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EAST ASIA

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Common Prosperity

INTERIOR CHINA AND THE COAST (PART 2)

"Our policy is to allow certain groups of people and certain regions to prosper first. The advanced regions are then obligated to bring along and assist the backward regions. We must hold to the course of socialism: the goal is common prosperity. But an equal pace of development is not possible. In the past we pursued egalitarianism and all ate out of iron rice bowls — this was actually common backwardness, common poverty. We all lost out. First and foremost, reform must do away with egalitarianism; we must smash the iron rice bowl."

—Deng Xiaoping (1986)

"Socialism is not when a small group of people become wealthy while most remain poor. Socialism's superiority is found in its pursuit of common prosperity — this is the embodiment of socialism's most basic value. If, however, the rich and the poor become polarized, this is something very different. Conflict between ethnic minorities, between regions, between social classes, even between the central government and localities could develop, possibly resulting in chaos."¹

—Deng Xiaoping (1990)

GUIZHOU, China

March, 1998

Mr. Peter Bird Martin
Executive Director
Institute of Current World Affairs
4 West Wheelock Street
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Dear Peter:

My previous newsletter provided a first-hand account of a profound human drama: 50 million men and women flowing away from China's less-than-prosperous regions toward areas of opportunity. Desperation and the fear of poverty, combined with the lure of pockets of relative wealth, have persuaded a massive population within China — equal in size to the U.S. population west of the Rocky Mountains — to live and work under often-difficult conditions far from home and family.

The spontaneity of this mass movement is striking, especially when one considers that for the first 30 years after communist "liberation" (1949-1979) almost every aspect of a person's life was organized and controlled. Today, however, market forces are at work. So is the growth of personal freedom as millions create a spontaneous referendum on their country's widening disparity — currently surpassing pre-revolution levels — by voting with their feet.²

The flip-side of migrant labor's spontaneous response to their country's

¹ Huang Junru and Xie Hekuan, *Xuexi Deng Xiaoping de fazhan lilun*, (Deng Xiaoping's Development Theory) (Guiyang: Guizhou People's Press, 1996).

² The absolute per-capita GDP disparity gap between China's richest and poorest regions has steadily widened since 1949, especially since 1978. For example, the per-capita GDP difference between Shanghai and Guizhou Province was 2,323 yuan in 1978; 3,437 in 1985; 5,024 in 1990; 10,468 in 1993; and 13,000 in 1994.

unequal prosperity is a series of government policies, developed during the 1990s, that attempts to assuage those who feel passed over by China's economic miracle.

This newsletter reports on the central government's response to the disparity dilemma and the way those in impoverished Guizhou Province view one of its policies: sister-city relationships in which wealthy coastal cities have been directed by the central government to adopt their backward, interior cousins.

COMPLAINT

In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping (88 years old at the time) made what will be remembered as one of his most skillful political maneuvers: he paid a visit to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, bordering Hong Kong. One of four "special economic zones" created in 1979 as an experiment in market-oriented reform, Shenzhen — the sleepy fishing village turned high-tech and export dynamo — had become the jewel in Deng's coast-led, development-strategy crown. After inspecting some key factories in Shenzhen, the elderly leader visited some other parts of Guangdong province and Shanghai. At each stop he called for the country to emulate Shenzhen's economic development by pushing ahead with rapid market-oriented reform.

Known as the "southern tour," Deng's trip was strategic because, just months before the 14th Party Congress [convened every five years to evaluate and determine policy and leadership direction], it was an end-run around conservative critics. As a trump-card played against retrenchment policies in place since 1989, Deng's outing mandated unequivocal support for continued reform and full-throttle economic growth. His designs were solidified during the 14th Party Congress in late 1992, as evidenced by the creation of the term "socialist market economy."

Deng Xiaoping's high-profile "southern tour" touched off explosive economic growth and got market-oriented reform back on track. At the same time, how-

ever, it disturbed many leaders in China's yet-to-prosper regions. Not only did they feel Deng Xiaoping's national form of trickle-down economics was not dripping quickly enough, Deng's visit to Shenzhen — symbolic of continued emphasis on coast-led development — indicated no hope for a shift toward, or even equal treatment for, developing the interior. The reform period had brought unprecedented growth to the inland provinces in absolute terms — inland leaders knew that — but compared to the highly-favored coast, they were falling farther and farther behind. Coastal China's high-growth takeoff had left most of the less-prosperous interior choking in its fumes.³

Leaders from the interior began to express frustration with not only their relatively smaller piece of a growing pie, but perhaps more importantly, a sense of injustice with biased government policy. Deng Xiaoping's development strategy had created a playing field that leaned hard to the east: special economic zones and other coastal regions received preferential tax policies and foreign investment incentives, as well as lopsided central-government investment.⁴ To make matters worse, because interior regions had little formal representation in the central government, as coastal economic strength was increasingly parlayed into political capital, impoverished interior regions had less and less voice in central-government politics.⁵ Hu Angang, an influential economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, calls the political-resource bias "the root cause of the sharpened contradictions between the central government and localities and between the developed and less-developed regions."⁶

Complaint continued to percolate during the years following Deng Xiaoping's landmark trip to Shenzhen. In 1994, economist Hu Angang gave voice to the growing anxiety through two surveys: one with 30 provincial-level inland leaders, the other with 127 county-level government officials from China's interior.⁷ Approximately 90 percent of each group believed that regional disparity had reached extreme proportions, violating socialism's "common prosperity" principle. Sixty-three percent of the provincial-level leaders and 95 percent of those from

³ For example, between 1978 and 1993, coastal Guangdong province's per-capita GNP grew from 390 yuan to 2,115 yuan. Guizhou's per-capita GNP, however, grew only from 195 yuan to 592 yuan.

⁴ The ratio of per-capita government investment (total fixed-asset investment) strongly favored China's richest regions. Between 1978 and 1995, for example, the distribution of per-capita investment in China's coast increased 19 percentage points (from 45% to 64%), while it decreased 11 percentage points in central China and 7 percentage points in western China during the same period. Instead of government investment promoting and balancing development, it served only to exacerbate disparity.

Between 1993 and 1995, the ratio of central-government funding for basic construction projects (e.g. transportation, power, telecommunications) increasingly moved in favor of the coast. In 1993, the ratio was 1.44 : 0.98 : 1.0 (coast: central: western); in 1995, the ratio shifted to 1.6 : 1.12 : 1.0 [source: Zhao Puping, *Guanyu zhongxibu liyong waizi zhengci de jidian sikao* (Points to consider regarding central and western china's foreign investment policies), State Council Development Research Center Report, no. 59 (August 10, 1997)]

⁵ At the 14th Party Congress (1992) four provincial leaders from China's high-income regions (Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Guangdong) and one provincial leader from an upper-middle income region (Shandong) were recruited into the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee. No provincial leader from the interior, low-income regions participated in the central-government elite.

⁶ Hu Angang, *Zhongguo diqu chabie baogao* (China regional disparity report) (Shenyang: Liaoning People's Press, 1995), 82.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 288.

“Maintain the basic line of the Communist Party for one hundred years.” This Shenzhen billboard celebrates Deng Xiaoping’s role as Shenzhen’s patriarch and creator of China’s coast-led economic miracle. The author, who took this photo, was in Shenzhen on the one-year anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s death — February 19, 1998. Displays of flowers set in front of the billboard memorialize Deng’s contribution.



the county level believed that a solution to the problem was urgent, that it could not be put off until the next century. Eighty percent of both groups felt that the gap would lead to social instability. Of that group, 16 percent at the provincial-level and 12 percent at the county level believed the development gap could lead to the country’s breakup. Hu’s survey results were passed along to central-government decision-makers.

In February 1995, Chinese Academy of Sciences President Zhou Guangshao made an unusual appearance on China Central Television’s (CCTV) investigative-report program “Focal Point” (*Jiaodian Fangtan*). In response to the reporter’s question on the potential consequences of widening economic disparity, Zhou said: “Chinese history has many examples that demonstrate when society’s distribution of wealth becomes terribly disproportionate, social instability can occur, in some cases leading to a break in social development.” Influential academics in China do not speak casually about potential social chaos in public — especially on national television. The situation had obviously become quite serious.

With influential commentators like Zhou Guangshao and Hu Angang reflecting sentiment that much of China’s interior felt passed over by China’s economic miracle — while at the same time growing numbers of migrant laborers were on the march — it became clear to the central government that regional disparity was no longer simply an economic issue; it had also become a political problem. With that kind of input flowing back to Beijing, central-government leaders began to sit up, take notice and respond.

RESPONSE

As coastal economic growth continued to charge forward — and dazzle the world — central-government

leaders began to echo back to China’s interior their concern over the hazardous development gap. In their speeches they began to speak of the disparity problem in a different tone. For example, President Jiang Zemin said in a 1993 speech:

“During the development of our nation’s socialist market economy, ethnic-minority regions of the country — because of a weak economic base — may fall further behind for a period of time. We must pay attention to this problem, we must strengthen our research, and we must develop a policy response.”

Premier Li Peng said in a speech the same year:

“We must admit the east-west gap. We must create conditions so that the gap can gradually close. The central government cares very much about this problem and has determined that the west’s development is a major issue that must be addressed through policy, funding and technological support.”

And not only did central-government leaders respond by speaking to the issue, they responded to a call for “western entry (*xijin*) and not just southern tours (*nanxun*)” by traveling to the interior. China’s leaders began to observe first-hand what was actually happening in the backwater regions. In 1996, for example, 11 central-government leaders visited Guizhou Province.

Beyond speaking and traveling, which, while important, could have resulted in nothing more than public-relations stunts, the most significant step in the central government’s response to the disparity alarm came in September 1995 at the fifth plenary session of the 14th

In the Autumn of 1994, Qiao Shi, then chairman of the National People's Congress, visited Guizhou Province's Sandu Shui Ethnic Minority Autonomous County, in Qiannan prefecture, where the author and his family now live. Part of a stream of central government leaders making their "western entry" (xijin), these trips were designed to let China's less-than-prosperous regions know that though there was a huge gap in economic wealth, they had not been forgotten.




Party Congress. Whereas China's Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) explicitly stated that the country would pursue a growth strategy to accelerate the development of coastal regions, at the fifth plenary session, the Central Committee put forward the principle of "persisting in the coordinated development among different regions and gradually narrowing regional development gaps." The result was a series of policy initiatives implemented in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). The policy package focused on a commitment to increase central government funding for poverty alleviation and infrastructure assistance, improve tax incentives to attract foreign investment to the country's central and western regions, and maintain a policy environment conducive to coordinat-

ing the interior's development with the rest of the country. Guizhou Province, for example, was designated to receive U.S.\$1.2 billion from the central government and various ministries through the year 2000 to support: farming and poverty-relief work; preferential treatment in major project approvals involving infrastructure and energy development; and designation as a key province for resource development through the construction of several major industrial bases.

Of these and other recent initiatives, the most fascinating policy I have observed is a central-government initiative to create sister-city relationships under which wealthy coastal cities adopt their poor, inland cousins.



Shenzhen Hope School, with its four-million-yuan investment, belies its location — the remote, impoverished mountains of southern Guizhou Province. It is the largest of 21 Shenzhen-supported schools in Sandu County.



As part of the central government's efforts to give greater attention to China's backward interior, the State Council matched wealthy coastal cities with their poor, inland cousins. For Guizhou, four coastal cities — Shenzhen, Ningbo, Qingdao and Dalian — each adopted two of the province's eight districts.

SISTER-CITY RELATIONS: SHENZHEN AND GUIZHOU⁸

As I walked through the school's front entrance into the courtyard, the open area teemed with elementary and middle-school-aged children. The impressive four-story, white-tile building belies its location — the remote, impoverished mountains of southern Guizhou Province. Shenzhen Hope School was constructed through the donations of 17 Shenzhen companies who gave 4.35 million yuan (U.S. \$526,000) as part of a sister-city relationship between Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and Sandu Shui Ethnic Minority Autonomous County [one of 10 counties in Qiannan Miao and Buyi Autonomous Prefecture]. The school is located in Sandu's county-town, on recently-completed Shenzhen Street — of all places.

Shenzhen Hope School, with its 1,400 students (800 elementary and 600 middle-school), is the largest of 21 Shenzhen-supported schools sprinkled though the mountains of Sandu County.⁹ Each of the other smaller, more distant schools, which educate a total of 4,000 students, is sponsored by one Shenzhen company. All but Shenzhen Hope School began opera-

tion the beginning of the 1996 school year; Shenzhen Hope opened its doors in September 1997. Because elementary education is so critical to an area's development, Shenzhen chose education as the centerpiece of its support.

Though Shenzhen Hope School has been open for just one semester, it buzzes with excitement. An inscription greets all who pass through the main gate. It begins: "In honor of Deng Xiaoping's words that the first-to-develop regions should help bring along the less-developed regions until, in the end, all reach common prosperity, the following companies donated funds to the construction of Shenzhen Hope School...."

In the spirit of Deng's intentions, the Shenzhen-Sandu relationship — and others like it across China's interior — is the result of a State Council decision in 1995 to link wealthy coastal cities with backward regions. For Guizhou Province, four wealthy coastal cities (Shenzhen, Ningbo, Dalian and Qingdao) were each selected by the central government to adopt two of the province's eight districts. Qiannan prefecture was paired with Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.¹⁰ In the first few months after the relationships were established, the four cities signed

⁸ I have translated the Chinese term for the policy — *duikou zhiyuan* — as 'sister-city,' even though the matched-location in the interior is usually not a city.

⁹ Sandu Shui Ethnic Minority Autonomous County has a population of 290,000, 100,000 of whom live in the county-town. Sandu is one of 10 counties in Qiannan Miao and Buyi Autonomous Prefecture.

¹⁰ Though the primary relationship is between Qiannan prefecture and Shenzhen, Sandu County, because of its uniqueness as the country's only Shui ethnic minority autonomous county and its extreme poverty, has a direct relationship with Shenzhen. Both Qiannan prefecture and Sandu County, for example, have their own representative offices in Shenzhen.

agreements with Guizhou for over 100 projects — mainly in education, health care and tourism development — totaling U.S. \$225 million.

During a recent visit to Shenzhen, I met with the director of Qiannan prefecture's Shenzhen Representative Office. Director Wang has led the office — in fact, the office is a one-man show — since its establishment in 1996. A former journalist from Qiannan prefecture's capital, Duyun, Director Wang described his threefold-role: to assist in directing Shenzhen donations; to provide information to relevant offices in Qiannan and Shenzhen; and to occasionally help place laborers from Qiannan in positions requested by Shenzhen companies (i.e., organizing migrant labor). Though he says the labor-matching role is the least time-consuming, Director Wang told me that a group of 30 young women from Qiannan prefecture had just arrived for training. These would-be Shenzhen maids were staying in his four-room office — one of the rooms had up to a dozen three-level bunkbeds — until they are successfully relocated.

I was surprised to learn from Director Wang that the



Director Wang of Qiannan's Shenzhen Representative Office pictured with the author in Shenzhen. "I'm like an ambassador," Director Wang said proudly as he described his role in the sister-city relationship.

central government does not require Shenzhen to produce certain funding levels for their contribution to the sister-city relationship. Rather, each city's government is to organize and encourage their companies to give as much as possible to projects in their poor sisters' areas. Director Wang's role, therefore, as information provider is critical both to Shenzhen as he lets them know of worthy projects, and back home to Qiannan as he communicates what Shenzhen companies are wanting and willing to give.

I assumed that the companies were motivated by tax incentives. I was wrong. Director Wang said there are other incentives at work: Shenzhen's leaders want to do a good job to impress the central government so as to increase their chances of being promoted to a central government position. Shenzhen's leaders also want to look well in comparison to other coastal cities in the support of their backward interior brethren.

In Sandu County, government officials also told me that the sister-city relationship is not a "give-and-get-out" type of arrangement. After the funds stop flowing, advising, training and exchange are to continue. The sister-city relationship's objective, beyond providing financial support, is to strengthen understanding between regions.

It is not difficult to see the potential good that can come out of sister-city relationships. For backward inland areas, the financial support helps alleviate capital shortages and provides education and health-care improvements otherwise not possible. The extent to which this good is maximized on the recipient-side, of course, assumes a bucket that does not leak — that is, that those tasked to oversee the handling of the donations get the gifts to their ultimate destination. From what I hear, skimming and resource diversion is a problem. Nevertheless, for Sandu County as an example, 21 schools have been vastly improved and are in operation, and 4,000 children across the county are receiving a better education than they were two years ago.

From the central government's perspective, the sister-city relationships are an important policy success. Because wealthy coastal companies foot the bill for what would otherwise be government expenditure, the government is able to provide social services without paying for them — a big victory for any politician.

Important as well is that the policy is an excellent mechanism to produce political fruit on the grass-roots level, where resentment by the less-prosperous may be the strongest. Sister-city relationships communicate that the government cares about the disparity issue. If I'm a poor farmer in the mountains of Guizhou's Sandu County who can now send my child off to Shenzhen Hope School, you bet it seems like the government has done something beyond just saying that it cares about regional disparity; they got some of those



Shenzhen Cigarette Factory donated U.S.\$60,000 to design and print postcards that showcase Qiannan's stunning mountain scenery and colorful ethnic minorities. The pack's cover reads: "The Scenery Over Here is Unique — Remove Qiannan's Mysterious Veil." The postcards hope to draw tourists, and their pocketbooks, to what is otherwise a poor, backward region.



Postcards like this one — picturing a Buyi ethnic minority bride (l) and a Miao ethnic minority bride (r) — hope to attract travelers to discover one of Qiannan prefecture's greatest resources: its people.

wealthy coastal folks back here to help us out.

The best comment I heard, however, regarding the value of sister-city relationships was from a Qiannan businessman as we discussed the issue over dinner. He said, “the money is not nearly as important as what sister-city relationships can do for our nation as a people. They have the potential of bringing us together, of helping us understand each other.” Well said. Certainly, those in the central government have this in mind as well. National unity has always been a top priority for China’s leaders; it is also one of the qualities most threatened by severe regional disparity.

Recently I quizzed a senior Qiannan prefecture government official regarding potential down-sides to the sister-city relationships. His greatest concern was the dependence charity tends to breed. The opportunity-cost of what these gifts take away from self-reliant initiative has to be weighed against their contribution.

As wealthy Shenzhen company and government officials — symbols of Deng Xiaoping’s growth strategy, which sacrificed the interior for the coast — blow in and out of the mountain communities for ground-breaking and photo ceremonies, a passive, “we deserve it” attitude undermines solid, much-needed self-initiative. Gifts do not always stimulate responsible action.

To guard against the dependence problem, a Sandu government official told me that Sandu County is currently forming a policy that requires all government cadre below age 30 to spend at least one to two years working as “migrant laborers” on the coast. After the required time period, they can return to Sandu to resume their posts if they fulfill at least one of three conditions: (1) learn a skill they can teach others; (2) bring back capital to their home village or town; and/or, (3) bring back an investor and a project. The rationale is that such “training” not only results in more resources flowing back to Sandu, it hopefully creates a leader who is less likely to passively accept poverty. Instead, having seen the relative prosperity of the coast, he/she will be more enthusiastic about creating change. If the young men or women choose not to come back, their remittance of funds back home alone makes it worthwhile for the county to have them remain on the coast.

From a broader perspective and with potentially more serious consequence, if the short-term fix of sister-city successes combines with national urgencies — e.g., state-owned enterprise reform and the Southeast Asian financial crisis — to distract the central government from pushing forward with comprehensive policies to stimulate growth in China’s interior, sister-city relationships will undermine long-term, necessary change.

Hopefully the sister-city relations will remain a complement to — and not a substitute for — the central

government’s commitment to “persist in the coordinated development among different regions and gradually narrow regional development gaps.” It is early to judge the results of the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

Since I began to investigate the government’s response to its economic disparity dilemma, Deng Xiaoping’s frequent use of the term “common prosperity” to justify his coast-led national development strategy has lingered in my mind.

During this last month, I visited two extremes of this great country — Shenzhen and Sandu County — that have been brought together through a government-directed sister-city relationship. Coastal Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, with its average annual economic growth of 45 percent (!) and per-capita GNP at 488 percent of the national level, boggles the mind. Sandu County is equally astonishing: locked away in Guizhou’s mountains, with per-capita GNP less than 45 percent of the national level, where at least half of the people cannot read and thousands do not have enough food to eat and clothes to wear. Several times — somewhere between Shenzhen’s Hard Rock Cafe and the bus ride through Sandu’s craggy mountains — I thought to myself, “How can China’s leaders even speak of a ‘common prosperity’?”

As Shenzhen Hope School’s principal and I leaned over the railing outside his third-floor office, delighting in the hundreds of poor school children as they skipped and played below us — the beneficiaries of Shenzhen, Inc. — I asked him: “What about Deng Xiaoping’s phrase ‘common prosperity’ that I read in the school’s inscription? Do you actually believe Sandu County will ever catch up to Shenzhen?”

“There will always be distance between us and Shenzhen,” the school principal replied. Then he thought for a long awhile as he looked over the children playing in the courtyard below, and said, “Common prosperity? We may never reach it, but it is something we can strive toward.”

I suppose that as long as those in China’s backwater are aspiring toward common prosperity with their wealthy, coastal cousins, and not burning with resentment, government policy is successfully holding off most of the potential dangers of skewed development. That will give the government more time to address the deeper, more fundamental issues associated with the country’s economic disparity.

Sincerely,





Shenzhen's "mountains" have been built in 20 years.



Guizhou's mountain scenery hasn't changed for thousands of years.

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INSTITUTE FELLOWS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES

ASIA]

Adam Smith Albion. A former research associate at the Institute for EastWest Studies at Prague in the Czech Republic, Adam is studying and writing about the republics of Central Asia, and their importance as actors within and without the former Soviet bloc. A Harvard graduate (1988; History), Adam has completed the first year of a two-year M. Litt. Degree in Russian/East European history and languages at Oxford University. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

Christopher P. Ball. An economist, Chris Ball holds a B.A. from the University of Alabama in Huntsville and attended the 1992 International Summer School at the London School of Economics. He studied Hungarian for two years in Budapest while serving as Project Director for the Hungarian Atlantic Council. As an Institute Fellow, he is studying and writing about Hungarian minorities in the former Soviet-bloc nations of East and Central Europe. [EUROPE/RUSSIA]

Shelly Renae Browning. A surgeon specializing in ears and hearing, Dr. Browning is studying the approaches of traditional healers among the Aborigines of Australia and the indigenous peoples of Vanuatu to hearing loss and ear problems. She won her B.S. in Chemistry at the University of the South, studied physician/patient relationships in China and Australia on a Thomas J. Watson Fellowship and won her M.D. at Emory University in Atlanta. Before her ICWA fellowship, she was a Fellow in Skull-Base Surgery in Montreal at McGill University's Department of Otolaryngology. [SOUTH

Chenoa Egawa. An enrolled member of the Lummi Indian Nation, Chenoa is spending two years living among mesoAmerican Indians, studying successful and not-so-successful cooperative organizations designed to help the Indians market their manufactures, agricultural products and crafts without relying on middlemen. A former trade specialist for the American Indian Trade and Development Council of the Pacific Northwest, Chenoa's B.A. is in International Business and Spanish from the University of Washington in Seattle. [THE AMERICAS]

Paige Evans. A playwright and former Literary Manager of the Manhattan Theatre Club in New York City, Paige is looking at Cuba through the lens of its performing arts. With a History/Literature B.A. from Harvard, she has served as counselor at the Buckhorn Children's Center in Buckhorn, Kentucky (1983-84), as Arts Editor of the International Courier in Rome, Italy (1985-86), and as an adjunct professor teaching a course in Contemporary American Playwrights at New York University. She joined the Manhattan Theatre Club in 1990. [THE AMERICAS]

Marc Michaelson. A program manager for Save the Children in The Gambia, Marc has moved across Africa to the Horn, there to assess nation-building in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and (conditions permitting) availing and unavailing humanitarian efforts in northern Somalia and southern Sudan. With a B.A. in political science from Tufts, a year of non-degree study at the London School

of Economics and a Master's in International Peace Studies from Notre Dame, he describes his postgraduate years as "seven years' experience in international development programming and peace research." [sub-SAHARA]

Randi Movich. The current John Miller Musser Memorial Forest & Society Fellow, Randi is spending two years in Guinea, West Africa, studying and writing about the ways in which indigenous women use forest resources for reproductive health. With a B.A. in biology from the University of California at Santa Cruz and a Master of Science degree in Forest Resources from the University of Idaho, Randi is building on two years' experience as a Peace Corps agroforestry extension agent in the same region of Guinea where she will be living as a Fellow with her husband, Jeff Fields — also the holder of an Idaho Master's in Forest Resources. [sub-SAHARA]

Daniel B. Wright. A sinologist with a Master's Degree in International Relations from the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Dan's fellowship immerses him in southwest China's Guizhou Province, where he, his journalist-wife Shou Guowei, and their two children (Margaret and Jon) will base themselves for two years in the city of Duyun. Previously a specialist on Asian and Chinese affairs for the Washington consulting firm of Andreae, Vick & Associates, Dan also studied Chinese literature at Beijing University and holds a Master of Divinity degree from Fuller Theological Seminary of Pasadena, California. [EAST ASIA]

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