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Algeria: What went wrong?

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Dear Peter,

The already-grizzly violence in Algeria is still on the rise. Heads have literally been rolling in Blida market and the use of napalm in Kabylie has now been confirmed. Three of my personal acquaintances, a Berber shopkeeper and two French clerics, have been assassinated in the Casbah recently, bringing the reality of the guerrilla war again close to home. I have been out of Algiers for over six months now, but Algiers is still not out of me.

Algeria remains the only real example so far of a Sunni Islamic revolution and it continues to send chills throughout the region.

What went wrong in that glittering white port city just across from the Côte d'Azur?

Algeria's current crisis is rooted in the very birth of the nation itself. The problems that have surfaced since the 1988 riots, which brought down Algeria's facade of a civilian government, are the result of issues left stewing on the political back burner since the start of Algeria's struggle for independence from France.

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The crisis can be traced to the beginning of Algeria's contemporary Islamist movement in the 1950s and the strategies of the leaders of independent Algeria who, even while they fought against Islamists as a destabilizing factor, favored the development of Islamist ideology as a strong alternative to French colonialism.¹ Widespread corruption and a poorly planned arabization program (which nearly started a civil war between Berbers and Arabs in Algeria before the war of independence had even ended) were the final touches of the volatile mix defining modern Algeria. When moves toward democracy loosened the lid on the Algerian pressure cooker after the 1988 riots, the current violent explosion resulted.

The evolution of Algeria's Islamist movement can be divided into four broad periods, which are inexorably intertwined with the evolution of Algeria's power structure.

1. The Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema and its influence (1930s-1970)

The Association of Ulema [*religious scholars*] was created while Algeria was still a French territory and sought to reform Algerian society and define Algerian identity as distinct from that of the French. In addition to being heavily influenced by the Algerian philosopher Ben Badis, it was also later influenced (as are most contemporary Islamists) by the writings of Sayyid Qotb² and Ibn Taimiyya³.

Soon after its creation, the seed organization of the FLN (the ruling Algerian party) was formed. The two competing groups were almost identical in ideology, although the latter took a more militant nationalist stance to the problem of Algerian identity. The most militant members of the Association of Ulema joined the more nationalist ranks of the FLN soon after the war for independence began in 1954, forming the beginnings of the complex overlap between cultural Islamism and political nationalism.

In 1956 the Association of Ulema regrouped and began rallying against the FLN for leadership of the independence movement. The early FLN, which had modelled its early discourse on the Association of Ulema and many of whose key members came from militant factions of the Association of Ulema, rallied in turn against the Islamic organization.

Largely because of the backing of the Algerian army, Ahmed Ben Bella came to power in 1962 as free Algeria's first president, but the dispute over the rightful heir of the

¹Les Islamistes Algeriens Face au Pouvoir, Aissa Khelladi, Editions Alfa, Alger, 1992. p. 8

²A principle founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood who wrote prolifically, mainly from his prison cell, from 1954 to 1964. He was executed by Egyptian authorities in 1966. Although his books are banned in Algeria, they remain widely available throughout the Arab world.

³Ibn Taimiyya (1263-1328) denounced those Muslims who did not actively participate in the jihad against the Tartars - or Mongols - who conquered Muslim territory and the ruled by non-Islamic law.

independence struggle, which left over a million Algerians dead, is at the heart of today's violence.

The fathers of many Islamist leaders (including FIS president Abassi Madani) who claim that Algerian independence was usurped by the FLN, were leaders of the Association of Ulema. Because of this mixed heritage, and the long-standing determination of the FLN (and now the army) to control the political arena, militant Islamists were dispersed throughout the FLN, where they remained an important religious lobby group.

The strong influence of this lobby group on national policy is evident in Algeria's national motto, "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country" and helps explain the adoption of Islamic family law as early as 1965 and the adoption of the Islamic Thursday-Friday weekend.⁴

A key link between the Association of Ulema and the contemporary Islamist movement was *El-Qiam El-Islamia* [Islamic Values], founded immediately after Algerian independence by a group of imams who declared themselves "protectors of the Islamic values endangered by a century and a half of colonialism."⁵ Hachemi Tidjani, Ahmed Sahnoun and Abdel-Latif Sultani, the fathers of Algeria's contemporary Islamist movement, were founding members of the group, later joined by FIS president Abassi Madani. Tidjani, the group's president, declared in 1964 that the outlook of the organization was reformist, and followed the philosophies of key Islamist thinkers such as Jamal El-Din Al-Afghani and Mohamed Abdou. He also recognized, however, the importance of militant strategists such as Sayyid Qotb and Hassan El-Banna.⁶ The group's goal, he said, was to integrate Islamic and Western values to form a modern and Islamic Algeria ideologically independent of France.

The formation of *El-Qiam El-Islamia* coincided with the huge influx of Egyptian and Syrian teachers, many of whom were being persecuted by Jamal Abdel-Nasser as members of the Muslim Brotherhood. These were the Arabizers of modern Algeria (the 75 percent illiterate) and like the *El-Qiam El-Islamia*, they were convinced that the union of socialism and Islam was impossible. Despite Ben Bella's declarations that Algeria was an "Islamic socialist" regime, a number of the ex-Ulemas in the FLN (including Sheikh Bashir El-Ibrahimi) joined *El-Qiam* in decrying socialism as anti-Islamic.

After only two years of independence the Socialist regime of Ben Bella faced serious opposition. On June 19, 1965, Houari Boumediene and his army, fearing that Ben Bella's socialism could lead to anarchy in Algeria, took control of the country. Boumediene put first the Education ministry and then the Minister of Information and Culture in the hands of Ahmed Taleb (the son of Ben Bella opponent Sheikh Ibrahimi). Despite this concession to the Islamic camp, Boumediene's "socialist reform" policy marked the rupture between his regime and the Islamists. Abdel-Latif Sultani, a member of the Association of Ulema and later a founding member of the Islamic Salvation Front, decried Boumediene's

⁴For the many Algerian companies with links to the west, this means Algeria can only conduct international business three days per week.

⁵Khelladi, p. 15.

⁶Founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

campaign to nationalize private property as un-Islamic and published a still-banned book entitled Socialism is Mazdekism⁷.

At that early stage some of the more militant Islamists were members of the ruling FLN and popular mobilization independent of the popular regime was seemingly difficult. The 1966 execution of Sayyid Qotb (who remains the forefather of modern militant Islamism) by Nasser changed all that.

El-Qiam responded to the execution by rallying the Algerian masses against the Nasserist regime and writing sharp letters of protest against the "satanic" Egyptian government. Boumediene banned the now-politicized opposition organization in 1970, but the leaders of *El-Qiam* continued to quietly rally Algerians against the socialist regime, which had so far failed to deliver concrete benefits to the Algerian people.

2. Islamic activism at the University of Algiers (1970 - 1980)

Just as these politicized Islamists, many of whom were teachers, were forced to continue their efforts underground, Algeria's arabization program reached a crisis point.

From 1962 to 1972, Arabic had been taught only as a second language, and most of the school curriculum was still taught in French. While declaring Arabic Algeria's official language, Algeria's policy-makers (themselves francophone) had never renounced French, which they hoped could give Algeria special access to European technology. The first "Arabized" generation graduated in the early 1970s, only to discover that Universities and employment were not to be had for non-French speakers. At the University of Algiers, where the first University prayer room was built in 1968, the mosque rapidly became a refuge for these frustrated Arabic speakers. It was in this first prayer room that Algeria's excluded Arabic speakers met to discuss the hypocrisy of a regime that declared itself Islamic and Arabic while*denying higher education to Arabic speakers. The lowest-paid profession, teaching, was the only career open to Arabic speakers since all other sectors of society still functioned (and continue to function) in French.

A more systematic Arabization policy, in which schools and universities were actually taught in Arabic, (and, as elsewhere in the Arab world, included daily Islamic Science courses) was not adopted until 1973. In addition to reforming and expanding the Arabization program, President Boumediene responded to the large and increasingly disgruntled Arabophone sector of Algerian society by declaring that "a thousand socialist villages equal a thousand mosques."⁸ There were already over 5,000 mosques in Algeria, but the socialist built more to satisfy his constituents. Most of these mosques were government controlled, and Friday prayers were written or censored by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Imams who spoke out against the regime were fired, but with five prayers a day seven days a week at thousands of mosques throughout the country, it was impossible to control every imam. Young imams such as Ali Benhadj who spoke out

*practically

⁷Mazdekism was a heretical Iranian sect popular in the fifth century.

⁸Khelladi, p.45

against the system and began producing underground cassettes and videos of their sermons gained considerable prestige during this period.

From 500 prior to independence, the number of Algerian students had jumped to 54,000 by Boumediene's death in 1978. Tension between Algeria's ruling francophones and the new generation of excluded arabophones mounted. The University of Algiers prayer room and thousands of Islamic pamphlets were mysteriously burned and the number of arrests of the *Arabo-Islamics* (now a majority) increased. The latter reacted by lashing out on morale grounds against culturally French Algerians, decrying them as *infidels* and *un-Islamic*.

The 1979 explosion of the Iranian revolution and the great sympathy it aroused among the young Arabic-speaking majority had a profound impact on Algeria. After an angry letter to the "non-Islamic and illegitimate" regime and the organization of a protest rally against the "oppressive" regime, Sahnoun, Sultani, Madani and Benhadj (all leaders of the present FIS) were arrested.⁹

3. Division of movement and emergence of radical groups (1980-1988)

By 1980, when President Chadli Benjedid was elected, Algeria's economic and political situation had worsened. Algeria depended overwhelmingly on revenues from natural gas and efforts toward diversification had been seemingly abandoned. The economy was a shambles and public accusations of mismanagement and corruption had become endemic. The FLN claims to popular legitimacy were rapidly crumbling under this increased criticism in both the Islamist camp and the relatively silent secularist camp.

In 1981 Mustapha Bouyali, a follower of the extremist Algerian imam Med Adelhadi Doudi¹⁰, founded the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA). He appointed a *majlis es-shoura*, a sort of religious board of directors or mini-parliament, and declared himself emir of the armed organization. Unlike previous Algerian Islamic groups, the MIA was organized into battalions throughout the country armed with rifles, grenades and dynamite. Most members of the group were arrested before the "Islamic revolution" could be successfully carried off, although Bouyali himself escaped from prison in 1982 and went into hiding.

Later the same year Chadli (with the necessary blessing of the Algerian army, which has been the backbone of Algeria since independence), possibly hoping for reconciliation with the Ulema, released Madani, Sultani and Sahnoun from prison. Sultani, who was already ailing, died soon after. After trying in vain to close Algeria's non-government-controlled mosques, Chadli also halted government censorship of Friday sermons. Most of the civic associations authorized by the Interior Ministry during this period were religious. Several imams banned in their own countries, such as Egyptian Islamist El-Ghazali, became almost official in Algeria during this unprecedented period of grace for Islam in independent Algeria.

⁹L'Algerie par ses Islamistes, M. Al-Ahnaf et al., Karthala, Paris, 1991. p.27.

¹⁰Doudi, who was half Algerian and half Egyptian, fled to France soon after Chadli took power.

For the next couple years, all seemed relatively quiet in Algeria. The silence was broken in when Bouyali finally succeeded in regrouping, rearming the MIA. The first attack was carried out in August 1985 in the Algiers suburb of Ain Nadja. The following attack was in Blida the following year. The organization grew and the attacks multiplied. until security forces succeeded in gunning down the renegade in 1987. The Islamic militias of Blida and Larbaa and various districts of Algiers, however, were already armed and in place.

4. Return of the Ulema and confrontation with the power structure (1988-?)

The October 5, 1988, riots in the gritty Bab El-Oued neighborhood of Algiers, where Ali Benhadj was a teacher and star imam, marked the point of no return for the Chadli regime. It was a spontaneous revolt by Algeria's youth against unbearable living conditions, a lack of opportunity (there were still few employment or higher education opportunities for non-French speakers), and shortages of basic goods. After a quarter century of military dictatorship, Algerians had had enough.

Algeria's \$70 billion economic boom which had begun in 1979 ended when oil prices plummeted in 1985. An estimated 50 percent of all young Algerians were unemployed at the time of the riots.

Extracurricular activities such as cinema and language clubs were suddenly dropped from school curricula for lack of funds and libraries found themselves unable to purchase new books.

Most of the young Islamists I met in Algeria said they had "discovered Islam" during this difficult period (1985 to 1988), in which the new network of neighborhood mosques and Islamic organizations met the desperate needs of Algeria's disenfranchised youth. Islamic community groups helped feed needy families and tutoring sessions for math and other subjects were offered free of charge at neighborhood mosques.

When the army fired pointblank at the demonstrators, leaving hundreds of young Algerians dead, disenchantment and frustration with the regime turned to outright hatred. The riots and the body count continued until October 10, when police pleaded with Ali Benhadj and Sahnoun to come themselves and disperse the crowds.

Ex-Ulema Ahmed Sahnoun wrote a letter to the president:

"I never believed I would live long enough to see the protectors of the nation kill the children of the nation. I was in the neighborhood of Sidi Mohamed to restore peace and calm to the youths who love their religion and their country; they returned to their homes in perfect calm and discipline. While they were returning home military forces stepped in their path; the dead and wounded fell. You are, Mr. President, responsible for the security of the people. Because of that we demand that you start an inquiry to discover who is responsible for that massacre. Such violent reactions are against the general interest in keeping the peace and are against the interest of the nation. God demands justice for each drop of blood spilled. Stop the violence."¹¹

Several months later Chadli Benjedid launched a program of liberalization and promised multi-party elections. The FIS, an umbrella organization encompassing

¹¹Khelladi, p.97.

everything from reformist trends embraced by conservative branches of the FLN to Bouyalist militancy, won the first round of national elections in December 1991 by a landslide. It gained 188 seats out of 231.

Shocked by the election results, the military forced Chadli to resign in January 1992, cancelled elections and banned the Islamic Salvation Front. The party's leaders and tens of thousands of its members were thrown in desert camps, many without trial.

Chadli's successor, Mohamed Boudiaf, was assassinated in June 1992 after he started inquiries into government corruption. It is widely assumed that he was killed by the military. After his assassination, an army-backed High State Council was named to run the country for a "transition period". This period expired in December and the military junta which Islamists argue usurped the nation's independence struggle and its elections is now running the country under martial law.

Since the 1992 coup, thousands of Algerians have been killed and many tortured. Middle East Watch has blamed both sides for the mounting violence, although with the appearance of armed anti-Islamist militias, deadly rivalries between armed Islamic factions, and increasingly grizzly tactics (including beheading, throat slitting etc) by security forces, it is increasingly difficult to say how many sides there are.

If there are more street riots like those of 1988, diplomats now doubt the young arabized army conscripts would be willing to use force against the demonstrators.

With the fractionalization of the Islamist movement, the only Islamist leader who still has enough credibility among both reformist and armed militant camps to stop Islamist violence is Ali Benhadj, who is in a Tizi Ouzo prison and has refused all invitations to a compromise with the military regime.

An influential and militant "modernist" minority in Algiers is also refusing suggestions of compromise between Islamists and the military. The longer fighting continues without a clear victory by Algeria's military, however, the more certain some sort of Islamic regime (whether direct or in the form of a decisive lobby group within the military-backed regime) in Algeria becomes.

If the Islamists do come to power, most Algerians agree that Ali Benhadj would be the most likely candidate first Islamic leader of the Mediterranean country.

Who is Ali Benhadj?

Ali Benhadj, 38, [nicknamed Alilou in the Algerian press] is married with four children. Benhadj was born in Tunisia to a Vietnamese mother and Tuareg father,¹² but became an orphan after his father was killed in Algeria's war for independence and his mother died soon after. He was raised by the south Algerian Touati family. Benhadj studied at an Islamic institute until 1970, when Boumediene closed the institutes and Benhadj, like some

¹²Tuaregs are Berber nomads who live in the Sahara. They are currently waging a war against the governments of Algeria, Mali, Niger and other Saharan nations for creation of an independent Tuareg state.

40,000 other Arabic speaking Algerian students, found himself out on the street. The luckiest of these Algerians found low-paying jobs as teachers and Benhadj was one of these few. In 1982, when Madani, Sultani and Sahnoun were serving time in prison and Algerian Islamic groups were going through a period of radicalization, Benhadj was arrested for stealing dynamite and making explosives. He was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. In prison he read and reread the Qor'an, along with the works of Ibn Taimiyya, Egyptian El-Ghazali and Saudi Sheikh El-Baz. When he was released four years later, Benhadj began his career as an imam in the poor Algiers neighborhoods of Bab El-Oued and Kouba. He did not speak French well enough to find other employment.

A gifted orator, he rapidly gained attention throughout Algiers, soon surpassing the more established Madani and Sahnoun in popularity. Young Arabic speaking Algerians came from miles to hear his sermons and his cassettes began to circulate throughout Algiers.

When the Islamic Salvation Front was created, Benhadj became its number two man. He has been imprisoned since the party was banned in 1992.

Benhadj, who has published a book on his interpretation of a modern Islamic state, is perhaps the most radical of the FIS leadership. In interviews prior to his 1992 imprisonment, he dismissed democracy as "an infidel invention." In response to assertions that women would be second class citizens in an Islamic regime, he reportedly said: "Those who want to play the women's card are not men but effeminate."¹³

Despite such wild statements, he is extremely well-read on Islamic subjects and in addition to his book, has contributed numerous articles to Algeria's Islamist newspapers.

In addition to his persuasive oratory style, much of Benhadj's popularity stems from his public comportment and image of sincerity. He did not cruise the streets of Algiers in a Mercedes, as did Madani, neither did he play the wishy-washy moderate, as did Nahnah.¹⁴

Asked about democracy, Benhadj said: "Democracy, we don't find any trace of the word in dictionaries of the Arabic language, or in the books of God, or in the Sunna, or in the writings of the great Arab authors....We will not submit to the majority, but to that which conforms to *sharia*. We reject all that is not in keeping with Islamic law. How did this concept of democracy, which is foreign, invade the country to the point where it has been on everyone's tongue since the October riots?"¹⁵

His open-ended question is an eloquent summary of the trials still awaiting war-torn Algeria. The country's death toll continues to rise and military pleas to Benhadj to call an end to the bloodshed are growing louder and more desperate. The economic quagmire that precipitated the 1988 riots has gotten even worse and a growing number of Algerians, exhausted from years of terrorism and torture are asking themselves the pressing and still unanswered question: "What will Ali Benhadj do?"

¹³Khelladi, p.154.

¹⁴Leader of the moderate Algerian Hamas party, closely allied with the now-moderate Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

¹⁵Khelladi, p.155.

Continuing saga of the Algeria crisis:

- 14 Sept., '93 *FIS announces the formation of a new Executive Body Abroad to coordinate the party's activities. Rabah Kebir is elected chairman.*
- 20 Sept., '93 *Police commissioners from all Arab countries met in Tunis to discuss ways and means to coordinate efforts to confront Islamic movements, especially in Algeria and Egypt.*
- 21 Sept., '93 *The use of napalm by Algerian authorities is reported by the foreign press [Le Monde] for the first time. Napalm was reportedly used in Kabylie in the Islamist-dominated region of Jijel.*
- 30 Sept., '93 *First killing claimed by an anti-Islamist death squad took place at the University of Tizi Ouzo (Kabylie) 60 miles from Algiers. Gunmen shot and killed a professor of Islamic law in front of his students.*
- 30 Oct., '93 *Anti-Islamist gunmen killed a suspected Islamist militant in Algiers.*
- 1 Nov., '93 *The French government rounds up 88 Algerian Islamists in Paris.*
- 13 Nov. '93 *Ali Benhadj wrote a 6-page letter from his prison cell in Tizi Ouzo (Kabylie) addressed to the Commission for National Dialogue. "Nothing will be possible without the judgement of those who interrupted the electoral process and caused the blood of the children of the Muslim people to flow," he wrote. Arguably the only Islamist leader with enough credibility in all Islamist camps to stop the violence, Benhadj has been in prison since the FIS was banned in 1991.*
- 15 Dec., '93 *12 Croates massacred in Tamezguida, not far from Medea. Security forces later convicted Sayeh Attia of organizing the massacre. Attia has led an armed commando unit for over a year and had carried out some 200 assassinations, according to Algerian sources.*

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- 19 Dec., '93 *The HCE, whose mandate was due to expire the end of the year, extends its term for one month.*
- 12 Jan., '94 *Three bodies of Islamists were found in a ditch in the tough neighborhood of Baragui. Anti-Islamist militias claimed responsibility for the killings.*
- 1 Feb., '94 *A French freelance journalist was shot dead and an Australian journalist wounded in the Casbah of Algiers. They were the first foreign journalists to be killed in Algeria's mounting violence.*
- early Feb. *Armed gunmen entered the downtown Algiers office of the Hebdo Libere weekly newspaper, killing three journalists and wounding several others.*
- February *The military officially takes charge in Algeria with the naming of General Liamine Zeroual as President.*
- late Feb. *In a desperate attempt to stop an Islamist takeover of Blida, (Ramadan) authorities reportedly marked Ramadan by beheading known Islamists and leaving their heads in the market. Residents said the grizzly beheadings had stopped by the end of Ramadan in mid-March.*
- 22 April, '94 *Suspected militant Islamists destroyed the operations center of a cement works near Algiers, putting the factory and its 600 employees out of work.*
- 8 May, '94 *Two French Clerics, Henri Verges and Helene Saint Raymond, were assassinated in the Casbah less than two hours after the end of a "demonstration for reconciliation" between Algerian "modernists" and moderate Islamists. It was the second time in a row that such marches against terrorism have been immediately followed by the assassinations of foreigners.*
- 14-16 May *The Algerian military killed 20 Islamist militants and wounded 22 others in roundups in various parts of the country, including Algiers.*

Best regards,


Katherine

SUR LA VOIE DE MA MERE, QUE C'EST VRAI!



Chuti!! On marche en silence pour mieux écouter le bruit des balles. Cette phrase «lapidaire» aurait pu être un magnifique slogan pour les organisateurs intégral-conservateurs de la marche du 8 Mai qui, honteusement et silencieusement, ont appelé à la réconciliation nationale.

Réconcilier? Mais qui avec qui? Ehen l'Algérie... Cette Algérie désarmée, terrorisée et endeuillée avec une minorité d'apatrides armées, sanguinaires et sauvages qui préfère user du «langage de la kalachnikov» (comme dirait Juppé, le ministre des A.E français). Voilà en fait ce que nous demande les marcheurs du 8 Mai qui, soit dit en passant n'étaient pas nombreux (mais alors pas du tout!) à Ghelzime ils étaient 39 marcheurs à sillonner les rues, comparés bien sûr à ceux du 22 Mars dernier. Mais bon, on ne va tout de même pas ressuser sur le bide, le fiasco (mon Dieu j'ai jubilé) de la marche des intégral-conservateurs qui coûte que coûte veulent réhabiliter l'ex-FIS et ses groupes armés. Non!? Bien sûr que non!

Mais une chose m'a intrigué quand même: Bon, certes! Aujourd'hui grâce à cette marche, on sait que le MDA, le FLN (surtout), Hamas, Ennahda et toutes les associations qui leur sont affiliées ne représentent rien sur l'échiquier socio-politique du pays. On l'a vérifié de visu la semaine dernière n'est-ce pas? Car contrairement à ceux qui sont sortis le 22 Mars et qui étaient, en grande partie, des citoyens, ceux du 8 Mai sont des militants qui revendiquent ses slogans de partis. Il faut bien relever la nuance! Les premiers ont exprimé leur attachement à une Algérie libre, démocratique et tolérante. Les seconds leur appartenance à leurs partis, leurs slogans et leurs ambitions politiques... Et uniquement à ça. Toute la différence est là. De toutes les manières, question représentativité populaire, les intégral-conservateurs peuvent repasser! Et j'espère que nos dirigeants l'ont enfin compris! Ben! On peut toujours rêver, non!?

L'INTRIGUE

Je disais que quelque chose m'avait intrigué. C'est vrai! et c'est la suivante.

Les observateurs et analystes de la scène politique ont expliqué à longueur de colonnes l'échec de la marche du 8 Mai et de la thèse, surtout, qu'on appelle «réconciliatrice». D'après eux, le FIS ne veut nullement partager le gâteau du pouvoir. C'est tout à fait vrai! Enfin! Je crois. Mais dans la foulée, ils ont pratiquement tous, glisse cette foutue et absurde remarque: «le FIS n'a pas marché». A mon (pas si humble avis (que ça), c'est faux!

La base militante du FIS n'existe plus. Une portée à balancée dans le terrorisme, une autre partie qui désabusée, frustrée et brimée par le système FLN et qui à l'époque des élections propres et honnêtes, a voté FIS. Justement, dans le seul but de se débarrasser du FLN et de sa dictature une bonne fois pour toutes, ne se reconnaît plus en ce parti dissous islamiste, fasciste, totalitaire et charlatanesque. A la limite, elle ne veut plus jamais entendre parler de lui. Elle ne veut surtout pas qu'on lui pardonne tous ses crimes abjectes. Cette partie-là, n'a pas oublié les arnaques et les mensonges de l'ex-FIS.

Il faudra que les gens comprennent que si l'ex-FIS n'a pas marché, c'est qu'il n'existe plus. La raison est pourtant

GIVE

FIS

A

CHANCE...

MAIS
REGARDEZ-LE
IL EST PLUS
DOUX QU'UN
AGNEAU...



LE GANARD A RAISON

De célèbre, journal satirique, Le Canard enchaîné, en un tour de main de maître a résumé la relation, la très complexe ambiguïté, qui règne entre FIS et pouvoir et qu'on nomme certainement par un doux euphémisme «dialogue». Et qu'est-ce qu'on voit SVP? La gueule, pardon! On ne rit pas guère quand il s'agit du président de l'Etat! plutôt le visage ou la bouille, très sévère d'ailleurs (mais en apparence seulement!) de Zeroual avec une bulle au-dessus de sa tête: «nous avons les moyens de vous faire dialoguer». Paf! dans la gueule. Voilà qui résume en une seule phrase le climat politique dans lequel nous baignons depuis quelques mois déjà. Le Canard a raison!

ZEROUAL ET LES DIRIGEANTS DE L'EX-FIS

Zeroual a été reçu par les dirigeants de l'ex-FIS, Si, Si, Si. C'est vrai! Il les a longuement écoutés et a tenté, tant bien que mal, de les convaincre de l'irréalisabilité de certaines de leurs exigences.

Entre autres exigences, le FIS demande:

a) la libération inconditionnelle de tous les cadres du parti dissous, quels que soient les griefs juridiques retenus contre eux. En clair, cela veut dire que l'ex-FIS exige que l'on ne poursuive plus les responsables de ce parti responsables de l'actuel génocide. Rien que ça! Ils sont franchement gonflés! Non?

b) la réhabilitation de l'ex-FIS en tant que parti légal avec la possibilité de réunir son madjless e'chira (non, ce n'est pas une erreur de frappe!) dont les membres en exil. Ben, c'est sûr! Ce jour-là, on ira à l'aéroport accueillir et applaudir avec des drapeaux dans les mains le retour du héros Kébir.

En tentant de les en dissuader comme je le disais tout à l'heure, de l'irréalisabilité de ces exigences, Ali Benhadj (un vrai malade mental qui assume totalement sa folie) rétorque: «nous en sommes pas les demandeurs» (source El Wattan). Benhadj a raison. Le FIS n'a jamais été demandeur de quoi que ce soit. Son seul et unique but c'est d'arriver au pouvoir. Et aujourd'hui, on sait qu'il ne reculera devant rien...

CONCLUSION

Le pouvoir algérien (oui, pas la peine de gueuler je sais qu'il n'est pas homogène!) est et sera le seul pouvoir au monde - et l'Histoire le retiendra - à avoir supplé des criminels en prison. C'est quand même fantastique!

Mais enfin! nos dirigeants devraient quand même méditer longuement sur les raisons de l'échec de la marche du 8 Mai. Et ils devraient surtout longuement méditer sur cette phrase de Ali Benhadj, le malade mental: «nous en sommes pas demandeurs». Ces deux phrases, à elles seules, expriment parfaitement l'impossibilité d'une réconciliation nationale. Si nos dirigeants ne nous croient pas... tant pis! Ils devraient au moins croire, Alain Juppé...

SAS

من التصريح بكفر الديمقراطية إلى التحفة الجسدية



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L'HEBDO

LI BERE

Kateb Yacine
est né
le 8 Mai 45

Que
va
faire



Ali Belhadj ?



4 224 marcheurs qui croyaient
ébranler l'Algérie

