

The bus from the state department capital of Cuzco into the Anta Valley carried us only as far as the town of Izcuchaca. There I disembarked with a small group of smartly dressed men and women in sport jackets and pant suits, carrying their cameras and new suitcases. All of us were traveling to the fifth national congress of the Confederación de Campesinos del Perú (CCP—Peruvian Peasant Confederation) which was being held in the small Andean village of Chacán. I soon learned that my Peruvian, apparently middle-class companions were not reporters nor an urban support group, as I had imagined, but a delegation to the peasant congress representing small landowners from the coastal state of Lambayeque. Their dress and manner sharply distinguished them from the local highland villagers (wearing Indian ponchos and sandals) who chatted in Quechua and watched the “gringos” (a term applied equally to foreigners and to whites from the Peruvian coast) with bemusement. It was the first time that any of the Lambayeque smallholders had ever been to the sierra (Andean highlands) and they excitedly snapped their cameras as a pack of llamas and alpacas appeared down the street. Surprisingly, they seemed less comfortable than I did among their fellow countrymen, their fellow *campesinos* (peasants) whom they were about to join in a national congress.

Starting out on the road toward Chacán, we waved down a truck filled with Indian villagers from the southern sierra province of Andahuaylas, a hotbed of peasant unrest in recent years. The Andahuaylans (some 50 of them) were delegates from various peasant communities who had traveled for over 15 hours along rough dirt roads in order to attend the congress. As we rode they sang a Quechua protest song to the haunting

accompaniment of Andean flutes. On the outskirts of Chacán we were stopped by a group of young “security guards” armed with pitchforks and clubs. Technically the CCP is not a legal rural organization, not having received government recognition as a peasant interest group under the terms of the 1974 rural mobilization law. Consequently, although the government was not interfering with the congress, these village guards were demanding credentials from delegates and letters of invitation from reporters and support groups in order to keep out “spies.”

Once a major spokesman for peasant discontent during the early 1960s (with the support of urban leftists), the Confederación de Campesinos became inactive in the middle of that decade owing to government repression of radical peasant organizations as well as limited concessions to campesino demands (through a state community development program and scattered agrarian reform). In 1974, the independently Marxist Vanguardia Revolucionaria helped revive the CCP at the Confederation's 4th National Congress. The organization's current support among landless peasants and smallholders in the northern state of Piura, the southern highland regions of Cuzco, Puno, and Apurímac, and (to a lesser extent) the coastal states of La Libertad and Lambayeque reflects the widespread discontent of many Peruvian peasants who haven't received the anticipated benefits of the military government's sweeping 1969 Agrarian Reform Decree.

Today, the CCP is one of Peru's two major national peasant organizations. The other one, the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) was established in 1973-74 under the auspices of the “revolutionary” military government for the purposes of combating landlord resistance to

agrarian reform. In mid-1978, the government dissolved the CNA at the national level after its top-ranking officers had proven to be too radical and independent for the tastes of a more conservative military regime. Avelino Mar, Secretary General of the CNA at the time of its official dissolution, and other CNA leaders attended the CCP Congress at Chacán in a move toward greater organizational cooperation.

The unfolding of the CCP's National Congress (the first since the organization's 1974 revival) suggested both the peasantry's potential for independent mobilization and the many obstacles still impeding the growth of a national campesino movement. Throughout the week one might observe various unresolved divisions within the confederation both at the rank and file and at the leadership level.

From the time I and the Lambayeque delegates first climbed onto the truck carrying the Andahuaylas villagers, I was struck by the cultural, economic, and linguistic differences between the *mestizo*, Spanish-speaking smallholders from the coast and the Quechua (or Aymara) highland campesinos. Later, at the congress itself, in talking with delegates from Peru's northern coast, I learned that many of them were small and medium farmers raising cotton, corn, and sorghum. Their principal concerns were for higher commodity prices and more government loans—rather modest, indeed petit-bourgeois, demands. Villagers from Cuzco and Puno—mostly cultivators of small subsistence plots or landless agricultural workers—were far more bitter and spoke angrily of their failure to receive land under the agrarian reform.

Within the highland peasantry, further divisions existed. I approached a group of villagers from the barren *altiplano* (high-altitude grazing region) of Puno, near the Bolivian border. They carried with them an Aymara flag which they proudly said they had successfully defended (at the cost of several peasant lives) two and one-half years earlier against attempts by local police to lower their banner and raise the Peruvian national flag. Their community leader expressed anger over the fact that bilingual Quechua-Spanish courses were being offered in many Cuzco villages while Aymara instruction was allegedly unavailable in Puno. Another Aymara-speaking peasant spoke contemptuously of the Quechuas' alleged lack of work ethic: "If we had land like this," he said, pointing to the

rich Anta Valley, "we wouldn't be going hungry."

After the hundreds of delegates had registered at Chacán, they assembled (by region) for a march back to Izcuchaca where an opening rally was to be held. I learned that Izcuchaca had recently been the site of a land seizure in which peasants from a nearby *comunidad* (a peasant village of smallholders with communal grazing land and work forms) had invaded a neighboring agrarian reform cooperative (i.e., an expropriated hacienda) because they had not been afforded the use of co-op land. Thus the rally site itself epitomized the differences between the beneficiaries of agrarian reform and the many villagers whose exclusion constitutes yet another impediment to peasant unity.

As we marched into Izcuchaca's main square, a battle for position was developing between supporters of Vanguardia Revolucionaria (the CCP's largest ideological faction) and those of the Partido Comunista Revolucionaria (a pro-Chinese faction), who also attempted to shout out each other with their respective slogans. The following day, I watched peasants at the congress gather in little circles in the fields outside Chacán listening to VR and PCR spokesmen engage in esoteric debates about the present state of the military's "bourgeois revolution" and the proper attitude of the radical left toward the announced transition to elected civilian government.<sup>1</sup> To my amazement, some of the village leaders to whom I spoke expressed interest in these highly ideological debates so far removed from the immediate needs and problems of the peasantry. Yet, most delegates seemed to view them as a necessary, if confusing prelude to discussion of the real issues. Moreover, in my conversations with delegates and with onlookers (from nearby Cuzco communities) at the Izcuchaca rally, I observed that the CCP leader with the highest degree of popularity among the campesinos was Hugh Blanco, a Quechua-speaking, Cuzco Trotskyist (elected to the Peruvian Constituent Assembly in the June 1978 national elections) whose Partido Socialista (PST) party had little influence in the Confederación de Campesinos.<sup>2</sup>

Cleavages such as these mute, but do not silence the voice of rural discontent. Since the outbreak of widespread peasant land invasions in the early 1960s and the accompanying growth of campesino federations, the Peruvian government has no longer been able to ignore the voice of its

rural tenants, smallholders, and agricultural workers. On June 24, 1969, General Juan Valasco Alvarado, President of the revolutionary military regime that had seized power the year before, announced the promulgation of the most sweeping land reform program in Latin America since the Cuban Revolution. "Peasants," he declared, "the landlords will no longer eat from your poverty."<sup>3</sup>

Unlike most of the Latin American agrarian reform laws issued in the 1960s, Peru's land redistribution was carried forth vigorously. By 1978, the traditional Andean haciendas and coastal plantations that had long dominated Peruvian agriculture were no longer in the hands of an all-powerful rural oligarchy. The political and economic power structure of the countryside and, hence, of the nation as a whole had been significantly altered. The CCP's resurgence in recent years and the CNA's growing militancy, on the other hand, indicate that, whatever its accomplishments, the government has failed to bring tranquility to the countryside. The search for explanations for this failure must begin with an appreciation of conditions before the rural reform, then proceed through the complex of political forces unleashed by changes in land tenancy, the mobilization of rural interest groups, the government's reaction, and the effects of all these changes on agricultural production.

### **Peru's Traditional Rural Structure**

Understanding Peruvian rural change since 1969 requires a brief review of land tenancy and rural power relationships prior to the reform. Underlying both is the distinction between coastal and highland agriculture. While both regions were dominated prior to 1969 by large latifundia, they differed in terms of their production methods, labor relations, and markets.<sup>4</sup>

*The Coastal Plantations.* Most of the thin strip that runs along the Pacific coast of Peru is a barren, uninhabited desert. However, in a series of valleys, irrigated by rivers that flow down from the Andes, are located the nation's largest cities (including the capital, Lima, and its twin city, Callao), half the country's population, and its capital-intensive, modern agricultural sector. The coast, particularly Lima, has long been the center of political and economic power as well as the seat of its *criollo* (white, Spanish) culture. In addition, the vast sugar plantations of La Libertad and Lambayeque have produced Peru's principal

twentieth-century agricultural export.<sup>5</sup> The sugar barons diversified their capital into banking, commerce, and industry as well. Indeed, "coastal sugar and cotton exporters had formed the dominant sector of the country's ruling coalition during the twentieth century" prior to the agrarian reform.<sup>6</sup> Smaller coastal haciendas (generally 50-250 hectares) also produced the rice, milk, and much of the vegetables for urban markets.

Coastal export agriculture (particularly sugar) has been characterized by a relatively high degree of capital investment (most notably in irrigation) and mechanization. Labor was provided by a permanent, salaried work force (supplemented by seasonal workers hired during the harvest) which generally manifested a working-class, rather than peasant orientation. Employer-worker relations were often impersonal and sugar workers, along with many other coastal agricultural workers, were organized into unions for more than two decades prior to the agrarian reform. Most of the unions—including the powerful Federation of Sugar Workers—were dominated by APRA, a reformist, populist political party which has brought together middle- and lower-class voters into Peru's largest political organization.<sup>7</sup> Worker demands were usually moderate and trade-unionist: higher wages and fringe benefits, better working conditions. The union members were little interested in agrarian reform and, indeed, when Peru passed its first, modest, land redistribution legislation in 1964, APRA insisted that the coastal plantations be excluded. During the late 1960s and early '70s, APRA union leadership was successfully challenged by leftist insurgents in some of the Lambayeque plantations.

*The Traditional Highland Hacienda.* If the Peruvian coast is the center of *criollo* culture and power, then the sierra is the repository of Indian and mestizo tradition. Two-thirds of the *serrano* population is rural and for the majority of highland peasants, Quechua is the primary language. Less than half the region's adults are literate.<sup>8</sup> Following agriculture, the sierra's major economic sector is mining, the source of Peru's most important exports. Primarily, however, the highlands have served the coastal cities as an "internal colony," a source of cheap labor, food, and raw materials.

Unlike the coastal plantations, the Andean haciendas have usually produced food for nearby local markets or for Lima-Callao. Except for some wool trade, Andean agriculture has not served the

export market. Particularly in the south, huge latifundia—devoted primarily to raising sheep, llamas, alpacas, and (at lower altitudes) cattle—have dominated the landscape. In Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Puno, and Apurímac, haciendas of over 500 hectares held 59-82 percent of the agricultural-livestock land area. In Puno there were 11 latifundia of 20,000 to 46,000 hectares.<sup>9</sup> These vast estates coexisted with thousands of peasant communities (Indian or mestizo) often containing both agricultural plots (each usually under 5 hectares in size) and communal grazing land. Peasant agriculture, along with many medium-sized haciendas, was primarily devoted to the production of corn, potatoes, grains, and vegetables either for subsistence consumption or for sale on the domestic market.

While the sierra's *hacendados* (hacienda owners) lacked the national economic and political power of the coastal oligarchy, they had great influence at the local level. Within the hacienda itself, they exercised considerable power over the neofeudal peons (called *feudatarios*) well into the middle of the twentieth century. In return for usufruct of a small plot of land and, perhaps, limited grazing rights, the hacienda feudatario rendered virtually unpaid labor on the hacendado's land for as many as 150-200 days per year. Often the peons were required to sell their crop surplus to the landowner at below-market prices. Resistance to this neofeudal system was reduced by the peasants' dependence on their "*patrón*" for tools, loans, aid in times of medical need, protection from the police, and support of fiestas.<sup>10</sup> Traditionally, the feudatarios were kept isolated from "potentially dangerous" contacts with outsiders, with peasants on other haciendas, and even—through the hacendados' tactics of playing peons off against each other—from other peons on the same estate. Peasants who became "trouble-makers" could be expelled from the hacienda or worse. Thus, until the 1960s, unionization of hacienda workers was extremely rare and even during the outbreak of peasant unrest in the early part of that decade, the feudatarios were less mobilized than village smallholders.<sup>11</sup>

The majority of highland peasants were not bound to the haciendas: most were village *minifundistas* (owners of small plots), and a few were landless, transient laborers. The peasant smallholders—particularly those belonging to organized communities—were more independent than the hacienda peons,<sup>12</sup> although they too were subject to the economic and political power of the

hacendado and his allies among the merchants, police, and local officials. This was particularly true of those minifundistas who were forced to supplement their income by working part of the year on nearby haciendas.<sup>13</sup> Finally, the independent peasant communities often were faced with long term encroachments by the haciendas on the villages' communal grazing land.

Throughout Peruvian postcolonial history, there have been periodic peasant rebellions; between 1921-22 (a period of particular unrest) and the mid-1960s, there were 33 recorded revolts in the southern sierra alone.<sup>14</sup> With some notable exceptions, however, these hundreds of scattered *jacqueries* and other "primitive rebellions" were generally isolated movements, lacking organization, ideology, or well-defined goals and, hence, were easily crushed.

### Land Tenure

Although the types of agricultural systems predominant in the two regions differed, both the more capitalistic coastal farms and the more feudal Andean highlands were marked by the heavy concentration of land in a small number of units. The results of a 1972 national agricultural census revealed the extent of such concentration. (Although the census was conducted three years after the promulgation of the agrarian reform, the data reflects the pre-reform situation, both because hacienda expropriation had scarcely begun in the highlands, and because those estates already expropriated on both the coast and the sierra were retained as cooperative production units and were not broken up.<sup>15</sup>).

Smallholders (0-5 hectares) accounted for 80 percent of the agricultural units on both the coast and the sierra, but held less than 10 percent of the land (see Table 1). Indeed, over half of those *minifundia* were under one hectare and accounted for a total of only 1.1 percent of coastal and 0.8 percent of Andean farmland. At the other end of the scale, 62 vast coastal estates owned nearly half of that region's agricultural area. Although the figures for the Andes appear even more extreme, the data are slightly misleading: the census table did not distinguish between haciendas and communally owned (village) pasture lands, thus failing to reveal that, of the 15 million hectares of sierra land concentrated in units of over 200 hectares, some 6 million actually belonged to 1,235 village pastures.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, large highland haciendas (the 5,400 estates that held over 200 hectares) actually controlled "only" 46 percent of

**Table 1**  
**Land Concentration on the Peruvian Coast and Highlands**

Size of Unit	Coast		Highlands	
	Number of Units (%)	Area (Hectares) (%)	Number of Units (%)	Area (Hectares) (%)
0-5 hectares	135,651 (79.9%)	176,568 (9.5%)	884,209 (81.7%)	1,168,998 (6.5%)
5-50	31,416 (18.5%)	350,657 (19.0%)	179,937 (16.6%)	2,049,688 (10.6%)
50-200	2,271 (1.3%)	218,589 (11.8%)	11,386 (1.1%)	1,086,931 (5.5%)
200-2,500	486 (0.3%)	245,944 (13.4%)	5,741 (0.5%)	3,455,042 (17.9%)
over 2,500	62 (0.05%)	855,513 (46.3%)	894 (0.1%)	11,530,803 (59.5%)
Total	169,886	1,847,271	1,082,167	19,291,462

Source: *II Censo Nacional Agropecuario* (Lima: Oficina Nacional de Estadística y Censos, 1975).

the region's land. Even with this adjustment, latifundia domination was almost as great in the highlands as on the coast.

### **Socioeconomic Changes**

The first organized challenges to this strongly hierarchical rural structure originated, not surprisingly, on the more capitalistic, modernized coast. The plantation workers' greater hispanization, higher levels of education and literacy, and greater exposure to the national political culture (as compared to the Andean peasantry), coupled with the impersonalized labor relations of corporate agriculture, produced a certain degree of working-class consciousness. During the 1940s, with the help of APRA party sponsors, coastal plantation workers were able to secure government recognition of their unions, the right to collective bargaining, the minimum wage, and the few social security benefits afforded by Peruvian law. While certain union locals became militant at times during the next two decades, and while strikes were sometimes violent, the region's agricultural workers—tempered by the APRA unions' moderate orientation—never challenged the national political system or the bases of the country's agricultural structure.

In the sierra, the peasantry's organizational capability was impeded by its frequent lack of familiarity with the Spanish language, low levels of literacy and education, and relative isolation from national politics. Through the 1950s and 1960s, however, some socioeconomic changes were taking place that eventually led to widespread mobilization within the Andean peasantry. When the campesinos finally confronted the culture of domination and oppression, their

challenge was far more dramatic and militant than that of the coastal workers.

The spread of rural education in the highlands gradually produced a pool of politicized (often radical) students and teachers who provided the leadership skills and sophistication for incipient peasant organization. Increased literacy and the spread of mass communication (mainly radios) also brought villages in contact with the Peruvian political system. Finally, the extensive migration of Andean villagers to urban centers (Lima and highland Department capitals) brought the migrants into contact with unions, political parties, and other agents of change. Those who returned to their communities to visit or to live provided new ideas and skilled leadership.

These forces of modernization were, of course, spreading throughout Latin America and the Third World during the postwar decades. In Peru, however, they were augmented by factors particular to that country. In the central highland states of Pasco and Junin, the expansion of mining and metal refining drew large numbers of peasants from neighboring communities into the modern work force. Through the miners and metal workers' union, these former peasants established a network of contacts with other villagers in the region. They also learned basic political and organizational skills and developed greater political consciousness and militancy.

All these factors were superimposed on a steady decline in the economy and philosophy of the traditional hacienda system. Increasing numbers of hacendados, anxious to leave the countryside for the greater attractions of the city (or pressured to do so by their children), managed their property as

absentee landlords, thereby reducing control over their peons. Others sold their estates—in part or entirely—to the land-hungry peasantry. Some landlords preferred to switch from feudal sharecropping and debt-labor arrangements to cash rental of their plots—or, in other instances, were pressured by increasingly militant peasants to do so. Finally some peons simply stopped paying rent on their plots as their patrón's control decreased.<sup>17</sup> Thus, by the early 1960s, only some 30 percent of sierra land and less than a fourth of the peasantry were subject to traditional neofeudal arrangements. The remaining land was either rented to the peasantry or was owned by communities and smallholders.<sup>18</sup> In short, in the Andes—with most of Peru's rural population and over 90 percent of its agro-livestock land—the stagnant, unproductive, old order was crumbling before the implementation of agrarian reform.

### **Land Seizures and Peasant Federations<sup>19</sup>**

From 1959 through 1964, peasant unrest exploded across the sierra, set loose by the socioeconomic changes just described. Initially, campesino mobilization centered in two areas: the central Andean mining and ranching state of Pasco; and La Convención, a cocoa, sugar, tea, and coffee-growing valley located on the eastern (high jungle) slope of the Andes. In Pasco, several villages, frustrated by latifundia encroachment on community grazing lands, and angered by conflicts with the Cerro de Pasco mining corporation (which also owned ranches), engaged in a series of hacienda invasions to "recover" land they insisted had been stolen from them over the years. The land seizures (or "recuperations" as the peasants and their supporters insist they should be called) occurred periodically from 1959 to 1962, sometimes resulting in successful occupations, more often leading to bloody police repressions. In La Convención the unrest involved both independent villagers (as in Pasco) and hacienda sharecroppers who formed a union to resist exploitation by their landlords. Led by Hugo Blanco, who came from Cuzco to join them, the campesinos first merely insisted on paying their rent in cash, then refused to pay rent at all, and finally seized the haciendas. Both of the peasant movements led to the formation of *sindicato* (union) federations and elicited support from leftist urban unions and university students.

By 1962, both the Pasco and La Convención movements had been "brought under control," but each planted the seeds of further mobilization

in the central and southern highlands. One year later, following the election of reformist President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, a wave of hacienda land invasions swept across the Andes. Belaúnde had actively sought the peasant vote—a significant voting bloc by 1963—and promised land redistribution. His government's initially tolerant attitude toward the seizures led hundreds of peasant communities—primarily in Pasco, Cuzco, and Junín—to occupy hacienda land they claimed was theirs. Ultimately, as many as 300,000 sierra villagers may have taken part in the movement. Land invasions were also accompanied by the formation of peasant federations, often linked with urban radicals—the only political group willing to support the campesino unrest.

In 1964, the Belaúnde administration came under intense pressure from the oligarchy, opposition political parties (including APRA), and the military to stop what many perceived to be a revolutionary threat. Most of the peasant federations were repressed, particularly those in the south that had links with urban Marxists. Some peasants kept their land, however, and Belaúnde's limited agrarian reform program (gutted by the opposition majority in Congress) granted legal sanction to many of the occupations. More important, though the government eventually repressed the peasant federations and crushed a 1965 guerrilla movement, the lesson of the early 1960s unrest was not lost on the military. When reform-oriented officers led by General Velasco ousted President Belaúnde in 1968, they resolved that the only way to bring long-lasting peace to the Peruvian countryside was to enact an agrarian reform which would truly eradicate latifundia domination of land tenancy.

### **The Military's Rural Revolution**

Probably more than any other program initiated by the Velasco government, Agrarian Reform Decree Law 17716 (June 24, 1969) expressed the "radical reformist" modernizing ideology of the military's more progressive sector. Few observers at the time of the reform decree—and certainly not the government itself—foresaw the full political and economic consequences of the proposed change. Critics on the left saw the agrarian reform, and the government's policies in general, as insufficient, bourgeois incrementalist change. Much of the Peruvian upper class and bourgeoisie viewed it (and the government in general) as quasi-communistic and the ruination of the country's productive capacities. In time, it proved to be neither a panacea for the country's

ills nor the cause of its economic collapse. Whatever its merits and faults, however, it seriously altered (probably irrevocably) political and economic power relationships in the Peruvian countryside.

The agrarian reform was based on a series of assumptions that were basic to the Velasco regime. Fundamental rural change was viewed as necessary for the following reasons:

(a) social justice demanded that long-standing inequities in the countryside and the domination of the peasantry be ended;

(b) without reform, national political tranquility would always be threatened by the latent potential for rural revolution;

(c) industrialization and broad-ranged economic development could only be accomplished if the rural population was further integrated into the consumer market;

(d) the landed aristocracy was a backward-looking elite whose continued power stood in the way of national industrialization and modernization;

(e) agrarian reform would create rural employment and slow down migration to Lima and other crowded cities;

(f) reform could be used as a means of transferring capital from the insulated, highland agricultural sector into the more modern and dynamic sectors of the economy;

(g) agrarian reform would increase agricultural production (and productivity) thereby better supplying the country's food, raw material, and export needs.<sup>20</sup>

Underlying the reform, then, was the military's anti-oligarchical impulse. Government spokesmen talked openly of "breaking the back of the oligarchy" and, several months after the reform decree was issued, President Velasco declared "the oligarchy is an impediment to a true development of Peruvian industrialization and has always been on the side of international consortiums."<sup>21</sup> To be sure, the military came to office at a time when the power of the traditional landed aristocracy was well into the process of collapse. The new military government was now ready to finish off the tottering hacendado wing of the oligarchy and, at the same time, confront the still-powerful coastal plantation barons.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, the reform would, it was hoped, have the additional advantage of lining up coastal agricultural

workers and the Andean peasantry behind the new regime, no small gain for a government in need of legitimacy.

Within 48 hours of the promulgation of Decree 17716, 8 of Peru's 9 largest sugar complexes were seized (with the ninth expropriated soon afterward). Together these estates had produced 60 percent of the nation's sugar.<sup>23</sup> This sector had specifically been excluded from Belaúnde's 1964 legislation and by expropriating them first (and so quickly) the military clearly demonstrated the seriousness of its intent. Tactically, the swift seizure of these vast plantations denied the rural oligarchy's most powerful sector (with important investments in banking, commerce, and industry) time to organize resistance or to decapitalize. The military also may have seen the expropriations as a way to weaken the *aprista* Sugar Workers Confederation, as APRA was a long-time *bête noire* of the armed forces.

If the military's motivation was anti-oligarchical, it was not socialist. While the largest haciendas and plantations were to be expropriated, the government envisioned an important role in the new rural order for the middle-sized farmer. Hacendados in the Andes were initially allowed to maintain some 55 hectares of irrigated land (more in some provinces) and twice as much unirrigated. On the coast, landlords could retain up to 150 hectares.<sup>24</sup> Having the right to choose what portion of their property they retained, the hacienda owners obviously kept the most productive land.

While the decision to permit, indeed to encourage, an agrarian "middle class" made sense from a productive and administrative point of view, it failed to anticipate the political problems arising from this group's attempts to limit the reform. The decision also conflicted with the peasantry's and agricultural proletariat's desire to extend land redistribution. In fact, Peru's military rulers initially viewed agrarian reform in highly technocratic terms, seeing it as a means of relocating resources, removing impediments to economic modernization, and increasing production and purchasing power. In conventional military fashion, most government officials envisioned the process of change as being dictated from above, with little room for peasant influence.<sup>25</sup> There was little appreciation of the complex political forces that would be unleashed or of the relationship of land tenancy to the power structure.<sup>26</sup> When the process of land redistribution led to renewed rural mobilization, rather than depoliti-

cization, the armed forces were confused and divided over how to cope.

### The 1969-1974 Period

For the first two years after promulgation of the reform decree, government expropriations were confined primarily to the coast. In the sierra, activity was largely limited to Cuzco, Junín, and Pasco—sites of 1960s peasant mobilization—and consisted principally of transferring title to peasant cooperatives of land already held by the agrarian reform institute (under the 1964 legislation) or of property in de facto control of the villagers as the result of invasions. In mid-1971, the Minister of Agriculture announced that the reform had largely been completed on the coast and that future expropriations would henceforth be focused primarily in the highlands.<sup>27</sup>

The process of expropriation is a slow one necessitating inspection of titles, determination of sometimes confusing boundaries, assessment of the land's value, and landlord appeals to an agrarian reform tribunal.<sup>28</sup> Typically, nearly two years elapsed from the time a hacienda was initially marked for expropriation and the time it was actually taken over by the agrarian reform institute (the nine major sugar complexes seized immediately after the reform decree were the major exception). Another year or more might pass until the title to the land was transferred to the peasantry (adjudication).

The complex process of expropriation and adjudication stretched the resources of the Ministry of Agriculture's technicians. Since it seemed impossible to handle the whole country at once, the government concentrated first on the coast, which held over one-fourth of Peru's cropland and 60 percent of its irrigated land in cultivation (see Table 2).<sup>29</sup> The long lapse time, however, allowed many highland hacendados to decapitalize their estates or to divide up title to their land between relatives (though the latter process was far more restricted than in other Latin American nations undergoing agrarian reform). By 1974, the slow rate of reform in the Andes precipitated renewed peasant unrest, which in turn accelerated government expropriations.

### The Hacendados Defend Their Interests: 1970-1972<sup>30</sup>

In the face of the "revolutionary" government's resolute attack on the latifundia system, Peru's landed elite found itself in an unaccustomed defensive position. The swift and definitive expropriation of the sugar complexes precluded any

**Table 2**  
**Land Use in the Coast and Highlands: 1972**

Type of Land	Highlands (Hectares)	Coast (Hectares)
Cultivated (Irrigated Crop)	2,280,523 (491,616)	806,198 (744,177)
Pasture	14,300,712	495,638
Other (Woods, Mountains)	2,782,226	543,435
Total	19,363,461	1,845,271

Source: *II Censo Nacional Agropecuario-1972* (Lima: Oficina Nacional de Estadística y Censos, 1975). Cited in Fernando Eguren, "La Tierra: Su Distribucion y los Regímenes de Tenencia" (Lima: Desco, 1978).

broad-front attack against agrarian reform. Most of the Peruvian lower and middle classes—in short, the bulk of public opinion—shared the military's anti-oligarchical sentiments. Consequently, landowning interest groups decided to salvage what they could and launched a defense of the "small and medium private property owner." Appealing to the more conservative, technocratically oriented officers within the Ministry of Agriculture and to the interests of the urban middle class, the hacendados tried to limit the damage done them by the reform program.

The landowners had several objectives: to slow down the pace of land expropriation, giving themselves time to organize politically; to decapitalize; to maximize the land ceiling; to maximize opportunities for selling their land at better terms than offered under the agrarian reform or to subdivide it among relatives and friends; and to isolate "radicals" within the armed forces who threatened the sanctity of private property.

The hacendados' political interests were articulated through the National Agrarian Society (SNA), the long-time spokesman of the rural elite, particularly the coastal exporters. The SNA sought to influence public opinion at large as well as attitudes within the military government. From 1970 onward, it launched a public relations campaign aided by editorials in the conservative press. The highly influential *La Prensa* of Lima, owned by Pedro Beltrán, a prominent landowner, was a critical ally in this effort. Ads and editorials stressed the need to respect private property. They also argued that middle-sized haciendas were more efficient than the agrarian reform co-ops



and were therefore critical in maintaining food production for the cities (the latter claim designed to elicit urban working-class as well as middle-class support). In a further effort to recast its oligarchical image, in 1969 the SNA reorganized its executive board to include owners of middle-sized haciendas and elected as president Luis Gamarra Otero, an agricultural engineer who owned a 55-hectare coastal hacienda.

SNA's "opening" was more than cosmetic. It was designed to forge an alliance between the old rural elite and medium (or even small) owners of private property. Such a coalition was facilitated by family ties between many large and medium-sized hacendados. Political support also came from the National Society of Industry and from conservative sectors of the National College of Lawyers. At the same time, however, the powerful coastal interests that had long dominated the SNA decided to cast off more traditional Andean hacendados whose political influence was primarily exercised at the local government level (and who were therefore increasingly powerless as the military centralized authority at the national level). Stressing the norms of efficiency, SNA propaganda urged the government to concentrate its efforts on: expropriating the neofeudal highland haciendas; improving the operation of already-expropriated coastal cooperatives; and colonizing new lands in the eastern jungle.

The SNA's energetic defense of middle-sized production units received a sympathetic hearing from Agricultural Minister General Jorge Barandiarán, who declared at a June 1970 press conference that private ownership must be protected since "increases in agricultural production will come through the middle-sized agricultural unit, through professional entrepreneurs with 150 hectares or less."<sup>31</sup> New regulations were issued at that time by the ministry to guarantee the rights of private owners. In March 1970 the ceiling on irrigated crop land was raised from 15 to 30 hectares in 4 Andean provinces.

Thus during the first two years of the agrarian reform the landowners were successful in slowing down the pace of land expropriation. Encouraged by the Agricultural Ministry to divide their land privately, many hacendados—particularly in the sierra where peasants were less well informed and very little expropriation was taking place in the early years—sold portions of their estates to their peons at prices that were more favorable to the owners (and costly to the peasants) than the terms of the reform law. Other landlords took advantage

of the government's "private division policy"—clearly designed to encourage subdivision of haciendas among their peons—to transfer title to relatives and circumvent ceilings legislation.

### **The Peasants React:**

#### **Coastal Mobilization: 1969-1972**

The hacendados' attempts to slow down and contain the sweep of land reform were not entirely successful. Their public relations campaign was challenged both by peasant countermobilization and by the more radical elements of the Peruvian armed forces.

Initial peasant reaction came on the coast, spreading both among those peasants who had failed to get land (or not enough) and within the reform cooperatives, where workers often were disillusioned by the new tenancy arrangements. In October 1969—just months after the promulgation of the land reform decree—and again in early 1970 workers on the "Huando" orange plantation, located in the Chancay valley north of Lima, protested its owners' efforts to evade expropriation by dividing the estate privately. When private subdivision was resumed in mid-1970, a new strike was called (in October) which lasted four months. Featuring several marches on the Presidential Palace, the Huando unrest became a national symbol of the confrontation between hacendado and peasant, and a test of the government's resolve to enforce agrarian reform. The plantation's workers were supported by radical students from the National Agrarian University, leftist urban labor unions, Hugo Blanco (just released from seven years imprisonment) and progressive newspapers such as Lima's *Expreso*. In November 1970 some 10,000 hacienda workers in the coastal Cañete valley struck against private subdivision of latifundia in their region.

If the SNA's attempts to protect the interests of the middle-sized hacendado were supported by conservative officers in the Ministry of Agriculture, protesting coastal peasants were endorsed by more radical military elements, particularly officers in ONDECOOP (National Office of Cooperative Development), the government agency charged with establishing agricultural co-ops. In February 1971—responding to the coastal demonstrations—the government annulled the owner-initiated subdivision of Hacienda Huando and other estates in the Chancay and Huaral valleys.

Expressions of discontent among peasants who had not yet benefited from land redistribution

were supplemented by unrest among agricultural workers who *had* been included in the reform process. On the coast most expropriated lands (particularly the sugar plantations) were turned into cooperatives called CAPs (Agricultural Production Cooperatives). Under the terms of the agrarian reform decree, managerial control was to be exercised by a directive board composed of elected representatives from the ranks of the cooperative's workers as well as government-appointed technicians. Although government rhetoric insisted that CAPs would be controlled primarily by the workers themselves ("the land belongs to those who work it"), it soon became apparent that real power often rested in the hands of government technicians ("*técnicos*"). In some instances these new administrators were the same people who had previously worked for the plantations' private owners. While such administrative continuity may have sometimes improved initial efficiency, it added to the workers' feelings that their "masters" had merely changed from private corporations or hacendados to the state. After announcing that the CAPs would be administered by their worker-elected Delegate Assemblies, the government proceeded to designate the majority of delegates on the principal coastal sugar plantations. In the Tumán sugar plantation, 98 of 120 delegates were designated by the state. On the giant Casagrande complex, the government selected 96 of 120. Indeed, in only one of the nation's primary sugar plantations (Cayaltí) did the workers really elect a majority of their Delegate Assembly.<sup>32</sup>

While government control over the critical sugar industry may have been justified on technical grounds or even in terms of the national interest, the contradiction between the agrarian reform's radical rhetoric and governmental behavior reflected both the crippling internal divisions within the armed forces and the military's general failure to grasp the political implications of its own actions. In order to insure the "continuity of technical and administrative direction" on the haciendas (as called for in Article 30 of the Agrarian Reform Law), reform was carried out from the top down ("on behalf of the peasants") with little or no grassroots participation. Even in the election of those delegates to the Delegate Assembly whom the workers did choose, white-collar workers were overrepresented and union officers were barred from holding positions.

Opposition to "external" (government) control of the CAPs was organized by two different groups. In the northern coastal state of La Libertad, members of the centrist APRA sugar workers' union resented the exclusion of their officers from the cooperatives' directorships. More radical resistance to government control came from the Marxist-led plantation workers in Lambayeque. From November 1969 through the end of 1971, strikes and protest demonstrations were carried out on many of the major coastal plantations. Workers on the haciendas "Tumán" and "Cayaltí" were particularly militant and elected CAP representatives who vigorously attacked the government's domination of cooperative administration. In Tumán confrontations between workers and government bureaucrats led to more than 50 arrests.

Initially the government reacted strongly against the coastal unrest. In March 1970 APRA union leaders on the Cartavio plantation were arrested during a strike. As discontent spread, the military issued a decree calling for the imprisonment of those "who block the progress of agrarian reform." The vaguely worded decree was designed to squelch opposition both from the rightist SNA and from militant hacienda workers. Conservative military elements even succeeded in removing some of the government's own ONDECOOP organizers who had proven to be too zealous in their mobilization of the peasantry. In January 1972 hundreds of police occupied the hacienda Tumán and arrested 40 worker leaders.

Gradually government policy began to change as more left-leaning military officers pressed for greater peasant participation in the reform process. One month after jailing the militant union leadership at the Tumán plantation, the government released them and increased the level of rank and file influence in the hacienda's administrative process. This turnabout in state policy was but one of several attempts by the military to respond to the coastal peasantry's unexpectedly vigorous mobilization. These events, coming after the organized campesino protests in the central coastal valleys north and south of Lima from 1969 through 1971 that forced the government to annul owner-initiated parcelization of estates in that region, made clear that a purely technocratic, nonpolitical agrarian reform was impossible. Organized pressure was being exerted on the government from both right and left, forcing a re-examination of basic rural policies.

### SINAMOS and the Death of the SNA: 1972-1974

In July 1971, ONDECOOP was replaced by SINAMOS, the "National System of Support for Social Mobilization." Officially designed to serve as a "transmission belt" of demands from the population to the government, SINAMOS was motivated largely by growing rural unrest. Peru's military rulers saw it as an umbrella organization which would stimulate and channel urban and rural mass participation in the revolutionary process and thereby weaken challenges to government authority from the right or the left. For the more radical officers, such as General Leonidas Rodríguez, SINAMOS' first national director, the organization provided a means for increasing peasant participation in the agrarian reform and for combating efforts by the landlords to restrict land redistribution. More conservative military men hoped that SINAMOS would outflank radically led, independent peasant organizations in Lambayeque and Piura.

The creation of SINAMOS intensified hacendado opposition to government policies. Landlords reacted indignantly when radical SINAMOS organizers at the grassroots level not only removed a number of rightist local officials but also, on occasion, supported peasant takeovers of expropriated haciendas. An SNA newspaper advertisement in the pages of *La Prensa* indicated the extent of landlord alarm. Entitled "Urgent," it charged that "known professional agitators tied to SINAMOS are entering coastal estates."<sup>33</sup> As the pace of land expropriation accelerated, hacendados hastened to decapitalize their land. Faced with growing landlord intransigence, on May 12, 1972, the military regime issued a decree calling for the creation of a National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) to serve as the sole legally recognized voice of agricultural interests. The most important effect of the new decree was the withdrawal of legal recognition for the hacendado-dominated SNA. In the months that followed, landlords made one more last-ditch attempt to slow the force of rural change. Through the closing months of 1972 and in early 1973, middle-sized owners organized a series of public demonstrations in the coastal state. In June 1973, a march by some 5,000 northern landowners in the state of Piura attacked the "collectivist" nature of the agrarian reform. Three months later the first "National Congress of Small and Medium Farmers and Ranchers" was held in Arequipa. Delegates allegedly representing all the country's 21 states demanded greater landlord input in the

agrarian reform, attacked new rules limiting owner-initiated sale and division of estates, and called for the abolition of SINAMOS. As usual, these demonstrations and congresses were accompanied by a public relations campaign in the conservative press.

This time the landlords' efforts attained very limited success. To be sure, in August 1973, conservative voices in the Agriculture Ministry did issue a "Law of Defense of Medium and Small Property" which gave private owners some additional protection. However, the same law also restricted the private purchase of new lands and permitted the expropriation of any middle-sized haciendas whose owners were not providing housing for their workers or were not conforming with national labor legislation (as was commonly true in the rural sector). As more leftist military men secured greater influence in formulating agrarian policy, government spokesmen criticized those who "use the defense of private property [as a means] of attacking the revolution." The July 1974 expropriation of *La Prensa* (and other major Peruvian newspapers) stripped the landowning class of its principal voice. Combined with the earlier abolition of the SNA, this government action helped silence the rural landlord's voice in national politics.

### The Growth of the CNA and the Spread of Peasant Unrest

As the pace of land expropriation quickened in 1973-73, and as the government stiffened its position against the rural oligarchy, Peru's military rulers saw a need for greater state control over spiraling peasant unrest. Through SINAMOS and the CNA, policy-makers hoped to direct campesino mobilization against the hacendados while at the same time diverting the peasantry away from more radical, independent organizations. The National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) was designed to include the entire range of agricultural interests. In effect, however, it largely represented the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform and members of the organized peasant communities (*comunidades campesinas* with communal lands). Day laborers, landless peasants, and independent smallholders were only marginally represented.

The CNA was organized through a pyramidal structure with each of the country's provinces having an Agrarian League representing its various base organizations. The leagues would elect delegates to a state-wide federation which

would, in turn, elect national representatives for the CNA. The first provincial Agrarian Leagues were established, under the direction of SINAMOS organizers, in October 1972, and four months later the first state federation was created in Piura (a center of peasant unrest at that time). Although several additional federations were organized in 1973, it was not until September 1974 that a sufficiently extensive rural network was created to justify holding the CNA's first national congress.

Peruvian sociologist Mariano Valderrama maintains that local base organizations or even provincial Agrarian Leagues were often initiated by SINAMOS organizers (called "promoters") with little or no peasant involvement. In one province, only three of the league's nine base organizations ever actually held meetings. In other instances, local CNA officials were elected who were government bureaucrats having little contact with the peasants they allegedly represented. Finally, the CNA was mistrusted by more militant campesinos who often viewed it as little more than the government's arm for controlling the peasantry. Marginal peasants—the landless and those with holdings too small to be visible—initially perceived the CNA as the voice of richer campesinos, particularly those who had benefited from the agrarian reform.

Given these early difficulties, it is small wonder that the government-sponsored confederation did little to stem the rising tide of rural discontent in various parts of the country. By 1973, the magnitude of rural discontent had grown both in terms of geographical spread and the intensity of protest. During 1974 peasant militancy reached a climax in the highland province of Andahuaylas, located in the south-central state of Apurímac. Inhabiting one of the most feudalistic, latifundia-dominated regions of Peru, the campesinos of Andahuaylas had greeted the 1969 Agrarian Reform Decree with great hope and expectation. As one local leader put it, "When we heard on the radio that they had thrown out the owners of the great coastal haciendas, we said '[President] Velasco is a man!' We thought that here in Andahuaylas they would do the same, that they would throw out the rural bosses [*gamonales*] who had robbed our land, those who had killed our animals when they entered the pasture."<sup>34</sup> Yet, more than five years later, Andahuaylas remained virtually untouched by the reform. As of June 1973, only 4 of the province's 130 haciendas had been expropriated. Peasants watched with mounting frustration as local hacendados decapitalized their

estates, selling off animals and equipment in anticipation of eventual expropriation. Finally, on July 15, 1974, militant campesinos, organized into FEPCA (the Provincial Federation of Andahuaylas Peasants), seized a local hacienda. Other land invasions soon followed and during the next three months peasant unrest spread across the province until a total of 68 haciendas had been seized. Working closely with Vanguardia Revolucionaria, FEPCA leaders coupled their land seizure movement with attacks on "capitalist imperialism and the bourgeois state."

Surprised by the intensity of the Andahuaylas movement, the government initially took a conciliatory position, entering into negotiations with FEPCA leaders and ignoring hacendado calls for the expulsion of peasants from the invaded estates. At the same time, however, government-controlled newspapers as well as the newly organized CNA condemned the wave of invasions and called on peasants to obey the law and not "sabotage the agrarian reform." Weakened by its rather utopian demands for sweeping national change and by intense repression including the arrest of critical leaders and rank and file, FEPCA soon collapsed as an independent organization. Its more moderate leadership was absorbed into the CNA. Most of the invaded haciendas, however, remained in the hands of the peasantry. More important, the pressures exerted by the militant peasants in Piura, Andahuaylas, and other mobilized regions of the sierra led the government to carry forward land expropriations at a higher rate.

#### **Land Redistribution 1974-1979**

In many ways 1974 marked the apex of the radicalization of Peru's land reform. The Andahuaylas and Piura grassroots mobilizations, the reorganization of the Confederación de Campesinos del Perú (CCP), the first national congress of the CNA, the increased militancy of SINAMOS, and the expropriation of the conservative press—all these events coming on the heels of the dissolution of the SNA—shifted the balance of rural political and economic power leftward. It was a shift that was to be shortlived since the following year witnessed the overthrow of the Velasco government by more conservative military officers led by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez. The events of 1974 had nevertheless created an inexorable momentum toward the completion of land redistribution, a momentum the Morales government did not try to reverse. Table 3 reveals the scope and pace of reform through mid-1979.

**Table 3**  
**Rate of Land Expropriation and Adjudication<sup>35</sup>**

Date	No. of Beneficiaries (families)	Expropriated Land (hectares)	Adjudicated Land (hectares)
June 1971	90,000 (approx.)	1,600,000 (approx.)	n.d.
December 1974	200,000 (approx.)	n.d.	4,181,000
July 1976	279,600	8,066,000	6,810,000
December 1978	347,000	8,932,000	8,070,000
June 1979	370,000 (approx.)	n.d.	9,000,000 (approx.)
Anticipated Final Total	400,000	9,500,000	9,750,000

Source: Dirección General de Reforma Agraria y Asentamiento Rural.

Thus, half the 21 million hectares of agro-grazing land in the coast and highlands have been expropriated from the hacendados and turned over to the peasantry. Another 3 million hectares (15%) was already in the hands of small farmers (under 20 hectares) before the reform. Officially recognized peasant communities, which controlled about 6.6 million hectares before the reform, received nearly 900,000 more from the redistribution process. Less than 10 percent of all land—1.5 to 2.0 million hectares—was left in medium-sized haciendas (20-150 hectares) and none in the huge latifundia that once dominated Peruvian land tenancy.<sup>36</sup>

The bulk of the expropriated coastal estates, as noted, were turned into cooperatives, called CAPs, where the land was supposed to be utilized as a single production unit and CAP members were to be paid workers (as most had been on the more modern plantations before the reform). The beneficiaries of the agrarian reform within the CAPs were thus the estate's workers and not neighboring villagers or independent smallholders who may have hoped to gain hacienda land from the redistribution.

In the sierra, CAPs were also formed but the bulk of expropriated land was converted into units called SAIS (Agricultural Society for Social Interest). The SAIS sought to meet the often-conflicting demands for land of the former hacienda peons and the villagers of surrounding communities. As many as 30 nearby peasant communities might be joined with the peons of one or more haciendas to form a SAIS. Villagers would vote for the directive board and could sit on it

(indeed, in many SAIS they had a voting majority). They would also share in any profits the cooperative might make beyond workers' salaries, operating expenses, and reinvestment. However, only the haciendas' former feudatarios actually worked for the SAIS and got use of its land (overwhelmingly pasture).

The purpose of creating CAPs and SAIS was to preserve the haciendas as productive units and not break them up into smallholdings, which government planners felt would lower agricultural output. Original planning called for turning 80 percent of agrarian reform land into CAPs and SAIS, with the remaining 20 percent to be given to peasant communities, "peasant groups" (groups of smallholders who banded together into a cooperative in order to receive agrarian reform lands) or, in a small number of cases, to individual smallholders. Ultimately, the proportion going to the CAPs and SAIS has been somewhat lower than planned.

Table 4 clearly shows the government's preference for maintaining large production units operated as cooperatives of some kind. Only in exceptional cases is land transferred to individual smallholders. The 60 vast highland SAIS each had an average of 1,000 families (including *comuneros* and over 46,000 hectares of land (largely pasture).

In actuality, the degree of cooperative farming has been far less than the data in Table 4 suggest. Economist José María Caballero notes that most of the SAIS (and some CAPs), while technically classified as cooperatives, in fact have continued

**Table 4**  
**Actual Adjudication of Agrarian Lands: 1967-1978** <sup>37</sup>

Type of Unit	No.	No. of Benefiting Families (%)	Area of Land Received (%) (hectares)
CAP	515	103,806 (29.9%)	2,264,411 (28.1%)
SAIS	60	60,930 (17.6%)	2,775,757 (34.4%)
Peasant Communities	427	114,511 (33.0%)	856,232 (10.6%)
Peasant Groups	747	44,043 (12.3%)	1,606,612 (19.9%)
Social Property	8	1,375 (0.4%)	223,000 (2.8%)
State Property			123,372 (1.5%)
Individuals		22,301 (6.4%)	220,932 (2.7%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,757</b>	<b>346,966</b>	<b>8,070,316</b>

Source: Dirección General de Reforma Agraria y Asentamiento Rural.

to farm their land as individual lots. This is particularly true in the highlands where the SAIS peasants seem committed to having their own land. On the coast—particularly on the sugar plantations—workers are accustomed to working for a large enterprise, realize that it would be absurd to break up their highly mechanized estates, and know full well that the government would not permit subdivision even if the CAP members preferred it. In all, about two-thirds of SAIS and CAP lands (particularly the highland SAIS) are actually composed of individual plots. Of the land that is really run cooperatively as a single unit, 85 percent is on the coast.<sup>38</sup>

As of the end of 1978, the redistribution of land was nearly complete. Ninety-four percent of the 9.5 million hectares scheduled for expropriation had actually been expropriated; 83 percent of the final total had been adjudicated to the peasantry; and 87 percent of the planned beneficiaries had received their land (Table 3). The Peruvian 1969 Agrarian Reform decree was but one of several issued in the 1960s throughout Latin America as a response to the Cuban Revolution and the perception by international agencies, the Alliance for Progress, and many Latin American officials that change was needed. Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile were other nations with much-touted programs (Mexico and Bolivia had experienced earlier redistribution as a result of their revolutions). Of these, only Peru actually eradicated the latifundia system.

#### **Peasant Mobilization on the Eve of the '80s**

During the early 1960s, when thousands of Peruvian peasants were challenging the old

order, few would have predicted that the national government would sweep away that order in the near future. Fewer still would have anticipated the renewed level of campesino discontent that has recently manifested itself in spite of, or because of, the agrarian reform.

Perhaps the clearest indication of the government's failure to marshal peasant support has been the growing radicalization of the Confederación Nacional Agraria. Created by the military as a counterbalance to independent Marxist peasant organizations, the CNA has increasingly opposed its government sponsors. From its very inception, the confederation included provincial and department leaders—from states such as Lima, La Libertad, Ancash, and Cuzco—who wished to maintain their distance from government decision-makers and to act as an independent pressure group on rural policy. Initially the CNA tended to represent the CAP, SAIS, and peasant communities who had directly benefited from the agrarian reform, while the radical CCP was more representative of campesinos who had been left out of the redistributive process. Gradually, however, that distinction has blurred and the two organizations have moved ever closer to each other in political outlook.<sup>39</sup>

As early as November 1974, the more militant CNA Agrarian Leagues in the states of Lima and Piura were supporting invasions of unexpropriated haciendas. In other parts of the country, local CCP and CNA leaders coordinated protest marches and occasional land seizures. By mid-1976 (after a brief period of intensified land redistribution and efforts by the new Morales

Bermúdez government to woo militant CNA leaders), relations between the military regime and the confederation had deteriorated sharply. The widening split was manifested in July of that year by the brief arrest of the CNA's Secretary General for the state of Lima.

Early in 1977, Avelino Mar, a militant peasant leader from the Convención Valley of Cuzco, was elected national Secretary General of the CNA. The election of a leader identified with the most radical wing of the Velasco regime reflected the victory of the CNA's militant wing over local officers wed to the government bureaucracy. Charging that the Morales Bermúdez government had abandoned the agrarian reform, Mar and other CNA national officers called for reductions in the amount of land allowed middle-sized haciendas, more extensive expropriations, and the creation of a government bank to assist the low income agricultural producer.

At a December 1977 CNA Assembly, the organization's militants strengthened their position by voting to expel government-supported state leaders in Junín, Pasco, and Huánuco. Shortly thereafter, the Minister of Interior, General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, charged top CNA officers with conspiring against the government. Six months later, following a CNA-endorsed nationwide general strike, the government announced the dissolution of the Agrarian Confederation at the national level.<sup>40</sup> Departmental federations and provincial Agrarian Leagues could continue to operate, but the confederation's national organization was denied legal recognition. At the same time, Lima's *El Comercio* and other government-controlled newspapers launched a press campaign against alleged "subversion" by CNA officers. Secretary General Avelino Mar was forced to go into hiding after he was accused of conspiring to halt food shipments into Lima during the general strike.<sup>41</sup>

By the close of 1978, the CNA and the CCP were reportedly on the verge of a merger. While both organizations were technically illegal at their national levels, they continued to operate rather openly. In an interview with an officer of the CNA's departmental federation in Cuzco (FARTAC), I was told that the policy differences between the CNA and CCP were minimal. On the wall of the FARTAC headquarters, posters advocating socialism and endorsing the Cuban Revolution suggested the extent of the federation's radicalization.

The frustration and anger of nonbenefiting peasants toward the agrarian reform is demonstrated by yet another recent phenomenon. Between 1973 and 1975 there were a series of peasant land seizures principally directed against unexpropriated haciendas. In 1975, however, several peasant communities invaded nearby agrarian reform cooperatives from which they had been excluded. During the next four years similar invasions of CAPs and SAIS spread to Ancash, Cajamarca, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Lambayeque, and Piura.

Within the coastal sugar CAPs, deteriorating real incomes and tightened government control have renewed tensions between workers and government administrators. In 1977, after five years of relative labor tranquility, an extensive strike of sugar workers took place. Labor unrest on the sugar estates has further intensified in 1978-79.

### The Roots of Discontent

Why has the military government's agrarian reform program, so far-reaching in its redistribution of latifundia land, been so unsuccessful in satisfying much of the peasantry? Some of the underlying difficulties can be attributed to the manner in which the reform program was conducted. Other problems have arisen from broader government economic policies that have undercut the reform's benefits. Finally, certain difficulties either are beyond the government's capacities to control or cannot be solved merely by agrarian reform.

*Peasants vs. Bureaucrats.* Though the Peruvian peasantry initially greeted the government's agrarian reform decree with anticipation and hope, they were less enthusiastic about the arrival of the first state bureaucrats. In the Andean highlands particularly, the sociocultural gap between local Agriculture Ministry officials and the peasants whom they allegedly serve has always been enormous. The white or mestizo bureaucrat, wishing he could have been stationed in a comfortable office in Lima and highly resentful of being assigned to the hinterlands, often treats the Indian peasantry with contempt. One Scottish anthropologist, who had developed a close relationship with the peasants of a Cuzco cooperative, told me of seeing a CAP bureaucrat physically abuse a co-op member of having become "too friendly with the gringo."<sup>42</sup> Those government bureaucrats who had more positive and progressive orientations (as in the case of many ONDECOOP and SINAMOS organizers) often



found themselves falling victim to the campesinos' understandable distrust and suspicion of all outsiders. In some sierra CAPs and SAIS (including the Cuzco cooperative just discussed) the peasants physically expelled government administrators from their land.

On the modernized coastal plantations there is obviously a far narrower cultural gap between the bureaucrats and workers. However, given the importance of the sugar, cotton, and rice estates to the nation's economy, the government has felt a stronger need to make basic economic decisions in the administration of these cooperatives. That intention has brought the state into conflict with the militant trade unionism of many coastal agricultural workers. During the early 1970s, when participatory values had more currency than they now do within the government (particularly when sugar prices were booming), concessions could be made to worker demands. Since the collapse of sugar prices and the concurrent decline of the Peruvian economy, tensions have risen sharply. Despite a 1976 government decree outlawing strikes on the sugar cooperatives, there have been several work stoppages in recent years.

*The Shortage of Agrarian Reform Lands.* If their grievances against government bureaucracies gave CAP and SAIS workers grounds for complaint, how much more has been the frustration of the many peasants who have failed to receive any land at all. Government statistics indicate that some 400,000 rural families will ultimately share in agrarian reform benefits. While estimates of the size of the agricultural work force vary considerably, the government figures suggest that only 25-33 percent of the agrarian population will benefit directly from land redistribution.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, José María Caballero points out that government estimates of the number of direct beneficiaries are exaggerated both because many families are not receiving enough land to satisfy the government's own minimum subsistence criteria and because many of the 61,000 families listed as SAIS beneficiaries (Table 4) are members (comuneros) of organized peasant communities (comunidades campesinas). They share in SAIS decision-making and in any of the enterprise's profits, but receive no land. Since divisible annual profits (after all expenses, including salaries, are paid) at one of the nation's largest and richest SAIS (Cahuide) only totaled \$30 (\$/1,324) per family in 1972-73, the economic benefits of SAIS membership for the comunero beneficiaries seem rather dubious.<sup>44</sup> Caballero estimates that only

45 percent of the peasant families which needed land will receive it.

To some extent the problem is beyond the Peruvian government's capacity to solve. With only 0.18 hectares of crop land per person in the country today (a density comparable to India's), Peru has one of the most unfavorable man/land ratios in the world. Fernand Eguren calculates that if all the nation's estates with over 50 hectares of cropland or over 500 hectares of pasture were divided equally among the approximately one million peasant families with holdings of under 5 hectares (including the landless), each family would receive only 0.41 hectares of irrigated cropland, 0.36 hectares of dry cultivable land, and under 6 hectares of pasture.<sup>45</sup> In short, even if the demands of the CCP to expropriate the middle-sized hacienda were accepted by the government, it would not nearly solve the land shortage. Caballero estimates that if the maximum amount allowed any private owner were only 5 hectares (i.e., if all but smallholders were eliminated), the pool of land available for the agrarian reform would increase by only 15-25 percent.

Experts do feel that, with extensive introduction of irrigation, better soil management techniques, and reasonable colonization of the eastern jungle, the amount of agricultural and grazing land in Peru could be increased by some 60 percent. Yet, a combination of urban expansion onto farming lands, the neglect of hacienda irrigation systems as their owners anticipated expropriation, and serious drought in 1977-1979 have slightly reduced food-producing lands. Considerable investments were made in new irrigation projects (particularly before the 1975 bankruptcy of the economy), but most of the payoff lies in the future and many projects are still in the pipeline. Moreover, most of the anticipated irrigation projects, unfortunately, are devoted to increasing sugar and corn cultivation rather than to the production of needed foods.

It is one of the greater contradictions of the agrarian reform that a program designed to defuse latent rural unrest has largely excluded and frustrated the most potentially explosive sector of the peasantry, the very sector that helped force the reform. During the massive peasant mobilization of the early 1960s—the land invasions and campesino sindicato demonstrations—it was the independent comunidades that formed the core of the movement, while the hacienda peons remained more isolated and unorganized. The military government's 1969 reform decree



was, in part, a belated response to that unrest.<sup>46</sup> Yet, once the decree was issued, those political factors were quickly forgotten and replaced by more technical and economic norms. Not wishing to divide up the latifundia, and believing that agricultural output would decline if neighboring communities were afforded the use of cooperative lands, military planners turned the haciendas over to their workers and peons, thereby effectively excluding the comunidades from benefits. Peasant communities gained only marginally useful participation in the SAIS and limited land grants (about 11% of the area redistributed—Table 4). Indeed, many communities whose lands had been encroached upon over the years by neighboring haciendas, and which had been engaged in long legal battles to establish their village titles, found their “property” included in the new agrarian reform cooperatives. It should not be surprising, then, that since 1976 there has been a rising number of comunidad invasions of co-op lands.

*Cities Against the Countryside.* Yet another irony of the Peruvian government’s rural policies is that, during the very period in which the regime has tried (with only limited success) to satisfy the peasantry’s most basic demand by giving them land, it has simultaneously implemented agricultural policies that are highly prejudicial to the countryside. Under both the Velasco and Morales Bermúdez governments, economic policy has favored urban interests over rural ones.

The level of technical aid offered the agricultural producer today is proportionately lower than it was before the agrarian reform. During most of the 1970s, the Agriculture Ministry’s personnel and economic resources were so tied up in the process of land redistribution that aid for production was reduced. Now, with the redistributive process complete, the nation’s severe economic crisis makes increased state investment in the countryside impossible.

Government import and price policies have also been fairly consistently biased against the agricultural producer. The Peruvian state controls the amount of food imported, the prices paid agricultural producers for many crops, and the cost of many inputs. Consequently, the state largely determines the economic context of agricultural production. As runaway inflation has vastly escalated production costs, the government has kept down the prices paid Peruvian farmers in order to mollify the politically critical (and volatile) urban population. Until 1979, crop prices have been set consistently below world market levels, and

have sometimes even failed to meet production costs. As economist Richard Webb notes:

*Price policy is discriminatory; food imports continue to be exempted from tariffs while the average duty on all other goods has risen from about 30 percent in 1961 to over 70 percent in 1970. Cheap beef imports compete with what is often the principal source of cash income for small farmers.... Tariff-exempt wheat imports favor the consumption of bread; a nondiscriminatory general tariff, or a reverse discrimination in favor of domestic foods, would raise Sierra income from potatoes and other substitutes for bread.<sup>47</sup>*

In short, the common Third World imbalance between city and countryside has been maintained in the Peruvian “revolution.” Political scientist Henry Pease García notes that prior to the agrarian reform the rural oligarchy—particularly coastal agribusiness—was a very powerful interest group that could pressure the national government for loans, technical assistance, and more favorable import policies. Now, with the destruction of the landed elite as a power contender, no agrarian political force has developed to take its place. The peasantry has been too preoccupied with the issue of land redistribution and too weak organizationally to serve as an effective pressure group. Thus, the political power of the agricultural sector has actually deteriorated as a result of the agrarian reform.

*The National Economic Crisis.* To some extent, the current malaise of many Peruvian peasants and agricultural workers is more closely attributable to the nation’s economic crisis than to defects inherent in the agrarian reform. During the early years of the military revolution, the government borrowed very heavily from international agencies and foreign banks in anticipation of revenues from new oil explorations and expected price rises for the country’s copper and sugar exports. Since 1974, the economy has been driven to the point of bankruptcy by the drastic decline in sugar prices, falling copper revenues, a sharp drop in the fishmeal catch, and the failure of jungle oil fields to yield hoped-for production.<sup>48</sup> Poorly chosen, high capital investments, excessive arms purchases, and administrative mismanagement compounded the crisis. Consequently, the past three years have been marked by severe depreciation of the national currency (from approximately 62 soles to the dollar to 220), enforced budgetary and import austerity, and drastically declining real incomes.

For the sugar workers, dramatic increases in the world price of sugar in the years following their estates' expropriation had led to sharply increased incomes. After 1974, however, the price of sugar fell precipitously and the real income of CAP workers (like that of the entire Peruvian working class) fell some 40 percent. The economic crisis caused the government to roll back the gains in self-management autonomy the workers won through their 1972 demonstrations and in 1976 to issue a decree denying sugar workers the right to strike. The 1979-80 recovery in the world sugar market is too recent to have had an impact on workers' incomes or to predict patterns for the future.

Estimates of the sierra peasantry's living standards are far more uncertain and difficult to calculate. Various case studies of highland SAIS and cooperatives during the early period of land redistribution seemed to indicate that the reform was bringing most beneficiaries rising living standards as they were freed of their former rent obligations. However, rampant inflation in recent years and the failure of crop prices to keep up with the peasants' costs have undoubtedly eradicated all or most of those gains. Indeed, to the extent that the agrarian reform has integrated peasants into the commercial market, they have been more vulnerable than previously to downturns in the national economy. Of course, for the smallholders and the "occasional" (nonpermanent) SAIS and CAP workers who have not shared in agrarian reform benefits, the picture has been even more negative.

The government's budgetary squeeze has also infringed upon rural development, technical assistance, and loan projects for the peasantry. Moreover, the crisis has moved the state to assert greater control over the cooperatives and to centralize the decision-making process even further. Such developments have undermined the desires of peasants and workers (and earlier government promises) for greater self-management of the cooperatives.

#### **Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Production: Food for the Cities**

Clearly the military regime's agrarian reform—far-reaching though it was—has failed to win the national government full loyalty of the peasantry, or to co-opt campesino mobilization. How successful has the program been in feeding the nation, particularly the rapidly growing urban sector? An underlying assumption of the 1969 decree was that a large portion of the country's hacendados, especially in the highlands, were

wedded to antiquated agricultural techniques and labor relations. Now, motivated by their new control over their own land and aided by government's technically oriented bureaucrats, the peasantry are expected to produce more on the reform cooperatives. Yet, there seems to have been little improvement in land use or in agricultural technology. If anything, disinvestment by landlords facing expropriation has reduced rural productivity. Total output for basic foods and key export crops has remained stagnant or fallen in the past decade.

Tables 5 and 6 reveal that, since the base years of 1961-1965, absolute production of beef, wheat, cassava, and cotton has fallen and there has been a marked steady decline in overall per capita agricultural and food production. Of course, the indices in Table 6 include a sharp agricultural decline from the base years through 1968, predating the military regime's agrarian reform. If recent production data are compared with 1968 (the year before the reform decree), one finds an absolute increase of 9 percent in total agricultural production and a 16 percent rise in total food output (Table 6).

Even this more optimistic interpretation of the data shows that the modest improvement in food production over the past decade has failed to match population growth. Overall agricultural output rose by 2.4 percent in both 1973 and 1974, but increased by only 1.0 percent in 1975. After a 3.3 percent increase in 1976, total output failed to grow at all in 1977 and rose only 0.5 percent in 1978.<sup>49</sup> Absolute production of beef and all basic crops has fallen since 1974 (Table 5). During the first decade of the agrarian reform, per capita food output declined approximately 9 percent.

Critics of the agrarian reform are quick to blame this poor agricultural record on the redistributive process. Marking the tenth anniversary of the reform, a Lima newspaper editorial claimed that the agrarian sector has been ruined by incompetent government bureaucrats managing the CAPs and SAIS. Private owners, said the conservative newspaper, could produce far more efficiently. Looking for another scapegoat, a government bureaucrat told me that when he was assigned to a coastal cooperative soon after its expropriation, he couldn't get the workers to exert themselves because they insisted that they were now their own bosses and could do as they pleased. Still other critics charge that the highland peasantry are not sufficiently educated to manage their own land.

**Table 5**  
**Total Production of Basic Commodities: Selected Years, 1961-1978**  
**(000 Metric Tons)**

Year	Corn	Pota- toes	Cas- sava	Rice	Wheat	Sugar	Cotton	Beef	Dairy
1961-65 (aver.)	490	1,487	436	324	150	7,373	140	91	
1968	533	1,592	399	286	119	7,226	101	90	
1970	615	1,929	498	587	125	7,530	91	85	
1972	589	1,750	490	552	140	8,582	73	96	
1974	600	1,722	469	426	150	9,179	88	95	634 (1975)
1976	700	1,670	402	579	148	8,761	57	84	640
1977	720	1,600	410	547	130	8,825	58	85	630
1978 (est.)	550	1,650	410	400	90	8,400		83	635

Source: U.S. Embassy, *Agricultural Attaché, Annual Agriculture Situation Reports, 1976-78*; U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Indices of Agriculture in the Western Hemisphere, 1968-77*. Both sources drew data from the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture.

**Table 6**  
**Indices of Crop, Agriculture and Food Production: 1968-1972**  
**(1961-65 = 100)**

	1961-65	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1977 (prelim.)
Crops	100	93	108	102	102	100	100
Total Agriculture	100	94	105	101	104	101	102
Total Food	100	98	116	113	115	116	116
Population	100	115	122	130	138	146	151
Per Capita Agric.	100	81	86	78	75	69	68
Per Capita Food	100	85	94	87	83	80	77

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Indices of Agricultural Production in the Western Hemisphere: 1968-77* (Washington: 1978).

More careful analysis of the types of agricultural and grazing lands that have been directly affected by the redistributive process suggests that output declines have been no sharper on the CAPs and SAIS than on land that has remained in private hands. Indeed, most food produced for the cities has long been grown on units of land too small to have been expropriated. Ministry of Agriculture estimates indicate that 90 percent of the nation's potato production, 84 percent of the corn, 90 percent of the wheat, and 95 percent of onion production comes from units that fall below the law's ceilings. Indeed, Fernando Eguren points out that most of the sierra's latifundia were devoted primarily to ranching or dairying while the coastal estates were mostly in sugar.<sup>5</sup> In short, over 80 percent of the nation's CAP and SAIS lands are composed either of pasture or of sugar

lands. Thus, it seems far-fetched to blame declines in major food crops on mismanagement of the cooperatives or on peasant laziness. To be sure, many medium and small farmers may have reduced their investment level fearing that the government would lower the ceilings and expropriate their property. With the completion of expropriations in 1979, that fear should abate.

Undoubtedly, the redistributive process has caused dislocations that reduced production. Declines in productivity, however, can be attributed more directly to the decapitalization of farms and the neglect of irrigation systems than to the failures of the cooperatives. On the sugar plantations, where immediate expropriation precluded decapitalization or sabotage by the owners, production rose sharply from 1968 to 1974 (some 27%—Table 5) and has fallen only slightly since

the 1974 collapse of sugar prices. Expert observers of rural Peru note that many cooperatives started off their existence with virtually none of the necessary farm machinery, trucks, irrigation pumps, or even office equipment because these items had either been sold by their owners, been moved onto the land that the hacendado was allowed to retain, been allowed to run down, or even been sabotaged by bitter landlords. Given these adverse conditions and the peasantry's lack of prior opportunity in management of large landholdings, the production record has not been that bad.

Obviously, many peasants, deprived of educational opportunities in the past, could benefit from government-sponsored training programs and technical assistance. Such programs, however, have been as woefully insufficient as has the general level of loans and economic assistance. The country's current economic crisis and need for austerity offer little hope that rural assistance will be increased, or even maintained at its present inadequate level.

Finally, serious drought in the northern part of the country and some central regions has been a critical factor in the nation's recent poor agricultural record. For example, water levels in Lambayeque's Tinajones reservoir began to fall seriously in 1975. By early 1978, the reservoir, which once held 300 million cubic meters of water, was virtually dry, cutting off critical irrigation for the state's rice plantations. Since 1976 drought has cut production of potatoes, corn, rice, sugar, and wheat.

### Conclusions

Despite the obvious difficulties and inadequacies of the agrarian reform, it would be wrong to categorize Peru's rural experiment as a failure. If the redistribution of land has not led to obvious improvements in the peasants' living standards or reductions in rural-urban migration, it is likely that the situation would be worse without the reform. Perhaps the most important contribution of the program is that it has more rapidly terminated the already declining system of restraints which the old order placed on the hacienda peasantry and their village compatriots. On many haciendas, peasants who formerly were subject to the whims of the local landowning bosses now are directing their own cooperatives. Even where government bureaucrats have replaced the hacendados as "the new masters," greater opportunities exist for workers and peasants. The agrarian reform has integrated the peasantry more fully into

the national economic and political systems and has opened the door for peasants and agricultural workers to assert some control over their own destinies. Initially, the reform unleashed dormant peasant unrest, but without it, peasant discontent (and the resulting political instability) would have been far greater during the Peruvian economic collapse of 1975-1979.

What has become abundantly clear in the past decade, however, is that land redistribution in itself is insufficient either to solve the problem of rural poverty or to produce more food. At the very least, the government must help increase the area cultivated through fuller use of already existing crop and pasture lands, increased irrigation, colonization of new areas, and better land management. Agricultural technology must also be improved. From the nutritional perspective, where it is ecologically possible (given altitude and other natural considerations) some of the sierra's extensive pasture should be converted to crop cultivation. State pricing policies should be altered to increase the profitability of raising nutritionally rich crops and dairy products and to reduce the cash incentives for producing meat.

On a more fundamental level, the countryside continues to receive an inadequate share, relative to the urban sector, of government resources and of national income. In Peru, as in most of the Third World, there is a vast income distribution inequity between city and countryside. Typically, urban per capita incomes are some four times greater than in rural areas. Richard Webb notes that from 1960-1970, under the Belaúnde and early Velasco governments, a certain degree of downward income redistribution took place within the urban and rural sectors, but virtually none occurred between sectors.<sup>51</sup> Through the 1970s the government has failed to correct that imbalance. As we have seen, state agricultural pricing policy has a strong urban bias.

Increasing the prices paid to Peru's agricultural producers, and the accompanying jumps in food costs to the consumer, would undoubtedly alienate the urban middle and working classes. Indeed, at the present time, with annual inflation rates of some 70 percent and a 40 percent decline in workers' real incomes over the past five years, price rises would soon precipitate urban rioting and strikes. Consequently, peasants can anticipate no significant improvements in the near future. Similarly, the austerity measures imposed on the Peruvian government by international

lending agencies (particularly the IMF) currently preclude increased government loans and technical assistance to the cooperatives and small farmers.

Ultimately, however, higher agricultural prices would serve the interests of the cities as well as

the peasantry by stimulating greater food production. Moreover, until government policies are introduced which redistribute income and resources to the countryside, the nation can continue to expect ongoing peasant discontent and unrest.

(August 1980)

## NOTES

1. After seizing power in October 1968, the Peruvian military government instituted a series of left-nationalist reforms—including its far-reaching agrarian reform decree—not normally associated with the military regimes in Latin America. Since a 1975 internal coup, however, the government has moved to the right. In the wake of economic collapse and the absence of popular support, the armed forces relinquished its control to a civilian government in early 1980. In June 1978, as a first step toward that transition, a national Constituent Assembly was elected. For analyses of the "military revolution" see: Abraham Lowenthal (ed.), *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Henry Pease García, *El Ocaso del Poder Oligárquico* (Lima: Desco, 1977). The latter contains an exhaustive 1,000 item bibliography. On the transition process, see: Howard Handelman and Thomas G. Sanders, *Military Government and the Movement Toward Democracy* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1981).

2. Blanco helped lead a peasant land seizure movement in Cuzco's high jungle region in the early 1960s, a movement which later contributed to peasant mobilization throughout the highlands. A legendary figure among the Quechua peasantry, Blanco has more recently amassed a great personal following within Lima's shantytowns and received the third highest individual vote of any candidate in the June 1978 Constituent elections. See: Hugo Blanco, *Tierra o Muerte* (México: Siglo XXI, 1972).

3. *El Comercio* (Lima: June 25, 1969).

4. The classic English-language work on Peruvian agriculture and land tenancy as of 1960 is Thomas Ford, *Man and Land in Peru* (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1962); socioeconomic structure in the rural sierra is discussed in Howard Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes: Peasant Political Mobilization in Peru* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1975).

5. During the past two decades sugar, fishmeal, and minerals (principally copper) have been Peru's major exports. Currently, mining occupies the first rank with coffee, having joined the leading group in export value.

6. Liisa North, "Political Conjunctures, Military Government and Agrarian Reform in Peru" (unpublished paper, 1978). Some sugar plantations are foreign-owned (Grace Corporation, etc.), but most belong to the Peruvian National Oligarchy.

7. On APRA's reformist ideology and origins, see: Peter Klaren, *Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870-1932* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1973); Liisa North, "Orígenes y crecimiento del partido aprista peruano" *Desarrollo Económico* 10 (No. 38), 1970. Though long Peru's single largest party, APRA has never been able to take power.

8. Julio Cotler and F. Portocarrero, *Organizaciones campesinas del Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1967). I have adjusted and rounded off the figures to compensate for changes in the past 12 years.

9. Roberto MacLean y Estenos, *La Reforma Agraria en el Perú* (México: U.N.A.M., 1959), p. 40; Hugo Neira, *Los Andes: Tierra o Muerte* (Madrid: Editorial ZYX, 1968), pp. 41-44.

10. The use of paternalism, mixed with repressive controls, as a means of containing peasant unrest is discussed in James Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975). On Peru, see Handelman, *Struggle*; François Bourricaud, *Cambios en Puno* (México: Instituto Indigenista, 1967).

11. For a discussion of hacienda mobilization: Julio Cotler, "Traditional Haciendas and Communities in a Context of Political Mobilization in Peru" in R. Stavenhagen, ed., *Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America* (New York: Doubleday, 1970).

12. Peru in the 1960s had some 1,500 officially registered peasant communities (with communally owned lands) and over 4,500 unrecognized ones. See: Roberto MacLean y Estenos, *Sociología del Perú* (México: U.N.A.M., 1959), p. 262; Handelman, *Struggle*, pp. 28-36.

13. Some 20 percent of all peasants had some feudal obligations, of whom perhaps one-third were full-time hacienda peons and the remainder, smallholders who worked for haciendas. Diego García-Sayán "Estudio de Cambio Rural." (Unpublished prospectus for a research project for Desco, Lima, 1978).

14. Jean Piel, "A propos d'un soulèvement rural péruvien au début du vingtième siècle" *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 14 (October-December 1967), pp. 375-405. For a history of peasant unrest since colonial times, see: *Allpanchis*, Vol. XI (Cuzco, 1975), *Movimientos campesinos*.

15. These figures are very similar to those collected in the early 1960s by: Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA), *Tenencia de la tierra y desarrollo socio-económico del sector agrícola: Perú* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1966), p. 56 and 107. However, the earlier CIDA study greatly understated the importance of communally held pasture lands.

16. Fernando Eguren, "La Tierra: Su Distribución y Los Regímenes de Tenencia" (Lima: Unpublished paper, Desco, 1978). In the officially registered highland peasant communities, technically all land was communally owned and was, therefore, registered as a single unit. Over 30 percent of all sierra agricultural land belonged to some 1,200 registered communities with a portion of that land farmed as individual subsistence plots and most used as communal pasture. Communal land was not a significant factor on the coast.

17. Sometimes this led to arrests, violent expulsions from the land, or confrontations with the police. At other times the peasants won, usually after having formed a *sindicato* (union). See: Cotler, "Traditional Haciendas..."; LaMond Tullis, *Lord and Peasant in Peru* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

18. García-Sayán, op. cit.; Eguren, op. cit. Of course, even with the land owned by peasant communities factored out of Table 1, nearly half the land in the sierra (about 9 million hectares) and 60 percent of the coastal agricultural area were still under the control of large haciendas (over 200 hectares). But Eguren and García-Sayán's analyses show that increasing numbers of sierra peasants were changing from neofeudal peons to cash-paying tenants or owners. Hired labor was also becoming more common in the Andes, another aspect of the capitalist transformation already taking place.

19. The 1960s mobilization of Andean peasants is more extensively discussed in: Eric Hobshawm, "Occupaciones Campesinas de Tierras," *Análisis* 2-3 (Lima, April 1977), pp. 111-147; Handelman, *Struggle* Chapters 5-6; Hugo Neira, op. cit.; Alberto Flores Galindo, "Apuntes sobre las ocupaciones de Tierras y el sindicalismo agraria, 1945-1964" *Allpanchis* XI (Cuzco, 1978).

20. For excellent analysis of the agrarian reform: José María Caballero, "Reforma y Reestructuración Agraria en el Perú" (Lima: CISEPA, Universidad Católica, 1976); Mariano Valderrama, *7 Años de Reforma Agraria Peruana* (Lima: Universidad Católica, 1976); Douglas Horton, *Land Reform and Reform Enterprises in Peru* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, 1974).

21. *El Comercio* (Lima, October 12, 1969).

22. North, "Political Conjunctures..."

23. John Gitlitz, "Impressions of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 13 (July 1971), pp. 456-58.

24. Valderrama, op. cit., p. 51, and Caballero, op. cit., p. 12. The amount of land which hacendados could maintain exempt from the agrarian reform was an extremely controversial issue and was periodically lowered or raised as the result of competing peasant and landlord pressures.

25. See: Eric Hobsbawm, "Generals as Revolutionaries," *New Society* (November 20, 1969); Gitlitz, op. cit.; Valderrama, op. cit.

26. Of course the military did conceptualize the agrarian reform partly in political terms in that they hoped to co-opt future rural unrest and thereby depoliticize the countryside. In fact, the reform had the opposite effect.

27. *El Comercio* (April 27, 1971), p. 4.

28. Hacendados were paid in long-term bonds, with land value often determined on the basis of the owners' (vastly undervalued) earlier tax statements. On the financing mechanism, see: J.M. Caballero, "Aspecto Financieros en las Reformas Agrarias" (Lima: CISEPA, Universidad Católica, 1975).

29. These figures exclude land in the sparsely populated jungle region. Data on the amount of land under agricultural or pasture utilization in Peru vary widely. The generally accepted figure is 19-20 million hectares for the coast and highlands and perhaps 23 million hectares including the jungle. But the Agrarian Reform Agency has issued figures as high as 29 million. See: Caballero, "Reforma y Reestructuración...", p. 7.

30. Excellent extended accounts of hacendado and peasant mobilization (from 1970-1976) related to the agrarian reform are to be found in: Valderrama, op. cit.; Henry Pease García et al., *Estado y Política Agraria* (Lima: Desco, 1977); Colin Harding, "Land Reform and Social Conflict in Peru," in Lowenthal, ed., op. cit.

31. *La Prensa* (June 25, 1970).

32. The percentages of delegates designated by the government varied according to the CAP's debt to the Agrarian Reform Agency. See Valderrama, op. cit., p. 56.

33. *La Prensa* (April 27, 1972).

34. Quoted in Abdón Palomino, "Andahuaylas, 1974: Un movimiento de reivindicación campesina dentro del proceso de reforma agraria," *Allpanchis* (Cuzco, November 1978).

35. Adjudicated land is property in which title has been transferred to peasant enterprises (CAPs, SAIS) or individual peasants. The gap between area expropriated and area adjudicated (i.e., those lands still held by the Agrarian Reform Agency) narrowed considerably from 1976 through 1978. Note that the final adjudicated area is expected to exceed the area expropriated because 250,000 hectares of public land will be included.

36. The 21 million hectare figure reflects expansion (from 1964-1974) in the number of hectares under exploitation.

37. Again, these data reflect titles actually transferred into peasant hands. The figures include some land adjudicated from 1967-1969 under the 1964 agrarian reform law, but this quantity was minimal. Social Property is another form of cooperatively controlled enterprise. It was supposed to become a central feature of rural and industrial production as envisioned by the more radical Velasco government but was quietly phased out under President Morales Bermúdez's move to the right.

38. Caballero, "Reforma y Reestructuración..."

39. Some differences do remain. The CCP's leadership is more ideologically homogeneous (almost exclusively Marxist) and has more extensive links to urban leftists. The CCP's rank and file is self-selected and clearly represents atypically militant peasants. The CNA, on the other hand, has many local leaders who are fairly moderate and progovernment. The rank and file is more diverse and far less uniformly militant.

40. The dissolution of the CNA's national-level organization followed close on the heels of the government's March 1978 announcement that SINAMOS would be abolished by August of that year.

41. Like CCP officer Hugo Blanco, Avelino Mar was elected to the national Constituent Assembly in June 1978 (only one month after he was charged with conspiracy) and now enjoys congressional immunity.

42. Conversation with Mr. David Gow. For a discussion of racial tensions and the prejudices of rural bureaucrats in the Peruvian sierra, see: Charles Kleymeyer, *Social Interactions Between Quechua Campesinos and Criollos* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Ph.D. Dissertation, 1973); David Gow, *The Gods and Social Change in the High Andes* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Ph.D. Dissertation, 1976).

43. Harding, op. cit., p. 220; Horton, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

44. Caballero, *Reforma y...*; Data were drawn from Douglas Horton, Peru: *Case Studies Volume* (Washington: IBRF Studies in Employment and Rural Development, #22, 1975).

45. Eguren, op. cit.

46. As we have seen, there were multiple motivations for the agrarian reform, not all of which were related to peasant pressures. However, the desire to pacify the countryside was an important factor.

47. Quoted in North, "Political Conjunctures...", p. 27.

48. A recent bright spot in the Peruvian export picture has been the sharp rise in coffee prices. Copper prices too have recovered somewhat from their post-1974 decline. But Peru's export revenues from metals have been badly hurt by crippling miners' strikes. The fishmeal catch has also rebounded somewhat after a sharp decline and the price of sugar has been up in 1979-80. In all, export revenues are still inadequate when compared to the nation's indebtedness.

49. United States Agricultural Attaché, *Situation Reports* for 1976-1978.

50. Eguren notes that 87.5 percent of latifundia land was devoted to pasture, while 87 percent of Peru's entire crop land was held in units of under 50 hectares (and, thus, not subject to agrarian reform). See, Eguren, op. cit.; García Sayán, op. cit.

51. Webb, op. cit.; Richard Webb and Adolfo Figueroa, *Distribución del Ingreso en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1975).