To pass judgment on the Cuban Revolution would be in mid-1960 improper and untimely: improper because most sources of information were biased; untimely because the Revolution was in full motion with its testing periods just ahead.

In Cuba, future crises will result from economic, social, and political forces released by the Revolution as it rolled through 1959 and into 1960. Impelling these forces are 400 years of social development on the island the revolutionaries took on January 1, 1959, from Fulgencio Batista and the entrenched elite behind him.

To understand the situation one must look to the sugar industry and the influence it has had on the Cuban economy and social structure. The cultivation and processing of sugar cane and the exportation of its derivatives is Cuba's biggest business, dominating the island's economy.

Cuba's sugar business is notable for its size, cartelization, inefficiency, apathy, and high profits. It has made many personal and corporate fortunes but has added virtually nothing to man's knowledge of the cane itself, its cultivation, the chemistry of its conversion into sugar, molasses, alcohol, and other by-products, or the usefulness of these derivatives.

[IPP-8-'60]
The technological stagnation of the industry is illustrated by the fact that most of the cane grown in Cuba is of a variety called P.O.J. (Proefstation Oest Java) 2878 developed in Java in the 1920's. The Cuban Government supported no research to develop cane varieties best suited to Cuba's soil and climate or to improve cane culture. Mill owners and growers, well organized in all other respects, established no major research centers.

The industry easily could have financed adequate agricultural research and industrial research on new uses for sugar and its by-products. If the customary one to one-and-a-half per cent of the industry's gross receipts had been set aside for these purposes, the annual contribution of the industry to research for its own benefit would have been, conservatively, close to four million dollars. The industry allotted not one cent for actual research, and individual mills were almost as lax, devoting small parcels of land to experimental plots in a few instances.

A project at Central (Mill) Baragua was abandoned a decade ago. A cane experiment station in Matanzas Province supposedly financed by the Government subsisted on small donations and sales, and did nothing useful. A half-cent tax per bag on sugar production, allegedly for research, disappeared elsewhere, if in fact it was collected.

The equipment of the mills was kept in repair and in a few cases there were innovations; but in its essentials today's equipment is the same as that of a quarter of a century and more ago. Machinery used in the cane brakes is somewhat more modern in some districts, but the resistance to mechanization by the growers and by the laborers has been formidable and incentives to more economical cultivation have been lacking.

In fact, for a time the regulations of the industry (which were written into the statutes as the Sugar Coordination Law of September 2, 1937) removed the incentive to increase the sucrose content of cane grown by an individual grower and even supplied an incentive to decrease the content. This illustrates the complexities of the business and the extent of its cartelization and regulation.

One purpose of the Sugar Coordination Law of September 2, 1937 was to assure to the colonos (who grew up to 90 per cent of all the cane in Cuba) a fair and certain share of the mills' gross receipts. Another was

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Prior to Castro's take-over, Cuba had about 40,000 colonos (sugar farmers). Although much of their land was owned by the mills, the colonos held rights to its use which could not be taken from them. About 15 per cent were wealthy; 70 per cent were of the middle class; and 15 per cent were poor. The list of colonos contained many fictitious entries made by the mills for tax and wage-cost advantages. As a consequence, the figures for the amount of cane grown by colonos is misleading.
to encourage millowners to become more efficient in handling the cane by offering them an incentive to buy more modern machinery.

The law fixed minimum rates of payment to a colono for his cane as follows: when the average sugar yield at the mill was not over 12 per cent, the colono was to receive the equivalent of 48 per cent of the yield from the cane processed at the mill; with the yield over 12 per cent but not over 13 per cent, the colono was to get 47 per cent; and when over 13 per cent he was to receive 46 per cent—all with adjustments for land rentals, if any.

The cost to each mill of the cane it handled thus was tied to the sugar it produced and the price received for it, which promoted flexibility. But the colono was paid on the basis of an average yield of sugar from all the cane going to the mill; the individual planter thus had no incentive for increasing the yield of his cane. And since the colono's proportionate share declined as the mill obtained higher yields of sugar, the colono under certain circumstances would make more money with cane producing less sugar.

In July 1949 a presidential decree altered this regulation by fixing 48 per cent as the standard for payment to the colono, removing the negative incentive; and in 1950 the minimum payment to the colono was set at the equivalent of six arrobas of sugar for each 100 arrobas of cane he delivered to the mill, irrespective of the sugar yield obtained by the mill. As the average sucrose content of the cane increased, a mill's colonos were to share pro-rata in the increase. Thus when Castro came to power there still was no incentive to an individual colono to improve the yield of his cane.

Later decrees gave the colono a share (47 to 50 per cent) in mill receipts from molasses (above a four-cent-per-gallon base) sold by the industry through its Instituto Cubano de Estabilizacion del Azucar (ICEA—the organizational embodiment of the cartel) at prices far above the base price. So the colonos, large, medium, and small, alike, had after 1950 a larger and more certain income, both in fixed percentages from raw and refined sugar and from molasses and syrups.

Agricultural and industrial laborers employed in the industry made gains commensurate with those of the colonos. They had the absolute security of tenure enjoyed by much Cuban labor, longer periods of employment, paid holidays, and extensive social benefits enforced by law, and basic wage rates. For millworkers these rates rose 185 per cent between 1941 and 1947 and steadily after that. Minimum basic wages for agricultural labor for an eight-hour day rose from 80 cents in 1938 to $2.88 in 1947 and to slightly more in the '50's. Unskilled millworkers started at $1.20 per day; skilled workers at $4.00, $5.00, or $6.00 a day after the series of increases had been instituted.2

2 About 500,000 workers find employment in the industry during the height of the cane harvesting and grinding period (zafra) when the mills are active 24 hours a day seven days a week.
The body of law and regulations governing the sugar industry affected not only the colonos, but all the workers in the industry. It tied wages to sugar prices. Payments to individual workers varied both according to the amount each cut, hauled, or loaded, and according to the value of the total amount of sugar the mill produced. A worker's daily wage rose as much as $1.86 a day as the price of sugar climbed from 1.56 cents to 3 cents per pound. Clerical workers' salaries could rise similarly.

However, the coupling of per-pound sugar prices and wages was broken when the sugar price dropped significantly while sales volume stayed high enough so that the total value of the crop declined only slightly. Wage rates were held at about the level they had reached when tied to the per-pound price of sugar. The result was a wage scale that approximated a profit-sharing scheme.

A problem was posed when the sales volume also dropped at a time of low sugar prices with the result that the total value of the crop decreased. A tax-rebate for colonos and millowners was designed to make it possible to continue the higher wage rates. The colonos did in fact receive their rebate but the millowners did not. Moreover, sugar workers retained a cash bonus system (granted them in 1950) that was linked to increased mill yields and shorter grinding periods for fixed amounts of cane. The usual bonus was six days' pay.

The laws relating to the sugar industry and the regulations tied to the laws made Cuba's major business one of the most thoroughly controlled industries in the world.

Each Cuban sugar mill had a fixed share of the domestic market (at a controlled price), of the United States market (at a price fixed by the United States Government, usually about two cents over the world market price), and of world market sales.

Regulations going into minute detail set the starting dates for grinding, production quotas for each mill, cane production quotas for individual colonos—the smaller mills and colonos being favored with minimum quotas. There also were regulations covering the size of bags to be used, ports of shipment, wage rates in all categories of employment, prices to be paid for cane to the colonos by the mills.

Internationally, Cuba had a voice in the setting of quotas, and the Cuban industry lobbied in Washington in an effort to get as favorable treatment as possible from the United States.

Figures on the profits and costs of enterprises in the sugar business are not easily available. The truly remarkable tax structure of prerevolutionary Cuba put a premium on evasion and graft and on double bookkeeping.
In Cuba as most other Latin American countries, an enterprise which paid in full all the taxes levied against it certainly couldn't compete and probably would become bankrupt.

Cuba's sugar mills have on occasion gone broke and during many years a good number of them were unprofitable. But, on the whole, sugar has been good business, a lot better than was reflected by the tax records.

Between the two Batista regimes Cuba had two elected presidents, who while making themselves and their associates very wealthy also enforced tax laws better than did Batista. One must look to these years, between 1944 and 1952, for reasonably reliable statistics on sugar industry profits. They show, for example, a steady increase in the taxes paid by sugar mills on profits and declared capital, the annual total for the country rising from around 5 million to 10 million pesos. Excise taxes on sugar, meanwhile remained at around 4.5 million a year. (The largest sources of revenue in Cuba were duties and charges on imports [over 60 million pesos annually] and a sales and gross receipts tax [under 50 million]. Personal income taxes seldom brought in more than 10 million pesos a year.)

An economic and technical mission that visited Cuba in 1950 under auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development noted that after 1939 there had been a trend away from American control and toward Cuban control over sugar mills.³

The report issued by the mission said: "Undoubtedly one of the causes is that sugar production in Cuba has less attractions for foreign capital than it used to have. [But] the despondent attitude of some foreign managers toward present [1950] conditions of the sugar mills may partly be discounted. When pressed, most of them--even those who are most critical of current labor and other problems--will admit that it is still worth operating in Cuba. But there is certainly less scope for large profits; and problems of management tend to increase."⁴

From the perspective of 1960 the sugar mill managers' problems of 1950 seem amusingly minimal. But the American and Cuban owners and managers of a decade ago didn’t laugh at their problems, which included,

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³ There were 68 mills producing 55.07 per cent of the total output controlled by United States interests in 1939 and 44 mills producing 47.27 per cent in 1950; while the figures for Cuban-controlled mills were 56 with 22.42 per cent in 1939 and 108 with 49.49 per cent in 1950. Actual production greatly increased for all mills.
⁴ Between 1939 and 1949 costs of production including cane rose around 300 per cent. Most of the rise was in labor costs, and shares going to the growers. Official average prices rose almost 290 per cent in the same years.
under President Grau (1944-48), a rising number of government interventions in enterprises having labor troubles. The interventions were uniformly on the side of the workers. Instead of laughing, the representatives of Cuban sugar mills welcomed ex-President Batista when he seized power by a coup d’etat in March 1952.

Interventions on behalf of the workers quickly declined, and so did the production and export of Cuban sugar. But between 1952 and 1959 there was no major modification of the structure of the sugar industry and it was delivered to Castro by Batista in much the same condition that he had received it from President Prio and as it had come to Prio from Grau. It still was the world's largest producer of raw sugar from cane; it still was strictly controlled and cartelized; it still had a few highly efficient plants and a good many obsolescent ones; it still was fairly profitable and fairly difficult to manage; there still were no incentives for more efficient utilization of the land, and no chemical or agricultural research work under way; and it remained as it always had been and always would be, a seasonal operation of four to five months duration which dominated the economic life of Cuba.

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Castro at first let the Cuban sugar industry continue its normal operations. The 1959 and 1960 crops were cut, converted, and exported by the same people and under the same conditions as prevailed in the time of Presidents Grau and Prio. The Cuban Revolution affected the industry only as a threat and a promise, and only in its marginal activities, until after the zafra (harvest) of 1960. Thus the 1961 crop will be the first to be financed, harvested, ground and converted, and exported under new management.

But even in 1961 only about half of the industry will be operated by the Cuban Government (working through a variety of organizations) unless the revolutionary program for the industry is overhauled before the next zafra begins. The bulk of the mills operated and owned by private Cuban enterprises escaped confiscation in 1959-60--when properties "wrongfully acquired" under Batista were taken--and indications are they may escape for another year or until such time as trained revolutionary managements become

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5 With the end of the Korean War and the end of ECA (U.S.) sugar purchases for Japan, a decrease in Cuban sugar exports took place. Also affecting Cuban sales was a dollar shortage in Europe and appreciable gains in European beet-sugar crops. The 1952 raw sugar production in Cuba was 7,964,000 tons up 1,500,000 tons from 1951. But in 1953 it was 5,687,000 tons; in 1954, 5,391,000 tons and in 1955, 4,993,000,000 tons. In 1956, 1957, and 1958 Cuban sugar exports stayed around 5,500 tons with the 1959 crop showing some of the ravages of the civil strife of the last year of Batista's regime. Exports to the United States were only 2,813,152 tons in 1955; 3,000,000 each in 1956 and 1957, and somewhat over 3,000,000 in 1958 and 1959. (All figures are in short tons.)
available to the government agencies currently taking over the mills operated and owned by United States enterprises, roughly 40 per cent of the industry.

The Government's program of intervention, expropriation, and nationalization seems to have been carefully planned in 1959 and present indications are that the plan has not been materially altered by later developments such as the United States action in reducing the Cuban sugar quota. But the timing of the Cuban Government's program probably was affected, since there are good reasons for believing Cuba did not expect to lose its preferential status in the United States market. The expropriation of American sugar mills in Cuba in one swoop rather than gradually seemed out of character; so also was the rapid intervention and subsequent expropriation of Cuba's three major oil refineries, two American, one European. But the eventual piece-by-piece nationalization of these enterprises clearly was planned, and in fact had been forecast by revolutionary leaders.  

In March 1960 Leon Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, editors of Monthly Review, a New York periodical with a leftist editorial policy, visited Cuba. It can be assumed that they had access to the chief planners of the Cuban Revolution. Writing for the July-August issue of their magazine, they indicated that Castro's officials expected the United States to hold the Cuban sugar quota at its old level. "All in all," they wrote, "it appears that vested interests in the United States sugar industry are overwhelmingly against any change in the present scheme." They also predicted that "the oil monopolies" would not "attempt to squeeze Cuba by cutting off supplies" of petroleum from Venezuela, and would find it necessary to refine the Soviet petroleum that the Castro Government had acquired.

Before moving ahead toward full acquisition of the sugar industry Castro naturally wanted the industry to continue to produce sugar for dollars and, as it turned out, sugar for barter; and in fact the industry did so in 1959 and 1960, producing around five-and-a-half million tons each year. Castro also wanted the industry to produce and export the full United States quota for sugar in these two years (3,215,457 tons for 1959 and 3,119,655 tons for 1960) plus the usual extra tonnage given Cuba to fill out the United States quotas of other overseas suppliers unable to fill them.

Castro needed every dollar he could get to pay for as many of his extensive projects as possible out of current income. It was essential for the sugar industry to earn dollars and also to deliver the product Cuba best could use in projected trade deals with Russia, Red China, and other countries.

Moreover, in the Marxist myth-world of the Cuban state planners, the United States Congress would respond to pressures from "the vested interests"  

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6 Ernesto Guevara, national bank president, stated publicly in February 1960 that private enterprise, having failed in Cuba, would have to be supplanted by state-owned enterprises in all "basic industries."
(substitute "Wall Street," "Monopolists," or "Banking Czars") who would oppose depriving Castro of his dollars-for-sugar so long as their property-rights in the industry were not expropriated.\(^7\) The result was the revolutionary policy of fringe benefits: Castro contented himself with the collateral properties of the sugar industry and with coercion where needed to keep the mills in running condition and producing a maximum of dollars.

Taking what fringe benefits he could from the sugar industry, Castro intervened (seized) and later expropriated the land of mills not in cane cultivation (grazing land for the oxen still used in great number; timber land to supply the lumber needed by the mill, lumber being an expensive and scarce commodity in Cuba, and reserve land, for future plantings or held for sale as a speculation) and the latifundia—sugar cane land owned by a mill, worked by hired hands, and exceeding the permitted maximum of 30 caballeries (about 995 acres) under the Agrarian Reform Law.\(^8\)

He also used the Agrarian Reform Law to seize lands owned by sugar industries but used for other purposes, mainly as cattle ranches.\(^9\) And he sought to bring additional dollars into the economy by promoting banking regulations intended to force United States mills to finance the zafra with dollar credits from United States banks.\(^10\)

But at the same time he called on the industry's workers to stay on the job, to cause no unusual difficulties for their employers, and he asked for a freeze of the financial structure of the industry so that the management

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\(^7\) On Castro's books there were 37 United States-owned sugar mills valued at $260,000,000. Industry sources in Cuba said there were only 31 mills owned by United States citizens and corporations and that they produced 36.5 per cent of the 1960 crop of 5.8 million tons. The value of these mills was estimated at "around $200,000,000," if there was a market for them, which there wasn't.

\(^8\) The law also prohibited the ownership of sugar cane land by foreigners and by anyone engaged in the production of sugar from the cane. A year ending in June 1960 was allowed for the necessary transfers. By that time the sugar cane plantations of United Fruit Company and other interests had been expropriated.

\(^9\) As for example, the 23,000-acre El Indio ranch of Francisco Sugar Company which in 1958-59 earned nearly half its income from cattle and products other than sugar; Manati Sugar Company's Compania Ganadera Becerra (shared 50-50 with the King Ranch of Texas) of 40,000 acres and 7,800 head of cattle; Miranda Sugar Estates, 36,121 acres; Belona Sugar Company, 13,645 acres.

\(^10\) The regulations actually accomplished very little in the way of forced dollar credits. A few United States corporations planned to liquidate their Cuban sugar holdings rather than send more dollars into the country. The stockholders of the West Indies Sugar Corporation voted in February 1960 to liquidate the company with its $22,000,000 plant and equipment in Cuba.
could plan for maximum production in 1959 and 1960. Aside from the prospect of its future expropriation there was little harassment of the industry and it responded with two fairly successful years.

The 1959 and 1960 sugar crops gave Castro the opportunity he needed to build the bridges he would have to cross when the sugar industry, starting with its United States-owned segment, was nationalized. The first bridge to be constructed was to the Soviet Union and was completed in February 1960. A five-year trade agreement was reached under which Cuba would sell to the Soviet Union one million tons of sugar a year. In the five years from 1955 to 1960, the Soviet Union bought nearly two million tons of Cuban sugar. Thus the agreement amounted to a new sale of three million tons over the five years starting with 1960, or 600,000 additional tons per year, to an old customer.11

But whereas in the 1955-59 period the customer had paid in dollars for all his sugar (an estimated total of $108,000,000 in cash for Cuba) in the period 1960-64 he was going to pay in dollars and goods; for each ton in dollars, four tons in goods presumably to be selected by the Cubans from Moscow's selection of soft, hard, and explosive wares.

The cash transaction was at the "world price"—about three cents a pound at the time of the deal. But Soviet purchases for dollars were limited to 200,000 tons per year—Russian purchases of Cuban sugar during the preceding five years had exceeded that tonnage annually, and all for cash dollars. For this reason the Havana newspaper Diario de la Marina (later closed) estimated on February 20, 1960, that Cuba stood to lose $64,000,000 in foreign exchange while Russia stood to gain a valuable market for its wares during the next five years. Cuba would have to take Russian goods in the total value of considerably more than $200,000,000.

The deal was sweetened by a $100,000,000 Soviet credit on easy terms. And it was followed by the Soviet purchase of 700,000 tons of sugar after the United States announced its reduction of the Cuban quota. But this purchase also was for 20 per cent cash—at 3.25 cents a pound—and 80 per cent in goods. Cuba could expect only $9,000,000 in cash and $36,500,000 in barter credit to replace the $85,000,000 it would have received from the United States for the same sugar at a price two cents per pound above the world market price.

11 Cuba exported to the Soviet Union virtually nothing until 1953 when Russia spent $763,000 in Cuba. In 1954, Russia spent $808,000; in 1955, $36,000,000; in 1956, $14,000,000; in 1957, $42,000,000; in 1958, $14,000,000, and in 1959 an estimated $30,000,000. Batista ruled in Cuba between March 1952 and January 1, 1959, when the Soviet Union was buying more than $108,000,000 in Cuban goods, mainly sugar. In return Cuba bought less than $3,500 worth of Russian goods. Either Soviet trade in these years was nonpolitical or Moscow looked with favor upon Fulgencio Batista. In sugar tonnage the Russians purchased from Cuba in 1955, 538,160 tons; in 1956, 224,000 tons; in 1957, 392,000 tons; in 1958, 210,000 tons, and in 1959, 302,000 tons.
It must be remembered also that while this last sale replaced one lost to the United States, the other sale to Soviet Russia was of sugar which would have been sold to Russia and to other buyers, but not to the United States. An unanswered question was what Russia would do with the Cuban sugar exceeding the amount of its customary annual purchases. If the Soviet resold the surplus to Cuban customers a new blow would be dealt the Cuban industry.\footnote{Cuban sugar sales to countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union amounted to 1,800,000 tons in 1955; 2,650,000 tons in 1956; 2,400,000 tons in 1957; 2,450,000 tons in 1958; and an estimated 1,900,000 tons in 1959.}

In July 1960 the Castro Government and Red China closed a deal providing for the sale of 2,500,000 tons of sugar to China during five years, at world market prices. China will pay British pounds sterling for 20 per cent of the sugar taken during the first year only. Machinery, electronic equipment, food, raw material, and a variety of goods will be sent to Cuba in exchange for the other 2,400,000 tons of sugar and for Cuban "iron, nickel, copper, chrome, cobalt, fibers, and some foods." (Nickel and cobalt can be exported in quantity by Cuba only by taking it from the mines of the Moa Bay Company owned by an American corporation, and the Nicaro installation, owned by the United States Government. Both enterprises have been seized.)

In 1960, therefore, Cuba contracted to sell 2,200,000 tons of sugar to Soviet Russia and Communist China, or more than it sold to all other countries except the United States in 1959. Presumably, somewhat similar trade patterns will be followed in 1961, if the Castro Government lasts out the next zafra. This pattern requires the importation of Chinese and Russian goods valued at $140,000,000 and probably more in 1961. Politics aside, Cuba's loss of dollar revenue for most of the sugar sold to Russia and China would force it to turn to other countries than the United States for imports, even if the Soviet Union and China had not negotiated barter deals.

The trade pacts with Russia and China were consummated in February and July 1960, respectively, but they were negotiated over many months in Havana, Moscow, and Peking. It, therefore, is obvious that United States policy and acts denounced by the three trade partners as economic aggression were not in fact the cause of Cuba's entry into the Sino-Soviet trade bloc. The United States' decision to reduce Cuba's sugar quota came after and not before Cuba's decision to trade with Moscow and Peking. Apparently, the conclusion to be drawn is that Castro's economic plans called for a major shift in Cuba's sugar exports and Cuba's principal imports away from North America and Western Europe and toward Communist China and the Soviet Bloc.

Castro seems to have decided upon the nationalization of the United States-owned segment of the sugar industry as the first major step toward nationalization of the entire industry; and upon nationalization of other United States properties in Cuba as the first step toward nationalization of Cuba's other major industries. His first steps were the seizures of marginal lands and ranches, and of rice plantations and other rural properties which would not
interfere with the production of sugar. His second step was the intervention and expropriation of selected sugar land latifundia, such as the lands of the United Fruit Company. His third step was the organization of sugar workers into co-operatives under state management, to handle the land taken. His fourth step was the collectivization of the colonos.

With all avenues of information blocked by the Castro Government, the Cuban people know very little about the struggle with the colonos ("kulaks") of the island's major industry. I talked recently with the former head of a colonos' organization (Cuban law provided for recognition of these groups) whose name can't be revealed as he remains subject to persecution inside Cuba.

During a long conversation, he told me of the resistance of the colonos, large, medium, and small, to the Government's proposal that they form "co-operatives" and share in the profits of the sugar industry as growers, along with their hired laborers, now to be co-operative members, and with the Government as represented by INRA.

The colonos, to begin with, prefer to work their land without owning it. They have been guaranteed possession; they can sell their right of possession; their share in the profits was fixed by law, and the value of these rights in most cases exceeded the value of the land itself. That is, a colono had more of a property interest as a colono than he was likely to acquire as a landowner and much more than he was likely to acquire as a cooperativista in an INRA enterprise. He also would lose much of the power and prestige he had as a man with "rights" to the land and as an employer. As a colono he bought the fertilizer, owned the machinery, and managed the business of growing, cutting, and transporting sugar cane for the mill.

The colono in short is a kulak. It may be that Dr. Castro may be forced, in imitation of Stalin, to liquidate the Cuban version of the kulak.

The colono problem did not arise when latifundia and the hands hired to work it by the owner-mill were organized by INRA into one of its many co-operatives. Latifundia in these cases represented sugar cane land in excess of the acreage allowed to private ownership under the Agrarian Reform Law. But some colonos are on land not legally subject to expropriation and some small farmers who were formerly landless or almost landless now hold parcels granted to them under the law. Such landholders join co-operatives only under pressure. All indications are that the Castro Government, in moving toward full nationalization, is ready to turn the screws tighter on the small landholders.

To break down the existing organization of the sugar industry; to enforce more efficient use of the land; to withdraw sugar cane land for other crops; to give the Government the control it needs over prices, wages, and
shipments, the colonos and the small farmers must be brought into the co-
operatives, which are used by the Government to enforce its will upon the
producers of sugar cane.

The Cuban Government is showing the same skill and tact in dealing
with 40,000 colonos as it showed in dealing with 161 sugar mills. Its purpose,
clearly, is to maintain high production during the take-over. In my opinion
it will succeed provided political power remains where it is.