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East Africa High Commission
(23) East African Railways and
Harbours Administration

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Dear Mr. Rogers:

The public Railways and Inland Marine Service of East Africa, all operated by the Railways and Harbours Administration, are by far the principal means of transport of the area. In 1952 they performed some 1,398,605,401 ton miles of freight haulage and some 6,433,898 passenger journeys over 3,055 route miles of metre gauge railway and other routes.

The present role of the railway is varied. At the outlying points it is providing access to new agricultural areas and to mineral operations. Along established lines it continues to bring in the capital equipment for development and the import goods in demand by the European, Asian and African population; but it also is serving increasingly as an economic integrator, allowing regional agricultural specialization so that each small bloc of territory need not remain fully self sufficient in food grains. The comparatively cheap*haulage to the coast of larger quantities of export produce, sisal, cotton, coffee, soda ash, is a necessary facility for the expanding economy of East Africa. The railway also gives mobility to labor in East Africa, facilitating the migrations necessary for agricultural purposes and for industries dependent upon large numbers of African personnel. By providing longer heavier haulage services, the railways complement their own and other motor transport services; the natural difficulties of road building and maintanance being formidable in East Africa, it is usually accepted that truck haulage routes should be ancillary to the railway.**

The principal problems of the railway at this writing are developmental. Operational and maintanance procedures, through a half century of experience, have become routine and seasoned to periodic drought, flood and other local difficulties. Problems of capital finance, of obtaining new locomotives and rolling stock under the limitations of a world shortage and currency-area finance barriers, and of translating obtained finance and materials into rapid and efficient expansion have been paramount since the 1939-1945 War.

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* Two-thirds of the public freight traffic was moved (1953 rates) at a cost of Shs. .05 to Shs. 12.9 per ton mile.

** With frequent dissension, such as that of the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce, which advised in 1953 a program of hard surfaced road building in Tanganyika.

The initial line of the two main East African rail routes had been pushed inland to the Lakes at the turn of the century. The Uganda Railway, now called the Kenya and Uganda Railway, reached Kisumu on Lake Victoria in 1901. The Tanganyika Central Line, in then German East Africa, was completed to Kigoma in 1914.

The Kenya and Uganda Railway was first operated - for 20 years - as a department of the Government of the East Africa Protectorate, all profits going straight into the Treasury of the Protectorate. In 1920, as a preliminary step to reorganization, railway finances were separated from those of the Protectorate. In October 1920 the Colonial Office sent an eminent railway engineer, Colonel Hammond, as a special commissioner to draw up a reorganization scheme. He proposed that the railway be

> "detached entirely from the Protectorate Government, removed from all control by the legislatures of Kenya and Uganda, and placed under a council with an independent and permanent chairman brought out from England. No legislation affecting railways was to be introduced into Kenya or Uganda without the consent of the council. The property rights of the railway were to be vested in the council; and the chairman was to have the right to veto any of the council's decisions."[1]

As a result of Colonel Hammond's recommendation, a five-man Inter-Colonial Railway Council, with Colonel Hammond as the first Chairman, was set up in February 1921, but because of opposition from the Kenya Governor and Legislative Council a decision on the other radical proposals was postponed. A new general manager, Mr. C.I. (later Sir Christian) Felling was brought up from South Africa and took over control on January 1, 1923. A reorganization of the Railway, based on a scheme drawn up by Mr. Felling, and defined in the Kenya and Uganda (Transport) Order-in-Council approved in August 1925, was effected. The ultimate ownership remained with Kenya and Uganda but the control and management of the railways and harbors were vested in a High Commissioner for Transport to be administered on behalf of both Kenya and Uganda. A railway advisory council was set up under the High Commissioner, consisting of two official and two unofficial members from each country. Annual estimates were dealt with separately by the territorial legislatures, with the General Manager present in each Legislative Council.

The Tanganyika Railways, completed some years after the Kenya and Uganda main line, remained under separate control until May 1948. Some coordination between the Kenya and Uganda and the Tanganyika Railways, after German East Africa had become a mandate territory, was accomplished through an East African Transport Policy Board whose duties were performed by the Governors Conference (the Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda). In 1929 the Hilton Young Commission reported that an ultimately united control of the Kenya and Uganda and Tanganyika Railways might be feasible, though acknowledging that divergent interests existed.

The amalgamation of the two railway systems into the East African Railways and Harbours Administration was envisaged in Colonial Papers 191 and 210, and in approving Paper 210 the territorial Legislative Councils had accepted the principle of amalgamation. Paper 210 proposed that an ad hoc committee of members designate of the Transport Advisory Council should draw up a scheme of amalgamation. The Commissioner of Transport did not refer the scheme to an ad hoc committee of the Transport Advisory Council because he thought "that a general feeling existed that persons in Kenya and Uganda connected with the

Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours had already expressed definite views on the subject of amalgamation and that the appointment of an ad hoc committee might well have placed the representatives of Tanganyika in a minority."[2] Instead a scheme of amalgamation of the two railway systems and for placing all ports and harbors under unified administration was drawn up by the existing Kenya and Uganda Railway Advisory Council and Harbour Advisory Board and the appropriate Tanganyika body. This scheme of amalgamation was presented in Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1948, which was approved in each of the three territorial Legislative Councils, then by the High Commission and finally by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It was approved by resolution in Uganda Legislative Council, with certain conditions, on April 27, 1948, in the Kenya Legislative Council, with one condition, on March 16, 1948, and by the Tanganyika Legislative Council on April 21, 1948.

The proposals of the Sessional Paper No. 1 did not differ from the original proposals in Colonial No. 191. It was proposed that the East Africa High Commission would take over the functions of, and replace, the High Commissioner for Transport, Kenya and Uganda. On the executive staff of the High Commission there would be a Commissioner for Transport in charge of the East African Railways and Harbours Administration and the railway-operated road services (when amalgamation of the two existing systems should have taken place). The Administration would be a common service to come under the executive jurisdiction of the High Commission and within the purview of the Central Legislative Assembly, with the legislative powers of the Central Assembly covering railways, harbors and inland water transport. The combined Administration was to have its own capital account and a self-contained budget and a common establishment of staff. The annual and supplementary estimates of the Administration were to be submitted to the Central Legislative Assembly. Provision was made for the establishment of an East African Transport Advisory Council of nine members, drawn from the nascent Central Assembly and the three territories with the Commissioner for Transport as ex officio chairman. The Council was to have two sub-committees, one for railways, roads and inland water services, consisting of nine members with power to co-opt two ad hoc members, and a similarly constituted Ports Committee, co-ordination of policy being maintained through the medium of the full Council.

In May of 1948 the two systems were united under the High Commission. The General Manager of the Kenya and Uganda Railway was appointed Commissioner for Transport, and the Superintendent of the Kenya and Uganda line was appointed General Manager of the newly amalgamated East African Railways and Harbours Administration.

At the time of the amalgamation the financial position of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours was strong. According to the Sessional Paper, the financial position of the Tanganyika Railways was not so strong, but its earning capacity was considerable. The capital account of the Tanganyika Railways was £10,000,000 which included ex-German assets valued at £4,800,000. The capital account was low in relation to the potential earning capacity of the system. The provision for renewals was inadequate and no reserves were available for general purposes, pensions, gratuities, or to meet temporary recessions. The General Manager, Tanganyika Railways, however, felt the strength of the finances of the Tanganyika Railways and Ports had been underestimated. The Administration took over the whole of the assets and liabilities of the Tanganyika Railways and Ports. It took over without payment to Tanganyika the ex-German assets because these had cost Tanganyika nothing. The Administration assumed the obligation to refund to Tanganyika a sum of £413,000 paid out from Tanganyika general revenue in the early twenties to meet the operating losses of the Railway.

In 1949 the integration of the two systems into one was reported practically complete with the exception of a common tariff, and the Commissioner, appraising the new machinery of central control, reported that he considered that adequate legislative control and freedom of management existed. In 1950 a comprehensive East African Railways and Harbours Act was passed by Central Legislative Assembly at its April meeting, and was assented to by H.M. Government in UK on May 17th. The Act provided a more complete and up to date legal basis for the amalgamation. In 1951 the Commissioner for Transport again stated his satisfaction with the present organization of the railways and harbors and with its methods of dealing with the Central Assembly.

The integration of the two railway systems was undertaken during a period of unusual strain and expansion. From 1948 through 1952 machinery for better common control, the involved agreements necessary in working out a common tariff, the adjustment of finances and the obtaining of capital loans were undertaken while surveys of prospective routes and new construction and improvements were increasingly in progress.

The East African Railways and Harbours Administration is a self-contained service with its own capital account. The General Manager acts under the Commissioner for Transport, one of the four principal executive officers of the High Commission, who also exercises oversight over the East African Directorate of Civil Aviation. The Commissioner for Transport is directly responsible to the High Commission. The Administration is set up to deal with the Central Legislative Assembly in somewhat the same manner as a territorial government department would deal with its territorial legislature, but this intention has been somewhat limited in implementation by the need for concurrence of the territorial bodies in financial and other matters. The power to grant or refuse prerequisite guarantees for capital loans to be floated on behalf of the East African Railways and Harbours Administration by the High Commission is but one of the powers held by the territories and their legislatures.

The overall headquarters of the Administration is located in Nairobi, with a regional headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Functionally the services are reported under such departmental titles as Marine Services, Hotels and Catering Services, Permanent Way, Works and Buildings, Mechanical Workshops and Locomotive Running, Railways Stores, Harbours. The various stations are usually set up under a superintendent with local control in such matters as booking and traffic expedition.

At the end of 1952 the total staff of the Administration was 51,311, including 1,273 Europeans, 4,769 Asians, and 45,269 Africans. In 1952 total expenditure on wages, salaries and temporary allowances reached approximately £5 million. Obtainance of labor for building programs became more difficult, and in 1952 special recruitment efforts became necessary in Uganda.

Much has been reported done to benefit morale and increase staff efficiency. In 1950 large housing schemes were reported in hand in all three territories. Housing and Welfare committees were reported to be in existence at all important centers, with special shops set up at the various housing estates to sell food and goods at controlled prices. A canteen providing adequate midday meals to Asian and African staff was set up in Nairobi. Medical clinics and dispensaries were operating at various points, and a dispensary for Dar es Salaam was reported being considered for construction in 1951. In March 1953 the first of 26 72-dwelling blocks for African housing was opened in Nairobi, each of the 72 units having one room of 120 square feet and a kitchen of 30 square feet. Though tiny by Western standards, by East African tribal measurements the space was adequate, and, of course, much more hygienic than the mud and thatch tribal housing.

In Nairobi provisions for education include two main training schools, one for the Transportation Department staff and one for Mechanical Engineering Department staff. The Administration has also claimed an effort in conducting mass literacy classes, the opening of further nursery schools, and the extension of classes in housewifery and like subjects among members of the African staff.

Some inadequacy in staff morale and efficiency remained evident. A meeting of nearly 1,000 Asian employees, in Nairobi in early 1953, resolved to request the Colonial Secretary to intervene on the matter of their salaries and conditions of service. A particular complaint was that there was too much stagnation in successive salary grades with very little increase from one to the other. In Dar es Salaam in 1950 there was a strike which resulted in the congestion of the Port with a backlog of some 15,000 tons. A new labor force was recruited and cargo handling was reported improved in ensuing months. A strike which was general in Nairobi during the same year was not joined by the Administration's African staff, their loyalty being attributed in part to preventive measures such as the provision of police protection for workers and to talks given in the housing estates by European officers.

Beyond the strikes and manifest Asian discontent, there was an admission of staff inefficiency, relative to railroads elsewhere, which limited technical development. Official reference was made to the inability of African and Asian maintenance staff to cope with the closer mechanical tolerances and greater delicacy of diesel equipment, pegging the railway for some time to come to the employment of a higher proportion of steam locomotives than would otherwise be advisable. Considering the level of performance normally expected in East Africa, the Administration's claims of an unusually good record, with few staff difficulties, seem valid.

After the amalgamation of the services, need for united staff associations was apparent. The Kenya and Uganda Railway and Harbours and the Tanganyika Railway and Ports Services European Staff Associations were amalgamated in 1950, while the East African Railway Asian Union continued to serve interterritorially for Asians. Two associations for African staff representation were reported to be making satisfactory progress towards responsible representation of African interests. Facing the future the Railways, along with other industry in East Africa, are aware that older methods of utilizing then available pools of very unskilled and cheap labor must be modified, with better training and more utilization of mechanical improvements to increase both production and wages.

Though not constituting a rail net comparable with those of Europe or America, the several lines, with their branches, provide an adequate means of freight and passenger conveyance between main points. The main line is laid through Kenya into Uganda and is 871 miles in length with 178 miles of sidings. A 134 mile branch runs from Nakuru to Kisumu, on Lake Victoria, the original terminus of the Uganda Railway. The Central Line of Tanganyika, with 780 miles and 84 miles of sidings, crosses that territory from Dar es Salaam, passing up through Morogoro, Dodoma, and Tabora to its western terminus at Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika. The Tanga line, farther north in Tanganyika, runs from the port of Tanga 218 miles to Moshi, a few miles short of which it connects with the Kahe Voi line and so with the main Kenya Uganda line. The Tanga line is extended, from its nominal terminus of Moshi, 54 miles to Arusha, the extension line being provided with 3 miles of sidings. The Kahe-Voi stretch is 92 miles in length with 3 miles of sidings. The most recent of the rail trunks of East Africa is the Southern Province Railway of Tanganyika.

As the main Kenya Uganda line moves inland from Mombasa several lines branch outward from it. The first, leading southwest, is the Voi-Kahe connection mentioned above. Next, also leading southeast, is the Magadi line, of 90 miles length with four miles of sidings, reaching the soda deposits of the lake of the same name. The Nanyuki Branch, going northward from Nairobi, is 145 miles long with two miles of sidings, providing access to the western slopes of Mt. Kenya. Yet further west is the Thompson's Falls branch, 48 miles long with 4 miles of sidings; the Solai Branch of 27 and 1 miles, respectively; and the Kitale Branch of 41 and 4. Continuing westward into Uganda there are the Namasagali branch in Uganda, 19 and 4; the Butere Branch, 43 and 1; and the Port Bell Branch, 6 and 10. From the Tanganyika Central Line, a branch connects Tabora with Mwanza, 236 miles away at the foot of Lake Victoria. This line has two other ancillary lines: the Masalgi-Horgoro branch of 37 miles with 4 miles of sidings serving the Kongwa area, and the new Kiluwa-Mpanda branch.

All descriptions of capital and consumer goods required by European, African and Asian sections of the community are distributed by the railway to major points, and the bulk of export produce of sisal, coffee, cotton and minerals are carried back to the ports. Until recently the railroad operated almost entirely without mechanical haulage competition, and even now with the beginnings of competition from roadways services (which, however, must operate largely on very poorly surfaced roads) the railways, excluding their own considerable ancillary motor transport, carry by far the bulk of East African goods.

The variety of imported goods carried up country is a necessary corollary to the extraction of the export materials hauled back to the coast. The predominantly agricultural economy of East Africa places peak-season demands on the transport system. Next to soda ash, the largest items of export freight tonnage carried by the Kenya and Uganda section and the Tanga Line in 1952 were sisal, coffee, and then cotton, the four items in tonnages of 113,020, 84,433, 81,752 and 77,951. For the Central Line in Tanganyika the chief item was sisal, totalling 45,669 with oilseeds next at 27,729.

Delays in handling the sisal traffic, which had grown heavier each season, have caused repeated complaints against the Administration. Another illustration of the difficulty of peak season agricultural haulage is the annual congestion caused by the Uganda cotton crop, which the senders prefer be sent only in covered wagons. In 1950, when large tonnages of famine relief food were also being moved, only 85 percent of this crop had been hauled by the end of July, considerably behind the ideal schedule. Such difficulties are increased by the absence of adequate storage facilities at up country points, by a climate often favorable to wet and dry rot, by danger of damage by vermin and pilferage. The periodic importation of heavy capital goods, such as the construction materials and heavy steel fittings for the cement plant at Tororo and the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda, as well as for the Railway Administration's own projects, has posed special problems of transfer and haulage. The effect of the development pace in Uganda, while creating a beneficial demand for the haulage of capital equipment over practically the entire length of the line, is tending to increase both the turn-around time of wagons and the volume of empty haulage back to the coast when balancing seasonal exports are not offering.

Special difficulties have arisen because of the droughts of 1949 and 1953 in Tanganyika. In 1950 it became necessary to curtail passenger travel and to decline much short haul cargo which could be carried by road in order that locomotives and wagons could be made available for the transfer of famine relief grains and water. Severe rains and floods create further problems. In 1950 parts of the Mwanza line were washed out by severe rains falling sometimes at more than 1.60 inches per hour. Maintenance difficulties in the north were further increased by the corrosive effects of using borehole water in locomotive boilers during the drought.

Providing long passenger service across an area of widely contrasting climate with a multi-racial population having a wide range of living standards, the Administration necessarily must maintain a wide variety of services and facilities. First, second, and third class passenger service is offered, the volume of the higher two class services affected to some extent in recent years by road and airways competition. Bedding is provided at a charge for upper class passengers, and at many points, where public facilities are not in operation, the Administration operates hotels and catering establishments. In 1952 the hotels and catering services served 938,105 meals, rented 111,369 sets of bedding, washed 709,354 pieces of laundry, and prepared 18,799 units of mineral waters. The general utility nature of the track and the severe gradients and curves have inhibited fast passenger services, and visitors from Europe and America often complain about the 47 hours and 5 minutes required for the 871 mile run from Mombasa to Kampala.

The Lake Victoria steamer services, though not so vital to the northern Lake Victoria shore since the extension of the railway around the north side of the Lake westward to Kampala, remains important and carries increasing tonnages. A weekly round-the-lake cargo and passenger steamer service is provided with ancillary tugs-and-lighter and launch services, increasing the routes to 2,770 miles. The principal ports around the lake are Musoma, Mwanza and Bukoba in Tanganyika and Port Bell in Uganda and Kisumu in Kenya. Other inland marine services are operated on Lakes Kioga, Albert, Tanganyika and on the Nile River. The steamer services on Kioga amount to some 697 route miles; the Lake Albert-Nile routes cover some 645 miles from Butiaba to Nimule in the Sudan; the Lake Tanganyika services consist of a three weekly scheduled shuttle from Kigoma to Mpulungu in Northern Rhodesia, with supplementary tug and lighter services as required. A small ocean schooner service was operated up to 1953 between Dar es Salaam and Tanga on the Tanganyika coast.

In Kenya and Uganda the Administration operates a 75 mile road system to move passengers and goods between Lakes Kioga and Albert. In Tanganyika a much larger road motor system is employed, amounting in all to 1,776 route miles. It has been the view of the Commissioner of Transport that roadways are ancillary to railways as far as freight traffic is concerned, feeding the railheads and serving areas not yet reached by them. Because of the large areas not reached by railroads, and the absence of a north-south link between the two systems, there has been an increasing dependence upon road haulage. In 1951 the Railway authorities shipped 18 new rail passenger vehicles chassis to Johannesburg for fitting with bodies, a round trip of some 4,300 miles, by road motor transport.

At Mombasa, Kilindini Harbour, facilities exist for vessels up to 760 feet long in tonnages of up to 45,000, with seven deep water berths handling vessels of 32-30 ft. draft. Facilities for dhows are also available, and facilities for landing coal and oils. Dar es Salaam Harbour facilitiesinclude a deep water anchorage and a mile-long creek affording anchorages for seven ships. The entrance channel has a depth of 19 feet at LWOST and a channel width, at 4 fathoms depth, of 420 feet. Three lighterage wharfs of 284,505, and 670 feet lengths are operated. Twin screw vessels over 550 feet and single screw vessels over 500 feet cannot enter the inner harbor. Shed floor space is in the region of 200,000 square feet. Tanga Port has about half a square mile of sheltered water allowing room for five vessels drawing 21-29 feet of water at all stages of the tide. There is one safe outer anchorage for a vessel drawing 36 feet, and accommodation for many coasters. The lighter wharf is 600 feet long, and transit sheds provide 95,000 square feet of storage space. An assortment of lighters, tugs, cranes and other landing equipment exists at all ports.

Improvements in quality and extent of tracks and rolling stock and of harbor facilities have been carried on continuously since the High Commission takeover. Though exaggerated by monetary inflation, an idea of the amount of expansion under the High Commission can be obtained by comparing the capital account figure at the end of 1948 with that at the end of 1952, some £27,000,000 against some £56,000,000.

The construction of new railway lines cannot be undertaken (under Section 8 (3) of the East African Railways and Harbours Administration Act, 1950) until it has been approved in both the Legislative Council of the territory in which the work is to be carried out and also in the Central Legislative Assembly itself. The initiative for the construction of new lines lies with the government of the territory in which the construction is to take place and the government must guarantee the Administration against net loss for a period of ten years with review after that time.

The construction of the rail link in Southern Tanganyika from the new port of Mtwara to the junction of the Mkwaya-Nachingwea was taken over by the Administration from the contractors in September 1950. Extension of the Southern Province Railway to Lumesole Juu under a joint guarantee by the Tanganyika Government and the Overseas Food Corporation was under way in 1951. Early in that year the Tanganyika Legislative Council had given its approval to the construction of the extension and approved of guaranteeing (jointly with OFC) this route and the Port of Mtwara against losses, and to loan up to £750,000 for construction of the extension. This action was endorsed in April of 1951 by the Central Legislative Assembly.

The first 45 miles of the important Western Uganda Extension of the Kenya-Uganda line from Kampala was reported completed in August of 1953. A resolution approving the extension of the railway westwards for approximately 50 miles from Kampala to Mityana (with a financial guarantee to the Administration against net loss in respect of the operation for a period of ten years and the advance to the Administration of up to £750,000 for the purpose of the construction of the line pending the raising of a loan) was passed in Uganda Legislative Council on January 9, 1951. In January 1952 after economic and engineering surveys had reported, a resolution approving the further extension of the Railway westwards from Mityana to connect with the Lake System of Lakes George and Edward (together with a financial guarantee to the Administration against net loss in respect of the operation of the extension for ten years and an advance of £3,350,000 for construction) was passed.

The surveying of possible routes for a north-south link of the East African and Rhodesian systems - which would involve a problem of different gauge track - was under way in 1950. The reports of the engineering and economic survey teams were published in late 1952. They estimated a cost of £33 million for the north-south link and £18 million for links to Mtwara. The alternative of all weather roads was suggested by the surveyors and the Acting Commissioner stated his opinion that present finances and material resources should be devoted to improving extant routes. The Commissioner, however, had referred to a connection with the Rhodesian rail systems as being probably a matter of time. A motion was made in Central Legislative Assembly in October 1951 to divert funds previously allocated toward a rail link between the Kenya and Uganda line and the Central line in Tanganyika.

The problem of addition of rolling stock since 1947 has been so much a matter of waiting for old orders to be filled that it can be described best as a procurement difficulty. Twelve new 58 class (4-8-4-4-8-4) locomotives and 3 Diesel shunting locomotives were received and put in operation in 1950, and some goods vehicles were received or artificed in the workshop and put into service on the Kenya or Uganda section. Some 27 second-hand steam locomotives and nine diesel shunters along with 139 goods vehicles were put into operation on the Tanganyika section. No passenger rolling stock was received by either line during 1950. Against these receipts there has been a constant gap of unfilled orders. Of 1,308 goods vehicles ordered between 1947 and 1948 only 550 had arrived by mid 1951. In early 1953 orders outstanding for 146 mainline and 55 shunting locomotives, for 51 upper and third class coaches and some 5,168 freight cars were just beginning to arrive and were not expected to be fulfilled before 1955. In 1953 more powerful locomotives, the heaviest Gerratt types ever manufactured for use on metre gauge tracks, were also on order. The delay in deliveries was costly in terms of price of rolling stock as well as in terms of retarded development. The manufacturers' contracts contained clauses authorizing price rises under certain circumstances to meet increased manufacturing expenses. The Commissioner for Transport had called for an allocation of £400,000 to cover such discrepancies in respect of the deliveries due in late 1951. Delayed deliveries of materials other than rolling stock also deterred development.

The rail lines at the end of 1952 were not being operated to the full potential capacity of a single track line. The busiest, the Kenya and Uganda line still had room for yet greater traffic density in early 1953, when the General Manager informed the Central Legislative Assembly that the construction of a second line at £12,000,000 "would be foolishly extravagant."[3] Heavier rails, more powerful locomotives, and increased numbers of wagons were described as the best means of bringing traffic up to the greater densities hauled by other single line roads elsewhere in Africa.

Considerable improvements have also been made in harbor facilities since the High Commission takeover. At Mombasa Port work toward providing further stacking space by cutting back a cliff face was undertaken in 1950. In 1953 delays in deliveries of steel ordered from Japan for the construction of two deep water berths at Mombasa threatened a serious delay in this essential port development. At Dar es Salaam a lighterage wharf was begun in 1950 and three deep water berths are now under construction. Further harbor improvements planned are the addition of some 700 feet of lighterage quay to be added to Tanga port.

Since the High Commission takeover in 1948 both freight and passenger haulage on the railway, road and inland water services has generally increased, with occasional fluctuations in the latter due to emergency curtailment. In 1952 the total freight ton mileage of all services was 1,398,605,401, as compared with 1,287,215,086 in 1951, which was higher than for any previous year, going 6 percent above 1950 and 130 percent above 1929. The 1950 total was some 8.5 percent greater than in 1949. The relative contributions of railways, inland water services and road services to the 1952 total were respectively 1,342,693,214, 43,768,925, and 12,143,262. As shown by the following table, the tonnages carried by each of the three services, railway, road, and inland water, increased during the period 1948-1952.

	Railway	Road	Waterways
1948	3,478,777	65,914	225,941
1949	3,688,510	66,385	264,837
1950	4,151,571	70,897	290,455
1951	4,440,424	72,424	275,196
1952	4,720,175	89,735	321,990

The increase in 1948 was achieved without significant additions to locomotives or rolling stock during the year and that in 1949 despite a serious drought.

Passenger journeys on the three services totalled 6,433,898 in 1952, as compared with 6,565,294 in 1951, a considerable rise above the 1950 total of 5,933,313, which had declined somewhat from a year earlier. The available figures, given in the table below, for the number of passengers travelling on the railway and the road services (figures for passengers on waterways services are not given in the annual reports) show that passengers increased on both services in 1949 over the 1948 figures but fell off in 1950. While the number of railway passengers apparently increased again in 1951 and 1952, the number of road passengers in 1951 and 1952 was less than the number in 1950.

	Railway	Road
1947	4,645,458	298,886
1948	5,495,353	331,872
1949	5,978,976	350,948
1950	5,933,313	326,435
1951	not given	272,130
1952	not given	285,305

The expansion trend and demand for services continued throughout the five year period, and in 1953 the Railway appeared as unable to satisfy increasing demands for services as five years earlier, despite the increases in tonnages and passengers carried. In answer to frequent challenges of the transport system the responsible officers have quoted the rather impressive amount of expansion achieved, and have explained inadequacies in terms of sharp seasonal peaks in hauling agricultural produce, of construction and maintenance difficulties, increased by occasional floods, and, more importantly, of the very limited availability of capital finance and capital equipment in the sterling area. The annual reports of the Administration give detailed statistics, with figures of loaded and empty goods-wagon mileage, to indicate comparative operating efficiency.

Both cargo tonnage and number of passengers handled at the East African harbors have also increased during the five year period 1948-1952. As shown in the following table, there has been a general increase in cargo tonnage handled at East African ports during this period, rising from 3,188,230 in 1948 to 4,070,488 in 1952 with a slight decline in 1950. At Mombasa and Tanga there has been a steady increase during the period. At Dar es Salaam and Mtwara/Mikindani the 1952 tonnage was well above that of 1948 although there had been a decline in 1950 and 1951 from the 1949 figure. Only at Lindi was the tonnage handled in 1952 less than that handled in 1948.

	Mombasa	Dar es Salaam	Tanga	Lindi	Mtwara/ Mikindani	Total
1948	2,344,066	504,008	205,603	106,113	28,440	3,188,230
1949	2,518,389	587,328	222,918	122,840	34,640	3,486,115
1950	2,548,164	567,093	237,681	87,600	34,576	3,475,114
1951	2,771,168	651,295	239,917	79,589	32,090	3,774,059
1952	2,810,435	766,449	268,194	87,662	37,748	4,070,488

The following table shows the general increase in the number of passengers landed and embarked at the East African ports during the period 1948-1952. At Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Lindi the number of passengers increased steadily. At Mombasa the number dropped in 1949 and again in 1951 reaching a peak for the five years in 1952.

	Mombasa	Dar es Salaam	Tanga	Lindi	Mtwara/ Mikindani	Total
1948	64,417	NA	NA	NA	NA	
1949	62,522	10,832	NA	4,358	NA	
1950	66,137	23,460	2,530	5,888	1,114	99,129
1951	64,298	40,688	3,925	7,569	1,929	118,409
1952	66,832	44,800	4,371	9,706	1,917	127,676

The tonnages handled at the ports have not fully satisfied needs. The dissatisfaction has continued, particularly in regard to Mombasa Port, despite a continuous program of harbor improvement. A special company, the Landing and Shipping Co. of E.A. Ltd., was formed to consolidate cargo handling operations, with the Administration holding a one-third share. A program of phasing ship arrivals through arrangements in London began to govern the inflow of cargo at the beginning of 1952 and thereby reduce the backlog of goods remaining expensively afloat or aground at Mombasa but uncleared for up country shipment. This was partly a matter of shifting the backlog (and to some extent the blame for delay) from the port itself to other locations more remote. Though congestion was ended at the port, import orders waited as long as nine months for shipping space out from the UK. The queue largely appeared to have been shifted from Mombasa to United Kingdom; the Administration conceded that the phasing scheme was "an unpleasant and temporary palliative" which however did eliminate the expensive holding over of ships at Mombasa; the real need was for permanent improvements of the port facilities.[4] Continued congestion in April of 1953 was explained in terms of limited rolling stock, wagons and locomotives being insufficient to carry away the inflow of cargo from the unloading operation, which was asserted to be operating at only 75 percent of maximum capacity. By June considerable improvement was claimed, with a record clearance of 113,000 tons for up country shipment during the month.

The following table shows the "working results" of all services, for the years 1948-1952, (in £).

	Gross Earnings	Gross Expenditures*	Balance-Net Earnings	Loan Charges Met	Surplus	Unallocated Balance from Previous Year
1948						
R	7,440,010	5,967,891	1,472,119	750,868	721,251	
H	1,748,171	1,094,582	653,589	176,814	476,775	
R&H	9,188,181	7,062,473	2,125,708	927,682	1,198,026	
1949						
R	8,586,427	6,389,924	2,196,503	615,146	1,581,357	
H	2,125,749	1,396,956	728,793	167,261	561,532	
R&H	10,712,176	7,786,880	2,925,296	782,407	2,142,889	362,998
1950						
R	9,426,410	7,334,359	2,092,051	701,197	1,390,854	
H	2,009,459	1,488,374	521,085	179,360	341,725	
R&H	11,435,869	8,822,733	2,613,136	880,557	1,732,579	269,548
1951						
R	10,832,313	8,638,897	2,193,416	713,600	1,479,816	
H	2,578,835	1,839,927	738,908	188,140	550,768	
R&H	13,411,148	10,478,824	2,932,324	901,740	2,030,584	
1952						
R	12,801,106	10,247,019	2,554,087	757,013	1,797,074	
H	2,926,797	2,170,249	756,548	200,849	555,699	
R&H	15,727,903	12,417,268	3,310,635	957,862	2,352,773	155,709

As the table shows, the net earnings of the Railways, after contributions to renewals funds, increased from £1,472,119 in 1948 to £2,554,087 in 1952 although the 1950 and 1951 earnings were less than those in 1949.**The net earnings of the Harbours increased from £653,589 in 1948 to £756,548 in 1952, a steady annual increase during the five years being interrupted only by a decline in the 1950 earnings compared with those for 1949. The combined net earnings of the Railways and Harbours Administration increased from £2,125,708 in 1948 to £3,310,635 in 1952, the steady annual increase in this case also being interrupted only by a fall in 1950. After loan charges have been met the Railways and Harbours together have had a surplus which rose from £1,198,026 in 1948 to £2,142,889 in 1949, dropped to £1,732,579 and £2,030,584 in 1950 and 1951 and rose to a peak of £2,352,773 in 1952. These surpluses are transferred to the Combined Net Revenue Appropriation Account and have, with the unappropriated surpluses from the previous years, been appropriated for the following purposes in 1949, 1950 and 1952.

	1949 £	1950 £	1952 £
Special Contribution to Renewals Fund	509,610	469,610	569,610
Contribution to Reserve etc. Accounts	226,200	186,200	159,500
Contribution to Betterment Funds	1,150,000	1,100,000	1,450,000
Salaries Commission Award 1946-1948	350,529	4,104	
Debt Liability to Tanganyika			41,305

* Includes contributions to Renewals Fund. These contributions for the Railways and Harbours combined were £716,638 in 1948, £874,622 in 1949, £938,489 in 1950, £1,073,506 in 1951, and £1,352,343 in 1952.

** Despite a loss in the road services in 1951 and 1952 and in the catering services for the years 1949-1952.

The operating surpluses during the post war years, of course, have not provided adequate funds for necessary capital improvement, and the outstanding financial problem of the Administration has been a shortage of funds for capital development to meet the increased demand for services. Difficulties and delays in procurement made it necessary that capital funds be available far in advance of capital improvement. Limitation on loan authorization within the sterling area prevented the easy obtainance of loans from abroad.

Under the High Commission, loans for the Railways and Harbours Administration have been raised by the High Commission after an enabling act has been passed by the Central Legislative Assembly and ordinances have been passed in each territorial Legislative Council guaranteeing the loan. (The question of vesting land in the Railways and Harbours Administration so that it could raise its own loans was raised by the unofficials in Kenya Legislative Council during the debate on the amalgamation and later during the debate on the guarantee of the £23 million loan, but no action in this direction has been taken.)

The loan authorizations approved from 1946 through 1952 total £59¼ million, as against a 1946 capital account of just under £35½ million. With difficulty, statutory authority was obtained in 1949 for the High Commission to raise £23 million for the Administration. This loan was provided for by the Loan (Railways and Harbours) Act, 1949, passed by the Central Legislative Assembly, and guarantees for the loan were given by each of the territorial governments. The loan was to cover general improvements (£1,900,000), additional rolling stock (£4,000,000), construction of new lines (£2,200,000) and realignments (£2,000,000), the provision of deep-water berths at the lighterage port of Dar es Salaam (£1,200,000), and additional berths at Mombasa (£1,200,000), as well as £4,550,000 for the construction of the Tanganyika Southern Province Port and Railway and £5,490,000 for loan redemption. Again with difficulty in respect to raising the loan ceiling, statutory authority was obtained for an additional £3½ million by the Loan (Railways and Harbours) Act, 1951, guarantees being given by the territorial governments, to enable the Administration to place orders for additional rolling stock. Requirements again outstripped the provision for capital improvements covered by these loan authorizations and the Chairman of the High Commission and the Commissioner for Transport made a special visit to London to secure agreement to the loan ceiling being raised by another £32,750,000. The Central Assembly in April 1952 passed an Act authorizing the raising of this amount and the territorial governments guaranteed the loan. The 1952 loan act schedule contains £10 million for general improvements, £11.1 million for new railways and extensions, including the Tanganyika Southern Province Port and Railway, Western Uganda Extension to Lakes George and Edward, and the Morogoro-Korogwe link.

Of the 59¼ million pounds authorized, £17,750,000 had been raised by September 1952 when the third installment of the £23 million loan was raised on the London market. This left £41½ million still to be found. In September 1953 £7,135,000, the balance of the £23 million loan, was obtained, again in the London market. The prospects for raising further loans on the London market is not promising. Following visits to East Africa of missions from the International Bank and the Mutual Security Agency, a loan of £2,390,000 was arranged with the Mutual Security Agency, as a contribution to specific works in the development plans for the ports of Mombasa and Tanga.

The £59¼ million authorization - which represents the limit of capital expansion for some years to come - remains inadequate to finance all the Administration's requirements, even after allowing for considerable use of Betterment

Funds. Continually rising costs have made the provision in the loan schedules for many major works inadequate, and the Administration has therefore had to reduce the scope of its development program, postponing certain works and reallocating the funds earmarked for them to more urgent projects. The cost of servicing almost £60 million of loan money, even if the whole amount were obtained on the more favorable terms which could be secured from the London market, will place a heavy burden on the transport users of East Africa. An increase of 20 percent in freight rates became effective January 1, 1954.

Any territorial government wishing to initiate new railway construction must guarantee the Railways Administration against operational loss on the venture for a period of ten years in the first place, with a review of the position at the end of that period. It is inherent in this arrangement that any losses met by a government during the period of the guarantee will be refunded out of future profits, settlement being made annually during the decennium. Principles for the determination of profits and losses on new lines have been laid down. The Development Commissioner, Uganda, stated:

> "These principles are conceived in a generous spirit and represent a real determination on the part of the Railway Administration to encourage Governments, who must take the initiative in new construction, to guarantee soundly conceived new projects. A new line is charged with all costs incurred on it including a percentage of supervision charges and receives credit for all revenue on traffic on the new line and also for the revenue accruing from the haulage of traffic from the new line over the main line, for which haulage it pays to the main line a charge based on working cost only. The new line in addition receives some further revenue from port charges."[5]

This basis was "thrashed out after many years of experience, some of it extremely painful" according to the Development Commissioner, Uganda. These principles, the Schuster principles, apparently cover the guarantees the territorial governments must give only with respect to branch lines.[6] Recently, in two cases, the territorial governments have also made advances to the Administration for the construction of new lines because of the shortage of capital finance.

Guarantees against operating loss and also advances to the Administration for construction have been made in regard to two new branch lines, the extension of the railway westward from Kampala in Uganda and the extension of the Southern Province Line in Tanganyika.

Uganda gave a financial guarantee to the East African Railways and Harbours Administration, by two resolutions passed in Legislative Council, against net loss in respect of the operation of the extension to the lake region for a period of ten years subject to review at the expiration of that period. It also agreed to advance a total sum of £4,100,000 for the construction of the line pending the raising of a loan (£750,000 for the section from Kampala to Mityana and £3,500,000 for the remainder of the line from Mityana to the lakes).

Capital for construction of different sections of the Southern Province Railway in Tanganyika has been advanced to the Administration by the Overseas Food Corporation and the Tanganyika Government, and operating losses are now guaranteed jointly by the OFC and the Tanganyika Government. Originally capital for the construction of the first section of the Railway to Nachingwea and the new Port of Mtwara which was required for the groundnuts scheme was advanced to the Administration by the OFC subject to repayment later by the Administration.

The OFC also gave a guarantee (contained in an agreement between OFC and the Administration) against capital losses. The OFC agreed that in the event of traffic not materializing the users would be protected against substantial losses. This meant that if the revenue earned from the groundnuts plus certain other traffic were insufficient to cover the interest and sinking fund and certain items of depreciation the OFC would make good the deficit. If the OFC should cease operations in the area and the people of East Africa considered that the railway and port were of no further use, the OFC would make good the outstanding part of the loan, with such assets as the Administration could sell set off against the OFC obligations. In order to do this, the accounts for the Southern Province port and railway would, for the first ten years of the agreement, be entirely separate. The guarantee did not cover operational losses as the Unofficial Members in Kenya Legislative Council had demanded as a condition of their approval of the amalgamation. The Administration, however, secured a pledge from the British Government that it would plant full acreage in the Southern Province, which would have provided ample traffic, and the Commissioner insisted on the application of full standard tariff charges to the Corporation traffic. It was considered that in this way the requirement of the Kenya Unofficials for a guarantee of operational losses had been met. Inward traffic of capital equipment, etc. was assured, and expert advice estimated that outward traffic would be no less than 365,000 tons per annum, whereas even a figure of 150,000 tons would have been ample.

When revised plans on a considerably reduced scale of production were announced in November 1949 the question of the guarantee was immediately re-opened. The OFC agreed to amend their agreement with the Administration to guarantee not only interest and sinking fund but also operation costs to the extent that these were not covered by revenue from all traffic handled on the section, provided that any operating losses in the earlier years of the ten-year period would be set off against operating surpluses, if any, during the later years. The port and railway were thus to be constructed and run without risk to the Administration or to the Tanganyika Government. When the OFC decided that their revised plans for the Southern Province area did not justify the completion of Mtwara or the Railway and were prepared to see construction abandoned, plans were drawn up for the extension of the line 60 miles to Lumesule Juu and new financial arrangements were made. The Tanganyika Government agreed to advance the Administration up to £750,000 for the construction of the extension. The Tanganyika Government and OFC jointly guaranteed the Administration against the net loss of operating the port of Mtwara and the railway through to Lumesule Juu for ten years. Tanganyika assumed responsibility for one-fifth of the deficit (the proportion that the cost and mileage of the Lumesule Juu extension bears to the investment of OFC capital in the port and the mileage of line to Nachingwea). This liability would begin when the port and line were opened to traffic. Approval of these guarantees was given by the Tanganyika Legislative Council in a resolution passed on February 8, 1951.

Losses on the Mpanda line in Tanganyika were guaranteed by the mining company. This guarantee, which was considered unsatisfactory by the Kenya Unofficials, was considered by the Transport Advisory Council and that body was satisfied that in the event of the mine failing to fulfill its obligations the financial consequence would not fall on the Railway Administration or on the Kenya or Uganda Governments but on the Government of Tanganyika.

Relations with transport agencies in other territories, and exchanges of information, have been maintained from time to time. The General Manager and the Commissioner for Transport attended the Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference in Johannesburg in 1950. The Belgian Congo makes use of East African rail transport, and an agreement for the construction of a special berth in Dar es Salaam for cargo intended for the Congo was negotiated in Brussels in 1950. The special contractual relations existing with Overseas Food Corporation regarding the financing and construction of the Southern Province Railway in Tanganyika and the loan for harbor development from the Mutual Security Agency have been mentioned above.

Relations with the territorial government departments have given little trouble. Official members of the territorial Legislative Councils have generally supported the Administration against charges of inefficiency, one instance being the opposition by the Official Members of Kenya Legislative Council to demands of Unofficial Members for the appointment of a committee of inquiry on the port of Mombasa.

Nearly every European in East Africa appears to have a definite opinion concerning the central administration of the Railways and Harbours. "Central control from Nairobi" and "High officials inaccessible to public criticism and insensitive to the real needs of the territories" provide the principal themes of criticism. The overall remedy most commonly prescribed is more "decentralization" or territorial control. An official of the Kampala Chamber of Commerce suggested to me that a complete counterpart of the central headquarters staff should be set up in Kampala, so that more detailed functions such as procurement could be carried on in Kampala in the same way as at the head office in Nairobi. The official was insistent that this would not cause uneconomic duplication of effort because "decentralization of control invariably furthers economy." This comment - however uninformed and inconsistent it may be - is not atypical of the opinions of many commercial and farming people throughout the three territories. The views expressed by unofficial members of the territorial legislatures, though generally founded upon more complete knowledge, still reveal the strong divergences of territorial interests even in such pervading matters as transport and communications. The divergence became particularly apparent during the debates on the final proposal of amalgamation.

The resistance to amalgamation was less in Kenya than in Uganda and Tanganyika. This lesser objection was related to the senior status of Kenya regarding the Kenya and Uganda section of the railways, and to the fact that the Colony and its capital of Nairobi could gain materially by becoming the administrative headquarters for an increasing number of interterritorial services. With particular reference to the railways amalgamation, however, some doubt existed as to the wisdom of pooling resources with Tanganyika because of the relatively poor and run down condition of the Tanganyika railways and their rolling stock at that time.

However, the Unofficial Members of Kenya Legislative Council approved amalgamation of the railways and harbors, despite the poor financial position of the Tanganyika Railways. There were two reasons for this. The first concerned the developmental outlook in Tanganyika, particularly the groundnut scheme plans involving an expenditure in Tanganyika of £18 to £20 million of the total UK investment of £24 million. The new port of Mtwara and the new Southern Province Railway were expected, partly through hauling groundnuts, to increase the earning capacity. Secondly, the Commissioner for Transport had assured the Unofficials that amalgamation as such would not cause an increase in railway rates in Kenya. The amalgamation was approved with the provision that satisfactory financial arrangements should be made with Overseas Food Corporation or the UK Government regarding the construction and operation of the port at Mtwara and the Southern Province railway to insure that no capital or operational loss could be incurred on those projects by the East African Railways and Harbours Administration. This provision was accepted by the Officials. An agreement was subsequently reached between Overseas Food Corporation and the Railways and Harbours Administration in which OFC guaranteed capital losses only. During the pertinent debate the Unofficial Member for Mombasa expressed the long held view of the Mombasa Chamber of Commerce and of shipowners operating ships on the East African coast that the ports would be better administered and run if they were divorced from the railways and put under a port commission or trust. "A certain amount of dead end occurs at the moment in Nairobi which hinders the operation at the port ..."7

Two African Members, Messrs. Mathu and Ohanga, while approving of amalgamation, insisted that Africans, being the largest users of the railways, should have representation in the various councils and committees. Mr. Patel appealed for Asian representation on the railway and port committees. The Financial Secretary explained that the Railway Advisory Council was a business body, not a political body at all, and it would be most unfortunate if representation on it were dictated by sectional interest. Also on the new railway committee he felt there should be strong Kenya representation, but selection of members based on political or racial factions would be deplorable.

In early 1950, when the guarantee for the £23 million Railways and Harbours loan - of which £10 to £11 million was for railway and harbor works in Tanganyika - was being considered in Kenya Legislative Council, the Unofficial Members again expressed serious doubts about Tanganyika because previously hopeful developments there (the groundnuts scheme and several mining enterprises), which had provided some of the basis for the earlier agreement to amalgamation, had not materialized. The failure of the groundnuts scheme was cited, and it was complained that insufficient information had been provided on Tanganyika mining enterprises. A suspicion was voiced that the more sound economy of Kenya and Uganda, built up by private enterprise, would be used to further schemes in Tanganyika in which they had no confidence. It was also pointed out that the Overseas Food Corporation guarantee on the Mtwara port and the Southern Province railway did not cover operational losses although the Kenya unofficials had made this a proviso of their approval of amalgamation. They asked if there was any limitation to the liability of the British Government should it decide to liquidate the Overseas Food Corporation. They asked for an assurance from Government that operational losses would be guaranteed by OFC and that if OFC ceased to operate in East Africa the UK Government would be responsible for its guarantees. Dissatisfaction also was recorded with the guarantee for the Mpanda line by the mining company, which the Unofficials pronounced useless, and assurance was asked that if the line failed the Railways and Harbours Administration and Kenya and Uganda would not have to bear the loss. It was not feared that Kenya would be called on to honor the guarantees directly but rather that there would be a rise in rates to compensate for Tanganyika losses. Major Keyser asked whether there would be an increase in rates in Kenya, not due to the increase in costs of running the railway, to cover the unsatisfactory financial position of the Tanganyika Railway.

The Unofficials also feared that by guaranteeing Railway loans they would prejudice the chances of raising loans for development in Kenya, insisting that they had been under the impression that land would be handed over to the newly amalgamated Administration to enable it to provide its own security for necessary loans. Mr. Maconochie Welwood asked the Government to affirm that it would investigate the possibility of making the Railways and Harbours Administration by itself a trustee investment and confer with other governments and ask them to do the same.

The Official Members attempted to assuage the doubts of the Unofficials. The Deputy Chief Secretary informed the Council that the OFC had agreed to guarantee not only interest and sinking fund but also operational losses provided that any operating losses in the earlier years of the ten year period be set off against operating surpluses during later years. He explained that originally the Administration felt that it had met the requirement of the Unofficial Members by securing a pledge from OFC to plant full acreage, which would have provided ample traffic, and insisting on the application of full standard tariff charges to Corporation traffic. The Financial Secretary said they were certain of inward traffic and expert advice had estimated outward traffic of 365,000 tons, whereas even 150,000 tons would have been more than economic. Mr. Havelock regarded this explanation as unsatisfactory: inward traffic was guaranteed but there had been no assurance that there would be adequate outward traffic. The Deputy Chief Secretary stated that it was difficult to imagine a situation arising in which H.M. Government would not ensure that an OFC guarantee was honored but it was not within the power of the Kenya Government to provide an assurance of this kind. In the event the Mpanda mining company failed to fulfill its obligations, the Deputy Chief Secretary advised, the loss would not fall on the Administration or on the Kenya Government; it would fall on the Government of Tanganyika. The Financial Secretary added his assurances it was not proposed to raise the rates on the Railway in Kenya because of the amalgamation.

On the second question raised by Unofficials, the Deputy Chief Secretary said the Government was prepared to consider the vesting of land in the Administration and to raise the matter in the Central Assembly to see whether it would be possible for the investigation to be carried on by the High Commission. He also said that, on the best advice which could be obtained in London, the loan-raising capacity of the Kenya Government would not be affected by the railway loan guarantee. After these assurances the Unofficials supported the loan ordinance.

Thus, most of the doubts about amalgamation in Kenya Legislative Council were expressed by European Unofficial Members, their principal fear being that Kenya would have to bear - indirectly at least - losses incurred on Tanganyika lines. The few Asian and African comments concerned representation on advisory committees.

In Uganda the pattern of reaction to the proposal for amalgamation differed from that in Kenya. There was fairly strong feeling against central control from Nairobi, but the advantages of centralization were recognized. In Uganda Legislative Council, an Asian Unofficial Member, Mr. Maini, stressed the importance of a unified policy, a uniform tariff, the advantages of a centralized, separate capital account, and the greater flexibility and resiliancy of a single system with pooled resources. Mr. Patel, another Asian Unofficial, added his conviction that amalgamation would provide "greater economy, efficiency, and amenities for the traveling public."[8]

In Tanganyika reception of the final proposal for amalgamation was conditioned by the fact that the Tanganyika railways were only partially linked with the Kenya and Uganda system, the important Central Line being fully independent from the Ocean to the Lakes. The fear that shipping and commerce might be diverted by a central transport authority from the Tanganyika port and capital city of Dar es Salaam to the Kenya Port of Mombasa tended to compound the already considerable resistance to the proposal among Unofficial Members of Legislative Council.

Unofficial Members were divided on the question of amalgamation. The Tanganyika Railway and Ports Council which considered the scheme for amalgamation were not unanimous. Three members opposed it. The Member for Finance, Trade and Economics thought they were influenced by a conviction that it would be a breach of the Trusteeship Agreement rather than by a feeling that amalgamation would injure the economic development of Tanganyika. The categorical assurance of the Secretary of State that amalgamation would be entirely consistent with article 5 (b) of the Trusteeship Agreement, providing that administering authorities could establish common services between trust territories and neighboring territories, was recorded in paragraph 9 of the Sessional Paper.

During the debate on the Sessional Paper in the Tanganyika Legislative Council the official members cited benefits which they believed Tanganyika would achieve through amalgamation. The General Manager, Tanganyika Railways, thought the most important advantage of amalgamation was that it made possible a uniform rating structure or tariff, which in practice would be very difficult for two administrations to operate as it would in effect prevent either one from controlling its own revenue. The uniform tariff would facilitate increasing interterritorial movements. Firstly it would lower rates in Tanganyika. The goods tariff of the Kenya and Uganda system had been generally below the level of that prevailing in Tanganyika and as the bulk of goods traffic was carried on the Kenya and Uganda system, the new tariff would be generally below the current Tanganyika level. Secondly, and of more importance, the break in tapered rates (decreased charges per mile as distance increases) would be removed so that charges for goods passing from one system to the other would no longer be generally higher per mile than movements of the same distance over one system. The General Manager said the second major advantage of amalgamation was "the ability of the larger system to withstand reduction in earnings arising from droughts or from depressions in specific industries." This would lead to "greater financial stability and consequent capacity to pursue a steady financial policy and to plan development projects further ahead than would otherwise be possible."[9] Amalgamation would also facilitate the adoption of the rolling stock standards, the structure gauge, and the track gauge already agreed for the whole of Southern Africa. There were also the relatively minor advantages of better designed timetables for passengers, simpler tariffs for users and quicker adjustment of engines and rolling stock to meet changing traffic demands. The Member for Finance, Trade and Economics stated Tanganyika should support amalgamation since it would facilitate the linking of the Rhodesian and East African railways, which would in turn increase Tanganyika's wealth.

The Unofficial Members were divided on the question. The Members for Arusha and Mpanda wanted the motion approving amalgamation passed immediately because it would mean a lowering of rates for users. One member, the Reverend Canon R. M. Gibbons, supported the motion simply because the Council had already accepted Paper 210, but he had no real conviction that amalgamation would be for the benefit of Tanganyika. Mr. V.M. Nazerali from Dar es Salaam seemed absolutely opposed to it. Most of the unofficial members, however, although generally in favor of amalgamation, had doubts about it and wanted certain assurances as a condition to approving amalgamation.

Most of the Members opposed immediate approval of amalgamation because of a fear that it would mean centralization of all control in Nairobi with no senior officials in Dar es Salaam with adequate authority to make decisions. Six Unofficial Members - European, Asian and African - were all concerned about this. They felt the proposal in the Sessional Paper that one Railway officer in Dar es Salaam might be appointed to act as liaison with the public and the Administration was inadequate. They wanted a detailed plan of reorganization showing which officers would remain in Dar es Salaam and the extent of their powers to make decisions before they approved the Sessional Paper. Mr. Chopra insisted that in the early years at least there should be a general Manager in Dar es Salaam supported by a body like the current Railway and Ports Council or a committee of persons representing all interests to deal with Tanganyika's problems. Mr. Carson (Tanga) moved an amendment that an executive organization should be established in Tanganyika designed to meet the requirements of the users and the Tanganyika Government, and this was supported by Chief Kidaha Makwaia.

The Unofficials also feared that part of the import and export needs of the Northern and Lake Provinces would be met through the port of Mombasa rather than through the ports of Tanga and Dar es Salaam. The unified railway would not be greatly interested in which route was used. Mr. Chopra wanted an assurance that Tanganyika produce and trade goods would pass through Tanganyika harbors before he approved amalgamation. Mr. Carson moved an amendment that "every effort be made to ensure the movement of Tanganyika trade through Tanganyika ports."[10]

Mr. Chopra also asked for an assurance that if in the future Tanganyika should decide that a new railway line should be built in Tanganyika the Railways and Harbours Administration would build and operate it instead of objecting that it would not be a profitable proposition. Mr. Carson proposed an amendment (exactly the same as that proposed by the Unofficials of Kenya) that the proposals be approved on the condition that satisfactory financial arrangements be made with the Overseas Food Corporation or the UK Government regarding the provision and operation of the new port of Mtwara and the Southern Province Railway so that no capital or operational loss is incurred in that project by the Railways and Harbours Administration. Mr. Carson - with no support from other members - also thought the £413,000 should be written off* and opposed the ommission of ex German assets from the combined balance sheet unless the free asset of £5,500,000 appearing on the Kenya and Uganda capital account was also omitted. Several of the members wanted the motion on amalgamation postponed until their various requests for assurances were met.

The Chief Secretary stated that Government could not accept the demands for an assurance of an executive organization in Tanganyika as a condition to approval of amalgamation, although Government would discuss these requests with the Commissioner for Transport. He stated for the Commissioner for Transport that there had never been any intention that a detailed scheme of organization should be submitted as a prerequisite of amalgamation. The preparation of such a scheme, mainly a managerial and technical matter, would have to be done in consultation with the General Manager who would have executive responsibility for the efficient working of the machine. The appointment of the General Manager could not be made until the Railways were amalgamated. Apart from this it was impracticable to draw up a fixed scheme of organization to satisfy the Tanganyika unofficials since the organization would have to be fluid and capable of adjustment to new circumstances. The Commissioner, however, had given repeated assurances that

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* See last sentence, p. 3.

when the scheme was prepared consultations would take place between interested parties. He had also indicated to the Tanganyika Chief Secretary that if the scheme for Railway liaison in Dar es Salaam did not work to the entire satisfaction of the Government and general public he would make other arrangements until he found something satisfactory.

The General Manager of the Tanganyika Railways assured the Council that Tanganyika could act to divert traffic from Mombasa to Tanganyika ports.

> "The Territory, apart from the railway, has a considerable interest in moving the bulk of all of the traffic through Tanganyika and will be free as it always has been to take such action as is considered appropriate to safeguard the interests of the Territory. It may then be argued that any action by Government in this direction would be contrary to acceptance of the view that East Africa has an economic unity. Though the territories form a geographic and economic unity they have varying forms of British administration. Tanganyika in particular is specifically required to safeguard the interests of its inhabitants and the Territory as a component of the East African unit is clearly entitled to take such action as appears necessary to safeguard its interests provided its actions are not detrimental to the interests of East Africa as a whole. I suggest ... that the diversion of traffic from Mombasa to Tanganyika ports would not appear to be detrimental to the East African economy."[11]

On the question of the ex-German assets, the General Manager maintained that the cost of the World War I East African campaign had fallen on the British taxpayer, not on the Tanganyika taxpayer, and that Tanganyika therefore had no claim in respect of these assets.

In contrast to the European Unofficials of Kenya, the Unofficial Members - European, Asian and African - of Tanganyika Legislative Council were doubtful about amalgamation because of a fear of extreme centralization in Nairobi and the loss of traffic from Tanganyika's ports to the Port of Mombasa.

In recent years the relations of the Administration with the public have been characterized by the pressure of development in the three territories and the demand for ever increased services, which the Administration has been unable to satisfy fully. Divergent user-interests in East Africa, under recent circumstances, are probably impossible to satisfy or even to appease. The Administration has consequently been under almost constant attack by users of the Railways and Harbours.

With Uganda located at the far end of a rail line moving inland through Kenya, it was inevitable that complaints against the railways service would be intense. Allegations of inefficient operation, irresponsibility, and lack of initiative have far outweighed occasional praise voiced in the Uganda Legislative Council.

Complaints of inefficient operation and of inconsiderate treatment of the public have been the most frequent. In early 1950 the Acting Chief Secretary answered a complaint in Legislative Council that exporters in Uganda were having difficulty securing rail transport while at the same time trucks were being returned to Kenya empty. He cited movement of famine maize in Kenya, the need for clearing an exceptional wheat crop and bed defects in the new rail alignment between Nairobi and Nakuru as causes of these irregularities, and gave assurances that the position was being "kept under constant review by the Uganda Loading Committee in consultation with the Railway Authorities and the Committee continues to press the Railway Administration for increased provision of rolling stock."[12] The trucks returned to Kenya, he said, were needed to clear the wheat crop before deterioration and in any case - since they were open trucks - they would have been of small assistance in moving the cotton and coffee waiting at Uganda stations. In late 1951 an African member of Legislative Council stated that conditions of travel between Tororo and Soroti were "appalling" and received assurances that inquiries would be made and necessary action taken.

Lack of cooperation with road transport - with implied monopolistic behavior - was another charge made in the Uganda Legislative Council. During the same period of delay mentioned immediately above, Mr. C. Handley Bird inquired if the Railway authorities had taken any step to enlist the help of road transporters in clearing the glut. When the Chief Secretary replied that the Railway authorities had taken no such steps, but that it was understood that they would have no objection to such use of road transport, Mr. Bird was not satisfied. He asserted that, on the arrival of private lorries at one point to move a delayed cargo of cattle cake, it was found that the railway had diverted trucks to lift the goods; and he added a request that the diversion of railway trucks to haul produce that should be carried by road be explained and asked the Acting Chief Secretary to investigate the possibility of moving lorries to the coast with coffee and other produce and allowing them to return from the coast loaded. The Acting Secretary replied that these points would be investigated.

In Uganda Legislative Council early in 1952 a further fear of railway monopoly at the expense of road transport development was voiced and answered. Mr. Maini, referring to the rail extension westward in Uganda, cautioned against "the possibilities of the reaction of this scheme of development on road transport within Uganda."[13] Referring to the essential role of road transport in Uganda, he warned that the Government, having guaranteed the line extension against loss, should not allow this fact to affect interpretation of the laws regarding road transport. This drew from the Acting Financial Secretary a prediction that conflict between road and rail transport in Uganda would not be serious, the two means being complementary with a feeder and short-haul role for road transport with the long haul task falling naturally to the railway. Similar assurances, that the westward rail extension would not preclude waterway-transport development if it appeared necessary in future were also provided by the Acting Financial Secretary.

An allegation of deficient initiative was made by Mr. Maini late in 1952, when he spoke of the westward extension then under construction as certain to be an immediate financial success and berated the Railway for not having themselves taken the initiative in planning and pressing home the construction.

> "It would give a far greater feeling of satisfaction in Uganda if the development towards the west came as an East African venture, originating from the management of the Railway and the Central Assembly rather than being put purely as a thing which has to a certain extent been forced by the Uganda Legislative Council."[14]

The Acting Financial Secretary in his reply implied that Mr. Maini had expected too much of the railway and denied that it had been deficient. The individual territories, he pointed out, must take the initiative, and if the Railway had not in fact displayed considerable initiative in the recent past, the westward extension would not have been possible.

Particular neglect of Uganda to the betterment of other territories was another accusation, voiced by Mr. Simpson in early 1951. Like the Kenya Unofficials, he particularly deplored the expenditure of a "vast amount" of money on Tanganyika ports without guarantee as to operational loss. Similarly disturbed, Mr. C. Handley Bird complained that Uganda, having agreed to bear joint responsibility for a railway loan knowing that none of the sum was going to be spent in Uganda, had been faced with a blunt refusal by the Railway to operate transit sheds erected at Uganda's expense to improve the movement of Uganda's cotton which was the most remunerative traffic over the Kampala-Mombasa line. Earlier, during the debate on the £23 million loan guarantee Mr. Bird had advised that the Uganda members of the Railway Council should be supported in their efforts to bring forward the question of development of the railway in Uganda, thus indicating his feeling that the Railways, to recognize Uganda needs, required prodding. The Acting Financial Secretary in his reply said that the Railway Administration was both alive to the desirability of urban development in Uganda and appreciative of the need for development of traffic in Uganda. On the question of negotiations by the High Commission regarding a loan for works in Tanganyika which was partly carried by Uganda, Mr. Bird felt that the Uganda members of the Railway Advisory Committee and Council should have been consulted in advance. Failure to do so had been, in Mr. Bird's opinion, a perhaps unconstitutional infringement of the rights of Uganda in the matter.

Occasionally - perhaps even often by normal legislature standards - the complaints would give way to compliments, the compliments usually being stated in general terms and often reflecting an attitude current in all three territories. A remark of Mr. Maini's in early 1951 was somewhat typical.

> "Everybody will agree that the execution of financial policy ... by the railway administration has been the subject of appreciation and compliments by everybody who has taken the slightest interest in the work of the railways. The way in which the recent loan was raised speaks well for the railway and is a symbol of the appreciation of the financial picture of the railway administration by the public."[15]

Strong criticism of the Administration has been made by various interests in Tanganyika. Illustrative of users' resentment was the agitation in early 1953, when a meeting of 60 representatives of commercial interests, led by sisal interests, passed a resolution informing the Government of their "profound dissatisfaction with the service of the Tanga Railway and port" and their view that "control of railways and ports in Tanganyika should revert to the Territory, whilst making provision for a coordinating body between the East African territories on matters of common concern."[16] It was claimed that, though in 1947 some two-thirds of a total sisal production of 60,000 tons were hauled by the Tanga line, the line in 1950 hauled only one-half of the 100,000 tons produced.

Another reason for Tanganyika dissatisfaction has been the delay in the construction of a rail link between the Tanga line and the Central Line in Tanganyika. This issue was revived when a motion was made in Central Legislative Assembly in October 1951 to divert funds previously allocated towards this project. Tanganyika representatives stated their opposition to the diversion of funds from this project to any other use, and questioned the Commissioner for Transport closely on his intentions regarding that line. At one point a Tanganyika representative, after the Commissioner had explained that shortage of capital funds and rising prices had made the reallocation necessary from a "survival" point of view, asked if the Administration could undertake construction of the link should the necessary funds be made available from outside sources. Though the Speaker assessed this as an unfair question to place without notice, the Commissioner did give a noncommittal reply. In its lack of a positive commitment, the reply could hardly be expected to lessen the feeling by some Tanganyika residents that their needs could be served more sympathetically with railways under territorial rather than central control.

Opposition has also come from Tanganyika in respect of the road services. In attempting to revise the Tanganyika road services to operate on an economic basis, the Administration in 1952-1953 became subject to violent criticism from sisal and other commercial interests in Tanganyika. Demands were voiced that the roadway "monopoly" of the Administration be removed, and that roadway services be improved and made less costly. Recently, since railway and roadway services have been unable to satisfy the sisal and other interests, there has been insistence in Tanganyika - particularly by the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce - upon a better program of hard surfaced roads, and one major bituminous surfaced road from Himo through Moshi and Arusha to Namanga at the Kenya border was completed late in 1952.

Thus, not long after amalgamation was implemented many of the difficulties anticipated by the Unofficial Members who argued against amalgamation or who insisted upon guarantees of autonomy for the Tanganyika railways actually arose. The dissatisfaction of European sisal growers was an illustration, and this was over and above the more routine complaints. In 1953, despite a lengthy hearing of users' grievances and lengthy defence by the Railway Administration, many of the Tanganyika commercial and agricultural community were still demanding restoration of territorial control.

Perhaps the most violent series of protests have been made in connection with the congestion and delayed clearances at the Port of Mombasa - and the unsolicitous attitude implied by regulations restraining shippers from circumventing the glutted Mombasa Port by shipping through Tanga or Dar es Salaam.

On October 1, 1951 the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Eastern Africa passed a resolution to initiate a committee of inquiry with an unofficial majority into the Port, Customs, Clearing and Railway facilities at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam and to make recommendations. This resolution was passed to the High Commission with copies to the East African Governments. On October 31, 1951 Major Keyser, an Unofficial European Member, asked in Kenya Legislative Council: "In view of the widespread dissatisfaction prevailing in the Colony due to the congestion at the port and the divergence of opinion as to where the responsibility for this lies, will Government appoint a committee to inquire into the delay in clearing goods from the port, to apportion responsibility for such delay and to make recommendations as to how the matter could be put right?" The Acting Chief Secretary replied that since the operation of the port concerned departments under the High Commission, the Kenya Government would askthe High Commission to consider appointing such a committee. Major Keyser then asked if it was the view of Government that they did not have the right to appoint the committee. The Chief Secretary thought "the question of the legal rights of Government in a matter of this kind will depend upon the scope of the inquiry." The Kenya Government had the right to establish a fact-finding committee about anything in Kenya, but he could "conceive of circumstances in which the right of the High Commission, as established by Order in Council, might be involved." Major Keyser then asked: "... in view of the fact that the Port of Mombasa is of no direct concern to Tanganyika Territory - it is situated in this Colony - and is of vital importance to the economy of Kenya and Uganda, does Government not consider the members of such a committee should be nominated by the Kenya and Uganda Governments and not by the High Commission, who should only nominate the Chairman?" The Acting Chief Secretary replied that he thought these considerations would be very much in the minds of the High Commission if such a committee were appointed.[17]

In November 1951 Mr. Michael Blundell asked about the distinction between the appointment by the Kenya Legislative Council of the Select Committee to investigate the High Commission and the Committee of Inquiry into the congestion at the Port of Mombasa. He was apparently attempting to use the former as the precedent for the appointment of a Legislative Council committee to inquire into the port operations. The Acting Chief Secretary said there was a difference between a committee inquiring into High Commission services to which Kenya makes handsome contributions and an inquiry into an entirely self-financing organization such as the Railways and Harbours Administration.[18]

A request was then made by the Kenya Government to the High Commission for a public inquiry into the causes of delay in clearing goods from the Mombasa Port, to apportion the responsibility for such delay and to make recommendations as to how the matter could be put right. The High Commission considered this request and the request from the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry on January 24, 1952 and issued the following statement on January 25:

> "The High Commission considered the request for an inquiry into the operation of the Ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam made by the Legislative Council of Kenya and the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Eastern Africa.
>
> "In view of the fact that discussions are to be held in Nairobi on February 11th and subsequent days under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner for Transport on short and long term proposals for East African ports and transport systems and the question of berthing of ships, and that the representatives noted below will attend these talks, and in view of the fact that this will be a high level technical conference, the members of which have an expert knowledge of transportation, the High Commission considered no further action was necessary.
>
> "The High Commission noted that it will not be possible for the conference to hear oral evidence but that any organization and person may submit written memoranda for consideration by the conference, provided such memoranda are sent to the General Manager, East African Railways and Harbours, Nairobi, to be in his hands not later than February 9th."

The composition of the high level technical conference appended was as follows:

> "Sir Reginald Robins (Chairman), Commissioner for Transport, East Africa High Commission; Mr. A Dalton, General Manager, East African Railways and Harbours; Mr. W. Graham, Head of the Shipping Division, Ministry of Transport; Mr. P.E. Millbourn, Ports Adviser, Ministry of Transport; Mr. Mundy, London Office of the B.I. and P.&O. Steamship Companies; Mr. Cayzer, London Office of the Clan Line and other Cargo Lines; Mr. Angus Ward, Consul-General United States of America (or representative); Mr. Arthur K. Lewis, President; and Mr. Maddock, Vice-President of the Robin Line of the United States of America, and Mr. Shields, Farrel Lines Shipping Company of the United States of America."[19]

This conference was held early in February and submitted its report on February 12th.

In Kenya Legislative Council on February 22nd Unofficials expressed their dissatisfaction because the High Commission had convened not a committee of inquiry with an unofficial majority but a high level technical conference which included no representatives of local merchants, business houses, ordinary consumers and producers and which would receive no oral evidence. Mr. Salter felt the action of the High Commission was contrary to the terms of the Order in Council. "... as a matter of constitution principle, as well ... as practical procedure and policy, the High Commission would be wrong in exercising its powers of administration except in accordance with the wishes and, in some cases, the advice and consent, of the territories concerned."[20] The High Commission, under the authority given to it by the Order in Council should have consulted the Kenya Government before deciding not to appoint the requested committee of inquiry. He implied the High Commission had shown contempt for the Kenya Government and people. The unofficial members were obviously under the impression that the technical conference had not been planned before the request in the Kenya Legislative Council - that it had, in effect, been called as a means of avoiding the necessity of appointing a committee of inquiry with an unofficial majority.

Major Keyser moved a motion noting with concern the High Commission's failure to meet the Kenya Government's request and recommending that since the action taken by the High Commission in convening a conference of experts did not meet the wishes of the public of Kenya for a full investigation, that the Kenya Government should establish a fact-finding committee to inquire into the whole matter and that the Government of Uganda should be invited to associate themselves with this inquiry. The motion was passed by 19 votes to 16, all unofficial members present voting for the motion, and official members voting against it.

The Kenya Government's attitude was that the decision of the High Commission had been perfectly sensible and proper. The conference of experts was better qualified to investigate the principally technical matter concerned than any local body. The problem facing the Administration was not the problem of finding what the facts were - they were already known - but of finding the proper solution to the facts. There was no need for the inquiry requested. The interests of the public would be better served by letting officials get on with their work rather than spending time preparing for another inquiry. The Acting Chief Secretary said it was "quite ridiculous and stupid" to talk about the High Commission showing contempt for the views of the Kenya Legislative Council when men of such high calibre had come out to Kenya. Such accusations were "truly unfair and entirely unjustified." He pointed out that the Governor of Kenya was a Member of the High Commission. He said a much more useful and sensible forum for this discussion was the Central Legislative Assembly to which the High Commission was responsible and where the Commissioner of Transport who was technically expert was present to give answers.[21] The Attorney General pointed out that although the High Commission must give serious consideration to a request of a territorial Government, it was not required to accede to that request.

The protests in connection with the congestion and delay at Mombasa finally forced the Central Legislative Assembly reluctantly to advise the High Commission to appoint a Committee of Inquiry. The membership of the committee was listed in the press on August 6, 1952. The terms of reference were to consider long and short term proposals for improving transport facilities in East Africa with particular reference to the Port of Mombasa and to investigate and report on reasons for delays. The committee included two members from each of the territories (with two extra alternates names for Tanganyika). Three out of ten members named were Asians.

When the report of the committee was published in April 1953, the reaction was a widespread controversy which continued throughout 1953. The committee was accused of plagerizing earlier advisory publications, of recommending changes which already were in hand or which had been given full consideration at an earlier date. Particularly it was accused of unfairly utilizing hindsight, of ignoring the obstacles of shortage of capital materials within the sterling area. A definitive reply to the report was published by the Administration, intended to rebuff implications of apathy and inept administration. Subsequent to receipt of the report the advice of the Transport Advisory Council (eight of its ten members are unofficials but all are appointed by the High Commission) was sought and the High Commission, thus advised, largely rejected the report. A "sessional paper" published by the High Commission designated the recommendations of the Inquiry Committee as largely unacceptable. The Transport Advisory Council considered some sixteen recommendations to be cliches, mainly recommending the undertaking of work which was already being done or projects which had been considered at length by transport authorities and rejected or postponed for cogent reasons. Advice to site new berths on the mainland, to supply a full complement of lighters at the earliest opportunity, to study the auxiliary use of a wharf (Mbaraki) some distance from the port railhead, to review plans to build staff housing on Mombasa island were among this group. A second group of recommendations consisted of six which were considered unacceptable, or acceptable only with reservations. These included immediate construction of a fourth deep water quay, enlargement of up country storage facilities to shorten wagon turn-around time, changes in parcels sorting arrangements and in the provision of meals for labor. A further suggestion was that an office be established to administer the ports independently of the railways and that in future the Commissioner for Transport should be a layman rather than a technician qualified in a particular field of transport. The sessional paper ended with an effort - successful in several quarters - to make the Committee's report appear ridiculous: "... to look ahead, in the sense used by the Inquiry Committee, presupposes that future events are susceptible of close evaluation ... In the atmosphere of 1948 ... neither the Administration nor the Harbours Committee could have been expected to have seriously entertained, at that time, the idea of additional deep water berths at Mombasa." Some "half-way" measures proposed by the High Commission in answer to the report, as reported in the East African Standard, were

(1) To appoint a Deputy General Manager of Railways and Harbours,
(2) To create a new post of Assistant General Manager for Harbours and Inland Waterways,
(3) To accept that the office of the Commissioner for Transport may be filled by a layman rather than a technical specialist.

After the rejection of all but a few of the recommendations of the inquiry committee's report, the public clamor regarding the port calmed somewhat.

Complaints of inefficiency and poor service have continued to be voiced in all three territories, often accompanied by the charge that the railway monopoly has prevented the development of private road transport companies. Both Uganda and Tanganyika unofficials have felt their territories have been neglected to the betterment of the others. Commercial interests in Tanganyika have gone to the extreme of demanding restoration of territorial control of its railways and ports. Railway officials have remained in a somewhat defensive posture, answering the complaints with statistics of rapid commercial development and increased demands, shortages of finance and of supplies in the sterling-area market, and other difficulties.

Sincerely,

John B. George

John B. George

P.S.

Footnotes
1. Huxley, Elspeth, White Man's Country, II, pp. 92-93.
2. Chief Secretary, Tanganyika Territory, Proceedings Legislative Council (hereafter referred to as TT, PLC), 22nd Session, 1948, Part I, 21 April 1948, 55-56.
3. East Africa and Rhodesia, February 26, 1953, p. 842.
4. East African Railways and Harbours, Reports of the Commissioner for Transport ... and the General Manager ... for the Year ... 1952, p. 10.
5. Uganda Protectorate, Proceedings Legislative Council (hereafter referred to as UP,PLC), 30th Session, 2nd Meeting, 9 January 1951, p. 17.
6. Mr. Simpson, ibid., p. 19.
7. Mr. Nicol, Kenya, Legislative Council Debates (hereafter referred to as K,LCD), 1948, 1st Session, 16 March 1948, 104.
8. UP, PLC, 27th Session, 5th Meeting, 27 April 1948, p. 7.
9. TT, PLC, 22nd Session, 1948, Part I, 21 April 1948, pp. 37-38.
10. Ibid., p. 49.
11. Ibid., p. 39.
12. UP, PLC, 29th Session, 5th Meeting, 9 May 1950, p. 7.
13. UP , PLC, 31st Session, 6th Meeting, 8 January 1952, p. 12.
14. Ibid., p. 11.
15. UP, PLC, 30th Session, 5th Meeting, 6 March 1951, p. 6.
16. East Africa and Rhodesia, April 2, 1953, p. 1005.
17. K, LCD, 3rd Session, 5th Sitting, 31 October 1951, 23-24.
18. K, LCD, 4th Session, 1st Sitting, 21 November 1951, 90-91.
19. Quoted by Mr. Salter, K, LCD, 4th Session, 2nd Sitting, 22 February 1952, 138-139.
20. Ibid., 141.
21. Ibid., 147-149, 155-157.

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