


INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

Katherine Roth
San'a, Yemen
12 November, 1994

Peter Bird Martin
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USA

Islamic Rumblings in the Kingdom of Saud



Dr Sa'ad Rashid al-Faqih



Dr Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Mas'ari

Muhammed bin Abdullah al-Mas'ari, a lawyer and law professor at King Saud University, and. Sa'ad Rashid al-Faqih a consultant surgeon and assistant professor of medicine at King Saud University, are spokesmen for the Saudi opposition organization, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. Both were recently fired from their jobs in Saudi Arabia for participation in the group.

Dear Peter,

I have lived in Yemen for seven months now and the rumbling of discontent from my northern neighbor, Saudi Arabia, has grown so loud it can no longer be ignored. The role of San'a as a back-door route for Saudi upheaval seems increasingly likely.

Katherine Roth is a Fellow of the Institute
writing about tradition and modernity in the Arab world

Since 1925 the Institute of Current World Affairs (the Crane-Rogers Foundation) has provided long-term fellowships to enable outstanding young adults to live outside the United States and write about international areas and issues. Endowed by the late Charles R. Crane, the Institute is also supported by contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations.

Since the war here I and undoubtedly many Yemenis have received basketfuls of faxes from one of Saudi Arabia's largest Islamic opposition movements, the London-based Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. Friends tell me other smaller Saudi opposition groups are based in northern Yemen (or southern Saudi Arabia, depending on where you think the border runs), although I have been unable to confirm their existence here.

At least unofficially, long-standing Yemeni animosities toward Saudi make Yemen sympathetic to opponents of the Kingdom of Saud. The Saudi government played a major role in the Yemeni war by encouraging and supporting southern secessionist forces and officials. For many Yemenis, San'a's victory was a defeat of Saudi forces as much as the demise of socialism and secessionist forces in Yemen. Yemenis blame Saudi Arabia for the war here and are also bitter about the Saudis' expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers during the Gulf crisis (when Yemen sided with Iraq after Saudi Arabia refused to allow Yemen entrance into the Gulf Cooperation Council).

Because Saudi Arabia is largely closed to the foreign press and has a tight grip on what is reported locally, it's hard to obtain precise information on what is going on there. Through the reports of Saudi friends I have spoken with in San'a and Khartoum and the bulletins I receive from Saudi's Islamist opposition, I have tried to piece together a back-door snapshot.

The stronghold of the Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia seems to be a town of about 300,000 people called Boraïda, about 100 miles north of Riyadh in the region of Qasim. It has traditionally been a conservative and religious town (Not even tobacco is sold there). It is a stronghold of Wahabi ideology, the official Islamic ideology of Saudi Arabia, which calls for a return to the literal teachings of the Prophet Mohamed. Many of Saudi Arabia's religious scholars are from Boraïda.


In the 1960s, when Egyptian and Syrian Islamists, mostly from the Muslim Brotherhood, fled persecution in their respective countries and went to Saudi Arabia, they naturally established themselves in Boraïda. This new influx of Islamic thought radically changed the way Saudi Islamists understood the role of Muslim activism in society.

By the late 1980s a new breed of young Islamic scholars emerged from Boraïda. They were as attached to Islamic tradition as before, but with a modern twist. Whereas previous religious scholars had focused on theology and moral and social issues, these young *ulema*¹ spoke openly about international affairs, politics and economics. Current affairs in the Muslim world - such as Algeria and Afghanistan - began to find their way into mosque sermons. It was the introduction of politics into the mosques of Saudi Arabia. Saudi scholars had previously deemed such subjects inappropriate for the masses gathered for prayer and religious inspiration.

The Gulf crisis started in 1990 and hundreds of thousands of foreign troops landed on Saudi soil. This deeply hurt Saudi pride, especially the pride of those in religious circles, in which many people were dismayed that the defenders of the holiest shrines in Islam found they were dependent on infidels for their protection. For the first time Saudis could remember, the vulnerability of the Kingdom of Saud became obvious.

¹Religious scholars

Saudi-Yemen Border



The bold young religious scholars from Boraida turned their focus from international events to the situation inside their own country. Their anger at the regime was expressed in their mosque sermons, although they did not refer to regime by name. They spoke in generalities that could be understood by the masses but that were not so direct as to raise the ire of the authorities.

One of the most important religious cassettes of the time was made by a Boraida Sheikh in his early thirties by the name of Shiekh Salman El-Auda. El-Auda called for the "collapse of the state" and he described how the state slowly "weakened and became corrupt" and would eventually "be replaced by another state."

"Lock us up and kill us but change the conditions," the sheikh is recorded as saying.

The cassette was widely available in Saudi cassette shops but was later banned. During the Gulf War, a small and clandestine industry of such taped sermons began. Some scholars also attacked Saddam Hussein and Iraq in their sermons, describing the Iraqi leader as an infidel. This saved the young sheikhs from being accused of treason and arrested.

The message was clear however, especially since it came at a time when the Kingdom was experiencing its most serious foreign threat since its establishment.

In December of 1990 the first-ever Saudi petition calling for reform was distributed. It was signed by conservative and liberal intellectuals, by dignitaries and by several former ministers, although the religious scholars were not among them. The historic document was reportedly handed to the King by Sheikh Abdel-Aziz Ben Baz, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia and the highest authority in the Council of Ulema².

Late in April, 1991 the Islamic version of the petition appeared. It was the first clear expression of the kind of national reforms Saudi activists wanted. The petition was signed by about 400 Saudi Islamic intellectuals, including judges and university professors and was handed over to Sheikh Ben Baz to be transmitted to the king. Ben Baz reportedly approved the document with only one qualification. He added the words "one the basis of the Islamic Shari'a" after the clause that spoke of "safeguarding the individual and collective rights...in accord with acceptable legal rules and regulations."

The petition demanded that the king form an "entirely independent" consultative council and make wide-ranging reforms in the "existing political, economic, administrative and other structures in light of the Islamic shari'a."

It went on to spell out the various areas of reforms requested such as:

- Granting people their right to justice and equality without fear, favor, or prejudice, and integrating all judicial institutions to give them full independence in their work.

- Building a powerful and complete army and equipping it with arms and equipment obtained from various sources and making plans for Saudi Arabia to produce its own weapons and equipment.

- To rebuild the media so that it reflects the values of society and cleanse the media of its contradictions.

²The official association of Saudi religious scholars.

- To make the country's foreign policy better reflect the interests of the nation. the state should adopt the concerns of all muslims and Saudi missions should be reformed to reflect the Islamic identity of the country.

- Establishing justice in the distribution of public wealth and safeguarding the assets of the state from waste and exploitation. Abolishing all forms of illegal ownership and monopolies; and removing the ban from Islamic banking and cleansing all public and private institutions of interest.

Inspired by this Islamic petition for reform, the first "Memorandum of Advice"³ was published in the Islamic month of Muharam in the year 1413 [hijra]⁴. It was a 40-page booklet specifying the reforms suggested by the leaders of Saudi Arabia's Islamist movement. Despite the fact that officials of the Kingdom had requested that all forms of advice be given in secret, parts of the lengthy memorandum appeared in the foreign press. This triggered a harsh response from the government, which accused the young Islamic scholars of threatening the peace and harmony of the Kingdom. The regime also requested the Council of Ulema to issue a religious statement criticizing distribution of the memo.

On March 3, 1993, in an atmosphere of tension between some Saudi religious scholars and the regime, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights [CDLR] was formed. The group consisted of six Saudi intellectuals, including several lawyers and a poet. Not long after its formation, one of the members who had been a member of the Council of Ulema dropped out under pressure of the Saudi regime. Because of the active role of CDLR spokesman Mohamed bin Abdullah Al-Mas'ari, a university physics professor, and the substantial funds of the organization, creation of the group brought international attention to what had previously been a quiet domestic problem. The CDLR distributes frequent bulletins (in English and in Arabic) on the situation in Saudi around the world at its own financial expense⁵.

The CDLR receives its information from inside Saudi Arabia and says it receives some 20 calls a day from inside the country. The organization has a 1-800 number which is not only toll free, but is also detection-free. The caller's number is apparently not registered on Saudi telecom computers.

In March of 1994 an official Saudi statement announced the withdrawal of Ossama Bin Laden's Saudi citizenship. Bin Laden, a young Saudi Islamist of Yemeni origin whose family runs one of Saudi Arabia's biggest construction companies, has had more influence on the armed Islamist movement in the Arab world than any other single individual. He founded numerous training camps for Arab mujahedin in Afghanistan and financed travel to Afghanistan for Arabs who could not afford to go at their own expense. He is the common point shared by Algeria's Armed Islamic Group (the GIA), Yemen's jihad and a plethora of other Arab Islamist groups willing to use force to achieve their goals. Since

³It is interesting to note that in the early 1980s when the Algerian Islamist movement announced its political ambitions, it put out a similar memorandum by the same name, evidence perhaps that the ideas political reform were regional.

⁴July 1992

⁵Information can be obtained from the London office CDLR in Arabic or in English free of charge. Tel: 44 081 8304715. Fax: 44 081 8304716.

his Saudi citizenship was withdrawn, Bin Laden has resided in Sudan. He is currently at work building a superhighway from Khartoum to the Egyptian border⁶.

On April 10, 1994, Ossama Bin Laden announced the formation of his own version of the CDLR, the Committee for Advice and Reform [See pages 7 and 8 of this newsletter for a sample copy of a ARC bulletin, which is similar in format to bulletins put out by the CDLR].

On April 20, 1994, the CDLR announced it was moving its base from Saudi Arabia to London because of harsh treatment by the Saudi authorities. The same month, a wave of arrests started in Saudi Arabia (which included the arrest of Abdel-Rahman El-Hashmawy, a well-known poet and relative of CDLR spokesman Mohamed Mas'ari), as the government tried to find out how Mas'ari had succeeded in escaping the Kingdom even though his passport had been confiscated by the authorities.

In June, 1994, a bold statement criticizing Saudi Arabia's role in the Yemen war and signed by 25 prominent Saudi religious scholars was distributed⁷.

On September 9, 1994, Dr. Abdullah Hamid, a founding member of the CDLR group was arrested. The next day Dr. Safar El-Hawali was arrested and Sheikh Alman El-Auda was called to the Ministry of Interior. After the meeting El-Auda return to his home town in Boraida with a long convoy of his supporters. Upon arrival in Boraida, he announced his refusal of the government request that he not speak in public again. The following day, September 11, a large gathering in front of the main mosque in Boraida turned into an anti-government demonstration. Sheikh Salman El-Auda was arrested and after large demonstrations protesting his arrest, hundreds of his supporters were also arrested.

On September 26, the Kingdom of Saud issued its first statement about the crisis, admitting they had arrested over a hundred people for disturbing the peace in the Islamic Kingdom of Saud.

Since that time, residents of Boraida report that the situation feels like martial law, and that every family has one or two members who were arrested in the recent incidents.

"It's like a defeated city," said one resident, on condition of anonymity.

Saudi Islamists outside of Qasim say they have had little access to information and are unsure what to do next. The fear of similar waves of arrests in other regions of the kingdom seems to be growing and Saudis with Islamist sympathies say they are keeping a low profile just in case they find themselves on the government's blacklist.

Yemeni Islamists who have been closely watching the situation in Saudi Arabia say the real Islamist movement in the Kingdom of Saud has yet to begin. They characterize the situation in Saudi Arabia as spontaneous reform movement led by liberal reformists using the *ulema* to express their demands and fringe members of the royal family.

"The real popular-based Islamist reform movement in Saudi Arabia is organized by the Muslim Brotherhood and is still underground," a high ranking Islamist official in the Yemeni government told me. "They are getting stronger, though, and when they're strong enough they will probably surface."

⁶At about the same time CDLR's London office was opened, Ossama bin Laden opened a similar Islamic organization

⁷See my previous newsletter KLR-19.

A.R.C
ADVICE AND REFORMATION COMMITTEE
London Office

هيئة النصيحة والإصلاح

مكتبها - لندن

بيان رقم (٤)

اندحار الشيوعية في الجزيرة العربية الحدث والدلالة

بعد سنوات من العمليات الجهادية التي أطاح فيها شباب الإسلام بكثير من رؤوس الردة الاشتراكية في اليمن ، وبعد شهرين من حرب شاملة أظهر فيها الشعب المسلم في اليمن - يتقدمه العلماء - إصراره على سحق الاشتراكيين المرتدين وقطع دابرهم . وبعد أن لم يبق من هؤلاء كيدهم من الله شيئاً ، سقطت آخر المعاقل الشيوعية في اليمن ، فانزاح بذلك شر عظيم ، وكابرس طالما جثم على صدور المسلمين معجلاً معارول الهدم في الإسلام ، ومشائق الإعدام في رقاب العلماء والتهاد ، وانطوت أسراً صفحة في تاريخ اليمن على الإطلاق .

إن هذه النهاية التي انتهت بها الاشتراكيون في اليمن لتحمل أكثر من هبة ودلالة ، فهي رسالة ناطقة بالنهاية المحتمية المعائلة التي تنتظر كل من يحمل فكراً معادياً لدين الأمة ، مهما أوتي من قوة ذاتية أو دعم خارجي .

كما كان في الدرس اليمني هبة لمن يعتبر من الذين عملوا على تأجيج الصراع اليمني بدعم الشيوعيين بخلاف أنواع الدماء المادي والمعنوي ، منحسين أنفسهم بذلك في رهان خاسر على حرب لا يملك الطرف الذي يدعمونه فيها مقومات الاستمرار ، فضلاً عن مؤهلات الانتصار .

لقد كان النظام السعودي الحاكم في مقدمة الدول التي قادت حملة دعم الشيوعيين اليمنيين ، حيث قدم وحده مئات الملايين من الدولارات ، فضلاً عن السلاح والمعدات ، بالإضافة إلى جيش من اليمنيين كان الملك فيصل قد أعده لمحاربة الشيوعيين سابقاً ، فإذا بنظام الحكم الحالي يدفع به دعماً لهؤلاء الشيوعيين بتعريض من وزير دفاعه الأمير سلطان ، هذا إضافة إلى الحملة الدبلوماسية المعهمة التي أرادت فيها حكومة المملكة ما تبقى من ماء وجهها السياسي دعماً لموقف هؤلاء الشيوعيين .

إنه من المستغرب أن تندفع الحكومة السعودية في دعم دعاة قزيق الأمة وخصوم العقيدة ، فعلى سعة بارزة وثابتة في سياستها كما أوضحنا في بيانات سابقة ، لكن المضحك المبكي فعلاً هو أن يبلغ الضياء السياسي بالنظام هذا المبلغ الذي جعله يلقه كل شيء ، ولا يحصل على شيء ، بل ليخسر معركة هامة في صراع مصري سوف يحده مستقبل هذا النظام .

إن الحرب اليمنية كانت معلومة النتائج مسبقاً عند كل من أوتي حظاً من النظر ، وهذه الحقيقة أدركتها الدول الغربية مبكراً ، فلم تهازف بالدخول المكشوف مع طرف خاسر بكل المعايير ، مع أنها تشارك النظام السعودي حرصه على قزيق الأمة ودعم أهدافها .

ومع كل المصائب الناجمة عن موقف النظام السعودي من أحداث اليمن ، وبالرغم من النهاية الفعلية للشيوعيين في اليمن ، لازال النظام السعودي يسير في نفس الطريق المسدود ، حيث أكد في بيان مجلس الوزراء في جلسته الطارئة يوم ١٤١٥/١/٢٩ هـ الموافق ١٩٩٤/٧/٨ م على نفس الموقف السابق ، معلناً تسكبه بتطبيق القرارات الطاغوتية الصادرة عن مجلس الأمن ، داعياً هذا الموقف بإبراء القادة الشيوعيين الذين قروا من اليمن ، معجهاً قولهم صلى الله عليه وسلم : « من أرى محدثاً فعليه لعنة الله والملائكة والناس أجمعين » ، لا يقلل منه يوم القيامة صرف ولا عدل » معلق عليه .

صفحة رقم (١)

A.R.C
ADVICE AND REFORMATION COMMITTEE
London Office

هيئة النصيحة والإصلاح

مكتب - لندن

إن أحداث اليمن لم تأتي فقط لتقطع دابر الشيوعيين في اليمن ، ولكن لتسقط الأقنعة الزائفة أيضاً ، وتفضح أولئك الذين طالما خدعوا الناس بالدجل والكذب ، فقد كشف موقف النظام السعودي ودوره في هذه الأحداث بطلان دعوته المستمرة بمسكه بالشرعية الإسلامية ودعمه قضائياً المسلمين ، وحرصه على الوحدة العربية والإسلامية ، وتبنيه لمبدأ عدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية للدول الأخرى .

كما كانت أحداث اليمن محك الاختبار قايماً فيه علماء القرآن وعلماء السلطان ، فلي الوقت الذي انحاز فيه البعض إلى جانب النظام الحاكم أبته نخبة من علماء الأئمة ودعائها إلا الانحياز إلى جانب الحق تارلين بذلك عند حسن ظن الأمة بهم ، ومعيدين عن ضميرها صدعاً بالحق وإقامة للحجة على الجميع ، ومؤكد من مرة أخرى جدارتهم بما أعطتهم الأمة من ثقة ، وهباتهم له الأحداث المختلفة من صدارة .

ومن أبرز الدروس المستفادة من أحداث اليمن كذلك أن الدول الغربية وعلى رأسها أمريكا ليست مستعدة للمخاطرة بالتدخل لحماية أنظمة فاسدة ليست لها أية مصداقية أو وزن عند شعوبها ، فالدرس التي أخذتها هذه الدول من قهرها مع بعض شعوب المنطقة كانت قاسية ومريرة ، لكنها كانت مفيدة ونافعة .

أما حكام بلادنا نحن فهم الذين لا يتعظون ولا يتعلمون ، فيستظلون يراهنون على حماية حروشهم من قبل الدول الغربية التي لن تعده في التعاطي عنهم عندما ترى أن حمايتهم تعرضها ومصالحها للخطر .


إننا في (هيئة النصيحة والإصلاح) نرى في هزيمة الشيوعيين في اليمن اندحاراً للشيوعية ورفضاً لكل المذاهب الرضعية والعلمانية في كافة أرجاء المنطقة ، ونرى في ذلك بداية جديدة لتطبيق وصية رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بإخراج المشركين من جزيرة العرب ، مهما تعددت ألوان شركهم وصورهم .

وهذه المناسبة فإننا نهني الأمة الإسلامية وشعوب المنطقة ، والشعب اليمني بالذات على هذا الإنجاز العظيم الذي يحبه أن يكون النهاية الأبدية لأي تواجد شيوعي في المنطقة ونحت أي خطأ كان ، فلا يلدغ المؤمن من جحر مرتين .

كما نساءل إلى متى سيظل النظام السعودي متعدياً في سياساته الانتحارية مستغنياً بالأمة مهدداً لطاقتها الاقتصادية فيما لا يعود عليه إلا بخزي الدنيا وعذاب الآخرة ؟؟

«ومن لم يجعل الله له نوراً فما له من نور»

عنهم / أسامة بن محمد بن لادن




١٤١٥/٢/٣ هـ

صفحة رقم (٢)

It may be too early to outline the precise shape of the Islamist reform movement in Saudi Arabia, but here at the kingdom's back door the first rumblings of that movement are clearly audible.

With all best regards,



Katherine Roth

P.S. For the time being, the London information office of the CDLR remains the main source of information on the unfolding events in Saudi Arabia.

Muhammed bin Abdullah al-Mas'ari and Sa'ad Rashid al-Faqih, who are in charge of CDLR's London office, recently granted an interview to the London Impact International magazine⁸. I've included here a few excerpts of the interview that help explain the perspective of the growing Islamic opposition in Saudi Arabia.

Impact: What is the background of the formation of the CDLR?

Al-Faqih: The CDLR was set up last year on 12 Dhu Qa'dah 1413 (May 3, 1993). The necessity for establishing such a body had been there for quite a long time - repression, injustice and denial of rights - but the stage finally arrived when many of our thinkers, intellectuals and scholars felt it was time they tried to stem the drift in the country's state of affairs and conveyed their Islamic council, *nasiba*, to those responsible for running the affairs of the kingdom.

Our objective had been to convey our *nasiba* directly to the authorities and keep it outside the press and give them time and opportunity to redress the problem. But while we were still pondering over the issues, consulting amongst ourselves and formulating our ideas, there was an escalation of government action against the *ulema*.⁹ When they took action against a very prominent scholar, Ibtahim Ad-Dubayyan, some of those involved in the consultation came to the conclusion that the *nasiba* on the quiet was not practical and it had become necessary to establish and announce the formation of an independent body that would communicate directly both with the people and with the authorities. They did so after making sure that there was no objection from the point of view of Islamic shari'a - indeed defending the rights of the people is a *fardh*, a duty, according to shari'a. If they had waited until they obtained permission to form such a body, they would have never received it under the current regime. So the best way was to declare the CDLR as a *fait accompli* to the country as well as to

⁸Impact International magazine is a monthly English-language news magazine written from an Islamic perspective. It is published in London by News and Media Ltd. and can be reached c/o: P.O. Box 2493, Suite B, 233 Seven Sisters Road, London N4 2BL, UK. Tel # 44 71 263 1417 or Fax # 44 71 272 8934.

⁹Religious scholars.

the world that there were people who were brave enough to announce it and prepared to face the consequences.

We have been successful in breaking the psychological barrier which probably many thought was almost impossible to cross. The government itself did not have the courage to refute our *daleel shari'a*, the basis of our action under Islamic law. All they were able to say was that we were against the State and anything against the State had to be crushed.

Impact: But Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country...

Al-Mas'ari: An Islamic state does not prevent muslims or groups of muslims from working to uphold justice or the rights of its people. It is a supportive and not an adversarial function. Syedna Abu-Bakr and Umar (may God be pleased with them), the first two right-guided caliphs, ask the people to correct them if they found them faltering and the people said they would not spare them if they did. We have the Islamic *adilla* (arguments) to support our view.

Impact: What are they?

Al-Mas'ari: To remove injustice and oppression is a *fardh*¹⁰ in Islam, and to remove injustice muslims are required to cooperate with each other, even with those who do not believe in Islam. Justice is a fundamental value in Islam.

The Qor'an asks us to "cooperate [only] in acts of goodness and piety" and forbids us in "collaborating with sin and aggression." (*Al-Maidah* 5:2). The Prophet made alliance with non-Muslims in order to remove oppression and injustice.

Impact: Do the *ulema* agree with such *ijtihad*¹¹?

Al-Faqih: We have two types of *ulema* - the independent *ulema* and the official *ulema*. The official *ulema* are employed to support and defend the regime, yet many of them admit privately that the CDLR's stance was correct and it was well-founded according to Islamic shari'a. They found no fault from the Islamic point of view. But their 'official' position was that since the State was already looking after the rights of people there was no need for an independent committee unless the leader of the State permitted it himself. They were unable, however, to cite a single ayah of the Qor'an or Hadith of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to support their position.

For their part, the independent *ulema* are barred from giving public vent to their opinion. Most of them are prohibited from talking in public. They cannot speak in the mosque, in the university, on the radio, or on television. Audio-cassettes of their discourses are banned from distribution now. However, they fully support CDLR's work.

¹⁰ Duty

¹¹ Interpretation [of the Qor'an].

Impact: How long can things go on like this [referring to the country's difficult economic situation] in Saudi Arabia?

Al-Faqih: We fear that economic collapse is coming. Some 3,000 contractors who have done work or provided services for the State have not had their bills settled for the past seven months. Last year the teachers, especially lady teachers, received their *shawaal*¹² salary ten days late because the department had no money. Again last year, the government departments were told after ten months that their budget allocations were exhausted and they should look for appropriations from other heads. The government has taken 15 billion Saudi Riyals of General Organization of Social Insurance funds and for six years it has not paid its share of the government employees' provident fund. They don't want to print false money because it would lead to the fall of the value of the riyal against the dollar. They are, therefore, borrowing from the money market.

Impact: Where does the power lie? Some think it lies with a few people within and around the Royal Court? Who are they?

Al-Faqih: All power is in the hands of the royal family, but true legitimacy lies with the classical Islamic scholars and but for the ulema, the al-Saud family would not have been able to gain and retain political power. However, the actual political power lies in the hands of the king and a few of his full brothers like Sultan, Salman and Nayef. Crown Prince Abdullah is very much an outsider.


...The day to day affairs are run by Sultan, Salman and Nayef. When we announced the formation of the CDLR, the king called Nayef and told him that it was his fault that he pushed these people (us) towards frustration.

...A great degree of influence is also exercised by American advisers. That explains the regime's policies towards Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen and several other areas of Islamic interest. These policies go against the ethos of the country, yet the regime behaves as if it was helpless. The best example of this was their inability to provide any useful political support and save the Bosnians from ethnic cleansing and genocide. All their best friends happened to be the best protectors of Kardzic & Co as well and yet one did not see them speaking clearly to their friends.

Impact: Where does the CDLR go from here?

Al-Faqih: The CDLR does not see itself as a political movement as such. It has no political manifesto. Our main objective is to create awareness about the need for rights, justice and legitimacy in the affairs of the country. We can already see a visible rise in public awareness and we are sure this awareness will find its own natural channels and course of action. The CDLR's work will also evolve in light of the developments in the objective situation within the country.

¹² an Islamic month



The official logo of the CDLR.



*ICWA Tradition and Modernity Fellow in Dareya, Saudi Arabia,
original home of the Al-Saud family.*

INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS

Katherine Roth
Zinjibar, YEMEN
17 November, 1994

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Afghanistan and the Yemeni Jihad: A Surprising visit to Post-war Aden
Part 1



This photo of Tarek El-Fadly (left) and his father, Sultan Nasr El-Fadly, appeared in the international weekly El-Wasat news magazine.

Dear Peter,

One of the more memorable Islamists I have met since beginning this two-year "Islamic journey" is Tarek El-Fadly, the young tribal and jihad leader from Abyan, the expansive province to the east of Aden. Since my last meeting with him he has been officially named Sultan of Abyan, replacing his father Nasr El-Fadly, who was the Sultan of Abyan before and during British rule in southern Yemen.

The widely respected and influential El-Fadly family fled Yemen to Lebanon and then to Saudi Arabia when the Socialists took control of southern Yemen after the country's independence. After fighting alongside the Afghan rebels against communist

Katherine Roth is a Fellow of the Institute
writing about tradition and modernity in the Arab world.

Since 1925 the Institute of Current World Affairs (the Crane-Rogers Foundation) has provided long-term fellowships to enable outstanding young adults to live outside the United States and write about international areas and issues. Endowed by the late Charles R. Crane, the Institute is also supported by contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations.