

When I left Peru in July 1969 — after a year's residence — the nation's military government had just promulgated the most sweeping land reform decree in Latin America since the Cuban Revolution.² The immediate seizure of the giant, coastal sugar plantations — owned by the most powerful sector of the Peruvian oligarchy — demonstrated the seriousness of the government's intent. During the next five years the "revolutionary" military regime, headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, introduced a series of programs designed to alter the economic and political structure of Peruvian society. Urban reform laws gave the vast population of squatters, on the peripheries of the nation's major cities, titles to their homes and the promise of more direct participation in the political system. The Industrial Community law, loosely based on the Yugoslavian model, sought (unsuccessfully) to establish some form of worker self-management and partial ownership of the means of production.

Every major sector of society — agrarian, urban, commercial, and industrial — was scheduled for serious transformation, just as all sectors of the traditionally powerful Peruvian oligarchy were being challenged. The agrarian reform program — which eventually destroyed the base of the landed elite — was followed by the industrial reform, the expropriation of major banks, the nationalization of the Cerro de Pasco mining corporation (the largest foreign firm operating in

Peru and the giant of the critical copper mining and refining industry), and the takeover of the fish meal industry (controlled by the most dynamic sector of the national bourgeoisie). By 1975, then, the state controlled production in Peru's three dominant export sectors: mining, sugar, and fish meal.³

These reforms, though worrisome to United States policy-makers and terrifying for the Peruvian economic elite, received the endorsement of a large portion of the population. Indeed, one American journal of political analysis insisted in 1971 that the Velasco government had the support of the Catholic Church, much of the Marxist and Christian left, the lower middle class, most of the urban poor and industrial working class, and the majority of peasants and plantation workers. Thus, said the author, only the economic elite stood squarely against the revolutionary regime.⁴

When I returned to Peru in August 1978, I was greeted at the Plaza San Martín in the heart of downtown Lima by the pungent odor of tear gas as guardia civil (national police) dispersed government bureaucrats who were demonstrating against the administration's announced plan to lay off thousands of public employees. At almost the same time, teachers throughout the nation were engaged in a prolonged, bitter strike and troops were violently dislodging striking miners who were staging a sit-in in the nation's capital. The intense labor unrest that was sweeping in

nation, and an air of political tension, reflected the collapse of the Peruvian economy. Economic declines since 1975 had produced vast state indebtedness amounting to \$6 billion. Harsh austerity measures undertaken at the behest of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had intensified an ongoing deterioration of living standards such that the real income of the urban working class declined by 40 percent between 1973 and 1978. The military regime, headed since 1975 by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez and more conservative officers, had lost all the popular support it once enjoyed.

The causes of the collapse of Peru's military revolution — once hailed as a model for political-economic change in the hemisphere — are complex and somewhat beyond the scope of this *Report*. Opponents on the right attribute the country's economic decline, and the concomitant political crisis, to the "misguided socialism" of the Velasco regime. Critics on the left respond that the problem was rather that the military's "revolution" was not radical enough — that a revolution directed entirely from above, which never came to grips with the problem of mass political mobilization, and which based development on loans from the international banking community, was doomed to failure.⁵

The fact of the matter is that the government had managed to alienate Peru's industrial-commercial elite and foreign

corporations—thereby decreasing investment from the capitalist sector—while at the same time refusing to take the kinds of radical measures necessary to bring about a socialist transformation. Political scientist Liisa North notes that the military itself was divided into competing factions having very diverse, and generally poorly formulated, ideologies.

Consequently, policy was marked by inconsistencies and wavering from left to right.⁶ In addition, the government suffered from the political incompetence, nepotism, and corruption characteristic of many Latin American military regimes. Finally, the regime's own failings were exacerbated by a number of exogenous factors which it could not control. Huge foreign loans—largely invested in capital-intensive projects using highly "inappropriate" technology—during the first years of the "revolution" was based on projected high sugar and copper prices and the anticipated extraction of significant amounts of petroleum in the eastern jungle region. The collapse of sugar prices after 1974, the decline in world demand for copper, and the disastrous drop in the anchovy fish meal catch (due either to previous overfishing, a shifting of the Humboldt Current, or

both) decimated Peru's traditionally strong export sectors, while at the same time petroleum finds were extremely disappointing.

By 1975, then, the Peruvian economy was clearly on the downslide—increases in the GNP failed to match population growth and inflation reached double-digit levels (common in other Latin American nations but not in Peru until that point). At the same time, the ailing President Velasco was losing his grip on leadership while his administration became increasingly intolerant of criticisms expressed in the media or in popular demonstrations.⁷ Consequently, the August 29 "internal coup," which toppled Velasco Alvarado and brought General Morales Bermúdez to power, was initially hailed by a wide spectrum of Peruvian public opinion ranging from left to right. During its first weeks, the new *junta* responded by freeing a number of jailed labor leaders and opposition leftists while simultaneously reducing restraints on conservative and leftist news magazines.

Within months, however, the government began to alienate the labor movement as well as its own mass organizations in the countryside and urban shantytowns, as it began phasing out Velasco's more radical innovations. The regime's shift to the right and the ongoing erosion of living standards cost Morales Bermúdez his initial support. By mid-1976, as the generals moved toward their eighth anniversary in power, the President and his inner circle resolved that continuing military rule was undermining the institutional legitimacy of the armed forces and contributing to internal dissension within the officer corps. Some means of restoring elected civilian government seemed in order.

The Decision to Restore Civilian Government

The major decision facing the administration was at what rate and in what form the transition to elected government should take

President Morales Bermúdez

place. During the height of the Velasco regime's popularity in the early 1970s, the President and his political strategists had toyed with the idea of creating a mass party—loosely modeled on the Mexican PRI—which would include peasant, urban shantytown, worker, and middle-class sectors under some type of control by *velasquista* (pro-Velasco, military progressives) leadership. To be sure, as late as the final year of Velasco's presidency there was talk of creating a *Movimiento de la Revolución Peruana* which would allow for the permanent institutionalization of the military revolution through a dominant political party. Even after the 1975 coup, centrist officers in the Morales Bermúdez faction shared the progressives' desire to preserve critical elements of the "military revolution"—the agrarian reform, state control of key sectors of the economy, and so on.

As the prospects of a military-dominated, mass party became more remote, most officers were still anxious that any elected government give the armed forces "due credit for its accomplishments." Less politicized and less "idealistic" officers were equally concerned that the new administration not investigate too carefully government corruption during the military's reign.⁸ For all these reasons, then, many military men felt the best elected president to succeed General Morales Bermúdez would be Francisco Morales Bermúdez. Several "insiders" have indicated that the original transition scenario sketched by administration officials in 1976 called for appointment of a well-controlled commission which would draft a new constitution to be submitted to the electorate for approval in 1978. Approval of that document, which would institutionalize and pay proper homage to the military's major reforms in a national referendum, would be followed by a presidential election in which General Morales would stand as the candidate of a newly formed populist party.



While such a plan may have been feasible in the heyday of the Velasco regime, by 1976 it was no longer viable. The introduction of strict economic austerity measures in the middle of that year, ensuing popular unrest, and the imposition of a state of emergency limiting civil liberties for over one year, all further eroded the military's already limited base of support. Though President Morales Bermúdez apparently continued to entertain dreams into 1979 of running in a popular election, his aides looked for more realistic alternatives for a "satisfactory" transition.

In the early months of 1977, the President indicated that an elected Constituent Assembly (rather than an appointed commission) might write the new constitution. On July 28, in a speech marking national independence day, Morales Bermúdez announced that elections of delegates to that Assembly would be held in the second half of 1978 and that the formulation of a new constitution would be followed by general elections, no later than 1980, for the presidency and congress. The pronouncement came at a particularly difficult time for the government. Emergency austerity measures introduced the previous month (featuring a 15-30% rise in the prices of rice, bread, noodles, and other basic foods) had led to rioting in several provincial cities (Huancayo, Cuzco, Sicuani, Arequipa, and Tacna) and had produced a July 19 national strike that paralyzed Lima and Peru's other major cities. The administration obviously hoped that the declaration of a concrete transition schedule would reduce popular discontent and divert attention from the nation's economic woes. Moreover, the promise of elections (and the underlying threat of their cancellation in the event of sufficient unrest) would possibly induce moderate labor unions (the *aprista* CTP and the communist CGTP) to control more radical rank-and-file elements.⁹

On August 28, 1977 the government lifted the state of emergency which had been in effect for some 14 months and restored constitutional guarantees. This action followed on the heels of the release of various labor union militants jailed during the July general strike. Two months later, government spokesmen announced that elections for the Constituent Assembly would be held on June 4, 1978. Finally, in December 1977, the laws and regulations governing that election were issued. A 100-seat Assembly would be elected through proportional representation. The voting age for the Assembly was lowered to 18 years, but, contrary to popular expectation, illiterates were not granted suffrage at this point. Finally, the nation's political parties were given until February 1978 to secure the 40,000 signatures required for inclusion on the ballot.

The decision to elect a Constituent Assembly *before* holding general elections for the presidency and congress was partially motivated by the military regime's desire to institutionalize the Velasco reforms in the new constitution. At the same time, the election would serve as a test run for general elections, thereby giving the country's political parties—dormant since the 1968 coup—time to reorganize. Finally, a more prolonged transition process would buy the military time—a "decent interval"—for a graceful departure from power.

Observers sympathetic to the Morales Bermúdez government argue that the military recognized that Peru's huge external debt and economic crisis would require further unpopular austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Consequently, the president decided to "swallow the bitter pill" himself (after softening the IMF's terms as much as possible) and thereby hand over power to the new civilian government after the worst of the economic crunch was over. Those Peruvians less well-disposed toward the military regime suggest more cynical motives behind the

slow transition process. Holding a Constituent Assembly before, rather than after, the investiture of a new civilian government, say these critics, guaranteed that the resulting document satisfied the armed forces. Moreover, they charge, the long transition period permitted the military to arrange a deal with the major civilian parties protecting outgoing government officials from prosecution for corruption.

The Context of the Constituent Assembly Elections

The promulgation of the December 1977 election law opened Peru's first national campaign in over 15 years. Unfortunately, Peru's worsening economic crisis, its ongoing negotiations with the IMF on debt refunding, and the protracted labor conflict hardly created an auspicious atmosphere for the restoration of civilian government. Hard-line conservative, military officers were allegedly questioning the decision to step down, and rumors of coups were rife throughout the electoral campaign.

The debt negotiations, which began three months before the President's July 1977 call for Constituent elections, lasted until the close of the campaign.¹⁰ The Morales Bermúdez government was faced essentially with two alternatives: either renounce the debt (estimated to be some \$5 billion)—a move that no nation had dared try to that point—or submit to the IMF's demands for harsh austerity measures as a precondition for debt refinancing.¹¹ The first option, renunciation, would be tantamount to a declaration of the government's fiscal bankruptcy and would make Peru an outcast in the Western economic community. It was a move advocated only by the Peruvian radical left and was never seriously considered by the military government or advocated by the major political parties. The alternative was implementation of the hard-line economic policies the IMF had already imposed on several other Latin American nations. The IMF was demanding that Peru reduce government subsidies for

food and other necessities, lower expenditure for basic services, impose tight wage restraints, and dismiss large numbers of public employees. The consequence of such measures would be further deterioration of the population's living standard. Coming on the heels of a 30 percent decline in urban real incomes since 1974, the austerity program would undoubtedly provoke additional labor unrest.

In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, similar austerity and declining living standards had been imposed on the working class through the dissolution of unions, prohibition of strikes, imprisonment of labor leaders, and generalized abrogation of civil liberties. Rightists within the Peruvian military—such as General Pedro Richter (then chief of staff and subsequently named Prime Minister in early 1979) and General Luis Cisneros (then Minister of Interior)—were apparently willing to restrict civil liberties in order to clamp down on labor unrest. However, while President Morales Bermúdez and his Prime Minister, General Oscar Molina Pallochía (who served for most of 1978) accepted the need for tough austerity and endorsed a crackdown on the most militant unions (teachers, miners), they were unwilling to impose broad-scale political restraints which would be incompatible with their commitment to restoring civilian government.

Given the conflict between the IMF's preconditions for debt refinancing and the political tranquility conducive to a smooth transition to civilian rule, and given the military regime's internal ideological divisions, it is not surprising that government policy during the Constituency election oscillated between concessions to labor and consumers at some points and iron-fisted austerity at others. While the administration accepted the inevitability of belt-tightening, its negotiators repeatedly tried to soften IMF's terms. Each new austerity measure imposed by the government unleashed popular discontent and labor strife. Each

manifestation of unrest was presented to the IMF negotiating team (and to more sympathetic ears in the Carter administration) as evidence for the need to modify the IMF's tough position.

Thus, the June 1977 agreement by Finance Minister Walter Piazza to reduce government subsidies for food and gasoline (thereby increasing their prices by up to 30%) produced popular demonstrations, the July 19 general strike, and Piazza's resignation. The strike—the most broad-based in Peruvian history—and the accompanying riots in several provincial capitals forced the new Finance Minister, General Alcibiades Saenz Barsallo, to restore some price subsidies and to renegotiate a more moderate IMF standby agreement. In a further concession to popular discontent, imprisoned strike leaders were released in August. At the same time, however, the government refused to reinstate thousands of public and private sector workers who had been suspended from their jobs during the general strike.

Governmental policy continued its oscillation into 1978. Following a bloody January labor clash at the Chimbote steel mills and the threat of another general strike, the administration decreed a national pay increase of 27 percent, but at the same time allowed the prices of public transportation, rice, bread, and milk to rise 20-30 percent. Consequently, on February 27-28, 1978, another, far less successful, general strike was called by the nation's leftist unions in order to protest the surging cost of living. The government's reaction was mild; Morales Bermúdez and Prime Minister Molina rejected rightist military demands to jail strike leaders or to suspend the June elections. Indeed, following the official start of the Constituency campaign in March 1978, the government sought to mollify radical opposition by permitting 20 exiled leftists to return to the country and participate in the campaign.

Two months later, however, the IMF refused to offer Peru further standby credits unless the military imposed sharp cuts in the 1978 and 1979 government budgets. Desperate to renegotiate the debt, the Morales administration removed subsidies from public transportation and a number of basic foods (thereby immediately increasing their cost by 50-60%) only weeks before the scheduled Constituent elections. The government's action precipitated an 11-week teachers' strike and riots in Lima, Cuzco, Arequipa, Huánuco, and Huancavelica. Approximately 35 persons were killed in the series of riots and the southern city of Cuzco was closed off to outsiders for several days. On May 22-23, yet another general strike was called—the third in less than a year. It was less successful than the July 1977 strike but more extensive than the one called earlier in 1978.

Once again, the government reacted with a mixture of repression and concessions. A number of leftist labor union and political party leaders (including several candidates for the Constituent Assembly) were deported, while others went into hiding. Several dozen officials of SUTEP, the radical teachers' union, and of other militant unions were imprisoned, and the national state of seige—only recently lifted—was reinstated. In another indication of its hardening line, the government closed down all the nation's major political journals for the last month of the electoral campaign.¹² Strict limits were also placed on public gatherings and other aspects of political activity as the campaign drew to a close. Less than two weeks before the scheduled June 4 elections, the military government announced that the vote was being set back to June 18. The postponement, though rather modest, had great symbolic import since the administration had made a major point of retaining the original election schedule. Consequently, the change of date—coupled with the deportation of some leftist

candidates, the closure of political journals, and the suspension of constitutional guarantees—raised fears that the election might actually be cancelled by an internal coup.

President Morales Bermúdez and Prime Minister Molina continued to resist pressure from the right for a more intensive crackdown. They refused to order massive dismissals or arrests of participants in the general strike, or to prohibit Marxist parties from participating in the Constituent election, or to cancel the election itself—all measures that were being advocated by military hard-liners. In short, the Morales administration maintained its commitment to the restoration of civilian government. As the first election date approached, however, the political and economic atmosphere was hardly auspicious for a smooth transition.

The Election Campaign

As Peru's many political parties (both old and new) began the task of gathering the requisite signatures for a place on the ballot, they encountered an electorate that was woefully uninformed about the details of the coming campaign. A survey of adults in the capital city of Lima (presumably better informed than the country at large) revealed that, as of late 1977, only 30 percent of the respondents knew what a constitution was and only 29 percent were aware that the June vote was to elect a Constituent Assembly. A mere 10 percent understood that it was the task of the Assembly to write a new constitution. Since over half the potential electorate had never previously voted, party recognition was also quite low. Fully 23 percent had never heard of the nation's largest, mass-based party, APRA, which had been a major political force for decades before the 1968 coup. Forty-three percent had never heard of Acción Popular (AP), the party ousted from power in the 1968 military takeover, and 85 percent did not know of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) recently formed by militant *velasquistas* (i.e.,

supporters of the more radical pre-1975 "revolutionary" impulse).¹³

At the February filing deadline, no less than 13 political parties (including several that were actually alliances of many smaller parties) had collected the required 40,000 signatures for placement on the ballot. The contestants included APRA and Acción Popular (the two frontrunners) in the center; four rightist parties; three on the left of center; and four parties on the radical left. One month later, however, the entire complexion of the June election was changed when Acción Popular withdrew from the race charging that there were insufficient guarantees the Constituent Assembly would be protected from interference by the military regime. AP's decision to boycott the election put perhaps 20-25 percent of the electorate (the proportion that AP might have expected to receive) up for grabs. The withdrawal left three major contending factions in the race: the rightist Popular Christian Party (PPC), APRA in the center, and a loose conglomeration of four radical parties on the left.

Acción Popular: The Politics of Abstention

Created in the late 1950s, Acción Popular (Popular Action) came into its own in the 1962 presidential



election under the leadership of its founder and guiding spirit, Fernando Belaúnde Terry.¹⁴ A non-Marxist, politically articulate, reformist party, AP presented the progressive, but nonrevolutionary, image so popular in the era of the "Alliance for Progress." Belaúnde was a North American-trained architect from one of Peru's more distinguished political and intellectual families (his father had served as prime minister in the 40s). A former Dean of the Faculty of Architecture in Lima, he attracted the active support of the progressive sector of Peru's middle class, including many non-Marxist university students and much of Lima's professional strata. Some observers categorize AP as a technocratic party which eschews a true ideology and seeks to by-pass Peru's internal class conflicts by offering technological ("scientific") solutions to the nation's problems. But Belaúnde's advocacy of agrarian reform, his commitment to expanding the nation's educational network, and his invocation of youthful idealism (including the creation of "Popular Cooperation," a Peruvian domestic peace corps) placed Acción Popular on the liberal side of the political spectrum. Attracting strong peasant support through his promises of rural development and agrarian reform, Belaúnde swept the southern and central highlands in the 1963 presidential election and added sufficient urban lower class support to his middle class constituency so as to win a close three-man race.¹⁵

Once in office Belaúnde Terry found many of his reformist programs stymied or gutted by the opposition majority (including APRA) in the congress. Though obviously well-intentioned, he was considered ineffective by his critics. In October 1968, he was ousted by the Peruvian armed forces both because of dissatisfaction with some of his policies (currency devaluation, failure to purchase aircraft desired by the military, an "unsatisfactory" resolution of a dispute between

Fernando Belaúnde Terry, former president and Acción Popular founder.

Peru and a subsidiary of Standard Oil) and because of the military's anxiety that APRA would win the presidential elections scheduled for 1969. Following his ouster, Belaúnde accepted a teaching position in the United States and waited for his country's "call to duty."

Today, Fernando Belaúnde remains the dominant figure in Acción Popular. While the party is not "personalistic" in the traditional Latin American sense (i.e., it is a programmatic party based on more than the personal following of its leader), its popular support is still tied to its standard bearer since it has failed to establish an effective organizational base among the peasantry, working class, or urban poor (though it continues to elicit their support). Thus, through the years of military rule, as APRA and the Marxist left battled for influence and power in the nation's labor unions, urban shantytowns, and school system, AP sat somewhat on the sideline, still very "middle class" in its political style.

Fifteen years after his electoral victory and a decade after his ouster from office, Belaúnde Terry (and his party) has lost some of his glamour. The defection of Belaúnde's former vice president, Edgard Seoane, with AP's most progressive (left-of-center) activists to form Acción Popular Socialista had probably not seriously weakened AP's electoral strength, but it had moved the party further toward the political center. Though the party has failed to present any dramatic new ideas, Belaúnde continues to command considerable respect and is backed by a highly competent team of professionals.

Throughout his career, starting with his opposition to the Odría dictatorship (1948-1956), Fernando Belaúnde has made a political virtue of his refusal to compromise with military regimes. Even during the height of the Velasco regime's popularity—when the "revolutionary government" drew the support and advice of the *Seoanista* defectors from AP and of

Belaúnde's erstwhile supporters in the left-of-center Christian Democratic Party—the former president remained resolute in his refusal to legitimize the government which had removed him from office.

When President Morales Bermúdez announced plans for the Constituent elections, therefore, AP was the only major party that insisted on having a general election (for president and congress) at the earliest possible date and *prior* to the revision of the constitution. Yet, the party waited for eight months after plans were announced for the Constituent elections (and one month after the start of the campaign) before withdrawing from the race. Apparently that decision was made by Belaúnde himself and surprised most *populista* (AP) activists who were gearing up for the campaign. Party leaders whom I interviewed subsequent to the Constituent elections insisted that the Assembly was an unnecessary diversion from the important business of restoring civilian government as soon as possible. But they offered no convincing reason as to why the party had waited so long to withdraw, nor why AP had pulled out after the decision to hold a Constituent election was a *fait accompli* (thereby denying itself a role in the writing of the new constitution).¹⁶ Some analysts have suggested that AP had withdrawn when its top leadership belatedly concluded that it would not do well. A more likely explanation is that Belaúnde had decided it would be politically prudent to stay clear of the Assembly's prolonged constitutional debates. By continuing to reject any institution "tainted" by association with the military government and by avoiding the squabbles which would obviously split the Assembly, Belaúnde Terry apparently felt he could enter the subsequent general elections with "clean hands." Critics of the party, however, argued that AP had abrogated its responsibility to partake in the transition process and to take a clear position on the critical issues being debated in the Constituent Assembly.

The Popular Christians (PPC): The New Right

Whatever the accomplishments and failures of the Peruvian "military revolution," its sweeping agrarian reform law, nationalization of major banks, mining and the fishing industry, and the takeover of the press (particularly Lima's *La Prensa* and *El Comercio*, the voices of the Peruvian economic elite) had accomplished one thing: they had destroyed the power base of the nation's oligarchy and with it the strength of traditional parties of the right. The expropriation of Peru's *latifundia* had accelerated the ongoing political decline of the *gamonales*, the rural bosses.¹⁷ Similarly, the increased politicization of the urban poor meant that the political chieftains of the rightist Unión Nacional Odríista (UNO) could no longer trade jobs and other favors for votes in the slums and shantytowns.¹⁸ Two, old-style, right-wing parties fielded candidates for the Constituent Assembly: the UNO (originally a personalistic party formed behind former dictator, General Manuel Odría) and the MDP (the Peruvian Democratic Movement, founded by another former president, Manuel Prado). But neither was of much consequence. They represented a political era in Peru that was now dead.

If the Peruvian political spectrum had shifted to the left under the military—and undoubtedly it had—and if the traditional right was no longer viable, an important new conservative political force now appeared on the horizon. The Popular Christian Party (PPC) was founded in 1967 and has been led largely by conservative, Catholic, Lima-based businessmen and lawyers. Many of its founders had been active in the Peruvian Christian Democratic Party, but had left that party because of its increasingly progressive political stance. Unlike the traditional Peruvian oligarchy, PPC leaders come out of the urban industrial and commercial elite of Lima and, to a lesser extent, the industrious southern city of

Arequipa. Their conservatism is not based in medieval Catholicism or rural feudalism, but on hard-nosed capitalism—*laissez faire* when it seems suitable and somewhat statist when the private sector needs external support. Mario Polar, a leading party figure, told me that the PPC feels the major task of the new civilian government will be to restore the confidence of the business community, woo back capital that had fled the country under the “pseudo-Marxist,” military regime (Polar’s term), and strengthen the private sector.¹⁹

For the most part, the PPC stresses the need for economic growth and rejects the call of the left—and even of AP and APRA—for more equitable distribution. “You must first create wealth before you can distribute it,” said Polar.²⁰ Not all the party’s leaders or activists are staunch economic conservatives, however, and one spokesman for the opposition Acción Popular admitted that the PPC’s “left” probably overlaps with the AP’s right. Most party leaders favor some limited economic role for the state and reject the ultra-*laissez-faire* philosophy of Milton Friedman, so popular within the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguayan right. For the most part, the PPC sees itself as ideologically congruent with the Christian Democratic parties of West Germany and Italy and with the conservative wing of the Chilean CD. Polar insisted, however, that it rejects the “socialistic” tendencies of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Christian Democrats or of the progressive (Tomic) wing of the Chilean CD. While the party criticizes most of the Velasco reforms, for the most part it accepts the agrarian reform and the nationalization of mining and other critical sectors of the economy as irrevocable accomplishments. It does, however, favor selective reprivitzation of the cement and fishing industries, newspapers, and some banks.

While the PPC’s top leadership is drawn heavily from the higher echelons of the business and legal

elite, party activists include many petite bourgeoisie while voting support can be found in Lima’s middle class and even the urban poor. The party’s electoral prospects in the Constituent Assembly elections were greatly enhanced by the withdrawal of Acción Popular. Many *populista* middle class supporters, who were not comfortable with the pugnacious populism of APRA and could never vote for the radical left, had nowhere to turn but to the PPC.

The Popular Christians’ strongest electoral asset, however, was its leader, Luis Bedoya Reyes. Bedoya had served two terms as mayor of Lima during the 1960s, securing re-election in 1966 with the backing of the Christian Democrats (to which he still belonged at the time) and Acción Popular (which was then allied with the Christian Democrats). As mayor he had developed a reputation as a skilled organizer and administrator. He was a builder whose major landmark was the expressway through Lima’s center into the middle- and upper-class suburbs. Bedoya Reyes is a polished orator and debater who established himself during the Constituent campaign as one of the most effective radio and television performers. With its big business backing, the PPC was able to buy Bedoya considerable media time. Building on its personal popularity in Lima (where almost half the nation’s voters reside), he was able to overcome the party’s weak organizational base, stressing the Popular Christians’ opposition to the military regime. Downplaying its economic conservatism, Bedoya emphasized the party’s commitment to the restoration of civil liberties.

The New Left:

Growth and Internal Division

If the military’s structural reforms coupled with the growing politicization of the Peruvian lower classes had weakened the traditional right, it had also opened up new possibilities for mass mobilization. The Velasco government—whose strong antioligarchical ideology was

generally accompanied by a distrust of independent mass mobilization—sought to organize this growing political force and control it from above. By creating SINAMOS (the National System of Support for Social Mobilization) and the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA), the government hoped to create a corporatist structure through which the growing political dynamism of the peasantry and urban lower classes could be mobilized in support of the military regime.²¹ When the leadership and thrust of SINAMOS (led by General Leonidas Rodríguez) and the CNA (headed by Avelino Mar) proved far too radical and independent for the new Morales Bermúdez government, both mass organizations were officially disbanded.²² The collapse of the Peruvian economy, the failure of the military—even under Velasco—to create an effective political base, and massive popular disillusionment with the Morales Bermúdez government all contributed to the radicalization of significant segments of the Peruvian working class, peasantry, and urban poor.

The orthodox Peruvian Communist Party had been an important force within certain sectors of the nation’s labor unions long before the “military revolution.” In the southern Andean city of Cuzco—capital of the Inca Empire—the communists had dominated the trade union movement for decades. In the central highlands, portions of the *aprista* miners’ and metal workers’ union had broken away to support more radical Marxist leadership. For the most part, however, prior to the 1960s APRA’s grip on the sugar workers’ union and the neighboring urban workers of the northern coast and the more generalized influence of the APRA-dominated CTP (Peruvian Labor Confederation) had contained the influence of the communist-led CGTP.²³ Indeed, APRA had traditionally co-opted much of the left’s potential constituency within the lower middle class and working class, thereby undercutting potential Marxist electoral strength.

In the 1962 and 1963 national elections, the left received negligible voter support.

By 1978, however, the Peruvian political panorama had changed significantly. As *aprista* influence in the critical miners' union had declined, the rank-and-file had moved rapidly leftward. Led by its charismatic Secretary, Victor Cuadros, a Marxist with a Maoist orientation, the union had become one of the most militant labor groups in Peru. So, too, was the 120,000-member SUTEP (also Maoist oriented), the union representing approximately one-third of Peru's schoolteachers. In short, the radical left was mounting a serious challenge, not only to the *aprista* CTP but also to the relatively moderate, communist CGTP, for influence in the labor movement.

In the countryside, the dramatic spread of education (particularly at the primary levels) dating at least as far back as the Belaúnde era, had substantially increased the number of potential voters among the peasantry as well as the peasants' level of political consciousness. While it was extremely difficult to gauge the degree of support for the Marxist left among the peasantry and rural workers, important nuclei of radicalization clearly existed. Many peasants were organized into the Velasquist-oriented CNA (whose leadership was becoming increasingly militant) while others belonged to the Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP) led by the independent-Marxist Vanguardia Revolucionaria.

Finally, with the demise of the old political machines and paternalistic controls in the urban shantytowns ringing Lima, a new generation of voters had emerged within the sprawling *pueblos jóvenes* ("young towns," the name given by the Velasco government to the areas formerly deprecatingly called *barriadas*). In the mid-1960s, political sociologist François Bourricaud had described the capital's *barriada* population as somewhat conservative in their

political leanings.²⁴ Indeed, the lion's share of their votes in the 1962 and 1963 presidential elections had gone to rightist candidate, General Manuel Odría. During the 1960s and '70s, however, the degree of independent political organization among the urban poor advanced considerably, often led by radical university students coming out of the *pueblos jóvenes*. As rampant inflation (reaching 70% in 1978) and the government's recent austerity program cut sharply into urban living standards, as social services were cut back and as unemployment rose, the shantytown population became increasingly receptive to the electoral appeals of Peru's various leftist parties.

While the economic crisis and increased lower-class politicization presented obvious opportunities for Peru's more radical parties, the incessant squabbles and countless Talmudic debates between contending Marxist groups weakened their electoral strength and cast doubt on the left's ability to unite into a viable political force. Pro-Soviet orthodox communists, Maoists, "Pekinistas" (adherents of the official Chinese position including its recent anti-Maoist turn), Trotskyists, Fidelistas, and even adherents of the Albanian model vied for power in the labor unions, peasant federations, shantytown organizations, universities, and within the electoral process.

Basically, the radical left was represented in the Constituent elections (and in many mass-based organizations) by four groupings: the pro-Soviet, Peruvian Communist Party (PCP-Unidad); the Velasquista, Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR); the Popular Democratic Union (UDP); and the Peruvian Worker, Peasant, and Student Front (FOCEP). FOCEP and the UDP, in turn, were each a somewhat tenuous coalition of a dozen or so radical factions, often having differing orientations.²⁵

The orthodox Communist Party (PCP-Unidad) is the oldest of Peru's

Marxist parties both in terms of the age of the organization and of its leadership. Its balding or gray-haired spokesmen, dressed in jackets and ties, contrast sharply with the younger (usually blue-jeaned) leaders of the UDP and FOCEP. The most moderate party of the left, the Communists retain a political base in the unions and in sectors of the old "intelligentsia." However, their close association with the military regime and timidity in criticizing even the most conservative policies of the Morales Bermúdez government not only has made them pariahs among the younger, more militant radicals, but also vitiated their appeal to the disgruntled electorate as a "party of the opposition."


The recently formed PSR was founded by men associated with the most radical wing of the Velasco government. They include a number of former military officers—most notably the flamboyant former director of SINAMOS, General Leonidas Rodríguez—and civilian officials of the CNA and SINAMOS. Though originally the only non-Marxist party in the radical left (after the Constituent elections it split into Marxist and non-Marxist factions), the PSR was always more militant than the Communist Party. Moreover, because many of its leaders are former military men who have "fallen from the fold," the party inspires a particular antipathy within the conservative wing of the armed forces. Following the May 1978 general strike, PSR leaders Guillermo Faura Gaig and José Arce Larco (both retired Admirals) were sent into exile while party President Rodríguez and former General Arturo Véldez Palacio went into hiding to escape similar fates. Three days before the June Constituent elections, General Rodríguez (a PSR candidate), carried out one of the campaign's most dramatic gestures. Still "wanted" by the police for his association with the general strike, he rode up to the presidential palace on his motorcycle, signed the guest book, and announced to waiting reporters (apparently forewarned by his party) and unsuspecting palace

guards that he wished to speak with the President. By the time the guards had realized who he was, Rodríguez had ridden off, eluding arrest. When he appeared to vote on election day, however, the General was seized and deported. Benefiting from the electoral appeals of Rodríguez—who had built a personal following as leader of SINAMOS—and CNA leader Avelino Mar, the PSR hoped to receive strong peasant support from the state of Cuzco (the home state of both men) and within the slums of Lima.

The UDP ranks with FOCEP as the most radical of the parties participating in the Constituent elections. It is a coalition of ideologically diverse factions including pro-Chinese (the most influential sector of the UDP), the independent Marxist Vanguardia Revolucionaria, some Fidelistas (pro-Cuban), and such respected nonaligned Marxists as attorney Alfonso Barrantes and author Carlos Malpica. Despite its ideological diversity, the UDP has been more adept at resolving its internal differences and working as a coherent unit than has FOCEP or the PSR. It entered the Constituent elections with more grassroots organizational strength than any other leftist party, with considerable influence in the labor movement (particularly among the miners), the shantytowns of Lima, and the Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP). However, its campaign suffered from a lack of nationally known personalities.

Finally, FOCEP is another Marxist coalition constituting the most heterogeneous and internally divided of the electoral contestants. Its largest ideological contingent is Trotskyist, but also includes Fidelistas, independent leftists, and even some pro-Albanians! If the party suffered from continual internal conflicts and lacked the UDP's organizational base, it benefited electorally from the personal popularity of its

Hugo Blanco, leading FOCEP vote getter.



well-known leaders, Trotskyist Hugo Blanco and independent leftist Genaro Ledesma. Blanco, a legendary peasant leader in the early 1960s from the state of Cuzco, now enjoys a massive following in Lima's *pueblos jóvenes*. His many years in prison and exile, his several close escapes from death (including his flight from Chile after the 1973 coup), and his uncompromising opposition to the military regime—he refused a position in the Velasco administration after he was released from prison in 1970—had earned him great popularity and respect among the Peruvian masses. Genaro Ledesma, the former mayor of the central Andean mining city of Cerro de Pasco, brought with him a strong following in his home state as well as considerable parliamentary skills lacking in Hugo Blanco.

In all, the left's strongest political assets in the campaign were its young and energetic leadership (other than the Communists) in a country with substantial numbers of young voters; the fanatical commitment of its cadre (students and young, skilled workers particularly); its growing organizational strength among the lower classes; and, perhaps most important, its intransigent opposition (other than the Communists) to the Morales Bermúdez regime's highly unpopular economic policies. Its greatest weakness was obviously its internal disunity, manifesting itself both in ideological divisions and personality conflicts (the latter being particularly relevant in the PSR and FOCEP).

The Old APRA

"Only APRA can save Peru"—so goes a basic article of faith for hundreds of thousands of Peruvians, now and through much of the 48 years since the party's legendary (and perennial) leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, first ran for the presidency. Founded in Mexico City in 1924 by Haya de la Torre and his fellow exiled student leaders, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance was anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchical.

Borrowing from Marx (but rejecting Marxism as inappropriate for solving Peru's problems), Hegel, Spengler, Albert Einstein, and others, Víctor Raúl produced a vague populist ideology encompassing nationalism, pan-Latin-Americanism, Indianism, and modified corporatism attracting to the party people of highly diverse beliefs. APRA's core base of support has always come from the northern coast (particularly the city of Trujillo and the sugar-producing state of La Libertad) where it enjoys the undying loyalty of large numbers of sugar workers, urban workers, and the lower middle class. To this base it has added support in Lima and the central highlands, again particularly among the organized working class and the lower middle class.

For more than four decades the party has commanded the firm support of nearly one-third of the electorate, a record no other Peruvian party has matched. Yet, it has long faced equally entrenched opposition and hatred from both the nation's left and right. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that modern Peruvian political history has largely involved an ongoing battle between those who love APRA and those who detest it.²⁶ A deep-seated enmity between APRA and the armed forces dates to the *apristas'* unsuccessful Trujillo uprising of 1932 in which several military officers were killed and large numbers of *apristas* massacred in retaliation.²⁷ Alienated by the party's fiery radical rhetoric in its early years and by its obvious capacity for mass mobilization, the military repeatedly blocked Haya de la Torre's presidential bids and with them APRA's aspirations for political power.

Never as radical as its rightist opponents (or some of its supporters) believed, APRA moved steadily toward the center from at least the mid-1940s. Over the years, its desire for some share of political power led it into a series of compromises and strange alliances

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, founder of APRA.

with the center and right. In 1946, it supported the centrist candidacy of José Luis Bustamante in order to regain legal status. In 1956, after eight years of renewed persecution, APRA supported the conservative candidacy of Manuel Prado for the same objective. Later, during the Belaúnde administration, it joined with the party of its old adversary, General Manuel Odría (who had imprisoned large numbers of APRA activists during his 1948-1956 dictatorship) to undercut the president's agrarian reform and other progressive legislation. By that point, most of the more radical young *apristas* had left the party (some to form the guerrilla-oriented *Apra Rebelde*).

Contemporary critics of APRA (particularly those on the left) insist that the party has failed to develop a new leader or a new idea for decades. Indeed, a look at its leadership on the eve of the Constituent Assembly elections is revealing. Haya de la Torre, subject at the age of 84 to occasional memory lapses (and, unknown at that time, the early stages of cancer) still ruled the party with an iron hand. His adulatory followers could scarcely imagine APRA without him and, in May 1979, they nominated him for the presidency despite the strong possibility that he would never live to take office and would



certainly never complete a presidential term. Indeed, he was the only presidential candidate the party had ever had in 50 years. Beneath Víctor Raúl in the *aprista* hierarchy were Luis Alberto Sánchez (nearly blind at age 75), Ramiro Priale (also 75), and the "younger" Armando Villanueva and Andrés Townsend (both in their late sixties). The party seems psychologically rooted in its past with *aprista* speeches and literature constantly harking back to earlier glories. When I asked one of APRA's highest-ranking spokesmen what new ideas or programs the party had formulated in response to current problems, he could only refer me to a collection of Haya de la Torre's speeches, none of which was less than ten years old.

It was within this context, then, that President Morales Bermúdez determined to breach the gap between the armed forces and Peru's leading populist party. Realizing that a military candidate could never win a popular election, the President sought an alliance with APRA, a party that still could claim the largest grassroots organization in Peru. Víctor Villanueva, a leading Peruvian military historian and former APRA supporter, maintains that a pact between Morales Bermúdez and Haya de la Torre was initiated in early 1976 and cemented on April 30 of that year when the President traveled to Trujillo and received a tumultuous welcome that could only have been orchestrated by APRA. It is thus one of the great ironies of the current political scene that the cornerstone of the transition process (to civilian government) depends heavily on an accommodation between these historically antagonistic forces.

For its part, the Morales Bermúdez administration apparently pledged that it would not only allow APRA finally to take power should it win the eventual presidential election, but that the military government would actively promote such a victory. In return, APRA leaders apparently pledged to use the party

machinery (and the *aprista* unions) to restrain, as best it could, popular unrest caused by economic austerity and to contain leftist opposition to the government within the labor movement and in the Constituent Assembly. Finally, were APRA to win the general elections, it would not prosecute high-ranking officials of the out-going military government for corrupt practices.

Of course, APRA leaders vociferously deny the existence of such an agreement. As party spokesman Andrés Townsend insisted to me, "just because we are talking civilly with the armed forces after decades of conflict, people say there must be a deal." But even if no formal accord was established, almost all impartial observers agree that an informal accommodation was reached.

One could easily dismiss APRA, then, as a stagnant party that has sold out its original ideals and lost its way. Civil libertarians speak warily of the party's goon squads (called "*bufalos*") that intimidate opposition (leftist) forces in the unions, universities, and public forums. Others criticize APRA opposition to any reformist programs—be they Belaúnde's or Velasco's—which the party did not originate. (Indeed, many *aprista* leaders had accused Velasco of "selling the country out to the communists.") Finally, one could point to the party's willingness to join forces with the far right, not only to block the left but Acción Popular as well. All these are salient criticisms, but they fail to come to account for the intense loyalty which a third of the Peruvian electorate, including large numbers of working-class people, feel toward APRA. They fail to explain why taxi drivers and construction workers would put in hours of volunteer labor for the party late at night after a hard day's work or why dozens of young men and women would stand for hours (till 2:00 A.M., if necessary) in the dark outside the Constituent Assembly waiting to greet Víctor Raúl, Sánchez, and

other party legends with the rhythmic *aprista* applause.

To understand the fierce commitment of the young women outside the Constituent Assembly, who declared themselves to me "*apristas hasta la muerte*" (*apristas* until death), one must visit the Casa del Pueblo ("People's House") in downtown Lima. Here, night after night, hundreds, sometimes thousands, of working- and middle-class *apristas* aged 12 to 80 come for their various needs. At the Casa's library, elderly people read popular magazines or, if they are true believers, lead through party histories, while high school students use the reference material for their courses. In the next room an *aprista* volunteer teacher works extra hours tutoring secondary students from the slums of Rimac who need additional help at school. Across the Casa's massive interior courtyard are game rooms and vocational training classes in nursing and electronics, and a large auditorium where workers can listen to concerts or lectures by APRA luminaries. Much smaller, but often equally ambitious, Casas del Pueblo are found in cities and towns throughout the country. In these "Peoples' Houses," one can talk to middle-aged party loyalists who will explain how the Casa gave them free food in the 1940s at its low-priced workers' cafeteria, or helped them when they were young orphans, or offered free immunization in times of epidemics. One can talk to young workers who listened to *aprista* "folklore" in their teens, belonged to the party youth movement, played in an *aprista* soccer league, and now belong to an *aprista* union and get their news from the party newspaper and magazine while they eat lunch in the Casa's cafeteria. These people are not particularly receptive to the criticisms of Peruvian leftists or liberals who talk of APRA corruption, sordid deals, and goon squads. They live in a political subculture unmatched in Peru and rarely approached anywhere in Latin America, a subculture that has

catered to their needs when nobody else was there to do it.

June 18, 1978: The People Vote

As more than 3.5 million Peruvian voters finally went to the polls, supporters of the return process were pleased that the Constituent Assembly election, which had appeared at times so close to being cancelled, was taking place only two weeks behind schedule. While limited opinion polls and a few political pundits had made projections, the fact that no Peruvian had voted for 15 years and that over half the electorate (including anyone under the age of 36) had never voted before made the outcome highly uncertain.

The results demonstrated both important continuities and potentially significant changes in the orientation of the Peruvian electorate. As expected, APRA finished first in the party voting and Haya de la Torre received the largest number of votes of any individual candidate.²⁸

The PPC ran somewhat stronger than many analysts had originally expected, capitalizing on the campaigning skills and personal following of Luis Bedoya Reyes. With Acción Popular not entered, the Popular Christians swept the middle-class districts of Lima and its suburbs. To this it added a significant number of the capital's low-income voters. The PPC did well in Arequipa (a city with a strong Christian political tradition) and picked up scattered votes elsewhere. Still, nearly 60 percent of the party's total vote came from the Lima area where it finished first, some 100,000 votes ahead of its nearest rival (APRA).

Perhaps the most dramatic aspect of the election results, however, was the nearly 1.2 million votes (33% of the total) and 32 seats won by the parties of the radical left. In the last national elections of 1962 and 1963, the left had been an insignificant electoral force. Now, after ten years of military reforms, the various Marxist parties (and the non-Marxist FNTC and PSR) attained a

Table 1: Results of the 1978 Constituent Assembly Election

	Votes	(%)	Assembly Seats
APRA	1,241,174	(35.3%)	37
The Right			
Popular Christians (PPC)	835,294	(23.8%)	25
Odristas (UNO)	74,137	(2.1%)	2
MDP	68,619	(1.9%)	2
MDRP	19,594	(0.5%)	0
Left of Center			
Christian Democrats (PDC)	83,075	(2.4%)	2
APS	20,164	(0.6%)	0
The Left			
FOCEP	433,413	(12.3%)	12
PSR	232,520	(6.6%)	6
Communists (PCP-Unidad)	207,612	(5.9%)	6
UDP	160,741	(4.6%)	4
FNTC	135,552	(3.8%)	4
TOTAL	3,511,895	(100.0%)	100

proportion of the national vote unmatched by the left in any competitive election in Latin America save Allende's Chile. While the left had been expected to make a significant showing, several FOCEP and UDP leaders admitted to me they had not expected the combined radical vote to exceed 25 percent. In the wake of their victories, FOCEP leaders Hugo Blanco and Genaro Ledesma and the PSR's Leonidas Rodríguez returned from exile to triumphant receptions and seats in the Constituent Assembly. Other newly elected left delegates (such as the PSR's Avelino Mar) came out of hiding to claim their seats.²⁹

Among the Marxist contenders there had also been some surprises. The UDP finished worse than expected (as did the PSR) while FOCEP fared better than had been predicted. With its strong organizational base among the lower classes (a dominant role in the Peruvian Peasant Confederation and in 14 labor unions including the miners), the UDP was expected to finish first among the parties of the left. Instead it finished a weak fourth, behind the aging Communist Party and with only 35 percent of FOCEP's total. By finishing third among *all* parties, FOCEP suggested that having "big name" candidates

(such as Blanco and Ledesma) might carry more weight than grassroots organization. Hugo Blanco—finishing with the third highest total of any individual candidate (behind Haya de la Torre and Bedoya Reyes)—attracted large numbers of votes for his party in the shantytowns of Lima and the peasant villages of Cuzco.

For the moment, one must remain cautious about projecting long-term trends from the Constituent Assembly results. The proportion of the vote going to APRA (about one-third) and to the right (30%) was strikingly close to their respective strength in the 1962 and 1963 elections. But with Fernando Belaúnde and the AP running in the 1980 national elections, the right's share of the vote (particularly middle-class support for the PPC) is likely to fall next year. Moreover, the PPC's new right politics are far more modern and creative than the old positions of the UNO. Thus, the Popular Christians' more moderate conservatism coupled with the substantial growth of the radical vote indicate a clear shift to the left in the Peruvian political spectrum over the past decade. How far that shift has been is difficult to say. The voting strength of FOCEP and other radical parties in this election partially reflected a popular protest

against unemployment and declining standards of living. If economic conditions begin to bottom out or to improve, the protest vote in 1980 will probably decline.³⁰ Moreover, AP's entry into the electoral race will undoubtedly diminish the left's vote among the urban poor and, especially, the peasantry among whom Belaúnde still attracts much support.

The Constituent Assembly (1978-79)

On July 28, 1978—exactly one year after President Morales Bermúdez's announcement of Constituent elections—the newly elected Assembly opened its first session. APRA was clearly the pivotal party: it not only held the largest single bloc of delegates, but also occupied the ideological center between the PPC and the left. With the support of the Popular Christians, APRA leaders Haya de la Torre and Sánchez were elected President and Vice President of the Assembly (when Haya had to travel to the United States for prolonged cancer treatment, the aging Sánchez took over as presiding officer).

During its initial weeks of deliberation, the Assembly's debate was confined to setting its rules of procedure and, more important, delineating the body's powers and objectives. Hugo Blanco and his Trotskyist faction of FOCEP insisted that, as the state's only elected body, the Constituent Assembly should immediately replace the military junta as Peru's legitimate governing authority. Blanco was well aware that such a move was out of the question. Indeed, even most of the leftist delegates failed to support his position. However, his proposal was designed to embarrass the military regime as well as the APRA and PPC delegations by "unmasking the Assembly" as a "tool of the military."

A more serious challenge to the Morales Bermúdez administration and to APRA, with objectives similar to Blanco's was proposed by the entire left bloc. They insisted that the Assembly go beyond the role of writing a constitution and

simultaneously debate major socioeconomic and political issues of the day. While not challenging the military government's authority, therefore, the leftist motion would allow the Constituent Assembly to criticize administration policies and to offer alternatives. In short, the radical opposition could use the Assembly as a platform for attacking the government's highly unpopular economic program.

APRA was now placed in a very uncomfortable position. On the one hand, Haya de la Torre had promised President Morales Bermúdez that he would contain the leftist delegates. *Apristas* were desperately anxious to prevent the Constituent Assembly from antagonizing the military lest it call off the general elections, thereby snatching from APRA, once again, the power it had so long been denied. On the other hand, Haya did not wish to seem excessively beholden to the military regime or to deprecate the importance of the Assembly. The PPC also was uncomfortable with the left's proposal. While it generally endorsed the government's austerity program and the military's tough line against radical labor unions, it too did not want to be seen as the underling of an unpopular regime. Moreover, much more so than APRA, the Popular Christians wished to express their own criticisms of particular government policies.

After weeks of debate, the delegates resolved that the central task of the Assembly would be to write a new constitution. Most of the work on the document would be carried out by a series of "commissions" (Assembly committees), each charged with handling a specific issue area such as civil liberties, education, or the decentralization of government power. The commissions were composed of Assembly delegates from the various parties, usually represented in rough proportion to their strength in the Constituent body. During the closing months of 1978 and early 1979, these

commissions held regularly scheduled hearings with expert advisers. Occasionally they commissioned independent study groups to explore particular issues in greater depth. Once the committees had finished their work, their proposals would be taken up by the entire Constituent Assembly.

Thus, in mid-September 1978, nearly two months after it had taken office, the Assembly passed beyond the issues of objectives, rules, and procedures, and began its work. Haya de la Torre and the *aprista* leadership were determined to get the new constitution written and passed quickly so that the country could move to the next stage of the transition process—general elections for the presidency and congress—as soon as possible. Until the commissions finished their work, the full Assembly would convene only one night per week. Haya de la Torre expected that, with the support of the PPC, he could keep the leftist bloc under control in Assembly debate.

But all did not go exactly according to Haya's plans. While APRA controlled the general direction of the Assembly, the Popular Christians occasionally sided with the left in order to show their own independence. Article 3 of the Assembly's rules specifically allowed that body to debate issues of national importance other than the constitution itself—exactly what the left had wanted. During the next six months—as the commissions worked on the draft constitution—the Assembly's Tuesday night meetings featured spirited debates on major national issues. Beginning roughly at 8:00 P.M., the sessions often lasted until 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. When political crises arose—the mass arrest of striking miners or suspension of the nation's major political magazines—the left was able to convene additional, emergency sessions.

In many ways, the full Assembly meetings were a microcosm of the Peruvian political scene, with all the drama of the best theater. Arriving

at the National Congressional Palace in downtown Lima, the delegates would pass through a crowd of partisans and two or three tanks outside the building, file past the ceremonial military guards, and enter the ornate congressional chambers where the three tiers of spectators' galleries were invariably already filled, mostly with *aprista* militants.³¹

Beneath the spectators, the delegates' chairs were arranged in a semicircle with a raised table at the front of the chamber for the Assembly officers and their aides. The APRA delegation sat at one side of the chamber, the various parties of the left directly across from them, and the PPC and several minor parties in the middle. Even before the night's debate began, much was revealed by the style and physical appearance of the delegations. The *aprista* bloc was composed of 37 men, most of them in their sixties (only 2 of the 100 delegates to the Constituent Assembly were women—one from FOCEP and one from the PPC). The *apristas* generally wore dress slacks and sport shirts—appropriate garb for members of a populist party—although Haya de la Torre, Sánchez, Townsend, and other top leaders wore jackets and ties. The PPC delegation, composed principally of slightly younger, middle-aged men (typically aged 45-65) looked much like the businessmen and lawyers they were—impeccably dressed in their 2 or 3 piece suits. Finally, the left delegates of FOCEP, UDP, and PSR—mostly in their thirties (some, like the UDP's fiery orator Javier Diez Conesco, even younger—usually wore jeans and pullovers. A few "elder statesmen" such as Carlos Malpica (at 48, the oldest UDP delegate) and Genaro Ledesma (like Malpica, a member of the National Congress dissolved in 1968) wore sports jackets. Only the Communists stood out from the leftist bloc. For the most part, they were over 55 and far more formal in their attire than their *enfante terrible* compatriots.

For the left, the Assembly sessions represented a political forum and a means of educating the masses. Consequently, leftist delegates tended to dominate speaking time, addressing themselves at great length to the government's political and economic policies or defending strikes and other antigovernment "popular protests." Leftist attacks were also frequently directed against APRA, drawing whistles and jeers from the well-orchestrated galleries. Indeed, as *aprista* leadership tried to prevent Assembly debate from offending the military regime, the critical cleavage in the Constituent body was not so much left versus right, but rather left against *aprista* center with the rightist PPC providing the swing votes.

During the sessions I attended in March 1979, FOCEP and UDP delegates spoke against the administration's shut-down of news magazines and its suspension of constitutional rights after the January 1979 general strike. APRA representatives responded with impassioned descriptions of government persecution against their party in the 1930s and 1950s (*apristas* seem most eloquent when discussing events at least 20 years old). Even the most mundane APRA speeches were repeatedly interrupted by rhythmic applause from the *bufalo*-directed audience in the galleries.

In most instances, APRA could draw on PPC votes to defeat leftist motions. On some occasions involving issues such as press freedom, however, the Popular Christians joined with the left to carry motions critical of the government. Following the imprisonment of miners' leader (and UDP delegate) Víctor Cuadros during a March 1979 strike, all three blocs joined together to protest the regime's violation of "congressional" immunity (Cuadros was released the next day).

Through the early months of 1979, then, the left was able to take the offensive in floor debate and to use the Assembly as a public forum on

major political issues. It is not clear, however, how much they gained from their efforts since the Peruvian masses whom they wished to reach generally lacked the opportunity to listen. With the closing of Peru's news magazines, and with tight government control over radio, television, and the newspapers, coverage of the Assembly's debates was extremely limited. The radical bloc also suffered from a lack of parliamentary skills (with the exception of the unofficial left floor leader, Genaro Ledesma) and found itself continually out-manuevered on critical issues by the more politically experienced *aprista* leadership.

The New Constitution

If the weekly sessions of the Constituent Assembly provided the major drama during that body's first six months of operations, it was in the committees where the new constitutional draft was forged. Here there was more interparty cooperation and less APRA-left confrontation than in the floor debates. By early March, the various commissions had drafted their proposed constitutional chapters and passed them on to the principle commission chaired by Assembly Vice-President Alberto Sánchez.

Some of the commissions—such as the one dealing with education—were able to submit single drafts endorsed by the left, right (PPC), and APRA. In other cases, the commission submitted majority and minority drafts. The principle commission then drew from these reports and wrote a single constitutional draft which it passed on to the full Assembly for debate. On April 2, 1979 the Constituent Assembly began nightly sessions for the purpose of debating the proposed constitution.

A number of issues provoked heated debate both in the commissions and in the full Assembly. One critical question involved the granting of suffrage to illiterates. With perhaps 30 percent of Peru's adult population functionally illiterate (and a far higher percentage among those in

the rural areas), enfranchisement would add hundreds of thousands of peasants to the voting roles. It was a change strongly endorsed by the left but feared by conservatives, particularly the Popular Christians and right elements within APRA.³²

Other constitutional questions dividing the Assembly included the issue of "human rights" (i.e., civil liberties), the relationship of the state and the press, and the role of the state in the economy. For the most part, APRA was able to dominate Assembly negotiations over such points. On occasion, however, younger, more progressive *aprista* delegates induced the party to vote with the left against the PPC. More frequently, APRA joined with the Popular Christians in a center-right coalition which easily out-voted the left. Concessions were made by the *aprista* leadership to the left on some occasions and to the right on others. On rare occasions the left and PPC joined to forge a left-right coalition against APRA. On the most important issues, however, the APRA bloc prevailed. As debate wore on, the left increasingly boycotted Assembly debates, trying to disassociate themselves with a constitution over which they were exercising little influence.

The most explosive and immediately relevant debate concerned the manner by which the new president would be elected. Since it was widely recognized that APRA would receive the largest number of votes of any party in the presidential race, but could not come close to a majority, the issue had obvious partisan overtones. The *apristas* maintained that any candidate receiving a plurality of 33 percent or more of the national vote (a proportion APRA felt confident it could attain, particularly if Haya de la Torre were its candidate) should be declared the winner. Opponents of the APRA position insisted that a candidate with only 35-40 percent of the vote would be a "minority choice." Should a "plurality winner" take office against the strong desires of 60-65 percent of

the electorate (a situation analogous to the Allende victory in Chile), they argued, he would lack the legitimacy to govern. Consequently, PPC leader Bedoya Reyes proposed a second round, run-off between the top two vote-getters should no candidate receive a majority on the first round (the so-called French system).

Bedoya's position also reflected his ongoing interest in forging an election alliance with Belaúnde's Acción Popular (AP) against the left and, to a lesser extent, against APRA. A two-round system would give the PPC additional room for political maneuver. AP, which had no votes in the Assembly, added its support to the run-off proposal since it would clearly benefit Belaúnde, the apparent consensus choice against APRA in a potential second round. The left found itself split on the electoral issue. On the one hand, should the left ever unite behind a single candidate, it hoped eventually to gain an electoral plurality either in the coming presidential race (a slim possibility, but not totally out of the realm of possibility) or in some future campaign when its strength had increased. A second-round, run-off system would effectively bar a leftist victory in the future since the right and center would obviously unite in the run-off against the left. For these and other reasons, FOCEP's Trotskyist faction (led by Hugo Blanco) announced its opposition to the Bedoya proposal. On the other hand, most of the leftist delegates—including their parliamentary leader, Ledesma—believed that run-off would not only add to their own bargaining power, but could be used to block an APRA victory. A majority of left representatives thus backed the second-round plan.³³

Initial indications suggested that a left-right (PPC) alliance would carry enough Assembly votes to approve a two-round election. In the end, however, *aprista* leaders were able to bargain for sufficient votes to carry a modified plurality system: the electoral law applicable to the 1980 election states that any

presidential candidate receiving 36 percent of the vote will be declared the winner. Should no candidate receive that proportion of the vote, the choice will pass to the congress.

On July 12, 1979—only 16 days before its one-year mandate ran out—the Constituent Assembly passed the final version of the new constitution. Though the left was able to win some points (on those occasions when APRA did not want to project too conservative an image to the electorate), it generally found itself out-manuevered. The leftist bloc boycotted most of the final deliberations and refused to sign the document.³⁴

The Coming General Election

With the new constitution finally completed, the military regime announced that the general election for congress and the presidency will be held in May 1980 and that the actual transfer of power to a civilian government will take place on July 28, 1980. Given the highly unstable political atmosphere prevailing in Peru, any predictions regarding the coming campaign are extremely precarious. Serious conflict between the more radical labor unions and the government has persisted into the closing months of 1979. The date of the national election—which the *aprista* leadership originally hoped to hold in late 1979—has been pushed back on several occasions. Thus, there is always the possibility that the election or the transition date may be further postponed or even—in the event of a right-wing internal coup—be cancelled. As of the writing of this *Report*, however, indications are that the transition will take place as scheduled.

Two factors dominated the presidential race even before the campaign had begun. The first was APRA's successful championing of a plurality system for selection of the chief executive. Less than two months before the Constituent Assembly voted on this issue, various political insiders suggested to me that the Assembly was likely to vote for a two-round, run-off (backed by the PPC delegation and

most of the left). Had a run-off system been passed, the second round would have probably matched the frontrunning APRA candidate (then expected to be Haya de la Torre) and AP's Fernando Belaúnde. In such a race, Belaúnde might have been expected to attract the support of much of the left (which is strongly opposed to an APRA victory) and most of the right (with PPC leader Bedoya Reyes having shown a clear preference for the AP), thereby securing a presidential victory. The approval of the single-round plurality election system, then, changed the former president from a potential favorite into an underdog.

Within weeks of its tactical victory (and on the heels of the promulgation of the new electoral law), APRA faced a severe setback with the death of its party titan. For some 50 years Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre had cast his giant shadow over Peruvian politics. Now, seemingly on the verge of the presidential victory that had so long eluded him, he succumbed to cancer. His death created further uncertainty regarding the transition process since he had been the linchpin of the understanding between APRA and the Morales Bermúdez government. In addition, Haya de la Torre's demise (anticipated by all but the most optimistic *apristas* since his relapse in late April) set off an internal struggle between his party's conservative and progressive wings. After postponing its choice several times, the APRA party congress met in October to select Armando Villanueva—head of the *aprista* party machinery and leader of its more progressive members—over conservative leader Andrés Townsend.

Given APRA's firm hold over one-third of the Peruvian electorate, the party is still expected to receive a plurality in the May election. Despite Villanueva's greater acceptability to the left, however, he is less likely than Haya de la Torre would have been to attain the 36 percent of the vote needed for an

outright victory. In the likely event that no candidate receives that margin, *aprista* leaders still expect to secure the presidency in the congress, where they will undoubtedly have the largest bloc of delegates.

Acción Popular's Fernando Belaúnde is likely to finish second in the presidential race. Ironically, he will pick up much of his support from voters who selected the left in the Constituent elections (particularly peasants) and from those who supported the rightist PPC (particularly the Lima middle class). Belaúnde is campaigning under a cloud of poor health (he is rumored to be suffering from Parkinson's disease) and has lost much of his earlier glamour. Yet he and his party still command considerable respect, and he remains the second choice of most non-*apristas* on the right and left (APRA militants presumably have no second choice). Belaúnde's chances hang on denying Villanueva 36 percent of the popular vote and picking up sufficient PPC and left support in the congress to secure a majority in that body.

The Popular Christian's Luis Bedoya can count on continued strong support in Lima, its twin city of Callao, and in Arequipa. However, Belaúnde's candidacy will greatly undercut the PPC, and Bedoya is likely to finish third or fourth. He has shown continued interest in an electoral alliance with the AP, but so far has been rejected by Belaúnde. Bedoya's greatest hope also lies in APRA's failure to win the popular election outright. In the congress, the PPC would be open to political overtures from both APRA and AP possibly permitting Bedoya Reyes to play the role of a kingmaker.

The left continues to speak bravely of uniting behind a single presidential candidate and thereby mounting a strong electoral challenge. Given the intense ideological commitment of the major Marxist factions and their inability to compromise over philosophical and political differences, however, there is little

likelihood of a unified campaign for a single radical candidate. As this article is being written, there seem to be two certain candidates: Alfonso Barrantes of the UDP and Genaro Ledesma of FOCEP. Hugo Blanco (the most widely recognized and popular of the Marxist leaders) and his Trotskyist party have been expelled from FOCEP. Blanco, who has blocked unification with the Communist Party (PC-Unidad) or with the PSR, will likely either stand as a third leftist candidate or will back Barrantes. In any event, the left's only hope of exercising electoral power lies in the congress, where the selection of members through proportional representation (and the absence of any minimum percentage needed for representation) has improved its electoral prospects.

Beyond the 1980 Elections

Of course, the left will continue to exercise some influence outside the electoral system through their important role in the labor unions and other mass-based organizations of peasants or shantytown dwellers. It is here that Peru's most delicate and pivotal political battle may yet be engaged. Articulate Marxist intellectuals expressed to me strong apprehension over the prospects of an APRA presidential victory. They felt, apparently with good reason, that an *aprista* administration would launch a strong assault on its long-time leftist opposition in the unions, universities, and shantytown organizations. Foreseeing *aprista* intimidation and violation of civil liberties, many leftists would prefer a Belaúnde victory or even Bedoya Reyes over an APRA administration.³⁵

Conversely, should the most militant Marxist unions (particularly the miners and teachers) seek a confrontation with the new civilian government, the results could be highly destabilizing. While the radical left lacks the strength to win a national election at this point, it has the ability to undermine any future government. Continued labor unrest could further undercut an already weak economy, thereby

precipitating repressive measures from the civilian government or the return of military rule through a rightist coup.

The agrarian reform and other programs instituted by the military regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado have changed Peru greatly over the past decade. Yet, in the realm of the nation's major political parties, "the more things change, the more they

remain the same." Had the presidential elections been held one year earlier (as APRA had hoped), the two leading candidates would have been Haya de la Torre and Belaúnde, the same men who finished on top in 1962 and 1963. APRA and Acción Popular remain the nation's leading parties, but neither offers creative new solutions for the country's current problems.³⁶ While the Marxist left

has emerged as the major new force in the electoral sphere, it shows little likelihood of achieving power in the foreseeable future (it is highly doubtful that the military would permit it to take office) and has displayed little evidence of a capacity to rule even if it did.³⁷

(October 1979)

NOTES

1. This *Report* is intended as a sequel to Thomas G. Sanders, "The Politics of Transition in Peru" [TGS-10-77], *AUFS Reports*, 1977. Readers not familiar with the Peruvian military "revolution" of 1968-1975 are referred to that *Report* (though I take a more positive view of the Velasco reforms than does Sanders). The best English-language work on the Velasco era is Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Peruvian Experiment* (Princeton University Press, 1975); the best Peruvian analysis of that period is probably Henry Pease García, *El Ocaso del Poder Oligárquico* (Lima: Desco, 1977), which contains an exhaustive 60 page bibliography; see also, works cited in Sanders' footnotes. On Peruvian society and politics in general (prior to the military revolution), see Francois Bourricaud, *Power and Society in Contemporary Peru* (Praeger, 1970).

2. For a recent analysis of the current state of the Peruvian agrarian reform, Howard Handelman, "Peasants, Landlords and Bureaucrats: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Peru" (*AUFS Report*, forthcoming). The best summary through 1976 is Mariano Valderrama, *7 Años de Reforma Agraria Peruana* (Universidad Católica, 1976) which includes an appendix of some 700 newspaper articles and official documents tracing the reform and associated political conflict. For earlier analysis, see Harding in Lowenthal, *op. cit.* There is an abundance of excellent recent analyses of the agrarian reform by Peruvian scholars. See footnotes in Handelman, *op. cit.*, especially works by Jose Maria Caballero and Fernando Eguen.

3. There continued to be significant foreign investment in mining, but the Peruvian state dominated the sector. Recently, there has been reprivityization of a portion of the fishing industry.

4. George W. Grayson, Jr., "Peru's Military Populism" in *Current History* (February 1971), pp. 71-77 and 116.

5. For left critiques of the Peruvian military experiment, see: Anibal Quijano, "Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru," *Monthly Review* 23 (July 1971), No. 3; James Petras and A. Eugene Havens, "Peru: Economic Crisis and Class Confrontation," *Monthly Review* 30 (February 1979), No. 9

6. Liisa North, "Perspectives on Development Policy and Mass Participation in the Peruvian Armed Forces" (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, Latin American Program Working Paper, 1978). For the way in which these ideological divisions influenced the military's inconsistent policy on rural mobilization, see Handelman, *op. cit.*

7. The expropriation of national newspapers in July 1974 was hailed by the Peruvian left since it struck a blow against the major spokesmen for the oligarchy (particularly Lima's *La Prensa* and *El Comercio*). Shortly thereafter, the government turned with equal energy to harassing left journals, such as *Marka*, as well as jailing or exiling selected leftist union and political party leaders. Compared to military regimes such as Brazil's, Chile's, Argentina's, or Uruguay's, however, political repression in Peru under Velasco or Morales Bermúdez has been very light.

8. Despite government attempts to keep them out of the press, reports have surfaced regarding several scandals. In the Agriculture Ministry, government officials apparently collaborated in speculation and hoarding of condensed milk (widely used in Peru). Government officials were also apparently bribed prior to Aeroperu's purchase of Lockheed tri-stars. While critics claim that corruption under the military has

been far greater than during the Belaúnde regime, I suspect that the two military administrations (Velasco and Morales Bermúdez) were not substantially more corrupt than many other Latin American regimes, including the elected civilian governments of Colombia and Venezuela.

9. Under Velasco, the government had tried to play off the nation's major labor federations—the CTP (led by APRA, a populist party long the subject of military enmity) and the CGTP (led by the communists) against each other and to strengthen the regime-sponsored CTRP. As of 1977-78, however, the CTRP had still failed to amount to anything and the CTP and CGTP were being careful not to alienate the military regime lest it hurt their respective (APRA and communist) chances for power in the new civilian government. The major opposition to the regime's economic policies came from militant, Marxist unions independent of the labor confederations. These included the miners' union and the teachers' union (SUTEP), both with Maoist leanings.

10. After 16 months of negotiation, Peru finally reached agreement with the IMF on the terms of debt refinancing on August 6, 1978—seven weeks after the Constituent Assembly elections. See, *New York Times* (August 8, 1978).

11. The \$5 billion represented only Peru's public (state) debt—*Wall Street Journal* (August 23, 1978). The *Latin American Economic Report* estimates Peru's public and private debt at \$8 billion. Debt servicing alone cost Peru 55 percent of its 1978 export earnings.

12. Since the expropriation of the national newspapers in 1974, the daily press—along with radio and television—had been government mouthpieces. Critical opinion in the media came only from news magazines. The Morales Bermúdez administration, as noted

earlier in this *Report*, had initially been more tolerant than the Velasco government of press criticism, but this changed quickly. Jorge Flores, editor of Peru's leading left political journal, *Marka*, told me that his magazine was shut down (for varying periods of time) four times between 1975 and 1979

13. The survey was conducted by Lima's Catholic University. Given that there had been no national election in 15 years, it was not surprising that party recognition should be low. The survey was conducted before the rules for the Constituent elections were even set and before the political parties began collecting signatures, much less running their campaigns. Undoubtedly public awareness of what the Assembly would do and what the parties were increased during the campaign.

14. For an excellent analysis of Acción Popular and Belaúnde, see Bourricaud, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-62.

15. After the 1962 elections resulted in a virtual deadheat between AP and APRA, the military stopped the recount through a coup. New elections were held in 1963 in which Belaúnde received 34.2 percent of the vote and APRA's Haya de la Torre 30.1 percent. See Sanders, *op. cit.* and Carlos Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1969).

16. *Populista* experts did play some role in drafting the constitution by testifying before committees of the Constituent Assembly. However, they obviously had no votes in the Assembly. Ironically, AP's boycott of the Constituent elections may have cost them the presidential elections since they were unable to vote for a form of electing the chief executive that would have favored Belaúnde over the *aprista* candidate.

17. The control of Peru's highland landowners over the peasantry was already in a state of decay prior to the passage of the agrarian reform. Indeed, the reform tended to fill a rural power vacuum by asserting the dominant role of the state in the countryside and preventing the growth of an independent, peasant political movement. See, Henry Pease García *et al.*, *Estado y Política Agraria: 4 Ensayos* (Lima: Desco, 1977).

18. During the dictatorship of General Odría (1948-1956), the President gained support in the shantytowns by endorsing squatter invasions of unused

(low value) land on the periphery of Lima. See David Collier, *Squatters and Oligarchs: Public Policy and Modernization in Peru* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). That policy and the trading of jobs and political favors for votes built Odría and his UNO party a strong constituency in the Lima shantytowns in the 1962 and 1963 presidential elections. By 1978, that support had totally eroded.

19. The analysis of party positions presented here is based, in part, on interviews conducted with a number of Peruvian political leaders. They include: Mario Polar, PPC deputy in the Constituent Assembly; Andrés Townsend, a leader of the APRA delegation; Genaro Ledesma and Hugo Blanco, leaders of the FOCEP delegation; Carlos Malpica, UDP deputy; Avelino Mar, PSR deputy; Elías Mendoza, AP Secretary General for Lima, and a number of other political leaders, journalists, and academics who prefer to remain anonymous.

20. World Bank data for 1971 shows the poorest 40 percent of the Peruvian population receiving 6.5 percent of the national income. That figure tied Peru with Ecuador and Honduras for the lowest proportion of national income going to the bottom 40 percent in any Latin American nation and was exceeded only by South Africa (with 6.2%) among the nations of the world. See World Bank, *Redistribution with Growth* (Washington, 1974). Income distribution in Peru changed little from 1961 to 1973 under the Belaúnde and Velasco governments. See, Richard Webb, "Government Policy and the Distribution of Income in Peru, 1963-73, in Lowenthal, *op. cit.*

21. See Julio Cotler, "The New Mode of Political Domination in Peru" in Lowenthal, *op. cit.*; David Chaplin (ed.), *Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution* (Transaction Press, 1979).

22. On the military's contradictory attitude toward mass mobilization, see North, *op. cit.*; on the rise and fall of the CNA, see Handelman, *op. cit.*

23. APRA union strength was greatest in those sectors of the industrial, mining and rural work force organized during the earlier stages of Peruvian capitalist development (1930-1955), while the left was stronger in the more recently developed sectors: the bank workers and miners in the southern Cajone region, for example.

24. Bourricaud, *op. cit.*

25. Another leftist (but non-Marxist) party was the FNTC (National Federation of Workers and Peasants). The FNTC eventually secured four seats in the Assembly (with 3.8% of the vote), but, contrary to its name, it is a regionally based party with most of its strength in the department of Puno. Its fortunes were heavily tied to the Cáceres family. The left-center includes the Christian Democrats and the politically insignificant AP-Socialista.

26. There is voluminous literature on this fascinating party, most of it highly partisan. For an excellent review of the literature and the nature of the debate over APRA, see Liisa North, "The Peruvian Aprista Party and Haya de la Torre," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* (May 1975); on the development of APRA, see: Bourricaud, *op. cit.*; Peter Klarén, *Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo* (University of Texas Press: 1973); Liisa North, "Orígenes y crecimiento del partido aprista y el cambio socioeconómico en el Perú," *Desarrollo Económico* 38 (1970), pp. 163-214.

27. The details of the Trujillo uprising and subsequent massacre remain subject to intensely partisan debate. The evidence seems to suggest that the uprising was initiated by *aprista* militants without support from Haya de la Torre and the top party leadership. However, the *aprista* martyrs of the massacre are revered in party histories. I was introduced (at APRA headquarters) to a survivor of the military assault who was given all the reverence afforded in China to survivors of Mao's Long March. An unsuccessful, APRA-supported, military uprising in Callao in 1948 further inflamed military antagonism toward the party.

28. Voters for the Constituent Assembly selected the party of their preference and individual candidates within those parties.

29. A number of leftist leaders in exile or in hiding were granted immunity and allowed to take their seats in the Constituent Assembly after their election.

30. Rising copper prices and an improved fish catch have strengthened Peru's balance of trade in 1979 and her debt standing. However, such improvements have not been reflected in rising living standards. Minister of Finance Javier Silva Rueta indicated in

mid-1978 that the average worker's standard of living had declined by 40 percent between 1973 and 1978 and that there would be no marked improvement for three more years. However, the bottoming-out of the decline and a certain popular resignation to austerity may decrease the protest vote in 1980. In the meantime, militant labor protests have continued through October 1979.

31. APRA controlled most of the visitors' tickets and made sure that its militants dominated the galleries. I received my admission ticket through an APRA leader.

32. While the left (particularly the UDP which dominates the Peruvian Peasant Confederation—CCP) hoped to get a large portion of the illiterate, peasant vote, it is not clear where those votes will actually go. Belaúnde and AP will probably benefit as much as any party. In any event, enfranchisement of illiterates would reduce Lima's disproportionate role in national elections. In the June 1978 Constituent elections, the capital and its metropolitan area—with 20 percent of the nation's population—contributed 40 percent of the vote.

33. From APRA's perspective, this was one more instance of the opposition ganging up to block *aprista* electoral aspirations.

34. The left did have an indirect influence on the final document. Their

strong showing in the June 1978 election undoubtedly induced APRA to support several more "radical" clauses in the constitution so that the *apristas* could compete in the 1980 national elections for the votes that had previously gone to the left. Four of the clauses in the constitution brought the entire Assembly (including APRA) into conflict with the Morales Bermudez administration. The military regime objected to clauses which would exempt peasants from further payments for their agrarian reform land (a clause which the government felt would weaken the already shaky treasury); ban capital punishment except for treason in war; allow government employees to unionize; prohibit summary arrests and deportations. The Constituent Assembly insisted that the new constitution—including these four clauses—should go into effect immediately. The military regime, fearing that the last two clauses would impair its ability to deal with continuing labor unrest, insisted that the constitution not go into effect until the new civilian government took office. When the military sent these clauses back to the Assembly for revision, the entire body (including APRA and the PPC) refused to amend them.

35. The nomination of Armando Villanueva as the *aprista* candidate may have allayed the left's fears somewhat. Villanueva and his more progressive supporters have allegedly made some

political overtures to more moderate Marxist spokesmen (particularly the Communists and PSR) and to the left-of-center Christian Democrats.

36. In a marked contrast to Belaúnde's 1963 campaign (which spoke of new jungle frontiers and a glowing, ever-expanding, future for Peru), AP is now stressing the limited ability of any government to resolve Peru's economic crisis in the near future. AP spokesmen call for "appropriate technology" in the nation's development and draw extensively from Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful*.

37. In the flush of the left's strong showing in the June 1978 Constituent elections, Marxist sociologists Petras and Havens *op. cit.* predicted that Peru was on the "crossroads of either a socialist revolution or a fascist takeover." I see little prospect of the former, either through the electoral process or armed struggle. Indeed, one Marxist deputy in the Constituent Assembly confided to me that it was fortunate that the left stood no chance of winning the 1980 presidential election since such a victory *at the present time* would only bring about a rightist coup. He expressed the belief that that situation would change in the future.