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**JW-5
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Jill Winder is a Donors' Fellow of the Institute studying post-reunification Germany through the work and attitudes of its artists.

Not Yet Europe, Part II

By Jill Winder

JANUARY 2005

BERLIN—I returned from Moscow on November 23, after a failed attempt at understanding the boundaries of Europe. Back in Germany, another debate about the meaning of European identity was raging. The brutal murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist on a busy street in Amsterdam in early November led to heated arguments about the failures of multi-cultural integration that began in the Netherlands and quickly spread to other European countries with large immigrant and Muslim populations, particularly France and Germany. It even led some American commentators to (somewhat smugly) note that the real implications of the September 11 attacks and radical Islam had finally come home to roost in Europe.

Theo van Gogh was no stranger to controversy; indeed, he often courted it with his inflammatory statements against everyone from Jews, Muslims and Africans to his personal enemies. So it came as no surprise that when his most recent short film, "Submission" aired on Dutch national television in 2003, radical and mainstream Muslims alike were infuriated. The film, written by Ayhaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born member of the Dutch Parliament who is an outspoken critic of Islam, depicted unveiled and naked Muslim women, some with scarred backs (attributed to domestic violence) and verses from the Koran inscribed on their bodies. After the film aired, van Gogh received numerous death threats and letters of protest from Dutch Muslim clerics, but he refused police protection and stood by the message in his work.

At 8:30 a.m. on November 2, Van Gogh was repeatedly shot and stabbed by his killer. The assailant stuck a five-page note written in both Arabic and Dutch on the victim's chest with a knife, threatening jihad against the West and specifically targeting five prominent Dutch politicians, including Hirsi Ali. The man in custody for van Gogh's murder is Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year-old with Moroccan and Dutch citizenship who has been linked to radical Islamic groups in the Neth-



Still image from "Submission" depicting a veiled woman in a transparent dress. A fragment of a verse from the Koran (in Dutch) appears on the screen. Roughly translated, it reads: "so Allah requires this, if thou believeth in Allah and the Last Day."

erlands. Violence continued for a week after the murder with the retaliatory torching of Muslim and Dutch schools across the country.

To say that most Dutch people (native and immigrant alike) were shocked and horrified by the murder and the subsequent wave of violence is an understatement. In a way, the events symbolize a profound loss of innocence for Dutch society. The Dutch are proud of their reputation as a tolerant, open society with liberal values. The fact that an artist was murdered because of the political content of his work was considered even more upsetting. What was at first reported as a *Dutch* national tragedy very soon became a front-page story in Germany, and led to a discussion about radical Islamic elements in the country and to a broader consideration of the failure to integrate Germany's immigrant and Muslim population.

Dutch Crisis, German Debate

Partly due to the legacy of World War II, Germans are particularly reluctant to criticize specific religious or immigrant communities in the country for fear of being perceived as xenophobic, a reluctance that continued after the September 11 attacks in the United States. Issues of integration and multiculturalism have always been part of the public discussion, but they have generally been couched in moderate language and have taken place on a relatively modest scale. But Theo van Gogh's murder brought the possible consequences of ignoring the radical elements of immigrant communities and religious extremism much closer to home.

The tone in German newspapers that reported the van Gogh story ranged from concern to thinly veiled panic. *Der Spiegel* wrote: "The veil of multiculturalism has been lifted, revealing parallel societies where the law of the state does not apply," while a headline in *The Berliner Zeitung* struck a more dramatic note: "Fear is spreading." The public reaction from prominent Turkish leaders and religious figures has been cautious, with many indicating that they resent being labeled as extremists.

Over 20,000 Muslim Turks took to the streets in Cologne a week following the murder to demonstrate against the violence and show Germans that the majority of them do not support extremism. The demonstrators also called for better integration of the Turkish-German population. The *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* responded positively to the protest: "More than anything, the Cologne demonstration shows that the argument over integration and parallel societies ... is not a cultural battle. It is a political battle ... and it is as divisive an issue within the Muslim community as it is between the Muslims and the Christian-leaning society."

One incident that received widespread news coverage involved a sermon given in mid-November by a Turkish-born imam. A couple of weeks after the van Gogh

murder, a camera team working for a German television network was filming a sermon given by an imam known as Yakup T. in a Berlin Kreuzberg mosque. The team had arranged the filming months in advance as part of a documentary on Turkish Muslims in Berlin, and Yakup T. knew he was being filmed. Nonetheless, his sermon included threats of future violence against "Europe's godless culture" and he called Germans "useless infidels whose armpits stink because they do not wash themselves properly"—a comment that was quoted ad nauseum in the papers as an example of the purported disdain immigrants feel toward Germans.

After the story aired, furious government officials characterized the imam as a "hate preacher" and he was ordered to appear at the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (FOPC), and was interrogated by police officials and immigration law experts. Despite the fact that Yakup T. has been living in Germany for the past 30 years, it is widely believed that the government is attempting to deport him for "incitement to hatred and violence."

The German government is taking steps to address radical religious elements in the German Muslim community, including a plan to classify the 200-plus mosques in the country and identify "extreme" mosques that are considered "centers of radical teaching and recruitment." At present, nearly 100 mosques are considered radical and are under close monitoring. These changes are particularly distressing for Turkish Muslims living in Germany, who tend to regard the country as a kind of Mecca of religious tolerance and feel that they are more free to practice their religion here than in many other European countries. For example, while the wearing of headscarves is banned in France (as well as in Turkey, one should add), there are no federal German laws limiting headscarves. But if the recent comments of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder are any indication, that may soon change. In late November, Schröder publicly announced that he does not believe that Muslim teachers should be allowed to wear headscarves in public schools. This opinion reflects that of five of Germany's sixteen federal states, which recently ruled that headscarves are inappropriate for teachers and other public officials.

German conservatives from the opposition Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and Chancellor Schröder alike called for immigrants to integrate better into German society, to learn German and to familiarize themselves with mainstream culture, German law and democratic principles, insisting that there can be no "culture war" or "parallel societies" in the country. However, the Social Democratic Party's spokesman for domestic policy, Sebastian Edathy, downplayed the current debate, stating that the German government's policy toward immigration and tolerance has always been the same. In an interview in *Der Spiegel*, he stated, "The issue of immigration is a non-stop debate and our position has been clear for years. Whoever lives in Germany must observe our constitu-

tion and learn German, otherwise they won't find much in the way of tolerance."

Many of the recent discussions about integrating immigrants in Germany have been couched in ideological terms, specifically seen in the re-emergence of a demand for a German *Leitkultur*, or dominant and guiding culture. Most people agree that the term began to be used in this context during 2000, during a public discussion about how to come to terms with integrating immigrant populations in Germany. The year 2000 was important in immigration policy reform, when, for example, Germany introduced the concept of *jus solis*, which said that German citizenship is determined by one's place of birth and not by blood. This change had major implications for hundreds of thousands of German-born Turks living in Germany. The use of the term *Leitkultur* is considered controversial because it creates a hierarchy of cultures and, critics say, echoes certain Nazi definitions of a pure "Germanic" culture.

Christian Democratic party leader Joerg Schoenbohm's argument for a German *Leitkultur* is considered particularly inflammatory. He recently told *Der Spiegel*, "In the Middle Ages, ghettos were founded to marginalize the Jews. Today, some of the foreigners who live with us in Germany have founded their own ghettos because they scorn Germans. Those who come here have to adopt the German *Leitkultur*. Our history has developed over a thousand years. We cannot allow this basis of our commonality to be destroyed by foreigners." In an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, a leading Christian Democrat was quoted as saying, "Germany's cultural diversity can only prosper if Europe's *Leitkultur* is accepted. In Germany, that's German culture."

The author of the article attempted to narrow the definition of *Leitkultur* by insisting, "this doesn't mean that people have to be Germanized, but they do have to learn the language, accept the laws of a democracy and the customs developed over generations. Other countries that allow immigration make the same demands." The article further asserted that it is important to develop criteria by which the success of integration can be measured, and to consider whether integration is a sufficient or realistic goal, but concludes: "In this debate it will not be possible to omit the issue of *Leitkultur* and the obligations a self-confident society can demand from those who live in its midst."

While many politicians feel that *Leitkultur* is a term that is too narrow and can lead to intolerance of cultural difference, at least one prominent German Muslim believes that European Muslims must adopt the mainstream culture of the countries in which they live, and argues for the promotion of a "European *Leitkultur*." Bassam Tibi teaches international relations in Germany (he is currently teaching at Harvard) and during the 1990s was one of the first political scientists to warn of serious conflicts in Europe if the Muslim population was not better inte-

grated. In his work, Tibi uses the term *Leitkultur* to refer to European values and culture that he insists immigrants need to adopt. In an interview in *Der Spiegel* on November 26th, Tibi was asked to comment on the resurgence of the term *Leitkultur* in Germany and the difference between a specifically German *Leitkultur* and the broader "European *Leitkultur*" he advocates. Tibi replied:

There is a huge difference between these terms. I have always emphasized how dangerous it is to talk about a specifically German Leitkultur. There are a number reasons for this. First of all, the problem we are taking about here is a European problem. One only needs to look at the Netherlands and the murder of Theo van Gogh to see that. Thus, we also need a European value structure. Any other approach would lead to a German "special path" and that is completely unadvisable. The important thing is that the line doesn't run between Europe and Islam, but between all open societies and their enemies. I myself am Muslim and I stand on the side of an open society. Democratic Muslims like myself can push for a European Leitkultur and against its enemies.

Adding to these discussions was the debate about Turkey and the European Union, which led up to the December 18 announcement in Brussels that Turkey would be invited to begin full membership negotiations. While opinion polls suggest that a majority of people in nearly all the EU countries (including 60 percent of Germans, according to a recent poll) oppose Turkish membership, Chancellor Schröder has been an avid supporter of Turkish entry, a position that is considered politically risky. This stance may seem surprising because Germany, with the largest Turkish population in the Union, stands to be uniquely affected by Turkey's future EU membership. It would, for example, become the likely destination of choice for Turks seeking employment in the EU.

Chancellor Schröder and other prominent German politicians have argued that Turkish membership in the EU may be the only way to ease tensions between the Muslim world and the West, and could help to discourage the development of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan echoed these sentiments a week before the Brussels decision by saying that keeping Turkey out of the EU would be "harmful for integration and could well lead to the exact opposite result. It could also increase the power of radical elements who would be given yet another reason to pit Muslims against Europe."

This argument is widely criticized, particularly by the Christian Democrats, who are fundamentally opposed to Turkey's EU membership. Edmund Stoiber, a Christian Democrat who lost to Schröder in the last election, reiterated the conservative position, threatening, "When we are in government in 2006 we will do everything, in conjunction with partners like France, to prevent full Turkish membership in the EU." Angela Merkel, the leading Christian Democrat and Schröder's likely

opponent in next year's elections, has gone even further, saying that a "yes vote for Turkey would be a catastrophe" and would prevent the EU from ever functioning as an integrated political body. She also made the controversial argument that Turkey's membership would mark the first time that the European Union had taken in a nation outside its "historical, cultural, religious and geographical borders."

Germany's (lack of) Integration Policy

According to 2004 government statistics, Germany's population is 82.5 million. Of that number 7.3 million are foreign, non-citizen residents. Two-thirds of Germany's foreign residents have been in the country more than eight years, and 20 percent were born in Germany. Under 2002 reforms in German immigration law, both groups can now qualify for citizenship, although data are lacking on how many immigrants have filed citizenship applications because of the changes. An estimated 3.2 million Muslims live in Germany, 2.5 million of whom are Turks.

Germany's large Turkish population is an inheritance of post-World War II reconstruction policy. From the 1950s to the 1970s, tens of thousands of foreign workers were imported—first from Italy, then in greater numbers from Turkey—to fuel West Germany's "economic miracle" by providing manpower and a workforce for primarily blue-collar jobs like construction. Such a person was called a *gastarbieter*, or "guest worker", and the documents and permits that allowed a guest worker to live and work in Germany had fixed time limits. The West German government provided little to no assistance to these temporary workers because it was assumed that they would eventually return home.

The policy, as it were, was a non-policy. The official stance was that there was no need to encourage or facilitate their integration into German society. As Rita Suessmuth, former head of the Federal Committee on Immigration told *Der Spiegel*, "Integration was never the goal. The idea was that the immigrants would return home. For years we allowed and even supported this sort of side-by-side living."

For immigrants, learning to speak the language of their new homeland is one of the most important keys to integration. It sounds like an obvious point, but to provide just one example of how long it has taken for the German government to respond to some of the most basic needs of immigrants, state-sponsored German language classes have been mandatory for all new immigrants only since *January 1, 2005*. To compare this lack of integration policy with the Dutch system, for example, is to realize just how far Germany lags behind in a coherent, standardized system for assisting immigrants.

Last month, I was speaking with my friend Maria about the Theo van Gogh murder. Maria is a Slovak citi-

zen who is married to a Dutch man. When she moved to the Netherlands in 1999, she was required by law to enroll in a rigorous and time-consuming course for new immigrants. If she had refused to take this course, or had failed the tests required to pass, her application for long-term residency would have been denied. Maria attended over ten hours of class per week for nearly a year, where students studied Dutch language, Dutch history and culture, the Dutch system of government and multi-cultural tolerance. The classes also included practical assistance like job-training and job-placement advice. When I told Maria that German language classes had been mandatory for new immigrants only since the beginning of this year, she was astonished.

The government is only now developing organized integration assistance for German immigrants. In December, German Interior Minister Otto Schily announced the creation of an integration course (quite similar to the one found in the Netherlands) that will be mandatory for new immigrants starting in 2005. This year the federal government will provide 208 million Euros (US\$270 million) to establish the program. Instruction will begin with an intensive German-language course, followed by "integration" classes covering German law, history and culture. The course will include 630 hours of instruction, 600 of which will be dedicated to language training. The participants in the integration course will be charged approximately one Euro (US\$1.30) per instruction hour, but individuals on welfare or unemployment rolls will be exempt from paying these fees.

To Heinz Buschkowsky, mayor of the Berlin Neukölln neighborhood, thirty-three percent of which is made up of immigrants, these measures are too little, too late. In an interview with Charles Hawley published in *Der Spiegel* in December, Buschkowsky blamed the failure of integration on Germans' commonly held assumption that integration would naturally happen over time. "We in Germany have completely forgotten that integration is a process requiring action from both sides. We have simply assumed that second- and third-generation immigrants would just become more German. But to expect someone from a foreign culture to abandon his culture is wrong."

The mayor also noted that if the state does not actively support integration, it ends up paying for neglecting immigrants in very tangible ways. In his district, for example, the unemployment rate among Turks is between 35 and 40 percent and Neukölln spends nearly 60 percent of its budget on social security and welfare payments. Even more shocking, nearly 70 percent of school children in Neukölln either never finish school or barely pass the texts required for graduation. Only five percent of the students who do finish the equivalent of high school go on to enroll in job-training programs. And it is estimated that as many as 80 percent of Neukölln's Turkish residents cannot speak German, despite the fact that many of them are second- or third-genera-

tion Turks born in Germany.

Parallel Societies—Istanbul in Berlin

Statistics, while interesting, can tell only one part of the story. In order to experience how the Turkish immigrant community exists both inside and outside mainstream German society, all I have to do is walk out of my apartment.

I live in Kreuzberg 36, a district that has been at the center of many of the city's transformations before and after 1989, and one of the most Turkish neighborhoods in Berlin. Kreuzberg was on the far-eastern border of the old West Berlin, and the Berlin Wall's path ran just across the Spree River, separating the west from the eastern district of Friedrichshain and the monumental Socialist boulevard, Stalinallee (now Karl-Marx-Alle). When the West-German government accepted hundreds of thousands of *gastarbeiter* from Turkey in the 1950s and 60s, nearly all of them settled in Kreuzberg where they remain to this day. Kottbusser Tor, a few blocks from my apartment, commonly called "Little Istanbul," is filled with small Turkish shops, markets and stores selling exotic spices and wonderful baklava—not to mention the ubiquitous Turkish doner kebab shops all over the city, which are as "classically" Berlin as stands selling bratwurst.

Although Turks and Germans alike patronize most



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Turkish-owned shops, a number of establishments in the neighborhood cater to a Turkish clientele. For example, professional photography studios specialize in taking traditional Turkish wedding portraits behind elaborate backdrops of Turkish beaches or idyllic Turkish village scenes. Turkish travel agencies deal exclusively with trips to Turkey and, for a large fee, will navigate the Kafkaesque German bureaucracy to acquire visas and permissions needed to bring relatives to Germany under the patronage of Turkish-German family members.

Signs everywhere indicate a large Muslim community in the neighborhood. Nearly all Turkish women I see



(right) Kottbusser Tor, the center of "Little Istanbul" in Kreuzberg 36. (above) One of hundreds of kebab take-away shops in Kreuzberg





A travel agency in Kreuzberg specializing in travel to and from Turkey. When I went in to inquire about flights to Istanbul, no German-speaking employees were in the office.

on the street or in shops are veiled, and most of the older women wear a traditional heavy black robe covering their clothes. On the corner of a major intersection, a large sign announces the construction of an elaborate, traditional mosque that will serve the local congregation.

Many private religious associations in Kreuzberg offer spiritual instruction and foster community ties within various immigrant communities. On one recent walk around the neighborhood, I came across ten different associations for specific groups, such as Iraqi Muslims, Kurdish Muslims or the more inclusive Turkish-Islamic

Union. Many private “clubs” run by Turkish Muslim men are registered as community centers, but often double as prayer rooms or cafes. Women and non-members are forbidden to enter these spaces.

Kreuzberg is as good an example as any of the kind of “side-by-side” living that Rita Suessmuth referred to earlier in this article.

My “interaction” with the Turks in the neighborhood is probably no different than most Germans’, which is to say that I constantly encounter Turks but never get to know them. When I have a craving for something sweet, I often find myself in a Turkish bakery buying a honey-coated nest of shredded phyllo dough filled with chopped, candied pistachios—a regional variation of baklava from eastern Turkey. When I want to buy fresh vegetables at budget prices, I take a five-minute walk to neighboring Neukölln to visit the Turkish market where I can buy a kilo (2.2 pounds) of vine-ripened tomatoes for 1 Euro (US\$1.30) or a large bunch of fresh mint for 50 Euro cents (US\$.60)—less than half of what these items cost at a German supermarket. I go to local Turkish grocers to buy spices or nuts in bulk, to pick up dense, white cubes of sweet feta cheese for less than one Euro or to bring home a large bouquet of fresh flowers for under 4 Euro (US\$5). And when my Dutch or American friends visit, I usually take them to Hasir, my favorite Turkish restaurant in the area. We sit near the open grill where Turkish cooks prepare spicy kebabs under a framed picture of Atatürk, the founder of modern, secular Turkey. In the smoky, onion-scented air we feast on grilled lamb,



The future home of a large Turkish Muslim mosque that is being built on Wienerstrasse in Kreuzberg.



The entrance to the Turkish-Islamic Union in Kreuzberg 36.

chickpea paste and flat bread dotted with black and white sesame seeds. To finish things off, we slowly sip traditional Turkish coffee as thick as tar, incongruously served in a delicate glass cup decorated with gold filigree.

Although all of my German friends have been known to shop in Turkish stores and are certainly known to have picked up an occasional doner kebab for a quick lunch, I don't know anyone who has a close friend that is Turkish. Aside from the Turks I encounter in various restaurants and shops, I've never met a Turkish person at a party or art opening. I don't think that this social divide is the product of racism, per se, but rather is indicative of how little the average German person interacts with the Turkish people in their midst (and vice versa).

The reasons for this are complex, ranging from cultural norms and traditional gender roles to linguistic divides. I think this is particularly true in the case of Turkish women, who, if they belong to a traditional family, are often discouraged (or even forbidden) from forming friendships with, or even talking to, foreigners. Over the course of two weeks, I attempted to chat with some of these people from whom I've been buying produce, flowers and bread for the last few months. I'm a "regular" in many of the local Turkish stores, and I wondered how difficult it would be to try to find out a bit more about these people I saw a few times a week. It turned out to be nearly impossible. Most people I tried to speak to were polite but tight-lipped, even after I told them that I was working on an essay about the Turkish population in the neighborhood and was simply interested in hearing some of the stories of locals.

The place where I did have some luck was at my German-language school. I take intensive German classes at

the Berliner Sprachschule Institut (BSI) in Berlin Neukölln, about a ten-minute walk from my apartment. It is a unique place that was founded in the 1970s by left-leaning community activists who lived in the neighborhood and felt that there were no reasonably priced private schools where Turkish immigrants could go to learn German. Well before "multicultural integration" was a political buzzword, this group wanted to do something concrete to contribute to the area.

I was first attracted to BSI because of its reasonable prices—at 150 Euros (US\$195) per month for an intensive course that runs three hours per day, five days a week, it is the cheapest private language school in the city. But I soon learned that besides the price and the school's competent teachers, there was another advantage to attending BSI: of the hundreds of students enrolled in classes at any given time, only a handful of them are native English-speakers. The diversity of the school allows me to meet people from all over the world, and to speak with them (in and outside class) almost exclusively in German.

About five Turkish students are in my class (considerably fewer than in previous classes). After getting to know everyone in the class, and after the collective bonding forced upon us by endless German grammar lessons, I managed to convince two Turkish female classmates to have lunch with me and share their stories. Ayse and Pelin are from very different backgrounds. Ayse was born and raised in Istanbul. The daughter of a well-to-do Turkish businessman and a doctor, Ayse had the luxury of growing up in a very progressive family that encouraged her to go to university and to choose her own mate.

Ayse told me that she has many friends from religious families who were pulled out of school as early as 12 and 13 and were forced to agree to arranged marriages a few years later. This is still a common practice in much of Turkey. Ayse studied architecture at a university in Istanbul and then accepted an invitation from her aunt



Shop window of a Turkish-owned grocery near Kottbuser Tor.

and uncle to live in Berlin with them, learn German and eventually apply to the Technical University to continue her studies (she will have to take another degree in Architecture to be able to practice outside Turkey).

At age 24, unmarried and educated, Ayse is an exception in the local Turkish community, and has had budding friendships fall apart when the parents of women from more traditional families learned that their daughters were spending time with Ayse. When I asked if she thought that the Turkish community here was isolated or disenfranchised by the system, Ayse said: "If people who have lived in Germany for twenty years still don't speak German, how can they expect to feel at home? The point of immigrating is not to rebuild your home country in the new one; it is to find some balance between your past and your present. You can't live in Germany and act like you're in Turkey! I can't believe that my aunt and uncle have managed to survive for thirty-five years with almost no German. I feel like if they don't know German people or don't want to, that is what they have chosen."

Pelin tells a completely different story. Much of the public debate about integration has centered on second- or third-generation German-born Turks, and the fact that many of them have integrated as little as their parents and grandparents. Pelin's grandfather, a carpenter by trade, moved to Germany with his wife in 1960 at the age of 20. He was encouraged to do so by a distant cousin who came to Germany with one of the first groups of Turkish *gastarbieter*. He settled in Kreuzberg and immediately found work reinforcing the foundations of houses that had been damaged during World War II. As early as the 1960s, a well-established Turkish immigrant community was settled in the city, and workers could effectively bypass learning German by working on Turkish construction crews and shopping in Turkish stores.

Pelin's father, born in 1965, went briefly to German schools, but dropped out at age 14 to work as a construction worker with his father. He was married at 18 to a Turkish girl from his father's home village who was sent to Germany at 16. Although Pelin's grandparents were Muslim, they were not particularly religious or traditional. Pelin's father, however, insisted on building a traditional Muslim hierarchy in the household. Pelin told me that although her father speaks passable German, he has never allowed her mother to learn it. Pelin and her three siblings (all brothers) were sent to local German schools but she told me that many of her teachers were Turkish-Germans who held much of class in Turkish (which is not allowed by German law).

I was most astonished by the fact that although she has attended German public school all her life, Pelin can only speak rudimentary German and cannot read or write German at all (during our lunch Pelin spoke mostly in Turkish and Ayse translated for me). When her grades began to fail at age 12 (mostly because she could no longer follow the lessons), her father pulled her out of school. Next year, when Pelin turns 17, she will marry a Turkish man she has never met, in a deal arranged by her father and relatives in Turkey. Pelin told me that the only reason her father is allowing her to attend German classes is that one of the conditions of the arranged marriage (outlined by her future in-laws) is that Pelin be able to speak enough German to translate for her non-German-speaking husband, who, while keen to live in Germany, has no intention of learning the German language.

In private, Pelin told me that she wishes she had more say in her life, but is resigned to her fate. She is just one example of hundreds of thousands of German-born Turks (particularly women) who are forced by their families and community to live within a parallel Turkish society that has no desire to integrate with mainstream German culture. Indeed, a significant segment of Germany's Turkish population prefers to retain its own culture, religion, language and traditions in perhaps an even more fundamental way than it is retained in Turkey itself. This is certainly the impasse that German lawmakers and Germans themselves must come to terms with, and it raises the question of whether integration, at least as many Germans imagine it, is an impossibly high goal. □

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