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FROM PARTICULARISM TO UNITY

The Kaleidoscope of Nationalism(s) in Yugoslavia

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There are few better places than Yugoslavia to study nationalism. Here nationalism is found not only in its more classic aspects--contemporaneously as well as historically--but also in a significantly new and as yet not clearly defined form: Communist nationalism.

The kaleidoscope of distinct national groups is the phenomenon of nationalism which is perhaps most characteristically Yugoslav. The several national groups are the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, and the Macedonians. Of the two other major national groups in Yugoslavia, the Montenegrins are ethnically Serbs, while the Bosnian-Hercegovinians are predominately either Serbs or Croats.

This paper will not go into the question of a definition of nationalism. Here it is taken to mean merely a positive group feeling of unity among similar peoples in geographic proximity. In Yugoslavia nationalism--or particularism--is expressed predominately among the various ethnic groups, but there is evidence also of an emerging Yugoslav nationalism.

The main roots of particularist nationalism in Yugoslavia are ethnic, geographical, and historical. Generally speaking, the people are all South Slavs. Yet they differ from one another. The distinctive features are well known: the Slovenes and many Croats tend to be fair in complexion, the Serbs and Macedonians darker. The Slovenian language is in mnay ways akin to Slovak and is distinctly different from the others. It is related to Serbo-Croat much in the manner, say that, Danish is related to Swedish. Serbian and Croatian, on the other hand, are related as closely as Swedish and Norwegian, the major difference being that Serbian is written in Cyrillic and Croatian in Latin letters. Macedonian again is a separate language, akin to Bulgarian and differing from Serbian perhaps as much as Swedish differs from German.

Slovenia is geographically separated from the Croatian plains by the Julian Alps, and a political separation was enforced

by early Germanic domination after the Frankish conquest. Although no geographical barriers divide Croatia and Serbia in the north, domination of Croatia by Hungary from the 12th century effectively separated it politically from Serbia. The earlier Turkish domination of Macedonia walled off that area from Serbia; while Montenegro, as the name implies, is entirely confined to ragged mountain peaks.

Geography itself accounts for enormous differences. In the fertile valleys of Slovenia and the plains area of Croatia, peaceful agriculture developed, while the mountain men of the South were perforce restless herdsmen, hunters, and warriors. Especially in Croatia there developed the Zadruga, which is a cooperative farm on which a number of families lived and farmed in common. Cultural sociologists like Tomasić believe that the difference in environment accounts for the fact that the people of the Zadruga area became peaceful and cooperative, while the mountain men became militant and individualistic. Certainly militant group feelings have been more in evidence in the south, yet even Tomasić would not discount Croatian nationalism as a powerful force.

However that may be, historical factors are probably most important in the development of particularistic nationalism among the South Slavs. Aggressive nationalism does not predominate among the Slovenes. One reason probably is that the Germanic domination, which occurred before a truly defined national society was formed, eliminated what Slovenian elite groups there were. There was never formed any distinctive Slovenian culture; and organized community life, on an all-Slovenian level, was Germanic. The masses of people--peasants under serfdom--were of course Slavs who spoke Slovenian. The distance that separated them from their masters was so great that they felt little identity with the political society. Although Germanic culture affected them little, many Slovenians did eventually look toward the German-speaking countries as their spiritual home. Slovenia did not possess a national church to stimulate the seeds of national idealism, and the Roman Catholic Church there was identified entirely with the Germanic ruling class.

The situation in Croatia was different. From the early 12th century, Croatia was under the domination of Hungary. When this came about, however, there was already a clearly-defined Croatian state and culture with a Croatian nobility. This nobility in effect sold out to the Hungarians and governed Croatia for them. The Roman Catholic Church in Croatia had the closest affiliation with the Croatian ruling class, and the two together were the mainstays of Croatian nationalism.

In the development of this nationalism, events to the South played an important role. Nationalism was and is doubtless more fully developed among the Serbs than among the other South Slavs. There are a number of reasons for this. One is that by the time the Serbs were so decisively defeated by the Turks at

the Battle of Kossovo Polje in 1389, they had built up one of the leading empires in Europe and had developed a culture as advanced in many ways as any in the West. It is likely also that the 500 years of oppressive Turkish occupation were a force for later nationalism. During this period, the Serbs were treated as few conquered peoples in modern times have been treated--certainly worse, for example, than the Russians under the Mongols. Still Serbian nationalism might not have flourished under these conditions if it had not been for the Serbian Orthodox Church. The ancient Serbian nobility was decimated and Serbian culture laid waste. But the Serbian national church kept alive a Pan-Serbian feeling for half a millenium.

Indeed, the merger of religion and nationalism probably was as complete in the case of Serbia as it has ever been before or since, not excluding the relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church to Russian nationalism during the 250 years under the Tartar yoke. One has only to visit the few remaining ancient Serbian monasteries, with their exquisite religious art, to see it. After the Battle of Kossovo Polje, the widow of Tsar Lazar gave to the Serbian Patriarch two gigantic candles, perhaps 15 feet high and nearly a foot in width. She told him to guard them unlit until the day when Serbia regained its freedom. Some 500 years later, the candles were lit. They can be seen today, still preserved, in the Dečani monastery, near Peč, where trappings of ancient Serbian glory are such that it is difficult to say if the place is a religious or a national monument.

The main conflict between particularistic nationalisms in Yugoslavia has been between the Serbs and the Croats. A major factor in this development--and also in intensifying both Serbian and Croatian nationalism--has been the age-old struggle between Eastern and Western Catholicism. In the land of the South Slavs, this struggle was perhaps even sharper than it was farther north between the Russians and Poles. Not only did both sides vie for geographical dominion and political power, but forced conversions were common--often accompanied by the most unspeakable tortures.

During the main period of development of nationalism in the West, the Yugoslav peoples were all under foreign domination. As the mighty Slav nation of Russia rose in the East and extended its influence to both Turks and Austrians, the possibility of liberation appeared. It was at this time that the idea of Pan-Slavism was put forth--by a Croat. At first the idea was more romantic and spiritual than practical and political--a union of all the Slav peoples, north and south. This concept of Pan-Slavism encountered two snags, however. It ran counter to Russia's alliances with Austria, and it incurred the opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church. The result was that the Roman Catholic Slavs under Austrian hegemony--the North Slavs and the Slovenians and Croats--were excluded from the concept of Pan-Slavism, as far as the Russians were concerned.

Thus it was the Serbs alone who, after the Treaty of Berlin, regained their independence in 1879. Soon thereafter, the

proud and fiery Serbs launched a drive not for Pan-Slavism but for Pan-Serbianism. In this development, the hotly anti-Roman-Catholic Serbian Orthodox Church played a big part. This brought the Serbs more sharply than ever into conflict with the Croats and the Roman Catholic Church. In the process, the identity between the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and Croatian nationalism became greater. It was during this period that Croats of the Orthodox faith came to be called Serbs, and Roman Catholic Serbs were called Croats, regardless of their ethnic origins or where they lived. It was out of this Serbian nationalism that the First World War was touched off at Serajevo. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, under the Austrians and attached to Croatia administratively, Serbian feelings probably reached a zenith. The Serbs of Bosnia-Hercegovina felt themselves oppressed by both the dominant Muslim aristocracy and the Roman Catholics. As a testimony to this passion, the footprints of Gavrilo Princip, who shot Archduke Ferdinand, have been embedded in the concrete sidewalk at the place where the attack took place. On the same corner is the Gavrilo Princip Museum, the present curator of which is the first cousin of the assassin.

Nevertheless, the idea of Pan-Slavism--at least as far as the South Slavs were concerned--took root and continued in Croatia and Slovenia, and to some extent in Serbia. The Balkan wars freed most of the South Slav peoples under Turkish dominion--they were then included in Serbia. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire broke up in 1919, the Pan-Slavist goal was realized in the creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later Yugoslavia.

The Slovenes entered the new state because they had no place else to go. The Croats entered it in part for the same reasons--in part because they saw themselves as an integral part of a great Slav state. The Serbs--defeated after magnificent opposition but maintaining their national entity--entered it as a step toward Greater Serbia. In a sense, that is what Yugoslavia between the wars was. The king, court, administration and civil service, army and police were predominately Serbian. Administrative divisions cut across ethnic boundaries, and the Serbian Orthodox Church was given especial privileges.

Under this state of affairs, the Croatians naturally chafed. The old Croatian aristocracy had less power and independence in many ways than before. Croatia was at times practically in a state of insurrection. An ardent Serbian patriot shot and killed the Croatian leader Radić in the Skupština. When the Croats demanded autonomy and a federal constitution, Radić's successor, Maček, was imprisoned and a royal dictatorship proclaimed. The answer of the Croatian nationalists--organized into a terrorist group called the Ustaši--was the assassination of King Alexander. The Roman Catholic Church in Croatia--both for reasons of defense and because it was so much a part of Croatian nationalism--spurred on anti-Serb activity.

To a lesser extent there were Slovenian separatist activities during this period also. The separatists tended to work with the Croats in part--despite frequent friction between the two--because the Slovenian movement too had an anti-Serb, pro-Roman-Catholic orientation.

Although the promise of a better working relationship appeared just before the outbreak of World War II, the conflict between Croatian and Serbian nationalism was again one of the central factors in the war itself in Yugoslavia. Certain Croatian leaders--not extreme nationalists but Pan-Yugoslavists--have contended that the army uprising in Serbia that finally brought in the Nazis was organized by Pan-Serbists who wanted to break up Yugoslavia once and for all. The evidence supporting this charge is almost entirely circumstantial, but Yugoslavia was broken up during the war. While the first opposition to the Germans came from the Serbian nationalist supporters of the monarchy--the Četniks under Mihailović--the extreme Croatian nationalists collaborated with the Nazi-Fascists to realize their aims of an independent, or at least a separate, Croatia. The Italian Duke of Spoleti reigned in Zagreb as King Tomislav II, the first king of Croatia in a thousand years.

Their tenuous unity thus broken, the Serbian and Croatian nationalists hurled themselves on one another in a release of pent-up fury. Who did what first is like discussing the chicken and the egg. In their frenzy to hit at the Ustaši, the Četniks attacked Croatians indiscriminately, thereby driving the latter more and more into the nationalist-separatist position, if only for protection. The Ustaši retaliated with all their might against the Serbs. In this bitter struggle it would have been impossible for the opposing Churches in either Serbia or Croatia to stand aloof. Indeed, they felt their very existence was at stake. Out of such a situation grew the famous case of Archbishop--now Cardinal--Stepinac.

In one sense, it was this bitter struggle between the Serb and Croat nationalist extremists that gave Tito his chance. Himself a Croat, Tito at the head of the Communists rallied around him a sizable group of Yugoslavs who wanted to fight the Germans and Italians more than they wanted to fight each other. In the course of events, as the leading opponents of the Axis invaders, Tito's Partisans found themselves often engaged with the Ustaši, who became increasingly nothing but an arm of the Germans and Italians.

What are the elements that produced these intense, particularist nationalist feelings among the Yugoslavs? The central fact seems to be that the trappings of conflicting nationalism were developed among the Serbs and Croats long before the two groups were united in one nation. First there were the different ethnic and language groups, separated from each other over a long period of time. Second, both groups had their own elite leadership, which profited by exploiting nationalist feelings. Third, there

were the separate, well-defined, and differing cultures. Fourth, each had a record of past national glories which the standard-bearers of nationalism utilized as a rallying point for emotions. Fifth, religion was a strong factor in keeping alive nationalist feelings and in wrapping national idealism in the cloak of religious idealism. Sixth, there was the element of danger or threat, past or present. The long period of terrible treatment of the Serbs by the Turks was a strong factor in Serbian nationalism, while both the Hungarian occupation and the threat from the Orthodox Serbs worked, each in its own way, to promote Croatian nationalism.

That these factors are not exclusive, however, can be seen from the interesting cases of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro. For the most part, the peoples of these areas are ethnically Serbs or Croats. Bosnia was long occupied by the Turks, during which period a large percentage of the Slavs there became Muslims. These Muslim Slavs comprised the elite group of the indigenous population and joined with the Turks in various kinds of oppression against the Orthodox Serbs. Further, they tended to identify themselves with Turkey rather than with other Slavic groups. The fact that there the Muhammadun religion was orientated toward Turkey was a factor. As an anti-Serbian group, the Muslim Slavs continued to occupy a favorable position during the Austrian occupation. In this period, however, when the Croatian Roman Catholics were given special treatment by Vienna, there was a beginning of Serbian solidarity among Muslim and Orthodox Slavs. But there never developed anything that could rightly be called Bosnian nationalism. The predominant intense feeling against the foreign occupiers came from the Orthodox Serbs, who looked to Serbia as both protector and spiritual home.

The Montenegrins are entirely Serbs ethnically. Little more than 500,000 in number, they stem from those Serbs who, after the Battle of Kossovo Polje, set themselves up in the mountain fastness and never surrendered. The history of Montenegro, at least up until the end of the 19th century, is a continuous war for survival in which the people fought the Turks individually and collectively. Here one finds nationalism at its height. Almost without exception, male Montenegrins were warriors or guerrillas. Fighting was not only an accepted occupation for a Montenegrin--it was the only accepted occupation. The values and attitudes of the warrior thus became the values and attitudes of the Montenegrin people: heroism, pride, glory, boastfulness. All this was encompassed in a Montenegrin nationalism, not a Serbian nationalism, although since the people were ethnically Serbs it was not hostile to Serbia. Here again one finds religion and the Church as important factors. The Montenegrins were, of course, all Orthodox; and the government in fact began and long continued as a theocracy, the head of the Church being the head of the state. It was only when this situation changed and the old enemy, the Turk, no longer presented a danger that Montenegrin nationalism lost some of its drive. The characteristics that this nationalism bred remain among the people, however. Invariably a

Montenegrin will tell you, pridefully, that he is a Montenegrin. Except for a few Četnik detachments, the Montenegrins were Partisans almost to a man, and today Montenegro can point to more officers in the army in proportion to its population than can any other Yugoslav republic. It was a Montenegrin, Milovan Djilas, who was first an outspoken opponent of the Soviet Union and then an ideological rebel even against Tito.

Macedonia presents another interesting example of nationalist development. The glories of Philip and Alexander were lost long before the centuries of Turkish occupation came to an end. The role of the Church was compromised, because Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece--all Orthodox--vied for Macedonian territory. Until lately there never was an independent Macedonian Church. There were few if any factors operating among the downtrodden Macedonian peasants to foster Macedonian national feelings, and the absence of a Macedonian literature made it difficult to perpetuate such ideals in any case. Liberated from the Turks in the Balkan wars, the territory once known as Macedonia remained partitioned among Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. To foster Bulgarian ends, Sofia organized a Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, known as IMRO, which tried--without success--to foster intense nationalism among the masses of Serbian Macedonia. Although it did not succeed in the way the Bulgars hoped, the efforts of IMRO did stimulate nationalist feelings among the few Macedonian intellectuals there were. This nationalism took the form of resentment against Serbian rule. The Tito regime--which made Macedonia an equal republic, sponsored the first grammatical treatment of the Macedonian language, and permitted the establishment of an autonomous church--has in a sense helped create a national awareness among the Macedonians. But this was done carefully under Communist supervision, and so far no antifederal particularism has been evident.

In discussing the various nationalisms among the Yugoslavs, it is interesting to note how different one of those nationalisms--that of Serbia--is from the nationalism of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, of course, are not South Slavs, but there is a parallel between certain historical developments affecting them and the history of the Serbs. The results, however, were quite different. The Czechs, too, had developed a great empire before they were decisively defeated by the Austrians at the Battle of White Mountain. This did not take place until 1629, so that Czech nationalism had more time to develop than was the case with the Serbs. The Czech nobility was also decimated so that, like Serbia, the Czechs were predominantly a peasant people. It would not be correct to say that no nationalistic feelings remained among the Czechs, and that nationalism came to fruition only as the result of activity among intellectuals and émigrés (notably Thomas G. Masaryk). It was never a fiery, personal thing, as it was with the Serbs. There were, of course, many differences in background. The treatment of the Czechs by the Austrians was benevolent, compared with the Turkish treatment of the Serbs. Both were Roman Catholic peoples. But there was a lack of

religious harmony among the Czechs; and the Roman Catholic Church, dominated by Germans and Hungarians, was never an instrument of Czech national aspirations. Doubtless this was a factor in the failure of the Czechs to keep alive in a meaningful way their past glories. Furthermore, there were many German and Austrian settlers in the Czech lands, compared with almost none in Serbia. Still, when one compares the reactions of the Czechs and the Serbs to the Nazis and to the Soviet Union, it is difficult not to believe that the Serbs are by nature more passionate and aggressive than their more northern Slav brothers.

One thing that the Yugoslav experience brings out is that nationalism can be not only a feeling for a group but also a feeling for a group organized in a particular way. Mihailović was certainly a Serbian nationalist, and he would doubtless have styled himself a Yugoslav nationalist. But a Yugoslavia dominated by communism was not the kind of Yugoslavia that aroused Mihailović's national feelings. Similarly many Croats, for example, were against the Yugoslavia of the Serbian king, which did not arouse their national feelings; but they were even more opposed to a fascist Croatia. In certain priests and Serbian aristocrats who fought with the Partisans there probably was, on the other hand, a feeling for what the French call "la patrie," the very national integrity itself. This type of nationalism was perhaps more clearly exemplified in France, where many scions of old aristocratic families joined the communists in the underground, knowing full well that their Marxist colleagues wanted an entirely different kind of France from what they wanted.

Was there, during the interwar period, anything at all that could be called a Yugoslav nationalism, as contrasted with the various particularist nationalisms? If nationalism requires a feeling of positive, or aggressive, unity among all the peoples and elite groups (or the preponderant majority of them), then the answer is that there was no Yugoslav nationalism in the sense that there was--for example--British or American nationalism. The concept of a Yugoslav nation meant little to the masses of people; and in the beginning even the founders of the new state were not sure of their nationalism, for they called the state not Yugoslavia but the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Time itself was certainly a factor.

Yet the ideal of Yugoslav unity did mean something to a few intellectuals and political leaders, despite their disillusionment with the Belgrade regime. As war clouds loomed, there was an increasing awareness--as the literature of the time testifies--that only by maintaining some sort of unity could freedom from non-Yugoslav oppression be maintained. Yet it was not until a couple of months before the Nazi invasion that Vladimir Maček, the Croat leader, threw his full weight behind the national government and supported general mobilization.

Certain domestic economic interests also saw advantages of a national market and thus advocated Yugoslav, as opposed to

particularist, nationalism. But these were few and not powerful, as compared with foreign interests or those allied with particularisms.

When the war came, those who fought for Yugoslavia fought with unquestioned valor. There is no evidence to show that the puppet fascist state of Croatia ever attracted much support among the masses of Croats, except as a sort of protection against anti-Croat excesses of the Serbian Četniks. The Italian Duke of Spoleti, ruling as Tomislav II, was never popular. Many, many Croatians and Slovenians joined the Partisans. But it was the Serbs--and Montenegrins--who unquestionably were the vanguard of armed opposition to the Axis.

Since the war, particularist nationalism has lost much of its force in Yugoslavia. Today the Yugoslavs are more a united people than ever before. This may be ascribed in part to conscious efforts of the Tito government--both during and after its satellite period--to eradicate particularism; but in large part it is simply the result of the nature of things under the Communists.

First, the war itself gave the Partisans--who by 1945 comprised a great and varied mass of Yugoslavs, over and above the Communists--a sense of unity and cohesion. Tito's leadership cut across ethnic borders. The Partisan victory over the Axis was a source of national pride--and thus of national unity--to those who participated in it.

Second, the nature of the Communist leadership from the beginning was more national than Marxist, ideologically speaking. The old Serb and Montenegrin sympathy for Russia was exploited, but nationalism was the main rallying point.

Third, the elite groups of Croatian and Serbian society, which furnished the leaders of particularist nationalism, were eliminated. Some fled with the Germans and Italians (as was the case with the Ustaši leaders), or with the Royal Yugoslav government; some died in battle or were killed after the war by the victorious Titoites; some were imprisoned or exiled. The police frightened others into abandoning overt activity, and in any event, because of the nationalization of property and big estates, they had no source of economic power. Those old political parties which remained were formed into a National Front, behind the leadership of the Communists, which meant there were no separate party programs--only the Communist program.

Fourth, the Communists undercut the political position of both the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church, which were important factors in Serbian and Croatian nationalism.

Fifth, the Serbian hegemony--one of the major sources of trouble between the wars--was ended. Tito himself was a Croat, and in the new Communist government the various ethnic groups had relatively fair representation.

Sixth, the autonomy granted to the various ethnic Republics, especially since the post-Cominform reforms, gives them at the same time a sense of independence and of unity with the national group.

Last but by no means least, the Communist Party itself, being organized on a national rather than on an ethnic or geographic basis, was a unifying force. Controlling political activity and the channels of information, the Party was, and is, able to stimulate a feeling of Yugoslav nationalism.

This contemporary Yugoslav nationalism, of course, is nationalism of a new sort: Communist Nationalism. In fact, however, it differs little in most of its characteristics from the old kind. In a sense, the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was a conflict between two concepts of communism: communism in the interests of the USSR, as the home base of the world movement, and communism in the interest of an individual communist nation. Even though they were disappointed by Soviet actions during the war, Tito and the Yugoslav Communists were willing to go along with the Soviet concept most of the way. But not all the way. Whether they drew the line because of their Yugoslav background, or because their peculiar political position made them dependent on popular acceptance more than was the case in other satellites, or because they--alone of all the Eastern European communist leaders--were sufficiently independent of the USSR to draw the line, remains a matter of conjecture. Very likely all three factors were present in producing the actions that resulted in their expulsion from the Soviet satellite community.

The very split between Tito and the Cominform produced more unity in Yugoslavia, once those Communists who could not go along had been weeded out. Much of the opposition to Tito had been opposition to Soviet domination. When Tito appeared as the bulwark against Soviet domination, many former opponents reluctantly gave him their support. There was in 1948 some fear that pro-Soviet forces might try to exploit particularist feeling against the Tito government. If they did, it was without apparent success.

The Yugoslav Communist Party emphasizes nationalism in all its propaganda. Gone now are the slogans of international solidarity. In their place are the Yugoslav equivalents of Stalin's "Socialism in One Country," but with the difference that the right of an outside nation to interfere in the activities of another is denied. The Communist drive and the enthusiasm certain segments of the population feel for communist ideals may well prove to be the most important factors in developing strong Yugoslav nationalism.

The army is especially subjected to nationalist indoctrination. The officer corps is certainly an elite group in Yugoslavia and is almost 100 per cent Communist. In the days after the Cominform fight, much of this army nationalist

indoctrination was of an anti-Soviet character. Now it is more positively pro-Yugoslav in character. One pamphlet distributed among the troops says:

"Yugoslavia is independent and free. It is independent and free because it is Socialist and strong. Yugoslav soldiers are the freest in the world, and because they are, they see to it that their army is the best. We are defending our homeland and only our homeland. We are not defending any bloc of nations. Every Yugoslav soldier is a warrior for his Socialist Fatherland. Long Live Marshal Tito. Long Live the Yugoslav People."

While Yugoslav nationalist feeling is perhaps strongest among the elite groups of the Party and the Army, it is difficult to say where it is strongest as far as the economic classes are concerned. In one sense--in a negative sense--it may be strongest among the peasants, especially now that collectivization has been abandoned. The peasants were the bulwark of the Partisan movement, if only because Yugoslavia was more than 80 per cent peasant.

The attitude of an old Croatian peasant near Novi Most was typical. Would Yugoslavia fight the Russians if the latter invaded?, he was asked.

"Ah," he replied, "we'd tear them apart. They'd take our land."

And would Yugoslavia fight against the West?

"We'll fight anybody who invades us," he said.

Then he was asked if he did not take pride in the achievements of the new Yugoslavia.

He scratched his head, and after a while he said: "Ah, what they do in Zagreb doesn't concern us."

And what about what they do in Belgrade?

"Ah, Belgrade." The old peasant flicked his hand as if to dismiss this distant concept and would say no more.

Yugoslav nationalism is more positive among industrial workers because Party leadership is strong. The comparison of present life with that before the war invariably comes up when one talks with workers. The union-directed worker schools are important in the development of nationalistic attitudes. One small paper-bound text for a workers' course of intermediate school level was headed: "Why We Should Take Pride in Being Yugoslavs." These factors were mentioned: Workers are better off. They manage their own factories and control their own destinies. They are helping build a great, new, modern nation. They are free from and independent of any outside control. They

showed their valor in defeating the invaders during World War II.

The regime's positive steps to re-employ mildly-anti-communist technical experts in both government and industry has affected the nationalist feelings of this middle class group, too. An architect in Ljubljana declared: "I'm no Communist. But they let me work, and we are doing things Yugoslavia never did before. I don't like all the political restrictions. I was denied a passport to visit my sister in Vienna this year. But things are gradually improving. I think we will all be proud of Yugoslavia."

Among the various republics, Yugoslav nationalism probably flourishes most in Serbia, where the transfer of intense Serbian patriotism to Yugoslav patriotism was more easily accomplished because of the nature of the interwar regime. Some have feared particularist grumblings in the more advanced regions of Slovenia and Croatia about contributing to the buildup of underdeveloped Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia. So far the various pressures of party and government have kept the dissenters under cover--if, indeed, there are any. Serbian officials in the federal government have privately poked fun at the Macedonians for making undue demands for aid, but this has been less a protest than a boast; it has been like saying "Aren't these Macedonians something!" In fact, one is impressed with the almost complete absence of separatist sentiments among even staunch opponents of the Tito regime.

The extent to which political and economic decentralization has been carried out has raised a question in the minds of some observers as to the danger of a rebirth of particularism. Both federal and republic officials uniformly discount this possibility. As long as the Party maintains its hold on all sections of the country--which bodes to be a long time--they are probably correct. There has, however, arisen something called "economic particularism," by which is meant that various government and industrial units take advantage of decentralization to profit at the expense of others. So far this phenomenon has been confined to local levels.

There is little question that what might generally be called the process of industrialization has been a strong factor in promoting Yugoslav as against particularist nationalism. The new workers have been drawn from the ranks of the peasants. This has meant that the new workers receive more education and are less subjected to local or particularist propaganda, such as might emanate from the village priest, for example. It has meant, too, more intermingling of the ethnic groups and a greater awareness of the relationships of various parts of the country. Since the workers are participating in the major effort of the new Yugoslavia--industrialization--it is not surprising that they should take pride in it.

Yugoslavia has never had a "small-nation complex" in the sense that Czechoslovakia has. If anything, it had and has a

"big-nation complex," even though it is a small nation. In Czechoslovakia (the writer was last there in the fall of 1949) one heard frequently from ordinary people the phrase "Tam je lepše," meaning "There [in America] it is better." One rarely hears this sentiment expressed in Yugoslavia, but at the same time foreign goods are generally preferred over Yugoslav products. This is natural, of course, because--the state of the economy being what it is--many Yugoslav goods are of poor quality.

If communist nationalism has developed in Yugoslavia, can the process be repeated in other communist countries? In the USSR, of course, Soviet nationalism has already been developed. In the case of the other Eastern European countries, the question is complicated by the strong hold the USSR has over the local communist leaders. There certainly is a well-developed national feeling in each of the satellite countries. This nationalism is often at odds with the Soviet-dominated communist governments, however. Among the communist leaders themselves, there have from the first been national interests that have clashed with Soviet interests, in much the same manner as in Yugoslavia. Those guilty or even suspected of nationalist deviation, however, were quickly eliminated after the trouble with Yugoslavia showed the USSR the dangers.

What Soviet policy attempts to do is to develop individual nationalism in each country but to utilize it in the interests of the Soviet hegemony. This, as Lenin once said about his own job, is "infernally difficult."

The main point about independent communist nationalism, of the Yugoslav type, is that it probably cannot develop elsewhere in Eastern Europe at present because the national communist leaders lack the necessary independence, local following, and freedom from direct Soviet controls. It was these factors, growing out of the manner in which the Tito Communists came to power, that made the Yugoslav deviation possible.

Similar conditions exist in only one other communist country: China. But to say deviation could happen in China is not to say it will happen. The Chinese Communists have never had a satellite status, in the same way as, say, Bulgaria or even Yugoslavia. The whole Soviet attitude toward the Chinese Communists has been different from the attitude toward the Eastern European communists, with whom, of course, the USSR has had an entirely different relationship. It is also likely that, with the Yugoslav experience in mind, Soviet policy consciously avoids actions which could turn the already well-developed nationalism in China into anti-Soviet channels.

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