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The Uncertain Future of Chiefs in South Africa

BLOEMFONTEIN, South Africa

September 1996

By Sharon F. Griffin

Ever so often, 70-year-old Samuel Maniki Moroka steals time from his duties as a traditional leader to stroll through the Thaba 'Nchu cemetery in which his ancestors lay buried. He stops first at the grave of Chief Moroka, the founder of Thaba 'Nchu. Thaba 'Nchu means "black mountain" in the language of the Tswana people and refers to a time long ago when the mountain was darkened by a thick cover of trees. Today, there are no dense forests but the mountain remains one of the most striking features of the area, rising 2,130 meters above sea level.

"I come here so they won't forget me," said Mr. Moroka, a former Methodist minister who spent 15 years working for the employment bureau of a Free State mine. "They're in heaven where things are good. They can protect and defend me. They mustn't forget me because earth is a hellish place."

Chief Moroka arrived in Thaba 'Nchu in 1833 accompanied by 15,000 followers and five (Wesleyan) Methodist missionaries. Today, more than 100,000 people live in and around the margins of Thaba 'Nchu, which has an area of 264,397 acres. The town is 38 miles east of Bloemfontein, capital of the Free State province, and about an hour-and-a-half drive from Lesotho, a landlocked country within South Africa. Thaba 'Nchu was once part of the mountainous country, which was founded by Sotho chief Moshoeshe (pronounced mo-SHWEE-SHWEE).

Weeds creep and crawl near the base of Chief Moroka's tombstone; on it is written in Tswana, "In Memory of Moroka, chief of the Barolong, who died here in Thaba 'Nchu on 8 April 1880. He ruled amid confusion and misunderstanding but stood firm during his rule of 50 years." Within a few steps of the grave are the graves of some of the chief's headmen and followers. No tombstones have been erected to indicate their names or status. Instead, neat stacks of rocks provide evidence that their old bones rest deep within the earth.

After visiting the chief's grave, Mr. Moroka sauntered by the burial site of Tshipinary. He was the "adopted" son of the chief. He died tragically at the hands of a jealous brother, Samuel, who set his rondavel on fire with him inside. The words on his tombstone have disappeared, but Mr. Moroka recalled that it read, "Here is buried the ashes of Tshipinary who died with a gun in his hand."

Mr. Moroka and I also paused at the grave of Ketimetse Mafane Moroka, grandmother of the late Dr. James S. Moroka, who in 1950 became the president of the African National Congress (ANC). With a boldness that few blacks dared to express at that time in this country's history, Dr. Moroka told South African Prime Minister Barry Hertzog, founder of the National Party and a self-confessed white supremacist: "I want the (black) vote extended from the Cape to the Orange Free State and the Transvaal — to the whole country." In April 1994, long after his death, Dr. Moroka's wish came true when people of all races in South Africa voted in the country's first democratic election.

Traditional Leaders and Government: Conflicting Interests

Mr. Moroka is proud to live in South Africa. But he's also worried about his status as a traditional leader. He strongly believes, as do a majority of tribal leaders in South Africa, that the Government of National Unity has stripped them of their God-given in-



Samuel Maniki Moroka, age 70, uses his finger to trace the Tswana words on the tombstone of Chief Moroka, the founder of Thaba Nchu

heritance, which is the right to rule their people as they see fit. It is this worry, and others, that brings Mr. Moroka to the graveyard with increasing regularity.

Democracy has brought radical change to the power, authority and functions of traditional leaders. First, traditional leaders are no longer the primary "government" in their rural communities. The administrative and development responsibilities previously theirs have been transferred to newly-created and democratically-elected government councillors. Second, the government's land-reform policy, which seeks to redress the injustices of apartheid by restoring land rights to people wrongfully deprived of them, impacts directly on traditional leaders, who along with their communities occupy almost 14 percent of South Africa.

Tribal areas operate on a communal system where land rights are held informally. Rights to live and grow crops on portions of land, as well as grazing rights, are allocated by chiefs. However, chiefs are merely the custodians of the land that they and the people who fall within their jurisdiction occupy. They do not own it. It is public land owned by the state. The new government plans to extend property rights to millions of impoverished black rural South Africans living on tribal land —

a first in the history of South Africa.

Rural dwellers, for example, will have an opportunity to upgrade to freehold title or to community-based title outside the present tribal administration of land. This is a choice that President Nelson Mandela made. He is one of the first people in South Africa to gain legal title to a holiday home he built in a tribal area in the Transkei, a former "independent homeland" of South Africa. This development — the right to have legal individual title to one's land — has grave repercussions for tribal leaders, since most derive power from their ability to control land.

Traditional Leaders: How Many and How Much do They Cost?

South Africa is home to some 1,000 tribal chiefs; one king, the king of the Zulus; and 16 paramount chiefs, not to mention more than 2,500 village headmen, who act as the "eyes and ears" of the paramount chiefs and king. Six of the nine provinces in the country have traditional leadership structures. Gauteng, Western Cape and Northern Cape are the three provinces that do not have such structures.

Salaries earned by traditional leaders vary between and within the provinces. In Thaba Nchu the chief receives an annual salary of \$1,837 and his 37 headmen \$1,050 each. By comparison, five paramount chiefs in the former Transkei each earn \$64,721 annually, which is \$30,444 more than the amount that each provincial minister there earns. The Transkei has 136 chiefs and 832 headmen, who each earn \$9,510 and \$2,705 respectively.


In KwaZulu-Natal, the annual income of "non-matriculant" chiefs (those who did not finish high school) is \$4,000. Chiefs who finished high school receive \$5,066. Those holding a three-year degree or diploma receive \$8,260, with an additional \$383 paid for each subsequent year of education successfully completed.

The provincial budget for the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, stands at \$3.7 million per annum. The amount covers the king's salary, administrative and transport costs, security services and maintenance of the royal family. The king has five wives and 35 children.

Last year the government drafted laws to put the payment of chiefs in the hands of the central government. At present, chiefs are paid by the provinces. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IPF) has objected to the Remuneration of Traditional Leaders Bill 1995, arguing that it allows the central government to transform chiefs into puppets of government. The bill is currently under consideration.

Constitutional Protection

The country's Interim Constitution recognizes and protects the institution, status and role of traditional leadership. Tribal leaders continue to exercise some of the same powers and responsibilities over their rural subjects as in the past. They arbitrate disputes and preside over traditional courts where minor offenses are heard. A visit to the office of the current chief of Thaba



The tombstone inside the gate belongs to the Rev. J.D. Daniel, a Wesleyan minister. He died July 15, 1888.

'Nchu found him counseling a mother and teen-age daughter. The daughter stood accused of cursing her mother and staying out late at night.

Beyond these duties, however, the power of traditional leaders has been narrowed to matters concerning custom and tradition, as opposed to development and administration. As evidence of this change, a copy of the constitution of the former independent homeland in South Africa known as Bophuthatswana (bah-POOH-tuh-TSWAH-nah, meaning "the Gathering of the Batswana People") was handed to me for perusal.

During the 1980s, Thaba 'Nchu was incorporated into Bophuthatswana. According to its constitution, the chief and his tribal authority, with its skeleton staff of 18, were responsible for the following: land administration; hygiene, sanitation and health services, including the establishment, management and maintenance of clinics; the development, improvement and maintenance of water supplies; the control of grazing and grass burning; and the co-ordination of soil conservation.

They were also responsible for the registration of births and deaths; the prevention of cruelty to animals; educational matters; study bursaries; the impounding of livestock; the destruction of vermin; the improvement of livestock and animal husbandry generally, and the establishment of co-operative dairy and other schemes; roads and works; forestry; the preservation of fauna and flora; the erection and maintenance of fences; the registration and control of dogs; local markets; and sports and recreation facilities.

Today, Mr. Moroka said he and members of the Barolong Tribal Authority are not sure what they are sup-

posed to do. Bophuthatswana has been incorporated into one of South Africa's nine provinces, namely the North West province, and its constitution has been repealed. "I don't know what our powers are," said Mr. Moroka. "There's a lot of confusion with these elected councillors... and tribal land being incorporated into the municipality. Personally, I'd like to preserve our customs and all the rest."


Under the terms of the Interim Constitution, traditional leaders are entitled to serve as *ex officio* members of democratically-elected local councils. They may advise and propose on issues relating to indigenous law and customs, and on issues pertaining to land usage, development and planning on land owned and occupied by their tribe. However, they do not have executive or voting powers. Their advice is not binding on the government.¹

All provinces with tribal authorities within their borders are required to establish a Provincial House of Traditional Leaders consisting of representatives elected or nominated by tribal authorities in the province. The size of each house depends on the number of traditional leaders in the province.

The Interim Constitution provides for a Council of Traditional Leaders at the national level, consisting of a chairperson and 19 representatives elected by an electoral college constituted by the members of the provincial houses of traditional leaders. Once again, it is a body empowered only to advise and propose. Both the national and provincial structures for traditional leaders may delay legislation they oppose for 30 days, but they may not veto legislation.

Traditional leaders argue that the Interim Constitution

1. The Institute for Democracy in South Africa polled 425 largely rural households in five provinces and found that 40 percent felt traditional leaders should automatically get seats in local government. Another 36 percent of respondents believed the leaders should stand for election. Only 23 percent of those sampled felt that traditional leaders had no role to play in South Africa. The rest were unsure.



places the future of their system of leadership at the whim of political parties. In Mr. Moroka's view, this development is as distasteful as the tiny berries on the pepper tree that stands near the Methodist church built by Chief Moroka's followers in 1834.

Chiefs, Women and Youth: Broken Bonds

In traditional African societies, power devolves to the people through a complicated hierarchical system. In KwaZulu-Natal for example, the king (or *ingonyama*) sits the apex of the traditional political structure. Under his authority are 285 chiefs or *amakhosi*, and reporting to the chiefs are village headmen or *indunas*. Several families are linked together under the administration of an *induna*.

In Thaba 'Nchu the structure is somewhat different. Only one person holds the title of chief. Everyone else is a headman, or traditional leader, as Mr. Moroka prefers to be called. The tribal chief is succeeded by the eldest son of his great wife, who is regarded as the "mother of the tribe" because the tribe as a whole contributed to her *lobola* (bride wealth).

The idea of rank and privilege being based on hereditary grounds is anathema to many South Africans, both black and white, and most especially among educated generations living in urban centers. Hereditary chiefs are viewed by many as corrupt, highly politicized and suffering from psychological disorders, ranging from alcoholism to paranoia.

Some of the strongest objections to chieftaincy emanate from African people who have experienced life under the rule of chiefs. They argue that chiefs were turned into bureaucrats during colonial rule and later co-opted into the Bantustan (homeland) system by the National Party government. They've been described as a class of bureaucrats

who now stand to lose a great deal of power and financial means if their structures are dismantled.

Women's groups regard the erosion of the power of traditional leaders as essential to the emancipation of rural women. They fought hard to ensure that the equality clause in the country's Bill of Rights takes precedence over customary law.

Customary law treats women as perpetual minors, always under the guardianship of a male — her father when she is unmarried; her husband when married; and again her father or his successor should she become widowed or divorced. As a consequence, women have no rights to land of their own. Chiefs allocate land to male heads of households. When a woman's marriage breaks up or when her husband dies, she is at the mercy of her in-laws. In Thaba 'Nchu, nearly all of the "permission-to-occupy" certificates are held by males and therefore the right of women to gain access to land is almost non-existent.

Yet it is primarily rural women who cultivate the land, scratching out a living mainly from subsistence crops. Women are expected to be among the main beneficiaries of the government's land-tenure reform program. Tenure reform is intended to end discrimination against women in both land allocation and holding.

Civic and youth activists have also come into conflict with traditional leaders, many of whom have proved to be stumbling blocks to democracy, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal where chiefs aligned to the IFP have fought hard — and allegedly killed — to stop the extension of a centralized state into rural areas. The franchise of 2.7 million people in rural KwaZulu-Natal was under threat during the run-up to local government elections. This is because IFP chiefs initially refused to allow registration to take place in their areas.

Free and fair elections in KwaZulu-Natal were further jeopardized by the existence of major "no-go" areas — contested terrain claimed by the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress as their strongholds. The Human Rights Committee listed 52 areas where one or the other of the parties was unable to move and campaign freely. Elections were postponed three times. Voters finally went to the polls on June 26, but under tight security. Approximately 30,000 security-force members were deployed in the province.

Tribal rulers believe that they are and should remain the primary government of communal societies. On more than one occasion I've heard chiefs refer to civic activists as "youngsters" or "young boys" who show up in their communities with ideas about democracy, a Western import that promotes individualism, and with an eye toward performing development functions that the chiefs believe fall within their exclusive power. In traditional

communities, chiefs have enjoyed respect and prestige. Now many feel threatened by contemporary society's respect for those who are young, highly educated and have good jobs.

Rural Development: The Battle for Control

Many people, President Nelson Mandela included, believe that traditional leaders have a legitimate role to play in rural life. They are the custodians of cultural values and they play a unifying role within the tribal system. The king and paramount chiefs are considered a direct link with the ancestral spirits of the tribe. Nevertheless, there is an expectation that tribal leaders must conform to a democratic system (*i.e.* be accountable to local government structures) rather than compromise democracy to accommodate feudalism. There's also a belief that the complexities and intricacies of modern administration are best handled by professionals with sufficiently high levels of academic training.

Development in rural areas is severely lacking. The government has the mammoth task of delivering basic services such as drinking water, roads, electricity, schools, hospitals and houses to rural communities, where an estimated 51.4 percent of South Africans live. However, no development can take place without addressing land rights. And land is both an emotional and divisive issue, especially with regard to traditional leaders.

Tribal rulers hold the view that private ownership of land goes against tradition and the communal value system. They further believe that land communally occupied by a tribe is rightfully owned by the tribe — not the state. This is certainly the view of the chief and tribal authority of the Barolong tribe, who maintain that they purchased their land from Chief Moshoeshoe in 1832.

Ernest H. Gaetsewe is not surprised that traditional authorities believe as they do. Gaetsewe is mayor of Thaba 'Nchu and one of three assistant managers of the Pilot


Land Reform Program in the Free State. Part of his work has involved sitting with the local chief and members of the Barolong Tribal Authority to explain land tenure reform and the state's need to fulfill its responsibility to provide public services to people.

He said he recognizes that there is a need to establish clear roles and functions for traditional authorities and elected local councils. Most rural dwellers are confused as to what institution is responsible for development and the delivery of services in their communities — elected rural councils, provincial departments or traditional authorities. In Thaba 'Nchu, there are 40 rural villages, and while the villagers have voted in local government elections, they still look to their village headmen for guidance on grassroots issues.

This confusion owes its existence in no small part to the fact that tribal authority in Thaba 'Nchu still has the right to issue permission-to-occupy certificates. The cost is \$51. This practice continues even though the government is committed to eliminating landholding systems based on permits.

Many rural dwellers mistakenly believe that a permission-to-occupy certificate means they own the land on which they live. But the certificate is not a title or a deed. A person cannot go to a bank and use it to secure a loan. Commercial banks will provide loans only for the development of privately-held land.

The banks' insistence on private property ownership will force many people to seek registered ownership rights, either as individuals or as communities. But tribal leaders argue that banks use the system of communal ownership as an excuse not to grant loans and subsidies. They have appealed to the government to lead the way in granting housing loans without attachments requiring individual proof of ownership, such as title deeds, from people living on communally-occupied land. Traditional leaders argue that private-property ownership makes it easy for people with money to buy up large tracts of



Ernest H. Gaetsewe, the mayor of Thaba 'Nchu.

land from those who have nothing but the land, forcing the removal of those who inhabit it.

Financial institutions and the private sector are reluctant to get involved in high-risk development. As an example, housing development in metropolitan regions of KwaZulu-Natal are at a standstill because 43 percent of all the projects earmarked for the province fall within trust land administered by the Zulu king. More specifically, it has been reported that \$111 million in development has been delayed and a further \$33 million in government housing subsidies has been stalled because of the Ingonyama Trust Act.

This is an act born out of a secret deal between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the National Party two days before the country's first all-race elections in 1994. The act effectively puts a third of KwaZulu-Natal's land under a trust administered by Zulu King Goodwill. This has frustrated development. Financial institutions refuse to issue mortgage bonds because title deeds remain with the king. Durban's seven mayors recently met with the king to plead permission from the monarch to free land administered under the act.

How Traditional are Traditional Leaders?

The downsizing of chiefs in South Africa started long ago. Powers exercised by chiefs today are derived in part from customary laws manipulated, defined and interpreted by white governments since the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 and, more recently, by the former Bantustan governments that sought to control the mass of African people.

The now-repealed Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 held that the state president could recognize or appoint any person as chief of a black tribe and also could make regulations prescribing duties, powers, privileges and conditions of service of the chief. The state president could also depose any chief. In effect, traditional leaders were forced to collaborate or face being deposed, banished, exiled or killed by the white government.

When self-governing homeland governments came into being, they entrenched rather than reversed this practice, thereby reinforcing state control over the traditional system of governance. In Bophuthatswana, for example, the state president had the power to recognize any person as chief or acting chief of a tribe. The same held true for the old KwaZulu Government. So while chieftaincy is supposedly hereditary, the traditional political structure has long been manipulated.

Succession battles are frequently fought in South African courts. The acting chief of the 80,000-strong Tembe tribe in KwaZulu-Natal sought the protection of the Durban Supreme Court to restrain two tribal members from allegedly taking over the position of chief. The Tembe tribe has been under the rule of seven generations of amakhosi (chiefs). The last chief was Mzimba Tembe who died in June 1995. The former KwaZulu government appointed Phasola Tembe acting chief, but now

two tribal members have laid claim to the chieftainship of the tribe.

In the Vryheid district of KwaZulu-Natal, one brother took another to court over the issue of chieftaincy. The older brother argued that to his "shock and dismay" the former KwaZulu Government installed his younger brother as chief, and now the older brother is trying to reverse the decision.

The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa has called repeatedly for an independent commission to determine the legitimate status of traditional leaders, particularly those whose positions are disputed. Both the Tembe and Vryheid cases illustrate that succession to chieftainship is not clearcut. But then it never has been, and the history of the Barolongs of Thaba 'Nchu provides yet another example.

The Barolongs of Thaba 'Nchu: Past, Present...

The Barolongs lived in Bechuanaland² as a sub-tribe under the Paramount Chief Montsiwa. Their local chief was Sebuclare. About 1829 Sebuclare and his people were attacked by the forces of Mzilikazi, leader of the Ndebele. Sebuclare was killed, and Moroka, with the survivors of the tribe, fled to Thaba 'Nchu, which was then Basotho territory (now the Kingdom of Lesotho). Moroka took with him Sebuclare's wife and infant child, Tsahipinary — Sebuclare's heir.

In 1832, the Wesleyan Mission purchased the land from the Basutos, to be held in trust for Moroka's people, for nine head of cattle and 17 sheep and goats. Voortrekkers soon moved into the region and Moroka assisted them in their war against the Basutos. The Orange Free State, in turn, recognized Moroka as a friend and an independent chief.

According to minutes from a 1916 Natives Land Commission report, Tsahipinary succeeded Chief Moroka after his death. However, on July 10, 1884, the chief's eldest son, Samuel, killed Tsahipinary and claimed the chieftainship. The President of the Orange Free State then intervened and "in the interests of order and good government" annexed Chief Moroka's territory.

The aging but clear-minded Mr. Moroka tells a slightly different version of the tribe's history. He said that Chief Moroka decided before his death to divide Thaba 'Nchu between his eldest son, Samuel, and Tsahipinary. However, bad advisers convinced Samuel that he deserved to rule *all* of Thaba 'Nchu, so he launched an attack against his "adopted" brother.

Tsahipinary was no easy target. He was reputedly a skilled marksman who "put down" every armed man who attempted to kill him, Mr. Moroka said. Tsahipinary finally met his death when his brother set his rondavel alight.

This act was a criminal offence. The case went to court and the then-government exiled Samuel to Mastsiloge in

2. The country of Botswana since 1966.



Aubrey Moroka, the wife of the late chief Robert Moroka, and her son, 22-year-old Albert, the next chief of Thaba 'Nchu. Albert is very shy, at least in my presence. He spoke only when prodded by his mother.

Botswana. His descendants, as well as those of the followers who joined him in exile, live in Botswana today. Mr. Moroka added that there are people living in Thaba 'Nchu who remain inclined towards Samuel but they keep it to themselves.

Controversy still surrounds the institution of chieftaincy in Thaba 'Nchu. In 1991 the Barolong Tribal Authority appointed Hillary Lebogang Moroka chief after the hereditary chief, Robert Phillip Tawane Mokgopa Moroka, died. Robert Moroka was 39 and had ruled for 17 years. His 22-year-old son, Albert, is next in line for the chieftainship. However, because Albert is still in school, the tribal authority signed a nine-year contract with Hillary Moroka — a contract that both Albert and his mother would prefer did not exist.

Hillary Moroka worked as a clerk for the railway before his appointment as chief. He is slight in stature, smiles easily and is meticulous about his dress — a shirt and tie are standard daily wear for him. He speaks Tswana and Afrikaans, and shies away from questions in English, directing them instead to Mr. Moroka, who is his right-hand man. His only comment about the institution of chieftaincy is that it has been here for centuries and must remain for centuries to come.

Thaba 'Nchu is neither the worst nor the best rural community I've visited. Within the urban area, a large number of households are living in informal settlements. The settlements are growing unabated, and it is nearly impossible for the local council to prevent or redirect the growth. Yet top-name national food, clothing and appli-

ance stores anchor shopping centers along Jan van Riebeeck Street, the main street in the town. Every household in the township of Thaba 'Nchu has tap water. The taps are usually in yards rather than inside houses. No one spends part of the day fetching water from a drilled well, as they did before the installation of taps. The roads in the central business district are paved and the roads in the residential areas of the township are graded.

Mr. Moroka laments that the ANC-led government ignores the accomplishments of tribal authorities and instead focuses on what the authorities failed to accomplish during apartheid. "Some of these fellows have short memories," he said, "and they came from these very places."

...and Future

Back at the cemetery, Mr. Moroka and I meandered through a maze of family graves until close to midday. We sidestepped the sun-dried skin and fur of a dog's carcass to visit the graves of a missionary family that accompanied Chief Moroka when he settled in Thaba 'Nchu. We paid our respects to Maria Moroka, after whom a game reserve is named. We also stopped at the grave of her son, Robert Moroka, the hereditary chief who died in 1991.

1999 — the eve of a new millennium — is when Robert Moroka's son, Albert, assumes his position as hereditary chief of Thaba 'Nchu. But the system of traditional governance that Albert inherits will be very different from the one his father enjoyed. He will not allocate land, as his father did. His subjects will turn to elected local councillors for basic services — water, housing, sanitation. The draft of the final Constitution provides for traditional leaders to serve as *ex officio* members of local councils only until April 30, 1999 or until an act of Parliament provides otherwise. This means the ANC can use its majority in Parliament to remove this constitutional privilege at any time.

So, beyond 1999 it is unclear what role traditional leaders will play in South Africa. Albert Moroka might find that his inheritance is worth little or nothing. By the time he takes over, he might find that the institution of chieftaincy is dying a slow, natural death — a casualty of a new democratic order. □

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Institute Fellows and their Activities

Adam Smith Albion. A former research associate at the Institute for EastWest Studies at Prague in the Czech Republic, Adam is spending two years studying and writing about Turkey and Central Asia, and their importance as actors the Middle East and the former Soviet bloc. A Harvard graduate (1988; History), Adam has completed the first year of a two-year M. Litt. degree in Russian/East European history and languages at Oxford University. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

Christopher P. Ball. An economist, Chris Ball holds a B.A. from the University of Alabama in Huntsville and attended the 1992 International Summer School at the London School of Economics. He studied Hungarian for two years in Budapest while serving as Project Director for the Hungarian Atlantic Council. As an Institute Fellow, he is studying and writing about Hungarian minorities in the former Soviet-bloc nations of East and Central Europe. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

William F. Foote. Formerly a financial analyst with Lehman Brothers' Emerging Markets Group, Willy Foote is examining the economic substructure of Mexico and the impact of free-market reforms on Mexico's people, society and politics. Willy holds a Bachelor's degree from Yale University (history), a Master's from the London School of Economics (Development Economics; Latin America) and studied Basque history in San Sebastian, Spain. He carried out intensive Spanish-language studies in Guatemala in 1990 and then worked as a copy editor and

Reporter for the Buenos Aires Herald from 1990 to 1992. [THE AMERICAS]

Sharon Griffin. A feature writer and contributing columnist on African affairs at the *San Diego Union-Tribune*, Sharon is spending two years in southern Africa studying Zulu and the KwaZulu kingdom and writing about the role of nongovernmental organizations as fulfillment centers for national needs in developing countries where governments are still feeling their way toward effective administration. [sub-SAHARA]

John Harris. A would-be lawyer with an undergraduate degree in History from the University of Chicago, John reverted to international studies after a year of internship in the product-liability department of a Chicago law firm and took two years of post-graduate Russian at the University of Washington in Seattle. Based in Moscow during his fellowship, John is studying and writing about Russia's nascent political parties as they begin the difficult transition from identities based on the personalities of their leaders to positions based on national and international issues. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

Pramila Jayapal. Born in India, Pramila left when she was four and went through primary and secondary education in Indonesia. She graduated from Georgetown University in 1986 and won an M.B.A. from the Kellogg School of Management in Evanston, Illinois in 1990. She has worked as a corporate analyst for PaineWebber, an accounts manager for

the world's leading producer of cardiac defibrillators, and manager of a \$7 million developing-country revolving-loan fund for the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) in Seattle. Pramila is tracing her roots in India, and studying social issues involving religion, the status of women, population and AIDS. [SOUTH ASIA]

John B. Robinson. A 1991 Harvard graduate with a certificate of proficiency from the Institute of Kiswahili in Zanzibar, John spent two years as an English teacher in Tanzania. He received a Master's degree in Creative Writing from Brown University in 1995. He and his wife Delphine, a French oceanographer, are spending two years in Madagascar with their two young sons, Nicolas and Rowland, where he will be writing about varied aspects of the island-nation's struggle to survive industrial and natural-resource exploitation and the effects of a rapidly swelling population. [sub-SAHARA]

Teresa C. Yates. A former member of the American Civil Liberties Union's national task force on the workplace, Teresa is spending two years in South Africa observing and reporting on the efforts of the Mandela government to reform the national land-tenure system. A Vassar graduate with a juris doctor from the University of Cincinnati College of Law, Teresa had an internship at the Centre for Applied Legal Studies in Johannesburg in 1991 and 1992, studying the feasibility of including social and economic rights in the new South African constitution. [sub-SAHARA]

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