Russia has turned upside-down during the past two years. Moscow's Bloody Sunday in October 1993 brought an end to dvoyevlastiye, the dual power standoff between President Yeltsin, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies that paralyzed political and economic reforms. Yet the aftermath of dvoyevlastiye--presidential authoritarianism--seems a dubious foundation upon which Russian is to build a democratic system of government and a market economy. By stepping over the line to violence, Russia's leadership fractured the nation. Political dialog has turned into a baying chorus of voices, each shouting desperately to make itself heard. The topsy-turvy events make life strange in Russia's provinces, and I have to admit that for all my research, I am as bewildered by what is happening to Russia as its own citizens, if not more. Of course, laying all the blame on Yeltsin won't do--blame for the present state of affairs in Russia goes far back into history, including (if you are willing to trace it), into the souls of the millions and millions of people who lived in and built the Soviet Union, and then watched their creation die.

Russia may have one last, precious chance to halt the downward spiral into anarchy. On December 11-12, for the first time in history, the Kamchatka Region's voters will elect politicians by truly open election rather than rubber-stamping a Moscow appointee. They will also vote on a new Russian Federation Constitution. Russia's political and economic fate hangs in the balance, but there is little true consensus about what is to be done. Russia seen from the Kamchatka Region resembles the Tower of Babel more than a proud democracy in the making.

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Since 1925 the Institute of Current World Affairs (the Crane-Rogers Foundation) has provided long-term fellowships to enable outstanding young adults to live outside the United States and write about international areas and issues. Endowed by the late Charles R. Crane, the Institute is supported by contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations.
he End Of Soviet Power On Kamchatka

Soviet power in the Kamchatka Region died not with a bang, but a whimper. On November 23, 1993, the Twenty-Second Session of the Kamchatka Region Council of People's Deputies met for the unlucky 13th time since 1991 to dissolve itself and formally transfer all duties to the Kamchatka Regional Administration. However, only 82 of the 107 People's Deputies needed for a quorum registered. Many of the 'no-shows' were Kamchatka's own hard-liners, Communists who were actually in attendance, but disdainfully refusing to participate in the ignominious end of the Soviet era. Their protest was in vain. Kamchatka Governor V. A. Biryukov dissolved the Council himself. While the dissolution of the Council means the body has ceased to function legally, most Deputies will continue to work as before at their duties to ensure a smooth flow of work until the next round of politicians comes to power. The Regional Administration will serve as a 'rump council' until a new council can be elected in the March, 1994, elections.

There was some nostalgia among the Deputies as they met for the last time. Council Chairman P. G. Premyak noted that the Deputies adopted important legislation during its term, including creating a social security fund for Kamchatka's poor and gaining official status for the Kamchadal ethnic group as a 'Northern People'. He praised the Council's loyalty to President Yeltsin during the August 1991 Coup and the bloody events of October 1993, and for working with, instead of against, the Kamchatka Regional Administration during its three years and seven months of political life "as was the case in so many of Russia's regions." The Council, Mr. Premyak later told journalists, left a positive economic legacy despite having to work during trying times for the region.

"[My opinion of the current economic situation on Kamchatka] is positive, since reform is happening: we have 46 registered joint-ventures, and 36 of them are working; we've [also] got 2000 private enterprises, and the main portion of the governmental sector has become joint-stock companies (note: aktsionernyi obshchestva, or joint-stock companies, feature joint ownership by the government and workers or other investors). And if you consider new forms of ownership, especially private, then here things are going pretty well. We managed to buy a mixed fodder plant and bought seven transport vessels for 129 million dollars. We're dealing with energy problems and are developing the economic-technical base for the Mutnovsky Geothermal Plant. 1

"But there is a negative moment—the drastic drop in [the Region's industrial] production has reached 10-15 percent per quarter. That's dangerous. To be honest, it's worse in other parts of Russia. Whatever laws we pass about social guarantees, if we don't have a national product, everything's going to be tough. Another sad fact is out-migration: in the past year 40 thousand people left
Kamchatka; people are leaving the [remote] regions, the intelligentsia is leaving, and soon we won't have any doctors or teachers."

Other recent, positive achievements by the Council of People's Deputies and the Regional Administration are the opening of Elizovo Airport for refueling by foreign aircraft, and an increase in allowable overflights of the Kamchatka Region. The airport was opened by order of Russian Federation Prime Minister V. F. Chernomyrdin on November 19, 1993. The increase in air traffic will generate jobs and revenues for the region and increase foreign investment possibilities. Less important in the short term, but of greater significance for the maritime region is the opening of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky's port to foreign shipping traffic. Although the final decision on opening the Kamchatka peninsula for international traffic officially came after the dissolution of the Council of People's Deputies, they lobbied hard for this during the past year. The opening may be counted as one of their major achievements. 3

The only discouraging words about the end of Soviet power on the Kamchatka Region came from embittered members of the Council of People's Deputies Communist faction, Sodeistviye (Cooperation), which wrote a scathing protest to their fellow Deputies. Council Chairman P. G. Premyak refused to read the protest on November 23. Two days later Kamchatskaya Pravda (the local anti-reform, nominally pro-Communist newspaper) published it in full.

"We, the Deputies from the Sodeistviye block...protest the violent removal of the legislative bodies of government and the anti-democratic methods [used] in accepting the Fundamental Law of Government. The dismissal of the Councils [of People's Deputies], [and] the authoritative, no-choice draft of the Constitution, to be voted on during [the December] elections, has but one goal--to legitimize the violent seizure of power by bankrupt politicians, create the illusion of a legal basis for changing the social order.

"The collapse of the USSR [and] the country's economy and governmental sector, the frenzied give-away of the nation's property and land, shameful 'voucherization', the gamble on exploitative production methods, the betrayal and consignment to oblivion of the interests of the broad working masses, the deep worsening of social inequality, the moral degradation of society, the silent assent to the crime wave, has brought many to ruin..." 4

Democratic Russia is living through strange times indeed when former Communists become a major dissenting voice of opposition! And when ostensibly democratic politicians censor them. Snarling, the red villains exited stage right, opening the way for the next generation of leadership. They face monumental tasks; implementing
a new Russian Federation Constitution, re-establishing broken economic ties to mainland Russia, attracting foreign trade, upgrading the region's faltering fishing industry and rebuilding its industrial base.

The Candidates

To quote the Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu, "To have true government there must first be true men." Certainly Russia's first post-Soviet elections offer voters a wide choice. The Kamchatka Region's candidates for the Duma and the Federation Council (the two houses of Russia's proposed new Parliament, the Federal Assembly) are as eclectic and varied as could any democratic-minded observer could want. Bear in mind that the Kamchatka Region will send one independent candidate and one candidate from an official political party to the Duma, and elect two candidates to the Federation Council. 5

Kamchatka's Duma candidates will come from the 88th Voting District (izberatelny okrug). Four contenders managed to get the 2800 signatures necessary for inclusion into the voting lists--I. Yu. Dankylinets, the Director of the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Internal Affairs Bureau (the Russian equivalent of the State Police); independent candidate A. Ya. Lezdinsh, sociologist, and Director of the independent 'Municipal Channel' television station; V. P. Pilipenko, a geologist representing Kedr (Russia's 'green party') and Director of the Rodon industrial enterprise; and Vybor Rossii (Russia's Choice) candidate S. I. Sharov, General Director of the Kamsudo ship repair and fishing company.

One more Kamchatka candidate, V. V. Veikhman, will participate in the National Register of Candidates (Obshchefederalny spisok) as a representative for Vybor Rossii. The eloquent and erudite Mr. Veikhman, a former Kamchatka Region People's Deputy, is best known in the region as the Chairman of the Kamchatka Region Committee for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression.

Competition for the Federation Council promises to be stiff; local opinion is that the Federation Council will actually turn out to be the more influential of the two new parliamentary houses. The Kamchatka Region candidates from the 41st Voting District for the Federal Assembly will be N. V. Vyankin, the Assistant Director of the security firm Kazak (representing the local kazachestvo, self-styled patriots who model themselves on Cossacks, the traditional tsarist guards.); and M. A. Vanin, the Assistant Chairman of the City of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Chairman of the City Property Commission, also representing Vybor Rossii. L. A. Grigoryevna, the Assistant Director of the Kamchatka Region Branch of the Russian Central Bank, is the only woman candidate from Kamchatka to any house of the new Russian Parliament. Many consider Ms. Grigoryevna a good bet to win a seat in the Federal Assembly. She is expected to capture the women's vote and has vowed to make the Russian government more fiscally responsive to Kamchatka's special needs.
Rounding out the list of Federation Council candidates are V. S. Yefimov, the Director of TVK (Kamchatka Television), Russia's first independent television network; longshot V. G. Medzhidov, an Azerbaidjani and President of the firm Layla, advocating the rights of Caucasian nationality groups; P. G. Premyak, former Chairman of the Kamchatka Region Council of People's Deputies; M. V. Skakun, the Director of the Kamchatka Federal Farmers and Small Producers Commission; and A. S. Smyshlyaev, local journalist and editor of the television program, Delovyiye Vesti (Business News).

Russian pre-election hype hardly dives to the same depths as American political campaigns, but familiar motifs of hyperbole and innuendo swirl around the candidates. Their lack of experience is obvious and sometimes refreshing--nobody can accuse any of these candidates of being 'teflon', even when they are full of guile. Sometimes the whole affair comes off as silly and bumpkinish. Mr. Yefimov and Mr. Lezdinsh, Kamchatka's two 'television' candidates, both announced their candidacy on their own shows, claimed they wouldn't use their television stations 'for agitation, propaganda and self-aggrandizement', and then spent the rest of November urging the public to vote for them. Fortunately, Russian Federation campaign laws prohibit them from doing this for the month leading up to the elections, so citizens have been spared their commentary for a short while. Mr. Vyankin, the kazachestvo candidate (wearing the requisite handlebar mustache), appeared completely bewildered by the questions posed by local television journalists on the program 'A Word For The Voters'. He seemed to think it was sufficient to drink tea, look fierce and fulminate against 'the destroyers of Russia'.

Predictably, television gives candidates recognition among voters, and the ones with the most airtime are the most recognized and influential. Many resent what they consider an unfair advantage for the television candidates. Local politicians and journalists I have spoken with, for example, say Mr. Lezdinsh stands a good chance of being elected to the Duma, mainly on the strength of his unflinching public criticism of local politicians over the past two years. He has a further advantage by not being burdened with a Communist Party past, which earns him support by a public fed up by their former leaders. "I'll probably vote for Lezdinsh because he's progressive," said one woman, expressing the common point of view.

The rumors flying around Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky about the candidates are wild, poisonous and (of course) completely unfounded. In this respect, the Kamchatka Region's first democratic elections have something in common with the American political process. Virtually everybody has dirt to throw on everybody else. Although Russian Federation campaign laws expressly prohibit public denigration of a candidate's characters, the private sector (typically for Russia) has stepped in and cornered the market on spletini, or cheap, malicious gossip.

At a dinner party in my apartment one night, one member of the Council of People's Deputies called Mr. Lezdinsh a fascist and opportunist. "He attracts the lumpenproletariat, all the destructive elements in our society, and doesn't offer a way to reach consensus," the Deputy said. "He has no political experience at all. He'd be the
worst candidate for Kamchatka." The Deputies comments irritated my other dinner guests, who favored Lezdimsh, (and didn't appreciate being lumped in with the lumpenproletariat). A spirited argument flared. When I suggested that perhaps an infusion of new blood into Russia's political process might do some good, the Deputy shot me down. "We need experienced politicians, economists, experts," he insisted. "Not demagogues and critics."

Perhaps so, but where to find them? Politicians and economists educated in the old Soviet system inspire the same confidence in Russia's citizenry as nuclear power plant engineers from Chernobyl might. "They've done enough damage for the past 70 years. We need truly new people" is a commonly expressed point of view. Unfortunately, even Kamchatka's progressives hardly present themselves as models of quality and distinction. The region's other television candidate, Mr. Yefimov, gets big recognition from his television reporting (he got his start by reporting the August 1991 Coup attempt live from Moscow to Kamchatka's information-starved public), but critics don't like Mr. Yefimov's abrasive attitude and claim this will hurt his political effectiveness in the Federation Council. Mr. Yefimov and TVK have been embroiled in a convoluted ownership scandal with former partner Setko-ST, a local advertising firm. Mr. Yefimov has been publicly accused of using payroll funds to line his pockets. The case is under review at the Kamchatka Region Arbitration Court.

Perhaps a more serious concern is how well the candidates present their point of view to Kamchatka's voting public--a far more difficult task than reacting to the television camera. Mr. Yefimov's published political platform shows a characteristic lack of sophisticated, considered political thinking:

"Kamchatka is the easternmost point of a huge country. I know that our region will have a big future only if economic and general human problems are presented in the necessary way to the central bodies of Russian authority.

"[I stand for] increased rights for economic independence for the Kamchatka province.

"[and] the rational use of geologic and fisheries resources.

"We are among the few who have remaining wealth in minerals, and living in the water and air. [I stand for] the moderate or complete exclusion of foreign capital from utilization of Kamchatka's natural resources.

"[I stand for] propaganda in the central bodies of authority for the rights of the inhabitants of the North and Sub-Polar regions. [And] an increase in benefits according to the Law of the North."
"My principles are for single power of a unified Russia, the Russia of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great." 7

On the face of it, some of Kamchatka's other candidates are more substantial. Mr. Premyak is well-recognized and experienced in big-time Russian politics; he knows Moscow's ins and outs. Working against him is the facts that he was a die-hard Communist until the very final moments of Soviet power, and the common knowledge that he worked in Vladivostok in the Soviet Navy's 'Special Branch' (Osoby otdel, the armed forces KGB representative body) as a 'personnel director' in charge of issuing permissions to go abroad. Worse, he presided over the Kamchatka Region during its darkest economic hours. But personal recognition will likely get him higher office; it will have to, considering his fluffy published platform:

"Kamchatka has unique nature, rich resources, and remarkable people.

"And [regional] authority should guarantee a worthwhile life for the populace.

"This will be possible if:

"--from political divisions of society into 'reds' and 'whites', we move towards peace and joint effort.

"--everybody does his job: a fisherman should catch fish, a deputy should write laws, and the government should direct the economy.

"--Moscow gives us political independence (samostoyatelnost), and the right to solve local problems.

"--a person should have the right to private property, not in word but in deed, including the right to land.

"--Kamchatka solves problems of transport, its own geothermal energy, and by means of opening the airport and the sea-trading port develop tourism and foreign trade." 8

_Vybor Rossii'_s Mr. Sharov is backed by big money in the Kamchatka Entrepreneur's Union and has not only made an effort to publish a coherent political platform, but interviews regularly with local journalists. Although one local journalist I spoke with described Mr. Sharov as "up to his neck in corruption and bribes", he has at least publicly answered questions about his personal finances. Mr. Sharov's supports creating a strong, independent entrepreneurial class on Kamchatka. He has tirelessly
advocated allowing private companies and individuals to have access to Kamchatka's fisheries resources.

With Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky's port open, Mr. Sharov proposes constructing massive refrigeration warehouses in the city and creating a Regional Fish Market, modeled on the fish market in Pusan, South Korea.

"This will make Petropavlovsk one of the largest centers of the world fish trade. Fish caught in the waters surrounding Kamchatka will flow in, and out of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky we will send out small but numerous shipments of fish to all corners of the globe." 9

Speak No Evil

Behind the personalities, election politics and *spletni* loom the larger philosophical issues affecting Russia's attempts to build democracy. Something seems badly amiss here; not any one major thing, but a series of small clues let on that the atmosphere is not as democratic as the campaign rhetoric suggests. Since the bloody October Events in Moscow, there has been an almost total lack of real hard news about what is happening throughout Russia. All of the usual Moscow newspapers, with the exception of the obviously pro-Yeltsin *Izvestiya*, have disappeared from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky's newsstands. Most notable among the lost newspapers are *Moskovskiy Novosti* (Moscow News) and *Argumenti i Fakti* (Arguments and Facts) which print excellent, information-packed articles and analyses of Russia's political situation. *Moskovskiy Novosti* was especially strong in reporting on the situation in Siberia's 'breakaway' regions and the Russian Far East just before the October Events. *Vostok Rossii* (The Russian East) a wildly erratic but informative weekly published in Magadan, also disappeared without a trace in November. *Vostok Rossii* reviewed the wider issues of Russian politics and economics as they looked from Siberia and the Russian Far East. These dissenting voices have been silenced during the critical pre-election period.

In the Kamchatka Region, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky's newspapers are useful but limited. The city has only a handful of journalists, and they are hard-pressed to keep readers posted on the most basic current events, much less provide in-depth analysis of developments in Russian politics. *Vesti*, subsidized by the (now defunct) Kamchatka Region Council of People's Deputies, studiously avoids any criticism of President Yeltsin or his government. *Kamchatskaya Pravda* takes a harder line, but has problems meeting its budget obligations and paying for its editorial offices at the City Council Building, and comes out only three times a week. *Rybak Kamchatki* (Fisherman's News) is only good for news in the fishing industry. The Russian navy's weekly newspaper *Tikhookeanskaya Vakhta* (Pacific Ocean Watch) publishes good information on military issues such as conversion, but little about politics. None of these local newspapers has more than eight pages, and much of that space is taken up by reprints of government documents and advertising.
In the absence of hard written news, voters must rely on television and radio for information. By law, government television stations must broadcast information about Russia's national parties, as well as regional candidates. Unfortunately, this information is broadcast after 9 o'clock in the morning, when most people have left for work. Repeat broadcasts in the evening run head-to-head with popular, imported soap operas like the American 'Santa Barbara' or the Mexican 'Simply Maria', and stand little chance of reaching a viewing public bored with politics. The furious pace at which elections have been forced by the Yeltsin Administration makes the process all the more incomprehensible, and pushes vital topics, such as the provinces' future relationship with Moscow or the proposed Constitution, to the side as candidates fight for airtime and the voter's attention.

Even more disturbing than the information vacuum are the things I'm hearing whispered on the side. Radio Rossii, the government-run radio station, is a major source of regional and national news on Kamchatka. One day I coincidentally met a radio journalist, A., while waiting for a bus. As we stood in the cold, he told me he was quitting radio. Why? I asked. "I'm disgusted with the whole thing," said A.. "Now we've got censorship again. I can't work with these people looking over my shoulder, telling me what to write and what not to write." I asked him what he meant by 'censorship'. "I mean the government is censoring our work again," he said angrily. "We have to write things favorable to Yeltsin and the government. We can't say anything now. A friend of mine just got hit with criminal charges for saying that Yeltsin razgonyal (from the verb razgonit, or to disperse, as in a mob) the Congress of People's Deputies, instead of using the acceptable verb, raspustit (to dismiss). Now he might go to jail for criminal agitation."

Another friend of mine at Radio Rossii confirmed what A. told me, and elaborated, "There's plenty of censorship now. Everything goes to the main editor, just like in the good old days. It's not hard censorship, like before, it's more like the editors say 'don't you think it would be better this way...or, are you sure this is what you want to say.'" She shrugged. "It's soft censorship, but it's definitely there. We can't really criticize the government now."

Some Federal Assembly candidates have been forced out of the political contention by old-fashioned intimidation. One close acquaintance of mine, V., a Kamchatka Region People's Deputy, had his bid for candidacy to the Duma cut short by intimidation and theft. First, he started getting threatening phone calls. "Then some guys came to my dacha and told me to stop trying to get my name on the ballot or there would be 'trouble' for me and my family," he said. V. finally gave up after voting lists with over 300 names on them were stolen from his safe at the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Higher Maritime College, where he teaches a night class. "They understood that I'm a former seaman, and that I have good connections in the fishing industry," he told me. "I probably had a good shot at the Duma, but now I'm not even going to try until the next election."

Rigging the Vote and The Yeltsin Constitution.
Compounding censorship and restrictions on information are critical legal issues surrounding acceptance of the Yeltsin Constitution by Russia's voters. Recall that a new constitution for the Russian Federation is to be voted on simultaneously as a referendum item during the December elections. In a sinister twist, a vote for the Yeltsin Constitution will be considered simultaneously to be a vote of confidence for President Yeltsin, similar to the April referendum. The election voting rules make the acceptance of the Constitution (and a vote of confidence for President Yeltsin) highly likely. Fifty percent of Russia's voters must turn out for the Federal Assembly election to be valid, but only 25 percent of the voters are needed to validate the new Constitution and President Yeltsin's course for Russia. Not only that, but if the Constitution does not pass referendum, the President may create a special Constitutional Commission to enact it without putting it to general vote. One way or another, it seems certain the Yeltsin Constitution will be the Russian Federation's new law of the land.

The Yeltsin Constitution was first published in the Kamchatka Region on November 23--three weeks before the December elections, hardly enough time for serious discussion. Most people here freely admit that they haven't read it. Worse, a recently issued presidential order prohibits any Federal Assembly candidate from criticizing the proposed constitution, under penalty of exclusion from the election. The result is that the most critical piece of political legislation in recent Russian history is not being freely discussed, and will not be before it is enacted. 

For all this, the Yeltsin Constitution goes farther to defend the human rights than any of the Soviet Union's three previous constitutions. While critics disapprove of the strong presidency envisioned in the constitution, and its conceptual base--"The President is the guarantor of the Constitution"--and see engendered in it a temptation to dictatorship, the sad fact is that somebody must bring order to Russia now. The problems confronting the nation cannot wait for resolution any longer.

A first step will be resolving the outmoded relationships between Moscow and the provinces. But before discussing how the Yeltsin Constitution formulates the new Russian federalist system, a few comments about the document itself are in order. The Yeltsin Constitution falls short in a number of critical psychological moments. Unimaginative and mechanical in tone, it reflects the bureaucratic mentality of legal minds raised on a steady diet of Communist Party doctrine. Politicians I speak with on Kamchatka universally bemoan the lack of good, broadly-trained minds in Russian politics, and reading the Yeltsin Constitution, it's easy to understand their dismay. There is no feeling that the Yeltsin Administration is trying to capture the moral high ground, no call for Russia's exhausted citizenry to rise above their present state and reach for their dreams. It reads like a hurried first draft (my copy even has a number of glaring grammatical errors), and is pretty thin soup to pass along to a population that prides itself on a tradition of great literature. This inspires little confidence among Russia's cynical citizens. As one local fisherman told me, "This is the fourth constitution I've seen in my life--one by Stalin, one by Brezhnev and one by Gorbachev--and none of the other three were worth a damn. I looked Yeltsin's version over, and I really have no reason to think this one will be any better."

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different. The *nomenklatura* will write anything, all kinds of lies, to fool the people and stay in their chairs."

**The New Russian Federalism and Joint Jurisdiction**

The Yeltsin Constitution grants equal rights to all Russian Federation federal subjects—the crazy quilt of republics, krais, oblasts, federally-designated cities, autonomous regions and okrugs presently making up Russia. Federal law will now apply equally to all federal subjects. The confusing situation that had developed over the past two years, with federal subjects within the Russian Federation enjoying different legal rights, has been eliminated. The way has been cleared for the establishment of a truly federal system of states' rights in the Russian Federation.  

Yet ambiguities remain. The new federal relationships are spelled out in Chapter 1 (Fundamentals of the Constitutional System) Article 5, which reads,


"2. Republics have their own constitution and legislative system (*zakonodatelstvo*). Krais, oblasts, federally-designated cities, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous regions have their own *ustav* and legislative system.  

"3. The federal structure of the Russian Federation is based on the integrity of its government, the unity of the governmental system of authority, the delimitation (*razgranichenie*) of the range of competence and authority between the bodies of the Federal governmental and the governmental bodies of the federal subjects of the Russian Federation, and on the equal rights and self-determination of the peoples of the Russian Federation.

"4. In their interactions with federal bodies of government authority, all federal subjects of the Russian Federation are equal among themselves."

Sound too good to be true? It is. Clearly, equality among federal subjects does not imply equality between the federal government and federal subjects. Chapter 3, (The Federal Structure), Article 71, leaves the authority to determine regional resource use and foreign economic trade with the central government:

"The following lie within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation:

"b) the federal structure and territory of the Russian Federation."
"d) establishment of a system of federal legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, [and] the observance (poryadka) of their organization and activity; the formation government authority.

"e) federal government property and its regulation (note: according to past Soviet Constitutions and fisheries laws, Russia's marine resources are considered federal property.)

"f) establishment of the basis of federal policy and federal programs for the governmental, economic, ecological, social, cultural, and national development of Russia.

"k) foreign trade relations of the Russian Federation.

"m) determination of the status and protection of governmental borders, territorial seas, air space, exclusive economic zones, and the continental shelf of the Russia Federation.

Article 72 establishes the principle of 'joint jurisdiction', a nominal system of equality between the federal government and federal subjects.

"1. The following lie within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation:

"a) ensuring the compatibility of the constitutions and laws of republics, and the ustavs, laws, and other normative legal acts of krais, oblasts, federally-designated cities, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs with the Russian Federation Constitution and federal laws.

"c) questions of jurisdiction, use and distribution of land, minerals, water, and other natural resources.

"d) the demarcation of governmental property.

"e) resource use (prirodopolzovaniye); conservation of nature and the ensuring of ecological security...

"h) establishment of the general principles of taxation and [tax] collection in the Russian Federation.

"i) administrative, administrative-procedural, labor, family, housing, land, water, and forest legislation, mineral resources legislation, and [legislation regarding] conservation.
"1) establishment of the general organizational principles for the system of federal government bodies and local self-management (samoupravleniye).

"m) the coordination of international and foreign trade relations (svyazi) of Russian federal subjects, [and] the fulfillment of Russian Federation international treaty [obligations].

"2. The regulations of the above Article have equal force in republics, krais, oblasts, federally-designated cities, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs."

According to Kamchatka Region Standing Legal Commission Chairman Viktor V. Yershov, the proposed Constitution doesn't go nearly far enough in giving federal subjects equal rights before the federal government. "It leaves us practically in the same place as we were before, with the old Constitution," he told me during a recent talk. True, but with an important exception; the Yeltsin Constitution at least offers federal subjects a legal basis to negotiate with the central government, something they never had before.

Unfortunately, a legal basis for negotiations might not do the provinces much good, since the Yeltsin Constitution does not spell out exactly how the principle of joint negotiation works. Instead, it delegates the final decision in all important legal disputes between the federal government and federal subjects to the federal government, and then declares the blanket supremacy of federal law over federal subjects' legislation. This is spelled out in Chapter 3, Article 76:

"1. For matters of Russian Federation jurisdiction federal constitutional laws are promulgated, and federal laws having direct force on the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

"2. For matters of joint jurisdiction between the Russian Federation and Russian federal subjects, federal laws are issued and, promulgated in accordance with them, laws and other normative legal acts of Russian federal subjects.

"3. Federal laws may not conflict with federal constitutional laws.

"4. For matters beyond Russian Federation jurisdiction, the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and Russian federal subjects, republics, krais, oblasts, federally-designated cities, autonomous oblasts and autonomous regions issue their own legal regulations, including the promulgation of laws and other normative legal acts.
"5. Russian federal subjects' laws and other normative legal acts must not contradict federal laws promulgated in accordance with the first and second paragraphs of this Article. In case of a contradiction between federal laws and other acts issued by the Russian Federation, federal law shall apply.

"6. In case of a conflict between a federal law and a normative legal act of a Russian federal subject issued in accordance with the fourth paragraph of this Article, the Russian federal subject normative legal act shall apply."

Additionally, since disputes between federal subjects and the federal government will be arbitrated by the Russian Federation Supreme Court (whose members are presidential appointees) and are subject to review by the president, it is safe to assume that the federal government will be able to force major issues to be resolved in its favor.

A New Era of Fisheries Management in the Russian Far East?

Yeltsin Constitution Chapter 2 (Human and Civil Rights) Article 34 (1, 2) guarantees independent entrepreneurs broad rights and freedoms, and prohibits monopolism and "unconscionable competition". Whether this largesse extends as far as free access to Russia's natural resources is another question altogether. The Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management, for example, has long spoken of becoming only a 'coordinating body'. If the federal government begins to limit ministerial authority, especially on the regional level, then there is chance future fisheries policy will be predicated on input from federal subjects and independent fishing enterprises. The key will be whether or not fishing enterprises with partial government ownership get preferential access to Russia's marine resources. 13

As yet there is no guarantee that independent fishing enterprises will be allowed equal access to Russia's marine resources, or indeed any access at all. Consider that although Russian Federation Basic Law on Entrepreneurship guarantees independent enterprises the right to use natural resources, in practice this legislation has been ignored by on the regional level Committee of Fisheries Management bureaucrats on various pretenses--"we must take care of traditional users first" or "there is not enough quota to give to private enterprises". Since the Yeltsin Constitution does not expressly grant independent enterprises access rights to resources, these questions will likely be decided on a case-by-case basis on the regional level. This will de facto leave regional apparatchiki with much of the same powers as they enjoyed under the Soviet system, and enjoy now.

Coordinating resource use among everybody wanting a piece of the quota pie will be difficult, and is sure to cause serious conflicts in the Russian Far East's highly competitive fishing industry. Giving preferential treatment to the traditional monopolies will tempt regional fisheries apparatchiki accustomed to running things their own way. Without new fisheries legislation in place to regulate the process, access to marine
resources and quota distribution will remain the exclusive domain of the traditional fisheries apparatus. Resolving the dilemma depends on enacting a new Russian Federation fisheries law. But this important piece of legislation has been delayed for over nine months by political infighting in Moscow.

A hint of the Yeltsin Administration's attitude towards the aspirations of Kamchatka's independent fishing enterprises appeared in a recent press interview with Presidential Representative to the Kamchatka Region Alexandr Kuzhim. In the interview, Mr. Kuzhim criticized Kamsudo General Director S. I. Sharov's demands for equal access to marine resources.

"The fact of the matter is, they [the Kamchatka Entrepreneurs Union] came with their big spoon and great ambitions to a small pot, trying to knock aside the elbows of those who have long stood at the counter. Sergei Ivanovich [Sharov] demands fishing quotas. But here I agree with [Kamchatka Region Governor] Biryukov--we have somebody to give the limits to. And another thing--they're not unlimited. And if we give them to everybody who wants them, like Kamsudo then it means we've got to take them away from somebody else. Behind the words that, well, I created 500 jobs, stands thousands of cutbacks of [workers] in fishing enterprises and fishing vessels sitting idle. So Biryukov is giving these wild-eyed, enterprising businessmen the right advice--let them go out and hustle in uncharted terrain, that is, go fish for shrimp, scallops, shellfish and sea plants." 14

If the Russian Federation government can begin to work with authority following the December elections, some semblance of order may come into the fishing industry. Clearing up the confusion won't be easy. Because of the lack of prior planning and clear direction from the federal government before beginning economic reforms two years ago, the Russian Far East has turned into a Pandora's Box of fisheries management problems. One newspaper writes,

"The lack of a succinct and clear conception of [fisheries] management brings other problems with it. Tomorrow’s uncertainty is a function of the fact that there is no mechanism for moving from the past system to the future one. Enterprises and regional administrations are striving to make the maximum profit, instead of making the satisfaction of the society’s consumers their goal. And you can't blame them—the existing legislative and normative base and the sharp reduction in the amount of government support forces them to it, even though this way leads only to collapse. The liberalization of fish and marine products exports has already brought huge material losses to enterprises, as well as the government. 'The parade of sovereigns' (note: Russian federal

15
subjects seeking independent status), drunk with their own independence, has significantly reduced the quality of management-the absence of a feedback mechanism with the Committee of Fisheries Management has made this government body half-blind--and specialists can't answer satisfactorily answer how much and what kind [of fish] went where, and for what price."

"So where's the solution? It follows from the existing situation...the basin principle of biological resource management must be preserved, on the basis of the development and implementation of unified, complex measures for their study, conservation and rational use. But at the same time regional interests must be considered, as well as their responsibility for the state of the [resource] base, its sustainability and utilization. Considering all this, the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management has already undertaken a number of measures, wherein the future scheme of resource management begins to be seen. In particular, in order to ensure federal subject participation in the development and implementation of basin-wide measures for the management and use of marine resources, representatives of [regional] executive bodies have been included in scientific-industrial councils for each basin as standing members.

"The Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management has concluded agreements for coordination and joint work with executive bodies--the administrations of a number of oblasts. Local executive branches from some regions have created 'regional fisheries management councils' (note: this includes the Kamchatka Region)--joint working committees involving administrative bodies and the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management. The Committee is supervising its policy, and orienting its central apparat on intensifying and broadening cooperation with the newly-founded fisheries management committees, departments and councils on the local level.

"So the scheme basically looks like this: The Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management is the coordinator, and scientific-industrial councils (with the participation of regional administrations) are the producers. In addition, agreements of coordination and joint operations work with the executive bodies of Russian Federation federal subjects, and joint working bodies function with regional fisheries management councils. Of course, this scheme is clearly more complex than the one that we had before. But it already permits us to consider everybody's interests--
those of the government and local executives bodies, and those of producers, no matter what form of ownership they have." 15

Whether or not this more complex (but ostensibly fairer) scheme will work, or perish in a morass of confusion and apathy like other Committee of Fisheries Management plans, remains to be seen. Even if it does work, serious damage to Russia's economy and resource base has already been done. The total revenue losses to Russia due to mismanagement in the fishing industry in 1993 have been enormous. The Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management reports,

"On October 19 the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management met for a session, during which the results of the fishing industry's work for the first 3 quarters of 1993 were discussed. It was noted that the most significant drop in the output of marine products in many decades. Compared to 1992 levels production of marketable goods fell by 9 percent, fish conserves fell by 39.7 percent and fish meal for animal feed by 6.1 thousand tons."

The solution to the fall in productivity—a program of massive federal intervention and central economic planning—is vintage Soviet. The Committee of Fisheries Management hopes that a combination of legislation, foreign fishing permissions to generate hard-currency earnings, and aid credits to purchase fuel and modern fishing technology will reverse the decline.

"...on October 20 on the Old Square (note: this address is headquarters for the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management) in Moscow, Russian Federation Prime Minister V. S. Chernomyrdin met with the Chairman of the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management, representatives of the largest fishing regions, leading Fisheries Conservation Bureau agents, and industry scientists.

"...questions concerning the most important problems of the industry were reviewed. The necessity of accepting a federal program Ryba (Fish), which has been prepared by the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management in three variations, was discussed...The present state of the fishing industry's legislative basis is extremely important now. Industry workers consider that the Law On Fisheries, which has passed all stages of agreement and is ready, must be accepted immediately."

"The leadership of the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management introduced a proposal to permit the right to conduct fishing operations for pollock in the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone on a payment basis. The right would apply to foreign legal
and private entities representing nations having intergovernmental agreements with Russia... (note: the article says earnings from these operations will be used to fund fisheries enforcement and research.)

"Questions of the necessity of setting production goals for seafood products for federal needs in 1994, and of the necessity of retaining 1993's government levels of support for the industry, were also discussed. Federal investment, advantageous credits and subsidies for fuel, and assigned credits to cover working capital for the fishing enterprises, are all needed for the normal functioning of the industry.

"In present conditions, when one ton of fuel costs between 150-180 thousand rubles and one ton of tin for conserve cans costs between 2-4 million rubles, the government must help. A system of government orders must be provided for the delivery of marine products into a general federal fund. Systems of material and economic stimulus for middlemen receiving and fulfilling government orders must be established. At present tens of thousands of tons of unclaimed product has piled up in ports. People who order don't have the means to pay fishermen and fishermen don't have the means to by fuel for their boats. This abnormal situation must be corrected and only the government can help here.

"V. S. Chernomyrdin signed a Protocol in which the following tasks were given to the appropriate ministries:

"1. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Economy must provide budgetary funds from 1994 to the year 2000 for investment and the opening of advantageous credit lines for fishing vessel construction.

"2. Recommend to the Foreign Trade Bank in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Finance to provide guarantees for attracting commercial credit from foreign banks for the acquisition of fully complete imported equipment for fishing vessels constructed in Russian ship yards from 1993 to 1995.

"3. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economy must provide in conjunction with the Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management a complete assignation of funds for the acquisition of examples of leading-edge technology of fishing vessel equipment not produced in Russia."
Bringing logic to the internal market, long-term credits and technology upgrades, while critical for improving the state of Russia's fishing industry, will not alone be sufficient to stop the current downslide. In the end, fishermen, and not bureaucrats, go to sea and fish. The fact is, most fishermen don't know what their enterprises earn and are kept in the dark about management's financial machinations. The Committee of Fisheries Management and the Yeltsin Administration must regain the trust of the average fisherman. Gaining this trust depends on allowing their voice to be heard, and giving them the chance to participate in the making of Russia's fisheries policy. Without this, Russia's fishermen will continue to lose trust and confidence in their government, particularly in an era of predatory bureaucrats and dirty business. The Yeltsin Constitution could offer a solution, but leaves too much unresolved to offer much hope. While Chapter 2, Article 29 guarantees "freedom of thought and word", Paragraph 4 spells out just how far this extends to the government:

"4. Everyone has the right to freely seek, obtain, transfer, produce, and distribute information by all legal means. The catalogue of information consisting of government secrets is determined by federal law."

It will be interesting to see which parts of the 'catalogue of information consisting of government secrets' finally 'determined by federal law' will concern economic activity by government agencies. Or how joint-stock companies with partial government ownership (a category including most of Kamchatka's fishing enterprises) will be affected. At present information concerning their economic activities is legally a 'commercial secret', not public domain, although government agencies and joint-stock companies trade in fish, which is federal property.

The Yeltsin Administration must begin to earn the public trust with actual deeds, not just hollow promises. Allowing fishermen to participate in the making of fisheries policy and in the greater political issues affecting their lives would be another good place to start. Right now Russian Far East fishermen don't even know what's going on in their own backyard. Rumors that the Russian government concluded a secret deal with Japan to return the four disputed Kurile Islands swept the Russian Far East following President Yeltsin's visit in early November. The lack of hard information since then has fed rumors that fishermen will lose some of the Far East's richest fishing grounds in the near future. In an open letter to Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, the Russian Federation Professional Fisheries Workers' Union expressed their concern:

"Honorable President! The Tokyo Declaration signed by you regarding Russo-Japanese relations forces us once again to turn to you for a clarification of the Russian position concerning the question of Japanese territorial claims on a number of islands in the Kurile Chain, and for proposals for its solution made by the Russian delegation.
"Analyzing the signed documents, we conclude that, in our view, the Russian position has drastically changed, and particularly in such a way as to completely contradict the promises and assurances that you gave in your December 5, 1991 Appeal to your countrymen.

"...the documents signed in Tokyo cannot, in our opinion, satisfy Russian Far East fishermen or Russian citizens, and introduce yet more uncertainty into the hopes for a fair solution to this issue.

"In connection with this, we would like to once more voice our proposals for a solution to this issue. They consist of the following:

"FIRST. The documents signed during your visit to Tokyo must be made public, and the official Russian position regarding the solution of the territorial problem be clearly explained.

"SECOND. In our view, in the future the solution to this issue must come in the first instance from the principles of Russia's economic security and her territorial integrity.

"Our point of view is not dictated by any political ambitions, and we express our firm conviction that, during any discussion of the territorial dispute, political wisdom and concern for the integrity of our government will be shown. Our certainty and the hopes of the inhabitants of the Kuriles are based on the Federal Program for the Development of the Kurile Islands, recently approved by the government. We assume that our hopes will not be dashed.

"The Presidium of the Central Committee of The Russian Federation Professional Fisheries Workers' Union." 17

Trust in government also means confidence in the earning power of the ruble and the Russian Federation's financial system. As long as the ruble is weaker than the dollar, Russian Far East fishing enterprise directors and fishermen will 'vote with their wallets' and sell fish for hard currency, even if they must do so illegally. That government enterprises are chronically unable to pay workers on time only makes matters worse. Rather than wait months for their enterprises to get the wages they are owed (the rule rather than the exception for most of Kamchatka's big fishing enterprises), fishermen prefer to sell their catches at-sea for cash, even if the prices are far lower than the ones officially set by the government.

One friend of mine, an executive at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky's Akros fishing enterprise, told me that fishermen had begun selling crab for hard currency directly to
Japanese processors operating in Russian territorial waters. "They deliver to our processors right on schedule when the Japanese don't come. But once that processor shows up, they forget all about their contracts with us, and send all that crab to the Japanese for cash," he said. The problem isn't the money--according to my friend, the crab fishermen actually make good money by any standard, and they can easily change their rubles to hard currency on shore.

The problem is that Akros, like all of Kamchatka's fishing enterprises, is scrambling to make ends meet itself. "All our money is tied up in other things, and we are owed billions of rubles by other enterprises," he said. "We don't have much cash left to pay fishermen. They come to shore and never know when they'll get their wages. I can't blame them--it's better for them just to get cash on the spot, even if they get paid less," he admitted sadly.

The theft doesn't always pay off, as one Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky newspaper reported recently:

"On November 29, militia workers confiscated approximately 400 cases of illegally prepared crab from the joint-stock company Akros fishing vessel, Uzon...the captain and first mate have been brought into custody and the product returned to Akros." 18

According to press reports, the Kamchatka crab fishery is working according to schedule, and the region's fishing enterprises are catching their quotas. But how much crab is going 'over the side' for televisions, alcohol and hard currency, is anybody's guess. None of this crab gets accounted for, and not only the economy, but information gathering about the state of the resource suffers directly as a result.

Russia's poor enforcement capabilities only exacerbate the problem, as another recent newspaper report suggests.

"The work of fisheries conservation agencies (rybookhrani) was discussed at Russian Federation Committee of Fisheries Management conference. Questions of funding, material-technical support and legislative protection were reviewed at the conference.

"Committee Chairman V. F. Korelsky analyzed the recent activities of the fisheries conservation agencies. He emphasized the importance of conserving and controlling use of the resource base.

"Many incidents of poaching, instances of fish sales abroad and unjustified distribution of fisheries quotas to commercial structures were cited in his report. Definite regions--Magadan, Arkhangelsk, the Far East and Kamchatka--were named. However, the above is characteristic for other areas."
"Unfortunately, it will be impossible to end this tendency when some fishing enterprises suffer from not being able to catch their quotas, while others advantageously resell them.

"Attention was paid to coordination of the efforts of fisheries conservation and law enforcement agencies, and the lack of information the 'center' receives about local activities.

"Committee of Fisheries Management Deputy Minister Yu. E. Kokorev addressed economic and funding problems [for fisheries conservation agencies], but nevertheless promised that the Committee would provide funds." 19

The lack of funding for a serious conservation and enforcement effort hurts most of the Russian Far East's fisheries. According to an unconfirmed report, for example, the rybookhrani have only one vessel posted in near the Peanut Hole in the Sea of Okhotsk to check for violations of Russia's Exclusive Economic Zone. Yet over seventy foreign vessels are reported to be fishing there now!

The disorder and financial losses caused by illegal fishing in the Russian Far East has reached unprecedented proportions. The evidence suggests that poaching and deceit have become the norm. A recent case in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky illuminates just a small portion of the dark economy that has grown up around the Kamchatka Region's fishing industry.

"Yesterday and the day before there was a distinct odor of the fishing industry at the [Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky] Sea Port. Officers of the Region Investigative Bureau and the Region Economic Crime Bureau opened containers with caviar and fish, illegally sent to Petropavlovsk's black market from the northern [Kamchatka] peninsula.

"Nine containers fell under suspicion. In the first one fifteen 50-liter barrels of excellent quality red caviar were found. According to initial estimates, one such barrel is worth 11 million rubles (note: one dollar equals about 1100 rubles at the current exchange rate). Even more 'salted gold' was found in the next two containers. Port workers, made dizzy by the intoxicating odor, uncovered more poods (note: one pood equals about 36 lbs.) of nature's bounty: thirty barrels of caviar and fish, nine boxes with screw-top jars, a huge box of canned fish liver....

"There is no complete information yet about the results of the militia operation. It is known that the caviar was prepared at a
fishing collective as a government order, and then secretly re-
shipped to the oblast capital as personal effects. Part of the cargo 
went by transit to the mainland. Obviously, to prepare and deliver 
such huge cargos required more than a single poaching group. It 
would be silly to think that the rough 'salt mafia' works only in one 
isolated village. The confiscated goods are just a small part of the 
'red tide' flowing illegally to 'the Big Country'.

Recently by chance I met an acquaintance of mine, Andrei, on the street in 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. I know Andrei from my days of working on Soviet-American 
joint-venture fisheries in the Bering Sea, when he was the First Mate on the factory 
trawler Priozersk and I was a company representative for Marine Resources International. 
Andrei had been working at UTRF, the Kamchatka Region's largest fishing enterprise, but 
decided to leave the fishing business this year. "It wasn't worth it to me," he said. "I went 
out for three months this year and made three hundred thousand, eighty-five rubles--only 
three hundred dollars! Where the money went from all the fish we caught only God 
knows. All I know is that while I'm making tiny wages and suffering on a rust-bucket, my 
bosses travel to Japan, Korea and the United States at company expense. They spend 
more in a day than I earn in months. Who needs it?"

I asked Andrei what he thought of elections, the new constitution, and the state of 
Kamchatka's fishing industry. He snorted disgustedly. "I try not to think about those 
things," he said. "It's all out of my hands. I'm just trying to make a living here." He lit a 
cigarette and puffed on it, looking a little sad. "But yeah, it's upsetting...here I am, with a 
good profession, and I'm selling junk from Korea. Everything's crazy now. Maybe if things 
were a little different, I could get interested again. I don't know."

We watched the traffic streaming by on the snowy street for a moment. "Well, 
we'll see soon enough, eh?" he said.

We will, indeed. Bydet sud, bydet i rasprava. There will be judgment, there will be 
retribution. Let's hope it's not too harsh.

Best wishes,

Peter H. Christiansen

FOOTNOTES

1 The Mutnovsky Geothermal Plant, located about 100 kilometers from Petropavlovsk- 
Kamchatsky, is intended to tap into a vast underground reserve of geothermal power near 
Mutnovsky Volcano. The project has been nominally under construction for over 10 years, 
but suffers from interminable delays and disorganization--for example, the towers for high
tension wires leading from plant were erected over 5 years ago and have been rusting in place ever since. The Kamchatka Region Administration has apparently found foreign partners from Iceland and Australia to invest in construction of the plant, but no construction timetable has been set yet.

2 "I'm Taking This All In With Sadness", Rybak Kamchatki, November 5, 1993.


4 "And They Tossed Their Hats In The Air", Kamchatskaya Pravda, November 25, 1993.

5 The candidates listed are contending for seats in Moscow. Elections for the next generation of local politicians are scheduled for sometime in March, 1994.


7 "I Believe In The Greatness Of A United Russia", RDV-Kamchatka News, (4) November, 1993. These excerpts are just a representative sample.


11 All citations for the Yeltsin Constitution are from Kamchatskaya Pravda, November 23, 1993.

12 According to the Oxford Russian-English Dictionary, ustav means regulations, rules or statutes. The Yeltsin Constitution nowhere distinguishes between a republic's constitution and an oblast's ustav, so perhaps they are presumed to be equal.

13 Most of the Kamchatka Region's fishing enterprises are mixed-ownership joint-stock companies, with up to fifty-one percent of their shares owned by the government, and the rest distributed between enterprise workers, private persons, and other companies or enterprises.

14 "Alexandr Kuzhim: 'We've Got To Air The Candidates' Dirty Laundry'”, Vesti, December 4, 1993.

15 "How To Manage Resources", Rybak Kamchatki, November 19, 1993.

16 "Where To Expect Help From", Rybak Kamchatki, November 12, 1993.

17 "Will Hopes Be Dashed?" Rybak Kamchatki, November 19, 1993.

