The Mugabe government's ability to carry out innovative domestic and foreign policies depends in great measure upon the Prime Minister's creativity in retaining the support of those who gave ZANU-PF its victory in the February 1980 elections.
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The ability of Robert Mugabe's government to succeed in carrying out innovative domestic and foreign policies depends in great measure upon the Prime Minister's creativity in retaining the support of those who gave the Zimbabwean National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) its 57-seat majority in the February 1980 elections. At the same time Mugabe must successfully placate the members of Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union), PF (ZAPU), who captured 20 seats; the white supporters of the Rhodesian Front Party, which won all 20 of the seats reserved for whites; and the remnants of Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Congress (UANC) who retained 3 seats in the new Parliament. It is a difficult tightrope Mugabe must walk.

The history of black African party activity in preindependent Zimbabwe is far too complex to recapitulate in this brief study. Suffice it to say that since the early 1920s, when the educated African elite organized the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association to secure voting rights for themselves, the Zimbabwean party system has been kaleidoscopic in nature. Almost overnight, a party or movement would come into being, with each group having its distinct panoply of heroes, its separate sources of external support, its own way of relating to white settlers, and its own military wing.

There were, however, important differences. The first was the ability of the Smith regime to engage in negotiations with one or more of the black leaders in order to weaken support for the liberation effort. Having failed to make headway with Nkomo at various times during the Emergency, Smith turned his attention to Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the UANC, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of the old ZANU, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau, who represented tribal traditionalists. The white leadership succeeded in securing African participation in drafting a new constitution, which nominally allowed for a black majority government but with many significant areas of privilege reserved for Europeans. In the election of April 1979, which both ZANU and ZAPU boycotted, the Muzorewa party gained 51 of the 72 African seats in the 100-member assembly. With the tacit support of Smith's Rhodesian Front Party, which won the 28 seats reserved for whites, Muzorewa became Zimbabwe's first African Prime Minister, a charade that was destined to be short-lived. There was a total absence of international diplomatic recognition, despite concerted right-wing pressure in Britain, the United States Senate, and elsewhere. Both Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces intensified their military struggle. Internal dissension among the collaborating blacks ultimately undermined the myth of majority rule. The Reverend Sithole's 12-seat party charged electoral fraud and largely boycotted the parliamentary deliberations. Later, James Chikerema, Vice Chairman of Muzorewa's party, broke with his leader and took seven other members into opposition. Muzorewa's reliance on white support was thus all too transparent and became a factor in leading the parties to the Lancaster House conference in September 1979.

The second major difference between the Angolan and Zimbabwe liberation struggle is that at a critical juncture the two major Zimbabwean factions in the independence movement were brought into a political coalition. Under the prodding of the presidents of the frontline states, ZANU and ZAPU in 1976 agreed to participate in a Patriotic Front coalition, which endured through the Lancaster House settlement of December 1980. Although their respective armies continued to fight without
coordination, the political cooperation of Mugabe and Nkomo considerably strengthened the hand of the liberation group in the negotiations in London.

The 17-year relationship of the two major Patriotic Front leaders was a microcosm of the broader history of black Zimbabwean politics. In the early 1960s Mugabe was Nkomo’s subordinate and ally within ZAPU. For many reasons they parted company, and each assumed the leadership of a distinct political movement: ZAPU operating out of Zambia and ZANU from Mozambique. The post-1976 wartime cooperation as the Patriotic Front ended after Lancaster House, when each decided to field a separate list of candidates in the independence elections. Each attempted to preempt the Patriotic Front label, but Nkomo beat Mugabe to the punch, though Mugabe also grafted the PF tag to ZANU. (Since then analysts have called them PF (ZAPU) and ZANU-PF, respectively.) When victory was assured, Mugabe invited Nkomo and three other members of his party to serve in a coalition cabinet. Several other PF (ZAPU) Members of Parliament were appointed to deputy ministerial positions. (The fragile nature of that coalition effort is discussed below.)

There is still a third difference between the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and in Angola. The elections in Zimbabwe, which were held under the international supervision, produced a clear-cut majority for one of the competing parties. Despite pre-election rumors, there was no need to put together a governing majority of minority party leaders. Such a coalition, which would undoubtedly have excluded Mugabe’s party and relied tacitly on white support, would have lacked legitimacy and led to the resumption of armed conflict. All pretense of Muzorewa’s legitimacy was completely shattered, as only he and two other UANC members were elected. His national influence had evaporated. The other black parties were eliminated completely in terms of parliamentary representation. The steady decimation in the ranks of followers of Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau is dramatically demonstrated by the growing ritual of minority party politicians announcing in the press their decision to join ZANU-PF. In some cases the decision was akin to a religious conversion; in others, the lure of Mugabe’s patronage was all too apparent.

Despite the magnitude of Mugabe’s electoral victory and his gestures of reconciliation, party politics plagued postwar reconstruction. Not only is Mugabe faced with factionalism within ZANU-PF, but the marriage of convenience with Nkomo also proved difficult—even before the honeymoon had started! Despite his poor electoral showing Nkomo expected almost as a matter of right that he should be named Minister for External Affairs, having already ruled out the largely ceremonial presidency. He accepted the post of Home Secretary, only to find that the ministry had been stripped of its control over the Special Branch (security police), which had been transferred to the office of the Prime Minister. Subsequently, as leader of one of the two liberation groups, Nkomo expressed public displeasure at not being invited to the July summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Freetown, where Mugabe was given a hero’s welcome. To attract international attention to himself, Nkomo suddenly embarked on a not-so-secret journey to the United Kingdom, Libya, and Iraq, supposedly to thank those countries for their wartime support. Mysteriously, he dropped plans to include the Soviet Union in his travel. The primary effect of his excursion, however, was to draw attention to dissension within the coalition at the very time Mugabe was attempting to convince overseas investors of Zimbabwe’s political stability.

The war of words reached a crescendo in the weeks preceding the pitched battle between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces in Bulawayo in November 1980. Patriotic Front (ZAPU) leaders complained that their party adherents were not being appointed to ambassadorships or receiving scholarships for study abroad. There were complaints, as well, that Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation reporters failed to give credit to the role of ZIPRA in the liberation struggle. Mugabe’s lieutenants—particularly Enos Nkala and the Minister for Manpower, Planning, and Development Edgar Tekere (at least until his own political and legal difficulties began)—in response seemed to have free rein to chide Nkomo. The PF (ZAPU) leader for all allegations of police misbehavior since the police came under his Home Ministry. The PF (ZAPU) leadership was accused of harboring sinister motives because of the slow integration of ZIPRA forces into the unified army. At various times Nkomo was also attacked for currying favor with the traditionalists by supporting the idea of chieftainship. Indeed, Senator Nkala (who is Ndebele) actually went to Nkomo’s stronghold in Bulawayo and vowed to “crush the self-elected Ndebele king.” During the early months after independence, both Nkala and Tekere issued public demands that Nkomo be “thrown out of the Mugabe government” and that Zimbabwe abandon the Lancaster House pledge to maintain a multiparty system for the first several years of the new constitution. Tekere even boasted that he had had “a 19-year-old mission to send Nkomo into the political wilderness.’’

Initially Mugabe neither participated in the public bickering nor did much to prevent it. One person I interviewed suggested it may have been his way of permitting the more radical left within ZANU-PF to let off steam against the opposition. This would, it was suggested, compensate the left for their lack of success in getting Mugabe to move more quickly toward socialism, into establishing a one-party state, and into more militancy toward South Africa. Indeed, during my visit, a crude handout, reportedly produced by Mugabe’s critics within ZANU, circulated in Salisbury, charging Mugabe with being a “puppet of white masters” for retaining General Peter Walls and for upholding the constitutional guarantee of 20 white seats in the House of Assembly.

By late August 1980, Mugabe felt obliged to intervene in the interparty squabbling. His mild chastising of his lieutenants, however, appeared to contrast with more acerbic remarks directed at the leaders of PF (ZAPU), UANC, and other parties he felt had prevented the new Zimbabwe from having “one government, one nation, one Prime Minister, and one cock” (referring to
the rooster, which is the ZANU-PF symbol. In unusually harsh terms he warned that “dissidents and smalltime politicians will be crushed.” And with obvious reference to Nkomo, Mugabe stated that “no one should prevent people from enjoying their freedom because one says he ought to have been elected to power.”

Interparty conflict escalated after the November clash between ZIPRA and ZANLA forces in Bulawayo. ZANU-PF leaders blamed the incident on PF (ZAPU) adherents. A week after the battle, a Bulawayo curfew was imposed, the scheduled local elections for that area were postponed, and nine senior members of PF (ZAPU) were arrested, becoming the first political detainees under the Mugabe regime.

The Mugabe-Nkomo split exceeds the level of factionalism any democratic system should be prepared to tolerate. Basically, it perpetuates the historic interethnic conflict that dates back to when the Ndebele people militarily dominated the larger Mashona grouping of clans. Nkomo’s strength comes largely from the Ndebele and related Kalanga areas—where Mugabe’s party made its poorest electoral showing. The advantages that ZANU-PF now enjoys in access to patronage seem only to further frustrate the PF (ZAPU) leadership and convince them that the Ndebele are in danger of becoming a “rejected minority.” This attitude was reinforced by the results of the November local government elections which resulted in a poorer showing for Nkomo’s partisans than they had achieved in February. And, at long last, the Soviet Union seems to have ceased giving Nkomo military and economic support.

Mugabe’s efforts at interparty reconciliation have been complicated by pressure from his own left wing. A tragic event, however—the arrest in late August 1980 of Edgar Tekere on charges of having been involved in a drunken shooting spree which led to the death of a 68-year-old white farm manager—may actually have provided Mugabe with the means of consolidating his control over the radical faction. Tekere, whose friendship with Mugabe arose during their years of political imprisonment, had a firm base of support among ZANU-PF adherents. Although he did not actually have a military command, his fund-raising activities for ZANU in the Third World and his comaraderie with “the boys in the bush”—as he called the freedom fighters—propelled him into the post of Secretary General of the party. In his dual government and party roles, Tekere continued to cultivate his constituency among ZANLA through his earthy speech, his preference for combat dress over civilian clothes, and his drinking habits. In having at the “vestiges of the colonial mentality,” Tekere seldom misses an opportunity to tongue-lash white bureaucrats, university officials, and even the Anglican Church—despite his being the mission-educated son of an Anglican priest. In defiance of official policy, Tekere has openly supported giving legal status to ZANU-PF “kangaroo courts” set up in the countryside. The former Minister for Manpower, Planning, and Development, Tekere also boasted of using his office to make sure that
Thus at one stroke Mugabe: (1) removed one of his most carping ZANU-PF critics from power; (2) brought all the security forces under the control of ZANU-PF ministers; and (3) revealed the eroding political base of Joshua Nkomo. Nkomo's acquiescence to the new arrangement demonstrated the lack of realism of those Ndebele who wished to take up arms in a war of secession, and the February 1981 disturbances at Bulawayo showed that Nkomo's effectiveness with his own people had also diminished. Blaming the British for having failed to integrate the armed services before independence, Nkomo was no better able to get his ZIPRA forces to disarm. (Ironically, once ZIPRA has been disarmed and integrated into a unified army, Nkomo and PF (ZAPU) lose their major trump card in asserting a special case for the Ndebele in the new Zimbabwe state.) Resolution of this crisis notwithstanding, the need to reassure and placate the followers of Nkomo remains the greatest challenge to Mugabe's program of reconciliation.

The Future of the White Settlers

Having observed Kenyan politics over a period of three decades, I visited Salisbury in mid-1980 with a certain sense of déjà vu. In each case the white residents reacting to independence murmured of a rising tide of the “white flight.” In each case the murmurings were contradicted by the obvious fact that not only had most whites remained but that they were also doing very well for themselves, prospering economically and retaining the lifestyle that had attracted them to Africa in the first place. Indeed, there were also parallels to Kenya in the continuing influence that whites maintained in the immediate postindependence era in the military, in rural administration, and even in national and local politics.

During the Smith and Muzorewa periods, the actual extent of the white exodus was a well-guarded secret. Figures published in July 1980 revealed that close to 50,000 whites had emigrated in the three years before independence. From an estimated high of 275,000 whites during the colonial era, the figure now stands close to 210,000. Gross figures, however, reveal only part of the picture. Many of the emigrants were South African citizens who simply returned home, being incapable of adjusting to black rule. Many were sales clerks, blue-collar workers, and others with replaceable skills. On the negative side, a high percentage of recent emigrants were skilled workers, professionals, and technicians and most of these were in the 25 to 39 year age bracket. This loss was only partially being compensated for by the return of black Zimbabweans who had been educated abroad during the war and by the arrival of European and other technicians on short-term contracts without the fringe benefits enjoyed in the past by Europeans.

Also reminiscent of Kenya was the altered attitude of those white Zimbabweans who had elected to stay. Perhaps most surprising of all were the comments of former Prime Minister Ian Smith, who indicated in late July 1980 that he had been “agreeably surprised” by the moderation, competence, straight talking, and conciliatory attitude of Robert Mugabe (although he could not say the same for those he called the “wild boys” in the Cabinet). Neither the stormy departure of Lieutenant-General Peter Walls nor the Tekere murder trial seems to have been decisive in forcing the whites to reassess their futures in Zimbabwe. Indeed, on balance, Mugabe probably came out ahead with his handling of the Tekere affair. And the program for economic recovery and growth set forth by the Mugabe government—which stressed the need for white talent and capital—has been reassuring to those who had feared a “Red takeover.” Many whites I talked to echoed the outrage of one businessman who complained that the settlers had been “seduced” by the propaganda of the Smith regime and the South African government that a Mugabe victory would make “terrorism a way of life in Zimbabwe.” Many remaining whites complained that their friends had needlessly sacrificed their lifetimes of labor and investment in order to escape the feared confiscation of their farms and businesses.

This is not to suggest that racial accommodation has been completely achieved. Whites as well as blacks are concerned about persistent violence. Many whites have stayed because of the limits on exported funds. European employers, moreover, have found it difficult to adjust to the higher expectations of the Mugabe government regarding minimum wages and improved conditions of labor. Firings, as a response to laws requiring minimum wages of Z$30 a month for farm and domestic workers, are deeply resented, since they further aggravate the serious unemployment problem faced by the Mugabe government.
White business entrepreneurs, in turn, have been critical of the newly created Commission of Inquiry on Incomes, Prices, and Conditions of Service. Although the racially-mixed commission includes distinguished economists and educators, its mandate has alarmed many Europeans: the Commission of Inquiry is expected to consider means of securing greater worker participation in the economy, more suitable machinery for industrial conciliation, enhanced pension and social security benefits for workers, and more effective controls over increases in price of food, rent, and transport. As one proponent of the commission suggested, its purpose was to determine "how best a socialist government can put to the use of the people the wealth produced by free enterprise." 3

Most whites who remain in Zimbabwe appear to accept the fact that there will be more rapid promotion of blacks over whites in public employment, the military, and in admission to professional training programs. While grumbling about them, they also seemed resigned to the many symbolic changes that inevitably will take place, such as the removal of the statue of Cecil Rhodes from a main street in Salisbury and the changes in street names. Although somewhat begrudgingly, most whites realistically accept the fact that equalization of treatment must become the norm in medical, educational and other services. Less willingly, but gradually, owners of white restaurants, hotels, and other public enterprises are being convinced to drop their stringent "dress codes" and their subtle slights to nonwhite patrons.

What are the irreducible minima—beyond economic security—needed to keep white talent and capital in Zimbabwe? As Ian Smith phrased it last July, life would become intolerable for whites:

If there was a breakdown in law and order or there was such a deterioration of standards—the things which affect one's personal life—or if one's freedom was interfered with. Those are the kind of things I think would make myself and most white people seriously consider if they could go on living here. 4

The "standards" to which Mr. Smith was referring mean the lifestyle which was a vestige of colonial privilege—the spacious suburban mansions, the host of servants, the tennis courts and swimming pools, and the sundown drinks at "the club." Those quaint institutions and activities of colonial life have in fact continued in the meetings of the Aloe, Cactus and Succulent Society; the performance by the local (all white) theater group of "H.M.S. Pinafore;" and the annual thoroughbred show of the Welsh Corgi Society.

It has become increasingly apparent, however, that the lines of acceptable conduct on the part of remaining whites are not to be drawn by whites alone. "Who, after all," one outraged black official said to me, "won this bloody war?" In more measured tones, the Minister of Information, Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, admonished the white community in August 1980 for their reaction to the resignation of Lieutenant-General Peter Walls:

We are now irritated by the continued threat of a mass exodus of Europeans being held like a pistol to the head of the government. I am authorized to make it abundantly clear that all those Europeans who do not accept the new order should pack their bags and be gone, either individually or in organized groups... We beg no one to stay; but we push no one to go... We welcome those whites who want to stay in a new, free and independent Zimbabwe. We will, however, not be held ransom by our racial misfits and malcontents who do not accept the new order. 5

Foreign Affairs

The one area where the Mugabe government is least likely to rely upon the remaining white citizenry is foreign affairs. Due to ideological factors as well as the diplomatic isolation of the Smith regime, there was no pool of experienced white talent that could be called upon

European-owned tea estates.
and in the preindependence elections (and is still suspected of giving tacit support to the Ndebele leader), has still not been given permission to establish a full diplomatic mission in Salisbury.

Central to the foreign policy concerns of the Mugabe government, however, has been the role that the new nation is to play in the southern African region. It is not an easy role to delineate. As the newest member of the frontline states, Zimbabwe owes a profound debt of gratitude to the leaders of Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, and Botswana for their assistance in the liberation struggle. As the past beneficiary of their support, Zimbabwe can legitimately be expected by them to play a key role in undermining the last bastion of white rule on the continent, the apartheid regime in South Africa. Mugabe contributed to that cause when, three months after independence, he broke diplomatic relations with South Africa.

How much further Mugabe can go in the anti-apartheid struggle is subject to question. First, the Lancaster House agreement of December 1979 secured the pledge of all parties not to use Zimbabwe as a base for the military support of South African liberation forces. Second, if Mugabe hopes to provide his war-weary constituents with the material advancement promised during the long struggle for independence, a period of peace and stability is necessary. (Zimbabweans need only look at the continuing strife in Angola and Mozambique, where South African commandos have been crossing the borders to strike at South African and Namibian liberation sanctuaries for an object lesson.) A third factor limiting Zimbabwean options is its need for external economic aid. Not only would renewed hostilities frighten away Western investors, but it would also confront one of the striking ironies of southern African politics: the economic fates of most countries in the region (excepting Angola) are inextricably linked at present with the economy of South Africa. “We are,” Mugabe has said, “temporary prisoners of our history and geography.” Even with the repair of the Beira and Maputo rail links, most of Zimbabwe’s exports enter world trade through South African ports; and most of the goods needed for development in Zimbabwe and neighboring countries are either produced in or shipped through South Africa. It is for this reason that Mugabe at the OAU summit meeting in July 1980 spoke out against the proposed oil boycott of South Africa. Since South Africa now converts coal into oil and supplies its other oil needs through spot market purchases or secret third party exchanges, a boycott would only marginally affect that country. On the other hand, a boycott of OPEC-priced oil to South Africa would spell disaster for the economies of other countries in the region.

Similarly, with respect to trade, South Africa is the best customer for Zimbabwe’s exports and is the primary supplier of much of the imported machinery and consumer products used in Zimbabwe. Capital needed for investment—particularly in mining—continues to be supplied in great measure by South Africa. One of the major Zimbabwe banks, Rhobank, is owned by South Africa. It is for these reasons that the break in diplomatic relations with South Africa in July 1980 was not matched by a termination of economic links. It is a question of balancing long-deferred black needs for development in Zimbabwe with obligations toward the plight of their racially oppressed brethren in South Africa. As one Asian diplomat philosophically commented on the dilemma: “It is true that blood is thicker than water, but it is also true that bread is thicker than blood.”

Although Mugabe recognizes that an abrupt rupture of links with South Africa would be “suicidal,” Zimbabwe has nevertheless taken an active role in discussions with the other frontline states, as well as with Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Zaire, which could lead to diminished reliance upon South Africa. The first round of discussions in Lusaka last April focused on transport and attempted to coordinate shipping networks to by-pass South African railroads and ports. Cooperation is also anticipated in industrialization and energy policies, food distribution, veterinary research and animal disease control, and other areas. Zimbabwe’s industrial development during the Emergency as well as its self-sufficiency in food make it a
natural focal point for the economic development of the southern region.

Some indication of Mugabe’s intentions to take an independent activist role in southern African integration is evidenced in the overtures being made to Malawi’s President H. Kamuzu Banda. In contrast to the cool—if not hostile—attitude of Tanzanian and other African leaders because of Malawi’s economic and diplomatic links with South Africa, Mugabe has opened a dialogue with Banda. Dr. Eddison Zvobgo, Minister for Local Government and Housing, for example, led a Zimbabwean delegation to the celebration of Malawian independence in July 1980. Zvogo had high praise for Banda’s domestic policies and took to task external critics of the Banda regime.

If Mugabe is to succeed in his strategy of making Zimbabwe a counterweight to South Africa in southern African development, it is clear that he must have outside help. Despite Zimbabwe’s relatively advanced economy, Mugabe needs foreign assistance in tackling post-war reconstruction and meeting the long-suppressed needs of the black majority while he seeks resources for structural economic growth. It is clear that he much prefers to get such support from the West rather than turning to the Soviet bloc. That inclination could make a significant difference in relations between Africa and the West. As an editorial in The Economist suggests, however, the West will squander that opportunity in Zimbabwe, “won almost without a single Western bullet being fired, if rich democratic countries go on acting as if they were poor.” It seems difficult to disagree with The Economist’s conclusion that the Western powers owe it to Mugabe—and to themselves—to “give him his bread.”

(February 1981)

Photos courtesy of the Zimbabwe Ministry of Information and Tourism.

NOTES

1. For a fuller description of African political parties at an earlier stage, see Nathan M. Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965); and Patrick O’Meara, Rhodesia Racial Conflict or Co-existence? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975).


