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## SEARCH FOR THE VANGUARD: PARTY AND POLITICS IN POLAND

by Robin Alison Remington

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**The Polish Communist Party suffered from ideological-political crises at all levels, and was paralyzed in its efforts to deal with solidarity, the independent federation of trade unions. Martial law papered over deep popular hostilities; it did not unite the Party but "militarized" it under General Jaruzelski's leadership.**

At midnight December 30, 1982, martial law in Poland was suspended. This officially ended the militarization of Poland's economy and political life that took place under the direction of the Military Council of National Salvation, chaired by General Wojciech Jaruzelski. That suspension was undoubtedly meaningful to the estimated 5,000 to 6,000 persons reportedly freed as a result.<sup>1</sup> Yet the cautious, seemingly ambivalent manner by which martial law was suspended caused many observers to rub their eyes and wonder if anything of significance had happened after all.

Martial law was suspended, not lifted. Its promised lifting will occur only in the context of a regulated process of "normalization" presumably to take place before Pope John Paul II returns to Poland in June 1983. There is a strong implication that if the situation is not "normalized," the Pope's visit may well be postponed.

The release of Solidarity internees is conditional. "The state of war" (as martial law was characterized) has been replaced by a package of emergency measures that continues the government's power to crack

down to "protect state security." If law and order break down, martial law will be reimposed either totally or piecemeal throughout the country.

Military supervision of the areas of the economy and administration deemed vital to state interest will continue, as will military jurisdiction over alleged "anti-state" activity. Anyone caught "sowing disorder" can be dismissed from work and charged with "social parasitism." The announcement that some 700 underground groups had been broken up, and the formal arrest of the seven leading Solidarity activists before "suspension" went into effect, underline both the Polish authorities' intention not to tolerate any organized opposition and the lack of interest in dialogue. In these circumstances, the appeals for "renewal" and "national reconciliation" beg the question: With whom? How?

General Wojciech Jaruzelski, moreover, shows no sign of returning to the barracks. Rather, he remains firmly in power as head of the Polish United Workers Party. How did his transition from military man to Party leader occur? What happened to Party-Army relations in Communist Poland during a year of martial law? How will that relationship affect the road to "normalization" of Polish politics?

Communist political systems are ideologically committed to the Party dominance so graphically spelled out by Mao Zedong:

*Power grows out of the barrel of the gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command*

*the Party. (On Protracted Warfare. July 1938)*

Western analysts looking at Trotsky's methods of rebuilding the Soviet Red Army and the subsequent ideological and organizational efforts made to insure Party control of Communist militaries have accepted Mao's statement as factual description, rather than ideological preference.<sup>2</sup>

When General Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, he reversed what may be considered standard Leninist guidelines for Party-Army relations. At the same time, he called into question some long-standing academic assumptions about the infallibility of Communist Parties vis-a-vis other institutional actors. It is true that the growing literature on Communist civil-military relations had begun to look more closely at seemingly unorthodox patterns in some Communist countries.<sup>3</sup> However, these focused primarily on such countries as Cuba and Yugoslavia, known for maverick behavior that would be unthinkable in those countries of "real socialism" according to Soviet usage. Despite General Jaruzelski's replacement of Stanislaw Kania as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party on October 18, 1981, martial law in Poland has brought with it a new array of institutions and actors that temporarily have eclipsed the Polish Communist Party.

The following analysis is concerned with the consequences of having the Polish military elite take over the job of Communist civilian actors. It explores a tentative, four-part hypothesis:

1. Poland by December 1981 had become an example of what Samuel Huntington identifies as political decay;<sup>4</sup> i.e., the country's political institutions no longer had the capacity and credibility to make decisions that could be implemented in an orderly fashion, thereby causing political authority and effectiveness visibly to decline.

2. Any "normalization" leading to final lifting of martial law requires reversing that process of institutional decline. In short, "party renewal" is a euphemism for what must be a major restructuring of the Polish Communist Party. This was

at best only feebly begun during the Party's 9th Plenum in July 1982.

3. Insights into the Polish dilemma are much more likely to come from the experiences of military regimes attempting to orchestrate transitions to civilian rule than from study of Communist ideological or organizational preferences concerning Party-Army relations.<sup>5</sup>

4. One must take seriously General Jaruzelski's statement, "I am first of all a soldier."<sup>6</sup>

There is an underlying assumption that the political dynamic in Poland was similar to that propelling soldiers into politics all around the world. The fact that we are dealing with a Communist Party located in the Kremlin's backyard complicates the situation but in no way saves Poland's military governors from the pressures experienced by military regimes in Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa. This view opposes that of those who argue that the Polish military is "the Party-in-uniform."<sup>7</sup>

How did the Polish military get into the business of running the country—as opposed to defending its borders and fulfilling Poland's obligations as the second largest army in the Warsaw Pact? If one looks even cursorily at studies of the phenomenon of *coup d'état*, Poland provides an almost textbook example of stimulants for military intervention in the political process: economic crisis, social disorder, civilian "legitimacy deflation."<sup>8</sup>

Poland's economy was caught in a vise between the political unacceptability of ending food subsidies and the pressure of deepening debt to the West. Edward Gierek had come to power in 1970 on a wave of food riots that made him intensely aware of the political danger of rising prices. His effort to avoid unpopular domestic austerity by heavy borrowing backfired under the weight of rising oil prices, worldwide stagflation, and the poor quality of Polish exports. East-West détente had facilitated Polish access to Western banks, but political anxieties raised by Soviet troops in Afghanistan made the future of this economic strategy less promising.

Simultaneously, the Party faced a crisis of political confidence within

Poland. It was not only that Gierek faced demands from what amounted to a workers' opposition on matters of food subsidies and public policy. The deeper problem was a credibility gap and the impression that the Party itself was riddled by corruption and favoritism. These political vices compounded the resentment that resulted from Gierek's inability to shake off those middle level, bureaucratic hardliners who had successfully resisted implementing genuine reform in any sector.

The declining civilian legitimacy accelerated the Party's ineffectual efforts to control the repercussions of the worker riots that followed a belated effort to raise food prices in 1976. The half-hearted repression surrounding the 1976 outburst only succeeded in generating a loose alliance between dissatisfied workers and intellectual dissidents, among which the Committee in Defense of the Workers (KOR) was to become the most important.<sup>9</sup> KOR, in turn, became a link to Catholic intellectuals and, almost imperceptibly, the Church also became a support base for the workers.

This is not the place to retell the dramatic story of the Gdansk Charter.<sup>10</sup> The workers' right to strike was achieved along with a package of decidedly political demands and the rise of Lech Walesa to national political prominence. When those demands became institutionalized in the form of the independent trade union federation, Solidarity, the situation became immensely more complicated. One could say that this was the victory of the Polish workers' demand to speak for themselves. Somewhat ironically, such a demand could even be credited to the successful implementation of socialist norms. After all, the purpose of the "leading role of the Party" in principle is to mobilize the proletariat. Certainly, the demand that "commercial shops," in which those who could afford to pay got the better cuts of meat, be abandoned in favor of rationing was a voice on the side of egalitarianism.

The Polish Party could survive and rationalize failure, however, more easily than deal with this backhanded form of success. Parties whose basic legitimacy is tied to

their position as vanguard of the working class cannot afford to have their constituencies decide to represent themselves. In Poland this amounted to an admitted crisis of confidence that rapidly became a frantic search for scapegoats. Yet the replacement of Gierek by Kania as First Secretary did little to stop the identity trauma that paralyzed the Party leadership's attempt to deal with Solidarity. Thus began the process by which the Polish Communist Party's leading role has been pre-empted, and the fiction that it continued soon wore thin in Warsaw, Moscow, and other East European capitals.

The Polish Party suffered from ideological-political crises at all levels. Its leaders rotated on what became known as "the carousel."<sup>11</sup> Its members were rapidly defecting to Solidarity. This was a kind of political hemorrhaging bitterly summed up by Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski when he agreed that the Party had essentially "disintegrated."

*....Which is quite clear since the military had to take its place in the government. Who could deny that it went bankrupt, intellectually and politically, that it was unable to organize the society, to get the country out of the disaster, even to defend the state? In the end you are right; we are the ones to be blamed, not Solidarity.<sup>12</sup>*

As membership and authority drained away from the Communist Party,<sup>13</sup> Solidarity reeled from organizational overload. Reportedly the independent trade union grew from 190,000 at the time of the signing of the August 1980 Gdansk Charter, to 10,000,000 by November.<sup>14</sup> Even allowing for journalistic exaggeration, the sudden thrust into the national limelight along with increasingly unrealistic expectations of its swollen membership pressed Solidarity's leadership and organizational abilities to the limit. The trade union had become the symbol of the Polish nation; radicalized students, disgruntled farmers agitating for Rural Solidarity, even the garbage-men of Warsaw all jumped on the bandwagon. Indeed, as one Polish scholar on a postdoctoral fellowship in the U.S. told me somewhat ruefully at the end of 1981, no week passed without some part of the

country on strike for the 16 months prior to martial law.

By the fall of 1981 Solidarity, like the Communist Party, had been pushed to the wall. The charismatic hero of the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk, Lech Walesa, was rapidly being turned into a figurehead; his position was substantially weakened by the open factionalism at the two-stage Solidarity Congress in September/October 1981. Although it is a matter of controversy, in my judgment, Solidarity—like many genuinely revolutionary movements—was sliding into a self-destructive extremism, demonstrated by the unrealistic demand December 12, 1981 for a national referendum on whether the Communist Party should be replaced.

In the meantime, the volume of Soviet objections to what Moscow considered "counter-revolutionary," antisocialist, indeed, anti-Soviet forces dominating Solidarity became ever greater and insistent.<sup>15</sup> The threat of external force was a reality, although there is no evidence to confirm the suspicion that Warsaw Pact Commander Marshal Viktor Kulikov issued an ultimatum while he was in Warsaw the week before martial law was declared. This is not to imply that Soviet pressure did not contribute to the process. It was undeniably one of the precipitants, but only one of an increasingly compelling array.

When Jaruzelski took over as First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party in October 1981, it was evident that efforts to restructure the Party at the July 1981 9th Congress had failed. The General faced a bleak prospect of Party decline, Solidarity intransigence, continued economic crisis, social disorder, moral platitudes from the West, and Soviet implied demands that he take action or see Poland become a case for application of the Brezhnev Doctrine.<sup>16</sup> And soon Jaruzelski's efforts to continue negotiation with Solidarity and the Church would break down as well. In the climate of economic scarcity, institutional degeneration, and potential invasion, it is not surprising that the Party proved unable to work out a genuine national front with the workers and the Church.

The real surprise was that such crippled institutional actors actually managed some 16 months of tense

negotiations before Jaruzelski substituted martial law and set up his Military Council of National Salvation. With both the Party and the Trade Union effectively paralyzed by lack of capacity to deal with organizational pressures and popular demands, the Polish military stood out as the only cohesive political actor. No amount of rhetoric from all sides can change that reality.

Nor was this the first time the Polish military had been drawn into politics. With the destabilizing impact of the 1953 Soviet succession struggle, Polish soldiers were expected to fire on Polish workers during the 1956 Poznan riot. Although accounts vary as to whether the regular Army actually did so,<sup>17</sup> it is generally agreed that Poznan raised serious doubts in the Party about its ability to depend upon the Polish Army as an instrument of domestic repression. These real or perceived restraints undoubtedly influenced the outcome of future political struggles. Indeed, Korbonski and Terry go so far as to suggest that the Polish military had the "pivotal role of political arbiter, especially during the various succession crises or challenges to the leadership in 1968, 1970, and 1976."<sup>18</sup>

Jaruzelski's own political history is not out of line with these authors' conclusion that the Polish military moved step-by-step from co-optation to subordination, accommodation, and eventual participation in decisions that Communist parties above all in principle reserve for civilian elites.<sup>19</sup> Jaruzelski fought with the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army in World War II and rose to the rank of Major General by the age of 33 (in 1956). His positions were strictly professional military until 1960 when he was shifted from the job of division commander to head of the Polish Main Political Administration (MPA), a post that led to his becoming a member of the Central Committee in 1964. Although he left the MPA to become Chief of Staff in 1965, within a scant three years Jaruzelski assumed two key civil positions—Defense Minister and alternate member of the Politburo. Thus the General was no stranger to political roles even before he was pressed into taking on the job of Prime Minister in February 1981, then that of First Secretary of the Party in the following October.

Throughout there is reason to think that the political element in Jaruzelski's career was less at his initiative than as a response to appeals from successive Party leaderships to lend a hand in stabilizing their rapidly deteriorating situations.

In this context, the General's oft alluded to statement of 1976 that "Polish soldiers will not shoot Polish workers"<sup>20</sup> may have reflected his reluctance to use force, or his concern for the national prestige of the military if the regular Army were used against the population. Conversely, such a statement could have been a straightforward professional assessment that his troops would not obey such orders. There is also a possibility that he did not say it, that the quote is actually a rumor started by those with a vested interest in keeping the Army untarnished and available to bail out the Party. Or such a rumor could even have begun as wishful thinking by those who desperately wanted him to say it.

What is more to the point is that whatever his reasons, Jaruzelski had the reputation of throwing his weight behind political solutions. In and outside Poland it was generally believed that he kept the Army on the sidelines both in 1970 and 1976,<sup>21</sup> thereby forcing the Party to opt for reform instead of repression. Right or wrong, this impression increased the military's credibility as a political force, while Jaruzelski himself was the only candidate to receive more votes than Kania in his re-election to the Central Committee at the star-crossed 9th Congress.<sup>22</sup> Undeniably throughout 1981 Jaruzelski had been a defender of Party renewal against both internal critics and Soviet skeptics.

Nonetheless, even before martial law, the Army had moved in to reinforce the sagging political fabric. Such key ministries as Energy and the Interior were taken over by generals. No sooner had Jaruzelski become First Secretary than he was joined by General Tadeusz Dziekan as head of the Central Committee's Cadre Department. Soldiers marched into villages and towns to wage war against corruption and inefficiency. Conscripts went into the mines. At all levels the military presence was making itself felt amid the clamor for Solidarity, while the Party faded from view.

When martial law was declared on December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski spoke to the nation as the head of the Polish government and head of the armed forces, referring to the Party in what could be charitably called an aside.<sup>23</sup> He pointedly assured his listeners that the Council of National Salvation was to be composed of "senior officers of the Polish Army." And despite some earlier political posts held by some of these officers, that seems to be an accurate characterization of the 14 generals, one admiral, and five colonels.

This is not to say that civilian political elites disappeared from sight. Rather, Jaruzelski appears to be working closely with handpicked committees of former high-ranking Party members. Still, the imposition of martial law interrupted whatever remained of "normal" functioning of the Polish Communist Party even as it cut short the development of Solidarity. Although early reports from Warsaw that two members of the July 1981 Politburo were among those arrested and that this top Party body had not been consulted before the declaration of martial law cannot be verified,<sup>24</sup> they are believable in light of how the Politburo was subsequently pushed aside. Nor is it an exaggeration to say that when the Party Central Committee met at the end of February 1982, it convened to rubberstamp the General's decision to continue martial law.

With martial law the militarization of Polish politics steamed ahead. Two other high-ranking members of the Military Council for National Salvation are deputy members of the Politburo, while there has been what de Weydenthal calls "progressive penetration" of other levels of the Party structure.<sup>25</sup> Officers have appeared as secretaries of "voivodships," regional administrative units, with emphasis on such sensitive areas as Silesia and the explosive coastal region. Others have filled leadership positions in local committees in towns and factories. This is in addition to those "military commissars" appointed by the National Defense Committee and sent into the countryside and cities in October and November to shape up the performance of local administrative bodies and get the economy moving. In short, at least for the

moment the Army became the backbone of what amounted to a truncated Party.

Despite ritualistic affirmations of continued dedication to the task of Party renewal, Jaruzelski has relied on government rather than Party bodies in his efforts to stabilize the country. While martial law was in place, both the powerful Socioeconomic Committee and the Economic Commission were headed by Deputy Prime Ministers and directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. The Voivods Convention consisting of 12 members from the regions and major cities and set up by the General in his role as Prime Minister was to advise the Council of Ministers and government economic agencies. In a partial list of presumably the most important institutions created after martial law, only the Factory Social Commissions were described in such a way as to imply an attempt to re-establish Party as opposed to state authority.<sup>26</sup>

Seen in this context, the leadership reshuffle at the 9th CC Plenum July 15 and 16, 1982, at best symbolically set the stage for a return to civilian control. These changes did considerably more to consolidate Jaruzelski's personal position than to strengthen the Party institutionally. The dropping of presumed Soviet favorite Stefan Olszowski and a "moderate" Hieronim Kubiak from the Secretariat may well be a wise move in terms of keeping a balance between conflicting policy perspectives.<sup>27</sup> Combined with the elevation of his personal aide Manfred Gorywoda to that body, the Party Secretariat would appear ever more in the pocket of its First Secretary, who we must remember also remained Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Chairman of the Military Council of National Salvation. Nor is the full Politburo membership accorded a politically unknown foreman from a plant in Poznan, Stanislaw Kalkus, likely to give workers a more independent voice at the top of the Party. Indeed, if one takes the view that a cult of personality is intrinsically incompatible with genuine political institutionalization, the Polish Party was weakened, not strengthened, in July 1982.

Another not implausible interpretation might be that General Jaruzelski has no intention of withdrawing to

the barracks with the end of martial law, but of following what might be considered the Egyptian pattern under Nasser. The Military Council of National Salvation disappears as did Egypt's Revolutionary Command Council, leaving a former General firmly in place as head of State and Party. Certainly, from the Soviet view that would be an improvement over the earlier situation in which the Army had visibly replaced the Party. From the beginning Moscow stressed Jaruzelski's role as leader of the Party,<sup>28</sup> and there is no reason to assume that Yuri Andropov is less concerned about Party dominance than was Leonid Brezhnev. Within Poland the Soviet line was not followed because the Party had lost credibility.

That Jaruzelski presided over a session of the Warsaw Pact on January 4, 1983 in civilian clothes instead of his customary military uniform indicates his willingness to make concessions to such concerns abroad.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, the General may genuinely want to lift martial law. He may long for those days when he was first of all a soldier and plan to return to them. Yet despite the successful aborting of the Solidarity strike planned for the anniversary of the declaration of martial law in December 1982 and the appearance of a sullen calm, it is highly unlikely that the Polish General is going to get out of politics soon or painlessly. Military rule in Poland, as elsewhere, has severely limited political association within as well as outside the Party.<sup>30</sup> The call to parliament to lift martial law on November 22, 1982 came not in the name of the Party but of the General's own attempt at a popular front, the Patriotic Movement for National Revival (PRON). In these circumstances, that move can hardly be seen as contributing to reviving party credibility.

Steps to return the Party to a "leading role" will depend far more on when General Jaruzelski and his advisers feel the Party is ready to resume such responsibility than upon exhortations from anxious Warsaw watchers in the Kremlin. My own guess would be that such a move is likely only when the military has "penetrated" Party institutions to such an extent that the Army is simultaneously the most cohesive element within both government and a "renewed" Party. In sum, the Polish Communist Party will return

to power only with the army as its vanguard. This will have completed the process of turning Leninist guidelines on Party-Army relations upside down.

And what of the workers? Communist Parties are supposed to be vanguards of a working class, a job for which a militarized Party blamed for the banning of Solidarity seems singularly unfit.

Although it is certainly too soon to tell, the Polish military may eventually find itself in a situation analogous to that of Peru. For many years Peruvian politics suffered because only the *Apristas* had popular authority and this group was the one unacceptable alternative in the eyes of the Peruvian military.<sup>31</sup> In the Polish context, that problem is compounded by the unacceptability of Solidarity in Moscow as well. His attempts at union building notwithstanding, General Jaruzelski's inability to bring about a reconciliation with a restyled Solidarity may prove exceedingly costly. For no matter how well he succeeds in other sectors improvement in the economy is crucial.

Before the suspension of martial law, there was some improvement in coal output and food stocks. Yet this is in the overall context of production that fell 14 percent in 1981 (estimated to have gone down another 5% in 1982), and price hikes totaling 140 percent in 1982. The real problem is not the underground Solidarity activists, whatever their annoyance value, but the fact that the Polish work force is essentially demoralized, without incentives, and quite capable of continuing low levels of productivity as an ongoing passive protest. Dialogue with Solidarity would offer some hope of preventing massive "internal emigration" of the Polish working class. Without it, the chances for economic national revival at any rate don't look good.

Meanwhile, although the Church may continue to stand publicly for much of the substance that Solidarity once represented, it is accommodating to the political reality. If there is not to be a three-sided dialogue between the government, Solidarity, and the Church, the Church appears increasingly willing to settle for a two-way discourse. Note Archbishop Jozef

Glemp's November 8, 1982 meeting with General Jaruzelski in which both men expressed concern for "social order." There is the compromise over the Pope's visit now set for June 1983. Catholic involvement in the Patriotic Movement for National Revival is signaled by the fact that the head of PRON's interim national council is a veteran Catholic writer. Although freed physically, Walesa is increasingly isolated.

But to return to the General's problem of Party building. In his interview with Orianna Fallaci, Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski insisted "This party still exists with its ideals and its members—not all of it is to be thrown away."<sup>32</sup> Even given the disappearance of more members since the Rakowski interview in February 1982, he is right. Except that at a minimum, two parties exist. One is dedicated to reform that seems more and more of an illusion in the context of the banning of Solidarity. The other is a party advocating hardline solutions that, violations of human rights under martial law notwithstanding, Jaruzelski has not favored.

As of this writing, Jaruzelski appears both in command of a strictly controlled "normalization" process and in favor with the new Soviet leadership, headed by Andropov.<sup>33</sup>

Yet an unpleasant reality remains. Martial law in Poland papered over and exacerbated deep popular hostility. It did not unite the Party. If anything, the split frequently referred to in oversimplified terms as between moderates and hardliners may have deepened as well. Incremental repression can still backfire. All around the world, the bottom line of military rule is more military rule. What if the lesson of martial law is not enough? As the official Polish Communist Party newspaper bluntly put it, "The worst possible effect of lifting martial law... would be the necessity of reimposing it."<sup>34</sup>

(January 1983)

## NOTES

1. Eric Bourne, *Christian Science Monitor*, December 21, 1982. According to the latest figures at the time this *Report* was written, as many as 1,500 individuals may still be locked up "for political reasons," including 7 top leaders of Solidarity and 5 leaders of KOR. Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban also has confirmed the existence of "a military training center" that the Church reportedly describes as "a penal colony" for Solidarity activists. *New York Times*, January 9, 1983.
2. For a concise description of the totalitarian/penetration model, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977, pp. 15-19.
3. See Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba" in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, ed., *Political Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1974, pp. 209-239; A. Ross Johnson, *Role of the Military in Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch*, Rand Memorandum P-6070, January 1978; and Robin Alison Remington, "The Military as an Interest Group in Yugoslav Politics," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Civil Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 181-200.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (April 1965): pp. 386-430.
5. Such as the analyses in the earlier American Universities Field Staff study, Howard Handelman and Thomas G. Sanders, eds., *Military Government and the Movement toward Democracy in South America*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981.
6. *The Statesman* (Delhi), February 12, 1981.
7. Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (December 1982): pp. 778-789.
8. For more information than most academics require on this matter, see Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook*, Fawcett World, 1972. Chapter two of Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith's text, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations*, North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, pp. 8-30, provides a concise summary.
9. *Dissent in Poland: Reports and Documents*, London: Association of Polish Students and Exiles, 1977. For analysis, Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977*. London: Poets and Painters' Press, 1978.
10. A comprehensive picture of events surrounding the Gdansk Agreement can be found in William F. Robinson, ed., *August 1980: The Strikes in Poland*. Munich: RFE, 1980.
11. George Sanford, "The Response of the Polish Communist Leadership and the Continuing Crisis (Summer 1980 to the Ninth Congress, July 1981) Personnel and Party Change," in Jean Woodhall, ed., *Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland: Reform, Failure, and Crisis*. London: Francis Pinter, 1982, p. 44 correctly points out that for the participants it must have been much more like riding a rollercoaster without any idea when or if one would get to the end of the line.
12. Oriana Fallaci's exclusive interview with Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, *The Times* (London), February 23, 1982.
13. According to unofficial reports, party membership dropped drastically from 3.2 to 2.5 million between August 1980 and December 1981, Eric Bourne, *Christian Science Monitor*, January 14, 1982. Even more serious than the dwindling membership was the fact that an estimated one million of those remaining party members had also joined Solidarity and far from carrying the party's message to the trade union were agents of the workers' demand for party reform. Edwina Moreton, "The Soviet Union and Poland's Struggle for Self-Control," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), p. 91.
14. *The Statesman* (Delhi), November 17, 1980.
15. On December 4, *Pravda* printed a Tass dispatch from Warsaw quoting Olszowski's charge that Solidarity was "against the Socialist System." This appeared amid a barrage of Soviet attacks associating the trade union with Kulak led subversion and preparations for "an open struggle for power," *Pravda*, December 9, 1981. For an unambiguous sample in English, see *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXIII, No. 49 (December 30, 1981): pp. 5-8.
16. S. Kovalev, *Pravda*, September 26, 1968. Put forward to justify Soviet intervention into Czechoslovakia, this doctrine claimed that if socialism in any socialist country was in danger or if developments within such a country threatened the internal stability of other socialist countries, Moscow reserved the right to intervene militarily.
17. I am grateful to Jan B. de Weydenthal for calling to my attention a recently published book by Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trajanowicz, ed., *Poznanski Czerwec*, 1956, published in Poznan, 1981 that includes eye-witness accounts to the effect that regular troops were first sent to put down the revolt. However, this does not specifically contradict M.K. Dziewanowski's report that "the soldiers of the Poznan garrison remained passive and in some cases willingly handed their weapons to the crowd," *The Communist Party of Poland*, 2nd edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 265.
18. Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah Meikeljohn Terry, "The Military as a Political Actor in Poland" in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1982, p. 160.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 28. For details see the chapter on the Polish military in A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*. New York: Crane Russak, 1982, pp. 17-61.
20. Korbonski and Terry attribute this statement to "personal interviews in Warsaw, June 1976" and despite reservations it is firmly entrenched in the literature, Johnson, et al., *ibid.*, p. 53.
21. Note the mid-1981 poll showing that the Polish Army stood just behind the Church and Solidarity as the third most respected institution in the country, *Kultura* (Warsaw), June 21, 1981.
22. A. Ross Johnson, *Crisis in Poland*. A Rand Note, N-1891-AF, July 1982, p. 12.
23. Moreton, p. 101. For substantial excerpts of Jaruzelski's decree see *The International Herald Tribune* and *The Times* (London), December 14, 1981.
24. Roger Boyes of *The Times* and Brian Mooney of Reuters dispatch from Warsaw, *The Times* (London), December 17, 1981.

25. Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Martial Law and the Reliability of the Polish Military," in Daniel Nelson, ed., *The Soviet Allies: Issues of Reliability*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983, forthcoming.

26. RFE-RL Background Report (Poland), Roman Stefanowski, "A Partial List of Martial Law Institutions," September 7, 1982. When the Economic Commission was dissolved in a leadership reshuffle at the end of October 1982, its functions were taken over by the government presidium and a planning commission headed by deputy premier Janusz Obodowski. Although it is too soon to tell whether or not this emphasis on state rather than party organs will continue, it is indicative that the new Minister of Culture, Professor Kazimierz Zygulski, reportedly is not a Communist Party member, and indeed, a veteran of the anti-Communist Polish Home Army during World War II.

27. RFE-RL Poland Situation Report, JFB, July 27, 1982. Olszowski retained

his Politburo membership and also took over the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He continues to be a potential challenge to Jaruzelski's consolidation of power.

28. *Tass*, quoted by the *International Herald Tribune*, December 14, 1981. Soviet coverage of Jaruzelski's visits to Moscow in February and the Crimea in August 1982 is even more emphatic in this regard.

29. *New York Times*, January 5, 1983. This was in line with the General's August 1982 visit to the Soviet Union out of uniform and may be seen as another step in his own "civilianization" Egyptian style as speculated above.

30. de Weydenthal's forthcoming chapter provides excellent detail in this regard.

31. Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, consider the mutual enmity of the APRA party and the military to be "the most significant element in Peruvian

civil-military relations through the present day," p. 149. Although that is less clear some eight years later, that profound hostility did dominate Peruvian politics for a good 45 years.

32. *The Times* (London), February 23, 1982.

33. Note the reference to Poland in the recent Warsaw Pact Political Declaration stressed that "Polish internal affairs will...be decided only by Poland" and assured "Socialist Poland" of the moral, political, and economic support of "fraternal socialist countries." TASS, Prague, January 5, 1983. This wording suggests that the signers of the declaration no longer considered it necessary to imply even by omission (as with the December 6, 1980 statement of Warsaw Pact leaders) that military support might be a consideration.

34. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 3, 1982.