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GSA-26
India: Report on Kashmir

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Dear Dick,

I am not trying, despite the weight and length of the attached, to rival the Sunday Times. But what started in August as a newsletter about the infiltration in Kashmir was overtaken by the war and all its side and after effects. As a result of the infiltration and the war, the Kashmir issue once more came to world attention and became an even more prominent point of contention between India and Pakistan. And the Kashmir issue, now that China is to be reckoned with, has dimensions that it lacked five or fifteen years ago. Because of all this and because much about the Kashmir issue has never been understood, it seemed to me that I might try to write about Kashmir as it is today in the context of its origins and its development as a problem. I leave it to you, and to other readers, to decide if the result is edifying.

Yours sincerely,

Red Austin

Granville S. Austin

Received in New York December 13, 1965.

HISTORY PAST AND HISTORY PRESENT:

Report on Kashmir

by

Granville Austin

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December 1965.

REPORT ON KASHMIR

Wisdom can begin in confusion, and in Kashmir that's where it must, if it begins at all. The first wisdom is to recognize the immense complexity of the 'Kashmir issue', to recognize that the over-simplification of the problem by participants and observers alike over the years has helped prevent its solution - to the detriment of everyone concerned, especially of the Kashmiris themselves. We must look at the problem again.

But in the garden of Nedou's Hotel in Srinagar - where the white-cheeked bulbuls preen among the russet dahlia blossoms and spiky orange zinnias lay their shadows on the lawn - it's hard to believe there is a problem. On October mornings the sun, streaming through gaps between the maple-like chenar trees, puts warmth into a tweed jacket, and one can sit in a canvas chair and watch the blacker foothills disappear into a line of clouds hanging below the higher peaks, this morning clean and light grey from a dusting of snow. And there one can recall trips across the valley through golden corridors of poplars, or imagine the half Parisian, half Tyrolian atmosphere of Ahdoo's outdoor cafe (tiny, delicious vol au vent and good coffee) with chenar leaves drifting to the ground and the steep gables of brick and timber houses sharp against the mountains. Or, by turning one's chair a little, one can look across the street to the huge garden that was the Maharaja's private polo field and that now has cows grazing on the soccer field at one end and beds of flowers. Or one can focus on the tidy, nineteenth-century English house at the far edge of the garden with its diamond panes and recall the many others like it in the city, symbols of the days when all the British who could escaped the summer heat of the plains for the green days and guitar-strummed, flirtatious nights of Kashmir.

But down the street, across the view, come a couple jeeps and behind them trucks filled with Sikh policemen, rifles and sten guns upright, butts on their knees. A man in each truck watches the street ahead, resting his Bren gun on the cab roof and cuddling it to his shoulder. One man stretches a cramped trigger finger. The police and the army are in fact everywhere -- if one hadn't forgot about it, enchanted by the mountains. Local policemen stand in ranks leaning on their lathis on the roads to the headquarters of the United Nations observer force. They man the checkposts on the roads, especially on the outskirts of Srinagar, where all non-official vehicles must report and where most are searched. They prowl the baazars with rifles and sten guns and guard public buildings. There

are police from the Punjab - the most disliked by Kashmiris - and other provinces of India. They also patrol the city or stand guard by sandbag pillboxes at bridges and at strategic street corners. Soldiers in the streets usually go armed even when doing their private shopping, and convoys grind through the streets at night bound for what used to be a cease-fire line and became an active front. The mood of the Valley and of the city isn't quite tense, but it's very careful.

Kashmir today is the eye of a typhoon. The winds of politics and war blow fiercely around it while at the center the air is quieter. But the seas at the eye are heaving and sometimes torn by the warning gusts that blow across it. The present storm has been brewing for 18 years and there seems to be little prospect of its blowing over. Kashmir is legitimately Indian, but Pakistan has claimed it with relentless propaganda, keeping both Kashmir and the sub-continent unsettled. This summer Pakistan tried to capture Kashmir by force, repeating the attack that originally drove the state into India's arms in 1947. Over the years Pakistan's propaganda and the behaviour of the various governments of the state - and of the Indian government at Delhi - have eroded much of the original good will and allegiance of the Kashmiri people until their loyalty to India is, to say the least, questionable. Other nations, through the United Nations and separately, have become involved to no good effect because they have apparently not understood the issue, either its past or its ever changing present. Kashmir is now a major source of enmity between Pakistan and India. But originally it was the deep-seated conflict of ideology and interests that led to the creation of these two states that also produced the Kashmir issue. The Kashmir issue, like Partition, is a product of the two hundred years that preceded it.

Hindus and Muslims in the British Period:

One of the prominent side effects of British presence in India was the change wrought in the relative economic and social status of Hindus and Muslims. In the years from the conquest of Bengal to the extension of British rule throughout India, roughly 1750 to 1850, it was principally the Hindus who filled the jobs in the new bureaucracy, in the expanding anglicized professions of law, medicine, and education, and who became ascendent (under the British) in trade and commerce.

The Muslims, defeated in war and less amenable to foreign ways, were left behind. As a result, the upper classes of the two communities drew apart. In 1857 came the army mutiny, for which the British for some years blamed the Muslims. During the 1860's and 1870's Muslim theologians rationalized the subordinate position of Muslims to the Christian British, and secular Muslim leaders set about modernizing the community and refurbishing its relations with the imperial power. Emphasis was first placed on 'westernized' education (Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in 1875 founded what would become Aligarh Muslim University), and second, Muslim leaders dissociated the community from national independence movements. (Sir Syed opposed Muslims having anything to do with the Indian National Congress -- founded 1885 -- because it might prejudice relations with the British). These efforts bore fruit and Muslims became favorites of the British. Later, Muslim leaders would begin to emphasize the cultural and religious separateness of Muslims and Hindus, but in the early years there was no religious conflict as such and the competition was largely economic and slightly political.

With the slow introduction in this century of the institutions of self-government and the growth of the independence movement, the opportunities for Muslim separateness increased, particularly as the British were willing to exploit this sentiment in the service of empire. Efforts to gain special treatment as a minority succeeded in 1909 when separate electorates were established for Muslims, and in the years to come Muslims (and several other minorities) would be granted reserved seats in legislatures and reserved places in the civil services. These tactics achieved moderate success, but they also relegated Muslims to perpetual minority status in Indian affairs - and made them increasingly dependent on British protection. When the Muslim League — founded in 1906 — failed miserably in the elections of 1937 (Its only electoral successes were in Muslim minority provinces; in Muslim majority provinces Muslim voters supported either Congress or non-League candidates), League leader Mohammed Ali Jinnah decided that there were better ways to make the Muslims' voice heard. Harking back to the 'two-nation theory' propounded by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Jinnah began claiming that Muslims were a separate nation, religiously and culturally apart, and that as such they should be treated on a par with the 'Hindu nation' in Indian politics. The logical extension of this theory was that Muslims should live in a separate state, and in 1940 at Lahore a League convention demanded that independent states be created in the Northwest and Northeast of India, where Muslims were in a majority - in fact, Pakistan.

There were several major reasons for the estrangement of the League and the rest of India. Muslims were a minority in India and they feared 'Hindu domination'. In part this was simply an unwillingness to accept minority status, illogical and intransigent. But the behaviour of certain Hindu revivalist groups (whose activities included attempted conversion of Muslims) and the voracious absorptiveness of Hinduism gave them more reasonable grounds to fear for their identity in an independent India. Jinnah capitalized on this fear in building up the Muslim League. Yet his appeal to religion, however opportunistic and although deplored by many prominent Muslims, was almost predictable given the condition of Indian society, which was so fragmented linguistically, economically, and socially that religion provided almost the only common bond between groups and individuals. And religion also provided a common idiom. Muslims couldn't express their group identity in any other way. The religious 'nationalism' of the two-nation theory was the Indian equivalent of class-consciousness and ethnic- or linguistic-group consciousness elsewhere in the world. Muslims under pressure from Hindus (and Hindus in reply to Muslims) turned to their religion for identity and security. Had Congress leaders not been so secular themselves, so averse to mixing religion and politics, some historians now believe, they might have been more aware of this danger in Indian society and taken more effective steps to avoid it.

Jinnah's bitterness toward Congress leaders, which their behaviour sometimes fostered, perhaps motivated him as much as fear of Hindu domination of Muslims. And there was a further source of conflict between him and Congress leaders. Jinnah saw himself as a member of the upper classes and the League's strongest supporters were Muslim landed interests. The League had no social reform program; in fact it had no program at all beyond the protection of certain Muslim rights. The Congress, on the other hand, had had a civil rights program almost since its inception, and, since the coming of Nehru and others, socialism - both humanitarian and doctrinaire - had been its goal as much as national independence. Jinnah and his supporters could not approve of this reformist ideology. And for Nehru and other Congress leaders, a compromise with the League was a compromise with economic as well as religious reaction.

Congress-League enmity also grew because of the League's abstention from the independence movement and cooperation with the British. Leaders of the League early saw that they would have power as a third force, able to bargain their support

for political gain, and they usually sided with the British against the Congress. Their prime opportunity came between 1942 and 1945 when virtually the entire leadership of the Congress was in jail as a result of the 1942 'Quit India' agitation. The League cooperated in the war effort, thus strengthening its position with the British. And unhampered by competition, the League built its power in the provinces. In the elections held at the end of 1945 and in early 1946, the League had the popular support it had previously lacked, winning nearly all the Muslim seats in the provincial legislatures and all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly.

During the next two years, with independence in the offing, Jinnah at times called for parity of Muslims with Hindus in India and at times for a separate Muslim state of Pakistan. He called upon the British to solve the Hindu-Muslim question before leaving India. The Congress called upon the British to leave and to let Indians solve their own problems, and it said that India should remain united. Jinnah and other League leaders said publicly that if the Muslims didn't get 'justice' through negotiations they would turn to the sword. In August 1946 large scale killings of Hindus by Muslims in Calcutta, apparently not spontaneous, began an ebb and flow of murder and counter-murder that went on for more than a year. For a time the League and the Congress agreed to try a British - planned scheme of confederation. But an interim government formed under this scheme got nowhere because the two parties were at loggerheads. In August 1947 the British quit India. Behind them was an atmosphere of violence and suspicion and the two states of India and Pakistan.

The leaders of the Congress had agreed to the creation of Pakistan not because they had been won to the two-nation theory but because the League and the Muslims had become too much to handle politically. They also may have thought that Pakistan would be such a small, weak state that it would cause India no trouble and even be susceptible to Indian control - an attitude that resulted in Nehru's policy toward Pakistan: friendliness alternating with condescension if not contempt, especially as Pakistanis strove ineffectually to create a stable government and an Islamic state. Pakistan's attitude was that it should have parity with India on the sub-continent in the same way that Muslims had wanted parity with Hindus in India. Pakistan, as I wrote in my last newsletter, has thought of itself as a counterpoise to India.

Seeing itself largely in the mirror of India's existence, its policies have often been negative, as if its national justification lay primarily in being anti-Indian. This attitude appeared in Jinnah's policy toward the Princely States issue before Partition became a fact. And the most important part of the states issue proved to be Kashmir.

The Princely States Issue: Background to Kashmir

There were 562 Princely States in 1947. They ranged in size from the smallest with a few acres of territory and a population of a few thousands to Hyderabad, nearly as big as England, Scotland, and Wales with nearly sixteen million people, and to Jammu and Kashmir, as big but with only four million population. They were feudal principalities ruled by hereditary princes. The British had a treaty relationship with these rulers in which the rulers acknowledge Britain as the 'paramount power' and in return the British allowed the rulers a certain autonomy in the governance of their states. In fact, the rulers were at the beck and call of the British, although they were not without influence because the British wanted to use them as a counter to the nationalist Congress. The question was what would happen to the Princely States on Britain's departure from India. The policy enunciated in the spring of 1946 and elaborated thereafter was that 'paramountcy' could not be transferred to India as the successor government. Paramountcy would therefore lapse and the states would become independent. The ruler could then accede to either India or Pakistan or he could remain independent. This was a highly theoretical proposal, and Lord Mountbatten, then Viceroy and Governor-General, told the Princes that to choose independence would be unwise and that they should accede to either India or Pakistan, whichever was their neighbor. The Congress's view was that for a ruler to remain independent would be dangerous for him -- few of the states would have been viable -- and even more dangerous for India or Pakistan. The Princes, said the Congress, must join either one country or the other. By 15 August 1947, the date of independence, all but three states had acceded, the largest number, by the logic of their location, coming to India and a few going to Pakistan.

Jinnah's position was that the Princely States could accede to either country or they could remain independent, and he even advocated the latter course. In retrospect it seems that although he had a greater regard for the Princes than Nehru did, his main reason was to make trouble for India, to incite the balkanization of the country that Nehru and other leaders so much feared. The first straw in the wind blew by in June 1947 after Partition had been decided upon but before it came into effect. The Maharaja of Travancore, an important state in South India, announced that his state would remain independent. Within two weeks Jinnah and the Maharaja allegedly had agreed to exchange ambassadors, and on 23 June Dawn, the Muslim League newspaper in Karachi printed an editorial entitled "Happy Augury" that said, "It is the decision of a Hindu State...to be the first to establish a friendly relationship with the Dominion of Pakistan." Several days earlier Dawn had said that the Princely States, whether Muslim or Hindu, would have a "more honourable position" as part of Pakistan or as allies of Pakistan than if they joined India. By mid-July, doubtless after being subjected to a good deal of persuasion, the Maharaja of Travancore changed his mind and acceded to India.

The second example was Junagadh, a small state of a group called the Kathiawar States on the West coast of India between Bombay and the Gulf of Kutch. It had a Muslim Nawab and a largely Muslim court, but the population was about 80% Hindu. In April 1947 the Junagadh Government had emphasized its solidarity with the rest of the Kathiawar States and in July the senior minister advised Mountbatten, according to a member of Mountbatten's staff, that he would propose to the Nawab that he accede to India. But in mid-August when the time came to sign on the dotted line, the Nawab announced his accession to Pakistan -- although by then Junagadh was surrounded by states that had acceded to India. This apparent reversal of policy allegedly came about at the instance of Jinnah through a Muslim League politician from Bombay named Bhutto (father of the present Pakistan Foreign Minister) who had been raised from the ranks of the government to be senior minister.

India refused to accept the accession to Pakistan - as Pakistan would refuse to accept Kashmir's to India - and it gave four reasons: because the state was not geographically contiguous to Pakistan, because it believed that a ruler should not alone determine a state's fate (a principle not always

adhered to in other cases), because of the fear that Junagadh's move might produce communal trouble in West India, and because of the possible effect of this precedent on the states of Hyderabad and Kashmir. The Indian Government's attempts to negotiate the issue with Pakistan came to naught even though India offered to abide by the results of a referendum in the state. By late September the situation had become extremely complicated and precarious. Indian troops began to move, and in early November the Junagadh Government, including Bhutto, called for conferences between India and Pakistan to settle the issue. The Government handed over administration of the state to the Indian Government and in February 1948 a referendum was held. To no one's surprise the vote went overwhelmingly in favor of India. Pakistan has never accepted the accession to India, and Pakistan maps continue to show Junagadh as Pakistan territory.

The third case that helped set the stage for the grand conflict over Kashmir was Hyderabad. Hyderabad was the largest Princely State in India and sprawled across the South-central part of the country. Its sixteen million population, 80% of whom were Hindus, were living fairly happily under a Muslim ruler, the Nizam, and a largely Muslim government. In June 1947, several days after the Maharaja of Travancore's announcement, the Nizam also proclaimed that he would remain independent. Jinnah supported his decision. The Nizam even sent a delegation to Delhi to seek Dominion status within the British Commonwealth -- which Mountbatten refused. Long months of negotiation began. By late October 1947 Hyderabad had still not acceded to India but seemed to be on the verge of signing a Standstill Agreement (an agreement that the relationship existing before independence would continue until altered by mutual consent) and a letter containing the substance of accession. But the actions of a fanatical Muslim group, and, allegedly, advice from Karachi, prevented the signing. The tribal invasion of Kashmir began at this time. Jinnah denied that he was advising the Nizam. By the summer of 1948 the situation had worsened: there still was no agreement between the Hyderabad Government and the Government of India; the initiative in the State was passing into the hands of Muslim brigands; and guns were being smuggled by air from Pakistan. A man I knew at Oxford and his family emigrated to Pakistan from Hyderabad on the return flight of one of these planes.

In August the situation seemed to be nearly out of hand, with raids by the Muslim brigands into neighboring states and an alleged alliance between them and Communist bands. In September 1948 the Indian army mounted a 'police action' in the state, took control, and the Nizam finally acceded to India. No referendum was held, although the year before India had expressed its willingness to hold one. To Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, Jinnah's actions in Junagadh and Hyderabad were 'traps and teasings' of India. And it is hard to see, in either the long or the short run, what they accomplished.

Kashmir Becomes an Issue:

In the spring of 1947 the positions that Jinnah and the Muslim League and the Congress held on Kashmir were consistent with their policy towards the other Princely States. Jinnah maintained that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir for short) could accede to either India or Pakistan or remain independent. His strong advice to the Maharaja was to stay independent. The Congress was equally vehement against this. Gandhi and other leaders said that Kashmir must join either one nation or the other. During a four-day visit to Kashmir during July 1947 Mountbatten urged the Maharaja to join India or Pakistan. And he also told the Maharaja, as Mountbatten has himself written, that he had the assurances of the Government of India that it had no objection to Kashmir's acceding to Pakistan. The Maharaja decided to stay in the middle. He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan and offered to sign one with India -- which Delhi for reasons still unknown refused to accept. But by 15 August 1947 he had not acceded to either country.

Fateful as the Maharaja's decision was, and wrong as it now seems to have been, accession to either country was not a simple choice. The Maharaja was in a peculiar predicament. He was a Hindu ruler, the descendent of Gulab Singh who in 1846 had bought the right to rule Kashmir from the British for the sum of seven and a half million rupees and the annual payment of two Kashmir shawls and three handkerchiefs. Yet had the Maharaja joined India his line would have got short shrift. Congress was bent on a national program of social and political reform that meant the end of feudal autocracy and Princely rule. Nehru had personally sided with the reformist groups in Kashmir that opposed the Maharaja, and in 1946 the

Maharaja had jailed Nehru for entering the State to take part in a campaign against him. Had the Maharaja acceded to Pakistan his personal position would have been better, at least temporarily. But he would have lead the state's 800 thousand Hindus into a Muslim nation -- and this at a time when communal killings were going on in North India. Nor would joining Pakistan have pleased the large proportion of Kashmir's Muslims who outnumbered the Hindus three to one in the state as a whole and who comprised 90% of the population of Kashmir Valley. The great majority of Kashmir's Muslims under the immensely popular leadership of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah had rejected the two-nation theory, and the relations of the Sheikh and the other leaders of his National Conference Party with Jinnah and the Muslim League were bad. The position of the Sheikh and the National Conference was that Kashmir must have freedom from the Maharaja and popular government in the state before the people could think of accession to anybody. Moreover, the people of Kashmir (with some exceptions) considered themselves a group apart, and to them joining either India or Pakistan meant an undesirable involvement in India-Pakistan affairs, an eventuality to be avoided if possible. Lastly, the Maharaja may have dreamed of founding a new nation.

But Jinnah didn't wait. Infiltrators from Pakistan began moving into Jammu and Kashmir in late August, according to the chief of staff of the state forces. Pakistani officials denied this. Also in August, according to the Kashmir Government, Pakistan began an economic blockade of Kashmir, preventing essential supplies like sugar and other foods, kerosene and gasoline, cloth and salt from entering the state. (The present Banihal Pass road was then a difficult route and the main road to Kashmir was from the West and Pakistan -- see map.) By October Kashmir was pinched for supplies and the blockade was the subject of a series of telegrams between the Kashmir and Pakistan governments. The Pakistanis admitted that the supplies were not getting through but blamed this on lack of transport and gasoline in Pakistan. The Maharaja's reply was that while the blockade was in force there could be no friendly or fruitful negotiations between the two governments. The situation was complicated by the communal frenzy in North India and by the passage of refugees bound for India and Pakistan across the southern edge of Jammu and Kashmir in the Jammu area. Also, demobilized Muslim soldiers from World War II were returning to their homes in the Poonch area of Kashmir and their relations

with the Hindu Maharaja were not good. A minor revolt apparently broke out in the Poonch area and the Maharaja attempted, sometimes brutally, to suppress it with Hindu Dogra troops. Hindu communal groups may also have attacked Muslims in the Jammu area. Pakistan claimed that many of the Muslims from Pakistan who entered Kashmir at this time did so to aid their co-religionists -- a claim that may have had a small element of truth in it at the moment, but that was later used when it was palpably false. Sheikh Abdullah was released from detention at the end of September, where the Maharaja had placed him for advocating popular government for Kashmir. The Sheikh promptly announced that "our choice for joining the Indian Union or Pakistan will be based on the welfare of four millions of people living in Jammu and Kashmir State." But, he said, even if Kashmir joined Pakistan "we will never believe in the two-nation theory" and the honor of Hindus and Sikhs in the State would be safe. Abdullah even sent an emissary, (G.M. Sadiq, the present Chief Minister of Kashmir) to Jinnah to ask him to respect the will of the people of Kashmir. But the effort, the emissary reported, was "of no use". The Kashmir Government informed Pakistan that if pressures on the state did not cease, it might have to seek "friendly assistance". Pakistan replied that such language showed that Kashmir intended to join India by a "coup d'etat." Two days later Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan invaded Kashmir.

The major attack came up the main road from Pakistan. Before dawn on 22 October 1947 the tribesmen, well armed with modern weapons, entered Muzaffarbad, overwhelmed the state troops, destroyed property, and began an almost systematic campaign of loot and rape. Five days later, having savaged their way up the Chenab gorges, they reached the town of Baramula at the western edge of the Kashmir Valley. Here brutality went beserk: the male population was butchered or fled; women of all religions were herded into a compound and held there for days to provide a common brothel; a hospital was destroyed and many of the foreigners on the staff, including nuns, were killed and their dismembered bodies thrown down a well. For three days the frenzy lasted, and then the raiders started up the road for Srinagar, 30-odd miles away. But those three days had saved Srinagar. Had the invaders gone straight to the capital, there would have been no Indian troops just outside it to halt them. Had they not 'stopped' in Baramula, they would have captured Srinagar with its vital, if tiny, airfield, and the coveted Vale of Kashmir would have been Pakistan's.

The Maharaja made his first appeal to Delhi for help on 24 October, the day that the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army received word that the tribesmen had seized Muzaffarbad. Plans were set in train to fly Indian Army formations to Srinagar. Yet the Indian Government believed that troops could not be sent to an independent Princely State and that if the Maharaja wanted help he must first accede to India. The accession would, however, be temporary. Both the Maharaja, who was by then in Jammu City, and Sheikh Abdullah, who had come to Delhi, agreed to these terms and insisted that troops be dispatched to Kashmir immediately. On 26 October 1947 the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession. Early the next morning Indian forces flew to Srinagar, and later in the day Mountbatten, as Governor-General, accepted the accession, writing to the Maharaja that in accordance with the policy of the Indian Government "as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". Mountbatten added that the Government was pleased that Sheikh Abdullah had been asked to form an interim government. Josef Korbel, in his book Danger in Kashmir, has implied that Kashmir's accession was not a necessary pre-condition for the entry of Indian troops into the state and that this was a device to get Kashmir into India. Korbel may be right, but his argument is thin, in my view, and as he says, there is no documentary evidence to support the point. And in any event, Abdullah, popular leader of the state, supported accession.

After saving Srinagar, the Indian Army moved rapidly to clear the invaders from the Vale of Kashmir. By mid-November Baramula had been liberated and the army was on the heights above Uri. In the hilly and mountainous areas to the Southwest, the West, and the North of the Valley, however, there was a different situation. Here the tribesmen were continuing the invasion and by mid-November their tactics indicated command by army officers. During the winter of 1948, the tribesmen were joined by regular Pakistan Army units for the giant north and eastward flanking movement that captured Kargil in April 1948 and that was beaten back from Leh in July. (See GSA-24). In January 1948, the Daily Telegraph, London, reported that there were 60,000 Pathan tribesmen in the State -- a figure that, if halved, would still indicate the scale of the invasion. The Pakistan Government has always denied complicity in the tribal invasion, but the evidence building up over the years shows beyond doubt that the Muslim League, if not the Government itself, planned and initiated the invasion, and that from its early stages the Government aided and backed the venture,

even placing the invaders under Army command. Later the Pakistanis dropped the mask entirely and the operations in northern and eastern Kashmir, in Baltistan and toward Ladakh, were a full-fledged army offensive.

Conversations and communications between the Indian and Pakistan governments during November and December failed to end the fighting or to prepare the way for a solution. The commitments and positions of the two countries were too contradictory; the sources of the dispute ran too deep. So in January 1948 India, confident that it had a good legal and moral case, took the matter to the United Nations. Nehru believed in the settlement of disputes by negotiation, and as an internationalist and an idealist he placed great faith in the United Nations. He hoped that prompt action by the Security Council would restore peace in the area. But he was out-maneuvered. Pakistan did not confine its reply in the Security Council to the Kashmir issue, but counter-charged that India's principal aim was to destroy Pakistan itself. The cases it cited and the evidence it produced to support this claim were almost entirely spurious, in my view; yet the technique proved brilliantly successful: the waters of the basic issue, Kashmir, were so muddied by the irrelevancy of the counter-charges, skillfully argued by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, that the facts of the Kashmir issue and of the Indian case have since been obscured. The United Nations debate on the Kashmir issue and Pakistan's counter-charges took place in January 1948 and the following months. A United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was set up, and on 13 August 1948 it produced one of the major documents on the issue.

The UNCIP Resolution called on both sides to stop firing. After the cease fire, both sides were to refrain from augmenting the military potential of their forces (organized or unorganized) in Jammu and Kashmir and they were to appeal to their respective peoples to create and maintain an atmosphere favorable to further negotiations. The UNCIP could appoint military observers to supervise the cease fire. The second part of the resolution called on Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the state and to "use its best endeavour" to get the tribesmen-raiders to leave. Areas evacuated by Pakistan troops were to be administered by local authorities under the surveillance of the commission. After the tribesmen and assorted Pakistani nationals in Kashmir had withdrawn from the state and when Pakistani troops were being withdrawn, the Indians were also to

withdraw "the bulk" of their forces. Pending a final settlement, India, in agreement with the commission, could maintain army units for the maintenance of law and order. According to part three of the resolution, the governments of India and Pakistan reaffirmed their wish "that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured". Both nations accepted this resolution with some reservations as to interpretation, and a 17-year long hassle began over its implementation. The cease fire actually came into force on 1 January 1949.

Three Sides of a Stalemate: The Pakistan Side

Pakistan's main claim to Kashmir has been in the name of religion. Pakistan was to be a home for Indian Muslims and it followed that Kashmir, with its predominantly Muslim population and contiguous frontier, should be part of Pakistan. As a Pakistani propaganda pamphlet put it:

> "...the self-determination of Kashmir is an essential commitment, a necessary part of the very establishment of Pakistan itself. Pakistan was brought into being as a result of the self-determination of Muslim majority areas in British India. Kashmir is a Muslim majority area. Unless this area is allowed to decide its future by its own will, Pakistan will be oppressed by a sense of incompleteness and by feeling that her integrity has been mutilated."

Anyone who opposed this 'completion' of Pakistan was at best an enemy or a traitor, and at worst a heretic. By the logic of this argument Kashmir's accession to India had to be the result of a conspiracy. Thus Sheikh Abdullah was a quisling, as the Pakistani leaders publicly called him, because he denied the two-nation theory and the a priori belief that Kashmir must join Pakistan. Thus the continual demand through the years for a plebiscite. "You can hold the plebiscite now or a hundred years from now, and the people will still vote to join Pakistan!

They are Muslims!" So Walter Friedenberg was told in Azad Kashmir in 1956. (WDF-7). But there are contradictions.

Jinnah's wooing of the Maharaja of Travancore and his offer to Hindu Princes to join Pakistan, his power play in Junagadh with its largely Hindu population, and his speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947 (in which he said that in Pakistan Hindus would cease to be Hindus and "Muslims would cease to be Muslims" in the political sense as citizens of the state) indicate a desire for secular power as much as for a Muslim state. And if plebiscite in Kashmir was Pakistan's goal, why the immense attention to the details of 13 August 1948 UN Resolution leading to Pakistan's non-fulfillment of the pre-conditions for a plebiscite? Was this simply fear of being out-maneuvered by India? Or did the Pakistan Government believe that so long as Sheikh Abdullah was popular, Kashmir would never join Pakistan? Did Jinnah believe that the only way to acquire Kashmir was to conquer it - as he nearly did? The evidence, I think, points to this conclusion.

Pakistan's position on Kashmir over the years has been based on another major premise: that Kashmir's accession to India was fraudulent and that, therefore, Kashmir is disputed territory and Pakistan is a party to the dispute. Hence Pakistan has argued that Indian as well as Pakistani forces should withdraw from Kashmir and that a 'neutral' government and forces should maintain order in the state pending and during a plebiscite. There have been few changes in Pakistan's outlook and policy on Kashmir in the last 17 years. The stark simplicity of Pakistan's argument and the government's relentless repetition of it have served Pakistan well. And paradox has given a final assist. Pakistan's only hope of achievement in Kashmir, with the failure of its invasion and the state's accession to India, was to internationalize the issue, to create a dispute and to gain its ends through foreign intervention. India, in possession of Kashmir, and with a sound legal and moral position, had only to sit quiet. Yet Nehru took the matter to the United Nations, in his honesty playing his opponent's game and placing on his own country a burden from which it is far from free.

The Pakistan Government's official attitude toward the invasion of 1947 and the large-scale infiltration of 1965 have been much alike. In 1947 Pakistan at first disclaimed

knowledge of the invasion and later said the tribesmen were going to Kashmir on their own initiative to aid their persecuted co-religionists. In 1965 Pakistan at first claimed that there were no infiltrators and that the disturbances in the Valley were due to the revolt of Kashmiri "freedom fighters." Later President Ayub asked in a radio speech how India could blame individuals from Azad Kashmir or "any part of Pakistan" for joining the Kashmiri people and helping them in their fight for self-determination.

The Indian Side

The Indians totally reject the Pakistan view on Kashmir. Over the years Nehru and the Indian Government have acknowledged that Pakistan has some right to be concerned about Kashmir (an attitude that has almost disappeared under the pressure of recent events), and the Indians have treated with Pakistan over Kashmir because the Pakistanis made themselves (with Indian help) a force in the matter of Kashmir, but Pakistan's claims to and about Kashmir have always been denied. Kashmir's status is not in dispute nor is its territory disputed territory, India holds. Kashmir acceded to India and thus became an integral part of India: "Kashmir acceded legally and constitutionally to the Dominion of India" when the state's freedom was threatened by invaders who "have been helped and are being helped by the Pakistan Government," Sheikh Abdullah told the Security Council on 5 February 1948. Abdullah also rejected the Pakistani suggestion that there be joint Indo-Pakistan control of Kashmir and a joint military force until a plebiscite could be held -- an idea that Pakistan recently revived in a different form, when it suggested that a United Nations force take over in Kashmir. "This is an unusual idea," Abdullah said. "What Pakistan could not achieve through ordinary means, Pakistan wishes to achieve by entering through the back door." In this same speech, Abdullah also supported the position that Pakistan has no 'locus standi', in Kashmir affairs, as the Indians are fond of saying, that Pakistan was merely a bystander -- however deeply interested -- in a dialogue between Srinagar and Delhi. Said Abdullah: "I refuse to accept Pakistan as a party in the affairs of the Jammu and Kashmir state; I refuse this point blank."

The Indian position on the religious aspect of the Kashmir issue consists of several points. In the first place, India holds, no doubt correctly, that the Partition of India on the basis of Muslim majority areas and the future of the Princely States after the departure of the British were separate matters. Therefore there was no moral or legal compulsion on Kashmir to opt for Pakistan on the ground of its predominantly Muslim population. If the Muslims of Kashmir had been supporters of the two-nation theory and had wanted to go to Pakistan, but had been taken into India by the Hindu Maharaja, then India's position would have been weak. Abdullah was, however, as strongly opposed to the two-nation theory (which he said was "responsible for so much of the poison in the country today") as were Gandhi, Nehru, and the Congress. Pakistan's claim to Kashmir on religious grounds was, then, purely Pakistan's. It had no foundation in the arrangements made for the creation of India and Pakistan, or in the sentiments of the people of Kashmir.

In later years India developed another argument to support its claim to Kashmir: that India needed Kashmir as a proof and bulwark of its secularism. It is true that if the people of Kashmir, because they are Muslim, decided that they wanted to go to Pakistan it would damage India's claim to secularism. As Pakistan believes that it must have Kashmir to demonstrate Muslim solidarity and to validate the two-nation theory, so India believes that the willing presence of a Muslim majority area in India (which could feasibly become part of Pakistan, as small Muslim areas deep within India cannot) proves that India is a nation where various religious communities can exist successfully and happily. The Government and Indians in general have also claimed with varying emphasis over the years that to hand over Kashmir to Pakistan for religious reasons would reawaken Hindu suspicion of Muslims, perhaps even leading to communal riots. Some reasonable, secularly minded members of the Government of India today believe that even with the best of intentions (which may not always be present, they add) government in India might not be able to prevent this happening. Sheikh Abdullah and a variety of Kashmiris I have met agree that this is a danger and that 50 million Indian Muslims mustn't be endangered for the sake of two million Muslims in Kashmir. Yet there is an unpleasant smell of blackmail about this argument and the frequent use of it in Parliament and by ministers may have helped to give it more reality than it once had. The

Government also says that any loosening of Kashmir's ties with India might start a chain reaction in the rest of the country, and that other states would demand special status, thus weakening Indian unity. There is no doubt a genuine fear of this, but the likelihood seems to me exaggerated.

India's intention to have Kashmir's accession ratified by the people of Kashmir, as has been seen, was made unilaterally at the time of accession. There can be little doubt that this was done sincerely, and there is sound evidence that as early as November 1947 and several other times before 1953 Nehru insisted on the necessity of honoring this commitment despite Abdullah's pleas that India make accession final. On the other hand, Nehru's holier-than-thou attitude toward Pakistan (particularly in regard to Kashmir) made him wilful and uncooperative in negotiations, which did nothing to improve the chances of a plebiscite. The negotiations with UN Representative, Sir Owen Dixon in 1950 are an example. By mid - 1953, Indian support for a plebiscite was waning, as the Government's actions in Kashmir in August showed - more about this later. Also, Pakistan had no intention of withdrawing its forces from Kashmir, in the Indian view, nor of fulfilling the other pre-conditions for a plebiscite laid down in United Nations resolutions, such as a cessation of propaganda on the Kashmir issue.

But the major reason for India's disenchantment with a plebiscite, say Indians, was American arms aid to Pakistan and later Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. To India this meant not only bringing the cold war to the sub-continent and endangering her policy of non-alignment, it meant the militarization of the Kashmir issue. As Nehru wrote to Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan in December 1953, "It becomes rather absurd to talk of demilitarization (in Kashmir) if Pakistan proceeds in the reverse direction with the help of the United States." Nehru later wrote Mohammed Ali that with Pakistan arming, "We can take no risks now, as we were prepared to take previously, and we must retain full liberty to keep such forces and military equipment in Kashmir state as we may consider necessary in view of this new threat to us." Mohammed Ali replied that he saw no necessary connection with Pakistan's receipt of arms and Kashmir, and he accused India of finding excuses to renege on its promises.

Mohammed Ali was presumably referring, with some justice, to the arrest of Abdullah the previous August and his replacement by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who did not support a plebiscite. In the light of Pakistan's actions in Kashmir in 1947, Nehru's wariness seems not unreasonable, and if he over-reacted to Pakistan's following a policy that displeased him, we must remember that India's sense of humor about Pakistan equals America's about Cuba. We should also remember that at the SEATO meeting in Manila in 1954, Pakistan and other nations rejected John Foster Dulles's initiative to write into the treaty that the organization, and US arms aid under it, be used only for defense against communist aggression and that two months ago Pakistan invaded Jammu with American tanks. There is more than a little justice, I think, in the Indian belief that the United States' insufficiently considered military aid to Pakistan unsettled the politics of the sub-continent and that India has been the prime sufferer. But the shoe doesn't pinch only on the American foot. Today, when Indians lay all their troubles in Kashmir on 'foreign intervention' and particularly on the United States, as they do in personal conversations and editorials, they might think back a little. In 1954 the Indian Government had as little sympathy for what America thought was its responsibility to the world and to democracy as the Americans had of India's fears of Pakistan. And more pertinent, when Indians claim that America should have seen that its 'natural' ally on the sub-continent was secular, democratic India and that it should not have allied with and armed theocratic, autocratic Pakistan, they might also ask themselves why in those same days India didn't pay friendlier attention to secular, democratic America and less to autocratic, theo-communistic Russia and China.

In November 1956 the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly (elected in 1951) for its part made accession final by enacting the state's Constitution. This said that "The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India." In late January 1957 in the United Nations, Krishna Menon, the unloved, said that the offer of plebiscite had been made but not accepted and that such a promise could not forever be held over the heads of the makers. If that statement didn't close the plebiscite issue so far as India was concerned, the following eight years and the Pakistani infiltration of Kashmir in August 1965 did close it. No matter what the future brings to Kashmir, it is safe to say that it won't bring plebiscite.

The Kashmir Side

We speak of Kashmir, yet the proper name of the state is Jammu and Kashmir, indicating that the state has at least two parts. Actually it has several parts and numerous diversities. It is more a hatch-patch than a state, which makes generalizations about it, and about its politics, difficult. No one thing links all the inhabitants of the state, not language, not dress or custom, not geography, not history in any real sense, not even religion (although it comes the closest), for the character of Islam and of Hinduism in the Vale of Kashmir is different than elsewhere in the state and in India.

Here are a few details.

Geography: Kashmir rises from the plains of India. First there is an outer strip of rolling, scrub-covered country running along the frontiers of East and West Punjab (India and Pakistan) approximately from Pathankot westwards and northwards to the latitude of Rawalpindi. (See map.) Then comes a jumble of mountains rising to 11,000 feet. These are generally timbered and the interior valleys are suitable for minor agriculture. These mountains form a crescent whose center is the famous Vale of Kashmir. The Vale is an elongated room: the floor is flat as a floor but has a few bumps in the rug; the walls are the mountains surrounding the Vale and there are doors in each wall. East of the Vale, through the Zoji La and other passes lies Ladakh. Northwards, northeastwards, and northwestwards of the Vale is a jumble of high mountains with a few major valleys that extends to Sinkiang, the USSR, and Afghanistan. Westwards of the Vale is the upper tip of the crescent of smaller mountains mentioned before.

Language: Several languages are spoken in Ladakh, a variety in the mountains north of the Vale, and there are dialects in the other hill areas. The people of the Vale and one or two other regions, primarily Doda and Kishtwar, which adjoin the Valley to the southeast, speak Kashmiri -- a language that has few or any ties with other Indian tongues and that has many 'sz' sounds like Russian or Polish. In the crescent of mountains and the flatter areas near the frontiers of India and Pakistan, the language is Punjabi or Hindustani. The lingua franca of Jammu and Kashmir is Hindustani or a slightly Persianized variant, Urdu. But only some peasants in the Vale and northwards and many fewer in Ladakh can speak it.

Religion: The religions of the state are Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. The Buddhists are almost entirely in Ladakh. Hindus predominate in the region around Jammu city, thinning out rapidly to the West and more slowly to the North, so that in the districts just south of the Vale the proportion of Hindus to Muslims is about even. Hindus constitute about 10% of the population of the Vale. In all other areas and in the Vale, of course, Muslims predominate. The census of 1941 gave the population of the state (then undivided) as 4,021,616, of which 3,101,247 were Muslims and 920,369 were non-Muslims (mostly Hindus). According to the 1961 census, the total population of Jammu and Kashmir (Indian side of the cease fire line) was 3,560,976, of which 2,432,067 were Muslims and 1,013,193 Hindus. Kashmiri Muslims constitute about 75% of the Muslims in the entire state.

Jammu has not been an unimportant part of the state. It was the Maharaja's family's home and the center of power of the Hindu Dogras, and today this community wields much influence in Delhi. There are valuable mineral resources in several districts and geographically the region is a fringe of the Indian plains. But the Vale of Kashmir has always been the psychological center of the state; when people say 'Kashmir', they are usually speaking of the Valley. The Vale has long been a fabled land ("If there is a heaven on earth, it is this, it is this..."), and today it is the prize that India has and Pakistan wants. The Valley itself, the immediately adjacent areas of the valleys that feed into it, and the nearby hills are obviously a geographical entity. In this area the people speak Kashmiri, and they think of themselves as Kashmiris, as a group apart. Perhaps the most notable, certainly the most pleasant, aspect of Kashmiri life is communal amity. The two-nation theory never took root in Kashmir because Kashmiris don't think in such terms. The Muslims may not fear the Hindus because they have a 90% majority, but the Hindus don't fear the Muslims either. A Punjabi Hindu family I know lives on a fruit farm in the middle of the Valley. During many of the tense days of last August the husband was away and the woman lived alone in the house with Kashmiri Muslim servants. Was she afraid? "Not here," she said, "and I know what communal killing can be in the Punjab." Another Punjabi Hindu woman lives in Srinagar -- I mention women especially because they are a sensitive commodity on the sub-continent. During the Sacred Relic Agitation of December 1963, a mob fleeing police firing overran her house. Was she afraid? Only that the children might be trampled; she had no fears for herself. A third Indian lady, a Christian raised in Lahore, now

teaches school in Srinagar. "It was wonderful to come here," she told me, "It's like the old days in Lahore when the city had a mixed culture and Hindus and Muslims lived happily together."

In the Valley today, a Kashmiri Hindu and a Kashmiri Muslim family, both traditional in their outlook, may live in a two-family house, a rare thing in India. Hindus and Muslims frequently share saints and holy places. Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims eat together, also rare in India except among intellectuals. True Kashmiri Hindus are all Brahmins, so the caste system, which causes Indian Muslims to disparage Hindus, does not come between the two communities. Nor are the Kashmiri Hindus, or Pundits, aggressively ethnocentric, as are many Indian Hindus. The Kashmiri Hindu is not a vegetarian and it is wonderful to see him tucking away the duck and mutton at a Muslim marriage feast. Kashmiri Muslims are devout, as the Relic Agitation showed, but they are not fanatical. Their Islam is as different in tone and content from that of North India as Indian Islam is distinct from that in the Middle East. Oppression of various kinds has marked the history of the Valley, but in modern times, except once in 1931, there has never been a communal riot. One day in the India Coffee House in Srinagar, being served by a man from Kerala who said he was a Communist, I sat with Kashmiri friends and acquaintances and listened. One, a relatively senior businessman and a Pundit, believed that the only way to satisfy Kashmiris was to give the state, at least the Valley, autonomy. Another Pundit, a contractor, strongly advocated putting an end to Kashmir's present special status and establishing the relationship with Delhi that other Indian states have. A third Pundit and a young Muslim, both engineers, sat with their arms about one another's shoulders, each ribbing the other unmercifully about his views. The Hindu was mildly for India and the Muslim adamantly in favor of joining Pakistan. A similar scene is unlikely in India. Truly, being a Kashmiri is also a state of mind.

1. The Coming of Abdullah:

In politics this non-communal attitude got its major impetus with the formation of the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah in 1938. Growing out of the Muslim

Conference, formed in 1932 as a result of a small-scale uprising the previous year in demand of social and governmental reforms, the National Conference aimed at rallying "all the progressive forces in the country... to fight for the achievement of responsible government". (We may add that Muslims in the state almost exclusively constituted the peasantry, and quite literally, the downtrodden and that the ruling classes and the landlords were almost exclusively comprised of Hindus. Hence early movements for social change resulted logically in the confrontation of Muslims and Hindus. In 1931 this was briefly violent, but not again.) The movement gained the attention of Gandhi and of Nehru, who visited the state in 1940, and from these leaders and the Congress it drew support for its socialist, non-communal approach. The National Conference's manifesto was a document entitled New Kashmir, published in 1944, which included the principles for a constitution, and an economic plan that provided for a planning commission and the abolition of landlordism. Hindu and Muslim communal groups made attempts to sway politics in the state after 1938, achieving some success in the areas near the Punjab borders. But their effect on the Valley, the stronghold of the National Conference was nil -- or negative: Jinnah was almost chased out of the Valley in 1944 after belittling the Conference's social program and anti-communal policy. The campaign of the National Conference reached its high point in May 1946 when it launched a movement to get the "autocratic Dogra House"to "Quit Kashmir", leaving the people to govern. In reprisal the government banned the National Conference and jailed Abdullah, who was not freed until 29 September 1947. Abdullah's arrest led to uprisings and repression -- a pattern several times repeated in later years. Nehru tried to visit the state in June 1946, but was arrested. In July he was allowed to come and meet Abdullah. The following year Gandhi visited the state. During this period the Muslim Conference under President Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas, not a Kashmiri, but a Jammu Muslim and later leader of Azad Kashmir, opposed the National Conference, saying that it was sabotaging the Pakistan Movement. The Muslim Conference did not cooperate in the Quit Kashmir Movement, but several of its senior leaders were arrested in late 1946 for other activities. And so came the crucial summer of 1947.

Much has been made at various times of what the people of Jammu and Kashmir and especially the Kashmiris have 'wanted'. About the period just before accession several things may be said. Probably few among the peasantry had strong or articulated political desires. They presumably hoped for mild prosperity and otherwise wanted to be left alone. In the areas bordering on the Punjab, the anti-Muslim Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League each had a core of supporters who favored accession to India or to Pakistan. Most of the Jammu Dogras followed the Maharaja, whose proclaimed policy was to remain independent, at least for a while. The Muslim Conference, perhaps following Jinnah's policy of the time, also supported independence, and it claimed that if the Maharaja chose independence and convened a constituent assembly to frame a constitution, he could "rely on the support and the cooperation of the Muslims forming an 80% majority in the state, as represented by their authoritative organization, the Muslim Conference". If this can be taken at its face value, the Muslim Conference itself was admitting that Muslims in the state didn't support accession to Pakistan. The Muslim Conference had some strength in the Valley, largely in one or two sections of Srinagar. It had substantially more among Jammu Muslims and in the largely Muslim districts of Mirpur, Poonch, and Muzaffarbad, although in several areas, particularly Poonch, regional loyalties and local leaders predominated to the detriment of all outside groups. The National Conference also had followers in the latter districts. The Valley was almost solidly behind Abdullah and the National Conference. In sum, sentiment in Jammu and Kashmir in the summer of 1947 favored independence and was apparently neither pro-India nor pro-Pakistan. Then came invasion and accession. The Hindus backed accession to India. So did the National Conference, which meant the Valley and followers in other areas. Some Muslims in the border regions from Jammu to Muzaffarbad doubtless supported Pakistan, but their number may not have exceeded 30% of the population in these areas, according to available evidence. And a leader of the pro-Pakistan group in Srinagar, now in jail, recently told Rawle Knox of the Daily Telegraph, London, that until 1952 India would have won a plebiscite in the state. Accession to India, I think it fair to say, was either acceptable to or popular with a large majority of the persons in Jammu and Kashmir.

2. After Accession:

The eighteen years from accession to the present divides into three periods. Sheikh Abdullah's government lasted until August 1953. Then came Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed as Prime Minister until November 1963. There followed a short interregnum under a man named Shamsuddin. Since February 1964 the Prime Minister has been Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq. But because in Kashmir, too, the more things change the more they are the same, the dethronement of the Maharaja hasn't much changed the pattern of government. Rule has been authoritarian, personal, almost dynastic. Sadiq attempted to change the pattern and for a while liberalised government, but events overtook him. Not only is there again authoritarian rule in Kashmir, but Sadiq himself, (whose title by a constitutional change has been reduced to Chief Minister), has become merely a pro-consul for the Government of India, the real force behind the Kashmir Government today.

Abdullah began his career as Prime Minister with a great deal of personal popularity. He initiated programs of reform such as land redistribution and democratization of recruitment into government service. He carried forward the National Conference's secular ideal and he preserved the state's relatively autonomous status vis-a-vis the Federal Government in New Delhi. On accession, Kashmir, like the other Princely States, had relinquished to New Delhi its authority over Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications, retaining control over other aspects of government. The so-called Delhi Agreement of 1952 formalized this arrangement and somewhat elaborated it. Under the agreement, for example, the state regulated citizenship qualifications, which resulted, generally speaking, in preventing Indians from owning property in Kashmir. The Indian Supreme Court had little jurisdiction in Kashmir, and the Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitution did not apply -- which meant that land was expropriated without compensation during the land reform program and that persons could be detained (as Abdullah later was) for years without trial. The Federal Government could intervene in the state's affairs only on request -- whereas it could intervene in other states anytime it wished.

Yet despite these achievements, Abdullah's popularity was seriously waning by late 1952. Evidently there were a number of reasons. In the process of democratizing government, Abdullah gave jobs to workers and members of the National Conference whose party loyalty was greater than their efficiency, thus lessening the government's effectiveness until it suffered by comparison to the Maharaja's administration. Abdullah was also tough. He either jailed his pro-Pakistan opponents or exiled them to Pakistan. Others who opposed him for various reasons reportedly risked prison, brutality, or other retribution. The leaders and their thugs and the police have always had a long arm in Kashmir - as elsewhere in India. The effect of these actions, like a stone tossed in a pool, was an ever widening circle of alienation.

An affair in Jammu increased Abdullah's isolation. A Hindu political party of Jammu, the Praja Parishad, challenged Abdullah's entire position. It charged, for example, that he had ignored the people's fundamental rights and ruled by totalitarian methods -- which to some extent was probably true. But it also bemoaned the passing of Hindu domination and charged that Abdullah was trying to 'muslimize' the state, meaning, as the Parishad's propaganda showed, that Muslims were finally getting important positions in government and that reform legislation and new economic opportunity were benefitting Muslims. Moreover, the Parishad advocated the state's total integration into India. Against Nehru's opposition, but with the help and encouragement of Hindu communal groups in India, the Parishad launched an agitation in November 1952. Abdullah's government suppressed it. Events took a nasty turn, culminating in the spring with the arrest and death in prison (from a heart attack) of an Indian communal leader (S.P. Mookerjee, President of the Jan Sangh) who had come to Kashmir. This caused serious repercussions in India and made Abdullah important enemies in Delhi as well as eliminating whatever vestiges of support he may have had among Jammu Hindus.

Abdullah's difficult political situation was compounded by the uncertain position of the state. Although Kashmir was a part of India, a plebiscite had been agreed

upon. Pakistan's incessant claims to the state were apparently causing unease among the population -- and this sentiment no doubt fed on local dissatisfaction with Abdullah. Abdullah recognized the danger of this uncertainty and publicly advocated continued accession to India instead of taking up the other choices, Pakistan or independence. He stated this view forcibly in his speech opening the state's Constituent Assembly in November 1951. And privately, I have been reliably informed, he tried to get Nehru to break the commitment to plebiscite and to make accession final.

Nehru refused. Uncertainty and alienation grew. Personally Abdullah, by all accounts a vain man, must have been wounded by his declining popularity. Abdullah, too, according to his speeches, greatly feared the growth of Hindu communalism in India and its ultimate effect on the security of the Muslims of Kashmir - an apprehension that the Jammu affair must have greatly reinforced. Perhaps in part because of this fear, perhaps in an attempt to regain his prestige, Abdullah allegedly began to advocate Kashmir's independence and to denounce his previous, pro-Indian position. The state Cabinet split, reportedly with encouragement from Delhi, and in August 1953 Abdullah, almost wholly isolated, was arrested. This, according to the more restrained accounts, produced serious upheaval and rioting. To much of the populace, Abdullah was still great, especially as a martyr. At least 40 persons were killed by police firing and hundreds were arrested. Abdullah remained in jail, except for a few months reprieve, until April 1964. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, a longtime associate in the National Conference and Abdullah's deputy until his arrest(and to whom the arrest may have been no surprise), became Prime Minister. Nehru always pleaded innocent of connivance in the palace coup. He told the Pakistan Prime Minister that Kashmir was autonomous and that the Indian Government couldn't meddle in its affairs. But there can be little doubt that he knew what was going on and did nothing to prevent it. This was one of several moral somersaults that Nehru performed on Kashmir.

Bakshi established his dynasty on the foundation of Kashmir's closer association with India. In 1954 he said that accession should be irrevocable, and in the same year a Presidential order increased the powers of the Indian Parliament in Kashmir. In 1956 the state Constituent Assembly declared Kashmir was and should remain an "integral part" of India, and the state Constitution was significantly inaugurated on Indian Republic Day, 26 January, 1957. There was irony in this denouement. The Assembly had been elected in 1951 under Abdullah's watchful eye. Seventy-three of its 75 members were National Conference candidates who had been elected unopposed. Opposition parties had cried "fraud" and "farce." Abdullah as much as told this claque to approve the state's accession to India. But in 1956 Abdullah, in jail, claimed that an Assembly decision taken without his presence was invalid. And there can be little doubt that the Assembly was by then in Bakshi's grip. In 1960 another Presidential order extended the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court to Kashmir and the power of the Federal Election Commission. In 1963 Bakshi proposed other, superficially minor, but of psychological importance, diminutions of the state's special status.

Bakshi's regime was also marked by thoroughness. He was a master politician. He extracted huge sums from New Delhi in the name of keeping Kashmir quiet. Much of the money went to subsidize food prices and toward economic development so that the state made good economic progress. There was enough money left, according to charges now officially pending against him, for Bakshi to line his own pockets and those of his family. And there was enough left from this to bribe most of the opposition. Those who wouldn't be won by bribery or patronage or the glad hand were beaten up or jailed. For ten years Kashmir heard hardly a whimper of protest. But the family went too far. Bakshi's brother, Rashid, acquired a reputation for limitless corruption and as a vicious torturer of imprisoned opponents. Bakshi began equating loyalty to himself with loyalty to India, thus alienating many persons and by definition making the regime's enemies the enemies of India. At the end Bakshi was getting too big for Delhi to handle. "Bakshi's regime hurt us more in Kashmir than anything else," a very senior Government of India official said to me recently. All this Nehru must have known, and to reassert his Government's authority and perhaps in an accumulated agony of liberal conscience, he eased Bakshi out of office in November 1963.

The day after Christmas 1963, with snow on the streets and the city shivering with cold, Srinagar exploded into massive agitation, the greatest demonstration of public sentiment it had ever seen, even greater than after Abdullah's arrest. The Kashmir of today, the Kashmir of Sikh policemen and soldiers with sten guns on their knees was being born.

3. Lessons of the Relic:

For several days hundreds of thousands of people flowed slowly through the streets as inevitably as lava. They camped on the sidewalks and on traffic circles. Women controlled one area and an important intersection -- a remarkable occurence in an Asian society. Every shop in the city closed, except the few that provided food for the demonstrators. Two cinemas owned by the Bakshi family and several cars were burned (Bakshi's brother barely escaped from one), and other damage was done, but the mob was generally peaceful, due to the efforts of opposition leaders. Had it run amuck nothing could have stopped it. "There was a total breakdown of civil government," a senior official told me. Theimmediate cause for this outburst of feeling: a Sacred Relic, a hair of the Prophet Mohammed had disappeared from the Valley's principal mosque, Hazratbal, just outside the city. The Bakshi family had stolen it, according to popular belief, in order to create a situation in which it could displace Prime Minister Shamsuddin and regain power. On the surface, the whole affair was anti-Bakshi. Hindus marched beside Muslims to protest the sacrilege and to protest against corruption and repression. But because Bakshi had been Delhi's dictator, the crowds were also protesting against Indian rule. To those who would see, the Relic Agitation showed that the Kashmiris' years of silence didn't mean that they liked India -- neither did it show that they wanted to secede to Pakistan; no one shouted pro-Pakistan slogans during the Agitation. The agitation showed that years of uncertainty, of Pakistan's propaganda, of being treated as India's vassals, had weakened and almost destroyed the Kashmiris' original allegiance to India. The agitation showed that so far as India was concerned, Kashmir was still a 'problem'.

In the months that followed the Indian Government tried a fresh approach in Kashmir. With the Relic returned to Hazratbal on 4 January, as mysteriously as it had disappeared,

apparently in part due to the presence in Srinagar of the Indian Minister without Portfolio, Lal Bahadur Shastri, negotiations began to form a government in Srinagar more acceptable to the people of the state. On 28 February 1964 the Shamsuddin interregnum ended and Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq became Prime Minister. Sadiq was a socialist intellectual and, it was generally agreed, honest. Analyses of him at the time varied. Some said he was too nice for the job; others that he had a soft exterior but a steel core and would be willing to hold Kashmir for India at any cost -- the prevalent assessment today. Certainly he had a long record as an integrationist. He had also been with Abdullah in the National Conference in the thirties, and he had been in and out of the Kashmir Government, most recently as Minister of Education.

Sadiq soon began to liberalize the Government. The press and public speech became freer than in years. Sadiq brought the police under control and stopped extra-governmental rule by goondas (thugs). He did a great deal to clean up the administration. In later months he eased restrictions on visas for Pakistanis wishing to visit Kashmir and there was serious talk of easing travel across the Cease Fire Line -- hitherto virtually closed. Evidently wanting to begin with a clean slate and believing that the trial of Abdullah for treason that had begun two years before(farcical, by all reports) was hurting India abroad, he stopped the trial and released Abdullah from jail in early April.

The great 'thaw' in the Kashmir situation and in India-Pakistan relations was under way. Abdullah returned to the people of the state, receiving gigantic welcomes. He talked in moderate terms, but said, according to the newspapers, that accession was provisional and that Kashmir was an international dispute. He also seemed to be talking of solving the issue without a plebiscite and said that all parties must be satisfied by the solution. At the end of April he came to Delhi for a tearful reunion with Nehru and talks that he claimed were encouraging. During the last week of May Abdullah went to Pakistan. Great crowds received him and reports said that the Pakistanis believed he would deliver Kashmir to them. He met President Ayub and apparently arranged for Ayub to come to India to meet Nehru and President Radhakrishnan.

In public speeches he said that India-Pakistan amity could not be achieved unless the Kashmir dispute was resolved, and he added that any plan for Kashmir must "not weaken the progressive and secular forces in India and jeopardize the future of 60 million Indian Muslims" -- a courageous statement to make in Pakistan and in the context of the times. But on 27 May the sun went behind the clouds and the thaw ended: Nehru died.

The warmth of the thaw, however, had started political ferment in Srinagar. Taking advantage of the Sadiq-induced atmosphere of freedom, the Abdullah moderates and the pro-Pakistan group, whose leader was of a family long unfriendly with the Sheikh's, bickered and even fought in the streets. Bakshi, out of office but still powerful, finally politicked himself into jail. The Legislative Assembly was prorogued. The public security situation in the city and district towns worsened, and police imported from India became increasingly evident. The experiment in liberalization wasn't working because it coincided with a period of public discontent, and the Sadiq Government began to tighten up. Then in December 1964 and January 1965, after months of rumors, came two important events: the National Conference -- the grand old party of the Kashmir freedom movement -- was abolished, and the Indian Government was empowered to take over the Kashmir Government in case of emergency -- a power it had long had in regard to the other states of India but not in Kashmir. The National Conference was not being destroyed, it was said, only 'merged' in the Congress. But to many Kashmiris that was just as bad (or worse) because the advent of the Congress meant Indian domination. So did the possibility of Federal takeover of the Government or "President's Rule", especially as this had long been the demand of Hindu communalists in India. Little of Kashmir's special status remained.

Abdullah and other opposition leaders protested both these decisions. Abdullah called for a social boycott of all National Conference members who joined the Congress. This meant that their jemadars were not to clean their houses, or dhobis to wash their clothes, or barbers to cut their hair. There were reports that mullahs had been asked not to perform marriages for these 'renegades.' The boycott caused fresh disturbances throughout the Valley, and security measures were tightened up further. In mid-February Abdullah

left for a trip abroad and to go on the Haj pilgrimage. Within a few weeks of his departure the Government had arrested 165 leaders and members of opposition political groups under the Defence of India Rules, according to press reports. Talk against Abdullah mounted in India, particularly because of several indiscreet statements made abroad and because he met Chou En-lai. Some of the adverse publicity from the trip might have been avoided had the Ministry of External Affairs not boggled the travel arrangements. Abdullah returned to India on 8 May, to be summarily arrested and sent to South India. Repercussions in Kashmir took place as expected. There were demonstrations and police action. One hundred persons were arrested and four killed by police firing, according to official accounts -- which usually means that the figures were higher. The Government again tightened security; less news was allowed out of Srinagar; more police came. The opposition then forswore any activity that might lead to violence and during the summer small groups regularly courted arrest in a satyagraha for Abdullah's release.

The paradox was maturing. The Government of India -- reversing its policy of laissez faire of the Bakshi days that had allowed such oppression of the Kashmiris and had so alienated their loyalty -- intervened to install the honest, liberal Sadiq Government. The liberalization permitted the easy expression of the alienation that had come about over the years and the Sadiq Government - the Indian Government standing behind it with police -- had to become illiberal to preserve itself, thereby bringing the Government of India further into disrepute. India was damned if it did and damned if it didn't. And another thing. The Kashmiris crave certainty; the indeterminate position of their state unsettles them. Certainty would mean peace of mind and, because of the all-important tourist trade, money in the pocket. During Bakshi's reign they had certainty: dissent meant retribution. There is even a tendency now to look back on the Bakshi days as a golden age of peace. Yet the freedom from Bakshi's oppression that the Kashmiris sought brought them uncertainty. Wild hopes of joining Pakistan or of glorious Himalayan Independence tantalized them. When liberalization ended, all this was

dashed to the ground. But was all hope lost? What would happen next? Uncertainty had been compounded.

The Government of Pakistan must have seen that constitutional and other changes were drawing Kashmir ever closer to India, and that its chances of getting Kashmir were less each day. Ayub is said to have considered this integration a betrayal because during his meetings with Shastri in December 1964 he had got the impression that Shastri would go slow on Kashmir. The Pakistan Government also knew, according to some analysts here, that the doubling of India's military strength -- promised by the Indian Government after the 1962 Chinese attack -- was within a year of realization. Thus, the argument runs, the Pakistanis saw 1965 as now or never in Kashmir. The uncertainty and turmoil in Kashmir could only have supported any tendency in Pakistan to take decisive action about Kashmir, particularly since the Pakistanis continued to presume that Kashmiris were strongly pro-Pakistan simply because they were Muslims. The time appeared ripe.

Pakistan, it now seems, has for several years been training and armying men to be sent into Kashmir as infiltrators. This spring the training program was expanded and quickened. One Razakar, or irregular, that I met in September in a hill village a few minutes after he surrendered said that he had been recruited a year earlier and given guerilla training by Pakistan Army officers. He had been paid a low monthly wage. In June his training was speeded up and beginning with July his pay was nearly tripled. According to the Indians, infiltrators became more active in May. The major push, as the world now knows, came in late July and early August, to be discovered by a herdsman on 5 August and reported to the Kashmir Government. The number of infiltrators, according to the official Indian estimate, varies from 5000 to 7000. Reliable individuals in Kashmir have told me that it was many more. The five principal infiltration routes seem to have been aimed at Srinagar, and a few infiltrators almost certainly reached the city itself. There was a skirmish in one suburb of the city and in a village a few miles away near an Indian Army gasoline dump. Incidents took place throughout the Valley, and the Indian Government claims to have killed over 1000 raiders and captured over 100.

By mid-October the Valley had been cleared of raiders, according to the Government, but officials would admit privately that small to medium-size groups had dug in at various places in the mountains. A fairly large group was said to be entrenched just west of the Pir Panjal Pass. The coming winter will not be easy on the raiders remaining, but chances are the weather will not drive them home, officials believe. Some of their supply lines from Pakistan are still open -- the country is so rough that is next to impossible to prevent all traffic. And Pakistan may send reinforcements. Although the situation seems to be in control, it is still a headache for the Kashmir and Indian Governments and could again develop into a more substantial pain.

The chain reaction sparked off by Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir is no longer news. To close one major and several minor infiltration routes and to capture a vital staging area for the invaders, the Indians attacked and took the mountainous area between Uri and Poonch where the Cease Fire Line bulged eastwards toward the well-known resort of Gulmarg. In reply to this the Pakistanis attacked across the Cease Fire Line and the international boundary into Jammu, hoping to cut the road between Jammu city and Poonch at Akhnur, [redacted] thus nullifying Indian gains above Poonch. Had the Pakistanis succeeded in this, they would quite probably have struck at Jammu and the main road connecting Srinagar with India. The Indian Army did not choose to hold the Pakistani attack threatening Akhnur for two reasons, I am told. In the first place the Akhnur bridge wasn't strong enough to bear the tanks needed to stop the American-aid Pattons used by the Pakistanis and a Bailey bridge would have had to be built. But more important, to have committed Indian armor on the northwest side of the Chenab would have left the southeast bank too lightly guarded against a strike from Sialkot directly at Jammu. This was a risk the Indians believed they could not take. The alternative to great risk, and perhaps to the loss of Kashmir, according to Indian tacticians, was to attack where India could use its own armor effectively. This it did, striking at Sialkot to threaten the rear of the Pakistan forces in Jammu and to cut North-South communications in Pakistan. The Indians also attacked North and South of Lahore. Twenty-two days after the Pakistanis moved on

Akhnur, the two countries agreed to a cease fire. Pakistan had failed to take Kashmir by force for the second time. And although it had also failed to get Kashmir by means short of war and by diplomacy in the years from 1948 to 1965, it turned to diplomacy again in a last desperate hope. The scene shifted from the battlefields of the Pakistan Punjab to the United Nations. But let us return to Kashmir.

4. What the People Think:

Opinion in Kashmir about the state's present and future varies from region to region and somewhat according to religion. The Hindus of the Valley are pro-India, but often mildly so. The large Hindu population of greater Jammu and, generally speaking, Hindus outside the Valley are strongly pro-India and would like to be integrated fully into the Indian federation. This is neither a change nor a surprise. The Muslims on the Indian side of the Cease Fire Line in the crescent reaching from Jammu city to Uri seem to have a greater range of opinion. Some are pro-India, I am told, more are fence-sitters, and some -- especially near Rajouri in Poonch district -- are pro-Pakistan. But the prevailing feeling is one of disillusion and hurt: they were involved in a war not of their own making -- the Kashmiris, over whom the war was fought suffered hardly at all — and no matter who they sided with somebody shot at them. The Muslim population of the crescent is approximately 424,000 and the Hindu population 831,000 -- Jammu district having an eight to one Hindu majority and Poonch district having almost a five to one Muslim majority. In the interior hill area more or less between the crescent and the Valley, called Doda or Kishtwar district, the Hindus (93,000) side pretty much with those of Jammu, and the Muslims (174,000) tend toward the attitudes held north over the hills in the Valley, except that they are probably more pro-Indian. Seventy per cent of the people in Doda speak Kashmiri.

This brings us to the Valley, the heart of both Kashmir and the Kashmir issue, with 89,000 Hindus and 1,700,000 Muslims, nearly all speaking Kashmiri. Trying to find out what a Kashmiri thinks is somewhat a guessing game. He talks politics as he sells a shawl, asking more

than he expects to get. Or if he is feeling really devil-may-care, he tells you the first thing that comes into his head just to see the reaction. Maybe he'll look at you woefully and say, "What do we know?" or "What can I say?" Friends may be frank, but even friends... Whatever reply the Kashmiri gives, he will, like Mahbub Ali, muddy the well of inquiry with the stick of precaution. For the Kashmiri has had centuries of practice in keeping his thoughts to himself. And from all appearances he believes that now is a good time to exercise his talents. The Kashmiri also dines on rumor and sups on exaggeration. But even in the resulting confusion, it is possible to learn something about what the people think.

During the purchase of cigarettes at a stall across from U.N. Observer headquarters one morning late in August, I asked the bland-faced proprietor what he thought about the infiltrators. "What infiltrators?," he said. "We haven't seen any here; the Government's just making it up." Changing his tack a little he went on, "And if there were any they were Kashmiris who have come to liberate us from the Indians." A little old guy, oak brown and with the typical skull cap, who had been crouching quietly at the edge of the stall, chipped in: "Infiltrators did come. They were Punjabi types and all that is bad for Kashmir; they'll just cause us trouble. Why don't they stay away?" There, in rough sum, is the Valley's mixed reaction to the infiltrators. For many Kashmiris, particularly in more politically conscious Srinagar, the infiltrators were liberators. For a larger number, particularly peasants, the infiltrators were outsiders who ruffled the calm of their lives with danger and possible violence. In themselves the infiltrators might be dangerous (although their manners seem to have been good: they bought food from villagers and didn't molest women and behaved in general as benefactors), and they would certainly attract the police and the army. Sometimes peasants harbored or fed infiltrators or otherwise helped them; more often they gave them away to the police. This was partly out of fear of police retribution if they didn't, and partly because they didn't want to become involved. They mostly wanted to be let alone to get on with vastly more important business: raising enough food to live.

Politically, I think this attitude means not that the peasant is a supporter of the present state government, or that the is pro-India, but that he likes his present government better than the risk involved in changing it. And when the infiltrators got help or sympathy (as they did from many in Srinagar), the sentiment behind it was about equally anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani. As an opposition leader said, "Those who helped the infiltrators took the short view: get rid of India and think about the future afterwards."

The coming (and going) of the infiltrators to some extent weakened Pakistan's position among Kashmiris -- speaking of the period before 1 September. Pakistan, so near, had tried to capture the Valley and had failed, was the verdict of some Kashmiris, and when the infiltrators were in difficulty, the Pakistan Army did not come to their rescue. (This view changed somewhat after Pakistan's September first attack in Jammu, as we shall see later.) Another view that I heard, as did other observers, was that the infiltration was an attempt by Pakistan to take over Kashmir rather than simply to liberate the people from Indian domination. This came even from individuals who were pro-Pakistan, but who, it seems, wanted Kashmir to join Pakistan by its own choice. "Do you suppose that Pakistan is going to come here and then hold a plebiscite?," exclaimed a senior opposition leader to me. Moreover, Pakistan was trying to take Kashmir by violence, and the Kashmiri doesn't really like violence even when he may have sympathy for its goal. Several important opposition figures also feared for their own position. The Pakistan Government, if it dominated Kashmir, would dislike their fence-sitting, basically pro-Kashmiri views as much as the Indians do now. So far as any definitive change of opinion is concerned, the infiltration seems to have left the peasantry largely untouched.

India seems to have gained one plus and one minus from the infiltration. The plus was its success: the army, the police, and civil control were stronger than the infiltrators. The minus is the widely held belief that the army and police committed 'atrocities' against the civil population during anti-infiltrator operations. The atrocities charged: wanton burning of villages, loot, and rape.

I do not know what the truth is, although I've tried to find out. But as a result of enquiries, this is my opinion: Widespread loot and rape did not take place. Occasional rape is possible but I found no evidence to support this, and I did find evidence to refute several stories. Small-scale theft is also possible. That villages and parts of villages have been burned during the search for infiltrators every one knows and the army admits. The army claims, however, that these fires were started by the infiltrators themselves or began as a result of shooting frays between the army and infiltrators. I think that most of the fires took place as a result of action against the infiltrators, either as a result of firing, or when a house was set on fire to drive out infiltrators. These fires might easily have spread; Kashmiri villages are tinderboxes. Under these conditions, fire is hardly selective as a means of warfare. In British times in India, it was a recognized, although not frequently used technique, to burn a village as a form of intimidation. The Indian Army took over much of the British 'War Book,' and so this may have happened in Kashmir, and I suspect that once or twice it did. On the night of 14-15 August 900 houses in a suburb of Srinagar called Batmaloo burned down. The Jammu and Kashmir Government says infiltrators started the fire. It cites as conclusive evidence an article published in a local newspaper on the thirteenth giving the news of the fire (the editor claims a misprint) and the news broadcasts on Pakistan radio on the fifteenth claiming that 'warriors of Islam' had burnt buildings in the area where the fire actually took place. I side with the government against locals who claim to have seen the army start the fires and who claim that the shooting was between overexcited army and police units — but I can't shake a few nagging doubts. Morally, the Indians -- the army and most of the police involved were Indian -- must for their own sake be concerned with the truth or untruth of these reports. Politically, it doesn't make much difference because Kashmiris already believe them and nothing is going to change their minds.

The war carried towards their conclusion trends made clear by the infiltration. The Kashmir Government's policy has narrowed and toughened since 1 September and especially in response to events in the state after the

the 23 September cease fire. The great mass of people who were not sympathetic to the Government have moved yet further away from it. A small group within the mass is now trying to give it militancy, but the general mood, I think, is one of quiet, resentful opposition. The immediate reaction to the outcome of the war has been favorable to India, but not so much as Delhi believes. India's showing in the war convinced Kashmiris that India had military power, but more impressive was that India used it. "In Nehru's day we never knew if India would fight," I heard people say. The sobering effect of India's near-victory over Pakistan is said to have been especially great on those higher-ranking civil servants in the Kashmir Government who have been anti-India if not pro-Pakistan. Yet not everyone thinks well of India's performance; many think that Pakistan won the war. "Look at Indian tank losses," they say. Or, "Why didn't the Indians take Lahore?" Persons with such views, and many others who see that Pakistan has again succeeded making Kashmir an issue of international importance, believe that India gained little from the war. And if India gained little, Kashmir gained nothing, they believe. They are frustrated by the return to uncertainty, to political limbo. "Neither violence nor diplomacy has solved the Kashmir issue," they say, "and we're no better off than before."

The dominant attitude in Kashmir is disaffection. The evidence is everywhere. An inspector of Kashmir police looked out of the corners of his eyes at an imported, turbanned Sikh policeman and muttered to me, "Indian dogs". A member of the state legislature, eminent in the Kashmiri Hindu community and a strong government supporter, claimed that the Sadiq Government was reasonably popular, but he admitted that many minds had been "poisoned by Pakistani propaganda". (And my intuition tells me that he didn't believe his original claim.) Two officials of the state government, whose reliability in this regard is virtually unchallengeable, told me that the government was not popular, and one said that a maximum of 10% of the Valley supported it. A former state cabinet minister, considered loyal to India, said (as an afterthought, almost to himself, as I was leaving from my interview), "We may not be in the majority, but our cause is just." An even more senior person in the present government said, "With or without popular support, this government will keep on." On trips into the countryside, sitting on the banks of irrigation canals smoking and talking with peasants, I

never heard praise for the government or even mild support. The common, peasant suspicion of strangers and of any government doesn't account for this negativism. After an hour of talk about crops, taxes, and local conditions, the conversation might go like this:

"What do you want for Kashmir?" I would ask.

"Freedom," would be the answer.

"What is freedom?"

"Freedom to govern ourselves."

"What does that mean?"

"No India, no Pakistan. We will govern ourselves."

"Who will be your leader?"

"Abdullah. Sheikhsahib is a great man."

Some of the group (there was always a group, which was both a help and a hindrance; a private conversation was almost impossible) would say they wanted Pakistan. When I asked what is Pakistan, their answers showed that Pakistan was a glorious dream of no fixed content -- emerald green grass on the other side of the fence. In Srinagar the disaffection is more obvious. Leaving aside what one is told, there are the police. The number of police and army patrolling the city aren't primarily for any infiltrators remaining or for the few genuine Pakistani agents. They are there to hold down a restive population. The strong arm and hot iron of Bakshi Rashid have been replaced by the bayonet and sten gun of the Punjab policeman.

The peasant in Asia has for centuries been suspicious of government. And the disaffection in the countryside of the Valley must also be seen in this light. The peasant, I suspect, wouldn't be truly happy with any government this side of paradise. Even Abdullah had his troubles in earlier days. Moreover, disaffection in the countryside doesn't mean the opposite: that the peasant is

strongly pro-Pakistan. He thinks, perhaps dreams, of Pakistan as a 'good' as opposed to the 'bad' of Indian domination. When cross-questioned closely, few pro-Pakistanis would hold their ground. They would return to safer territory, some kind of 'self government' for Kashmir. And among articulate city-folk there is fear of domination by Pakistan. The Kashmiri Muslim as well as Hindu has felt the hard hand of the Punjab Muslim before, and I very much doubt that he wants to feel it again.

Yet there is throughout the Valley an enormous sentimental attraction toward Pakistan and to the land and cities that were India but are now Pakistan. To the Kashmiri Muslim there is the fellowship of Islam, despite the distinct differences between the two brands of religion. More important is a traditional affinity born of travel and commerce. The main route, almost the only route, out of the Valley until 1947 was the road to Rawalpindi. Persons who could afford it went by this road to spend their vacations in Pindi and Lahore. Many travelled it on affairs great and small. The Valley's commerce went up and down it. But since 1947 this road has been closed. Kashmiris still talk of those days. They talk of 'Pindi salt' - then and now thought to have special dietary value and to be especially tasty. (To the Kashmiri who puts salt in his tea, this is not a small matter.) The Kashmiri, cut off from this route, lives in a queer psychological isolation. It would satisfy one of his great longings if it were open again. The route is no longer essential to heavy trade and commerce now that the Banihal road is good, but Srinagar businessmen I met would like to have it open as an alternative route, and one much less liable to be closed by winter snows. Pro-Pakistan feeling is stronger in Srinagar than elsewhere in the Valley. Two or three Mohallas (quarters) of the city provide the hard core of sympathizers. Several religious leaders have long been pro-Pakistan and certain non-religious intellectuals are said to be using these leaders as a screen for their activities. Among lower-ranking civil servants, pro-Pakistan sentiment is very strong, I've been told, and several senior officials and prominent families have told or implied such views to me The members of a family are frequently not united in their politics, however. Certainly there is a great deal of pro-Pakistani talk in Srinagar, and all of it cannot be written off as a bargaining position or as exaggeration. "Although the rest of the Valley is

pro-India, Srinagar is pro-Pakistan," said one of the officials of 'unchallengeable' honesty previously quoted. Whether or not this is true, Srinagar wields a disproportionate influence in Kashmiri politics. It is the tail that wags the dog of the Valley. Lately the tail has managed only an occasional twitch and so the body lies still.

The war may not have increased the number of individuals in the Valley who were pro-Pakistan, but it has apparently made existing anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani feeling stronger. (One hesitates to use words like crystalization and polarization as too definite and final in their connotation for use with the malleable, not-so-definite Kashmiri.) Yet the war did cause one important development: it separated the popular leaders, who were moderates, from many of their supporters, who wanted to become more militant. Now even these moderate leaders are in jail and the opposition in Srinagar (and the rest of the Valley) is leaderless. The principal anti-Government figures at large in Srinagar till recently were Maulana Mohammed Masoodi, leader of the most powerful opposition party, the Plebiscite Front, a gentle man who looks like a kindly Svengali; Mohieddin Karra, founder in 1953 in opposition to Abdullah of the Kashmir Political Conference and still president of it, a quick talking lawyer and somewhat a rabble-rouser in manner; and Maulvi Farook, president of the Awami Action Committee. Farook is an engaging young man in his early twenties, very much under the influence of his advisers, and a member of a prominent religious family and himself head preacher (a hereditary post) of Jama Masjid, Srinagar city's principal mosque. The two senior opposition leaders of course have been in jail since May, Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg, a brilliant lawyer and political strategist often described as Abdullah's evil genius. Beg was arrested with Abdullah in 1953, and during a brief holiday from jail in 1954 he founded the Plebiscite Front in opposition to the National Conference, then in the hands of Bakshi. When Abdullah was released from jail in April 1964 he associated himself with the Front, much to the dismay of young Farook, who hoped that Abdullah would join the Holy Relic Action Committee. The Action Committee sprang up in December 1963 when the Relic was stolen and was very popular. Farook was its first

chairman. It lost some of its raison d'etre when the Relic was returned, but nevertheless for several months remained the most important opposition organization. Later it fell on evil days. Farook didn't get on well with the other members and was expelled in June 1964. And most important, Abdullah's reappearance eclipsed all other leaders. The Relic Committee is now called the Kashmir Action Committee and is an omnibus organization of six Muslim religious and social organizations, plus the Plebiscite Front, the Political Conference, and the Awami Action Committee. It has some political significance, but does not rival the popularity of the major parties. The Plebiscite Front, oddly enough, stands for plebiscite. The meaning of plebiscite is another matter. Afzal Beg is said to be pro-Pakistan. Sheikh Abdullah has never been pro-Pakistan and few consider him to be now, but few can honestly claim to know his mind. Masoodi, according to reliable observers, and I agree, is not pro-Pakistan but pro-Kashmir, and he believes that the Kashmiri people and leaders like himself would get short shrift from Pakistan should it take over Kashmir. Karra is widely believed to be pro-Pakistan and rumor says that he has accepted sizable gifts of money from the Pak Government. Two very reliable persons have told me that Karra is pro-Pakistan, "but he wants a Gandhian Pakistan". I don't know what this means but I'm pretty sure he'll never find it. For this reason and others, I suspect that Karra is nowhere near so pro-Pakistan as he sounds -- a view held by several officials of the Kashmir Government. Farook is apparently the most pro-Pakistan of the opposition leaders. At least the groups for which he speaks are pro-Pak, and his family was long associated with the Muslim Conference and favored Kashmir joining Pakistan in 1947. His uncle, Yusuf Shah, was one of those Abdullah exiled to Pakistan in 1948. Farook has been accused of having tried to give the Relic Agitation a communal tinge and of trying to incite communal violence in recent months. If true, this may be more his advisers' doing than his own. Of the major leaders only Farook, several observers believe, would be willing to use communalism as a political weapon. Several well-informed Kashmiris I met believed that Farook could be persuaded to move closer to the middle of the road.

During the infiltration of August and the open war of September, Masoodi, Karra, and Farook made no important public announcements. They spoke occasionally of plebiscite and self-determination, but no more. They did not denounce the infiltrators, but they did not publicly support them either -- although Farook and his followers were alleged to have been in contact with them. Nor during this period did these leaders criticize the Kashmir Government. No doubt political and personal expediency in part accounts for their silence. Had they come out for either the Government or the infiltrators they would have lost supporters, and had they come out for the infiltrators they would almost surely have gone to jail -- which at that time would have gained them nothing. Also, I am convinced, they saw the infiltration for what it was, an attempted violent conquest of Kashmir by Pakistan, and they believed this dangerous for Kashmir and for themselves. Unfortunately for them, however, sitting tight ultimately lost them the following they hoped to preserve. The ever-present anti-Indian sentiment and the pro-Pakistan elements wanted a voice, and when they did not hear it, they turned away from the leaders. Masoodi acknowledged that his control was slipping. In late September, after two months of quiet, a series of mysterious fires broke out in Srinagar. In early October processions were taken out in the city and students organized demonstrations. A hartal (or shutdown) of the city began on 9 October, called for by students and other groups. On 10 October Farook and the president of the Plebiscite Front (a lesser-known figure name Ishaq) were arrested. Demonstrations continued as the Indian Army and the police set about breaking the hartal, prying the shutters off locked shops and forcing their owners to remain open. On 12 October the police fired on a crowd, killing at least three persons and wounding more. In succeeding days schools and colleges were closed, but the city continued to simmer. On 18 October there was an incident at Hazratbal mosque, followed by more demonstrations and arrests in Srinagar. On 21 October Masoodi, Karra, and at least two dozen others were arrested. The police tightened their grip and the city quieted down. The Kashmir Government has said that the opposition leaders were jailed for fomenting unrest. If they were, one wonders if they did so to try to regain lost ground, if, like many Arab leaders in the past, they felt forced to take extreme positions in order to keep up with 'the street'. There have been reports, however, that

the student agitation had other leaders, one or two perhaps genuine Pakistan agents, and that it was carried on without the sanction of the major opposition leaders.

What will happen now? With the more moderate leaders in jail, will 'the street' get out of hand? With public demonstrations of anti-Indian feeling now difficult or impossible, and more than risky, will Srinagar produce an underground terrorist movement? It is doubtful. Besides the leaders, several hundred of the active members of the opposition parties are also in jail, thus denying such a movement organizers and leaders, unless a few come over from Pakistan. But more important, Kashmir isn't Algeria. The Kashmiri has never had weapons and he doesn't know how to use them. Furthermore, he doesn't want to use them. Kashmiris are fond of saying that they're cowards, but they are simply peaceful people, basically tolerant, who don't like to fight. For example, there were several attempts at sabotage of transformers and telephone lines when Abdullah was rearrested last May, but they were reportedly the first, and I'm not aware of any since, except, possibly, for the mysterious fires. Several grenades have been tossed in recent weeks, but always in open areas causing few casualties. A student organization that might have become militant and terroristic was started in 1964, I was told, but collapsed for lack of support. Nearly every Kashmiri I met pointed out that if the strong pro-Pakistan elements in Srinagar had been warlike, they would have risen in arms in cooperation with the infiltrators in early August when the city's defenses were weak. No, with the lid on the Kashmiri will quietly wait for better days. And this is India's good fortune, for it gives Delhi opportunity and time to reconsider its position in Kashmir.

The infiltration and the war has had a profound effect on the Jammu and Kashmir Government. While the attitude of the opposition was merely strengthened by the war, the outlook of the state government has definitely been crystalized. Its policies are now firm and unrelenting. It will continue the reform programs it initiated and its efforts to tone up the administration. But the 'hundred flowers bloom' period in local politics is finished.

A top-ranking civil servant put it this way: "Before the war the opposition here could be pro-Pakistan or pro-independence -- anything it wanted if it didn't go too far. But now it must decide what it wants, what it is willing to fight for, or it must shut up. The politicians had their chance. They wouldn't fight for their cause when the infiltrators were here, so why the devil should we let them fool about now?" This view is not entirely unreasonable, I think. In the context of the war it smacks somewhat of treason for Kashmiris to advocate Pakistan's cause.

Senior ministers and officials apparently understand that the Government has almost no popular support. Their attitudes make mock of the reports of Kashmir's loyalty to India that appear in the Delhi press. Opinions already cited show this. But the members of the Government believe that they are in the right ("...our cause is just.") and they intend to rule ("With or without popular support, this government will keep on."). As a senior civil servant who looks objectively at the Cabinet said, "I know when these johnnies are serious, and this time they mean business." Indeed they do, and they are confident of their power. The strength of the Indian Army in Kashmir is reported to be 150,000. This may include three divisions in Ladakh and many troops facing Pakistan, but there are enough left over for Srinagar. The strength of the police, including the Jammu and Kashmir police, the Central Reserve Police (some of which are stationed near the Cease Fire Line), and other Indian police units, probably exceeds 35,000. And this power is not to lie idle, as the arrests of Masoodi and other leaders show. All political activity (except that sponsored by the Government) is now suppressed. Srinagar is an armed camp. Although the Valley is not quite a police state, persons look over their shoulder as they talk and the tension is much greater than four months ago. Kashmiris are again under the heel of what they consider a foreign government. But in fairness it should be repeated that there has just been a war over Kashmir, and that life in the state has always been greatly controlled by the government if the government hasn't been outright autocratic.

Nor is the attitude of Prime Minister Sadiq and his Government entirely negative. These men see Pakistan not simply as their rival for the possession of Kashmir, but as a reactionary country where large, 'feudal', landed interests and a few merchant capitalists control the economy, politics, and the government. They like even less the obscurantist Islam of the mullahs in Pakistan (which has been one of the great impediments to Pakistan's success as a nation) and the shrill Muslim nationalism with which the country has recently conducted its campaign to get Kashmir. Kashmir would be the loser if it became part of such a country they believe, and they are prepared to risk the medicine's being harsher than the disease to see that it doesn't happen.

Summary

In October 1947 Pakistan invaded the independent Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, disguising its complicity by using Pathan tribesmen. A few days later the Maharaja acceded to India, with the blessing of Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader, so that Indian troops could enter and prevent Pakistan's conquest of the state. In May 1948 Pakistan dropped all pretence and sent in its regular army. Pakistan's aggression, then, was first against the state of Kashmir and then against India because Kashmir had become part of India. Part of the outcome is visible on a map: Pakistan holds all of Kashmir west and north of the Cease Fire Line. Pakistan contends that it had nothing to do with the tribal invasion and that the Maharaja's accession was a conspiracy hatched by India and the Hindu ruler to take Kashmir's Muslims into India against their will. Pakistan bases its claim to Kashmir on their geographical relationship, on the alleged invalidity of the accession, and on the two-nation theory. Because Hindus and Muslims are separate peoples for whom cohabitation is impossible, says Pakistan, because the subcontinent was divided in August 1947 into a Hindu state and a Muslim state, and because the state of Jammu and Kashmir was predominantly Muslim, therefore the state of Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan. India was divided (with the acquiescence if not approval of the leaders of India-to-be) so that a Muslim state came into existence. The leaders of India,

however, never accepted the validity of the two-nation theory nor did they believe that because Pakistan was a Muslim nation, India must be a Hindu nation. Although there are manifest imperfections in its much vaunted 'secularism,' India has not become a Hindu state. Although there is evidence that Jinnah was as much interested in personal power as in building a purely Muslim state, Pakistanis have tried hard to build a viable and an Islamic nation. Their own belief in the two-nation theory has always blinded Pakistanis to the character of Islam in Kashmir. The large majority of Muslims in the state, primarily those of the Valley, lead by Abdullah, didn't believe that simply by being Muslims they were compelled to join Pakistan. And today, even given the depth of anti-Indian feeling in the Valley (in which fear of Hindu domination plays some part), I do not believe that Kashmiris would opt out of India or into Pakistan simply for reasons of religion.

Written into the Indian Government's acceptance of Kashmir's accession was a stipulation making it conditional on the approval of the people of the state — a precedent it had set itself in Junagadh. This was a unilateral commitment by the Nehru Government. This commitment came to have international status after the Indian Government brought charges of aggression against Pakistan in the United Nations in January 1948. Since then the issue has been 'Plebiscite'. India promised it, but never fulfilled the promise. India claims that Pakistan has prevented a plebiscite by not fulfilling the pre-conditions set in U.N. resolutions. It is true that Pakistan has never met the pre-conditions. Pakistan also has refused to admit that the tribals crossing into Kashmir and the later dispatch of its own army there were contrary to international law -- Dixon Report, 1950. Yet I cannot help thinking and feeling that Nehru's wilful and superior attitude toward Pakistan over the years did a good deal to prevent a rapprochement that might have led to a Kashmir settlement. Never, it seems to me, was Nehru more niggling or obstinate in negotiations than during those held with Sir Owen Dixon in 1950. But Pakistan's India-psychosis and rabid Islam hasn't helped either.

American military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan's subsequent membership in American-sponsored defense organizations spelled the end of India's interest in a plebiscite. Granting in part the validity of India's fears of a militarized Pakistan, one must add that military aid was only speculation in August 1953 and apparently had little to do with the arrest of a frustrated Abdullah by an ambitious Bakshi, who spoke immediately and publicly of Kashmir's place in India, never mentioning a plebiscite. In 1956 the Bakshi-controlled state Constituent Assembly, originally packed by Abdullah 1951, declared accession final and within a bit more than a year India tacitly made this its policy. Over the years the major points of the dispute as well as the details — all-important to the participants became blurred or were forgotten. The United Nations helped the confusion along, it seems to me, by never fully understanding the roots of the dispute and, particularly, the difference between the Muslims of Kashmir and those of the remainder of North India. Paradoxically, it was Pakistan that shot first and since then the world has expected India to make amends. Weighing the evidence, it is fair to conclude, I think, that Kashmir's accession to India is valid and that overall India's case is the righter, but that India's record on the plebiscite issue is far from unblemished.

Now Pakistan has attacked India again in Kashmir and a war resulted. The two nations are farther apart than they have ever been and so far as Kashmir is concerned any agreement seems out of the question. The war pushed Kashmir further into India's arms. Pakistan still demands a plebiscite and India says, Never. If India would ever have bargained over Kashmir, it won't do so under duress or after a Pakistani attack that it defeated. President Ayub, according to reliable news correspondents recently returned from Pakistan, would like a way out of the entanglement, but he must save his country's face in the process. Any solution that Pakistan cannot claim as a victory for its principles cannot be accepted. The question now is, Has Pakistan committed itself so far over Kashmir and by its war with India that only the conquest of Kashmir or the humiliation of India will save its honor? For its part, the Indian Government continues to maintain that Kashmiris

are happy to be part of India. Neither country is rational about Kashmir - anymore than Americans have always been rational about the communist 'menace.' For all these reasons and for many others (the possible effect on Muslims in India, what might happen in Kashmir itself, the near impossibility of making administrative arrangements) to talk of a plebiscite, meaning a chance for Jammu and Kashmir to opt out of the Indian Union, is a waste of time.

In a speech inaugurating the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly in 1951, Sheikh Abdullah discussed the three choices open to the state: remaining with India, independence, and joining Pakistan. He refuted the arguments for the latter two, concluding that the sensible course was continued accession to India. By the time of his arrest in August 1953, he may have been having second thoughts. Speaking immediately after his coming into power, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed said that democratic forces in Kashmir continued to support the goal of an autonomous Kashmir within the Indian Union. If tomorrow morning a ballot was shoved into the hand of every adult Kashmiri in the Valley and he was told to vote then and there for being part of India or Pakistan (the alternatives of the original U.N. resolutions), the result would overwhelmingly favor Pakistan, say most Kashmiris and observers I know, and I agree. If such a snap vote were taken with independence made a third choice, Pakistan would get a lot of votes, but independence would win, I think. Some persons whose judgement I respect would still expect Pakistan to win. And an able official in Kashmir thought that India would win a two-choice plebiscite, but that Kashmiris would vote for independence if it were offered. One thing is clear: Kashmiris are no longer happy to be part of India, the old loyalty is gone. Kashmiris today are the forgotten pawns of India-Pakistan rivalry. They live in a minor police state. Not only are they suppressed politically, but their tolerant way of life is threatened by the tensions under which they live. Hindus and Muslims of age 35 and over still put friendship above politics, but they told me that they were worried about their children and even more about their children's children.

Young Hindus and Muslims in schools don't get on as well as they used to. School elections are sometimes fought on communal lines. India-Pakistan hockey and cricket matches have several times resulted in fights between Hindu and Muslim schoolboys. Under the constant pressure of Pakistani propaganda, Kashmiri Muslims are looking more toward Pakistan for protection of their 'interests.' And this has a counter effect on the Pundits. The somewhat uncertain position of the 50 million Muslims in India and the frothings of Hindu communalists also unsettle if not frighten Kashmiri Muslims. Occasionally one hears the ugly remark that a Kashmiri Muslim who supports India is being untrue to his religion. For years Kashmir was the only considerable place on the subcontinent where Muslim domination fell with equal brutality on Muslims and Hindus alike, thus helping to create a bond of Kashmiri-ness between the communities. But this feeling is being weakened. It is no longer so likely that a Kashmiri Hindu would prefer a Kashmiri Muslim official above him to a Hindu from the plains, and vice versa. The danger of communal strife is not immediate in the Valley, but Kashmir has been subjected to pressure and propaganda for 18 years now and the cracks are appearing. Unless the present trend is halted, we may someday be saying, "Kashmir was a nice place, wasn't it?" There is a discrepancy between all this and Nehru's statement in 1957 that "Kashmir is not ours but it is for the Kashmiris. It is not our property."

Do the Kashmiris 'deserve' special consideration? Many groups in many countries, particularly if they happen to inhabit the geographical fringes of the country, are less than happy with the central government. Indians argue that special treatment for Kashmir will cause repercussions in other states and weaken Indian unity. Yet there is a difference. Kashmir acceded to India, as did the other Princely States, on the basis of a limited federal relationship. But implicit in the agreement that even this accession would be placed before the people was certainly an understanding that Kashmir would not be brought further into the Indian Federation without the people's consent. This understanding has not been honored, in my view. There may never have been much democracy in Kashmir even in Abdullah's day,

but certainly there was not under Bakshi -- under whose rule elections were no test of the popular will. The closer integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union from 1953 to the present has, therefore, little if any popular sanction. And one has only to see the police in Srinagar's streets to know that it couldn't get it. Moreover, Kashmir for years was culturally and politically removed from the main currents of Indian life, more so than other major Indian sub-nations like the Bengalis, the Tamils, and the Maharashtrians. Kashmir is geographically more separate, not Jammu, but the Valley. As a Kashmiri friend once said to me, gesturing to the encircling mountains (we were sitting in Nedou's garden), "These mountains have limited our vision and given us a Kashmiri feeling." The mountains also kept the rest of India away. The case for the special consideration of Kashmir exists, says the evidence, and for years this consideration has either been forgotten or tossed aside.

Which brings us to a proposition: that India is right in claiming Kashmir's accession to be constitutionally and morally legitimate; that Pakistan has interests in Kashmir that India should recognize; and that the Kashmiris have been the victims of Indian bungling, if not worse, and deserve a square deal for a change.

"Tourist in God"

Coming back into Srinagar one day my taxi stopped at a checkpoint at the same time as an outbound bus. While a cop looked me and the back seat over and peered into the trunk, I read what had been lettered in the rectangle above the windshield of the bus where the destination is usually given. The letters read "Tourist in God," and considering how the Valley makes much of its money and the uncertainty of its future, I decided that for Kashmiris it was as good advice as any.

What might be done about the Kashmir problem? The Indian Government could do what it has so far explicitly refrained from doing, despite pressure from communal groups:

change the land ownership laws in Kashmir and flood the state with Hindus from other parts of India. Such a drastic step might create as many problems as it would solve, but it would end the Kashmir problem as such. Or the Government can continue its apparent present policy of drift or status quo. This will mean, observers here believe, that the force of political gravity will operate and Kashmir will slowly sink further into India. Neither policy will meet the desires of Kashmiris and, one can safely predict, unrest in the Valley will continue. Continued unrest has to result in continued repression. India is powerful enough with its army and police to hold the Valley and to repress dissatisfied Kashmiris for years perhaps. But, observers here ask, can India conduct a police state in Kashmir and remain a democracy? Or would such behavior so corrupt the democratic conscience that expediency would become the rule everywhere? Would India wish to risk the effect such behavior might have on the other nations of the world? The Indian Government has often said that Kashmir must remain part of India to demonstrate India's secularism. Originally this argument was used against allowing Kashmir to go to Pakistan; later it was applied to an independent Kashmir; now it is fashionable to argue against a return even to the limited accession of 1947 on these grounds. It is also widely claimed that no change in Kashmir's status can be made because it would endanger the security of 50 million Muslims in India. Abdullah has said that any solution of the Kashmir issue must take into consideration the welfare of Indian Muslims. Indians, it seems to me, use both these arguments as excuses for inaction, and have not faced up to certain inconsistencies. It would seem not to be logical or moral, for example, to make Kashmiris sacrificial goats for Indian secularism, especially if the repression entailed by this policy means the ruin of Kashmiri secularism - which has been more of a reality than Indian secularism. I have met Indians in Kashmir who are devoted to Kashmir's welfare who say that Kashmir must remain with India so that the Kashmiri example will be a guiding light for India. Would that this were so. But can Kashmir be a guide if its own light is darkened by a blanket of repression? President Radhakrishnan and Prime Minister Shastri have said that the struggle between India and Pakistan is one between secularism and democracy and theocracy and dictatorship. As a secular democracy, what should India's policy in Kashmir be?

The alternative to further integrating Kashmir into India is to loosen the ties linking Srinagar to Delhi, to try within the context of Kashmir's accession to India to give Kashmiris the maximum possible autonomy. Most groups in India seem to be against this. The Hindu communalists and the Communists and certain 'socialists' talk of further integration, and some among the 'socialists' and the communalists go beyond this, fulminating about "undoing Partition." Many ranking Congressmen and government officials have convinced themselves that 'anti-national elements' in Kashmir have been dealt with, that the Kashmiris are happy, and that, therefore, no change in policy is needed. To assure that nothing is reported to confound this view, the Government, I am told, has warned all newspapers not to publish articles about Kashmir without its permission. The Government also says that there can be no change in Kashmir's status so long as Pakistan persists in challenging accession. Chief Minister Sadiq in his public speeches has talked not only of further integration but of recapturing Azad Kashmir, a suggestion also heard in New Delhi. I have seen little evidence, however, that important figures in New Delhi have thought through to the consequences of this policy. And, indeed, if the Kashmiris were contented with their lot, the policy would be sound.

Yet not everyone holds these views. C. Rajgopalachari, the aging leader of the miniscule Swatantra Party has been taking a very pro-Kashmiri line, and Minoo Masani, one of the party's ranking members of Parliament, said the other day that India should follow a policy of conciliation in Kashmir, seeking a solution to the problem unilaterally on its own initiative. On the basis of his past pronouncements, Jayaprakash Narayan, the former socialist leader and now often called the conscience keeper of the country, would share this view. Strong support for a fresh approach to Kashmir came at the end of October from the respected editor of The Hindustan Times. In a signed leader-page article, he wrote: "It would be unwise to see an incompatability between Kashmir as an integral part of India and a special status for Kashmir. The tendency to conclude that all political opposition is traitorous in motive is fatal to India's real interests... To imagine that all political opposition in Kashmir is Pakistan-inspired or Pakistan-inclining is to do an injustice to the people of Kashmir and to award an undeserved victory

to Pakistani propaganda...The least that ought to be done is to start a serious dialogue...A positive policy in Kashmir is needed both to preserve our real interests and to help in persuading Pakistan to accept Kashmir's place as an integral part of India." Kashmir's being part of India, the editor also wrote, "need not rule out an economic role of friendly interest for Pakistan" in Kashmir. Some of the highest-ranking members and officials of the Kashmir Government have expressed similar views. One of them said to me,"I would advocate and work for a loosening of ties between New Delhi and Srinagar." But he thought that this was not feasible with Pakistan in its present mood. Whether this man and others could be swung around to working toward this end despite Pakistan's attitude is a question. It would be risky, but in the long run the dangers of policies that can result only in repression of Kashmiris may be much greater.

There have been a variety of proposals over the years for settling the dispute, ranging from partition of the Valley to a India-Pakistan condominium to govern the Valley. Like plebiscite they all came to naught because neither India nor Pakistan saw enough advantage in them and because they presupposed a climate of cooperation between India and Pakistan. Common to most of these plans has been the suggestion that Jammu be given to India and that Pakistan keep the areas west and north of the Cease Fire Line over which it already has control. There has always been controversy about the Muslim areas of Poonch and Mirpur and especially about the Valley. The latest suggestion was made the other day in the Economic Weekly of Bombay. It was, in part, that the Valley be made into a Kashmiri-speaking state separate from Jammu and the rest of the present state. As the major linguistic groups of India now have their own states, or are agitating for one, like the Punjabi-speakers, the same could be done for the Kashmiris. This might be a help. It might be better than the present policy of blindness and drift. But it wouldn't go near to assuaging Kashmiri desires. These might be met by a return to the limited accession of the 1948 to 1952 period. A senior opposition leader told me that he believed the point of no return had not been reached in the Valley and that the Kashmiris would still accept status that granted "the substance of independence"—

meaning, I think, something like the limited accession of 1948-52. If this is correct, someone would have to persuade Kashmiris that this was either just or the best they could hope to get. Many persons believe Abdullah could do it because he is still immensely popular. A few say that it is too late even for him. But this presupposes, leaving aside the Indian Government for a moment, that Abdullah would agree to cooperate — something no one knows. Kashmiris I've met are quite certain, although not positive, that only Abdullah could bring this off, that no other Kashmiri leader -- like Masoodi, for example -- has sufficient stature. The old ties, sentimental and intellectual, between India and Kashmir are not yet dead, I think, especially, so far as the principal opposition leaders are concerned. With the right medicine and gentle treatment they might be revived. And Kashmiri patriotism (Kashmiris refer to both Indians and Pakistanis as 'they') may yet prove an asset to India. Perhaps it is the only counter-force, other than bayonets, to Pakistan.

Pakistan's reaction to such a plan would presumably be negative, at least at first. But there is a possibility, according to some observers, that if Pakistani leaders believed that Kashmiris were receiving reasonable consideration, they might mute or halt their campaign to keep the Kashmir issue alive. India might increase the chances of Pakistan's acquiescence by allowing free travel between Kashmir (and especially the Valley) and Pakistan, by opening the Srinagar-Rawalpindi road for traffic and permitting easy trade between Kashmir and Pakistan, by establishing river control boards with Pakistani members to ensure that Pakistan's water rights were protected, and so on. These ideas are far from new, but they might be worth trying again as part of an overall effort to solve the problem. And if such a normalization of relations with Pakistan were in the offing, Kashmiris might be more willing to accept permanent accession to India.

And what of foreign nations in all this? Some Kashmiris say that the United States must do thus and so, but what they want, quite understandably, is support for their own point of view. Others say, for

heavens sake stay out of it; all you've ever done is confused the issue or hurt us. I don't know what the United States or the United Nations should try to do. But one thing is certain: that whatever outsiders try to do they must do it quietly, subtly, kindly, and with a much clearer view than they seem to have had of the background and of the sensibilities of the nations and peoples involved.

There are many 'ifs' in all these schemes and hopes. If (Ah ha, 'if' again) a return to limited accession has any virtues, it is because it is short of each party's wishes, a solution of mutual unpalatability. But maybe the blind in Delhi and the greedy in Rawalpindi are right: that the Kashmiris don't rate, that they were born to be sacrificed on the distant altars of other nations' self-interest (with several thousand Indian and Pakistani soldiers for company). Maybe this is History and no frail reporter (or Secretary-General or Secretary of State) should step in with two-bit morality and cheap suggestions -- and hopes. Maybe Kashmir is due for years to be, like Palestine and Cyprus, a glowing example of men's ability to hurt each other until aggressor and aggrieved, fact and fancy, and right and wrong end in a scream. Maybe, maybe. But can we try again?

Received in New York December 13, 1965.

SKETCHY SKETCH MAP OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

SKETCH MAP OF JAMMU & KASHMIR