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PAR-16  
The Greek Cypriot Election--I

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6 February 1986

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Dear Peter,

In mid-January, 1985, Spyros Kyprianou flew to New York to meet with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denктаş and UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. In a session that the UN official expected to last no more than an hour, the leaders of the two Cypriot communities were expected to sign a draft agreement that had been painstakingly constructed over the preceding months; then, they would begin discussions on the manner in which some of the more important blanks would be filled in and thereby attempt to prepare the way for working groups to hammer out the remaining details. On the 17th, when Kyprianou declined to sign the agreement as presented and indicated that he considered everything in the document open to renegotiation, Denктаş denounced him for negotiating in bad faith; Perez de Cuellar and his aides betrayed pique; and, for once, the world press took the Turkish side. Within a week, a new joke was making the rounds in southern Cyprus.

There was, so the story goes, a dinner party in New York City. Those present included members of the American, the Soviet, and the Cypriot delegations to the United Nations. All concerned had a bit too much to drink, and they soon began boasting of their respective country's accomplishments. One American observed, "A few years ago, in my country, we had a baby born without arms. Our scientists designed plastic arms for the child, and now he is the best basketball player in the world!" One of the Russian guests responded, "That's nothing! We had a child born without feet. Our engineers designed plastic feet for the kid, and today he's the best football player in the world." Not to be outdone, the sole Cypriot present added his two cents. "You haven't seen anything yet!" he contended. "In Cyprus, we had a baby born without brains; we sent him to the gymnasium and, then, on to the university; and now he's our President!"

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Now that the Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections have been held and Kyprianou has achieved a victory of sorts, most Greek Cypriot observers are prepared to acknowledge that their President may well have learned a thing or two at the gymnasium and the university. But they still tell the joke--for it is not at all clear that, in the course of his studies, Spyros Kyprianou learned the most needful thing. When the foreign correspondent of a leading Turkish newspaper mentioned to me that he expected to cross to the North soon to interview Rauf Denktaş, I wagered that the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would be even more pleased with Kyprianou's performance at the polls than Kyprianou himself. I won that bet hands down.

## I


The current President of the Republic of Cyprus was born in Limassol, attended primary and secondary schools on the island, and then travelled to London in the early 1950s to study law at the Inns of Court. There, the young man performed an additional function: he served as the chosen representative of Archbishop Makarios III's Ethnarchy Council; and, from an undistinguished office located in the vicinity of Euston Station, he disseminated propaganda calling for the unification (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece.

When Britain granted Cyprus its independence, Kyprianou returned home and took up new duties as the infant republic's foreign minister. In this capacity, for a period of eleven years, he attended sessions of the United Nations, Commonwealth gatherings, and meetings of the Nonaligned Conference; normally, he accompanied Archbishop Makarios on the latter's many trips to Europe and to the new nations of the post-colonial world; and, though he never really emerged from the shadow cast by the Cypriot Republic's formidable first President, the young lawyer from Limassol became relatively well known both on the island and in the larger world. As the author of what is arguably the most perceptive book on the Cyprus question puts it: by May, 1971, when the Greek Colonels successfully brought pressure on the Archbishop to oust his loyal aide, Kyprianou's "many foreign trips with Makarios and his frequent appearances as Cypriot Foreign Minister in the United Nations debates had given him a standing that his own abilities might not otherwise have secured. The man who was eventually to succeed Makarios as President never gave the impression of great intelligence or political acumen. But he was a stubborn lawyer who could stick to his brief."<sup>1</sup>

Kyprianou's actual succession was an accident. Prior to 1976, the lawyer and former RAF pilot Glafkos Klerides had been Makarios' righthand man--at least in the Parliament and in electoral affairs. For sixteen years, Klerides had served as President of the Parliament and, in the absence of the Archbishop, as Acting President of the Republic. For last eight years of that period, he had been the Greek Cypriot intercommunal negotiator charged with conducting the discussions aimed at reaching a settlement with the Turkish

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1. Stanley Mayes, Makarios: A Biography (London 1981) 221.

Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas. He was arguably the one noncommunist leader with sufficient standing within the Greek Cypriot community to be capable of posing a political threat to the Archbishop himself, and that was doubly true after the fateful summer of 1974.



#### **Glafkos Klerides at his DYSY Office<sup>2</sup>**

When the regime of the Colonels in Athens collapsed shortly after the Turkish invasion of the island in mid-July, 1974, Nicos Sampson, the former EOKA assassin whom the Colonels had installed as President when they ousted Makarios, quickly resigned and dropped from sight; and Glafkos Klerides was left holding the bag. George Grivas had died the previous January, but the gunmen of his second underground terrorist organization, the anti-Makarios EOKA-B, remained on the prowl. A considerable number of Greek Cypriot leftists had been killed, and it was clearly unsafe for Makarios to return; so, the President of the Parliament assumed office as Acting President of the Republic. In the months that followed, Klerides played a critical role in restoring the rule of law, in stabilizing the situation on the island, and in minimizing the damage done by the coup d'etat staged by the Colonels and by the Turkish invasion that followed that coup. In the process, he demonstrated that the Archbishop was by no means indispensable: some figures both in Cyprus and abroad (including Rauf Denktas) did not hesitate to argue that the Makarios was the greatest obstacle to peace on the island and that he should be prevented from returning to Cyprus. Klerides appears to have toyed with this notion himself--for, at times during those critical months, he styled himself President of the Republic of Cyprus; and he sometimes suggested that, if the Archbishop were to return and once again assume the supreme political office, he would have to run for the post.

It should not then be surprising that, after Makarios' return, when circumstances became propitious, the Archbishop broke with his lieutenant, secured his resignation as intercommunal negotiator, and installed his loyal

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2. The photographs reproduced in this letter I took myself.

assistant, the former EOKA leader Tassos Papadopoulos, in his stead.<sup>3</sup> Nor should it inspire wonder that he then organized a coalition of parties to prevent Klerides and his followers from securing any seats in the new parliament elected in September, 1976. Here, Ezekias Papaioannou of the Cypriot communist Party AKEL, Vassos Lyssarides of the island's Baathist-model Socialist Party EDEK, and Spyros Kyprianou with his newly formed Democratic Party (DIKO) were the Archbishop's chosen instruments. The strategy worked: despite the opposition of Makarios, Klerides' Democratic Rally (DYSY) gained 24.1% of the vote--but, in the absence of a scheme of proportional representation, it failed to elect a single deputy. By the time that Makarios died unexpectedly on the 3rd of August, 1977, Kyprianou had supplanted Klerides as President of the Parliament; and, therefore, in accordance with the dictates of the constitution, he became Acting President of the Republic.

Spyros Kyprianou is still a relatively young man as Greek Cypriot politicians go--but, even in earlier years, his health was poor. Between 1971 and 1976, the future President suffered more than one heart attack; and, again, shortly before Makarios' death, he was apparently in ill health. He had even announced that he would be retiring from politics within the next week or two, and he was expected to resign from Parliament and to take up an ambassadorship. But, when the opportunity presented itself, he did not hesitate to become a candidate for the Presidency; and, since the right was divided and the leaders of AKEL were prepared to throw their considerable support to him in a bid to prevent Klerides from seizing the leadership, Kyprianou was virtually bound to win. As it worked out in the end, he ran early in 1978 unopposed: Klerides had welcomed into DYSY a number of individuals who had been involved in EOKA-B and who had joined the shortlived Sampson government, and he could therefore easily be tarred with their brush. When Kyprianou's son was kidnapped in December, 1977 in the midst of the campaign (purportedly by some former members of EOKA-B), Klerides' position

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3. When I questioned Klerides about his quarrel with the Archbishop, he (perhaps understandably) made no mention of his assumption of the Presidential title during the events of 1974. Instead, he emphasized suspicions bred of outside intervention in Klerides' favor. He told me that, at the Helsinki Conference, Gerald Ford, Giscard d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt all suggested to Makarios that Cyprus might be better off without a Greek Orthodox Archbishop as its President. When Makarios concurred but added that there was as yet no one on the scene really capable of filling his shoes, they all suggested Glafkos Klerides. Makarios flew back as far as Athens in the company of Greek President Constantine Karamanlis--who later told Klerides that the Archbishop kept asking him over and over why all three men had urged him to resign in favor of Klerides. Not long thereafter, in February, 1976, when it became evident that Klerides had exceeded his instructions as intercommunal negotiator and had given Rauf Denktaş advance notification of the contents of a Greek Cypriot offer, the leaders of the two leftist parties denounced him as a "traitor." When Makarios declined to back him up, Klerides resigned. No one whom I met seriously believes that this event was anything more than the occasion for the split.



**Spyros Kyprianou, President of the  
Republic of Cyprus**

became untenable and he withdrew from the race.<sup>4</sup> Kyprianou was then subsequently re-elected to the Presidency in February, 1983 with 56.54% of the votes--this time with AKEL support in a race against Klerides and Lyssarides.

II

In one regard, Kyprianou has had an easy time. Though the division of the island wreaked havoc with its economy, the Greek Cypriots quickly recovered their balance: Makarios died in the midst of a boom that still continues today. Despite all that they have suffered, the Greeks of Cyprus are now once again considerably better off than their brethren in Hellas--and the incumbent President has been able to take a share of the credit for his compatriots' accomplishments. No one can accuse his government of grossly mismanaging the economy.

In other regards, Kyprianou's task has been less easy. Makarios was a devious man generally inclined to play all ends against the middle. Decisive

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4. Klerides supporters insist that the kidnapping was an act of political theater staged by Kyprianou himself: I have been unable to secure independent confirmation of this claim, but I suspect that there may be something to it. Kyprianou is not at all scrupulous in his dealings as a politician: on the eve of the 1983 Presidential election, the Athenian tabloid Ethnos--which appears to be a KGB front (see PAR-13)--concocted a story claiming that Klerides had become a Nazi collaborator after his plane had been shot down over Europe, and the DIKO paper in Nicosia immediately reprinted the tale.

action was never his forte; he preferred to wait until opportunity knocked. In general, he tried to prolong negotiations and to keep all his options open for as long as possible. Thus, for example, in the period from 1968 to 1974, he carefully avoided giving Turkey occasion for intervention on the island and managed to keep the intercommunal talks with Rauf Denktaş alive without ever committing himself to an agreement; and, though he had once conceded that enosis--while "desirable"--was "not feasible," he more than once hinted that this unfortunate situation was temporary, and he still spoke of enosis as "my deep national aspiration." There is every reason to suspect that Makarios' flexibility was tactical only.

On his election as Archbishop of Nicosia on the 18th of October, 1950, Makarios III had sworn, "I take the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never waiver from our policy of annexing Cyprus to mother Greece." In an interview published in the mainland Greek press nearly twenty years later, at a time when the intercommunal talks were underway, Makarios pledged, "I shall never violate my oath, and I shall never deviate from my goal. I have desired ENOSIS, and I have never struggled for anything else other than its achievement." In a speech delivered at Yialousa on the 14th of May, 1971, he chanted, "Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of its history, and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece." On the 29th of October, he issued a statement concerning the internal situation on the island: "I can now disclose that I have stated clearly and categorically to Greek Governments from time to time that I would unhesitatingly proclaim ENOSIS, if I had the consent to this end, that is if Greece were prepared to accept ENOSIS and share the responsibilities for the repercussions from such a venture." And, in an interview published in the French magazine Le Point on the 19th of February, 1973, he made his position clear once again: "If I have any ambitions, my greatest ambition would be for my name to be associated with ENOSIS."<sup>5</sup>

After his return to Cyprus in December, 1974, Makarios once again pursued a two-track course. On the one hand, he spoke of "the long struggle" that his people would have to undertake in order to oust the mainland Turks from the island and achieve "a just solution" to the Cypriot problem. On the other hand, when Rauf Denktaş wrote to him on the 9th of January, 1977, deploring the fact that "generations of Greeks and Turks are growing [up] who regard each other as enemies" and suggesting a meeting at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the UN Buffer Zone, he accepted the suggestion right away.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, when the two men did finally get together on the 27th of January and again on the 12th of February (their first face-to-face encounters in thirteen years), Makarios was willing to join Denktaş in endorsing four guidelines designed to provide the basis for further negotiations:

1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal republic.

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5. See Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute 27.

6. For the text of Denktaş' letter, see Necati Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute, 2nd edition (Nicosia 1984) 277.

2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land-ownership.
3. Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal state and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.<sup>7</sup>

For a brief moment, it appeared that a settlement was at hand: Makarios indicated to Denktas that he was ready to accept a bi-zonal division of the island and to concede 25% or more to the Turks. But, within six weeks, the Greek Cypriot intercommunal negotiator Tassos Papadopoulos was advancing territorial proposals that would have left the Turks with no more than 20% of the island (and not much of any real value at that). In June, Makarios began harping once again on the UN resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of all Turkish troops from the island and for the return of all the refugees to their homes. By late July, he was once again speaking in fiery tones of "the long struggle" ahead.

Kurt Waldheim, who attended the Makarios-Denktaş meetings in his capacity as UN Secretary-General, speaks of the events of 1977 in his recently published memoirs, In the Eye of the Storm:

Our discussion [at the Ledra Palace summit] started at seven o'clock in the evening, and we really seemed to be making substantial progress on the basis of an independent, single, non-aligned federal state. Only Makarios had the necessary authority to depart from what had for years been his government's stated position.

It looked like a real breakthrough at last. The negotiations were prolonged. Dinner had been arranged and there came a point when Denktash shouted that he was hungry. Makarios said "No," he wanted to continue with the talks.

My own contribution was to order a huge plate of sandwiches and beer, and Denktash wolfed the lot. Makarios had a glass of orange juice. Thus fortified, we even drew up a four-point memorandum that appeared to provide solutions to the constitutional and administrative problems, freedom of movement and the powers and functions of central government.

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7. For the document, see Z. M. Nejatigil, Our Republic in Perspective (Nicosia 1985) 25-26.

But soon we realised that even Makarios had gone too far for his hard-line supporters. When the next round of talks was held back in Vienna, all I heard was a sterile repetition of all the previous points of contention. It seemed pointless to go on.<sup>8</sup>

Waldheim is correct in observing that many Greek Cypriots supporters were persuaded that their President had conceded far too much.<sup>9</sup> But the former UN leader neglects one vital dimension of the matter. Makarios' ambivalence was due to much more than his domestic political difficulties; it was also arguably a reflection of his double position: on the one hand, he was Archbishop and Ethnarch of the island's Greek Orthodox community; on the other hand, he was President of a modern, liberal, multi-ethnic, multi-religious republic. As Glafkos Klerides remarked to me in the course of our conversations this past December, the Archbishop-Ethnarch often found it hard to stomach what the President was called upon to do.

One event illustrates the Cypriot President's difficulties with particular clarity. In his capacity as the leader of the autocephalous Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church, Makarios III had the right, granted his archepiscopal predecessors by the Byzantine Emperor Zeno in the 5th century A.D., to sign documents in the same red ink that the Emperor had himself employed. According to an article published in the Greek Cypriot daily Phileleftheros three days after the Archbishop's death, Makarios made a pledge in late June, 1977 that "the signature in red ink will never be put under an agreement that will give even a piece of stone to the Turks." After making this statement, the Archbishop allegedly walked to the window of his palace and pointed to the statue of his predecessor Archbishop Kyprianou, who was executed by the island's Turkish governor in 1821 when the news reached Nicosia that the War of Independence had begun in Greece. "Even if I wanted to," Makarios explained, "he does not allow me to put my signature in red ink." When he died early in August, 1977, the first President of the Republic of Cyprus left Spyros Kyprianou a legacy of tactical flexibility and strategic intransigence.

The ambivalent posture he unexpectedly inherited that day has been a source of endless trouble for Makarios' successor. Waldheim observes that Kyprianou was "inclined to be more unyielding in negotiations" than his predecessor; characteristically, the former UN leader ascribes this to the fact that "he was less sure of his electoral support" than the Archbishop had been. One seasoned and relatively impartial observer of Cypriot affairs takes another view: he describes Kyprianou as "a diehard Enotist."<sup>10</sup> The evidence suggests that he is right and that Kyprianou lacks the tactical skills so often evidenced by Makarios. Early in 1977, the President of the Greek Cypriot Parliament tried diligently to dissuade his master from signing the

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8. I have not yet been able to lay my hands on a copy of Waldheim's book. Here, I am quoting excerpts that appeared in The Cyprus Weekly, 13-19 December, 1985.

9. For the arguments employed, see Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980 (London 1980) 205-207.

10. Mayes, Makarios 221.

agreement with Denktas that has formed the basis for negotiations ever since; and, shortly after assuming office, Kyprianou backed away from the Archbishop's commitment to the establishment of a bi-zonal (as opposed to a multi-zonal) republic.<sup>11</sup> Later, when Denktas proposed opening up the posh Famagusta suburb Varosha to Greek occupation in exchange for re-opening Nicosia International Airport for the use of tourists and others wanting to visit the North as well as the South, Kyprianou turned him down flat; and then, when the Greek Cypriot hotel-keepers and restaurant-owners from Varosha kicked up a fuss, he devised a counter-proposal that was self-evidently unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. Only when under pressure on the home front has he proved willing to consider anything but "the long struggle"; and, even then, his proposals have been aimed at mollifying his domestic critics and not at achieving any sort of lasting settlement with the island's Turks.

This was evident in 1979. The intercommunal talks broke down in 1978 over the question of bi-zonality; and, when Makarios' intercommunal negotiator Tassos Papadopoulos quarreled with Kyprianou resigned his position, charging that the new President was in fact opposed to the talks, he was not replaced. In due course, Kyprianou came under severe pressure both at home and from abroad; and, in late May, 1979, Kurt Waldheim managed to get the talks started again on the basis of the following ten-point formula:

1. It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.
2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktas guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the U.N. resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.
3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.
4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under U.N. auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, all matters relating thereto will be discussed.
8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole

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11. See Mayes, Makarios 273, and Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute 46-48, 279-285.

or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.

9. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.

10. The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.<sup>12</sup>

The talks collapsed a month later: Denktas̄ insisted on bi-zonality, arguing that the Turkish Cypriots' need for security ruled out their dispersal into a series of isolated cantons, but Kyprianou was no more willing to accept bi-zonality than he had been in the past. Finally, in August, 1980, the Turkish Cypriots were able to persuade the Greek Cypriot leadership to concede the point; and, in his opening statement, the UN Secretary-General included two pertinent observations:

- Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem.
- Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole.

That very day, Kyprianou made a public statement in Nicosia denying that his government had made any "advance commitment." As he put it, "It has been argued that since the opening statement contains the word bi-zonal, we have committed ourselves with regard to this term. First of all, we have not undertaken any commitment and everything is open for discussion as stressed in the statement itself.... It is not at all correct to say that we have accepted bi-zonality. We have not done so." The next day, Denktas̄ denounced Kyprianou as "a lying machine" and "a shortsighted Enosis puppet."


Eventually, George Ioannides, Tassos Papadopoulos' replacement as Greek Cypriot interlocutor, gave vent to frustration and accused his own government of "amateurism and offhandedness" in its handling of the talks. He intimated that the constant maneuvering of the various Greek Cypriot politicians was making proper negotiations impossible, and he suggested that an all-party administration be established--but this came to naught. Finally, in April, 1982, when Kyprianou made a formal alliance with AKEL in preparation for the 1983 Presidential elections, Ioannides resigned.<sup>13</sup> Up to that time, though the two sides had exchanged views on numerous occasions, there had been no real movement in the talks since Makarios' death.

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12. For the text, see Nejatigil, Our Republic in Perspective 31.

13. Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute 368, 370-374, 468-469.

## III

Spyros Kyprianou's most recent troubles began in the Fall of 1983 when his Foreign Minister Nikos Rolandis resigned over the President's unwillingness to give UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar his full cooperation in the latter's attempt to narrow the differences separating the two sides. Rolandis had been Foreign Minister since 1978; and, though more inclined to be conciliatory than his President, he had been willing to implement Kyprianou's policy. But, as he explained to me on the eve of the



### Nikos Rolandis in his Study

recent elections, he received a shock in March, 1983 when he journeyed to New Delhi to attend the Non-aligned Conference. Prior to that meeting, the non-aligned countries had consistently taken the Greek side in the Cyprus dispute. In its official statement, the Conference did so once again. But, in the drafting committee, a series of diplomats--representing countries such as Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, Senegal, the Comoros, the Maldives Islands, and the like--rose to denounce the Kyprianou government. Rolandis found this alarming; and, since he was on good terms with Boudros Ghali, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, he asked him to find out what was going on. "He sniffed around a bit, came back, and told me that the Saudis were behind it; every one of the countries ranged against us was a recipient of Saudi aid," he explained. "Right then," he added, "I recognized that time was working against us." Eventually, the Islamic countries would rally to the Turkish Cypriot cause.

When he returned to Nicosia, Rolandis tried to persuade Kyprianou that "the long struggle" could end only in defeat and that it was essential to reach an accommodation with the Turkish Cypriots soon--before the inevitable erosion of international support for the Greek Cypriot side. "I warned him that Denktas might soon declare independence," he told me. "I argued that there was no practical way to implement the UN resolutions. His expectations were unrealistic." In August, 1983, when Perez de Cuellar expressed a desire to pursue negotiations within the frame of certain "indicators" designed to

clarify just how far each side was willing to go in order to reach a compromise, Rolandis urged the President to welcome the suggestion. As he put it, "I felt that the effort was a plausible effort, and I considered it extremely counter-productive to reject the initiative. As for Kyprianou, well, he was not negative in public. He neither accepted nor rejected the initiative, but, in practice, he was unwilling to make any commitments regarding what was acceptable to us. We discussed the matter in depth; I disagreed; and, on the 20th of September, I resigned. In my letter of resignation, which I released to the press, I predicted that Denktas would make a unilateral declaration of independence."

Rolandis' prediction was soon borne out by events. Two months later, on the 15th of November, the Turkish Cypriots made a formal declaration of independence, and Turkey immediately extended diplomatic recognition to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. There were rumors that Bangladesh and Pakistan would soon follow suit; and, when they failed to do so right away, word spread that Ankara had counselled delay.

Meanwhile, in Nicosia, Kyprianou's rivals had a field-day, and his allies in AKEL expressed considerable displeasure at the President's failure to head off the declaration. It was deemed essential to freeze the situation, to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from articulating the institutions of their new state, and, most important, to stop Denktas from actively pursuing diplomatic recognition by members of the Islamic bloc. Much to his chagrin, Kyprianou found it necessary to accept and give full support to the Secretary-General in launching a new initiative. As a consequence, the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus held three rounds of proximity talks in the Fall of 1984. In early November, the United States brought pressure to bear on all concerned; and, later in the month, when the Secretary-General presented the two sides with a draft agreement, Rauf Denktas surprised everyone by accepting it without reservations on the spot.

This left Spyros Kyprianou in a quandary. Rather than be trapped into a settlement based on the acceptance of "the equal political status of the two communities" and legitimizing the division of the island into two ethnic cantons, he torpedoed the January, 1985 summit in New York.<sup>14</sup> On Cyprus, both in the North and in the South, the euphoria of December gave way to anguish, and anger soon followed. It was a particularly difficult month for Kyprianou. From the outset, Andreas Papandreou had been critical of Kyprianou's alliance with AKEL. On the 22nd of December, the Greek Cypriot President had bowed to the pressure exerted by the Greek Prime Minister, and he had abrogated the alliance and dismissed the communist ministers from his cabinet. This left him particularly vulnerable after the failure of the summit. In February, AKEL took its revenge by joining hands with the conservative party DYSY. That month, a majority of the members of the Greek Cypriot parliament, falling just short of the two-thirds needed to amend the constitution and provide the means for Kyprianou's ouster, voted no confidence in his Presidency. When Kyprianou refused to resign, a deadlock ensued--which the elections held this past December were designed to break. The only issue given serious discussion

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14. For the draft agreement, see Nejatigil, Our Republic in Perspective 195-199.

in the course of the campaign was whether Spyros Kyprianou should remain in office; and, though AKEL and DYSY secured between them 61% of the vote, their failure to gain the number of seats required for Kyprianou's forcible retirement meant in practice that he would remain President until February, 1988.

## IV

That prospect suits Rauf Denktaş perfectly. With considerable justification, he argues that any conceivable settlement would be viewed by the Greek Cypriots as a provisional arrangement preparatory to the ultimate achievement of enosis. And he presumably has an additional reason for preferring that the current deadlock persist: no one on the island seriously supposes that Rauf Denktaş is willing to be Vice-President to Spyros Kyprianou or to anyone else.

But it is essential to keep in mind that the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not a free agent. The authorities in Ankara want a settlement, and they hold all the cards: they can quite easily force the Turkish Cypriots to make concessions to the island's Greeks. For Turkey, Cyprus is an albatross: the dispute poisons her relations with Greece and with the states of Europe, and it places obstacles in the way of her securing the military and financial aid from the United States and elsewhere that she desperately needs. If they could negotiate an agreement that would effectively rule out enosis forever, thereby prevent Greece from securing an unsinkable aircraft carrier just forty miles off Turkey's Mediterranean coast, and, at the same time, provide the Turkish Cypriot community with security, well-being, and a modicum of autonomy, the mainland Turks would be prepared to fold their tents and to withdraw all but a token military force from the island.

Rauf Denktaş and his associates remember the long years when Ankara left the Turkish Cypriots pretty much to fend for themselves: they fear that the island's Turks will be abandoned once again, and they take consolation in the fact that Denktaş' opposite number will always find a way to weasel out of any possible deal--if necessary at the last possible second and in a clumsy manner that will undermine international support for the Cypriot Greeks and justify Turkey in the eyes of the world. Denktaş does not hesitate to display the genuine contempt he feels for Kyprianou, but he is also grateful that the Greek Cypriot leader refused to sign the draft agreement in January, 1985, and he has done his best to return the favor. During the recent electoral campaign, the Turkish Cypriot leader did everything he could to undermine Greek Cypriot support for Kyprianou's chief rival Glafkos Klerides.

Sincerely,  
  
Paul A. Rahe