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A NOTE ON YUGOSLAVIA

by Fred Warner Neal

"Yugoslavia" means the land of the South Slavs, who--except for the Bulgarians--are mainly included within its borders. These are chiefly the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. Yugoslavia is the heart of the Balkans and one of the most beautiful countries in Europe. Its history and its conglomeration of peoples, languages, religions, institutions, and landscapes combine to make it also perhaps the most complex. Its importance and interest are currently highlighted by its unique position as a Communist state outside the Soviet Community, and by the new theoretical and institutional developments since 1950 that the Yugoslavs believe are charting a new form of socialism.

The Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia is divided into six constituent republics, generally following the lines of the major national groupings of the country. These are Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Serbia, the largest republic, also has attached to it the Autonomous Province of Voivodina, which is the center of the Magyar minority, and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija, which contain the bulk of the Shiptar (Albanian) minority. The peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnically are largely Croatian, although there is a large Turkish minority there as well as in Macedonia. The Turks of Macedonia, however, are less well assimilated into the Slav cultural patterns than those of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and many of them are currently being repatriated to Turkey.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS

In addition to the national differences, the complexion of Yugoslavia is colored by major religious divisions as well as by many national minorities. The Slovenes and the Croats are Roman Catholic, and the Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians are Orthodox. Both Orthodox and Roman Catholics, as well as a large Muslim group, are found in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These religious differences play an important part in the particularism that has long plagued Yugoslavia.

The total population of Yugoslavia, as reported in the 1953 census, is 16,927,275. The religious composition of the population (1948 census) is as follows:

Orthodox	49.53	per cent
Roman Catholic	36.70	" "
Muslim	12.52	" "
Other Christian	1.14	" "
Jewish	0.04	" "
Miscellaneous	0.07	" "

follows: The numerical breakdown of national groupings is as

Serbs*	6,547,190
Croats	3,784,960
Slovenes	1,415,214
Macedonians	809,613
Montenegrins	425,697
Shiptars (Albanians)	750,483
Hungarians	496,493
Wallachs	102,947
Turks	98,001
Slovaks	83,624
Italians	79,573
Gypsies	72,671
Rumanians	64,092
Bulgars	61,160
Germans	55,328
Czechs	39,014
Russenes	37,168
(Ruthenians and Ukrainians)	
Russians	20,065
Greeks	1,897

Among the Yugoslavs themselves, language differences exist but are not really important divisive forces. The language of the Serbs and Croats--Serbo-Croat--is essentially one language, despite its varying dialects and the fact that Serbian is written in the Cyrillic alphabet. Slovenian, while quite similar, is a separate language, more akin in some ways to Slovak. Macedonian is somewhere between Serbian and Bulgarian and is written in Cyrillic.

Yugoslavia as a nation has existed only since 1918, when the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed at the end of the First World War. It became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1928. During the Second World War it was parceled out among the Axis Powers.

GEOGRAPHY

Yugoslavia has an area of approximately 100,000 square miles, 34.5 per cent of which is contained within the Republic of

* In contrast, the 1953 census shows the population of the Republic of Serbia to be 4,460,405, and this includes many non-Serbs.

Serbia. It is approximately the size of the United Kingdom, or the size of the states of New York and Pennsylvania combined. Geographically the country is dominated by mountains, rivers, and sea. About 75 per cent of its territory consists of rugged mountains and plateaus. The principal ranges are the Alpines of Slovenia; the Dinara, running across part of Croatia and down into Bosnia-Herzegovina; and the Sharas (part of the Balkan Mountains) of Eastern Serbia and Macedonia. The great plain in the North, running from Northern Croatia to the Danube, is known as the Pannonian Basin and is a fertile agricultural area. There are three major river systems: that flowing to the Black Sea, that flowing to the Aegean, and that flowing to the Adriatic. The largest rivers are the Yugoslav part of the Danube, 369 miles long; the Sava, 587 miles long; the Morava, 355 miles long; and the Drina, the Drava, and the Vardar. The basins of the Morava and the Vardar cut deep corridors into the mountains of Eastern Serbia and Macedonia. The Adriatic Sea, forming Yugoslavia's southwestern border, gives proximate areas of the country a subtropical, Mediterranean climate, contrasting with the Continental climate of the plains areas and the Alpine climate of the mountain ranges.

Yugoslavia's foreign political problems are aggravated by the fact that it borders seven countries. While its dispute with Austria over Carinthia is not of serious proportions, the controversy with Italy over Trieste--and involving the United States and Great Britain as occupying powers--has been a major factor in European politics. Its disputes with the Soviet satellite countries to the East and to the South are not so much geographical as political, and almost-constant border incidents have been the rule since 1948. Although it has no actual border with Turkey, Yugoslavia is allied with Turkey and Greece in a Balkan Pact that is the easternmost bulwark against Soviet military power.

Few countries illustrate as clearly as Yugoslavia the impact of geography on human and social institutions. Generally speaking, the people of the plains--traditional agriculturists--are of a type different from the people of the mountains, who have traditionally been warriors, hunters, and herdsmen. Dinko Tomasić is one of those who believe that this disparity of type is the central fact of Yugoslav life. The chief social institution of the plains-people traditionally was the zadruga or cooperative farm household, in which a number of families participated; while the individual household, or kucha, obtained among the mountain people. Those who emphasize these different ways of life among the South Slavs contend that leaders seeking political and military power have come from the mountain societies, while peace-loving, "power-indifferent" people have come from the zadruga society. Certainly the old fighters for Slav independence--as well as the core of the wartime fighters--seem to have come from the so-called "Dinaric" or mountain society. The most sharply-defined example of this type of society is in Montenegro, which is entirely mountainous. On the other hand, Tito himself is a product of a zadruga of Northern Croatia.

To this observer, it seems that historical influences are of equal importance in explaining the various Yugoslav peoples. But religion as part of historical influences, must be counted for the two are inextricably mixed. Religious divisions, however, are themselves influenced by geography. Surely it is not entirely accidental that the westernmost areas--Slovenia and Croatia--are the most completely Roman Catholic ones. There is a large Orthodox minority in Croatia, however, and in the past Orthodox Croats have often regarded themselves as Serbs. The Roman Catholic Church has proselytized vigorously in the Croatian areas for a thousand years. Croatia was one of the places where the ancient Bogomil heresy took root. The efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to stamp it out were doubtless a factor in the switch of many to Mohammedanism when the Turks seized Bosnia-Hercegovina in the 15th century. The large Muslim minority is centered in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and the Kosmet province of Serbia. Turkish influence is strong in these areas and throughout Serbia generally. The Serbian language still contains many Turkish words and expressions.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The history of the Yugoslavs is a long history of dissension among themselves and of domination by foreign powers. Although the Slovenes, rooted in the foothills of the Julian Alps, were not separated from the Croats geographically, they became separated politically at an early date because of Germanic domination. The Croats and the Serbs, divided geographically, were divided politically as well. From the early 12th century, Croatia was an adjunct of Hungary, although technically it always kept its political entity. Serbia, long under the influence of Byzantium, had established Orthodoxy as its state religion in the 12th Century. About this time, the Dalmatian Coast area, dominated by the ancient Republic of Dubrovnik, was taken over by Venice.

Serbia was thus the major independent South Slav state. During the Middle Ages it had an advanced and flourishing culture of its own, with fine religious art and architecture. Ancient Serbia reached its peak under the so-called Great Serbian Empire of Tsar Dušan. It included Macedonia down to Salonica, Bulgaria, Albania, and parts of Greece. Dušan was crowned Tsar of the Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, and Albanians at Skopje in 1356. At the same time a separate Serbian patriarchate was established at Pech. In the meantime, the Hungarians had taken the Dalmatian Coast from Venice and seized most of what is now Bosnia-Hercegovina. Dušan, however, defeated the Hungarians in the northeast and took the city of Belgrade.

Then began the Turkish drive to the north. The Sultans were able to exploit discord among the various South Slav princes. At the battle of Kossovo Polje in 1389, the Turks annihilated the Serbs, putting an end to Serbian independence for 500 years. Sixty years later, all of Serbia was taken into the Ottoman Empire, followed soon by Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro.

Under the long period of foreign control, there were important institutional differences among the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, which help to explain some of their later history. Slovenia was Yugoslav only in that the people were Slovenians. There were no Slovenian nobility, administrative class, or culture; they were entirely German. Croatia, as stated, retained its legal political entity as a part of Hungary. The Croatian nobles in effect signed a pact with the Magyars to administer the country for them. Thus the ruling class remained in large part Croat; and although there was frequent dissension as Magyar pressures increased, the Magyar and later the Austro-Hungarian regimes were more or less stable. In Serbia, however, the old Serbian nobility was practically erased. The country was hurled from a comparatively high level of culture into the most oppressive kind of exploitation from Constantinople. But the Serbian Orthodox Church remained and helped to keep alive the idea of a Serbia. So oppressive was Turkish rule that in self-defense guerrilla opposition not only became acceptable in what remained of Serbian society but also became in fact a badge of distinction. Nearly every Serbian family at one time or another contributed recruits to the Hajduks, or insurgents, against the Turks. Especially in the rugged mountains of Montenegro the guerrilla activity flourished, and the Turks were never able to stamp it out. As Austrian and Russian pressure on the Turks accelerated, the Sultan in desperation granted independence to Montenegro in 1799--and then in 1804 he was unable to cope with the Serbian revolt led by Karageorge. Although Karageorge was defeated a few years later, Miloš Obrenović led a second revolt which culminated ultimately in restoration of Serbian independence in 1878 after the Russo-Turkish War.

Although there were Pan-Slavists even before this time, the idea of Pan-Slavism soon gave way to the concept of Greater Serbia. The religious conflict between the Orthodox Serbs and the Roman Catholic Croats served to accelerate the Serbs' efforts toward self-identification. The conflict was complicated by the fact that in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (now taken by the Habsburgs from the Turks and administered as a part of Croatia) there were many Orthodox. During the long period of Turkish domination, the Orthodox had identified themselves with Serbian resistance and tended to regard themselves as Serbs. They now provided a sort of "fifth column" for Serbian aspirations and looked to Serbia to protect them against strong-arm proselytizing by the Roman Catholics. The clash between Serbia and Austria-Hungary over Bosnia-Herzegovina--culminating in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo and in World War I--was accompanied by some misgivings and reservations on the part of the Roman Catholic majority of Croatia.

However, with the destruction of the Dual Monarchy after World War I, unity of the Yugoslavs was the only possible course. Serbia, which had fought magnificently against the Austrians and had an established independence as well as a ruling house, was still the leader. That the new state of Yugoslavia was dominated completely by Serbia and the Serbs was galling to

many Croats, who considered that--because of their Western heritage, higher living standards, and cultural traditions--they were superior. The religious conflicts accentuated particularism; and indeed both the Orthodox clergy of Serbia and the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Croatia promoted particularism of a kind in which religion and political power were inextricably interwoven.

The "Croat question" dominated much of the life of the new state. After the national election of 1923, the Croat deputies, under Stefan Radić, refused to take part in the Skupština, or parliament. Radić was imprisoned shortly thereafter, and his Croat Peasant Party--which completely dominated Croatian politics--was outlawed. He was released six months later and reentered the cabinet. In 1928, Radić was shot and the Croats again withdrew, demanding a federal constitution. King Alexander's answer was to proclaim a royal dictatorship, to abolish all political parties, and to arrest Vladimir Maček, the new Croat leader. For this the king answered with his life. An operative of the Croat terrorist organization, the Ustaši--who also worked in collaboration with Macedonian extremists--assassinated him in 1934 at Marseilles. The Yugoslav government charged that Italy and Hungary were also implicated.

After the death of King Alexander, the Croatian Peasant Party offered to cooperate with a new government, and Maček was pardoned. In 1939, he became vice-premier, and Croatia received cultural and economic autonomy.

That was the situation on the eve of World War II.

When, in March 1941, Prince Paul's Regency allied Yugoslavia with the Axis, the army led a popular Serbian uprising against it and replaced Paul with young King Peter II. A week or so later, Croatia--under Maček--joined the Serbs in a general mobilization. But when the Axis Powers struck, the Yugoslav army was completely incapable of withstanding the blow. In short order, Yugoslavia was parceled out among Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. A much-truncated Serbia remained under German occupation. Slovenia was divided up between Italy and Germany. And a "Free Croatia" puppet state was set up under the Ustaši leader, Ante Pavelić.

WARTIME RESISTANCE

Now began the famous Yugoslav resistance operations. First, King Peter's minister of war, Draža Mihailović, organized the resistance of the so-called Četniks, who were chiefly Serbian supporters of the monarchy. Soon thereafter the Communist-led Partizan movement of Marshall Tito began its operations. Tito gained many supporters among the Croats, because the men under Mihailović conducted many of their operations against the Croats in general rather than against the pro-Nazis only. Tito and the Mihailović forces at first fought the Axis armies and the Croatian Ustaši, and they also fought among themselves. Gradually, how-

ever, the conflict with the Partizans occupied Mihailović more and more. Mihailović was in some ways a Yugoslav Chiang Kai-shek. A militant patriot and nationalist of the old school and the official representative of the royal regime, he was hard put to decide who was the worst enemy of the things he stood for, the Nazi-Fascists or the Tito Communists. This hesitation was fatal. More and more Yugoslavs, irrespective of politics, flocked to Tito's banner. Especially after Winston Churchill threw the weight of the Allies to their side, the Partizans became the major Yugoslav resistance force. They fought magnificently, against overwhelming odds. The sometimes fantastically-cruel reprisals of the Germans and Italians, rather than frightening the population, rallied them around the Partizans even more. Although Communist-led, the Partizans were more a fighting organization than a political one. With considerable Allied material aid and almost no assistance from the Russians until late in the war, Tito and his Partizans themselves drove off the Italians and Germans and emerged masters of the country.



TITO

Serbs and Croats--and of course the other national groups--cooperated in fighting the invaders. However, early Cetnik operations against the Croats forced many Croats to join Pavlič's Ustaši in self-defense. Conversely, the Ustaši responded with the most violent reprisals against the Serbs. Since in Croatia this tended to include all Orthodox, a religious angle was injected into the feud. In some cases, the Roman Catholic clergy lent its support to Ustaši forces, and thousands of instances of forced conversion were reported. This kind of activity was a factor in the trial of the Croatian Archbishop (now Cardinal) Stepinac, which had such repercussions among the Western countries.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE USSR

Tito's Communist-led Partizans hastened to set up a Socialist state in Yugoslavia after the pattern of the Peoples' Democracies that were being established throughout Eastern Europe under Soviet auspices. There were, however, these important differences:

1. The Yugoslav Communists themselves organized the state and established themselves in power, without primary assistance from the USSR, and they commanded an experienced and loyal army.

2. Because of the popular support engendered by the nationalist Partizan movement, the Tito Communists had backing in the country which extended far beyond actual Party members. This backing was organized into a People's Front, which governed the country as a façade for the Communist Party.

3. Yugoslavia attempted to set up a complete Socialist state right from the start, while other Eastern European countries, directed by the USSR, proceeded from stage to stage to reach political and economic socialism gradually.

These were important factors in the celebrated dispute between Yugoslavia and the Cominform that broke into the open in June 1948. Actually, however, the roots of this controversy go farther back. Even during the '20's, the Yugoslav Communist leadership (underground, as the Party was illegal) was in hot water with the Comintern in Moscow. The leadership was accused of nationalist deviation, and the party's ideological level was constantly criticized. It was in one of the several purges of Yugoslav Communist leaders over these matters that Tito became Secretary of the Party in 1937.

During the late war, relations between Tito's Partizans and Moscow were never close. Moscow, catering to British and American opinion apparently, refused to recognize until late in the war that the Yugoslav Communists were actually an effective force against the Germans. Supply difficulties kept the Russians from giving extensive aid, and of course it was the West which helped insure Tito's success against both Mihailović and the Axis. The Yugoslav Communists, it is related by Vladimir Dedijer (Tito's biographer), felt "sick at heart" because of this treatment by Moscow. The situation was aggravated when Stalin, without consulting Tito, agreed that leaders of the government in exile should participate in the first postwar government and made a deal with the British to "share" influence in Yugoslavia.

In setting up their Socialist state, however, the Yugoslavs as a matter of course asked for and received the aid of Soviet experts. Joint companies were formed for air and river transport, and others were planned. It was apparent early that these were of benefit to the USSR at Yugoslavia's expense. Based on promises of Russian largess, Yugoslav trade was oriented entirely to the USSR and the satellite states.

Now these were the conditions of the satellite states in general. If the Yugoslav Communists in fact chafed under them more than their comrades elsewhere in Eastern Europe did, they carefully concealed the fact. To the eye, Yugoslavia appeared to be the very model of a Soviet satellite. But the Yugoslav Communists, because of their stronger internal position and because they owned their positions to their own rather than Soviet efforts, were able to be more independent. Actually, they did not utilize this advantage to any serious degree. But they did ask for various changes in Soviet economic policy. They did remonstrate against Soviet enlistment of Yugoslav citizens to spy

on them. Their generals did not always follow the opinions of their Russian advisers. And, more important, they proceeded on their own path of internal and external development without always consulting the Russians first. As Tito cut more and more of a figure in Eastern Europe, Stalin and the Politburo began to have doubts as to how loyally the Yugoslavs were committed to the first principle of Soviet communism: What is good for the USSR is good for world communism.

In the meantime, the USSR had formed the Cominform, with one of its chief purposes being the stamping out of just such heresies of independence as were becoming evident in Belgrade. When Yugoslavia showed some signs of a unilateral approach to the matter of a Balkan Federation, Moscow decided it was time to bring Tito to heel.

In the ensuing exchange of correspondence between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Party officials, Tito was charged with every imaginable kind of deviation and theoretical malpractice. Instead of following immediately the usual Communist practice of admitting everything and promising to do better, Tito questioned the charges against him. When this happened, Moscow knew that, from its point of view, the Yugoslavs could be relied on no longer. In publishing the correspondence and in subsequently expelling the Yugoslav Party from the Cominform, Moscow was in effect washing its hands of the whole Yugoslav development.

It is significant to note here that, although Yugoslav insistence on independence contributed to the showdown, what really happened was not that Tito withdrew or "escaped" from the Cominform but that the USSR expelled him, much against his will. Whether it did so because of its emphasis on the importance of ideological purity or because of a mistaken hope that "loyal" Yugoslav Communists would replace Tito with a leader subservient to the Kremlin continues to be debated. In any event, Tito and his cohorts were shocked almost beyond belief at the Soviet action and tried their best for some time to get back in Soviet good graces. At the Yugoslav Party Congress immediately following the break, Tito pledged allegiance to Stalin and the USSR, and reiterated time and again the hope that the dispute would be patched up amiably. At the Danube Conference, after their expulsion, the Yugoslavs continued to vote with the Russians on actions clearly against their own interests and refused to admit that an unbridgeable chasm existed.

This period of inability to do anything but continue to talk and act the same as they did while a Soviet satellite continued for a year. The Yugoslav Communists--born and bred to believe that Stalin and the USSR were invariably right in all things, but now forced by circumstances into a position of opposition to Stalin and the USSR--suffered from a sort of political schizophrenia. Then, finally, they pulled themselves together and took action which produced one of the most amazing political developments of our time.

"TITOIST" YUGOSLAVIA

First, the Yugoslav Communists had to come forward with an ideological basis for their position as a Communist nation outside the Stalinist community. The answer to this was that the Yugoslavs were, after all, genuine Marxists-Leninists, but not Stalinists. Stalinism was itself a deviation from true Communism. Freed then from the necessity of conforming to Soviet practices, the Yugoslav Communists developed a new outlook not only on Communism in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union but on Marxism and the world generally. They began to take an attitude in discussions with Westerners different from the impervious, suspicious and hostile attitude typical of Moscow. They frankly admitted having been "duped" by Soviet ideas, and some of them went so far in these testimonials that it was reminiscent of confessions at the Communist purge trials.

By 1950, the Yugoslav Communists began formulating their new theories into institutional law. In this, a leading role was played by Edvard Kardelj, vice president of the Federal Executive Council and leading Party ideologist; Moše Pijade, the grand old man of Yugoslav Communism,"; the academician, Professor Jovan Djordjević; and, of course, Tito himself. As of 1954, they have worked out not only a new ideology but also a new system of government and economy which include institutions radically different from those found in any other country. These reforms are based on the general idea that the Soviet deviation from true Communism resulted from the creation in the USSR of an independent Communist bureaucracy which was able to establish a dictatorship not for, but over, the proletariat and the masses of people. Therefore, instead of the state apparatus "withering away," as Marxist theology foretells, the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union has not only perpetuated itself but has become stronger and bigger, with no end to the growing process in sight. The nationalization of industry and management by the state, according to the new Yugoslav dogma, is only the first, and the lowest, form of socialism. Yugoslavia is now "passing gradually to a higher form of socialist ownership," in which workers and peasants, rather than the government bureaucracy, will control and manage the factories and the farms. In the process, the Yugoslavs insist, the state is in fact withering away.



EDVARD KARDELJ
Yugoslavia's Ideological
Pilot

To achieve this, the Yugoslavs have instituted these reforms:

All of these developments have meant a drift away from the rigid, police-state dictatorship that existed before 1950. There is unquestionably more political freedom, and a new criminal code sharply curbs the activities of the UDBA (political police) and gives the courts more independence. Since 1948, arrests of political prisoners have decreased sharply. The new freedom does not, however, extend to supporters of the Cominform.

The religious situation seems to have become stabilized, too. The official press frequently still makes acrid criticisms of religion, and recently the Orthodox Metropolitan of Montenegro, Arseny, was sentenced to prison for antistate activity. However, in general the Orthodox Church--long accustomed to being an instrument of the state--has accepted the Tito regime, and the Government's relations with the Roman Catholic Church, although far from friendly, are quiescent. Archbishop Stepinać, once hailed throughout the West as a Roman Catholic martyr as a result of his imprisonment, has been pardoned but is restricted to a small village in Croatia. He has since been named a Cardinal, a move that did not help Yugoslav-Vatican relations. If there is not freedom of religion, there is at least freedom of worship, as manifested by Sunday throngs at the churches.

The post-Cominform reforms have undoubtedly had an effect on the popularity of the Tito regime. Since Tito now poses as the chief bulwark against Soviet infringement on Yugoslav independence, one of the chief props of the anti-Communist opposition has been removed. Peasant opposition, always a force during the period of emphasis on collectivization, has all but subsided. There is no doubt that the liberalizing trend has been well received generally. The government has further strengthened itself by taking to its bosom many prewar technical experts and giving them increased freedom to follow their professional interests.

Relations between Serbia and Croatia are unquestionably better than they ever have been. This may be explained by a number of factors, among them being:

1. The war had a unifying effect itself, and the new regime eliminated from political life the more ardent proponents of Croatian and Serbian nationalism.
2. The dominance of the Communist Party has been important, because it is a national organization, which has been neither pro-Serbian nor pro-Croatian.
3. Although Tito is a Croat, he maintains his federal government in Serbian Belgrade.
4. Especially after 1950, the autonomy given to the republics has meant that Yugoslavia is a more truly federal state than ever before.

1. Workers' Councils. These are organs elected by workers in each factory to share in management and planning, to determine wages and prices within certain limits, and to select the director. Collective farms operate on similar principles.

2. Decentralization. The federal government has abandoned its direct control of all industry, retaining only certain major over-all financial controls. Some of these responsibilities have been turned over to the republic governments and local governments, but individual factories, separately and in associations of workers' councils, have been given an unprecedented degree of initiative and freedom. Competition among them in near-capitalist fashion is the order of the day.

3. Producers' Council. A new bicameral parliament was created, one house of which, the Producers' Council, consists of representatives of the workers' and peasants' councils. This body has primary legislative responsibility for economic matters. Similar bodies exist in the legislatures at the republic and local levels.

4. New Federal Constitution. These reforms are in part spelled out in a new constitution which itself contains interesting innovations. One of these is the theory that the administrative organs of government are separate from the political, decision-making organs.

5. Local autonomy. The new constitution reserves many political and economic powers usually associated with central government--especially under socialism--to the six republic governments. And within broad limits, local governments have been given almost complete autonomy under popularly-elected People's Committees. A new institution, the Commune, linking city and country, is now being created.

Agricultural reforms come under a somewhat different category. When the Soviet-type policy toward collectivization was abandoned, Tito declared that this was a temporary situation aimed at getting higher production, and he insisted that "complete socialization of the villages" remained the goal. Although the number of Soviet-type collectives probably never exceeded 10 per cent of all farms, nearly all of these have now been disbanded --except in the important agricultural Voivoidina area, where formerly-landless peasants were settled on estates once owned by Germans and Hungarians. The limit on individual landholdings has been fixed at from 10 to 15 hectares. This is not as important as it might seem, because Yugoslavia has always been essentially a land of small farms. The average private holding is now less than four hectares. There are many cooperatives of the so-called Zadruga type where peasants own their own land but produce and sell crops collectively. There are also some large state farms. But the whole trend of Yugoslav agriculture since 1952 has been away from the kolkhoz system. It is now a question whether or not the agricultural reforms are in fact any more temporary than the rest of the institutional innovations.

The contrast between Yugoslavia and the satellite states across the Danube and to the north can hardly be exaggerated. Nothing should suggest, however, that Yugoslavia is becoming a democracy of the Western type. It is still a one-party state in which political opposition is permitted to a degree; opposition is not.

THE PARTY

Yet the Communist Party itself has been affected by the trend toward liberalization. The name of the Party has been changed to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The official membership is 700,000. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1952, it was asserted that the Party's role in the new Yugoslavia was to be confined to "political and ideological education," with the implication that its role as a directing force in the state was to be restricted. The People's Front was renamed the Socialist Alliance of Working People, and it continues to be the broad transmission belt through which the Party operates.

Exactly what this meant was, and still is, unclear. That it did not mean that the Party was abandoning its dominant position, however, was made clear by the Djilas episode of the winter of 1953-54. Milovan Djilas, generally regarded as the second man in the Party, published a series of articles which in effect called for the elimination of the League of Communists as a political party. Djilas' point seemed to be that there was no longer any danger from reactionary forces in Yugoslavia but that the Party bureaucracy itself was a danger. The reaction of the Central Committee was prompt and unequivocal. Djilas was severely censured and dismissed from the Central Committee and from the presidency of the parliament (which post he had not in fact actually assumed). He has since resigned from the Party altogether and continues to live in Belgrade, ostracized by officialdom but unmolested. Tito's close friend and biographer, Dedijer, who alone publicly supported Djilas, remains in the Party but is definitely in the political doghouse.

The real significance of the Djilas case is not yet apparent. At the Plenum of the Central Committee dealing with the matter, Tito admitted that he knew of the Djilas articles--as was obvious in any case--and he spoke also in such terms as "eventual withering away of the Party," an amazing phrase for a Marxist-Leninist. Whether Djilas overstepped the bounds of the task assigned to him, or whether opposition from the inner corps of "unreconstructed" Party members was too great, are major questions in the strategy of Yugoslav ideology.

ECONOMY

Economically, Yugoslavia is in a difficult position. The economy was ruined by the war. The country lost 1,700,000 persons, or 10.6 per cent of its population as a result of the war. This includes those killed, those expelled (Volksdeutsche,

et al), and prisoners and forced laborers who did not choose to return.) Material losses which are officially put at \$46 billion (calculated at 1938 prices), include staggering destruction of industrial plants, cattle and livestock, and housing. In the first years after the war the Yugoslav economy was geared to the USSR and its satellites, and after the break with the Cominform in 1948 complete reorientation was necessitated. In addition, the Cominform countries imposed an economic blockade on Yugoslavia which caused severe repercussions. As if this were not enough, since 1950 the country has experienced two years of devastating drought. The total result is that, although production is now picking up, the standard of living is still very low and a balance-of-payments crisis has resulted. High defense expenditures are also a complicating factor.

Part of the difficulty, however, must be ascribed to early economic planning, which can only be termed grandiose. Not only were productive abilities and Soviet aid grossly overestimated, but much investment went into construction of great plants and buildings that later had to be abandoned. Since 1950, planning has been on a more modest scale, with markedly greater success.

It was understandable, however, that Yugoslavia should have been in a hurry to industrialize, not only because Communist ideology demanded it but also because the country suffers from extreme overpopulation of the land. For every 100 hectares (247 acres) of arable land, 114 persons are engaged in agriculture--compared with 97 persons in Rumania, 52 in Germany, and 17 in the United States. About three-fourths of the population is still engaged in agricultural pursuits. The size of the holdings has always been small, and agricultural methods are primitive. The inability of the country to provide sufficient machinery was a major difficulty in the way of earlier collectivization efforts.

In natural resources, Yugoslavia is one of the richest countries in Europe; its problem has always been exploitation. The more important resources are copper and bauxite, lead and zinc, molybdenum, chromium, antimony, and mercury. There are also extensive lignite resources, and some oil. After the war not a single mine in the country remained undamaged, and enormous effort has gone into repairing them. In addition to mining, the chief Yugoslav industries have been textiles, lumber, and fishing. Major emphasis since the war has been on expanding production of machinery and electrical equipment.

The major Yugoslav exports are agricultural products--chiefly corn and timber. Next come ores, metals, and metal products. Chief imports are manufactured goods--principally machinery. Because of adverse agricultural conditions, wheat has had to be imported regularly since the war. The foreign trade balance is persistently negative, in 1951 the deficit amounting to 61 million dinars and in 1952 to nearly 40 million dinars. The larger part of the deficit has been made up through foreign aid--mostly American--but the balance-of-payments problem is one of the most serious faced by the Yugoslavs.

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

Yugoslavia's relations with the United States have shifted sharply since the break with the Cominform. Early post-war hostility was acute. This resulted from Yugoslavia's position as a model Soviet satellite; from the American refusal to return gold stored in the United States for safekeeping by the prewar government; and from the Anglo-American policy on Trieste. Relations between the two countries probably reached a nadir in 1947 when the Yugoslavs shot down an American airplane allegedly flying over Yugoslav territory. Yugoslav assistance to the Greek Communists was unquestionably a factor that helped produce the Truman Doctrine.

After 1948, however, isolated from her erstwhile Communist allies, Yugoslavia adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward the West. The West obviously provided the only source of assistance to a country fearful of Soviet aggression. Yet even if Tito had wanted to join hands openly with the United States prior to 1950, Yugoslavia's domestic politics prevented it. Things began to change after the drought of 1950. This threatened to weaken Yugoslavia internally so seriously that Tito's anti-Soviet regime might be jeopardized. American economic aid was prompt and effective. This was followed by military aid and liaison. Tito continues to declare he will not join NATO; so far he has not been asked. He did say, however, that should EDC become effective Yugoslavia would consider becoming affiliated with it under certain conditions.

Now the British and French have joined the Americans in an economic aid mission in Belgrade, for which most of the money is furnished by the U.S.A. Extensive technical assistance for industry and agriculture is also provided. An American military mission is in the country. American aid (about half of which has been military) has been--as of the summer of 1954--in excess of \$700,000,000.

Yugoslavia is spending nearly one-fourth of her budget on military outlays, despite the economic problems caused thereby. The Yugoslav army of 85 divisions, however, still lacks much modern equipment. American military opinion as to its effectiveness is divided, but the consensus is that it is well-trained and disciplined. From the point of view of its use against possible Soviet aggression, there is still a question in the minds of some observers as to the extent of Cominform sympathy in the Yugoslav army--although few consider this very widespread. Traditionally, the Yugoslavs have proved themselves to be brave and heroic fighters for the defense of their country.

The Balkan Pact--signed at Bled in August 1954--joins Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey in an alliance that is at once military, political, and economic. Since Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO, an effective link between Yugoslavia and the American-led European defense system has been established. In addition to its military significance, the pact may prove to

be an important instrument for regional economic and political cooperation. In addition, it may well lay at final rest the long heritage of bad feeling that has historically existed among the three signatories.

For all its close alliance with the West, however, Yugoslavia persists in pursuing a sometimes painfully-independent foreign policy. Although Tito gave in to some extent on the Trieste question, he remained firm regarding the Yugoslav position in Zone B. The Yugoslavs look hopefully toward the new nations of the East, particularly India, although their attitude toward Communist China remains ambivalent. All this is a reflection of Yugoslavia's unique position in the world. But in general, the trend is inevitably toward greater political cooperation with the West. The recent movement toward a "normalization" of political relations with the Soviet bloc has not altered--and it is not likely to alter--this trend.

Fred Warner Neal