that they complained as bitterly about the dearth of consumer goods then as they do about the lack of money to buy them today.

"The Soviets were clever," said Vitaly Grishin, a 26 year-old Russian acquaintance. "They gave people apartments. They gave them cars. For almost nothing! Except a life of oppression. But that's what people forget."

Those hankering after the Soviet Union's stability have indeed forgotten its corruption, reviled by the population in its day. At a Communist Party rally on a raw afternoon a week before presidential elections, kindly, red-faced Rima Zorina, 70, said she wanted to see the Soviet Union resurrected. "We're fighting to give power to the working class," she said.

"But did the working class have power under the Soviet Union?" I asked.

As always, the question is avoided, wiped off the collective memory of the nostalgic. "[Communist Party leader Gennady] Zyuganov supports honest people," Zorina said by way of a reply. "Honest patriots."

The rallies draw mostly pensioners, a fair number of whom smile ironically when the familiar Soviet cry "Hoo-

ray!" goes up. It's a lark, they seem to be saying.

But it will most likely be too late when society suddenly remembers about just how corrupt the Soviet Union really was. The unconstitutional continuation of residence permits in Moscow, left over from the days in which the Soviet Union tied its subjects to the towns and cities in which they lived, is but one sign of the growing danger — certainly more threatening than the books circulated at Communist rallies such as *Jewish Fascism in Russia*. One Muscovite who called a hotline for complaints about the Moscow city administration recently said he and his wife came to live in Moscow from the city of Penza (350 miles to the southwest) five years ago and still do not have permission to live in the capital. "I think it's a clear violation of our constitutional rights," he said. "We work, we're artists, we pay our taxes... We think this must be ended, and we must live and feel ourselves free in our own country, and not how we live now."

This kind of complaint is common. What's new is that not only do police on the street have greater authority to carry out their whims in "enforcing" the law, but that those at the very top are now openly exercising the same type of arbitrary force in the name of the country's well-being.

It is not for nothing that Putin stole a significant part of the Communist vote during elections on March 26 — he wisely appealed to a nationalistic urge that the newly reincarnated Communist Party began to cultivate last decade. Putin came to power in a show of force when he oversaw the beginning of Moscow's brutal military campaign in the breakaway region of Chechnya. For that, he was awarded around 52 percent of the vote.

Putin also frequently calls for a "dictatorship of the

law." The president wants to sound both powerful and fair, but "dictatorship" in any context is risky in Russia. Some of the trappings, such as bona fide official propaganda, are already here. In a semi-westernized pharmaceutical factory outside Moscow days before the election, bulletin boards displayed "letters" from Putin. No other candidates were represented. The letters ostensibly had nothing to do with the campaign. They were official statements from the acting president, on such topics as... the "dictatorship of the law." But they could not have been more effective advertising for Putin, who said he would use no advertising in the campaign. He was also supported by state-run media outlets that showcased him and ignored his opponents.

Most of Putin's government appointees have been his colleagues from the Federal Security Service, a successor to the KGB, where Putin spent most of his professional life. While it is natural for Putin to appoint people he knows and trusts, they happen to come from the agency most responsible for carrying out the Soviet Union's repressive policies. "They are really creating a system like the one from which they came," Nikolai Petrov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center told me of Putin's appointees. "Not because they're bad or good, but because it's the only model they know and understand. To expect something else isn't realistic. Russia is becoming a half-police state where various official and civil agencies are headed by people from the 'special forces,'" Petrov added.

### A Show of Force


The use of force as a sign of potent political power is nothing new in Russia. As with many aspects of life here, however, appearance and reality have been quite different, if not opposite — and purposefully so.

Ever since the Russian empire began to expand, par-

*Many elderly Muscovites are forced to supplement their meager pensions by selling trinkets in pedestrian underpasses.*







*Visitors to Moscow are frequently surprised by the number of uniforms they see on the streets. These two Interior Ministry police approached me after I'd taken their photograph and demanded I erase it. But they broke into bashful smiles after I told them their pictures would appear in a prestigious western publication.*

ticularly during the 17th century, Moscow could effectively control neither the lands it acquired nor the bureaucracy it took to run them. The only way to keep the administration running was to instill fear; hence a highly detailed code worked out punishments for the minutest blasphemies against the czar. Public executions and stories of severe punishment for criticizing the czar figure largely in the western image of Russia. Such loudly publicized incidents, however, were the rare exception and not the rule. Many believed the state's all-powerful facade, especially foreigners. In fact, during most of its existence, the Russian Empire barely clung together by an overstretched bureaucracy.

The parallels with today are clear. In order to seriously reform the state's functioning and empower democratic institutions necessary for overseeing a real transition to democracy and fairer capitalism — such as the country's nearly ruined court system — many bureaucrats used to their corrupt ways would have to be fired and state agencies completely restructured. That takes time and money, not to mention will and political capital no one has to spend on such a venture.

So the economically crippled Russian state is once again resorting to traditional tactics. The most dangerous aspect of the show of rule of law is that it creates conditions for zealous and arbitrary abuse of power, the kind exercised by the Bolsheviks after the Revolution, for the state's agents are given the freedom to exercise their power at will. That gives them a stake in the system while allowing their superiors to run a highly vertically integrated command structure.

Needless to say, corruption and abuse of power exist everywhere. But whereas in the West, a critical mass of the population essentially lives by rule of law, in Russia, the opposite is true. One's professional position, for example, often does not necessarily reflect promotion after good work

done. Officials' positions reflect status, not vice-versa. The same was true under the Soviet Union, when bureaucrats saw their offices as something to milk for personal use (just as entire enterprises and sectors saw their goal as trying to gain as much from the central planning apparatus in raw materials and subsidies).

Police today are no different: Everyone in Moscow knows they live on the bribes they demand. Every driver knows he will at some point be arbitrarily stopped by the traffic police and asked for money that goes straight into officers' pockets and not the Treasury. That's seen as natural because police aren't paid enough to live a normal life. They *have* to take bribes; it's a state-sanctioned activity.

Otto Latsis, one of Russia's most respected journalists and commentators, uses the institution of new traffic violations to illustrate the official approval of bribe taking. "It used to be that for a certain violation [making an illegal turn near Latsis's apartment], traffic police couldn't collect money themselves," he told me under the sloping eaves of his office at the progressive *Novaya Izvestiya* paper. "They had to confiscate your license and take it to the station. To get the thing back, you had to sacrifice two working days to stand in line and arrange the necessary paperwork. The fine was ten rubles [30 cents]. That really didn't benefit anyone. Then, last year, police were authorized to take the money themselves. The fine simultaneously tripled. Everyone knows that money isn't going to make it to the city government. The change was a state-sanctioned institution of bribe-taking for that particular driving offense."

### The New Dissidents

Until last summer and the appearance of Putin as the country's new savior, the politician most known for favoring a strong hand in running his administration was the

powerful Moscow Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov.

That savvy political boss, seen as Russia's most likely next president until his attacks on the Kremlin lost him his popularity, is a key figure in Russia's political system whose administration is widely acknowledged to be run in a closed, conspiratorial fashion rife with corruption.

Last June, former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, a so-called ex-young reformer, launched a blistering assault on Luzhkov, accusing his administration of corruption and repression of Muscovites' rights. Kiriyenko — Yeltsin's last reforming premier sacked during Russia's catastrophic financial collapse in August 1998 — simultaneously announced the inception of a new "social organization," *Moskovskaya Alternativa* (Moscow Alternative). The new



An election season bulletin board. Voting was more of a referendum on strong-man Putin than a race for the presidency. Never did democracy feel deadlier since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

group, Kiriyenko said, would maintain a hotline for complaints about the way in which the city is run. Kiriyenko also said he would run for City Hall, a symbolic gesture, given that Luzhkov won 96.6 percent in the previous elections in 1996. (He won over 70 percent last December.)

*Moskovskaya Alternativa* grew to unite a number of allies under the banner of a Moscow opposition. It became part think tank, part legal-aid group, part organizer of cultural events. In the broadest sense, it represented a new brand of Russian reformers bent on working on a local, practical level to challenge what it saw as Moscow's "authoritarian bureaucratic" administration, a system many feared would soon be extended to the entire country. "The goal was to create a social organization in Moscow that would exist outside the city's totalitarian-style power," says Denis Gubin, deputy director of media relations for the Internet Press Center, a *Moskovskaya Alternativa* project.

"Our most important achievement is the fact that a pub-

lic opposition now exists," said Vyacheslav Glazyshev, a key *Moskovskaya Alternativa* organizer who coordinated its group of experts and ran on Kiriyenko's ticket for the post of Vice Mayor. "It's the first expression of a point of view different from the official one." Strange words, one would think, in a country that calls itself a democracy and has a multitude of political parties, even one for beer lovers.

Marat Gelman, who owns a chic downtown art gallery and has become one of Russia's most visible cultural figures, spent much of last year working closely with *Moskovskaya Alternativa*, shuttling back and forth between its bustling headquarters and his gallery, which also functioned as the group's "Internet Press Center" and a base for planning various exhibits and events. "It's right to compare us to Soviet dissidents," said Gelman, whom Kiriyenko has asked to help coordinate his political activities in Moscow. "It seemed that for nine years or so, political power in Russia wasn't as all-consuming as it had been before. Dissidence wasn't deemed possible then. But in Moscow especially, times of fear have returned."

Last September, *Moskovskaya Alternativa* staged "Unofficial Moscow," a series of concerts and exhibitions that coincided with the city's celebrations of its 852<sup>nd</sup> anniversary. The official events have become a symbol for Luzhkov's desire to control every aspect of city life. In 1997, the mayor even had clouds over Moscow seeded to precipitate premature rain before the capital's 850<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration. (Stalin was another who saw Moscow anniversaries — such as the lavish 800<sup>th</sup> in 1947 — as pet projects to create public spectacles that would emotionally involve average citizens in supporting his own utopian vision.)


*Moskovskaya Alternativa* was just one of Kiriyenko's fronts ahead of parliamentary elections last December. Since his firing on the heels of the country's ruinous financial collapse in August 1998, the ex-premier also formed his own party, *Novaya Sila* (New Force), to campaign on a national level; and he is one of three leaders of parliament's liberal bloc of ex-reformers, *Soyuz Pravykh Sil* (The Union of Right-Wing Forces).

Besides maintaining its hotline, *Moskovskaya Alternativa*, which since last December's mayoral elections is being reorganized into an umbrella group, made impressive use of the Internet. Gelman's Internet Press Center held briefings on topics such as corruption in outdoor city markets, city housing and construction projects and brought in experts and witnesses to discuss the subjects in Gelman's one-room gallery, which posted transcripts live and fielded questions on the Internet.

*Moskovskaya Alternativa*'s core consisted of a group of around 30 experts who processed over 2,000 e-mails and more than 6,000 hotline calls from Muscovites.

The main work of the group's coordinator, Glazyshev

The building housing *Moskovskaya Alternativa's* offices near Zubovsky Square in downtown Moscow. It is telling that the government's propagandistic information agency for the war in Chechnya, Rosinformcenter, is housed in the same structure. The two organizations might be ideologically opposed, but they both served the interests of the Kremlin.



— a wizened humanist whose academic background includes architecture, sociology and cultural studies — consisted of drafting a report on Moscow. “Upsetting as it may sound, it was the first public report since the beginning of the 1930s at the very least,” Glazychev said. “Moscow until now has only been discussed within narrow professional or administrative circles.” The group was — if not the only — one of the few socio-political organizations with cosmopolitan views to have taken concrete steps to battle what is in essence a return to Soviet ways of doing things — in closed, conspiratorial fashion behind closed doors.

### Uphill Battle

*Moskovskaya Alternativa's* effects are already being felt. One of those is the establishment of horizontal ties between the city's social groups. “The Soviet feudal system of sectoral division in the city, which has to a large extent survived to this day,” Glazychev says, “is beginning to break apart because those oppressed by the administration are finding out about the common nature of their goals.”

Residents in different prefectures with the same problems — such as being forced to listen to construction work day and night because of Luzhkov's unrealistic deadlines for city projects — have joined to take legal action backed by *Moskovskaya Alternativa*. “The noise goes on around the clock,” Gubin says. “The health and the rest of people are economized. It's like a Soviet five-year plan.”

Whether the legacy of *Moskovskaya Alternativa's* campaigning will last is now in doubt.

The organization flourished partly because it served the goals of one political clan, Boris Yeltsin's Kremlin, which

provided Kiriienko's political patronage. Last summer, the Kremlin saw Luzhkov as its biggest threat. When the mayor (and later his ally, the popular former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov) seemed destined to take over the presidency, the Kremlin wanted to do everything it could to smear its rivals. That included backing Kiriienko's attacks on the city administration.

After December's parliamentary elections, Luzhkov and Primakov lost their steam when Unity, a pro-Putin party the Kremlin founded barely three months earlier, won a surprising 20 percent of the vote. The Luzhkov-Primakov duo's Fatherland-All Russia political movement instantly fell apart. Several weeks later, a depressed and politically spent Luzhkov began to make up with the Kremlin, saying he wanted find ways to work with Putin.

Unsurprisingly, *Moskovskaya Alternativa* became irrelevant for its backers, and is now on its own. It no longer holds news conferences or publicizes its activities. Since the December elections, only Glazychev has held the group together.

Meanwhile, Kiriienko and most of his young reformer colleagues wholeheartedly backed Putin despite the fact that the new president slapped them in the face several times. In one example, the pro-Putin Unity Party pooled its votes in the State Duma lower house of parliament with the Communists' to re-elect Communist Gennady Seleznyov speaker last January and divvy up most of the chamber's key committees. Several blocs, including Kiriienko's Union of Right-Wing Forces, stormed off to organize a boycott, but later reluctantly accepted the deal. Kiriienko also backed Russia's campaign in Chechnya, jumping on Russia's growing nationalist bandwagon in order to firmly place himself in mainstream



politics. That helped win his Union of Right-Wing Forces a surprising 9 percent of the vote last year.

Since then, it is clear his ties with *Moskovskaya Alternativa* no longer serve his purposes.

Even the liberal icon Kiriienko supports moves that have traditionally produced the appearance of social stability in Russia, such as putting more police on the streets. Putin calls for a stronger state, and not only Russians but also political leaders around the world applaud him for promising to bring order to Russia's lawlessness. But the most likely results of his actions are precisely those

Kiriienko once campaigned against.

The trouble is that politicians' rhetoric and actions have rarely coincided in Russia. Appeals for a stronger state in fact most likely mean the entrenchment of what is in essence a corrupt system, functioning along informal lines much like the Soviet Union's — precisely what Russia doesn't need.

The chief tool is fear, and as I have found out myself, it is growing on the capital's streets. At least enough so that I no longer dare catch the eye of a member of Russia's finest for fear of creating a provocation. □

# FELLOWS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES

## Institute of Current World Affairs

### EUROPE/RUSSIA

#### Adam Smith Albion—Uzbekistan

A former research associate at the Institute for EastWest Studies at Prague in the Czech Republic, Adam is studying and writing about the republics of Central Asia, and their importance as actors within and without the former Soviet bloc. A Harvard graduate (1988; History), Adam has completed the first year of a two-year M. Litt. Degree in Russian/East European history and languages at Oxford University.

#### Gregory Feifer—Russia

With fluent Russian and a Master's from Harvard, Gregory worked in Moscow as political editor for *Agence France-Presse* and the weekly *Russia Journal* in 1998-9. Greg sees Russia's latest failures at economic and political reform as a continuation of failed attempts at Westernization that began with Peter the Great — failures that a long succession of behind-the-scenes elites have used to run Russia behind a mythic facade of "strong rulers" for centuries. He plans to assess the continuation of these cultural underpinnings of Russian governance in the wake of the Gorbachev/Yeltsin succession.

#### Whitney Mason—Turkey

A freelance print and television journalist, Whit began his career by founding a newspaper called *The Siberian Review* in Novosibirsk in 1991, then worked as an editor of the *Vladivostok News* and wrote for *Asiaweek* magazine in Hong Kong. In 1995 he switched to radio- and video-journalism, working in Bosnia and Korea for CBS. As an ICWA Fellow, he is studying and writing about Turkey's role as nexus between East and West, and between traditional and secular Islam.

#### Jean Benoît Nadeau—France

A French-Canadian journalist and playwright, Jean Benoît studied drama at the National Theater School in Montreal, then received a B.A. from McGill University in Political Science and History. The holder of several Canadian magazine and investigative-journalism awards, he is spending his ICWA-fellowship years in France studying "the resistance of the French to the trend of economic and cultural globalization."

### SOUTH ASIA

#### Shelly Renae Browning—Australia

A surgeon specializing in ears and hearing, Dr. Browning is studying the approaches of traditional healers among the Aborigines of Australia and the indigenous peoples of Vanuatu to hearing loss and ear problems. She won her B.S. in Chemistry at the University of the South, studied physician/patient relationships in China and Australia on a Thomas J. Watson Fellowship and won her M.D. at Emory University in Atlanta. Before her ICWA fellowship, she was a Fellow in Skull-Base Surgery in Montreal at McGill University's Department of Otolaryngology.

### sub-SAHARA

#### Marc Michaelson—Ethiopia

A program manager for Save the Children in The Gambia, Marc has moved across Africa to the Horn, there to assess nation-build-Institute of Current World Affairs

ing in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and (conditions permitting) availing and unavailing humanitarian efforts in northern Somalia and southern Sudan. With a B.A. in political science from Tufts, a year of non-degree study at the London School of Economics and a Master's in International Peace Studies from Notre Dame, he describes his postgraduate years as "seven years' experience in international development programming and peace research."

### THE AMERICAS

#### Wendy Call—Mexico

A "Healthy Societies" Fellow, Wendy is spending two years in Mexico's Isthmus of Tehuantepec, immersed in contradictory trends: an attempt to industrialize and "develop" land along a proposed Caribbean-to-Pacific containerized railway, and the desire of indigenous peoples to preserve their way of life and some of Mexico's last remaining old-growth forests. With a B.A. in Biology from Oberlin, Wendy has worked as a communications coordinator for Grassroots International and national campaign director for Infact, a corporate accountability organization.

#### Paige Evans—Cuba

A playwright and former Literary Manager of the Manhattan Theatre Club in New York City, Paige is looking at Cuba through the lens of its performing arts. With a History/Literature B.A. from Harvard, she has served as counselor at the Buckhorn Children's Center in Buckhorn, Kentucky (1983-84), as Arts Editor of the *International Courier* in Rome, Italy (1985-86), and as an adjunct professor teaching a course in Contemporary American Playwrights at New York University. She joined the Manhattan Theatre Club in 1990.

#### Peter Keller—Chile

Public affairs officer at Redwood National Park and a park planner at Yosemite National Park before his fellowship, Peter holds a B.S. in Recreation Resource Management from the University of Montana and a Masters in Environmental Law from the Vermont Law School. As a John Miller Musser Memorial Forest & Society Fellow, he is spending two years in Chile and Argentina comparing the operations of parks and forest reserves controlled by the Chilean and Argentine governments to those controlled by private persons and non-governmental organizations.

#### Susan Sterner—Brazil

A staff photographer for the Associated Press in Los Angeles, Susan received her B.A. in International Studies and Cultural Anthropology at Emory University and a Master's in Latin American Studies at Vanderbilt. AP gave her a wide-ranging beat, with assignments in Haiti, Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border. Her fellowship topic: the lives and status of Brazilian women

#### Tyrone Turner—Brazil

A photojournalist (Black Star) whose work has appeared in many U.S. newspapers and magazines, Tyrone holds a Master's degree in Government and Latin American politics from Georgetown University and has produced photo-essays on youth violence in New Orleans, genocide in Rwanda and mining in Indonesia. As an Institute Fellow he is photographing and writing about Brazilian youth from São Paulo in the industrial South to Recife and Salvador in the Northeast.

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