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522 Fifth Avenue
New York 36, New York

Dear Mr. Rogers:

The evening I arrived in Karachi, I was strolling around the city when three young men, spotting me as someone who obviously had just gotten off the plane, approached and offered their assistance. They turned out to be students in an engineering college, and they invited me to their hostel for a cup of tea. I bombarded them with questions about their schooling and their plans after graduation, and then, after a half-hour, they said they wanted to ask me some questions. The first question was, "Why doesn't America support us (Pakistan) on Kashmir?"

Since that evening, scarcely a day has gone by without my hearing or reading something about Kashmir. Even the most casual conversation swings over to the Kashmir issue. It is Pakistan's No. 1 gripe. While there is disagreement on many issues in the national life---the path of nation-building, the relation of religion to the state, land reform, foreign alliances---Kashmir seems to be the one issue on which there is basic agreement: "Kashmir must be ours."

In the Pakistani view, the division of Kashmir along the cease-fire line is temporary. "Occupied" Kashmir must someday be joined to "Free" (Azad) Kashmir. At the time of Partition, Kashmir, with its predominantly Muslim population and geographical position, should "of course" have joined Pakistan. As the situation stands now, there is among Pakistanis a feeling of immense frustration that Partition has not been completed. What's more, since Pakistanis feel that they were wrongfully deprived of half of the Punjab and half of Bengal at Partition, they are all the less inclined to "back down" on Kashmir.

Whatever has happened regarding Kashmir since 1947---and that includes connivance, negotiation, bloodshed, mediation and stalemate---the Kashmir issue is now viewed here with new hope and anxiety. For one thing, the new Prime Minister, H.S. Suhrawardy, is widely regarded as a clever, resourceful man; for another, there are cautious hopes that the United Nations, emboldened by the steps it took in the Suez crisis, will resume with new firmness its efforts to solve the Kashmir question. At the same time, in "Occupied" Kashmir the Constituent Assembly recently pronounced Kashmir "an integral part of India for all time"---with the public approval of Mr. Nehru---and this has intensified Pakistani fears that Kashmir might slip out of their hands "for all time."

Recently I paid a four-day visit to the capital of Azad Kashmir, Muzaffarabad. There, as a guest of the Azad Kashmiri Government, I talked to political leaders, visited a village near the cease-fire line, and spent a day attending a series of political rallies in the countryside. I came away with the impression that there is enough resentment

and frustration among the Azad Kashmiris to cause them to break the truce ---to start shooting---unless concrete steps are taken soon to let them gain ascendancy over the part of Kashmir now controlled by India.

Since in this letter I will try to present only the Pakistani and Azad Kashmiri point of view, I had better try first to review a bit of the background of the issue. For this I have depended especially on Prof. W. Norman Brown's The United States and India and Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955). I intend later to go into Kashmir from the Indian side.

Underlying Pakistani-Indian differences over Kashmir are nearly 1000 years of Muslim-Hindu antipathy in the sub-continent. For all the cultural assimilation and common history within old India, there were fundamental religious and social differences and economic and political antagonisms, and they became intensified as Independence drew near. It was this communalism that led to Partition, with its bitter savage strife and mass migrations. Hostility lingers on.

Following in the wake of Partition were disputes over the treatment of the Muslim minority in India and the Hindu minority in Pakistan, over the possessions abandoned by refugees, over the sharing of the assets of the old Government of India, over the distribution of canal waters in the divided Punjab, over mutual discriminations in trade relations, and over the accession of three "hold-out" princely states, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

According to the Indian Independence Act, "British India" was split into the two new dominions, while the 562 "Indian States" were theoretically independent but were expected to accede to one dominion or the other. The advice of Lord Mountbatten as Governor-General was that ruling princes should accede either to India or Pakistan, "with due regard to" the geographical position of their state and the communal make-up and the wishes of their subjects.

Junagadh was a small state (3337 square miles, 675,000 population) on the Arabian Sea. Although the people of the state were four-fifths non-Muslim, the ruler, the Nawab, was Muslim, and when he opted to Pakistan, India objected to this "utter violation of principles on which Partition was agreed upon and effected," and proposed that the matter of accession be referred to a plebiscite. When anti-Pakistan sentiment arose and, as India put it, threatened the state with "administrative breakdown," Indian troops occupied the capital city. Later a plebiscite showed the populace in favor of accession to India, and this was accomplished.

The case of Hyderabad, the largest of the princely states, was less substantially an issue between India and Pakistan, but it touches on the Kashmir question. Although 80 per cent of the state's 16.5 million subjects were Hindus, the Nizam and the ruling class were Muslim. The Nizam, long hostile to the Congress Party, refused accession to India. On the other hand, he realised that accession to Pakistan was impractical. Therefore he sought a treaty with India as an "equal sovereign." India pushed hard for integration of Hyderabad, perhaps because of Congress' quarrel with the Nizam, perhaps because of a professed desire to democratize the "feudalistic" state, certainly in order to secure territorial integrity. In 1948, as Muslim-Hindu violence increased and the communists threatened to seize power, Indian troops blitzed the state in four days in a "police action to restore law and order." Although placed under Indian adminis-

tration, Hyderabad was retained as a state (and the Nizam as its ruler) until last Nov. 1, when under the states reorganization Hyderabad disappeared as a political unit and the Nizam retired.

Viewed in Pakistan in the light of events in Kashmir, the cases of Junagadh and Hyderabad have been reduced to this simple politico-religious proposition: The Indian stand is that a state with a Hindu majority must accede to India, even if its Muslim ruler does not want to do so; it follows that a state with a predominantly Muslim population must accede to Pakistan, even though its Hindu ruler may decide otherwise.

Kashmir is a predominantly Muslim state whose ruler opted to India, presumably against the wishes of the people, but there is more that goes with it.

Kashmir fits into the northernmost corner of Indo-Pakistan. It is about the size of Kansas, but the geographic similarity ends there. Except for the 85-mile-long Valley of Kashmir and a bit of the Punjab plain, Kashmir is a maze of mountain ranges---Pir Panjal, the Great Himalayas, Zaskar, Ladakh, Karakorum---running from a height of 4000 feet up to 28,000. The northern border is not demarcated, but somewhere on top of the world Kashmir meets Tibet and is separated from Russia only by the narrow Wakhan strip of Afghanistan,

Running down through the mountain valleys are three snow-fed rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, which flow down into Pakistan and water the Indus plain. A fourth river, the Ravi, borders on Kashmir and India, and also flows into Pakistan.

The population of Kashmir is about 4.5 million, three-fourths of whom are Muslims. Nearly half of them live in the Valley. Poverty is their lot. Again, the ruling family of pre-Partition days, the Dogras, were Hindu. Their rule was stern and distressing, and popular unrest led, in the 1920's and '30's, to modest political reforms. Leading the reform movement was a Muslim, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, friend of Nehru. After World War II, while the Congress in India was calling for the British to "Quit India!" Abdullah's National Conference was demanding that the Dogras "Quit Kashmir!"

As Independence and Partition came near, the Maharaja of Kashmir was reluctant to accede either to Muslim Pakistan or to India, which appeared to be headed toward democracy. The Maharaja entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan stipulating no accession but providing for normal trade and communications. Pakistan assumed that the agreement provided her with all rights in Kashmir which the old Government of India had enjoyed. Subsequently, India, in a move implying that it had inherited control over Kashmir, began to build a road from Pathakot in the Punjab to Jammu city, i.e., through Kashmiri territory.

While both Pakistan and India hoped and pushed for a favorable decision from the Maharaja, three other developments were taking place: in an extension of the communal bloodshed, Hindus and Sikhs battled Muslims in Kashmir; Abdullah renewed his campaign for independence, and a Muslim rebellion against the government broke out in Poonch in western Jammu.

In October, a couple thousand Pakistani tribesmen from the neighboring hills invaded Kashmir to "help" their Muslim brothers. Operating with the aid of Pakistani officials, they entered Kashmir and marched on the capital

city of Srinagar. The Maharaja fled to Jammu city and there, on the advice of India and the support of Abdullah, acceded to India. Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession provisionally, stating that once the "invaders" (presumably the tribesmen) were expelled and order resumed, the question of accession should be settled by a "reference to the people." To this, Prime Minister Nehru gave his endorsement.

Meanwhile, air-borne Indian troops quickly landed in Srinagar and drove the tribesmen out of the Valley. And as the rebels had formed a "Free" Kashmir Government with Pakistani assistance, so Abdullah formed an "Emergency Administration" at the "request" of the now-powerless Maharaja.

At the same time, in Pakistan, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali took up the Mountbatten-Nehru statement about the "reference to the people" and turned it into a cry of "Plebiscite!" He demanded as prerequisites, however, the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kashmir and the creation of a coalition government including Azad Kashmir representatives.

The fighting continued indecisively, now with Pakistani regular troops involved as well (as is generally known but not admitted). Indian-Pakistani negotiations proved inconclusive. On Dec. 31, 1947, India took the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council. The charge: Pakistani "aggression against India." In debate, Pakistan brought the countercharge of "fraudulent procurement" of Kashmiri accession.

Essentially, UN action has been aimed at securing (1) a cease-fire and (2) demilitarization as a prerequisite for (3) sponsoring a fair plebiscite. The first has been accomplished. The latter two, agreed to in principle by both sides, have not. The procedural difficulties have been at least two-fold: both India and Pakistan have insisted on "you-first" demilitarization of Kashmir, and both countries have insisted, in planning for the plebiscite, on measures which would justify the Srinagar and Muzaffarabad governments, respectively, to the detriment of the other. There the Kashmir question has rested.

There have been one or two other pertinent developments on the Indian side that I should mention. First, in 1951 an Indian-backed "Constituent Assembly" was elected in virtually uncontested elections. Although a UN resolution of March 30, 1951, affirmed that such an assembly would be regarded as incompetent to take any binding action on the question of accession, the Assembly on last Nov. 17 proclaimed accession to India, an act publically approved by Nehru. Secondly, in 1953 Abdullah, apparently grown less inclined to India or perhaps more inclined to independence once again, was jailed for "corruption, nepotism and intrigues with foreign powers." In jail he has been and in jail he is now.

Before going up to Azad Kashmir, I paid a call on the office of the Pakistan Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (the Prime Minister himself is the nominal Minister). The Undersecretary looked worried: "The Kashmiris are becoming restless. It's all we can do to keep putting them off." He said he'd call to Muzaffarabad to make arrangements for me to stay in the government Rest House, the only inn there. He gave a bulky package filled with press handouts---mimeographed sheets entitled "Honest Facts," "A Year of Kashmir Negotiations," "A Note on Recent Events in Indian-Occupied Kashmir" and the like.

The 80-mile trip from Rawalpindi in the Northern Punjab to Muzaffarabad took five hours by bus. We chugged up the foothills to Murree, a mile-high resort town in the pines, then shimmied downhill to the Jhelum River Valley and then along the river bank to the end of the line.

As I stepped down from the bus and headed across the road to the Rest House, I spotted a group of 30 or so gentlemen taking tea on the lawn. They all turned to look at me and one of them, an energetic young man, came over, introduced himself as the Deputy Secretary-General of the Government, and said, "We've been waiting for you. Come and meet the Cabinet and some other gentlemen." On closer questioning, I found that the tea party had not been arranged especially for me, but that was the general atmosphere for the next few days. They were only too glad to have a foreigner in camp, especially an American carrying notebook and pencil.

I had not finished unpacking that evening when there was a rap on the door and in came the Deputy Secretary and three other young officials. They came to provide me with a lengthy account of the Kashmir issue as they saw it.

Their argument was that basically the Kashmir issue is the issue of self-determination...that four million Kashmiris, themselves included, had been denied that right, that three million of them were living "in tyranny" in "Occupied" Kashmir...that if a general plebiscite were held Pakistan would win, that a local plebiscite (in which case Hindu eastern Jammu and Buddhist Ladakh would probably go to India) would be "morally wrong"...that the rivers of Kashmir flow into Pakistan and the only two roads leading to the outside led to Pakistan, until the Indians pushed through a road in 1948...that Kashmir's chief income has come from timber, 90 per cent of which annually has gone to Pakistan...that the rebellion against the Dogras was crushed by Indian troops after the Maharaja, having lost effective control of the state, illegally acceded to India...that the Indian intervention was precisely the same sort of intervention that the Russians had recently made in Hungary...that Nehru, after "solemnly promising" that the question of accession should be settled by a plebiscite, has reneged on his promise and declared accession to India final...that Pakistan, after long years of trying to settle the Kashmir question "by peaceful means," should be given one more chance only...that the UN likewise should be given one more chance...that if the UN debate scheduled for early 1957 does not produce "substantial progress" toward a plebiscite, "we will have to take the matter into our own hands."

If this is the rough outline of the argument, the details were filled in during the rest of my visit by others in the government and by farmers, businessmen and students.

The next morning I walked into the former District headquarters, a one-story, quadrangled building, that served as the home of the Azad Kashmir Government. The "temporary" appearance was heightened by the fact that officials and clerks had moved their desks and chairs and boxes of papers out of the chilly cubicles into the sunny courtyard.

I talked to the Cabinet Secretary, a stocky, slightly stooped man who had been a colonel in the Indian Army. He first outlined the nature of the Government. It was founded in October 1947, a couple of days after the fighting ("the war of liberation") began in earnest. It is, he said, "a revolutionary government." It is also the agent of the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (what is normally called "Kashmir" is properly called

"The State of Jammu and Kashmir"). Officials are not elected by the public but chosen by the Conference, which "is the conscience of the people." General elections, however, have been announced as a "principle to be put into effect once the constituencies are demarcated." Except for the Secretary-General and the Inspector of Police, "both technical men" on loan from Pakistan, officials are all Kashmiris, and half of them formerly lived on the other side of the cease-fire line. Financial support comes chiefly from timber revenues, but the Government of Pakistan supplements Governmental operations with an annual ways and means contribution of undisclosed size. Moreover, last year Pakistan gave Rs. one crore (one crore equals ten million, and one rupee officially equals 21 U.S. cents) for development projects, plus Rs. five million for "social uplift." The Government maintains an army of two divisions, which are trained by the Pakistan army. With Pakistan in charge of Azad Kashmir's foreign affairs, the Government supposedly concerns itself chiefly with domestic affairs, with emphasis on improving education, agricultural production, health standards and roads. But since the very basis of the Government's existence is its avowed intention to "liberate 'Occupied' Kashmir," it is that concern that colors every phase of the Government's activity.

The conversation shifted to Kashmir and the UN. "We will wait until JNO take up the matter afresh in January," the Colonel said. "But perhaps we are making a mistake in working for a peaceful solution. It seems that JNO can take action only when chaos breaks loose. That was the case in Korea and in Egypt.

"You see, primarily the Kashmir issue is mine. If I keep quiet, who will bother himself about it? Perhaps, if UNO does nothing this time, we should start shooting. This is what the Cypriots are doing, the Algerians, the Hungarians. Do you think we love our country any less than they love theirs?"

What about the speculation that Azad Kashmir will send a delegation to the UN when the debate comes up? "Yes, I think so," replied the Colonel. "But, you see, we have to be 'taken along' by Pakistan. Azad Kashmir has no legal status and it is difficult for us to be heard when we speak for ourselves. We have gotten so tangled up in this Pakistan-Indian business! What we should like to do is to get the people of Kashmir before UNO! Then we will argue our case with force and reason and zeal.

"What we want is really very simple: that we should be allowed to decide our own fate, without interference from Mr. Nehru or Mr. Suhrawardy! The Indians accuse Pakistan of aggression in Kashmir. Well, I say let us concede that point. But let the Kashmiris decide! We know that Pakistan is nasty and India is so good, so let us have the plebiscite! Of course the Indians want the issue to be prolonged so that after many generations the people will forget the issues involved. I tell you this: you can hold the plebiscite now or a hundred years from now, and the people will still vote to join Pakistan! They are Muslims!"

That afternoon the President of the Government, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, came to the Rest House to have tea and to talk. From the porch I saw him coming up the walk, with his bushy black beard and long coat, and I took him for an old man. When he drew near I saw that he was only in his early 30's. We shook hands---his hands were small and hard---and sat down on the sofa in the commonroom inside.

I learned later that Qaiyum comes from an old Indian Army family, as,

for that matter, do most of the men of his native district in Poonch. After finished high school, Qaiyum joined the Army, spent most of World War II stationed in the Suez. Returning home, he was mustered out and then took a job as a clerk in the Soldiers Board, so he could organize anti-Dogra sentiment among ex-soldiers. In the fall of 1947, he was among the first to rise up in rebellion. At the age of 23, he organized a squad, then a company, a battalion, finally a brigade, which he commanded until the cease-fire. Then as a political leader he was arrested by the Pakistan Government in 1951 for conspiracy to violate the cease-fire line, spent 15 months in jail. Last September he was chosen president of the Government on the promise to unify Kashmir for once and for all. They say that he exhausts his personal staff by taking them along on long walks to mountain villages to make unexpected checks on public administration. Recently he inspected a middle school, found the pupils poorly prepared, promptly ordered the teacher's pay increase halted until an improvement was noted.

While Qaiyum was still pouring tea, we got down to brass tacks. What did he expect from the forthcoming UN debate on Kashmir? "Nothing," he answered quickly. "You see, there is only one question for us: Will the UNO sponsor a plebiscite or won't it? The answer must be 'No.' The point is that India will never agree to a plebiscite. They couldn't, because they are certain to lose. All the crores of rupees they have spent there on arm and food, their prestige, their pose as moralists---all that would be lost. So the UNO may 'recommend' this or 'suggest' that---and, mind you, this plebiscite is long since suggested by the UNO---but all the UNO can do is to give its sanction, that is all. It will not provide the force necessary to drive the Indians out."

Didn't he think the UN of today is a stronger organization than when it first considered the Kashmir issue? "No. The point is that the UNO is dominated by the big powers. In the case of Korea, the UNO went in because the States went in. In the case of Egypt, you may say that Russia forced the British to withdraw, or the States put pressure on them to withdraw---in either case, it was not the UNO. We hear a lot about 'world opinion.' We have been waiting for world opinion to do something about our country for nine years. No, this is a world of 'Might is right.' We have taken a long time in learning this, but now we understand it."

What next, then? "We will let the UNO have another try." Then? "The I am afraid we will have to take matters into our own hands. We would be forced to break the cease-fire line."

Did he believe the reports that the Indians have six divisions---90,000 men---in "Occupied" Kashmir? "Yes, and perhaps more. But we are strong enough. We could gradually win. All of Kashmir will be an army to drive the Indians out. We would attack from the front and the people in Indian-held territory would strike from the rear." He went on to speak of the two divisions of the Azad Kashmir Regular Forces, "plus two division we can raise overnight" plus "tens of thousands of men, women and children who would volunteer for service the moment the fighting began." True, he admitted, they would have only small arms, "but the fighting would be confined chiefly to the hills, and our people know these hills." What of fighting in the Valley, where tanks and artillery of the Indians could be brought to bear? "That would be more difficult, but if we cut off the Pathankot road, those weapons would be difficult to supply by air."

But wouldn't war in Kashmir mean a general war between Pakistan and India? "Yes, that is the trouble. We would prefer that Pakistan remained

out of this." He refused to speculate on the strategy of such a war but said only, "War between India and Pakistan will be the annihilation of one side or another."

What would he like to see the United States do in the Kashmir issue? "Well, the States' position on Indian-Pakistan relations has been rather peculiar. First we (sic) are given military aid and then we are warned we cannot use it against our enemy (India)...I am afraid that America is so bent on wooing Mr. Nehru that it cannot see straight on the Kashmir issue. Either America believes that we should have the right to choose our own government or we should not. They should let us know how they feel. They should either help us, or leave us."

Specifically what should the U.S. do? "First, the States should side with us in the UNO---take a clear-cut stand on the plebiscite issue. Then the steps the UNO might take would have some force behind them. Second, the States should connive with Pakistan to give Pakistan a free hand in case war broke out. But I am afraid the States would not want to displease India to that extent."

We talked on through a second pot of tea. What kept his Government from being a puppet of the Pakistan Government? "If fighting breaks out, you will see who is a puppet! No, we are together: Pakistan without Kashmir is like a body without a head, and vice versa..." What would happen if Kashmir were unified? We would hold a plebiscite ourselves, and we will then join Pakistan." What about the Hindu minority then? "They would be well protected. We are tolerant, and we could not jeopardize the safety of the 4 crores (40 million) Muslims living in India." What of Abdullah? "He has made some mistakes, but we could work with him."

As we finished, well after dark, Qaiyum invited me to go with him "on tour" a couple of days hence. I said "fine."

I had asked to have the chance to take a ride into the interior, so the following morning a young reporter from one of the dozen or so local weeklies came by the Rest House in a jeep, and we drove up the Jhelum River toward the cease-fire line. The reporter was concerned either with propagandizing me or provoking me into providing some copy for his own paper. He would make a statement like "The U.S. has betrayed us on Kashmir!" and wait for the reaction. He is still waiting.

We came to the village of Chinnari, perched on the river bank just eight miles from the cease-fire line, and 75 miles to Srinagar. We got out of the jeep and wandered along the street talking to shopkeepers and passers-by. Many of them said they were refugees from the Valley. (An estimated 500,000 Kashmiri refugees are living in Pakistan.) Some said they had relatives on the "other side." Nearly all the adult men told me that had fought the Indians. One man in his early 20's apologized, "I'm very sorry, I was too young at the time."

As we headed back to the jeep, I saw a crowd of at least a hundred men standing in the street ahead. As we approached they began chanting, "Break cease-fire! Break cease-fire!"

The first thing that occurred to me was that someone in the Government had telephoned ahead and arranged a little demonstration for the American, and when the leaders of the crowd came up and said they had a message for me "to take to America" I was sure that was the case. But as they gathered around on all sides, and I caught the scowling glances of the men and the

fierce eye of the chief spokesman, I began to wonder.

"The American sahib---I am sorry I cannot make the speech," he began. "Sahib's country is the fair and the powerful---" He switched into Urdu and the words flowed out of his mouth. A tobacco-shopkeeper translated:

"For nine years we have been waiting for freedom. We rose up against the Dogra rule and drove them from Srinagar. Then Nehru sent the Indian army and we had to come back. The Valley is our home; the Valley means everything. How can we live in these poor hills? Our fathers and old mothers live in 'Occupied' Kashmir under the shadow of Indian bayonets. They are not happy, even with the food they have been given.

"For nine years we have trusted in Pakistan to get our territory back. Nothing is done. The big Pakistani politicians talk of 'Kashmir! Kashmir! but nothing is done. We are Kashmir!"

The man's lip began to quiver and I had no doubt about his being in deep earnest. "Now the UNO will again talk about Kashmir. We see the UNO white jeeps driving along the road. The officers spend summer in Srinagar and winter in 'Pindi (Rawalpindi). What are they gaining? The UNO goes for fighting in Korea and Egypt. Why don't they come in Kashmir? This is the last time. Either we will have our country, or they do not want us to have it. Then we will fight. We will break cease-fire."

I asked, "What if the leaders in Muzaffarabad say it is not wise to break the cease-fire line?" He seemed to not understand. I rephrased the question. It was obvious the possibility I had raised was unthinkable. "They would not do that." What if they did? "We would fight anyway."

What about America? "America should take our side in the UNO. (Another man interrupted, "Send us tanks.") We depend on America in the UNO."

What of the Indian battalions across the cease-fire line? "One Kashmiri is worth ten Hindu banians (traders)..." What if many of you were killed? "Better to be killed than live without honor," he replied, and he shouted off a long burst of words. The interpreter shrugged his shoulders and said only, "He said we will fight. That is our warning."

As I walked away, the crowd sent up their shouts once again: "Break cease-fire! Break cease-fire! Long live Azad Kashmir! Long live Pakistan. The shouts rattled off the hills across the river. I had---and still have---the feeling that no matter how irrational an armed crossing of the cease-fire line might be, these men, with their Government's direction or not, are capable of attempting an attack on the other side.

One night as I was eating supper, three men came to my room. They said they were "party leaders." Which party? "It has no name." They went on to explain first that "Indian imperialism is the same as Dogra imperialism." Then they added, "Pakistan's control over Azad Kashmir is the same thing." Kashmir, with its "7000 years of history," should be an independent nation. "Some people---they are uneducated---think that if we join Pakistan we will have freedom. What all of us really want is not to join India or Pakistan but to have our own nation. There should be no solution on the basis of religion."

Were they Muslims? "Yes, good Muslims." What would happen if there were three boxes in a plebiscite: one pro-India, one pro-Pakistan, one pro-

independence? "The third box would win." What share did this group have in the Azad Kashmir Government? "None. We have been frozen out." Did they know of any Indian agents in Azad Kashmir trying to undermine the Government? There was a pause, then "No." How would an independent Kashmir manage to maintain itself politically and economically? "We would depend on America for aid." What if the U.S. did not come through with aid? "If not, we would be forced to turn to Russia." They left me a folder entitled "The Only Possible Solution of Kashmir Problem" (viz., "independence") and then left.

On the last day I went whistle-stopping. President Qaiyum and three Cabinet ministers and I drove down to Kohala, on the Pakistan-Kashmir border, there met Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas Khan, the "veteran Kashmiri leader," as the newspapers invariably call him, and Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, president of the Muslim Conference. Abbas, a white-haired grandfatherly-looking man, was jailed in pre-Partition days for anti-Dogra activities. He is the symbol in Azad Kashmir of "liberation." Ibrahim, a slender, well tailored man of 40, moves quickly, talks quickly in a high-pitched voice. He is Abbas' protege and the diplomatist of Azad Kashmir. Both men clearly outrank the younger President.

The trio, with a squad of aides, were beginning a week-long tour of the Poonch area "to urge the people to be patient." We boarded the six or seven cars and jeeps and the procession headed down the road to the interior.

The main event of the day was to be a political rally in Dhirkot in the afternoon, but as we drove along the twisting mountain roads, the column was halted at each of a dozen villages for a welcome and a sub-rally. As the party approached the village, firecrackers would explode, a band (usually two drums and a bagpipe left over from the British Army days) would play furiously. A committee of villagers would lasso the visitors with garlands of marigolds; there would be a ten-minute assembly in the street or school courtyard; one of the villagers, dressed in his best clothes, would read a declaration of faith in their guests, who in turn would stir the audience up, then urge patience for a little while longer. Then they would go off again to the next village.

During lunch, in the Rest House in Dhirkot, I chatted with Abbas and Ibrahim in turn. Abbas seemed tired and had little to say. As for the UN: "There are perfectly good resolutions waiting to be put into effect. Now the UN will have to implement them, implement the whole (general) plebiscite...Otherwise, the results will be tragic." Tragic? "Yes, literally, tragic. We cannot wait much longer this way."

As for America: "America has been a great disappointment to us on Kashmir. We are for America, but America wants to placate India at the cost of principles. We pin our hopes on America, but we will go ahead, we will bear the brunt ourselves. We will force you to come in."

Ibrahim came over, and between mouthfuls of rice and mutton, picked up the theme. "We think you are completely wrong on India, but let's say that both India and Pakistan are your friends. But which is the 'A' friend and which is the 'B' friend? Pakistan is your ally in SEATO, is in the Baghdad Pact, takes the (military) aid from you, supports you faithfully in UN. India---India is pro-communist, pro-Russian, and gives you a hard time at every turn...When you remain neutral in the Kashmir issue you are automatically pro-Indian, because what India wants is for the world to forget

the issues and accept the fait accompli! Now, why do you treat your 'B' friend better than your 'A' friend? Why do you side with your 'B' friend against your 'A' friend?"

The UN? "Look, sir, we have had commissions, committees, mediators, administrators, resolutions, recommendations without number. We are sick of all that! We want unqualified implementation of the plebiscite agreement." Or else? "These people will fight." "People get killed," I said "Yes," he shot back, "but take Hungary. What they have done is tantamount to suicide, but they are doing it." If fighting began in Kashmir, did he think the UN would try to intervene? "No. How can they get up here? Once the UN leaves the Kashmir issue, let them leave it for good."

After lunch we drove across the narrow valley and half way up the hill where, sitting on the terraced fields, as in a giant-sized grandstand, four or five thousand men were waiting for the rally to begin. The Big Three of Azad Kashmir mounted the wooden platform and sat down, while a cheerleader directed the crowd in lusty wishes for the long life of Abbas, Ibrahim, Qaiyum, Kashmir and Pakistan, and the breaking of the cease-fire line.

The rally began with a solemn recital of prayer. During the next three hours a procession of local chieftains, students, party workers and Government officials took turns at the microphone, and the crowd was prompt with its applause. None of the themes which I had heard in the previous days was omitted, except that regarding American assistance. There was talk of Nehru and the Dogras and the "puppet" Srinager Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, of liberty and honor and sacrifice and jihad (holy war). The main theme was presented by Sardar, whose shrill, soaring force excited the crowd: "We will wait a while longer to see whether the United Nations will support people who fight for freedom...If we must, we'll burn our boats (burn our bridges behind us)...Muslims cannot be slaves of Hindus. We will either rule this country or finish ourselves trying!"

As the rally ended, I said goodbye to those on the platform. I had to be heading back to 'Pindi. They thanked me for coming. Ibrahim smiled, "I hope you got the point." I told him I had.

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