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Pakistan: Impressions

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Dear Dick:

The nation of Pakistan was established to provide a home for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. By 1947 many of India's Muslims had convinced themselves, or been convinced by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, that they were a group culturally as well as religiously apart and that they constituted a "nation" whose fulfillment (as a corporate body and as individuals) lay in self-government free from "Hindu domination." The slogan heard in pre-independence days in Lahore was "Pakistan kaa matlab kya / Wa Mohammed rasool 'lah," What is the meaning of Pakistan? / That Mohammed is the prophet of God.

Today, Pakistan continues to emphasize its Islamicness. Although at the constitutional and institutional level the attempt to create an "Islamic State" has been, as one Pakistani said, "a flop" (The political organization and law of Pakistan is not Islamic and today's leaders are secular and secularist, making only necessary and occasional bows to Muslim divines.), Pakistanis still see themselves primarily - if not entirely - as Muslims. During the India-Pakistan war of last September President Ayub called on Pakistanis to fight India in the name of Islam. Ayub has said that only the brotherhood of Islam holds the wings of East and West Pakistan together as a nation. The Pakistanis I met on a recent trip to West Pakistan were intensely proud of being Muslims - and of being Pakistanis. They believed that Islam gave them a special identity and superiority - particularly in regard to Indians. The Pakistan army held back the larger, better equipped Indian army during the Indo-Pak war because of the superior spirit and fighting qualities of the Muslim soldier, Pakistanis told me many times.

The Pakistanis' belief in their religion-based superiority, however, goes beyond this rather understandable nationalism. Because they believe in the superiority of the Muslim soldier, most Pakistanis I met claimed that India, despite a great advantage in numbers and resources, could never defeat Pakistan in an all-out war. Many Pakistanis, on the contrary, were ready to go to war again with India and expected they'd win. One Pakistani soldier is

equal to six Indian soldiers, was a commonly heard equation. Another might have been: "Muslim spirit is equal to Indian (Hindu) might." Significantly, I think, one of the theories from Liu Shao-Chi's writings that was singled out in newspaper articles about Liu during his state visit to Pakistan was his claim that the "spiritual atomic bomb" in China was superior to the nuclear variety possessed by China's enemies. Several Pakistanis went so far as to tell me that never in history had a Muslim army been defeated.

Nor is Muslim superiority confined to the battlefield; where Hindus are concerned it is comprehensive. A former, and successful, Minister of Agriculture in India was Rafi Ahmed Kidwai. His success, one Pakistani told me (an emigre from the United Provinces), was due to his being a Muslim with the indefinable quality of a "Muslim mind." Pakistanis consider Hindus untrustworthy, sly, cheating. They break their word: "India has gone back on every agreement it has had with Pakistan." And Hindus, having been for centuries ruled by foreigners, are an inferior people, claim Pakistanis, who, in my experience, always equate themselves as Muslims with the Muslim conquerors of North India. Pakistanis do not realize, apparently, that the mass of the Indian people, whether Hindu or Muslim, was under the heel of the conqueror. Hindus hate Pakistan, say Pakistanis, but all Pakistan wants to do is live at peace with India. Such views, I found, were held by most of the persons I met in Pakistan. If I put forward the suggestion that untrustworthiness was a human failing and not the prerogative of Indians, the response was incredulity or disagreement. "You Americans will come back to us for friendship," one man said, "when the Indians have milked you dry and then turned on you." Pakistan's cause is thought just. Therefore anything done in the name of that cause is just. Pakistan may make a mistake, but it can not commit a wrong.

Pakistanis, with apparently few exceptions, believe India to be a giant conspiracy to harm Pakistan. A senior superintendent of police and a deputy director of intelligence ticked off on their fingers a long list of charges against India. India, they said, has tried to thwart Pakistan at every turn, and its ultimate aim is military conquest. India's behavior over the former Princely States of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir, and its hatred of Pakistan since Partition prove India's basic, evil intent. (Later in the conversation when I mentioned that Kashmiri Islam was somewhat different from Punjabi Islam, they claimed that this was evidence of a policy to Hinduize Kashmiri Muslims.) That India intends military conquest, they said, was borne out by the conquest of Goa and a projected invasion of Nepal in 1962 (which had to be called off because of the Chinese attack in October that year). Even the Chinese attack had been provoked by India so that it could get American arms to use against Pakistan, they told me. They saw nearly every action of the Indian government as communally motivated: the Sikhs had demanded a Punjabi-speaking state for themselves because they were being "persecuted" by the Hindus, and the Indian government was fighting the Nagas because they were Christians. They implied that Muslims were in even greater danger from India.

Pakistanis consider the Indian attack - or counter-attack depending on one's point of view - on Lahore and West Pakistan as a result of the

escalation of the hostilities in Kashmir the greatest evidence of Indian conspiracy against their country, the final proof that treachery had crouched across their border for years. Kashmir to Pakistanis is disputed territory; therefore, "anything we do there is all right." The infiltration, begun by Pakistan in early August, grew step by step into the Pakistani attack with American-aid tanks toward Akhnur. Once it became clear that the Indian army could not or chose not to hold the Paks in this area, most Indians and foreigner observers in India began looking for an Indian riposte in the Punjab plains, particularly toward Lahore, the capital and psychological center of West Pakistan. That Lahore would be a primary Indian objective if war ever broke out between the two countries has been accepted here since the early fifties. The Pakistan press has several times raised the cry that Indian troops were massing to threaten Lahore. Newspapers in both countries discussed the alleged desire of Indian generals to attack Lahore when things were going badly for the Indians in Kutch a year ago. Yet Pakistan was mesmerized by its own argument. It believed that because it considered Jammu and Kashmir disputed territory the Indians must also think so and would therefore limit the war to this relatively less sensitive area. It also seems to have believed that Hindus were cowards and would not fight, and, according to reliable sources, the Indian army was not prepared to launch an attack. So no one in Pakistan, among the citizens or in the government, thought the Indians would attack in the Punjab. That the attack was unexpected, I have been told by individuals ranging from the colonel of an armored regiment, to college professors, to taxi drivers, and to journalists. There is a great deal of indirect evidence that President Ayub--a professional soldier and a Field Marshall--was equally surprised. Thus the Indian counter-attack in the Punjab, instead of being the culmination of events, was, in the words of a Pakistani businessman, "a treacherous, sneaky attack across the international frontier, naked aggression against Pakistan when we had not attacked India."

The light and air of dissenting opinion rarely penetrate this dank cellar. During the two weeks I was in Pakistan, relations with India as such and the Kashmir issue never got less than two column headlines in each day's newspapers. Generally they got three columns and on several days banner headlines. None of these articles were analytical, in any real sense, of Pakistan's position, let alone of India's position. I saw no criticism of, or dissent from, the view that Pakistan was all right and India all wrong. In private conversations there was equal unanimity of opinion. So far as the war goes, there is the firm belief that Pakistan won a smashing victory over the Indians, even though President Ayub himself uses the word "stalemate" to describe the outcome. The true result of the war--which, no matter what it was, was not a great victory--and its implications for future national policies are unknown and unthought of. The government's propaganda machine and the credulity of the people have so complemented each other that West Pakistan, with, reportedly, the exception of President Ayub and a handful of men around him, lives in a dream world. Until the early days of the war Ayub apparently lived in the dream world, too, because it could have been only he who made or approved the decision to send large numbers of infiltrators into Kashmir and who made the calculation that the Indians, threatened at Akhnur, would not have the guts or tactical common sense to strike back in the Punjab. Speaking

lines they write themselves from a stage of Islamic superiority and purity, Pakistanis play to the audience of Pakistan. The audience cheers, the actors bow, and tomorrow night a repeat performance in the hall of mirrors.

The Pakistani preoccupation with India amounts to an obsession. I have used the word to Pakistanis, and not been contradicted, and they to me. A variety of foreign observers, some of them sympathetic to Pakistan's general position, have said the same, adding that along with the obsession goes hatred. No one, I think, should deny the Pakistanis the right to their own view of history or the right to take their own part. Yet when a government or a people becomes so transfixed by its own world view that it has no eyes or thought for the realities of situations, or for the existence of contrary or competing views, then one may expect that it will behave irresponsibly.

In fairness to Pakistan, it must be said that India is not free from fault and that India frequently flouts Pakistan's sensibilities. Although there is little reason to believe, for example, that the Indian Government during the past 17 years (including during the late war) planned to invade and to destroy Pakistan,there are countless Indians in the government and out who would cheerfully dance on Pakistan's grave. They are like Clarence Darrow who said he'd never committed a murder but had read many obituaries with pleasure. And there is a vocal lunatic Hindu fringe that does call for Muslim blood and the reabsorption of Pakistan territory. In the years right after Partition senior Indian leaders openly said that Pakistan couldn't last and that Lahore, 'Pindi, and Dacca would soon be asking to rejoin India. Nehru, for all his greatness of mind, treated Pakistan both as an abnormality and as a wayward younger brother who should heed his wishes and advice. None of these postures increased Pakistan's affection for India or its faith in India's good intentions. Today, the Indian attitude towards Pakistan is much less condescending, but Pakistan is still expected, like an English servant, to know its place. Also, the Indian Government seems unaware of political realities in Pakistan. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi recently said that internal political pressures in Pakistan may have helped shake the petals off the "Tashkent spirit" but there is little understanding that the Pakistan President must be anti-Indian in the same way that the American President must be anti-Communist. Americans now tolerate Moscow's fulminations as part of the game; yet Indians expect Rawalpindi to radiate sweetness and light.

Yet withal, there is less paranoia in India. India is, speaking generally, a free society; Pakistan is a minor police state. India has a free press subject only to limited government coercion and control; the government in Pakistan completely controls the press. In India, therefore, there is public discussion of subjects like relations with Pakistan and the Kashmir problem, whereas in Pakistan, in real terms, there is none. And in India this freedom has produced a good deal of dissent. Although the brave souls may not be many, leaders on public platforms and in the press have even advocated giving Kashmir to Pakistan simply to get the mess over with. In recent days, prominent figures have advocated the release of Sheikh Abdullah and the holding of free elections in Kashmir (something new for the state, should they be held). In Pakistan, however, an individual cannot publicly criticise the

government's signing of the Tashkent Declaration or discuss many other subjects. There are other reasons for the relative rationality of India--some of them no especial credit to Indians, but existing, nevertheless. A big country with a huge population, India has not the minority, small-man complexes that Pakistan has--and militarily it is not so vulnerable. The successor state to the British Raj on the sub-continent, India has not had to prove its right to existence as has the new, experimental state of Pakistan. Consequently India feels more confident and secure. Finally, Hinduism does not inject nearly the same degree of militancy into Indian political life that Islam does in Pakistan.

The relations of the two countries have not been helped by the ignorance in each country about the other. Travel has long been restricted and the circulation of each other's newspapers has been confined to the large cities--and even this has stopped since the war. Persons in each country think they know all about the other because they were once politically united. But most of their information is now 18 years out of date. There is little awareness in India of Pakistan's economic successes or of the militancy of its political outlook. In Pakistan few realize how free India is and how much development and change there has been in Hindu society (much of it for the better) since Partition. If each side knew these things and others through newspapers and travel, the edge of their enmity might be blunted. Most persons I've met in either country are hungry for news from the other (even if they don't always accept what they hear), so the necessary appetite exists. But it is safe to predict, I expect, that such a change is a long way off because each government will say that the easing of present strained relations must precede the reestablishment of contacts rather than the other way around. In the case of loosening travel restrictions, this may be necessary, but the exchange of newspapers and other public information could begin at once. I fear that even this won't happen, however, and that the lack of understanding will become greater.

The obsession with Kashmir and India in West Pakistan has now become a danger to President Ayub, and to the stability of the entire nation. (Feeling about Kashmir is much less strong in East Pakistan, I am told. And many East Pakistanis are publicly angry with the national government in Rawalpindi for having gone to war with India without consulting, or even warning, them.) The Tashkent Declaration is the principal focus of popular resentment in West Pakistan. The masses feel that they were engaged in a war against an ancient enemy (the Hindus) to fulfill their 19-year old promise to their Muslim brethren in Kashmir. They believe that they were winning the war and cannot understand why the government agreed to a cease-fire without achieving its goals. The question one hears everywhere in West Pakistan is, "If we were winning, why did we quit?" Then came the Tashkent Declaration in early January enjoining both sides to return to peace, to renounce force in settling disputes, and leaving Kashmir in Indian hands. Slogans immediately appeared on the walls of Lahore: "Kashmir has been sold;" "Ayub has no balls." Students rioted on The Mall in Lahore and six were killed in police firing. Five leaders of the opposition were jailed (and have remained there) for attacking the Declaration. Public

criticism of the Declaration is prohibited, indicating that dissatisfaction with it is too strong, too widespread, and too dangerous to be allowed free expression. Certainly nearly everyone I met in West Pakistan opposed it and continued to believe that the country's first duty was the liberation of Kashmir. A Pakistani friend of mine believes that a skillful politician might have overturned Ayub in the days just after the Declaration was signed. And another Pakistani said to me, "If Ayub doesn't do something about Kashmir, he'll have to go." Several foreign observers summed up the common view this way: "Tashkent used up most of Ayub's huge stock of goodwill; public sentiment now is a real danger to him."

Having inherited a tiger, and having himself whipped it into a gallop by the infiltration of Kashmir and the subsequent war, Ayub must now contrive to ride it--and at the same time to calm it--or risk losing power. He must neither ignore the issue nor make too much of it. This is evident, it seems to me, in the government-controlled press and in statements by senior officials. Daily the newspapers devote much space to Kashmir and to India's treachery and continuing bad intentions. The government charges that India is not honoring its pledges under the Tashkent Declaration to discuss the future of Kashmir, and it claims a great gain in having again "internationalized" the Kashmir dispute. But Foreign Minister Bhutto has been very careful, when speaking to the press, not to set a time limit for negotiations with the Indians beyond which Pakistan would stop talking and fight. No one hears now of Bhutto's boast that Pakistan would withdraw from the United Nations if it didn't get satisfaction on Kashmir, and so far the Pakistan Government has not reopened the issue with the Security Council. Ayub, although denying that the government has shelved or forgotten the cause in Kashmir, has called the war a stalemate and speaks of getting along with India. Ayub's main device--and aim--seems to be to focus attention on domestic issues. In several speeches he has said that Pakistan should concentrate on the wheat crop and economic progress, which he called the best guarantee of national defense. And, I am told, he has been very impressed with the praise he has received abroad for being the architect of Pakistan's economic progress. Ayub does not have an easy job ahead of him. If popular sentiment on the Kashmir issue should somehow quiet down, if Pakistanis should decide that they could bide their time and live with the issue for awhile as the Arabs have with Israel, there would be hope of stability in Pakistan.

But if popular feeling does not die down, Ayub might be forced to act to save himself. Personally, I doubt this will happen, although many Pakistanis I met said that the country would go to war again if India failed to meet their terms on Kashmir. But popular clamor is not the only danger to Ayub. The army officer corps is an equal or greater one, according to some observers. They argue that the officers will be the first to learn that the losses in men and material were substantially greater than the government has admitted, that the war was not the victory (even the defensive victory) that it was so loudly proclaimed to be, and that the officers are the most likely critics of Ayub's fantastic miscalculation of the Indian reaction to the Chambh-Akhnur attack. The officers might

turn on Ayub as the man who led them astray and is responsible for their besmirched honor, these observers think. Right now there may be little danger of this because reportedly few officers understand what happened during the war, knowing only what happened in their sector. One senior officer believed that neither ammunition nor spare parts shortages contributed to Ayub's acceptance of the ceasefire, although competent foreign opinion is almost unanimously of the opposite view. Other officers I met, including a battle-hardened colonel, believed that the Pak army could today inflict a significant defeat on the Indians--although the colonel admitted that the war proved that Pakistan could not take Kashmir by force. Whether in its present mood the army could become the spearhead of mob opinion in renewed hostilities with India I cannot guess. The other danger to Ayub is that a nationalist firebrand might use popular resentment against the Tashkent Declaration to drive him from power. Bhutto's is the name that first springs to mind. He is generally believed to be exceedingly ambitious, although most observers and Pakistanis I met thought that at present he lacks the popular backing to challenge Ayub. But as one diplomat put it, "He's young and he can wait." There was also speculation that Ayub might relieve Bhutto as Foreign Minister because he opposed the Tashkent Declaration and Ayub's desire for a milder Indian policy. Most observers tended to think, however, that Ayub would not do this, at least for awhile, because it might feed pro-Bhutto and anti-Tashkent sentiment in the country.

Ayub's chances of preserving national stability and his position depend on many things. Continued economic progress could mellow the popular mood, some persons believe. And a further strengthening of regional economic and military relationships with Iran and Turkey, and to a lesser extent with Afghanistan, could give Pakistan a sense of security that in the long run might lessen its truculence. The "saner elements in the country," as Ayub calls those who agree with him about Tashkent (and he presumably means the important landlords and industrialists), may make their weight felt in coming months. India could itself contribute to Ayub's stability by showing more understanding of the exigencies of political life in Pakistan and by making some attempt to save Ayub's face relative to Kashmir. This could begin with the recognition that Ayub cannot sound pro-India or drop the subject of Kashmir. When India trumpets that Pakistan is forgetting the "Tashkent spirit," it makes it even more likely that Pakistan will do so. For India to do something about Kashmir is not so easy. "Something" would presumably mean responding to popular sentiment in Kashmir by such actions as loosening ties between Delhi and Srinagar, releasing Sheikh Abdullah from jail, holding genuinely free elections, and so on. But for obvious reasons such actions would be risky, although the rewards could be proportionately great. Should India succeed in improving the Kashmir situation, it would, I think, have done much to refurbish its reputation abroad; it would have removed moral cancer from its own body and a great danger to both its internal and external security; and it would have made the greatest possible contribution to stable government in Pakistan and to the betterment of relations between the two countries. The Pakistan Government now favors an "honorable settlement" of the Kashmir

problem. To most Pakistanis this means nothing more or less than Kashmir going to Pakistan--either via conquest, plebescite, or partition of the state. Yet there are rumors that President Ayub and a few others are not so adamant. If India wishes well of the sub-continent, it will take such a possibility into consideration.

Pakistan's foreign policy, nearly as much as other aspects of its national life, is an expression of its preoccupations with India and with its own Islamic character. Pakistan has sought support and allies widely, but it has concentrated on Muslim nations. It has tried in the name of Muslim solidarity to create a diplomatic network of Muslim nations from Indonesia westwards, with particular regard to Iran and Turkey. In his speech of 22 September 1965 announcing to the nation the government's acceptance of the ceasefire, Ayub named only China and several Muslim nations as endorsing Pakistan's cause during the war. India and Pakistan compete for the support of the Arab and Muslim countries on Kashmir, with Pakistan having the edge. Pakistan's attitude is that Muslim nations should back another Muslim nation, particularly where the fate of a third group of Muslims is concerned. And Pakistan expects other nations to consider it and to treat it in all respects as India's equal, just as before Partition the Muslim League, representing 90 million Muslims, demanded "parity" representation in an all-India government with the Congress Party, which represented 260 million Hindus and other Indians.

Pakistan's relations with the United States since the early fifties are largely a product of its attitude toward India. Since the early fifties Pakistan wooed (and allowed itself to be wooed by) the United States in order to strengthen itself against India. This was a perfectly honest policy and Pakistan's representatives made no bones about their aims to Washington, which refused to believe what it was being told. (On this subject, those interested should consult the brilliant, I think, series of articles by Selig Harrison that appeared in the New Republic in 1959.) This relationship grew, so it has been described to me, until Pakistan became almost a satellite of the United States. In the process, the Pakistanis slowly became resentful and each nation built higher its myth about the other. The American government saw Pakistan as a bastion against communism, subject to America's whim, and without any foreign policy identity or needs of its own. The Pakistanis, for their part, came to think that the United States should underwrite anything it wanted or did. Thus the common Pakistani reaction to American behavior during the Indo-Pak war was, "We had a military alliance with you Americans and it was your duty to help us drive the Indians out of our country. You let us down." The United States also felt let down by Pakistan's use of American military aid equipment in a war against India.

Pakistan's China policy is also an outgrowth of its relations with India, although officially this is played down. "The friendship between Pakistan and China is not based on expediency," President Ayub has several times said, but on "the common desire of their peoples to maintain peace and stability and to promote the welfare of the region." Although

attention has recently focused on Pakistan's relations with China, they are not new. Pakistan was one of the first nations to recognize Peking, Madame Sun Yat Sen was a state guest in Karachi in 1956, the Pak Prime and Foreign Ministers were scheduled to visit China in June 1957 (but did not because of U. S. pressure - see Harrison), and Chou-En-lai visited Pakistan in December 1957. The relationship has grown more extensive, however, since the India-China war of 1962. This proved to Pakistan that China was more competitor than friend to India and thus her weight was on Pakistan's side of the scales. Also, American arms aid to India in 1962 alarmed the Pakistanis as much as arms to Pakistan in 1954 disturbed the Indians. Since 1962 Pakistan has signed a border agreement with China (it applies to the border of Sinkiang and far northern Kashmir, an area which India officially claims but unofficially and tacitly has agreed that Pakistan can have), established an air route to Canton, exchanged visits of heads of state, increased trade, and accepted military aid in the form--at least--of tanks and fighter aircraft.

Among Pakistanis I don't think I met one opponent of the government's China policy. The army is glad to get equipment. Even if there hadn't been the losses of the Indo-Pak war and the shut-off of American aid, the army wanted to diversify its sources of supply, I was told. The government from all appearances wants a lever to pry concessions out of the United States, and Ayub is publicly grateful to have such an important ally against India. Certainly the man in the street is very pleased to have China on his side. "They stood by us during the war," is the common opinion. And if all China did was talk and rattle the saber, a contribution easy to dub as negligible, this stiffened a lot of backs in Pakistan and prevented, so Pakistanis think, India from committing its full strength against Pakistan. Nor are Pakistanis, in my experience, worried about China gaining too much influence in their country. "We are Muslims so communism cannot become important here," some persons said--an argument I would consider fallacious on evidence from Arab countries where if anything has stopped communism it has been secular government, not religious zeal. Other persons claimed that they would be wary of the Chinese: "We will never become another Indonesia," they said. They were confident that Pakistan could go so far with the Chinese without having to go farther and that Pakistan could deal with China in external affairs without endangering its internal security. Most Pakistanis I met saw no reason why they could not and should not be able to follow this policy toward China and at the same time have good relations with the United States--including the resumption of economic and military aid. President Ayub has explained his policy this way:

> "The guiding principle of our foreign policy is that differences among other countries should not interfere with our relations with them. Consequently, alongside our ties of sincere friendship with China, we are developing friendly relations with the United States on the one hand, and with the USSR on the other."

This view, plus the blow hot, blow cold tactics of the Pakistan government

were summed up with humor if not accuracy by a young journalist: "Our foreign policy has two faces," he said. "Bhutto is our extremist face and Ayub the moderate face. It's like Johnson, who says no aid, and Humphrey, who comes here and gives us fifty million dollars."

Some observers view Pakistan's relations with China as sensible behavior toward a large Asian power with whom Pakistan has an extensive common border and with whom trade and diplomatic relations would normally be expected. This is leaving aside the argument that both Pakistan and China have borders with India, are in competition with India if they do not fear it, and thus can be expected to make common cause against it. Pakistan reasonably wishes to diversify its military establishment and its sources of foreign support, these observers argue, and to China and its Muslim neighbors (who are not entirely free agents because of their relations with the United States) are the logical places for it to turn. The other school of thought holds that dancing with China must inevitably lead to Pakistan's seduction--as the old argument goes: "You can't deal with a communist and win." Of the Americans I met in Pakistan some, although not all, believed this. Yet I am under the impression that the American government has not made up its mind just what it thinks of Pakistan's present China policy or what it would try to do to remedy the situation should it decide something must be done.

Personally, I think that Pakistan's present policy makes sense from Pakistan's point of view. Nor is there reason for undue fear that the country will inevitably be subverted by China. Strong forces in Pakistan, particularly the Punjabi landlords and the major industrial families as well as the non-revolutionary peasantry, will resist strong swings to the left and alienating the United States. It is said now, in fact, that the first two groups have already counseled caution and that their voices have been heeded. If some sort of entanglement rather than internal subversion or leftward drift is feared, I think we may look to the Middle East for precedents. In the mid-fifties when Egypt, especially, and Syria were trading extensively and cosying up to the Russians and East Europe, the wail was often heard that X country had mortgaged its future, or its cotton crop, to the Russians. Yet this proved not to be so. A small nation today can snub or repudiate a debt to Russia or China if it wants to. Many have done it and Pakistan can do it. If a country is in easy reach of a Communist army (Vietnam or Hungary) this may not be possible, or if it lets communists utterly take over its government. But short of this, a country may maintain a fairly close relationship with a communist nation without endangering either itself or its friends. Pakistan may be in this position because military pressure by the Chinese would alienate Pakistan when Pakistan is useful to China and because of geography. Five hundred or more miles of fierce mountains lie between the China-Pak border and any significant city or area in Pakistan. (Any attack on East Pakistan would have to pass through India.) The situation is wholly unlike India where sensitive areas--the Brahmaputra Valley and Assam's oil--are within striking distance of Tibet.

Because Pakistan's China policy is in its own national interest, and is even quite reasonable from a more dispassionate point of view, I believe the United States should accept it calmly if not graciously. The U. S. should neither expect nor can it enforce total conformity with its own policies and position, and it diminishes its own influence and prestige when it tries to do so, particularly on lesser issues. As an experienced father advised me after I'd become a father, "Save your 'noes' for the big things." One of the big things that Pakistan cannot be allowed to do without bringing down American retribution is to collaborate with China to the detriment of India. A little speech making, some alarums and excursions, and a predictable persistence on the Kashmir issue in an attempt to bring international opinion to its side are permissible. But Pakistan must not be allowed to go beyond face saving gestures. The United States has too great a stake in India to allow the Pakistanis wantonly to upset India's development and progress. To control, or attempt to control Pakistan in this regard, the United States may have several levers. One could be its economic aid--on which Pakistan is more dependent than India. If this aid continued to flow in large quantities and with long term commitments to allow Pakistan to continue its already laudable economic development, yet was subject to "good behavior," the result might be a saner attitude toward China and India--for the profits and losses would be the greatest for those groups in Pakistan who have the most influence with Ayub.

The resumption of military aid to Pakistan is a different matter. Pakistan originally accepted U. S. arms aid with India in mind, not the Russians, and eventually used the weapons in an attack on India. Any military equipment it gets in the future will also be primarily for use against India. Thus American military aid to Pakistan might someday be fighting American economic aid to India. Why then should the United States resume military aid to Pakistan? To the argument that if we don't give it to them the Chinese will, the reply is, "So what?" It is in China's interest to arm Pakistan against India, not ours. And it does not follow that because Pakistan receives Chinese arms aid it will be in China's pocket politically. Sometimes it is argued that the U. S. should at least help Pakistan maintain a minimal military force to meet the needs of internal security, national pride, and so on. This is an attractive, gentlemanly view, but Pakistan will surely not be content with such a force, and so American aid will become the foundation on which Pakistan will build (in fact, rebuild from the damage suffered in the Indo-Pak war) a larger force with arms got elsewhere. This is apparently what the Pakistanis are already doing. Arms and ammunition are reportedly arriving from Iran and Turkey, the Chinese have delivered tanks and planes, and, foreign military observers believe, the government went to the international arms market for spare parts for F-86 fighters and other equipment.

"The United States can't stop Pakistan getting arms," a seasoned diplomat said to me, "nor has it the right to limit the size of Pakistan's military establishment. Every sovereign nation must assess its own security needs." But the United States can, as best it can, try to prevent Pakistan from spending too much on armaments (nothing, say, beyond X percentage of

its gross national product) and from spending foreign exchange from U. S. aid funds on arms. The preventive, again, would be the instant stopping of economic aid. Admittedly, it would be most difficult to detect should Pakistan, for example, take away from economic development programs the foreign exchange it had earned from jute export and spend it for arms, replacing this money with U. S. aid funds. Some of this would certainly occur; in international relations, no system is watertight. In general, however, a good measure of control can be exercised, observers believe.

Pakistan is a pleasant country. Pakistanis are a charming and determined people. They are building a nation in difficult circumstances, and they have made much progress in agricultural and general economic development, especially in the past few years. Yet their view of history can be dangerously narrow and out of focus. Their view of themselves can be too self-centered and self-righteous. It would be unwise for the United States or India to forget this.

Yours sincerely,

Red Austin

Granville Austin

Received in New York September 1, 1966.